Tag: 2026

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 13 May 2026.

UK Statement at the World Trade Organization’s General Council in Geneva.

Agenda item 5: Request for Observer Status by the African Union – Communication from Mozambique on behalf of the African Group (WT/MIN(26)/9 – WT/GC/W/995) – Request from Namibia on behalf of the African Group

The UK is a supporter of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and was the first non-African country to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the AfCFTA Secretariat in September 2021.

The UK is content with the request from the African Group for the African Union to be an observer, recognising the unique role of the African Union.

This should not, however, be a precedent for more regional and supranational groupings being observers. All requests should be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Agenda item 8. Preserving the Spirit of Open and Predictable Trade: Collective Restraint Against Actions Undermining Trade Liberalization – Request from the Republic of Korea

We agree with much of Korea’s analysis. The gaps in the WTO framework and the poor implementation frameworks have left us unable to address systemic issues that are leading to politically unacceptable outcomes.

These problems, including those connected with subsidies and overcapacity, have been debated in many different parts of the WTO. In disputes, in the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and elsewhere. 

We very much agree that these issues have long-standing and complex roots.

Yet all of our discussions, all of our conversations have not yielded any results. They have not resulted in any change.

It has left Members with no other option but to act. It underlines the urgency that we need to change our approach and get really serious about addressing the lack of a level playing field and move forward with reform.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 13 May 2026.

UK Statement at the World Trade Organization’s General Council in Geneva. Delivered by the UK’s Permanent Representative to the WTO and UN, Kumar Iyer.

Agenda item 1: Election of Chairperson

The UK would like to start by expressing our condolences at the passing of the Commerce Secretary, Mahbubur Rahman, a tragic loss. We would also like to bid a fond farewell to departing colleagues and to welcome new Members whom we look forward to working with. Importantly we would like to thank Ambassador Saqer bin Abdullah Al-Moqbel for the thankless task that you have taken on, and we would like to thank you as much as possible for having done so. As others have said your dedication and patience, and on a personal note, I am particularly grateful for your warmth and openness in the work that you have done.

A warm welcome to Ambassador Kelly. The UK very much looks forward to getting to work under your guidance, and you have the UK’s full support on the choices of beverages. I know that New Zealand has a very strong coffee culture. I also note that you have great Marlborough Sauvignon Blanc and that the UK is content with either beverage, at any time of day!

Agenda item 2+3: Follow-up to MC14 (Yaoundé)

The UK is grateful to Cameroon and the Secretariat for the organisation of MC14 and in particular for the genuine warmth, the reception and hosting of the event. We are however disappointed in the outcome. Something that the hosts could not control and is way beyond their ability to shape.

The outcome is what it was. We did not achieve substantive outcomes on any of the major decision items. We did, however, as has been mentioned, come very, very close. What is clear from the discussions is that the need for change is significant. The support for reform and change is also significant. As has been noted, we do have a document that has widespread support. I know from the UK perspective we do not currently have a mandate to engage in further process discussions. We are however ready to engage in further discussions with any and all countries who are willing and ready to do so. The UK will start to think about substantive policy papers that we will bring forward to this Council.

However, we want that process to be inclusive and orderly, involving all Members. That requires a process, we think that some of those ideas set out by the Chair are ones that we would fully support. Whilst the Work Programme is not everything that the UK wanted, to maintain order, if other Members are willing, the UK to voluntarily constrain its scope to the work programme as outlined at the end of Yaounde in the Chair’s statement.

We believe there are lessons to be learned from previous process. I think some of the points that you note are in the right direction in that regard.

There is also outstanding work to do in two areas where we missed an opportunity for decisions.

The first is IFDA. We thank South Africa and Türkiye for changing their positions, but we are still extremely disappointed that we did not reach consensus. We do celebrate the launch of the joint Ministerial Declaration which provides clear next steps to advance incorporation and implementation of the Agreement.

On E-commerce the UK is also disappointed at the outcome. We are now in a situation with no moratorium, no dedicated venue to discuss digital trade. This provides significant challenges for the reputation and credibility of the WTO and an important sphere for companies around the world. We do however welcome the ECA and the UK remains open and committed to providing certainty to businesses through this and other viable mechanisms in the interim period. Primary for us is to seek a multilateral solution in place for the moratorium. Finally, we were of course disappointed very significantly with the lack of outcomes on development and we are willing to support all areas of the LDC package including to find compromises on LDC Graduation. The UK would encourage all parties to continue to engage with an open mind on this topic.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 13 May 2026.

UK Senior Military Advisor, Colonel Joby Rimmer warns that Russia’s selective ceasefires mask bad faith engagement, a war dependent economy, and growing militarisation, making Moscow more coercive and risk tolerant. Russia’s actions, not its rhetoric, demonstrate the absence of any genuine commitment to a lasting peace in Europe.

The United Kingdom remains unequivocally committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. We warmly welcome President Trump’s achievement in brokering a 3-day ceasefire and a substantial prisoner exchange. We fully support US-led efforts to secure a just and lasting peace and would emphasise that Ukraine has demonstrated its commitment to peace, including by agreeing to a full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire, and is working constructively with the US, UK and other partners towards that objective.

Unfortunately, Russia has failed to engage with peace efforts in good faith. Moscow’s rhetoric may suggest openness to restraint, but its actions demonstrate something very different: a non-committal, selective approach designed to serve their own short-term political and security objectives rather than a genuine effort to bring the war to an end. The limited ceasefire announced last week was not a step toward peace, but a pause timed to protect domestic political symbolism from increasingly capable Ukrainian long-range and unmanned strike capabilities.

The Kremlin’s primary concern was clearly the protection of high-profile commemorative events from disruption, not the cessation of hostilities or the protection of civilians. The fact that Russia could suspend certain operations for its own convenience, while refusing a broader ceasefire proposed by Ukraine and supported internationally, exposes the fundamentally instrumental nature of its approach to de-escalation.

This posture is closely linked to a growing structural challenge for the Russian system: an economy that is becoming ever more dependent on the continuation of war. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has become the central mechanism through which the Kremlin sustains industrial output, channels employment, protects regime-linked interests, mobilises society, justifies repression, and preserves the political narrative on which it increasingly relies.

The United Kingdom takes no satisfaction in the hardship imposed on the Russian people by their government’s decision-making. But the deterioration of Russia’s economy has direct implications for military sustainability, escalation dynamics and regional stability. A weakening Russia that remains committed to imperial aggression is not a less dangerous Russia. It is a more militarised, more coercive and more risk tolerant one.

Russia’s own data underlines this trend. Economic growth has stalled, investment remains weak and consumer demand is slowing. Fiscal pressures are intensifying as revenues decline and expenditure, particularly defence spending, continues to rise. Even where commodity revenues provide temporary relief, they do not address the deeper structural imbalances of a war-driven economic model that is approaching its limits.

This creates a dangerous feedback loop. As the civilian economy weakens, the Kremlin relies more heavily on defence spending and state procurement to sustain output, employment and political control. The greater this reliance becomes, the harder it is for Russia to disengage from the war without triggering internal economic and political costs.

Consequently, major components of the Russian system now have material interests tied to the continuation of the conflict: defence manufacturers, recruitment structures, regional patronage networks, sanctioned intermediaries, security services and state-connected businesses. This is an economy seemingly being actively reorganised around coercion, mobilisation and confrontation.

Such dependence on war increases risks across the OSCE area. A state under fiscal strain may rely more heavily on coercive bargaining and brinkmanship. A government whose conventional economic strength is eroding may turn increasingly to asymmetric tools: cyber activity, sabotage, disinformation, political interference, nuclear signalling, attacks on critical infrastructure and sanctions evasion.

The problem is not simply inefficiency, but choice. The Kremlin alone bears responsibility for this war. It chose to violate Ukraine’s sovereignty. It chose to reject peaceful settlement. It is choosing imperial ambition over the welfare of its own people. Its refusal to engage seriously on a ceasefire flows directly from these choices.

The United Kingdom will continue to expose the reality behind Moscow’s claims. Until Russia withdraws its forces, ends its attacks and returns to compliance with its OSCE commitments, we will not be convinced that Russia has any meaningful interest in a lasting peace.