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  • Jeremy Corbyn – 2016 Speech on the Chilcot Inquiry

    jeremycorbyn

    Below is the text of the speech made by Jeremy Corbyn, the Leader of the Opposition, in the House of Commons on 6 July 2016.

    Before addressing the issues raised in the Iraq inquiry report, I would like to remember and honour the 179 British servicemen and women who were killed and the thousands maimed and injured during the Iraq war, and their families, as well as the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who have died as a result of the invasion and occupation launched by the US and British Governments 13 years ago.

    Yesterday, I had a private meeting with some of the families of the British dead, as I have continued to do over the past dozen years. It is always a humbling experience to witness the resolve and resilience of those families and their unwavering commitment to seek truth and justice for those who they lost in Iraq. They have waited seven years for Sir John Chilcot’s report. It was right that the inquiry heard evidence from such a wide range of people and that the origins, conduct and aftermath of the war were examined in such detail. However, the extraordinary length of time that it has taken for the report to see the light of day is, frankly, clearly a matter of regret.

    I should add that the scale of the report, running to 6,275 pages, to which I was given access only at 8 o’clock this morning, means that today’s response, by all of us, can only be a provisional one.

    The decision to invade and occupy Iraq in March 2003 was the most significant foreign policy decision taken by a British Government in modern times. It divided this House and set the Government of the day against a majority of the British people, as well as against the weight of global opinion. As Sir John Chilcot says, the war was not in any way a “last resort”. Frankly, it was an act of military aggression launched on a false pretext, as the inquiry accepts, and has long been regarded as illegal by the overwhelming weight of international legal opinion. It led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people and the displacement of millions of refugees. It devastated Iraq’s infrastructure and society. As the report indicates, the occupation fostered a lethal sectarianism that turned into a civil war. Instead of protecting security at home or abroad, the war fuelled and spread terrorism across the region. Sunday’s suicide bomb attack in Baghdad that killed over 250 people, the deadliest so far, was carried out by a group whose origins lie in the aftermath of the invasion. By any measure, the invasion and occupation of Iraq have been, for many, a catastrophe.

    The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 on the basis of what the Chilcot report calls “flawed intelligence” about weapons of mass destruction has had a far-reaching impact on us all. It has led to a fundamental breakdown in trust in politics and in our institutions of government. The tragedy is that while the governing class got it so horrifically wrong, many of our people actually got it right. On 15 February 2003, 1.5 million people here, spanning the entire political spectrum, and tens of millions of others across the world, marched against the impending war. That was the biggest demonstration in British history.

    It was not that those of us who opposed the war underestimated the brutality or the crimes of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. Indeed, many of us campaigned against the Iraqi regime during its most bloody period, when the British Government and the US Administration were supporting that regime, as was confirmed by the 1996 Scott inquiry. But we could see that this state, broken by sanctions and war, posed no military threat, and that the WMD evidence was flimsy and confected. We could see that going to war without United Nations’ authorisation was profoundly dangerous, and that foreign invasion and occupation would be resisted by force, and would set off a series of uncontrollable and destructive events.

    If only this House had been able to listen to the wisdom of many of our own people when it voted on 18 March 2003 against waiting for UN authorisation for a second resolution, the course of events might have been different. All but 16 Members of the official Opposition at that time supported the war, while many in my party voted against it, as did others in other opposition parties. There are Members here today on all Benches, including dozens of my Labour colleagues, who voted against the war. But none of us should take any satisfaction from this report.

    We have to be saddened at what has been revealed, and we must now reflect on it. In addition to all those British servicepeople and Iraqis, civilians and combatants, who lost their lives in the conflict, many members of this House who voted to stop the war have not lived to see themselves vindicated by this report. First and foremost, it would do us well to remember Robin Cook, who stood over there, 13 years ago, and said in a few hundred words, in advance of the tragedy to come, what has been confirmed by this report in more than 2 million words.

    The Chilcot report has rightly dug deep into the litany of failures of planning for the occupation, and the calamitous decision to stand down the Iraqi army and to dissolve the entire Iraqi state as a process of de-Ba’athification. However, the reality is that it was the original decision, to follow the US President into this war in the most volatile region of the world and impose a colonial-style occupation, that led to every other disaster. The Government’s September 2002 dossier, with its claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction that could be deployed in 45 minutes, was only the most notorious of many deceptions. As Major General Michael Laurie told the inquiry:

    “We knew at the time that the purpose of the dossier was precisely to make a case for war, rather than setting out the available intelligence”.

    Military action in Iraq not only turned a humanitarian crisis into a disaster, but it also convulsed the entire region, just as intervention in Libya in 2011 has sadly left the country in the grip of warring militias and terror groups. The Iraq war increased the threat of terrorism in our own country, as Baroness Manningham-Buller, former head of MI5, made clear to the inquiry.

    There are many lessons that need to be drawn from the Iraq war and the investigation carried out by Sir John Chilcot in his inquiry; lessons for our Government, our country and this Parliament, as well as for my party and every other party. They include the need for a more open and independent relationship with the United States, and for a foreign policy based on upholding international law and the authority of the United Nations, which always seeks peaceful solutions to international disputes. We also need, and the Prime Minister indicated this, much stronger oversight of security and intelligence services. We need the full restoration of proper Cabinet government and to give Parliament the decisive say over any future decisions to go to war—based on objective information, not just through Government discretion but through a war powers Act, which I hope this Parliament will pass. As, in the wake of Iraq, our own Government and other western Governments increasingly resort to hybrid warfare based on the use of drones and special forces, our democracy crucially needs to ensure that their use is subject to proper parliamentary scrutiny.

    There are no more important decisions a Member of Parliament ever gets asked to make than those relating to peace and war. The very least that Members of Parliament and the country should be able to expect is rigorous and objective evidence on which to base their crucial decisions. We now know that the House was misled in the run-up to the war, and the House must now decide how to deal with it 13 years later, just as all those who took the decisions laid bare in the Chilcot report must face up to the consequences of their actions, whatever they may be.

    Later today, I will be meeting a group of families of military servicemen and women who lost loved ones, as well as Iraq war veterans and Iraqi citizens who have lost family members as a result of the war that the US and British Governments launched in 2003. I will be discussing with them, our public and the Iraqi people the decisions taken by our then Government that led the country into war, with terrible consequences.

    Quite bluntly, there are huge lessons for every single one of us here today. We make decisions that have consequences that go on not just for the immediate years, but for decades and decades afterwards. We need to reflect very seriously before we take any decisions again to take military action. We should realise that the consequences of those decisions will live with all of us for many decades to come, and will often be incalculable.

  • David Cameron – 2016 Statement on the Chilcot Inquiry

    davidcameron

    Below is the text of the speech made by David Cameron, the Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on 6 July 2016.

    This morning, Sir John Chilcot has published the report of the independent Iraq inquiry. This is a difficult day for all the families of those who lost loved ones. They have waited for this report for too long, and our first thoughts today must be with them. In their grief and anger, I hope they can draw at least some solace from the depth and rigour of this report and, above all, some comfort from knowing that we will never forget the incredible service and sacrifice of their sons, daughters, husbands and wives—179 British servicemen and women and 23 British civilians who gave everything for our country. We must also never forget the thousands more who suffered life-changing injuries, and we must pledge today to look after them for the rest of their lives.

    This report would have been produced sooner if it had been begun when Conservative Members and others first called for it back in 2006, but I am sure that the House will join me in thanking Sir John and his Privy Counsellors, including the late Sir Martin Gilbert, who sadly passed away during the work on this report.

    This has been a fully independent inquiry. Government Ministers did not even see it until yesterday morning. The Cabinet Secretary led a process that gave Sir John full access to Government papers. This has meant an unprecedented public declassification of Joint Intelligence Committee papers, key Cabinet minutes, records of meetings and conversations between the UK Prime Minister and the American President, and 31 personal memos from the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to President George W. Bush. The inquiry also took evidence from more than 150 witnesses, and its report runs to 2.6 million words, in 13 volumes. It cost over £10 million to produce. Clearly the House will want the chance to study and debate it in depth, and I am making provision for two full days of debate next week.

    There are a number of key questions that are rightly asked about Iraq. Did we go to war on a false premise? Were decisions taken properly, including the consideration of legal advice? Was the operation properly planned? Were we properly prepared for the aftermath of the initial conflict? Did our forces have adequate funding and equipment? I will try to summarise the key findings on these questions before turning to the lessons that I believe should be learned.

    A number of reasons were put forward for going to war in Iraq, including the danger that Saddam posed to his people and to the region, and the need to uphold United Nations resolutions. However, as everyone in this House will remember, central to the Government’s case was the issue of weapons of mass destruction. Sir John finds that there was an “ingrained belief” genuinely held in both the UK and US Governments that Saddam Hussein possessed chemical and biological capabilities, and that he wanted to redevelop his nuclear capabilities and was pursuing an active policy of deceit and concealment.

    There were some good reasons for this belief. Saddam had built up chemical weapons in the past and he had used them against Kurdish civilians and the Iranian military. He had given international weapons inspectors the run-around for years. The report clearly reflects that the advice given to the Government by the intelligence and policy community was that Saddam did indeed continue to possess and seek to develop these capabilities.

    However, as we now know, by 2003 this long-held belief no longer reflected the reality. Sir John says:

    “At no stage was the proposition that Iraq might no longer have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes identified and examined by either the”

    Joint Intelligence Committee

    “or the policy community.”

    And as the report notes, the late Robin Cook had shown that it was possible to come to a different conclusion from an examination of the same intelligence.

    In the wake of 9/11, the Americans were also understandably concerned about the risk of weapons of mass destruction finding their way into the hands of terrorists. Sir John finds that while it was reasonable to be concerned about the potential fusion of proliferation and terrorism, there was

    “no basis in the JIC Assessments to suggest that Iraq itself represented such a threat.”

    On the question of intelligence, Sir John finds no evidence that intelligence was improperly included, or that No. 10—or Mr Blair personally—improperly influenced the text of the September 2002 dossier, but he does find that the use of Joint Intelligence Committee material in public presentation did not make clear enough the limitations or the subtleties of assessment. He says that the assessed intelligence

    “had not established beyond doubt either that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued”,

    and he says that the Joint Intelligence Committee

    “should have made that clear to Mr Blair.”

    Sir John also finds that public statements from the Government conveyed more certainty than the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments. There was a lack of clarity about the distinction between what the JIC assessed and what Mr Blair believed. Referring to the text in Mr Blair’s foreword to the September 2002 dossier, he finds

    “a distinction between”

    Mr Blair’s

    “beliefs and the JIC’s actual judgements.”

    But in his words Sir John does not question Mr Blair’s belief or his legitimate role in advocating Government policy.

    Turning to the question of legality, the inquiry has “not expressed a view as to whether or not the UK’s participation in the war was legal.” However, it does quote the legal advice which the Attorney General gave at the time and on which the Government acted—namely, that there was a legal basis for action. Nevertheless, Sir John is highly critical of the processes by which the legal advice was arrived at and discussed. He says:

    “The circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there was a legal basis for UK participation were far from satisfactory.”

    I am sure hon. Members will want to study that part of the report carefully.

    Sir John also finds that the diplomatic options had not at that stage been exhausted, and that

    “Military action was therefore not a last resort.”

    Sir John says that when the second resolution at the UN became unachievable, the UK should have done more to exhaust all diplomatic options, including allowing the inspectors longer to complete their job.

    Turning to the decision making, the report documents carefully the processes that were followed. There was a Cabinet discussion before the decision to go to war. A number of Ministers, including the Foreign and Defence Secretaries, were involved in much of the decision making. However, the report makes some specific criticisms of the process of decision making. In particular, when it came to the options for military action, it is clear that these were never discussed properly by a Cabinet Committee or Cabinet. Arrangements were often informal and sporadic, and frequently involved a small group of Ministers and advisers, sometimes without formal records.

    Sir John finds that at crucial points, Mr Blair sent personal notes and made important commitments to Mr Bush that had not been discussed or agreed with Cabinet colleagues. However, while Sir John makes many criticisms of process, including the way information was handled and presented, at no stage does he explicitly say that there was a deliberate attempt to mislead people.

    Turning to operational planning, the initial invasion proceeded relatively rapidly, and we should be proud of what our armed forces managed to achieve so quickly. This was despite the fact that the military did not really have time to plan properly for an invasion from the south, because they had been focused on the north until a late decision from the Turkish Government to refuse entry through their territory. It was also in spite of issues over equipment, which I will turn to later.

    But a bigger question was around the planning for what might happen after the initial operation, and we mentioned this briefly at Prime Minister’s questions. Sir John finds that

    “when the invasion began, the UK government was not in a position to conclude that satisfactory plans had been drawn up and preparations made to meet known post-conflict challenges and risks in Iraq.”

    He adds that the Government

    “lacked clear Ministerial oversight of post-conflict strategy, planning and preparation and effective co-ordination between government departments”

    and

    “failed to analyse or manage those risks adequately.”

    The Government—and here I mean officials and the military, as well as Ministers—remained too fixed on assumptions that the Americans had a plan, that the UN would play a significant role, with the international community sharing the burden, and that the UK role would be over three to four months after the conflict had ended. Sir John concludes that the Government’s failure to prepare properly for the aftermath of the conflict

    “reduced the likelihood of achieving the UK’s strategic objectives in Iraq.”

    And Sir John concludes that anticipating these post-conflict problems—and I quote, as I did at Prime Minister’s questions—

    “did not require the benefit of hindsight.”

    Turning to equipment and troops, Sir John is clear that the UK failed to match resources to the objectives. Sir John says categorically that

    “delays in providing adequate medium weight Protected Patrol Vehicles and the failure to meet the needs of UK forces…for ISTAR and helicopters should not have been tolerated”,

    and he says:

    “the MOD was slow in responding to the developing threat in Iraq from Improvised Explosive Devices.”

    The inquiry also identified a number of moments when it would have been possible to conduct a substantial reappraisal of our approach to the whole situation in Iraq and the level of resources required. But despite a series of warnings from commanders in the field, Sir John finds that no such reappraisal took place. Furthermore, during the first four years, there was

    “no clear statement of policy setting out the acceptable level of risk to UK forces and who was responsible for managing that risk.”

    Sir John also finds that the Government—and in particular the military—were too focused on withdrawing from Iraq and planning for an Afghan deployment in 2006, and that further drew effort away.

    Sir John concludes that although Tony Blair succeeded in persuading America to go back to the UN in 2002, he was unsuccessful in changing the US position on other critical decisions, and that

    “in the absence of a majority in the Security Council in support of military action at that point, the UK was undermining the authority of the Security Council”.

    While it is right for a UK Prime Minister to weigh up carefully the damage to the special relationship that would be done by failing to support the US, Sir John says that it is questionable whether not participating militarily on this occasion would have broken the partnership. He says there was a substantial gap from the outset between the ambitious UK objectives and the resources that Government were prepared to commit, and that even with more resources, the circumstances surrounding the invasion made it difficult to deliver substantive outcomes.

    While the territorial integrity of Iraq remained, deep sectarian divisions opened, and thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians lost their lives. While these divisions were not created by the international coalition, Sir John believes they were exacerbated, including through the extent of de-Ba’athification, and they were not addressed by an effective programme of reconciliation. Overall, Sir John finds that the policy of Her Majesty’s Government fell far short of meeting its strategic objectives and helped to create a space for al-Qaeda.

    Of course, the decision to go to war came to a vote in this House, and Members on all sides who voted for military action will have to take our fair share of the responsibility. We cannot turn the clock back, but we can ensure that lessons are learned and acted on. I will turn to these in a moment and cover all the issues around machinery of government, proper processes, culture and planning, some of which we discussed in Prime Minister’s questions, but let me be the first to say that getting all of these things right does not guarantee the success of a military intervention.

    For example, on Libya, I believe it was right to intervene to stop Gaddafi slaughtering his people. In that case, we did have a United Nations Security Council resolution. We did have proper processes. We did have comprehensive advice on all the key issues. And we did not put our forces on the ground. Instead we worked with a transitional Libyan Government. But getting these things right does not make the challenges of intervention any less formidable. The difficulties in Libya are plain for everyone to see today.

    As the Prime Minister for the last six years, reading this report, I believe there are some lessons that we do need to learn and, frankly, keep on learning. First, taking the country to war should always be a last resort and should only be done if all credible alternatives have been exhausted.

    Secondly, the machinery of government does matter. That is why, on my first day in office, I established the National Security Council to ensure proper co-ordinated decision making across the whole of government, including those responsible for domestic security. This council is not just a meeting of Ministers; it has the right breadth of expertise in the room, with the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the heads of the intelligence services, and relevant senior officials. The Attorney General is now a member of the National Security Council.

    I also appointed the UK’s first national security adviser, with a properly constituted team in the Cabinet Office to ensure that all the key parts of our national security apparatus are joined up. The national security machinery also taps the experience and knowledge of experts from outside Government. This helps us to constantly challenge conventional wisdom within the system and avoid, hopefully, group-think. It is inconceivable today that we could take a premeditated decision to commit combat troops without a full and challenging discussion in the National Security Council, on the basis of full papers, including written legal advice, prepared and stress-tested by all relevant departments, with decisions formally minuted.

    Thirdly, I would argue also that the culture established by Prime Ministers matters too. It is crucial to good decision making that a Prime Minister establishes a climate in which it is safe for officials and other experts to challenge existing policy and question the views of Ministers, and the Prime Minister, without fear or favour. There is no question today but that everyone sat around the NSC table is genuinely free to speak their mind.

    Fourthly, if we are to take the difficult decisions to intervene in other countries, proper planning for what follows is vital. We know that the task of rebuilding effective governance is enormous. That is why we created a conflict, stability and stabilisation fund, and beefed up the cross-government stabilisation unit, so that experts are able to deploy in post-conflict situations anywhere in the world at short notice. Frankly, none of this would be possible without the historic decision that we have taken to commit 0.7% of our gross national income on overseas aid. A lot of that money is spent on conflict-affected and fragile states, not only assisting with post-conflict planning but also trying to prevent conflicts in the first place.

    Fifthly, we must ensure that our armed forces are always properly equipped and resourced. That is why we now conduct a regular strategic defence and security review to ensure that the resources we have meet the ambitions of the national security strategy. We are meeting our NATO commitment to spend 2% of our GDP on defence, and planning to invest at least £178 billion on new military equipment over the next decade. We have also enshrined the armed forces covenant in law to ensure that our armed forces and their families receive the treatment and respect they deserve. Sending our brave troops on to the battlefield without the right equipment was unacceptable, and whatever else we learn from this conflict, we must all pledge that this will never happen again.

    There will be further lessons to learn from studying this report, and I commit today that that is exactly what we will do, but in reflecting on this report, and my own experience, there are also some lessons here that I do not think we should draw. First, it would be wrong to conclude that we should not stand with our American allies when our common security interests are threatened. We must never be afraid to speak frankly and honestly, as best friends always should. And where we commit our troops together, there must be a structure through which our views can be properly conveyed and any differences worked through. But it remains the case that Britain and America share the same fundamental values, that Britain has no greater friend or ally in the world than America, and that our partnership remains as important for our security and prosperity today as it has ever been.

    Secondly, I think it would be wrong to conclude that we cannot rely on the judgments of our brilliant and hard-working intelligence agencies. We know the debt we owe them in helping to keep us safe every day of the year. Since November 2014, they have enabled us to foil seven different planned terrorist attacks on the streets of the UK. What this report shows is that there needs to be a proper separation between the process of assessing intelligence and the policy making that flows from it. And as a result of the reforms since the Butler report, that is what we have in place.

    Thirdly, it would be completely wrong to conclude that our military is not capable of intervening successfully around the world. Many of the failures in this report were not directly about the conduct of the armed forces as they went into Iraq, but rather the failures of planning before a shot was fired. There is no question but that Britain’s armed forces remain the envy of the world, and the decisions we have taken to ensure that they are properly resourced will ensure they stay that way.

    Finally, we should not conclude that intervention is always wrong. There are unquestionably times when it is right to intervene, as this country did successfully in Sierra Leone and Kosovo. I am sure that many in this House would agree that there have been times in the recent past when we should have intervened but did not, such as in failing to prevent the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica.

    Intervention is hard. War fighting is not always the most difficult part. Often, the state-building that follows is a much more complex challenge. We should not be naive to think that just because we have the best prepared plans, in the real world things cannot go wrong. Equally, just because intervention is difficult, it does not mean that there are not times when it is right and necessary.

    Yes, Britain has to, and will continue to, learn the lessons of this report. But as with our intervention against Daesh in Iraq and Syria today, Britain must not and will not shrink from its role on the world stage or fail to protect its people. I commend this statement to the House.

  • Alun Cairns – 2016 Speech to National Assembly for Wales

    aluncairns

    Below is the text of the speech made by Alun Cairns, the Secretary of State for Wales, at the National Assembly for Wales on 6 July 2016.

    Diolch yn fawr Llywydd.

    It is a privilege to be here in the Senedd chamber once again, following the opening by Her Majesty the Queen last month.

    I remember this chamber fondly from my time as an Assembly Member. Return has caused me to reflect on how much it has changed since that time.

    Since 2011, when this Assembly took on full law-making powers it has passed 28 Acts and numerous pieces of secondary legislation including innovative legislation about organ donation, about sustainability and about housing.

    Llywydd, I want to talk today about the UK’s legislative programme and how it delivers security and increases life chances for people across Wales.

    EU Referendum

    But first, I want to touch on the vote to leave the European Union and what this means for us all.

    The people of Wales and UK have spoken and we must act on that to deliver a managed exit from the European Union.

    We need to show strong leadership and instil confidence in businesses and investors, Universities and Colleges, Charitable organisations and Local Authorities and to families and consumers alike.

    We will remain full members of the EU for at least two years and having spoken to the leadership contenders, it is clear that Article 50 will not be invoked immediately on their election. This offers more stability to the economy and to those who benefit from EU support.

    We need to use the interim period to prepare the nation for withdrawal. The Cabinet agreed to establish an EU Unit in Whitehall looking at all the legal, practical, regional and financial issues that need to be considered. I will work closely with the FM to inform the Unit as the UK negotiates to leave the EU. I will ensure Welsh interests are represented as the Cabinet agrees our negotiating position.

    Talking negatively doesn’t help anyone. I am hugely impressed by the response from the business community in Wales. Phrases such as ‘Business as Usual’ and ‘re-birth of businesses’ came out of a recent briefing session I held, with my favourite, ‘Entrepreneurs thrive on change’ being quoted by one exporter.

    And I want to ensure that the values which British society holds dear – the values of tolerance, of open-ness, of unity – are not seen as casualties of this referendum…

    …that we re-double our efforts to support community cohesion at both a locally and nationally.

    The British economy is strong: near record employment and a reduced deficit puts us in a good position from which to grow.

    We are leaving the institution of the EU, not turning our backs on our friends, neighbours and trading partners in Europe.

    I am optimistic about our future and of the Wales and Britain we must create outside the European Union.

    I have committed to make UKTI resource available to open new markets and to use the Foreign Office to develop relationships further afield. The Wales Office stands ready and waiting to give that access across all Whitehall resource and expertise.

    Legislative Programme – Security for Working People

    Turning to our legislative programme, economic security is our priority. Good progress has been made over the last six years and I am the first to recognise that there is always more to do.

    The Digital Economy Bill will modernise the climate for entrepreneurship and give everyone a legal right to superfast broadband. The Bill will support Wales’ key strengths in the technology sector to develop further.

    The Modern Transport Bill will provide for driverless cars, spaceports and safety around drone operations amongst other policies. And the Neighbourhood Planning and Infrastructure Bill will simplify planning and put the National Infrastructure Commission on a statutory footing.

    The Local Growth and Jobs Bill will promote home ownership in England and devolve significant additional powers to English Regions. This creates opportunities for regional economies in Wales to form strong partnerships but also highlights greater competition across the UK, which we must see as a positive challenge.

    Legislative Programme – Increasing Life Chances

    We are also determined to go further in tackling the barriers to opportunity.

    Through the Prison and Courts Reform Bill will empower Governors to take forward innovation that our prisons need, ensuring Prisons will no longer be warehouses for criminals but incubators for changing lives instead.

    The Children and Social Work Bill will make major changes to adoption to tip the balance in favour of permanent adoption if that is the right solution for the child.

    And the Higher Education and Research Bill will cement the UK’s position as a world leader in research ensuring we maximise the £6 billion a year investment we make. Welsh Universities receiving more than ever and I know that the Cabinet Secretary for Education is discussing other matters relating to the Bill with the University Minister.

    Legislative Programme – Strengthening National Security
    Keeping our country safe in these challenging times is a priority.

    The Counter Extremism and Safeguarding Bill will help Authorities to disrupt the activities of extremists.

    The Investigatory Powers Bill will fill holes in our security apparatus so that we give law enforcement agencies the tools they need to protect the public in the digital age.

    And the Policing and Crime Bill will take forward the next phase in Police reform while the Criminal Finances Bill will cement the UK’s role in the fight against international corruption and enable a further crack down on money laundering and those who profit from crime.

    Alongside this we will bring forward a British Bill of Rights to reform the UK human rights framework, consulting fully with the Assembly on the proposals.

    England-only changes

    This legislative programme also makes further changes that will only apply in England, including reforming social work and giving more freedom to teachers in schools, as well as encouraging new universities.

    I hope that you all will look on legislation that applies to England and seek opportunities from them. It may be by replicating it or by doing something very different but hope that we all recognise that the UK is our biggest market in which we are inextricably linked and associated with.

    The closer communities work, co-operate, compliment and co-ordinate and even compete the better the outcomes tend to be, particularly in light of the referendum outcome less than 2 weeks ago.

    The Wales Bill

    My key aim for the Wales Bill is to ensure it delivers two underpinning principles for the future devolved governance of Wales: clarity and accountability.

    Timing

    Second reading took place last week and the first day of Committee took place yesterday. I know there were concerns around the time allocated but on each occasion, the debates finished early, with much time to spare.

    The second day will take place next Monday. And there will be further debate into the autumn as the Bill reaches Report Stage before Third reading. The whole process will start again when the Bill moves to the other place when their Lordships will undoubtedly show close interest and scrutiny.

    Of course, I want this Assembly to pass a legislative consent motion and I am sure that the First Minister, the Presiding Officer and I will continue our warm discussions.

    The Assembly Coming of Age

    The Bill will devolve significant powers, provide clarity and accountability and underpins my commitment to devolution.

    Constitutional Bills are not what comes up on the doorstep but it will allow the Welsh Government and the Assembly to focus on things that matter to people who live and work in Wales. Tax levels, the economy, health policy and education, energy projects and regeneration.

    Single Jurisdiction

    Llywydd, the debate on the draft Wales Bill, was dominated by the ‘necessity test’ and the inclusion of the test led to calls for a separate jurisdiction.

    The test was believed to set too high a bar and calls were made for a lower threshold. But Llywydd, I have gone further, and removed the test entirely when the Assembly modifies the civil and criminal law in devolved areas.

    As a consequence, many of the arguments for a separate legal jurisdiction should have fallen away.

    However, I also recognise the validity of some of the points made. Therefore, I have included a clause on the face of the Bill that recognises for the first time that Welsh Law is made by the Assembly and Welsh Ministers within the single legal jurisdiction.

    Distinct administrative arrangements also need to be recognised to accommodate Welsh Law and I have established a working group involving the Welsh Government, LCJ and UK officials. This will run in parallel with the scrutiny of the Bill.

    The single jurisdiction gives confidence and continuity and I have never heard that a policy cannot be delivered because of the single jurisdiction. It offers business simplicity and allows Wales and Welsh legal firms to capitalise on opportunities in London and elsewhere.

    The legal profession is one of Wales’ fastest growing sectors.
    I am not sure what the additional regulatory burden, bureaucracy and risk to investors and law schools would achieve. This was accepted by opposition MPs yesterday.

    The advent of Metro Mayors and devolution across England put us in greater competition for investment. I suggest that we don’t underestimate how risks would be portrayed by our competitors.

    Delivering Clarity – Reserved Powers Model

    At the heart of the Bill is the reserved powers model.

    And we have cut a swathe through the reservations since the draft Bill was published in October.

    The list in the Wales Bill has been streamlined with clearer and more accurate descriptions of reservations. I believe that, broadly, we have struck the right balance.

    This reserved powers model will deliver a settlement that will make it clear to people in Wales who they should hold to account – the UK Government or the Welsh Government – for the decisions that affect their daily lives.

    Powers for a Purpose

    The Bill also devolves further powers – over ports and energy projects, speed limits, traffic signs and transport services in Wales.

    ….powers over fracking and coal mining as well as marine licensing and conservation.

    Accountability

    A key feature of a mature legislature, of a Parliament, is that it raises, through taxation, much of the money it spends.

    The devolution of Stamp Duty Land Tax and Landfill Tax and the full devolution of Business Rates last year, are the first steps toward this and it is only right that a portion of income tax is devolved too.

    The Wales Bill removes the need for a referendum to introduce the Welsh Rates of Income Tax.

    There are practical issues to agree with the Welsh Government, particularly how the Welsh block grant is adjusted to take account of tax devolution and I will continue to build on our warm relationship and hope that delivering the much needed funding floor will give confidence to Members.

    Conclusion

    Llywydd, fel y nodais yn gynharach, mae’r rhaglen ddeddfwriaethol gymaint yn fwy wrth gwrs na dim ond datganoli yng Nghymru .

    Mae’n ymwneud â mwy na’r cyfansoddiad, sydd mor aml wedi ymgolli cymaint ym Mae Caerdydd.

    Mae’r rhaglen ddeddfwriaethol yn ymwneud â darparu diogelwch ar gyfer pobl sy’n gweithio ledled Cymru. Mae’n ymwneud â chynyddu cyfleoedd bywyd pobl ledled Cymru. Ac mae’n ymwneud a chryfhau ein diogelwch cenedlaethol .

    Rhaid i ni nawr gyd weithio gyda’n gilydd , y ddwy Lywodraeth, i ddarparu dyfodol llewyrchus ac unedig i Gymru.

    Diolch.

  • Rob Wilson – 2016 Speech on Launch of Life Chances Fund

    robwilson

    Below is the text of the speech made by Rob Wilson, the Minister for Civil Society, at the University of Oxford on 4 July 2016.

    Good afternoon. Thank you all for coming and thanks also to the Blavatnik Institute for hosting us.

    I’m sure I’m not the only person here who was looking forward to a quiet summer.

    Euro football, a visit to Wimbledon perhaps, a bit of Test match cricket, maybe even a chance to catch up on some reading, that was my hope!

    Unfortunately my summer reading now appears to include the Lisbon Treaty.

    The EU referendum has of course changed everything.

    But in a more profound sense its changed nothing.

    And this is my message to you today: whatever happens in the weeks and months ahead, our work continues.

    We are still the same one nation government, working to build a bigger and stronger society; working to extend hope and opportunity to those who need them most.

    But the EU Referendum did demonstrate that big questions, built up over many decades, are present in our country.

    Six years ago we began the task of tackling this by building a bigger, stronger society with compassion at its heart. It is true that we need to do more, to redouble our efforts, but I am proud of our achievements to date: Giving is increasing, the social economy is thriving.

    We created the world’s first social investment bank in Big Society Capital which has already made almost £600 million available to charities and social enterprises.

    And over 1 million people in the UK now give regularly, a total of £11billion each year.

    Social action is helping to transform lives: it contributes £34billion each year to public services, adding an extra one-sixth to state spending on education, health and local services.

    200,000 young people have taken part in the National Citizen Service (NCS) and alone they have given more than 8 million hours of service to their communities. We hope to see 100,000 more young people take part in NCS this summer.

    And communities are stepping up: the 6,500 community organisers we have recruited to date have supported over 400 neighbourhoods to take action on the things that matter to them most.

    There is much more we can and plan to do. Our expansion of the National Citizen Service will guarantee a place for all young people, with 60% of eligible young people participating each year by 2020.

    We will expand community organisers to 10,000 and we are preparing programmes to grow volunteering by older people, increase volunteering in health, and getting business involved in driving youth skills.

    Public services that get results are increasingly absolutely key to our task of building a bigger and stronger society that supports the people who need them the most.

    Public services that get results

    That means staying relentlessly focused on the people in this country who haven’t had a fair shot in life. The child in care with the odds stacked against them; the repeat offender who can’t read or write; the troubled families who spend half their lives with the government in their living room – Because they, more than anyone, need us to get results.

    And that’s exactly what we together, have to deliver.

    Too often in the past government has approached the most difficult social challenges by finding the money, designing the programme and concluding job done. Spending money rather than investing it.

    But doing something isn’t the same as solving something.

    What we’ve learnt over the last 6 years is that the test of a good social programme isn’t how much you spend but how well you invest it.

    In short, how many lives you change.

    It’s why paying for outcomes is at the heart of our commitment to improving the life chances of the most disadvantaged in our society.

    Everyone here knows the cost of social failure: £30,000 a year for a first time offender; sometimes over £100,000 a year to support a child in care.

    But success can also be measured.

    It’s the child in care who finds a stable, adoptive family; the repeat offender who leaves prison with an English GCSE; the troubled families who get the help they need to get their lives back on track.

    Not only do these programmes change lives for the better, they also save huge amounts of money.

    By paying for outcomes, we can cut the cost of failure.

    Paying for results gets results

    And we know that paying for results really does get results. I’ve seen it for myself all over the country.

    Take Worcestershire.

    Its Reconnections Programme is all about tackling loneliness and isolation.

    It deploys an army of volunteers across the county, who work with older people to build their confidence and reconnect them to social activities – from lunch clubs to libraries.

    It’s all paid for by £850,000 of social investment, wrapped up in a Social Impact Bond that only pays out when the programme delivers a measurable reduction in loneliness.

    Later this afternoon you’ll hear how a similar approach in Birmingham is helping troubled young people move from residential care to stable and supportive family placements.

    But there are many other examples from across the UK.

    The Peterborough Social Impact Bond, or SIB, achieved an 8 percentage point reduction in reoffending among short sentence prisoners leaving prison.

    The London Rough Sleeping SIB has helped over half of its 830 participants to achieve improved outcomes, including sustained stable accommodation, employment, or reconnection to their home country.

    Or look at the Essex SIB, which has helped 200 young people on the edge of the care system stay safely with their families.

    Paying for outcomes works because it allows us to focus on what really matters.

    It concentrates minds on prevention and early intervention. It frees charities and social enterprises to use their expertise to deliver services that really work.

    And when things don’t work, it gives a clear incentive to stop, think again, adapt and refine until they do.

    It really is a win-win for commissioners, providers, investors and communities.

    We’ve already backed 32 SIBs, and we can be incredibly proud that we’re world leaders in this field.

    But now we need to go bigger and better.

    We’ve built the prototype, proven the concept – the task now is to scale the model up – so we can help even more of our fellow citizens lead happy and fulfilling lives.

    Life Chances Fund

    That’s what the government’s £80 million Life Chances Fund is all about.

    The basic idea is simple.

    Whitehall gains some of the benefit from payment by results, so Whitehall should front some of the cost.

    For example, we invested £700,000 from our Social Outcomes Fund – the forerunner of the Life Chances Fund – in Worcestershire’s Reconnections Programme, recognising that less loneliness means less pressure on additional care provision funded by the welfare system.

    The early indications are that Reconnections is having a significant impact – with clear reductions in the levels of measured loneliness for those going through the programme.

    The new Life Chances Fund will build on the work of the Social Outcomes Fund, providing a top-up for outcomes that generate savings for us.

    From today you can apply for a share of that £80 million fund – which I hope we can add to in the future. It will contribute to you getting SIBs that tackle deep-rooted issues, off the ground, and in doing so improving the life chances of our most vulnerable citizens.

    The Fund is structured around 6 key themes: drug and alcohol dependency, children’s services, early years, young people, older people’s services, healthy lives.

    The Life Chances Fund will aim to make contributions of around 20% to local SIBs, but it could contribute more if you can make the case.

    Applications for proposals focusing on children’s services and tackling drug and alcohol dependency are now open. These will be followed by the other themes over the next 12 months.

    Through the Life Chances Fund we have a huge opportunity to revolutionise our public services to focus on achieving positive outcomes for people.

    The Social Impact Bond market could be worth £1 billion by the end of the Parliament if we can create momentum.

    I am committed to harnessing their power in the service of social progress. Today we are making a downpayment on that commitment.

    GO Lab

    But it doesn’t end there.

    You will also hear this afternoon from Ngaire and her team about the Government Outcomes Lab that we’re launching today, in partnership with the Blavatnik School of Government.

    The GO Lab will provide expert support to local commissioners looking to use SIBs to transform lives.

    So this is a system of end-to-end support, from helping you draw up your initial ideas to funding the final outcomes.

    It’s about central and local government, academia and the voluntary sector – all coming together to work at tackling some of the most entrenched social challenges we face.

    Over to you

    So the question for commissioners is this: what part will you play in the social investment revolution?

    I want you to use this afternoon to start thinking about which social challenges in your communities could benefit from an outcomes-based approach.

    From children in care to elderly care, drug and alcohol dependency, to youth unemployment – you have it in your power to make a difference, get results, and save money.

    So make use of the materials and support that the GO Lab will be working up and get your expressions of interest into the Life Chances Fund.

    And for the voluntary sector providers and social investors out there, I want you to talk to your commissioners about the ideas you have for transforming local services.

    And remember that it’s often the simplest ideas that can have the greatest impact.

    Conclusion

    So we’ve taken clear action to help you seize this opportunity.

    And we stand ready to work with you to help you transform your local public services.

    This is the start of a fundamental shift, from fixating on process to focusing on outcomes, from stifling creativity to rewarding innovation.

    Finding out what works, getting results, saving money, changing lives.

    The divides that the referendum has revealed make a strong civil society even more important. We all have a part to play in knitting the country back together.

    I haven’t backed a candidate yet in the Conservative Party leadership election, but I am passionate about social mobility and giving people a chance in life. It’s what brought me into politics.

    The next PM must have civil society and social mobility, that hope to get on and move up in life, at the centre of their agenda.

    Now, more than ever, people facing the most challenging problems need a government relentlessly focused on improving their lives.

    I’m looking forward to working with you to make that happen.

  • Sir John Chilcot – 2016 Speech on Chilcot Report

    johnchilcot

    Below is the text of the speech made by Sir John Chilcot, introducing his report into the Gulf War, on 6 July 2016.

    We were appointed to consider the UK’s policy on Iraq from 2001 to 2009, and to identify lessons for the future. Our Report will be published on the Inquiry’s website after I finish speaking.

    In 2003, for the first time since the Second World War, the United Kingdom took part in an invasion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign State. That was a decision of the utmost gravity. Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly a brutal dictator who had attacked Iraq’s neighbours, repressed and killed many of his own people, and was in violation of obligations imposed by the UN Security Council.

    But the questions for the Inquiry were:

    – whether it was right and necessary to invade Iraq in March 2003; and

    – whether the UK could – and should – have been better prepared for what followed.

    We have concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.

    We have also concluded that:

    – The judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction – WMD – were presented with a certainty that was not justified.

    – Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate.

    – The Government failed to achieve its stated objectives.

    I want now to set out some of the key points in the Report.

    First, the formal decision to invade Iraq, if Saddam Hussein did not accept the US ultimatum to leave within 48 hours, was taken by Cabinet on 17 March 2003. Parliament voted the following day to support the decision.

    The decision was, however, shaped by key choices made by Mr Blair’s Government over the previous 18 months – which I will briefly set out.

    After the attacks on 11 September 2001, Mr Blair urged President Bush not to take hasty action on Iraq.

    By early December, US policy had begun to shift and Mr Blair suggested that the US and the UK should work on what he described as a “clever strategy” for regime change in Iraq, which would build over time.

    When Mr Blair met President Bush at Crawford, Texas, in early April 2002, the formal policy was still to contain Saddam Hussein. But, by then, there had been a profound change in the UK’s thinking:

    – The Joint Intelligence Committee had concluded that Saddam Hussein could not be removed without an invasion.

    – The Government was stating that Iraq was a threat that had to be dealt with. It had to disarm or be disarmed.

    – That implied the use of force if Iraq did not comply – and internal contingency planning for a large contribution to a military invasion had begun.

    At Crawford, Mr Blair sought a partnership as a way of influencing President Bush. He proposed a UN ultimatum to Iraq to readmit inspectors or face the consequences.

    On 28 July, Mr Blair wrote to President Bush with an assurance that he would be with him “whatever” – but, if the US wanted a coalition for military action, changes would be needed in three key areas. Those were:

    – progress on the Middle East Peace Process;

    – UN authority;

    – and a shift in public opinion in the UK, Europe and the Arab world.

    Mr Blair also pointed out that there would be a “need to commit to Iraq for the long term”.

    Subsequently, Mr Blair and Mr Straw urged the US to take the issue of Iraq back to the UN. On 7 September, President Bush decided to do so.

    On 8 November, resolution 1441 was adopted unanimously by the Security Council. It gave Iraq a final opportunity to disarm or face “serious consequences”, and it provided for any further breaches by Iraq to be reported to the Security Council “for assessment”. The weapons inspectors returned to Iraq later that month.

    During December, however, President Bush decided that inspections would not achieve the desired result; the US would take military action in early 2003.

    By early January, Mr Blair had also concluded that “the likelihood was war”.

    At the end of January, Mr Blair accepted the US timetable for military action by mid-March. To help Mr Blair, President Bush agreed to seek a further UN resolution – the “second” resolution – determining that Iraq had failed to take its final opportunity to comply with its obligations.

    By 12 March, it was clear that there was no chance of securing majority support for a second resolution before the US took military action.

    Without evidence of major new Iraqi violations or reports from the inspectors that Iraq was failing to co-operate and they could not carry out their tasks, most members of the Security Council could not be convinced that peaceful options to disarm Iraq had been exhausted and that military action was therefore justified.

    Mr Blair and Mr Straw blamed France for the “impasse” in the UN and claimed that the UK Government was acting on behalf of the international community “to uphold the authority of the Security Council”.

    In the absence of a majority in support of military action, we consider that the UK was, in fact, undermining the Security Council’s authority.

    Second, the Inquiry has not expressed a view on whether military action was legal. That could, of course, only be resolved by a properly constituted and internationally recognised Court.

    We have, however, concluded that the circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were far from satisfactory.

    In mid-January 2003, Lord Goldsmith told Mr Blair that a further Security Council resolution would be necessary to provide a legal basis for military action. He did not advise No.10 until the end of February that, while a second resolution would be preferable, a “reasonable case” could be made that resolution 1441 was sufficient. He set out that view in written advice on 7 March.

    The military and the civil service both asked for more clarity on whether force would be legal. Lord Goldsmith then advised that the “better view” was that there was, on balance, a secure legal basis for military action without a further Security Council resolution. On 14 March, he asked Mr Blair to confirm that Iraq had committed further material breaches as specified in resolution 1441. Mr Blair did so the next day.

    However, the precise basis on which Mr Blair made that decision is not clear.

    Given the gravity of the decision, Lord Goldsmith should have been asked to provide written advice explaining how, in the absence of a majority in the Security Council, Mr Blair could take that decision.

    This is one of a number of occasions identified by the Inquiry when policy should have been considered by a Cabinet Committee and then discussed by Cabinet itself.

    Third, I want to address the assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and how they were presented to support the case for action.

    There was an ingrained belief in the UK policy and intelligence communities that:

    – Iraq had retained some chemical and biological capabilities;

    – was determined to preserve and if possible enhance them – and, in the future, to acquire a nuclear capability; and

    – was able to conceal its activities from the UN inspectors.

    In the House of Commons on 24 September 2002, Mr Blair presented Iraq’s past, current and future capabilities as evidence of the severity of the potential threat from Iraq’s WMD. He said that, at some point in the future, that threat would become a reality

    The judgements about Iraq’s capabilities in that statement, and in the dossier published the same day, were presented with a certainty that was not justified.

    The Joint Intelligence Committee should have made clear to Mr Blair that the assessed intelligence had not established “beyond doubt” either that Iraq had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued.

    The Committee had also judged that as long as sanctions remained effective, Iraq could not develop a nuclear weapon, and that it would take several years to develop and deploy long range missiles.

    In the House of Commons on 18 March 2003, Mr Blair stated that he judged the possibility of terrorist groups in possession of WMD was “a real and present danger to Britain and its national security” – and that the threat from Saddam Hussein’s arsenal could not be contained and posed a clear danger to British citizens.

    Mr Blair had been warned, however, that military action would increase the threat from Al Qaida to the UK and to UK interests. He had also been warned that an invasion might lead to Iraq’s weapons and capabilities being transferred into the hands of terrorists.

    The Government’s strategy reflected its confidence in the Joint Intelligence Committee’s Assessments. Those Assessments provided the benchmark against which Iraq’s conduct and denials, and the reports of the inspectors, were judged.

    As late as 17 March, Mr Blair was being advised by the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, the means to deliver them and the capacity to produce them. He was also told that the evidence pointed to Saddam Hussein’s view that the capability was militarily significant and to his determination – left to his own devices – to build it up further.

    It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments. They were not challenged, and they should have been.

    The findings on Iraq’s WMD capabilities set out in the report of the Iraq Survey Group in October 2004 were significant. But they did not support pre-invasion statements by the UK Government, which had focused on Iraq’s current capabilities, which Mr Blair and Mr Straw had described as “vast stocks” and an urgent and growing threat.

    In response to those findings, Mr Blair told the House of Commons that, although Iraq might not have had “stockpiles of actually deployable weapons”, Saddam Hussein “retained the intent and the capability … and was in breach of United Nations resolutions”.

    That was not, however, the explanation for military action he had given before the conflict.

    In our Report, we have identified a number of lessons to inform the way in which intelligence may be used publicly in the future to support Government policy.

    Fourth, I want to address the shortcomings in planning and preparation.

    The British military contribution was not settled until mid-January 2003, when Mr Blair and Mr Hoon agreed the military’s proposals for an increase in the number of brigades to be deployed; and that they would operate in southern, not northern, Iraq.

    There was little time to prepare three brigades and the risks were neither properly identified nor fully exposed to Ministers. The resulting equipment shortfalls are addressed in the Report.

    Despite promises that Cabinet would discuss the military contribution, it did not discuss the military options or their implications.

    In early January 2003, when the Government published its objectives for post-conflict Iraq, it intended that the interim post-conflict administration should be UN-led.

    By March 2003, having failed to persuade the US of the advantages of a UN-led administration, the Government had set the less ambitious goal of persuading the US to accept UN authorisation of a Coalition-led interim administration.

    When the invasion began, UK policy rested on an assumption that there would be a well-executed US-led and UN-authorised operation in a relatively benign security environment.

    Mr Blair told the Inquiry that the difficulties encountered in Iraq after the invasion could not have been known in advance.

    We do not agree that hindsight is required. The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active Iranian pursuit of its interests, regional instability, and Al Qaida activity in Iraq, were each explicitly identified before the invasion.

    Ministers were aware of the inadequacy of US plans, and concerned about the inability to exert significant influence on US planning. Mr Blair eventually succeeded only in the narrow goal of securing President Bush’s agreement that there should be UN authorisation of the post-conflict role.

    Furthermore, he did not establish clear Ministerial oversight of UK planning and preparation. He did not ensure that there was a flexible, realistic and fully resourced plan that integrated UK military and civilian contributions, and addressed the known risks.

    The failures in the planning and preparations continued to have an effect after the invasion.

    That brings me to the Government’s failure to achieve the objectives it had set itself in Iraq.

    The Armed Forces fought a successful military campaign, which took Basra and helped to achieve the departure of Saddam Hussein and the fall of Baghdad in less than a month.

    Service personnel, civilians who deployed to Iraq and Iraqis who worked for the UK, showed great courage in the face of considerable risks. They deserve our gratitude and respect.

    More than 200 British citizens died as a result of the conflict in Iraq. Many more were injured. This has meant deep anguish for many families, including those who are here today.

    The invasion and subsequent instability in Iraq had, by July 2009, also resulted in the deaths of at least one hundred and fifty thousand Iraqis – and probably many more – most of them civilians.

    More than a million people were displaced. The people of Iraq have suffered greatly.

    The vision for Iraq and its people – issued by the US, the UK, Spain and Portugal, at the Azores Summit on 16 March 2003 – included a solemn obligation to help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbours. It looked forward to a united Iraq in which its people should enjoy security, freedom, prosperity and equality with a government that would uphold human rights and the rule of law as cornerstones of democracy.

    We have considered the post-conflict period in Iraq in great detail, including efforts to reconstruct the country and rebuild its security services.

    In this short statement I can only address a few key points.

    After the invasion, the UK and the US became joint Occupying Powers. For the year that followed, Iraq was governed by the Coalition Provisional Authority. The UK was fully implicated in the Authority’s decisions, but struggled to have a decisive effect on its policies.

    The Government’s preparations failed to take account of the magnitude of the task of stabilising, administering and reconstructing Iraq, and of the responsibilities which were likely to fall to the UK.

    The UK took particular responsibility for four provinces in the South East. It did so without a formal Ministerial decision and without ensuring that it had the necessary military and civilian capabilities to discharge its obligations, including, crucially, to provide security.

    The scale of the UK effort in post-conflict Iraq never matched the scale of the challenge. Whitehall departments and their Ministers failed to put collective weight behind the task.

    In practice, the UK’s most consistent strategic objective in relation to Iraq was to reduce the level of its deployed forces.

    The security situation in both Baghdad and the South East began to deteriorate soon after the invasion.

    We have found that the Ministry of Defence was slow in responding to the threat from Improvised Explosive Devices and that delays in providing adequate medium weight protected patrol vehicles should not have been tolerated. It was not clear which person or department within the Ministry of Defence was responsible for identifying and articulating such capability gaps. But it should have been.

    From 2006, the UK military was conducting two enduring campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. It did not have sufficient resources to do so. Decisions on resources for Iraq were affected by the demands of the operation in Afghanistan.

    For example, the deployment to Afghanistan had a material impact on the availability of essential equipment in Iraq, particularly helicopters and equipment for surveillance and intelligence collection.

    By 2007 militia dominance in Basra, which UK military commanders were unable to challenge, led to the UK exchanging detainee releases for an end to the targeting of its forces.

    It was humiliating that the UK reached a position in which an agreement with a militia group which had been actively targeting UK forces was considered the best option available.

    The UK military role in Iraq ended a very long way from success.

    We have sought to set out the Government’s actions on Iraq fully and impartially. The evidence is there for all to see. It is an account of an intervention which went badly wrong, with consequences to this day.

    The Inquiry Report is the Committee’s unanimous view.

    Military action in Iraq might have been necessary at some point. But in March 2003:

    – There was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein.

    – The strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time.

    – The majority of the Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring.

    Military intervention elsewhere may be required in the future. A vital purpose of the Inquiry is to identify what lessons should be learned from experience in Iraq.

    There are many lessons set out in the Report.

    Some are about the management of relations with allies, especially the US. Mr Blair overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq.

    The UK’s relationship with the US has proved strong enough over time to bear the weight of honest disagreement. It does not require unconditional support where our interests or judgements differ.

    The lessons also include:

    – The importance of collective Ministerial discussion which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge.

    – The need to assess risks, weigh options and set an achievable and realistic strategy.

    – The vital role of Ministerial leadership and co-ordination of action across Government, supported by senior officials.

    – The need to ensure that both the civilian and military arms of Government are properly equipped for their tasks.

    – Above all, the lesson is that all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with the utmost rigour.

    And, when decisions have been made, they need to be implemented fully.

    Sadly, neither was the case in relation to the UK Government’s actions in Iraq.

    To conclude, I should like to thank my colleagues, our advisers and the Inquiry Secretariat for their commitment to this difficult task.

    I also want to pay tribute to Sir Martin Gilbert, who died last year. As one of the pre-eminent historians of the past century, he brought a unique perspective to our work until he became ill in April 2012. We have missed him greatly as a colleague and friend.

  • Tony Blair – 2016 Statement on Chilcot Inquiry

    tonyblair

    Below is the text of the statement made by Tony Blair, the former Prime Minister, on 6 July 2016.

    The report should lay to rest allegations of bad faith, lies or deceit. Whether people agree or disagree with my decision to take military action against Saddam Hussein; I took it in good faith and in what I believed to be the best interests of the country.

    I note that the report finds clearly:

    – That there was no falsification or improper use of Intelligence (para 876 vol 4)

    – No deception of Cabinet (para 953 vol 5)

    – No secret commitment to war whether at Crawford Texas in April 2002 or elsewhere (para 572 onwards vol 1)

    The inquiry does not make a finding on the legal basis for military action but finds that the Attorney General had concluded there was such a lawful basis by 13th March 2003 (para 933 vol 5)

    However the report does make real and material criticisms of preparation, planning, process and of the relationship with the United States.

    These are serious criticisms and they require serious answers.

    I will respond in detail to them later this afternoon.

    I will take full responsibility for any mistakes without exception or excuse.

    I will at the same time say why, nonetheless, I believe that it was better to remove Saddam Hussein and why I do not believe this is the cause of the terrorism we see today whether in the Middle East or elsewhere in the world.

    Above all I will pay tribute to our Armed Forces. I will express my profound regret at the loss of life and the grief it has caused the families, and I will set out the lessons I believe future leaders can learn from my experience.

  • Donald Tusk – 2016 Speech to European Parliament

    donaldtusk

    Below is the text of the speech made by Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, in the European Parliament on 5 July 2016.

    First of all I would like to thank you for your contributions to today’s debate. It is fully understandable that events of the past days have produced a lot of negative emotions. But we cannot give in to these emotions. We have to preserve the ability to make sober assessments and rational decisions.

    First, I would like to stress that the EU is ready to proceed with an amicable divorce with the UK even today. In this process we will stand firmly on the grounds of the Treaties, which have prepared us for such a situation. And one thing must be clear: the Treaties have left the decision on the initiation of the divorce proceedings to the member state that wishes to leave the EU. In other words we cannot effectively force this decision on the UK.

    Secondly, before launching the divorce procedures, we will not undertake any negotiations on the future shape of relations between the EU and the UK. These future relations will be based on a balance of rights and obligations. I would like to reassure you that wherever there may be a conflict of interest, we will act in the interest of the EU, and we will do so effectively.

    Thirdly, today we have heard a lot of severe and critical comments aimed at member states. I want to tell you that in our talks with the leaders of member states I always repeat that there is no EU without the EU institutions. In the current situation, attacks on the EU institutions, including the Commission and the Parliament, can only deepen the confusion. The national capitals must undertake an effort to stop accusing the EU and its institutions of weaknesses and failures. The referendum in the UK was lost, also because the political elites have for years been building a negative and often unfair vision of the EU. But there is no EU without the member states either. It is impossible to solve serious problems in the EU against the will of the member states. Taking responsibility for one’s own words applies also to representatives of EU institutions. Today we must combine all our efforts to agree on what is our common interest, as opposed to constantly demonstrating individual importance, in some kind of perpetual vanity fair.

  • Theresa May – 2016 Statement on First Round of Voting in Tory Leadership

    theresamay

    Below is the text of the statement issued by Theresa May, the Home Secretary, after the first round of voting in the Conservative Party leadership contest on 5 July 2016.

    I am pleased with this result, and very grateful to my colleagues for their support today.

    There is a big job before us: to unite our party and the country, to negotiate the best possible deal as we leave the EU, and to make Britain work for everyone.

    I am the only candidate capable of delivering these three things as prime minister, and tonight it is clear that I am also the only one capable of drawing support from the whole of the Conservative party.

    I look forward to continuing the debate about Britain’s future – in parliament and across the country.

  • Greg Clark – 2016 Speech to LGA Conference

    gregclark

    Below is the text of the speech made by Greg Clark, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, at the Bournemouth International Centre on 5 July 2016.

    Colleagues,

    We meet today in circumstances that a year ago, few of us would have expected.

    The United Kingdom resolved to leave the European Union.

    The Prime Minister – only recently re-elected – resigned and a contest to replace him underway.

    The principal party of Opposition contemplating a second contest within a year for the post of Leader.

    In these turbulent times it is more appropriate than ever to be grateful for the stability and confidence that local government brings to our national life.

    While some Westminster politicians can give a good impression of losing their heads and blaming it on everyone else, that doesn’t wash in local government.

    In fact, when the Local Government Association (LGA) had a spot of political instability after the local elections in May it was resolved amicably within days.

    One of the reasons why I’ve always been passionate about getting power out of the hands of central government and into yours is that there is a practicality and a directness in local government.

    You focus on the job in hand.

    Local government is agile, dependable, hands-on.

    As the author Benjamin Barber put it in the American context: “Presidents pontificate, mayors pick up the garbage.” Literally, and metaphorically.

    So let me thank you and, through you, all your fellow members and officers. Not just for picking up the garbage. But for educating our children, giving security and respect to our elderly. For making those who would be left out of our society welcomed in. For catching people when they fall into homelessness or debt or despair. For providing refuge for people fleeing violence whether perpetrated in their home or from brutal regimes the other side of the world.

    Thank you for helping our cities, towns and villages be better places to live and to work and do business, through your hard work in making them more attractive, making them greener, cleaner, and healthier.

    Thank you for running a planning system that brings you no end of brickbats but which has, for the first time in decades, produced planning permissions which match the growing population.

    Thank you for keeping our roads running – we’d certainly know if you didn’t – our parks beautiful and our neighbourhoods safe.

    And it’s not just the things that have to be done everyday. Local government proves itself time and again as being exceptionally agile at dealing with the unexpected.

    In December last year floods struck the North of England. The first to respond – alongside the emergency services – were officers and lead members of local authorities. As I saw first-hand during my time there, they worked round the clock for days on end – Christmas holidays literally washed away – to evacuate people affected, check on those isolated, to get money and help to people and businesses who needed it.

    I want to thank everyone who came to the rescue of our communities in their hour of need.

    I would like to thank Gary Porter for his leadership of the LGA during the last year, and the Group Leaders David Hodge, Nick Forbes, Gerald Vernon-Jackson and Marianne Overton.

    Let me now talk about the matter of Europe.

    The first thing to say is that whether we’re in local government or national government, government is about leadership. We have the responsibility to keep a cool head.

    The referendum was an instruction to negotiate terms for leaving the EU. Nothing has changed and should not, in my view, until we have a clear view of the change that we want.

    We are still members of the single market, we are still members of European Councils with full voting rights. People from other European countries have a perfect right to continue to live and work here.

    The second is that I think it is essential that we conduct ourselves with the courtesy and respect which not only is a hallmark of Britain’s reputation but an essential condition for any successful negotiation.

    Our European neighbours will continue to be our partners and must be our friends.

    Our society and our communities must be open, tolerant and welcoming.

    The Polish men who fought the Luftwaffe were welcome here.

    The Polish and other European men and women who have come more recently and who contribute to our national life – you too are welcome here.

    To those who come to us because they have fled persecution and to whom we have offered sanctuary – you are welcome here.

    Just because we have voted to leave the European Union does not mean we should abandon our international outlook, out openness to the world, our strength in being one of the most diverse, welcoming and civilised places on the planet.

    I’m proud of the work that my department supports, that many of you lead on, in tackling hate crime. We must redouble those efforts on behalf not just of those members of our society who have been subjected to sickening abuse in recent days, but of the whole of Britain whose repugnance at the behaviour of an unrepresentative few must prevail.

    I think that the referendum did not so much create divisions in our country so much as expose ones that were already there.

    London voting to remain, most of the rest of England for out.

    Some metropolitan cities voting marginally to stay in; smaller industrial towns voting heavily to leave.

    There was a critique that was made of the European Union – whether we think it was accurate or not. Too remote. Too unaccountable. Too bureaucratic. Trying to be too uniform. Run by people that don’t know what it’s like for me, where I am.

    Travelling around the country, talking to people during the campaign, I sensed that some of those charges were levelled at the way the country is run too.

    So among the answers to the challenge that the referendum result poses has to be a much bigger role for the local in our national life.

    Local government that is rooted in communities; Is practical and pragmatic not doctrinaire; Understands the communities that comprise an area – and the differences from one place to another.

    Local government has local, powerful leadership.

    Our great towns and cities over centuries have been led by – and in some cases founded by – people who have had the ability, but also the freedom, to pursue a bold vision for their city, town or county. To be proud of it and to care little for being told what to do.

    It was always the case that local leaders put national leaders in their place.

    One of my favourite stories is from my home town of Middlesbrough where the Prince of Wales came, in 1887, to open the new town hall. In his speech, the Prince admitted, with a condescending note, that he expected to see a smoky town.

    The Mayor instantly and publicly upbraided the Heir to the Throne:

    His Royal Highness owned he had expected to see a smoky town.

    It is one, and if there is one thing more than another that Middlesbrough can be said to be proud of, it is the smoke (cheers and laughter).

    The smoke is an indication of plenty of work (applause) – an indication of prosperous times (cheers) – an indication that all classes of workpeople are being employed, that there is little necessity for charity (cheers) and that even those in the humblest station are free from want (cheers).

    Therefore, we are proud of our smoke (cheers).

    In my view, local leaders should be similarly assertive in our day, the response to leaving the European Union has to be a radically expanded role for local government.

    That means that local government must be represented at the negotiating table. I argued successfully last week for English local government to be part of the negotiations on the terms of our exit.

    In the days ahead I will ask Gary to put together a team representing all parts of local government; all parties and all parts of the country to make sure we make good use of this seat at the table.

    When we are transferring powers from the EU to Britain I think it is essential that Whitehall is not the default destination for them.

    For years we have been urging subsidiarity – the principle that power is held as close to the people as possible – on the European Union.

    We now must apply it at home and ask first whether powers and funds can be transferred to local government. I also think it is essential that we confirm, as soon as possible, that the continued availability of the structural funds which co-fund many important investments in infrastructure and economic development, including in the North, the Midlands and the South West.

    The programme runs from 2014 to 2020 and it would be madness to put at risk major job-generating projects when they are already underway and much-needed.

    Although you could be forgiven for thinking so, there are many other matters that we need to discuss at this conference apart from our relationship with the EU.

    The Communities and Local Government Select Committee used to fret in the past about whether the department’s agenda was prominent enough in government. That is not a question they ask anymore.

    During the last 12 months, local government has played a more prominent and influential role in government policy than at any time I can remember.

    Ten Devolution Deals for combined authorities have been negotiated covering 30% of the population of England. Local government will retain 100% of business rates from 2019 to 2020 and will be financially independent of central government.

    Every part of England is on the point of submitting proposals for the Local Growth Fund which I launched in 2014 and is now driving growth in all parts of the country.

    There is much more to do, and I am determined that you should drive the reforms that are needed.

    During the last few months I have been working closely with the group leaders and officers in the LGA on how to make sure business rates retention is implemented in a way that is fair and effective to all types of councils an all parts of the country.

    I have argued strongly in government that we should get on with the preparations and specifically invite local government to recommend its preferred solution.

    So I can announce today that I am publishing the official consultation on business rates retention that will allow us to continue the momentum for reform. The consultation is open enough – rather than narrowly prescriptive – to give ample space for colleagues here to shape the solution that we arrive at.

    There is a major opportunity – arising from a major challenge – to transform the way in which the NHS and local councils work together to care for our elderly and vulnerable.

    In the Local Government Finance Settlement I negotiated with the Treasury and was able to secure a proposal that had been made to me by local government – the 2% social care precept, which has raised £308 million extra for social care in its first year, and a new fund available to local government to improve social care. But I am well aware that there is further to go.

    At its best, local NHS bodies work efficiently with local councils to ensure that hospital patients and elderly residents – who are one and the same people – are helped to get the best care they need in the most appropriate setting.

    But too often this is the exception rather than the rule, and the genuine full-hearted collaboration that is necessary has too often been lacking. That that must change – culturally, as much as structurally.

    I will redouble efforts to work with the Health Secretary to support any area that brings forward new ways of working that can improve social care. I will help ensure that you are not held back because it hasn’t been done before, or because budgets held by health providers have proved elusive to local government.

    I thanked you earlier for the transformation that you have made in providing the planning permissions we need to provide the homes that we need for the next generation. But while more planning permissions were granted, the number of new homes actually built has increased but not at the same pace.

    We need to close this gap. There is nothing more frustrating to you – or to me – than seeing a plot that has been granted planning permission taking years to be built out.

    So we need, together, to speed up the implementation of planning permissions. One of the ways we can do that is to provide smaller sites – or subdivide bigger sites – so that they are available to the small and medium-sized local and regional builders who literally built the Britain we are familiar with today, but whose balance sheets and access to finance puts them at a disadvantage when it comes to acquiring large sites.

    At the Spending Review we secured £20 billion for investment in house building and I am determined to work with you so that we can – in partnership – turn around the 30 year deficit in house building that has caused so much anguish for the millions of young people who want only to do what our generation was able to do with confidence – count on a home of their own.

    We have important further work to do on devolution. The devolution deals we have agreed already cover a third of the country by population – but they are very much available to all of the country.

    No place is the same and no deal should be the same.

    The geography and powers and governance that are right for one place will not be right for another. But in every case I will look for local agreement, not central imposition.

    Now I know that in many cases it would seem easier to give a standard blueprint and compel authorities to adopt it.

    But if you believe in devolution as I do that is to miss the whole point. I will not compel any council to join any devolution arrangement. It needs to be locally agreed.

    But in a Britain in which the question has changed from whether to devolve to how significantly, there is a huge opportunity for leaders who are willing to work together in harmony to take powers and budgets which can be used to magnify the impact on the lives of their residents.

    Mr Chairman, Conference. In at least 3 political parties – the Conservative Party, the Green Party and UKIP – there is a leadership contest underway – and if Labour were to join it would make 4.

    My advice to local government in these leadership contests is not to take the new found resurgence of interest in local government for granted.

    For many years devolution to local government was campaigned for locally, but was thwarted nationally. Some departments of government are recent converts, but in the recent past they were the most implacable opponents.

    A year ago I said I wanted to see a nation of muscular communities. Now is the time to exercise that muscle.

  • George Osborne – 2016 Statement on Maintaining Support for Businesses and Households

    gosborne

    Below is the text of the statement made by George Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and co-signed by leaders of numerous banks on 5 July 2016.

    While we are realistic about the economic challenge facing the country after the referendum result; we are reassured that collectively we can rise to it.

    The last time Britain faced an economic shock the banks were at the heart of the problem.

    Thanks to the hard work of rebuilding the banks, making them stronger and safer, and the arrival of new challenger banks – banks and building societies are now part of the solution.

    The government gave the Bank of England new counter-cyclical capital buffer powers to support lending in the financial system in the good times and bad.

    The independent FPC of the Bank of England have today used those powers.

    Now the UK’s main lenders, meeting with the Chancellor this morning, have agreed to make the extra capital available to support lending to UK businesses and households in this challenging time.

    The Chancellor called for a joint national effort to meet the economic challenge. Today we see that effort take place.

    Signatories and attendees

    Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne
    Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Harriett Baldwin
    Ms Jayne-Anne Gadhia (CEO, Virgin Money)
    Baroness Vadera (Chairman, Santander UK)
    Mr Douglas Flint (Chairman, HSBC)
    Mr Craig Donaldson (CEO, Metro Bank)
    Sir Howard Davies (Chairman, The Royal Bank of Scotland Group)
    Mr David Roberts (Chairman, Nationwide Building Society)
    Mr John McFarlane (Chairman, Barclays)
    Mr Alan Dickinson (Non-Executive Director, Lloyds Banking Group)