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Category: Speeches

  • Ian Murray – 2026 Statement on UK Biobank Data

    Ian Murray – 2026 Statement on UK Biobank Data

    The statement made by Ian Murray, the Minister for Digital Government and Data, in the House of Commons on 23 April 2026.

    With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will make a statement about the use of UK Biobank data.

    UK Biobank is a non-profit charity, independent of Government. The Biobank brings together data, kindly donated by its volunteer participants, that is shared with accredited researchers globally to make significant scientific discoveries that improve patient health. That includes discovering genes that affect the risk of heart disease or cancer, identifying new ways of predicting dementia, identifying early warning signs for cancers, understanding immunity to covid-19, and work towards earlier detection of Parkinson’s. It is one of the most successful and important studies of its type, and it continues to benefit patients in the UK and around the world. We are all grateful to those individuals who are part of this landmark study that is so important for all of our health.

    On Monday 20 April, the UK Biobank charity informed the Government that it had identified that its data had been advertised for sale by several sellers on Alibaba’s e-commerce platforms in China. Biobank told us that three listings that appeared to sell UK Biobank participation data had been identified. At least one of the three datasets appeared to contain data from all 500,000 UK Biobank volunteers. Additional listings offered support for applying for legitimate access to UK Biobank data or analytical support for researchers who already have access to the data. I want to reassure the House up front, however, that Biobank has advised that this data did not contain participants’ names, addresses, contact details or telephone numbers. The Government have spoken to the vendor today and they do not believe that there were any purchases from the three listings before they were taken down.

    Once the Government were made aware of the situation, we took immediate action to protect participants’ data. First, we worked with Biobank, the Chinese Government and the vendor to ensure that the three listings that UK Biobank informed us included participant data had been removed. I want to thank the Chinese Government for the speed and seriousness with which they worked with us to help remove the listings and the ongoing work to remove any further listings. Secondly, we ensured that the Biobank charity revoked access to the three research institutions identified as the source of the information. Thirdly, we have asked that the Biobank charity pauses further access to its data until it has put in place a technical solution to prevent data from its current platform from being downloaded in this way again. I can confirm to the House that this pause is now in place. UK Biobank has also referred itself to the Information Commissioner’s Office.

    We are still working with Biobank to ascertain from it the specific detail of what has happened. We have asked it to investigate how this data ended up for sale online as a priority, but I wanted to ensure that the House was aware of the incident and the action that the Government are taking.

    Officials have been in regular contact with UK Biobank since the Government were made aware of the issue on Monday. I personally spoke to the chief executive and chair last night, alongside the Minister of State for Science and the Minister for Health Innovation and Safety. We have received assurances that the charity will conduct a rapid board-level review of the safeguards in place for accessing its data.

    As I mentioned, in the short term, Biobank will suspend downloads from its platform. That is until a new system is brought in to control analysis downloads to approved researchers and will significantly enhance data access controls and safeguards. We have advised the chair and chief executive of Biobank to write to all participants as soon as possible to ensure that they are aware of what has happened.

    In summary, and to be clear to the House and to those people affected, the charity has assured us that the data did not contain anybody’s names, addresses or contact details. It includes only data of people who have explicitly opted in to be part of the Biobank. Those are people who have given their explicit consent that this data can be used, in the knowledge that it will be shared with researchers globally.

    Participants have done a great service to the people of this country, and human health globally, through their participation. For example, valuable research is being carried out at McGill University in Canada into chronic pain, which afflicts millions of people here in the UK. We expect UK Biobank to remain one of the leading health research resources.

    This has been an unacceptable abuse of the UK Biobank charity’s data, and an abuse of the trust that participants rightly expect when sharing their data for research purposes. The Government take the incident extremely seriously, which is why we have acted rapidly to support the UK Biobank charity in its response and why I wanted to update the House at the earliest opportunity.

    The Government will soon be issuing new guidance on control of data from research studies. I take this opportunity once again to urge all businesses and charities to ensure that that their systems and data-sharing processes are as secure as possible. We wrote to businesses last week about the cyber-security tools available to them—for free—from the Government and the steps they should take to maximise security. Ensuring the safe use of UK data is a priority for the Government. I commend this statement to the House.

  • Anna Turley – 2026 Comments on Jeremy Corbyn and Antisemitism

    Anna Turley – 2026 Comments on Jeremy Corbyn and Antisemitism

    The comments made by Anna Turley, the Labour Party chair, on 23 April 2026.

    Zack Polanski’s rewriting of history is beyond the pale. Not only is it downright offensive, but it is completely wrong.

    Labour has a proud tradition as an anti-racist party. But under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, we endured the most shameful period in our history and the equalities watchdog found that we had acted unlawfully in our discrimination and harassment of the Jewish community.

    For Polanski to dismiss that as ‘propaganda’ shows his own determination to court the worst of the worst into his own ranks.

    Keir Starmer booted the antisemites out of the Labour party when he became leader. The Greens have now opened their arms to them. The contrast could not be clearer.

  • Ed Davey – 2026 Speech on Security Vetting

    Ed Davey – 2026 Speech on Security Vetting

    The speech made by Ed Davey, the Leader of the Liberal Democrats, in the House of Commons on 20 April 2026.

    It is 2022 all over again. Back then, when the Prime Minister was in opposition, and when it was Boris Johnson who was accused of misleading Parliament and scapegoating senior officials, the then Leader of the Opposition could not have been clearer; he said:

    “The public need to know that not all politicians are the same—that not all politicians put themselves above their country—and that honesty, integrity and accountability matter.”—[Official Report, 25 May 2022; Vol. 715, c. 298.]

    He promised “change”. He promised to

    “break this cycle and stop the chaos.”

    He promised a Government with

    “more focus on long-term strategy, not the short-term distractions that can animate Westminster.”

    I am afraid that the fact that he has even had to make a statement today shows how badly he has failed—how badly he has let down the millions of people across our country who are so desperate for change.

    The Prime Minister blames his officials. He says that he had “no idea”. He gives every impression of a Prime Minister in office, but not in power. The facts remain, even by his own account, that the Prime Minister appointed Peter Mandelson as ambassador to the United States even after he had been warned about his relationship with Jeffrey Epstein. The Prime Minister announced the appointment before Mandelson had been vetted, despite the clear risk to national security of putting someone unsuitable in that role. One of his top officials, just three weeks into the job, clearly believed that the Prime Minister wanted Mandelson to be appointed regardless of what the vetting process turned up. The Prime Minister has relied on the vetting process to defend his decisions, so why did he ask so few questions personally about the vetting process?

    We all know the truth: the Prime Minister knew that appointing Mandelson was an enormous risk, but he decided that it was a risk worth taking—a catastrophic error of judgment. Now that has blown up in his face, the only decent thing to do is take responsibility. Back in 2022, the Prime Minister rightly accused Boris Johnson of expecting others to take the blame while he clung on. That was not acceptable then, and it is not acceptable now. I hope that the Prime Minister can at least tell the House this. We will be listening very carefully to his answer. Was he given advice by Simon Case, the then Cabinet Secretary, that the necessary security clearances should be acquired before he confirmed his choice for US ambassador? Did the Prime Minister follow that advice—yes or no?

    After years of chaos under the Conservatives, we needed a Government focused on the interests of the people—the cost of living crisis, the health and care crisis, and our national security. We needed a Government with honesty, integrity and accountability. Will the Prime Minister finally accept that the only way that he can help to deliver that is by resigning?

    The Prime Minister

    I set out in my statement the full facts. In September, when the Bloomberg emails came to light, I asked the then Cabinet Secretary to review the process. He told me that the process was as it should have been, and as soon as the information about the security vetting came to light last Tuesday, I asked for the facts to be established, so that I could update Parliament.

    The right hon. Gentleman asks me about the announcement before developed vetting. He has heard the evidence that I have given to the House from the former Cabinet Secretary and from the former permanent secretary. In relation to the advice from Simon Case, when I asked the former Cabinet Secretary to review the process after September 2025, he specifically addressed whether the process had been followed by referencing the Simon Case letter, and assured me that the process was the right process to have followed. In answer to his question, that was specifically looked at by Sir Chris Wormald in the review that was conducted in September last year.

  • Emily Thornberry – 2026 Speech on Security Vetting

    Emily Thornberry – 2026 Speech on Security Vetting

    The speech made by Emily Thornberry, the Labour MP for Islington South and Finsbury, in the House of Commons on 20 April 2026.

    The truth is that my Committee did ask. We asked on the record, and we got a partial truth that could hardly be the whole truth. We are on record as asking the very questions that hecklers on the Opposition Benches say should have been asked. The answers are there, on the record; people can see what we got when we did ask.

    A month before Mandelson’s appointment was announced, the then Cabinet Secretary advised that the necessary security clearance should be acquired before a political appointment was confirmed. That does not seem to have been the usual practice. I am glad that it has changed, because the process was clearly abused. Someone—probably Peter Mandelson himself—leaked his appointment as US ambassador to the press, which effectively bounced the Government into confirming it. When the confirmation of his appointment came forward, neither the offer letter to Peter Mandelson nor the Government’s press release made it clear that the appointment was subject to vetting. Does it not look as though, for certain members of the Prime Minister’s team, getting Peter Mandelson the job was a priority that overrode everything else, and security considerations were very much second order?

    The Prime Minister

    I thank my right hon. Friend for her question. Her Committee did ask relevant questions, and that is why I have indicated that it was unforgivable that the Foreign Secretary was asked to sign a statement in response to those very questions without being told about the recommendation. The questions were asked; the Foreign Secretary was advised and asked to sign a statement without being told the relevant information. That is unforgivable. As for the appointment before developed vetting, I have changed that process now, so that it can never happen again; my right hon. Friend the Committee Chair heard me quote the evidence of the former Cabinet Secretary and the former permanent secretary in relation to that.

    Let me deal with my right hon. Friend’s third point, which is that somehow Downing Street’s wish to appoint Peter Mandelson overrode security concerns—[Interruption.] No, Mr Speaker, let me be very clear: if I had been told that Peter Mandelson, or anybody else, had failed or not been given clearance on security vetting, I would not have appointed them. A deliberate decision was taken to withhold that material from me. This was not a lack of asking; this was not an oversight—[Interruption.] It was a decision taken not to share that information on repeated occasions.

  • Lindsay Hoyle – 2026 Statement on the Arrest of a Parliamentary Worker under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 Act

    Lindsay Hoyle – 2026 Statement on the Arrest of a Parliamentary Worker under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 Act

    The statement made by Lindsay Hoyle, the Speaker of the House of Commons, on 20 April 2026.

    Before we start today’s business, I want to make a brief statement about a security matter. I have been informed by the police that a former parliamentary employee was arrested last week under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. The police investigation is ongoing. As the House knows, we do not discuss the details of such issues on the Floor of the House—it is an ongoing criminal investigation. I do not intend to take points of order on the matter, and I will update Members when I am in a position to share more information.

  • Kemi Badenoch – 2026 Speech on Security Vetting

    Kemi Badenoch – 2026 Speech on Security Vetting

    The speech made by Kemi Badenoch, the Leader of the Opposition, in the House of Commons on 20 April 2026.

    I thank the Prime Minister for advance sight of his statement. His reputation is at stake, and everyone is watching, so it is finally time for the truth.

    Earlier today, Downing Street admitted that the Prime Minister inadvertently misled the House. The Prime Minister has chosen not to repeat that from the Dispatch Box. I remind him that, under the ministerial code, he has a duty to correct the record at the earliest opportunity. The Prime Minister says he only found out on Tuesday that Peter Mandelson failed the security vetting. The earliest opportunity to correct the record was Prime Minister’s questions on Wednesday, almost a week ago. This is a breach of the ministerial code. Under that code, he is bound to be as open as possible with Parliament and the public in answering questions today, so let me start with what we do know.

    We know the Prime Minister personally appointed Peter Mandelson to be our ambassador to the United States. We know that Mandelson had a close relationship with a convicted paedophile. We know that he had concerning links with Russia and China—links that had already raised red flags. We know that the Prime Minister announced the appointment before vetting was complete—an extraordinary and unprecedented step for the role of US ambassador.

    The Prime Minister says that it was “usual” because it was a political appointment, so I remind him, and the rest of the Labour Front Bench who are heckling, that Peter Mandelson was a politician who had been sacked twice from Government for lying. That meant he should have gone through the full security process. We also know that when Peter Mandelson failed the security vetting, he was allowed to continue in the role with access to top secret intelligence and security information. This goes beyond propriety and ethics; this is a matter of national security.

    Let me turn to what we do not know. We still do not know exactly why Peter Mandelson failed that vetting. We do not know what risks our country was exposed to. We do not know how it is possible that the Prime Minister said repeatedly that this was a failure of vetting, went on television and said things that were blatantly incorrect, and not a single adviser or official told him that what he was saying was not true. At every turn, with every explanation, the Government story has become murkier and more contradictory. It is time for the truth.

    There are too many questions to ask in the allotted time, so I will ask the Prime Minister just six. I have taken the unprecedented step of providing these questions to the Prime Minister in advance, so he has them in front of him. I have asked for these questions to be put online for the public. They and I expect him to answer.

    The Prime Minister appointed a national security risk to our most sensitive diplomatic post. Let us look at how this happened. The right hon. and learned Gentleman told me at PMQs in September 2025 that

    “full due process was followed”—[Official Report, 10 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 859.]

    in this appointment. We now know that in November 2024, Lord Case, the then Cabinet Secretary, told him that this process required security vetting to be done before the appointment. He did not mention any of what Lord Case said in his statement earlier. First, does the Prime Minister accept that when he said on the Floor of the House that “full due process was followed”, that was not true?

    Secondly, on 11 September last year, journalists asked his director of communications if it was true that Mandelson had failed security vetting. These allegations were on the front page of a national newspaper, and yet No. 10 did not deny the story—why?

    Thirdly, will the Prime Minister repeat at the Dispatch Box his words from last week: that no one in No. 10 was aware before Tuesday that Mandelson had failed his vetting?

    Fourthly, the Prime Minister says he is furious that he was not told the recommendations of the vetting, yet on 16 September, a Foreign Office Minister told Parliament that

    “the national security vetting process is rightly independent of Ministers, who are not informed of any findings other than the final outcome.”—[Official Report, 16 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 1387.]

    That was the Government’s stated process, so why is the Prime Minister so furious that it was followed?

    Fifthly, on 4 February 2026, the Prime Minister told me from the Dispatch Box that the security vetting that Mandelson had received had revealed his relationship with Epstein. How could the Prime Minister say that if he had not seen the security vetting?

    Finally, Sistema is a Russian defence company that is closely linked to the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin’s war machine. Was the Prime Minister aware before the appointment that Peter Mandelson had remained a director of that company long after Russia’s invasion of Crimea?

    Everyone makes mistakes. It is how a leader faces up to those mistakes that shows their character. Instead of taking responsibility for the decisions he made, the Prime Minister has thrown his staff and his officials under the bus. This is a man who once said,

    “I will carry the can for mistakes of any organisation I lead.”

    Instead, he has sacked his Cabinet Secretary, he has sacked his director of communications, he has sacked his chief of staff, and he has now sacked the permanent secretary of the Foreign Office. All those people were fired for a decision that he made.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman’s defence is that he, a former Director of Public Prosecutions, is so lacking in curiosity that he chose to ask no questions about the vetting process, no questions about Mandelson’s relationship with Epstein and no questions about the security risk that Mandelson posed. Apparently, he did not even speak to Peter Mandelson before his appointment. It does not appear that he asked any questions at all. Why? Because he did not want to know. He had taken the risk and chosen his man, and Whitehall had to follow.

    It is the duty of the Prime Minister to ensure that he is telling the truth—or does the ministerial code not apply to him? I am only holding the Prime Minister to the same standard to which he held others. On 26 January 2022, he said from this Dispatch Box to a previous Prime Minister:

    “If he misled Parliament, he must resign.”—[Official Report, 26 January 2022; Vol. 707, c. 994.]

    Does he stand by those words, or is there one rule for him and another for everyone else?

  • Keir Starmer – 2026 Statement on Security Vetting

    Keir Starmer – 2026 Statement on Security Vetting

    The statement made by Keir Starmer, the Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on 20 April 2026.

    With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to provide the House with information that I now have about the appointment of Peter Mandelson as our ambassador to the United States.

    Before I go into the details, I want to be very clear with this House that while this statement will focus on the process surrounding Peter Mandelson’s vetting and appointment, at the heart of this there is also a judgment I made that was wrong. I should not have appointed Peter Mandelson. I take responsibility for that decision, and I apologise again to the victims of the paedophile Jeffrey Epstein, who were clearly failed by my decision.

    Last Tuesday evening, 14 April, I found out for the first time that on 29 January 2025, before Peter Mandelson took up his position as ambassador, Foreign Office officials granted him developed vetting clearance, against the specific recommendation of the United Kingdom Security Vetting that developed vetting clearance should be denied. Not only that, but the Foreign Office officials who made that decision did not pass this information to me, to the Foreign Secretary, to her predecessor, now the Deputy Prime Minister, to any other Minister, or even to the former Cabinet Secretary, Sir Chris Wormald.

    I found this staggering. Therefore, last Tuesday I immediately instructed officials in Downing Street and the Cabinet Office to urgently establish the facts on my authority. I wanted to know who made the decision, on what basis, and who knew. I wanted that information for the precise and explicit purpose of updating this House, because this is information I should have had a long time ago, and that this House should have had a long time ago. It is information that I and the House had a right to know.

    I will now set out a full timeline of the events in the Peter Mandelson process, including from the fact-finding exercise that I instructed last Tuesday. Before doing so, I want to remind and reassure the House that the Government will comply fully with the Humble Address motion of 4 February.

    In December 2024, I was in the process of appointing a new ambassador for Washington. A due diligence exercise was conducted by the Cabinet Office into Peter Mandelson’s suitability, including questions put to him by my staff in No. 10. Peter Mandelson answered those questions on 10 December, and I received final advice on the due diligence process on 11 December. I made the decision to appoint him on 18 December. The appointment was announced on 20 December. The security vetting process began on 23 December 2024.

    I want to make it clear to the House that, for a direct ministerial appointment, it was usual for security vetting to happen after the appointment but before the individual starting in post. That was the process in place at the time. This was confirmed by the former Cabinet Secretary, Sir Chris Wormald, when he gave evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 3 November 2025. Sir Chris made it clear that

    “when we are making appointments from outside the civil service…the normal thing is for the security clearance to happen after appointment but before the person signs a contract and takes up post.”

    At the same hearing of the same Select Committee, the former permanent secretary to the Foreign Office, Sir Olly Robbins, said that Peter Mandelson

    “did not hold national security vetting when he was appointed, but, as is normally the case with external appointments to my Department and the wider civil service, the appointment was made subject to obtaining security clearance.”

    After I sacked Peter Mandelson, I changed that process so that an appointment now cannot be announced until after security vetting is passed.

    The security vetting was carried out by UK Security Vetting—UKSV—between 23 December 2024 and 28 January 2025. UKSV conducted vetting in the normal way, collecting relevant information, as well as interviewing the applicant, in this case on two occasions. Then, on 28 January 2025, UKSV recommended to the Foreign Office that developed vetting clearance should be denied to Peter Mandelson. The following day, 29 January 2025, notwithstanding the UKSV recommendation that developed vetting clearance should be denied, Foreign Office officials made the decision to grant developed vetting clearance for Peter Mandelson.

    To be clear, for many Departments a decision from UKSV is binding, but for the Foreign Office the final decision on developed vetting clearance is made by Foreign Office officials, not UKSV. However, once the decision in this case came to light, the Foreign Office’s power to make the final decision on developed vetting clearance was immediately suspended by my Chief Secretary last week.

    I accept that the sensitive personal information provided by an individual being vetted must be protected from disclosure. If that were not the case, the integrity of the whole process would be compromised. What I do not accept is that the appointing Minister cannot be told of the recommendation by UKSV. Indeed, given the seriousness of these issues and the significance of the appointment, I simply do not accept that Foreign Office officials could not have informed me of UKSV’s recommendations while maintaining the necessary confidentiality that vetting requires.

    There is no law that stops civil servants from sensibly flagging UKSV recommendations while protecting detailed, sensitive vetting information, to allow Ministers to make judgments on appointments or on explaining matters to Parliament. Let me be very clear: the recommendation in the Peter Mandelson case could and should have been shared with me before he took up his post. Let me make a second point: if I had known before Peter Mandelson took up his post that the UKSV recommendation was that developed vetting clearance should be denied, I would not have gone ahead with the appointment.

    Let me now move to September 2025, because events then, and subsequently, show with even starker clarity the opportunities missed by Foreign Office officials to make the position clear. On 10 September, Bloomberg reported fresh details of Mandelson’s history with Epstein. It was then clear to me that Peter Mandelson’s answers to my staff in the due diligence exercise were not truthful, and I sacked him. I also changed the direct ministerial appointments process so that full due diligence is now required as standard. Where risks are identified, an interview must be taken pre-appointment to discuss any risks and conflicts of interest. A summary of that should be provided to the appointing Minister. I also made it clear that public announcements should not now be made until security vetting has been completed.

    In the light of the revelations in September last year, I also agreed with the then Cabinet Secretary, Sir Chris Wormald, that he would carry out a review of the appointment process in the Peter Madelson case, including the vetting. He set out his findings and conclusions in a letter to me on 16 September. In that letter, he advised me:

    “The evidence I have reviewed leads me to conclude that appropriate processes were followed in both the appointment and withdrawal of the former HMA Washington”.

    When the then Cabinet Secretary was asked about that last week, he was clear that when he carried out his review, the Foreign Office did not tell him about the UKSV recommendation that developed vetting clearance should be denied for Peter Mandelson. I find that astonishing. As I set out earlier, I do not accept that I could not have been told about the recommendation before Peter Mandelson took up his post. I absolutely do not accept that the then Cabinet Secretary—an official, not a politician—when carrying out his review could not have been told that UKSV recommended that Peter Mandelson should be denied developed vetting clearance. It was a vital part of the process that I had asked him to review. Clearly, he could have been told, and he should have been told.

    On the same day that the then Cabinet Secretary wrote to me, 16 September 2025, the Foreign Secretary and the then permanent secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Olly Robbins, provided a signed statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee. The statement says:

    “The vetting process was undertaken by UK Security Vetting on behalf of the FCDO and concluded with DV clearance being granted by the FCDO in advance of Lord Mandelson taking up post in February.”

    It went on to say:

    “Peter Mandelson’s security vetting was conducted to the usual standard set for Developed Vetting in line with established Cabinet Office policy”.

    Let me be very clear to the House. This was in response to questions that included whether concerns were raised, what the Foreign Office’s response was and whether they were dismissed. That the Foreign Secretary was advised on, and allowed to sign, this statement by Foreign Office officials without being told that UKSV had recommended Peter Mandelson be denied developed vetting clearance is absolutely unforgivable. This is a senior Cabinet Member giving evidence to Parliament on the very issue in question.

    In the light of further revelations about Peter Mandelson in February of this year, I was very concerned about the fact that developed vetting clearance had been granted to him. Not knowing that, in fact, UKSV had recommended denial of developed vetting clearance, I instructed my officials to carry out a review of the national security vetting process. But, as I have set out, I do not accept that I could not have been told about UKSV’s denial of security vetting before Peter Mandelson took up his post in January 2025, I do not accept that the then Cabinet Secretary could not have been told in September 2025 when he carried out his review of the process, and I do not accept that the Foreign Secretary could not have been told when making statements to the Select Committee, again in 2025.

    On top of that, the fact that I was also not told, even when I ordered a review of the UKSV process, is frankly staggering. I can tell the House that I have now updated the terms of reference for the review into security vetting to make sure it covers the means by which all decisions are made in relation to national security vetting. I have appointed Sir Adrian Fulford to lead the review. Separately, I have asked the Government Security Group in the Cabinet Office to look at any security concerns raised during Peter Mandelson’s tenure.

    I know that many Members across this House will find these facts to be incredible. To that, I can only say that they are right. It beggars belief that throughout this whole timeline of events, officials in the Foreign Office saw fit to withhold this information from the most senior Ministers in our system of government. That is not how the vast majority of people in this country expect politics, government or accountability to work, and I do not think it is how most public servants think it should work either.

    I work with hundreds of civil servants—thousands, even—all of whom act with the utmost integrity, dedication and pride to serve this country, including officials from the Foreign Office who, as we speak, are doing a phenomenal job representing our national interest in a dangerous world—in Ukraine, the middle east and all around the world. This is not about them, yet it is surely beyond doubt that the recommendation from UKSV that Peter Mandelson should be denied developed vetting clearance was information that could and should have been shared with me on repeated occasions and, therefore, should have been available to this House and ultimately to the British people. I commend this statement to the House.

  • Hamish Falconer – 2026 Comments on Support for People in Lebanon

    Hamish Falconer – 2026 Comments on Support for People in Lebanon

    The comments made by Hamish Falconer, the Minister for the Middle East, on 16 April 2026.

    Conflict in the Middle East benefits no one. The UK is working with partners to de-escalate and pursue a political solution.

    People in Lebanon are again suffering a conflict they did not choose, with displacement robbing families of security and dignity. The UK is increasing support for those most in need, reflecting our commitment to regional stability.

    In Beirut I met leaders and welcomed direct Israel–Lebanon talks. We need an end to hostilities. This government will work with Lebanon and international partners to deliver vital aid and support a durable resolution. In Antalya, I will reinforce de-escalation efforts regionally.

  • Wes Streeting – 2026 Comments on Expanding Community Diagnostic Centres

    Wes Streeting – 2026 Comments on Expanding Community Diagnostic Centres

    The comments made by Wes Streeting, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, on 13 April 2026.

    Thanks to this government’s investment and modernisation, the NHS delivered a record number of tests and scans last year. But there’s still a long way to go before we’re catching disease on time.

    I was one of the lucky ones – my kidney cancer was caught early, and today I’m living cancer-free. But it shouldn’t be a question of luck. The NHS should be there for all of us when we need it, catching illness earlier so we can treat it faster.

    As part of the record investment we are making in the NHS’s recovery, these new CDCs are part of the biggest expansion in NHS diagnostics in a generation – continuing the progress we’re making and helping save lives.

    We’re not just investing in more, but delivering differently. The NHS should fit around people’s lives, not require patients to fit their lives around the NHS. Community Diagnostic Centres mean patients can get tests, checks and scans while they’re doing their shopping on the weekend or on the way to pick up the kids from school – without travelling across town to a hospital.

    This is part of the extra £26 billion the government is investing in a new, modern NHS that is fit for the future.

  • Edward Leigh – 2026 Comments on the Middle East

    Edward Leigh – 2026 Comments on the Middle East

    The comments made by Edward Leigh, the Father of the House, in the House of Commons on 13 April 2026.

    The Prime Minister may recall that on day one of this war, I supported his defensive attitude to it and said that we could not change the regime from the air. We agreed and he has been proved right, but—with apologies to Leon Trotsky —we may not be interested in war, but war is interested in us. We all agree that we have to rapidly re-arm, but the trouble is that with an ever-increasing proportion of our economy being taken up by the state pension and benefits, perhaps we cannot afford to do so. Will the Prime Minister work with the Leader of the Opposition to take the necessary—perhaps unpopular—decisions to return defence spending to what we spent in 1989 at the end of the cold war?

    The Prime Minister

    The right hon. Member is right to raise this, and we have already raised defence spending, as he knows, in the most significant way since the cold war. I was clear in the Munich security conference speech that I gave a few weeks ago that we need to go further and faster, and we will. In addition to the funding itself, it is really important that we take this opportunity to collaborate and co-operate with our partners, particularly in Europe, because if all European countries simply increase their spending without regard to the capability that they are using that spending on, we will not make the best of what we have got. Therefore, I am making a dual argument—first, in relation to the actual money we have spent, and secondly in relation to the way we need to collaborate on this with our allies, particularly in Europe, in a way that we have not done, frankly, in decades.