Tag: Issue of the Week 3

  • ISSUE OF THE WEEK 3 : Barbara Castle and the Rail Network

    ISSUE OF THE WEEK 3 : Barbara Castle and the Rail Network

    This is the third in our ‘issue of the week’ series which are designed to collect information and resources together about specific matters of political debate. Although we are publishing a number of documents every week for each new issue, we will also continually add new resources to these pages to make them as comprehensive as possible over time. We also hope that students will find the topics useful as a starting point for research on matters of political interest.

    Some of the interviews below were conducted for UKPOL, but there are also several new speeches that we’ve added to the web-site by Barbara Castle and from other politicians and commentators from the era. Many thanks to the Urban Transport Group for their assistance with this project and also to the National Archives. We have been offered additional resources relating to Barbara Castle which we will add to the web-site in due course.

    Particular thanks also to Christian Wolmar, a railway historian who has written a number of books including The Subterranean Railway: How the London Underground was Built and How it Changed the City ForeverCrossrail : The Whole Story and more recently, British Rail : A New History.


    INDEX

    Introduction

    Timeline

    Richard Beeching and the Cuts to the Railways

    Ernest Marples

    Tom Fraser

    Closures of Stations and Rail Lines By Year

    The Build-Up to a Transport Policy

    1968 Transport Act

    Was Barbara Castle an Effective Transport Minister?

    Further Reading


    “Barbara Castle was one of the most notorious or most effective transport ministers in history, depending on your view. She introduced the breathalyser, the 70 mph speed limit on motorways and car seatbelts, but also presided over 2,050 of Beeching cuts in a betrayal of Prime Minister’s Harold Wilson’s pledge to reverse them” – from the book On the Slow Train by Michael Williams


    INTRODUCTION

    Barbara Castle was a British politician who served as a Member of Parliament for over thirty years and held several high-profile cabinet positions in the Labour government of the 1960s and 1970s. She had been a trail blazer in many ways, she was the youngest female MP in the House of Commons in 1945 and only the fourth woman to hold a Cabinet position. She was a MP representing Blackburn between 1945 and 1979 and then was the MEP for Greater Manchester between 1979 and 1989. Following the election of the Labour Government in 1964 she was appointed as the Minister for Overseas Development, before a surprise move to become the Minister for Transport in December 1965.

    Castle followed on in the Transport Minister role from Conservative Ernest Marples, who had commissioned Beeching to write his report on the future of the rail network and her Labour predecessor Tom Fraser. Marples had a strong focus on roads, not least partly due to involvement in a road building company, whereas it has been said by politicians of the time and historians that Tom Fraser didn’t produce a clear direction for the railways. It was a challenging legacy for Castle who had to deliver on a new transport policy in line with the 1964 Labour Party manifesto.

    As Minister of Transport in the late 1960s, Castle oversaw the implementation of the Beeching cuts, a series of drastic reductions to the UK’s railway network that resulted in the closure of thousands of miles of railway lines and stations. The goal of the controversial Beeching cuts was to reduce losses on unprofitable lines and to shift investment to more profitable routes, however it also resulted in many rural communities and industrial areas losing their rail connections, and it also made it harder for people to travel for work and leisure. It was against the backdrop though of a railway network which grew in a fragmented way in the late nineteenth century, was used heavily during both war periods and under-invested in, leaving a bloated network which was losing substantial sums of money.

    Castle’s railway policy was met with some controversy and criticism at the time because it seemed to go against the promises made at the 1964 General Election to stop some of the major closures. However, defenders of her also note that there were external factors that needed to be considered, not least the rapid growth of car ownership. Barbara Castle wrote in 1984, when the Castle Diaries 1964-1970 were published, her comments on the background of what she faced. On the state of the network, Christian Wolmar said:

    “Some of what Beeching closed was inevitable. If you look at the maps there were little lines connecting villages and branches off branches, none of that was ever going to really be very useful in a motoring world”.

    Later on, Castle introduced major legislation, the 1968 Transport Act, which was wide in its scope but which did introduce the principle of subsidising some rail lines where there was a social need. She also looked at new ways of encouraging freight to be moved from road to rail and also introduced new passenger transport bodies to try and create more strategic public transport policies at a local and regional level. Opinions on Castle’s performance as Transport Minister are divided, some view her as a strong leader who modernised the country’s transportation system and made important changes to improve efficiency and profitability, while others see her policies as harmful to many communities and industries that relied on rail transport.


    TIMELINE

    14 October 1959 – Ernest Marples becomes Conservative Transport Minister

    27 March 1963 – First Beeching Report published (The Reshaping of British Railways)

    15 October 1964 – Labour win General Election and Labour Party manifesto

    16 October 1964 – Tom Fraser becomes Labour Transport Minister

    16 February 1965 – Second Beeching Report published (The Development of the Major Railway Trunk Routes)

    21 December 1965 – Barbara Castle’s diary entry on being asked to become new Transport Minister

    23 December 1965 – Barbara Castle becomes new Transport Minister

    31 March 1966 – Labour win General Election and Labour Party manifesto

    24 May 1966 – Barbara Castle’s diary entry following meeting with rail unions

    15 June 1966 – Barbara Castle’s statement on retaining routes for potential re-opening

    15 March 1967 – Barbara Castle’s statement in Commons on the Railway Network Map

    6 November 1967 – Barbara Castle’s speech in Commons on Government’s Transport Policy

    20 December 1967 – Barbara Castle’s statement in Commons on the Transport Bill

    6 April 1968 – Richard Marsh replaces Barbara Castle as Transport Minister

    25 October 1968 – Transport Act passed (Text of railway section of 1968 Transport Act)


    RICHARD BEECHING AND THE CUTS TO THE RAILWAYS

    Richard Beeching, Baron Beeching, was a British engineer and businessman who served as the chairman of British Railways from 1961 to 1965. During his tenure, he oversaw the creation of a plan which led to a major restructuring of the rail network, which included the closure of thousands of miles of railway lines and stations, known as the “Beeching cuts”. Although some blame Beeching for savaging the rail network, historians often have a more nuanced view that he was tasked with a specific objective by Ernest Marples and many of his recommendations proved to be useful for the modernisation of the rail industry.

    The goal of the Beeching cuts was to reduce losses on unprofitable lines and to shift investment to more profitable routes. Beeching’s report, “The Reshaping of British Railways”, which was published in 1963, identified over 5,000 miles of railway lines and over 2,300 stations as uneconomic, and recommended their closure. As a result, many rural communities and industrial areas lost their rail connections, and it made it harder for people to travel for work and leisure.

    It’s also useful to note that Beeching wasn’t the first to suggest cuts, they had already been taking place, it was just that his report laid out with clarity what the future held for specific lines and the network as a whole. HP White writes in Forgotten Railways that:

    “In 1963 came the British Railways Board’s publication ‘The Reshaping of British Railways’, which will also be known as the ‘Beeching Report’. It is rightly regarded as a landmark in the story of rail closures, but probably for the wrong reason. It is not generally realised that while the Beeching Report recommended the closure of some 5,000 route miles of passenger services, it did not initiate the closure programme. Between 1950 and 1962, 4,236 route miles had already been closed. What was important was that, for the first time, the approach was a planned one”.

    He adds:

    “As a result of the association of his name solely with closures, Beeching has been seen as having a purely negative approach to his brief. But in a message to BR employees in July 1962 he expressed the hope that, having talked hitherto largely about cuts, he would soon be able to talk of growth. That he was denied the opportunity was due less to his own inclinations than to Government policies – or rather lack of them”.

    The Beeching cuts were mostly implemented by the Labour government of the time, led by Harold Wilson, and were initially supported by Tom Fraser and at first Barbara Castle, the Ministers of Transport. The cuts were met with significant controversy and criticism, as they were seen as detrimental to many communities and industries that relied on rail transport. But, with Castle reluctant to push forward the second Beeching report, it was evident that a change was coming.

    Beeching’s report and the railway cuts have had a long-lasting impact on the British railway system and many people still regard the size of the cuts as a major mistake and a missed opportunity to modernise the rail network. Over recent decades there has been a political move towards what is called “Reversing Beeching” and reopening lines and services. The House of Lords have produced a library briefing discussing these potential efforts to reopen lines, with this research document also linking to a speech on this web-site by Andrew Adonis which was made to the IPPR on this subject.


    ERNEST MARPLES

    Ernest Marples was a British businessman and politician who served as the Minister of Transport from 1959 to 1964. He played a key role in the restructuring of the UK’s rail network during this period. One of Marples’s most significant actions as Minister of Transport was the introduction of the “Beeching Plan” which proposed the closure of thousands of miles of railway lines and stations in order to reduce losses on unprofitable routes. The plan was named after the chairman of British Railways, Dr. Richard Beeching, who was appointed by Marples.

    The “Beeching Plan” was implemented by the Labour government that succeeded Marples’ and led to the closure of more than half of the UK’s railway stations and a third of its railway lines, causing significant controversy and criticism, particularly in the regions that lost their rail connections. To this day, Marples is known by many as one of the villains in railway history, as although some cutbacks to the number of lines and stations were inevitable where usage was particularly low, the fully implemented proposals would have devastated the network.

    Marples is also known for his involvement in the construction of the M1 motorway, the first of its kind in the UK, which was completed during his tenure as Minister of Transport. The road construction was also controversial given the personal interests that Marples had. Joe Moran writes in ‘On Roads – A Hidden History’ that:

    “Already, though, the flyovers were losing some of their lustre as they became embroiled in political wrangling. Ernest Marples remained a major shareholder in Marples Ridgway, the company he co-founded in 1948 which was involved in much of the early motorway building. When this company won the Hammersmith Flyover contract in 1960, the press challenged him over the conflict of interest. In a nod to the ancient road running along the chalk escarpment from the Dorset coast to the Norfolk Wash, this flyover became popularly known as the Maples Ridgeway. Marples was forced to divest himself of his shares – although probably not, as some history books have alleged, by selling them to Mrs. Marples. One MP asked the minister whether he would see to it that ‘before the opening ceremony the huge Marples nameplates which are scattered all over it, are removed in order that people can see the flyover?’”.

    In terms of legacy, Marples’ tenure as transport minister is viewed in a negative light by many due to the severe impact of the Beeching cuts on many communities and industries that relied on rail transport. His promotion of road infrastructure over rail also had a long-term impact on the UK’s transportation system and the environment. However, at the time there were those who supported his plans, including journalist Douglas Haig who wrote in December 1965 that he was the best of the recent Transport Ministers.


    TOM FRASER

    Tom Fraser was Labour’s Minister of Transport between October 1964 and December 1965, responsible for implementing the transport policy laid out in the 1964 Labour Party manifesto which said:

    “Nowhere is planning more urgently needed than in our transport system. The tragedy of lives lost and maimed; growing discomfort and delays in the journey to work; the summer weekend paralysis on our national highways; the chaos and loss of amenity in our towns and cities – these are only some of the unsolved problems of the new motor age. Far from easing these problems, the Government’s policy of breaking up road and rail freight co-ordination, of denationalising road haulage and finally of axing rail services under the Beeching Plan, have made things worse.

    Labour will draw up a national plan for transport covering the national networks of road, rail and canal communications, properly co-ordinated with air, coastal shipping and port services. The new regional authorities will be asked to draw up transport plans for their own areas. While these are being prepared, major rail closures will be halted.

    British Road Services, will be given all necessary powers to extend their fleet of road vehicles and to develop a first-rate national freight service. Reform of the road goods licensing system must now await the report of the Geddes Committee but, in the interests of road safety, we shall act vigorously to stop cut-throat haulage firms from flouting regulations covering vehicle maintenance, loads and driving hours.

    Labour believes that public transport, road and rail, must play the dominant part in the journey to work. Every effort will be made to improve and modernise these services. Urgent attention will be given to the proposals in the Buchanan Report and to the development of new roads capable of diverting through traffic from town centres. Labour will ensure that public transport is able to provide a reasonable service for those who live in rural areas. The studies already mentioned will decide whether these should be provided by public road or rail services”.

    The Government had come into power saying that it would review the Beeching cuts and look to form a new policy on how to tackle the losses in the rail industry, halting any major rail closures. Fraser was in the role for just over a year and he had ultimately decided that the general thrust of Beeching seemed correct, a view which had taken hold within the Transport Department. Despite the manifesto, he continued the closures policy, although he decided in June 1965 not to renew Beeching’s contract when his second report soon proved to be too politically difficult for the Government.

    One of Fraser’s most controversial decisions was the closure of the Varsity Line between Oxford and Cambridge even though this hadn’t even been listed by Beeching as track which should be shut. Over recent years, work has begun on plans to reopen the line to improve east-west rail links. Charles Loft wrote in ‘Government, the Railways and the Modernization of Britain’:

    “Fraser was unable to take decisions and was unduly reliant on his officials, his downfall was precipitated by his commitment to a planned transport policy. Even if such a policy could have been devised so as to justify a halt to the closure programme, it could not have been done quickly enough to satisfy important sections of Labour Party support; and without a new policy the advice that Fraser received on individual closure proposals was unlikely to differ from what Marples had received. Transport planning, it turned out, was at odds with the maintenance of an aura of dynamic change. It was in this respect that Fraser clearly failed to deliver and in which, on the face of it, things were to change with the arrival at the Ministry of Barbara Castle”.

    David Henshaw wrote in this book ‘In The Great Railway Conspiracy’ focusing on the closure of the Varsity Line:

    “In July 1965, the hapless Fraser – poorly briefed and seemingly disinterested – consented to closure [of the Varsity Line]. During this unhappy period, with lines being put forward [for closure] and processed at a rate of ten a month, this crucial link fell with hardly any national debate, as did others that were soon regretted. Implementation proved difficult, because there was trouble arranging bus services on a local basis, but the greater part of the line closed to passengers in November 1967, with the western end remaining open for freight, and a short section between Bedford and Bletchley for passenger trains. These remaining tenuous threads were to be of priceless value 30 years later, when action was finally taken to begin the long and complex task of reinstating the line”.

    He continues:

    “By the end of 1965, with the greater part of the Reshaping proposals now processed, there were few realistic candidates left for closure. Why then, did the Labour Government continue the process? According to Roger Calvert of the National Council for Inland Transport, the new and inexperienced administration had been bullied into submission by the powerful anti-rail civil servants at the Ministry of Transport, who were in turn being harassed by the Treasury over the railway’s growing deficit. Labour had, technically, arrived in power with a brief to integrate transport, but the railways were making big losses and Tom Fraser was getting top level advice that further closures were the way forward. In the end, there was no other game in town. He certainly seems to have had little interest in the transport job, and was understandably considered by the rail lobby to be openly road-biased”.

    Many of Fraser’s most notable decisions are in relation to the road network, as he introduced the 70mph speed limit, initially as a trial. His year in office was otherwise unremarkable, with many policies from the Conservative Government not being widely changed. This was the challenging backdrop of what Barbara Castle took over when she became Transport Minister, a need to try and create a new transport policy rather than just a continuation of what the Conservatives had been doing. Fraser was widely seen by politicians of the time and railway historians to have struggled with the role, hence why Wilson caused some initial shock, not least to her, by bringing Barbara Castle in to develop a new strategy.


    CLOSURES OF STATIONS AND RAIL LINES BY YEAR

    Railway line closures by year:

    1963 : 324 miles (521 km) [Conservative, Ernest Marples]
    1964 : 1,058 miles (1,703 km) [mostly Conservative, Ernest Marples]
    1965 : 600 miles (970 km) [Labour, Tom Fraser]
    1966 : 750 miles (1,210 km) [Labour, Barbara Castle]
    1967 : 300 miles (480 km) [Labour, Barbara Castle]
    1968 : 400 miles (640 km) [Labour, Barbara Castle and Richard Marsh]
    1969 : 250 miles (400 km) [Labour, Richard Marsh and Fred Mulley]

    Details of closed railway stations can be found at http://www.disused-stations.org.uk/.


    THE BUILD-UP TO A TRANSPORT POLICY

    Harold Wilson had given Barbara Castle the role of Transport Minister as Tom Fraser had struggled in the job and the Prime Minister wanted it to become a priority for the Labour Government. She faced challenges immediately, Fraser had effectively continued many policies from Ernest Marples and she needed to come up with an integrated transport policy which had been promised in the 1964 Labour party manifesto.

    TR Gourvish noted in his book ‘British Railways 1948-1973’ the scale of the administrative problems that she faced:

    “The Ministry, like the railways themselves, required improved planning mechanisms and a better co-ordination of departments. Castle was apparently shocked to find that she had been posted to ‘a huge, sprawling jungle’ of 7,000 civil servants, patently in need of major departmental reform”.

    Philip S Bagwell similarly noted in The Transport Crisis in Britain that “the overwhelming majority of the staff in the Ministry were concerned with road transport”. A few weeks into her new role, in February 1966, Barbara Castle stated her thoughts to how she would develop the Government’s transport policy. She said that:

    “The time has come for a radical new railway policy. We had to decide its shape and size, taking into account national and regional plans as well as social needs and also how we should pay for it, so identifying costs which should be borne by the community, giving realistic efficiency targets to British Railways and taking from them the slur of a deficit.

    The first requirement was to regard our railways as a valuable national asset, as the French did, and to concentrate on improving them. Labour had never denied that some pruning must be done, but there was no need to go to the other extreme and write off any part of it which didn’t fit in with the ‘superficially defined criteria of profitability’ without making any effort to see whether, by imaginative adjustments, the lines could be made more remunerative”.

    Lisa Martineau wrote in her biography of Barbara Castle that car usage was growing and that there were limits to what she could do as Transport Minister, noting:

    “Democratising car ownership would mean building new roads and spending more on existing ones, of course; but 90% of passenger traffic and 60% of freight was carried on the roads, and Barbara accepted that you would not get people out of their cars and ‘onto railways which could not take them where they wanted to go’. An accommodation with the car had to be found: ring roads, restrictions on cars in the centres of towns and cities, and subsidised public transport were obvious beginnings”.

    There were hints at the excitement of road building for Barbara Castle, when she noted in 1966 at the construction of the Almondsbury interchange that “these are the cathedrals of the modern world”. TR Gourvish comments in his book ‘British Railways 1948-1973’ that after getting to grips with the role, Castle wanted to redefine the Government’s policy:

    “When Castle took office, the Board was about to embark on the second stage of its passenger rationalisation programme, a systematic evaluation of all its passenger services in order to weed out those which were ‘suspect in the sense that earnings do not cover direct costs’. But this initiative was put to one side with the change of direction in 1966, which involved the identification of a larger, 11,000-mile network for development and a group of passenger services which would qualify for government subsidy. Castle was certainly expected to be more hostile to closures, particularly by those on the Labour backbenches and in the rail unions who had attacked Tom Fraser for perpetuating the Beeching-Marples approach. One of the myths of railway history is that the new Minister, by championing the cause of the commuter and rural rail user, finally nailed the lid on the Reshaping coffin”.

    The closures of railway lines kept coming, with Castle justifying many closures by saying that the cuts were less than Beeching had intended. She did save some lines from closure, but there were others cases such as the railway line from Buxton to Matlock which she authorised the closure of, even though it hadn’t been on the list proposed by Beeching. The debate on the future of the railways continued with the work towards legislation planned for 1968.

    Work was beginning on a new model for public transport, including what became regional passenger transport executives who could co-ordinate and organise at a regional level. In a parliamentary debate, prior to the passing of the Transport Act, in November 1967, the Shadow Transport Minister Peter Walker said:

    “I turn to the proposals for passenger transport authorities. These proposals have no friends. Local authorities do not like them; industry does not like them, and the bus industry in particular does not like them. Everybody is opposed to them”.

    Castle said in response:

    “The 1962 Act set up the railways as a separate entity, encouraged them to compete with other forms of nationalised transport and then left the profit and loss account as the sole criterion of success and did not even provide conditions in which the profit and loss account could be balanced”.

    Walker had said in his speech that Barbara Castle’s plans involved substantial nationalisation, but the proposals were more nuanced than that. They were an attempt to deliver an integrated transport policy, recognising that roads were now the future of transport for many, but also ensuring that bus and rail services would continue to be an option. Castle would have by nature of her political instincts been in support of more nationalisation as she was on the left of the party and had at other times argued for this approach, but she wanted in transport to be a partnership of public and private.

    There was another challenge evident with Barbara Castle’s diary entry following meeting with rail unions which was that it was necessary to keep the workers and the trade unions on side. This proved to be a real challenge, although the rail unions did recognise that things could have been much worse given the backing that Castle was trying to give to the network. Christian Wolmar said that “even today, the unions are strong enough to suddenly make a lot of trouble and part of the problem that the Government has now found itself in is because they haven’t talked properly to the unions”. He added that “Castle realised the importance of winning the unions over and devoted a lot of time to it”.

    Castle had by this time “become a media hate figure” according to Joe Moran in ‘On Roads – A Hidden History’, but much of this wasn’t with relation to railway policies, but instead because of her policies with regards to roads. She had introduced the breathalyser, she had effectively made permanent the 70mph road ban introduced by Tom Fraser and introduced compulsory seatbelts in new cars. There were protests about the motorway speed limit by many who felt they should be able to do what they liked in their car on the new motorways and didn’t appreciate being told what to do by a Government Minister.

    One controversial decision that Barbara Castle took was the dismissal of railway manager Gerry Fiennes, who had saved the East Suffolk line from closure by cutting costs locally and showing that the line could save money by competent management. He went public with an announcement that lines could be saved, but Castle thought that his book ‘I Tried to Run a Railway’ went too far. David Webster, the Shadow Transport Minister for the Conservatives condemned the dismissal and demanded an inquiry into the decision.

    Barbara Castle’s preparatory work in 1966 and 1967 was building up to one of the most substantial pieces of legislation that had been seen since the war, what became the 1968 Transport Act.


    1968 TRANSPORT ACT

    The text of 1968 Transport Act at legislation.gov.uk and the book ‘The British Railways System’ by Roger Spear et al is a useful detailed guide written for Open University students as to the structure of the railways at the time and the challenges which Ministers faced.

    The Transport Act 1968 was a major piece of legislation passed by the UK government that aimed to modernise and reorganise the country’s transportation system. The main architect of the act was Barbara Castle who wanted to not only deliver on the party’s 1964 manifesto but also to have clarity on the future of transport.

    The act was substantial in its scope and size, the largest since the Second World War. It aimed to achieve numerous objectives such as delivering a more integrated public transport system by the creation of PTEs and it created the National Freight Corporation (previously known as British Road Services), with the goal of improving the efficiency and profitability of the country’s freight operations.

    The Act also allowed for the establishment and development of liner trains, which evolved into Freightliner, which allowed containers to be transported by rail in an attempt to stop some of the move towards transporting goods by road. Despite progress actually being made, Barbara Castle wrote in her diaries that some of her proposals weren’t progressed, noting her successor:

    “Dick Marsh never brought them into operation because he did not approve of them, so the experiment in shifting goods from road to rail was never made”.

    The Act gave local authorities more powers to plan and provide public transport services, and it established the National Bus Company, which aimed to improve the efficiency and profitability of the country’s bus operations. The creation of PTEs, or Passenger Transport Executives, allowed areas (usually urban) to take control of bus routes in their region as well as working with the rail industry. There had until this point been a general policy to tackle urban transport problems by building new ringroads and flyovers in cities, leading to residential areas being demolished and causing environmental issues.

    Significantly, the Transport Act also included provisions for the closure of uneconomic railway lines and stations, with subsidies available for lines which fulfilled a social good for the community. HP White writes in Forgotten Railways that “until at least 1963 subsidy had been a dirty word for all political parties” and so Castle’s subsidy was “a very significant policy change”. Richard Pryke and John Dodgson note in their book The British Rail Problem : A Case Study in Economic Disaster:

    “Barbara Castle wanted to eliminate open-ended subsidies and impose some financial discipline on the Railways Board. The solution adopted was to identify those passenger services that were losing money and to cover their estimated deficits through a subsidy. It was hoped and expected that the Board would then be able to break even provided its capital charges were scaled down, and if it were relieved of responsibility for the highly unprofitable freight sundries service”.

    They add that:

    “The Transport Act of 1968 has failed in its objective: British Rail is once again heavily in deficit, despite the financial reconstruction and the receipt of a large subsidy. In 1969, the railways and their ancillary activities had a net profit of around £20 million, after taking into account the £76 million which they received from the Government. However, by 1971 they were once again in deficit, and in 1973 they sustained a net loss approaching £50 million, despite £94 million of subsidies”.

    Lisa Martineau wrote in her biography of Barbara Castle just how sizeable and revolutionary the legislation was:

    “Barbara’s labyrinthine Transport Bill was the longest non-financial Bill in parliamentary history and the longest Bill or any sort since the war. The experts and the media, for the most part, were impressed. She had, said the New Statesman, set out ‘to reform practically the whole of the internal transport system …. by a nice blend of traditional socialism and up to date technocratic intervention’. The Bill was often called a pantechnicon – a bazaar and a receptacle containing many miscellaneous objects, as well as a removal lorry – it was ‘stuffed with all the radical proposals for reorganising British transport that have been maturing under that neat crop of fiery hair for the past eighteenth months’ wrote The Times”.

    Some were disappointed by the Act in terms of how the road lobby still seemed to be winning the arguments over the future of transport, with David Henshaw writing in the Great Railway Conspiracy:

    “The 1968 Act proved a serious disappointment. The Government lost its nerve in the face of concerted opposition from the road lobby and eased the lorry taxation proposals. And the unremunerated railway grants system actually precipitated a fresh round of closures, because there was a cap on the total grant aid, and the level of grant for individual lines proved too generous, leading the Government to refuse aid in many cases. By 1970, the implementation of Dr Beeching’s Reshaping report was more or less complete, but with railway income falling, overall financial viability remained as far out of reach as ever”.

    Richard Pryke and John Dodgson note in their book ‘The British Rail Problem : A Case Study in Economic Disaster’ that:

    “The moral which the Railways Board appears to have drawn from the Transport Act was not, as the Government intended, that British Rail must do its utmost to cut its costs and trim its investment, but that, if the need arose, more assistance would be forthcoming”.

    Overall, the Transport Act 1968 and Barbara Castle’s efforts aimed to modernise and reorganise the country’s transportation system and to reduce losses on unprofitable lines, however it also resulted in significant controversy and criticism for the negative impact it had on many communities.


    WAS BARBARA CASTLE AN EFFECTIVE TRANSPORT MINISTER?

    Barbara Castle’s period as Transport Minister was one of the most remarkable of anyone who held the role, as there was an ambitious new policy position put together for the future of rail and road. The 1968 Transport Act was in many ways revolutionary in terms of public transport integration, subsidising rail lines and also developing freight services by rail.

    However, for those who believe the rail sector was badly damaged following Beeching, they will point to how many stations and miles of railway lines closed during her period in office. Castle, herself not a car driver, was always sympathetic to the needs of those without their own car, but she faced the challenge of a society where car ownership was becoming more common and there seemed to be a shift away from public transport. She once said:

    “I refused to be a King Canute trying to force people onto railways which could not take them where they wanted to go”.

    Christian Wolmar said that “she didn’t quite understand the impact that cars would have, like everyone else at the time” with not just politicians of the time, but also the Transport Ministry in the 1960s being very much in favour of a car focused future. Wolmar adds though that “it was a breakthrough” that Castle introduced the process of subsidising some rail lines where there were social benefits to doing so, adding that “many politicians today still don’t understand that and they talk about railways paying their way”.

    During the initial part of her period in the role, she did though continue the closure programme and she also extended it, closing lines such as Buxton to Matlock which hadn’t been part of the Beeching plan. Although Castle did approve the closures of thousands of miles of rail line, she did ensure that some routes were saved, including York to Harrogate, Manchester to Buxton and the Exeter to Exmouth line.

    Outside of the rail network, Castle was also known for other innovations, such as the introduction of the breathalyser which helped to tackle the shock figure in 1966 that 8,000 people had died on the roads. She also was also responsible for requiring seatbelts to be fitted into new cars and extending the 70mph limit on motorways so that it effectively became permanent. In addition to this, she enabled 1,400 miles of the British canal network to be saved in a substantial part for leisure use, despite objections from HM Treasury that it wasn’t commercially viable.

    Alfred F Havighurst noted in his 1985 book ‘Britain in Transition – The Twentieth Century’:

    “Barbara Castle’s notable Transport Act of 1968 reflected courage and intelligence in dealing with financial deficits and inefficiency in the railway and road haulage. For the nationalised railways this legislation wiped out financial losses which had piled up from the past, transferred unremunerative traffic to road haulage, and provided compensation for services which were still socially desirable though unremunerative. The goal for British Railways was operation without deficits by 1974. Also, the Transport Act completely transformed road haulage in the endeavour to make maximum use of railways in handling freight previously carried on congested highways, to eliminate competition between the railways and road haulage, and, in general to render road haulage safer, more efficient, and more economical”.

    Charles Loft wrote in ‘Government, the Railways and the Modernization of Britain’:

    “Castle’s reputation as an innovative minister of transport who restored a measure of coordination to transport policy and gave rail a better deal rests primarily on a series of measures contained in the 1968 Transport Act. Although she refused to recreate the BTC, the Act’s provision for Passenger Transport Authorities to coordinate transport in urban areas and its creation of a National Freight Corporation (NFC) to control the former British Road Services, the BRB’s collection and delivery services and various rail freight services, including freightliners, largely satisfied Labour’s desire for coordination. Its provision of subsidies for loss-making rail services and a ‘quantity licensing’ system for road haulage, designed to divert freight from road to rail, combined with her commitment to an 11,000 mile network, rather than the 8,000 implied by the final round of Beeching’s traffic studies, given even a critic such as Henshaw the impression that she successfully challenged the pro-road bias of the Ministry and its Permanent Secretary Sir Thomas Padmore, an impression which owes much to the weight of opposition brought to bear on quantity licensing by the RHA and the Conservatives”.

    David Henshaw wrote in this book ‘In The Great Railway Conspiracy’ about the legacy of Barbara Castle:

    “Castle has had a mixed press over the years. After the cheerfully road-biased Marples, and ineffective Fraser, she entered the Ministry like a breath of fresh air, standing up to the powerful civil servants and making a serious attempt to find a fair solution to the railway issue. On the other hand, she oversaw some disastrous closures that should never have been allowed. Unlike previous incumbents, her transport politics were hard to place. She rarely used railways, but needed a chauffeur because she couldn’t drive, and apparently had no desire to”.

    The individual reader can make up their own mind as to whether or not Barbara Castle was a successful Minister, but she was perhaps unarguably productive and industrious in developing policy directions. Much of what an individual might make of Barbara Castle likely depends on whether they feel she did enough to stop the rail closures that took place in the 1960s or whether her new policy of subsidising unprofitable lines actually meant an end to the closures at least from the 1970s onwards. Looking back though at transport policy in the twentieth century, it would be hard not to look at the 1968 Transport Act as being a revolutionary piece of legislation which contained some radical and innovative new visions for the future.

    Jonathan Bray addressed this question and concluded:

    “So, 50 years on, what is the legacy and the relevance? You can argue long and hard over whether she was in the end too radical or too pragmatic – or whether the positives are outweighed by the scars that haven’t healed from the lines that closed on her watch (and she would have loved to have the argument with you!). But you can’t fault her for ambition, determination and brio. She showed that you need to go out there and sell radical change (she always had her press people in for the key decisions and led from the front on making the case)”.


    FURTHER READING

    The Transport Crisis in Britain by Philip S Bagwell

    Fighting All the Way by Barbara Castle

    The Castle Diaries 1964 – 1970 by Barbara Castle

    I Tried to Run a Railway by Gerry Fiennes

    British Railways 1948-1973 by TR Gourvish

    The Great Railway Conspiracy by David Henshaw

    Little Book of Beeching by Robin Jones

    Politics & Power – A Biography of Barbara Castle by Lisa Martineau

    On Roads – A Hidden History by Joe Moran

    The British Rail Problem : A Case Study in Economic Disaster by Richard Pryke and John Dodgson

    Forgotten Railways by HP White

    On the Slow Train by Michael Williams

    British Rail : A New History by Christian Wolmar


    EXTERNAL LINKS

    Barbara Castle’s Archive at the Bodleian Library

    Barbara Castle’s Cabinet Diaries at the University of Bradford

    Article by Jonathan Bray – “The best transport secretary we’ve had?”

    Christian Wolmar

    National Archives

  • Barbara Castle – 1965 Diary Entry on Becoming Transport Secretary

    Barbara Castle – 1965 Diary Entry on Becoming Transport Secretary

    The diary entry on 21 December 1965 in Barbara Castle’s diaries, The Castle Diaries 1964-1970.

    TUESDAY 21 DECEMBER 1965

    At 8.45 pm phone call from Marcia [Williams]. Could I come down and see the PM? Harold [Wilson] waved me into his room, boyish and slightly dishevelled. “May I open my heart to you? You and I ought to talk more, only I’m so busy and you are, too. Have a whisky or brandy?”. When I said that I’d love a brandy, he said, “it’s the only thing that keeps me going. Fortunately I have a most intelligent doctor who prescribes it for me. It does something to my metabolism”.

    ……

    “I always knew that Tom [Fraser] was weak, but I was saddled with a shadow Cabinet, every one of whom expected a job” he went on, “I must have a Minister of Transport who can act. Tom has got a very strong Permanent Secretary whom Churchill got rid of in the Cabinet secretariat and brought in Burke Trend (though I’ll get rid of Helsby before I’m through). I am convinced he has killed integration. But we have got to have an integrated transport policy. I can’t hold the Party otherwise. And the Party is key to everything. We have offered Tom all sorts of advisers but he doesn’t know how to make use of them. Unless you accept my offer the reshuffle can’t take place. I hope you will, but, Barbara, if you say no I shan’t hold it against you. I know what you feel about Overseas Development, but I want you on the home side. I think you are the best person we have got. I want you to be Minister of Transport”.

    I closed my eyes.

  • Barbara Castle – 1966 Diary Entry on Meeting with Rail Unions

    Barbara Castle – 1966 Diary Entry on Meeting with Rail Unions

    The diary entry on 24 May 1966 in Barbara Castle’s diaries, The Castle Diaries 1964-1970.

    Tuesday 24 May 1966

    A vital day in the evolution of my policy. I met all three rail unions a BR’s headquarters in order to let Raymond [Sir Stanley Raymond] explain the proposed new rail network to them. My heart was in my mouth because I knew it meant the closure of 3,000 more miles of lines, although the outcome would be a network of 11,000 route miles instead of the 8,000 proposed in the second Beeching Report.

    I told Raymond to pile on the positive side of the policy and he excelled himself. I told them I had got my colleagues’ agreement to the survey into railway finances and stressed this meant a subsidy – open and overt – to the railways, something we had refused to other nationalised industries like coal. I then asked for questions. There was a long silence while I waited, hardly daring to breathe. As last Sid [Sidney Greene] said slowly, “I am very pleased with what we have heard. Clearly there is going to be a very good future for the men who are left in the system. Our trouble is, as I expect you know, with the men who will not have a place in it. I know you think we are always moaning and are against change, but we have to deal with our members and we have to speak for those who are affected. I shall to moan a lot more, but nonetheless I am pleased with what we have heard and not least for the fact that we have had it all explained to us so fully in this way, not like when the Beeching Report came out – that blue book – and the first we heard of it was when a copy was put into out hands two hours before publication”.

    The other unions leaders echoed him in turn, ASLEF saying almost pathetically, “You must help us with our members”. Tom Bradley played into my hands by asking how we proposed to get private hauliers to use the railways more. I launched into a passionate appeal for open terminals through which even Kelly sat silent, at a loss for a wrecking question. And I warned them that I was having trouble with TGWU who suspected I was favouring rail too much – so they had better hurry up and get as much on to rail as they possibly could while the going was good. In all a most encouraging afternoon.

  • Barbara Castle – 1967 Speech on Transport

    Barbara Castle – 1967 Speech on Transport

    The speech made by Barbara Castle, the then Transport Minister, in the House of Commons on 6 November 1967.

    This debate is on the Queen’s Speech and our present discussion is geared to the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. Peter Walker) to the passage in the Gracious Speech relating to transport. In that Amendment the hon. Gentleman complains that the Government are not … concentrating on practical measures to improve conditions for the travelling public and for industry”. The passage in the Gracious Speech on which the hon. Gentleman bases this complaint reads: Legislation will be brought before you to provide for the better integration of rail and road transport within a reorganised framework of public control … That is an integration which has long been overdue and which the development of the container is making technically imperative.

    The passage continues: … to promote safety and high standards in the road transport industry … Is not that a matter that will improve conditions for the travelling public and for the public in general, who have been complaining for years about the danger of “killer” lorries on our roads?

    Then the Speech says: … to strengthen the powers of local authorities to manage traffic … Will any rational Member in this Chamber seek to claim that this will not be an important measure for improving the travelling conditions on the congested roads of our great cities? The hon. Gentleman did not have time for even a fleeting reference to it, although he asks the House to approve an Amendment condemning this whole paragraph.

    The paragraph states, finally, that the legislation will: … reorganise the nationalised inland waterways with special emphasis on their use for recreation and amenity “. Is not that another matter in which the public is very interested indeed? The hon. Gentleman is always pressing me to produce my White Papers elaborating the different aspects of the Bill I shall be presenting to Parliament before very long. I gave him a White Paper on the inland waterways part at the beginning of September. I do not think that he has even read it, and today he has not made so much as a passing reference to it.

    I will come in a moment to the perfunctory way in which he has dismissed another White Paper, which he has had in his hands all morning.—[Laughter.] Yes, I know—the hon. Gentleman is slow to pick up new ideas, but in the other part of his speech he was complaining that the ideas were not new at all, so I do not know what further time he needs to discuss it.

    Before I leave that aspect of the argument let us get the roads expenditure position quite clear. The hon. Gentleman believes in economy. He believes in economy in new speeches, and we have had this same one of his time after time. Let me therefore deal once and for all with this aspect of his argument, which is at the heart of the comparison between the records of the previous Administration and this Government in this important sphere.

    Under this Government, the total Exchequer expenditure on roads in the five years up to 1970 will be greater than that involved in the previous Conservative Government’s proposals—and let us remember that their proposals for the five years were merely paper plans. They had never got to the point of finding the money for them. They had never got to the point of having to turn a pre-election propaganda into concrete fact, but this is what we are doing.

    Mr. Peter Walker rose—

    Mrs. Castle Just a moment. This is what we are doing.

    The fact is that in the seven years 1964–65 to 1970–71, a period for which the Labour Government will be responsible, Exchequer expenditure on new and improved roads in Great Britain will be in the neighbourhood of £1,600 million. The total public expenditure on new and improved roads in Britain will be about £1,850 million. We have had to find the money, and we have been doing so, and we shall be doing so faced merely by demands from hon. Gentlemen opposite that we should cut public expenditure.

    Mr. Peter Walker Will the right hon. Lady explain why, in reply to a Question on 28th February of last year, the Parliamentary Secretary stated that, for the years 1965 to 1970, Exchequer expenditure would be £1,100,000 on new roads, yet in July, 1964, my right hon. Friend stated that expenditure would be £1,200,000 for the same period?

    Mrs. Castle I assure the hon. Gentleman that the figures I have given exceed the proposal of the former Conservative Administration, just as the expenditure has exceeded it beyond all bounds. I remind the hon. Gentleman that this year alone—and let us talk about 1967–68—Exchequer expenditure on new and improved roads will be nearly double what it was in 1963–64, the last full period of Conservative Administration. That was the peak of their achievement after 13 years in office; and it really does not lie in the mouths of hon. Gentlemen opposite to keep bringing up this Tory charge.

    The transport system which the Labour Government inherited required fundamental and practical improvement over the whole sphere. This was the approach which underlay last year’s White Paper. It is the approach which will dominate the Transport Bill, which will give effect to it—except, of course, to the ports issue, which, as has been explained, is a matter for separate legislation later in the lifetime of this Parliament.

    After that, I part company with the hon. Gentleman because his main preoccupation on every possible occasion, both inside and outside the House, is to denigrate public ownership. The Labour Government’s approach is to recognise that public ownership must play a vital rôle in transport, and to ensure that the nationalised industries are given the right social and financial targets to enable them to play their rôles. The publication today of the White Paper on railway policy shows how successfully the Government are succeeding with that task.

    It is no good the hon. Member for Worcester coming along with his sad story about morale in the railways. The constant propaganda of hon. Gentlemen opposite against the very concept of public ownership is one of the most damaging things that can be done to denigrate this publicly-owned industry. The fact is, of course, that the hon. Member for Worcester does not care about the railways. He does not care about any particular form of public ownership. My hon. and right hon. Friends, on the other hand, do care and we believe that the people of this country want to see their nationalised railways made a maximum success.

    Sir Robert Cary (Manchester, Withington) Does the right hon. Lady recall that in our debate on 18th July, when we were discussing bus operators and road hauliers, she promised to publish a White Paper, to be laid in August, with the Bill to come in September? She has laid a White Paper today on the railways. Why has she not also laid a White Paper on bus operators and road hauliers?

    Mrs. Castle I promised—I intend to keep this promise and I am in the process of keeping it—to lay detailed White Papers on the different aspects of the Transport Bill, before the publication of that Bill, so that the House fully understands the implications of what will be a very detailed Measure.

    I have already produced two of the White Papers and the remaining two, including the one to which the hon. Member for Manchester, Withington (Sir R. Cary) referred, will be appearing during the next few weeks. I assure the hon. Gentleman that he will get it well in advance of the publication of the Bill; and I shall be only too glad to enlighten him and his hon. Friend the Member for Worcester about some of the implications of the P.T.A.s, which he is so anxious to mis-represent.

    I have told the House that the details which I have circulated about my proposals are for consultation only. Those consultations have taken place. Ideas have been advanced and these have been adapted in the light of those consultations. The results of the consultations will appear in the White Paper for which the hon. Gentleman has asked and I certainly do not intend to anticipate that White Paper today.

    The hon. Member for Worcester has really wasted an opportunity. Instead of repeating, almost verbatim, the speech which he made the last time we debated this subject, he might have given a little attention to the White Paper on railway policy, which, at last, should have enabled him to deal not with speculation but with fact. I appreciate that this document was available in the Vote Office only at 11 o’clock this morning. It was due for publication tomorrow, but when the Opposition chose today for this debate I thought it only courteous to expedite its publication. [Interruption.] If it had appeared tomorrow, when the debate was over, I can imagine what hon. Gentlemen opposite would have said.

    Several Hon. Members rose–

    Mrs. Castle I must get on. The Stationery Office worked overtime during the weekend to enable the House to have the White Paper in time for this debate.

    I regret that the hon. Member for Worcester has seen fit to pay such perfunctory tribute to the outstanding work that has been done by the Joint Steering Group, under the chairmanship of the Joint Parliamentary Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Mr. John Morris). However grudging hon. Gentlemen opposite may be, I assure them that the Government are deeply grateful to the group for the long and arduous months of work they have put in.

    As for the date of publication, the simple position is this. Although it is true that the final Report of the Joint Steering Group—the Report in its final form—is dated September, that was only one part of the process. The Government had to consider the recommendations, decide their action on them and write and publish a White Paper; and this is, in fact, what we have done. It would be no good giving the House the Joint Steering Group’s recommendations without the Government’s reaction to them. To have produced that White Paper as quickly as we have is an indication of the sense of urgency which the Government feel about the railway situation, despite the frivolity of hon. Gentlemen opposite.

    This has been a novel kind of inquiry. On the Joint Steering Group have been representatives of the railways, of Government Departments and from outside. We are particularly grateful to the independent members who have worked tirelessly without reward and who have given us of their wisdom and long experience. The inquiry is also a shining example of worker participation because on the group and contributing his ideas was a rank and file railway man, in addition to representatives of the railway trade unions, who submitted their experienced views. I pay tribute to the masterly way in which this work has been chaired by the Parliamentary Secretary. The House should recognise the calibre of the Morris Report and pay tribute to all concerned.

    The hon. Member for Worcester is always complaining about the Government trying to keep things from the House. I assure him that we have been a great deal more forthcoming than the Administration who produced the Stedeford Report, not a word of which ever got published. Indeed, I have not even been allowed to see it, though a succeeding Minister. There has, therefore, been a very different practice between the two Administrations in handling what is a matter of widespread public interest.

    All that the hon. Member for Worcester could find to say was that there had been Press leaks. He said that The Times had it all on 26th June. He wanted to know what the Government were doing about it, what was the point of having a White Paper and what was the point of publishing the Report. The July Report of the group did not exist on 26th June. So the report was not even accurate. Certainly, the Government’s decisions upon it did not exist at that time. So it is absurd for the hon. Gentleman to suggest that in some way I had leaked the matter to the Press.

    I hope that the debate will now be concentrated on the White Paper and the indications that it gives of the kind of approach that we shall have in the Transport Bill. Let us look at what the White Paper says. It should be considered as one of the triumvirate. There will be other White Papers on the National Freight Corporation and the Passenger Transport Authorities, though the implications of the setting up of a National Freight Corporation on the finances of the railways are taken into account in Appendix B of the Report in the Annex, and also it is important to remember that the method of fixing the grants for the socially necessary lines will be appropriate whoever may become responsible for them.

    Today’s White Paper concentrates on two aspects which are critical to any business—finance and management. If these two are right there is a good chance that the business, whether it is private or nationalised, will prosper, and unless they are right, it will not prosper. But the railways are not just a business. That was the mistake that right hon. and hon. Members opposite made when they voted for the 1962 Transport Act. To treat nationalised transport as a business or a series of businesses without taking account of the social aspects of a public service is not to have any real grasp of the needs of the travelling public.

    The 1962 Act set up the railways as a separate entity, encouraged them to compete with other forms of nationalised transport and then left the profit and loss account as the sole criterion of success and did not even provide conditions in which the profit and loss account could be balanced. The Railways Board was early told to break even as soon as possible, but an open-ended grant was provided in case it failed. So it is not surprising that the deficit for the current year is almost as large as in 1962.

    This fact is a complete indictment of the whole purpose and machinery of the 1962 Transport Act. It took no account of the social factors. It provided detailed machinery for closing lines but imposed no duty on the Minister to heed social considerations when deciding closures, still less the effect on the workers involved.

    Mr. T. G. D. Galbraith (Glasgow, Hillhead) The right hon. Lady has made a charge—

    Mrs. Castle I have not given way.

    The Deputy Speaker (Sir Eric Fletcher) Order. The hon. Member must resume his seat unless the Minister gives way.

    Mrs. Castle I object to being harangued by the hon. Gentleman on his feet when I am on my feet. If he will behave courteously I shall be glad to give way.

    Mr. Galbraith I am very grateful to the right hon. Lady. But she made a charge against the previous Administration when she said that social considerations were not taken into account. I can categorically deny that and would like her to accept it.

    Mrs. Castle To the extent that they were taken into account they were in breach of the terms of reference of the 1962 Act. The hon Gentleman had better make it clear. The 1962 Act placed an obligation on the British Railways Board to break even as soon as possible. The very fact that the right hon. Member for Wallasey (Mr. Marples) could not follow the logic of his own statute does not mean to say that that made the position any better. Indeed, I believe that one of the serious sources of the problems of the railway industry is that it has never been given any clear-cut financial target appropriate to the sort of social conditions that a railway business has to take into account as well.

    During the 18 months from the publication of the Beeching Plan in March, 1963, and being swept out of office in October, 1964, the right hon. Member for Wallasey had already imposed on British Railways an annual burden of well over £1 million by refusing to consent to closures, which, therefore, showed the inconsistency of his own policy.

    What we are doing—it is long overdue, and when the hon. Gentleman says that nobody outside approves of my policy I would tell him that every sort of financial and economic commentator has been asking for a very long time that this kind of separation of financial and social objectives should be carried through—is to recognise and face the fact that there are many railway passenger services which do not pay and cannot be made to pay but are an essential part of any foreseeable transport system.

    This is what the White Paper is about. We said that, having decided that as a Government, and decided it as a point of principle, we ought to identify these services, consider whether they were of the right level, whether they should be increased or reduced, make sure that they run efficiently and then meet the full cost of any losses on these socially necessary lines, and meet that consciously as a community.

    The Joint Steering Group’s Report, which is annexed to the White Paper, explains in detail the procedure which has been worked out. I think that every hon. Member who studies that Report—and no one ought to talk about transport policy in future unless he has—will agree that the procedure has been systematically and carefully evolved to enable us to get the benefits of a social element of transport policy without undermining financial incentives and efficiency. For instance, the Report suggests that these grants, instead of being paid in arrears, should be based on estimated losses three years ahead, with no repayment if the Railways Board does better than the estimates, and this is designed to give an incentive to the Railways Board to do even better than at first had been hoped.

    Hon. Gentlemen opposite have frequently asked me for the estimated total cost of the grants, and I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman did not consider even mentioning it in his speech. The best estimates that the consultants and the Group can make of what would be the total of these grants in any one year is a figure of some £40 million in 1969, plus £15 million allowance for interest, making £55 million in 1969, and reducing to some £50 million in 1974.

    This decision, which is in accord with the Government’s policy on nationalised industries, and is published in the White Paper, marks a major development in nationalised industry policy. No one in the House can talk about the need for greater efficiency in the Government or in the nationalised industries unless he fairly and squarely faces the fact that something of this kind had to be done. The hon. Gentleman who is so anxious to quote denigrations and attacks upon me might have paid a little attention to the leading article in The Times a day or two ago when it welcomed this new approach to the finances of the nationalised industries and said that it was imperative to their future efficiency that economic and social elements should be differentiated out from the financial ones.

    Mr. Gordon Campbell (Moray and Nairn) Did the right hon. Lady also notice the leading article in the Scotsman last Thursday, saying, “For integration read disintegration”?

    Mrs. Castle Yes, I read it. That leading article was applying to a wider field than just this. But I would tell the hon. Gentleman and the Scotsman that it is a curious definition of disintegration when the Government come along and say, “It is time the country established what size of railway network we need and then set about finding more intelligent ways of paying for it.” In my view, that is not disintegration. It is the first ray of rational light on this subject for many a long year.

    The Report also provides for a capital reconstruction of the railway industry so as to give a really efficient target to the railways and provide the basis on which we can expect the railways to meet their charges, including interest, out of revenue by the early 1970s. Here again, a first-class expert job of work has been done by all concerned.

    I think that it is helpful to the House to have had examined all the possible elements in railway costs that could be attributed to their social obligations. The Joint Steering Group, for example, examined the concept of stand-by capacity which the railways have argued for a long time as one of the excuses why they could not be expected to break even. The railways say, “The trouble with the public is that they want the railways, but only to use them very occasionally, so we should be compensated for an element of stand-by capacity.”

    This the Report has rejected, but it does point to the existence of surplus capacity in the railway system due to the duplication of track in many places where a reduction of track would achieve dramatic economies. Reducing tracks from four to two and, in some cases, from two to one can make a major contribution to cutting costs.

    Miss J. M. Quennell (Petersfield) The right hon. Lady keeps saying that the Report will be “useful” to the House. She has said that the Report was in the Vote Office at 11 a.m. I have been in the House all day and I did not know that it was available until I read about it in the mid-day edition of an evening newspaper. It was 2.15 when I got the Report, and it was not possible to read it sensibly before this debate.

    Mrs. Castle I also took the precaution of informing the House, in a Written Reply on Friday, that the Report would be in the Vote Office at 11 a.m. today. I am only too anxious to give the House as much time as possible to study the Report, but it was not I who chose the subject of today’s debate. The best I could do was to expedite the White Paper as quickly as possible.

    The Joint Steering Group’s Report therefore proposed—and I think that the House will agree that this is an imaginative and constructive suggestion—that the best way of helping to reduce costs and the deficit was for track rationalisation to be pressed ahead with the help of a track rationalisation grant which would taper off over the next few years.

    The major part of the Group’s Report is the emphasis it lays upon the management question. When capital reconstruction has been carried through, even if the Railways Board begins by breaking even, we know that it will have a very tough job to maintain that position. That is why an integral part of the Report is the emphasis that it lays upon the need to have another look at the management structure of the railways.

    As the House will have seen, the Report recommends a somewhat smaller Board whose members should not be tied down by day-to-day executive responsibilities for particular functions. This would leave the Board freer to concentrate on policy questions and on the long-term planning and financial control of the industry, helped by the appointment of two senior members of the Board with specific responsibility for these two aims, in addition to a chief general manager and a member responsible for long-term development of labour relations in the industry.

    The Government broadly accept these recommendations, which, clearly, will involve a considerable reorganisation of the Board’s work. The hon. Gentleman raised with me the position of the chairman of the Board. I believe that this reorganisation must involve a change in the chairmanship and I am currently discussing with Sir Stanley Raymond the possibility of his taking another job in transport. The outcome of our discussions will be announced in due course.

    As for the suggestion that there is some kind of breach between Mr. Philip Shirley and myself, I will tell the hon. Gentleman that Mr. Shirley resigned at his own request and that it was not as a result of any disagreement between him and me. I remind the hon. Gentleman that Mr. Shirley is, after all, a signatory of the Report which is in the Annex to the White Paper, and if there had been any such disgruntlement he would not have accepted my invitation to become a part-time member of the Board, which he has willingly done.

    It is sad that the hon. Member had nothing to say about the merits of these proposals in the Joint Steering Group’s Report. If he claims that he has known for some time what was in the Report, then I should have thought that he would have been giving a little thought to it in all his consideration of the problems of the railway system. If he has known, as he says he has, that the Joint Steering Group—and I have announced this to the House on more than one occasion—was working on the principles of a social grant to keep alive the socially necessary lines, he has had plenty of time to decide first whether he approves of the Government’s proposals to pay such grants on the socially necessary services which do not pay their way and, secondly, what principle the Government should employ in fixing them.

    The hon. Gentleman has challenged me more than once today. I challenge him now. It is not asking him very much, between 11 a.m. this morning—I saw that the hon. Gentleman had the Report; he got it personally—and 5 p.m., to decide whether he approves of the principle of paying grants on socially necessary lines which do not pay their way. Perhaps he will answer that one now.

    Mr. Peter Walker I did not receive the Report at 11 a.m., but somewhat later. I will judge this question on the criteria to be used for these services. I want to know how they are to be paid for. I am violently against their being paid for out of the rates. What are “social criteria”? The term can mean anything. I am not willing to commit myself to the details of the Minister’s proposals until she has expressed them fully.

    Mrs. Castle That will not do. The hon. Gentleman is dodging it. If he does not know what social criteria are, he should ask some of his hon. Friends behind him. Week after week they ask that railway lines be kept open in their areas. They say that they should be kept open because they serve tourism or remote areas, or because their constituents would not have alternative means of transport, or because the lines are heavily used by commuters or because they serve areas scheduled for future development and to which industry is being attracted.

    Mr. Peter Walker If that is the right hon. Lady’s view, where do the 3,000 miles of railway track that she is closing fit into these social criteria? May we have the answer to that?

    Mrs. Castle Certainly. The basic network published in the railway map some months ago was drawn up in full consultation with the regional economic planning councils and with the Government Departments concerned with development and the siting of new towns. All these factors were taken into account. But the 3,000 miles of line will still be subject to the full statutory procedure and it has been made clear that, as a result of the examination, some of these lines not marked for development in the basic map may be added to the “black line network”. That has been made clear to the hon. Gentleman time and again. Some pruning of duplicate lines as well as duplicate stations is not only inevitable, but desirable in the interests of railwaymen themselves who have to live in an industry that ought to be able to afford them higher standards.

    We need to find a balance between complete sentimental sterilisation of the status quo and an adjustment of the policy of drastic reduction which we would have been faced with under the 1962 Transport Act. The hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well what are the social criteria. He knows perfectly well that there are lines which the right hon. Member for Wallasey refused to close and other lines which his hon. Friends would like to Government to refuse to close.

    The question we now have to ask ourselves is, if, as a result of these examinations and the will of Parliament, some of these lines are to be kept open and will not pay their way, is it or is it not right that they should be included in the operating deficit of the Railways Board? Should they not rather be put into a separate account, carefully costed by the Ministry and the Railways Board, and have a proper grant affixed to them, the Government deciding to pay that grant? That policy will be widely welcomed by the travelling public and by railwaymen as one of the most practical contributions which the Government can make. It is a great pity that the hon. Member is still back in his July speech and has not moved a step further forward despite all the information and evidence we keep putting in front of him.

    So much for this Government’s interest in efficiency of the nationalised industries. There was not a word of praise from the hon. Member, although we are debating the references in the Queen’s Speech, for our intention through the computer licensing Bill to establish a licensing system for motor vehicle licensing and driver licensing. This is something which is urgently needed and which was welcomed by The Times Business Supplement. It reported that car dealers have to deal with 183 local authorities and they are expected to welcome this proposal as a practical contribution to the transport problem, but there was not a word from the hon. Member about it.

    There was not a word from him about our White Paper on the inland waterways which, once again, has taken the chaotic, muddled situation left by the previous Administration and clearly separated the commercial from social activities. This is what a Socialist transport policy means and it makes practical sense. There was not a word by the hon. Member about all the other practical contributions we have made. He is concerned and obsessed about the conditions of the passenger transport authorities. As I said earlier, we shall discuss this matter in the light of the White Paper. I certainly do not intend to anticipate the outcome of the consultations, which will be reported fully to the House in that document.

    In conclusion, I refer to one very practical activity in which the passenger transport authorities will be engaged. One of them is proposed for the Manchester area, S.E.L.N.E.C. area. The need for integration of road-rail services there, for something to be done practically and urgently to improve transport conditions for people using public transport, is demonstrable to anyone who ever tries to travel in that city.

    No one knows this more than Manchester City Council. That is why it gladly engaged with us in the promotion of a rapid transport study towards the possibility of which we paid a grant of 75 per cent. That is something else practical done in this matter by this Government. The report is now available and will be published tomorrow. A Question is to be asked of me about it and I shall be giving fuller details. It begins to hold out exciting possibilities of a breakthrough in the improvement of public transport.

    I merely say to the hon. Member—this is another of the practical things we have done to which he never troubles to refer —that my new power to pay capital grants towards the cost of new public transport authorities, a power I shall be seeking in the Transport Bill, will enable me to contribute to the cost of new major transport projects in Manchester, provided they form part of a comprehensive transportation plan.

    Here we have been acting while the hon. Member has merely talked. That is why I say to the House that the local authorities, whatever the hon. Member may try to do, will welcome these passenger transport authorities and cooperate with them because they know that what is needed are practical measures and that they are getting them from this Government.

  • Peter Walker – 1967 Speech on the Government’s Transport Policy

    Peter Walker – 1967 Speech on the Government’s Transport Policy

    The speech made by Peter Walker, the then Conservative MP for Worcester, in the House of Commons on 6 November 1967.

    I beg to move, at the end of the Question, to add: but humbly regret that the Gracious Speech contains proposals to nationalise further large sections of the transport industry instead of concentrating on practical measures to improve conditions for the travelling public and for industry. I am sure the House regrets that this debate is taking place under the shadow of a major railway disaster. I assure the House that any criticisms of the management or policies of British Railways are in no way connected with the railway’s safety record, which has been outstanding over the years, or the diligence with which our railwaymen apply themselves to seeing that railway travel is safe and secure.
    Last week’s by-election results are perhaps a reflection on the fact that the Government’s performance contrasts vividly with their plans. If the plans which have been published week by week, and month by month, had been fulfilled, or even started to be fulfilled, the Government’s popularity would be very much higher, but instead we have had a long series of plans contrasting vividly with performance, and this is particularly true of transport.

    An examination of the various forms of transport shows that in every sphere Government policies are hindering progress. In aviation one finds that B.E.A.’s future is in jeopardy as a result of the constant delay and indecision of the Government on replacing the present B.E.A. fleet. If one considers future developments in aviation, internal air services, the development of freight air services, and the indecision, and probably wrong decision, on matters such as Stansted, one sees aviation once again being affected by the Government. It is remarkable that this industry, which could perhaps best be quoted as an industry of the future, is completely and utterly without investment grants as a result of the Government’s policies.

    When one considers shipping, and ports and docks, one sees that only last week the Confederation of British Industry and the British Shippers’ Council gave their verdict on the Government’s policy. Their verdict is summarised in a statement issued last Wednesday or Thursday: To face the industry with an administrative revolution when it is already grappling with great changes would surely reduce operating efficiency, retard evolution, increase costs, and thus, by raising the price of exports, damage the economy. No case has been made for fundamental change now or in the future. The Minister’s proposals establish no reasoned case for a further change of ownership or control. On the railways, we see a fast increasing deficit, obviously completely out of the Minister’s control. Indeed, it was the Minister herself who said in reply to a Question on 25th January of this year, at col. 1471 that the railway deficit this year would be £130 million, but we were told in a debate in another place that the figure was now likely to be £150 million. Labour relations on the railways have never been worse than they are at the moment, and the position of top management is in complete chaos.

    One of the most fundamental needs is an improvement in the road building programme, but we see the Minister complacently going up and down the country boasting that at the moment expenditure on road building is higher than it has ever been in our history. This is a boast which every Minister of Transport has been able to make every year since 1950, but the real test of the Minister’s performance—and that of the Government—is to see how the right hon. Lady has carried out the road building programme which she inherited.

    The programme was laid down in great detail in July 1964. It proposed Government expenditure of £1,200 million on road building in the years 1965 to 1970. The party opposite said that it was an electioneering offer, and something to entice the voters. Indeed, the right hon. Member for Vauxhall (Mr. Strauss), who at that time was the shadow Minister of Transport, stated categorically in the Press and in speeches that the programme announced by the Tories for the period 1965–70 was too little and too late.

    Let us examine what has happened to the programme which the present Government described as too little and too late. We can establish the exact figures because my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) published a White Paper setting out the Government’s investment programme for 1967–68. He said that in that year at 1963 prices, £470 million would be spent by the Government and local authorities on roads in this country. Adjusted to 1963 prices, it would be necessary to spend £53 million this year to fulfil the promise which hon. Gentlemen opposite described as too little and too late. This year the Government and local authorities will spend £450 million on the roads, so this year alone they will spend £81 million less than that set out in a programme which they described as too little and too late.

    The Government have stated categorically that in the period 1965–70—this information was given in reply to a Question—they will spend £1,100 million. This is £100 million less than the sum laid down in the programme which they described as too little and too late, and during this period the motorist has had an extremely bad deal. Comparing this year’s figures with those for 1964–65, one sees that this year the Government will spend £70 million more on roads, but from the owners of motor cars they will get an extra £350 million in increased petrol tax, in increased Purchase Tax, and in increased motor vehicle licences. Thus, for every £1 extra which they are spending on reads they are taking an extra £5 from the motorist. This is the Government’s record for the motorist and the roads.

    The Government’s record on the railways, in aviation, in shipping, and in the road programme is bad, and what do they offer for the future? They have put forward a programme—which received enthusiastic support at the Labour Party conference as a good Socialist one for tackling transport problems—substantially to increase the nationalisation of public transport.

    First, I turn to the proposals for passenger transport authorities. These proposals have no friends. Local authorities do not like them; industry does not like them, and the bus industry in particular does not like them. Everybody is opposed to them. The Minister says that this is not nationalisation, and describes me as illiterate for speaking of it as such. She claims that it is local ownership and not nationalisation. The only real ownership which will be given locally is the ownership of losses.

    How can the Minister claim that these P.T.A.s will have local control? Let us consider some of the features of the proposal. These authorities will be very much in the hands of the Minister of Transport. First, the Minister will designate the boundaries of the P.T.A.s, and she has specifically stated that not only will she designate them but will allow no form of public inquiry into them, and there will be no appeal from her decisions. So much for local control of the boundaries.

    Secondly, local control will consist of immediately confiscating the assets of all municipal bus companies—a very odd and peculiar way of giving local control—and doing away with local bus companies.

    Thirdly, there will be considerable investment control in the hands of the Minister. Grants will depend on her being satisfied with the way P.T.A.s are run. Then, the Minister will have nominees on the boards of the P.T.A.s. Her first suggestion was that one-third of the representatives should be appointed by the Ministry of Transport and that the chairmen should also be so appointed. We are pleased to know that as a result of considerable criticism and pressure she has reduced her demands for representation, and the chairmen will now be appointed by the P.T.A.s. But let us remember that even if, for example, her representatives consisted only of 20 per cent. of the Board, this would be 20 per cent. more than the representation on the boards which are now running local government transport. Also, if, in a public transport authority area, 60 per cent. of the authorities were Tory-controlled and 40 per cent. Labour-controlled, with the Minister’s nominees and the Labour-controlled representatives the Minister’s nominees would have a majority on the P.T.A. Under the P.T.A.s, many major boroughs will have no appeal on the question of fares or timetables.

    There is much evidence that there is no great advantage in size, in respect of bus operations; indeed, the public will vouch for the fact that the bigger the size the less efficient is the bus company, the more inferior its labour relations, and the less direct contact it has with the public.

    It is becoming more and more clear that all the local authorities in the major conurbations and elsewhere are becoming bitterly opposed to this project. The Minister will say that this is due to briefing and interference on the part of the Conservative Central Office and the leaders of Tory councils, but she should remember that last May the people of this country overwhelmingly voted Tories to their local councils, and they did not vote for them to give back into public ownership private and municipal bus companies.

    But not only Tory councils are opposed to this scheme. One of the Minister’s civil servants—a person who is particularly responsible for P.T.A.s.; a Mr. Locke—spoke to municipal operators, and if he reported accurately to the Minister he will have told her that local authorities are passionately opposed to her proposals. At the M.P.T.A. conference five Labour chairmen of local authority transport committees spoke in the debate upon the P.T.A. proposals. Every one was opposed to those proposals. Perhaps their objections were most appropriately put by Councillor Williams, chairman at St. Helens, who said: It would be a voice in the wilderness. I am second to none as a supporter of the Labour party, but this is not one of the things they ought to be doing. Another opinion—and I am sure the Minister will appreciate this, as she represents a Lancashire division—was expressed by Alderman Walsh, vice-chairman at Bolton, who said that the whole programme could only be called a load of codswallop. It is understandable that local authorities should be strongly opposed to P.T.As. First, the ratepayers will have to bear the service charges necessary to compensate for the taking over of privately owned bus companies. Secondly, they will lose their municipal assets. Thirdly, they will have to make a contribution to the deficit of passenger railway services in their areas. Fourthly, fares will increase as a result of the levelling up of wages and conditions of all those employed in bus companies which are taken into P.T.As.

    One of the proposals which will be greeted with great alarm is a clear undertaking that P.T.As. will have control over coaches and coach excursions going out of their areas. Many people travel by coach because of the cheap fares. To travel from Birmingham to London costs 34s. by coach, but £3 6s. by second-class railway fare. We can understand this Minister, for what she will describe as good transport planning, deciding that it is wrong to take this traffic from the railways and therefore placing considerable restrictions on coach services.

    Alternatives to this programme are quite clear. They are immediately to repeal some of the policies which the Government have pursued, which are directly opposed to the efficient running of our bus companies. It was this Government who took away investment allowances for buses and coaches, immediately resulting in increased fares. It is this Government who made bus companies create an interest-free overdraft for the Government, in the form of S.E.T., and it is this Government who are dragging their feet on trade union reform, which would help to bring single manning and do away with some of the overmanning which exists today.

    It is a remarkable thing that if there was one proposal which should have waited for the report of a Royal Commission it was the P.T.A. proposal, which should have waited for the report of the Royal Commission on Local Government. But the Government were determined to hasten through these proposals before the published. What a different attitude to their attitude on trade union reform. The creation of passenger transport authorities will result in considerable increases in road fares and a great loss of freedom of choice in terms of transport for the individual, and we shall oppose this proposal.

    The post-war history of the railways is that from the early 1950s, as people began to own more and more motor cars, and passengers turned from the railways to the roads, and as a great modernisation programme was required to change from steam to diesel electric, the railways ran into increasing deficits. It was then that a Conservative Government appointed Lord Beeching and a major reorganisation started to take place. The success of this was reflected in the last two years of Tory Government, when the railway deficit was reduced by £37 million. In the first three years of Labour Government it will have increased by over £30 million.

    Today we have had published a White Paper. I say that it has been published today but, like all Government documents, it was really published many weeks previously in the Press. It is remarkable that every major proposal in the White Paper appeared in The Times of 26th June. That newspaper’s transport correspondent described the proposals of the Joint Steering Group under the chairmanship of the Parliamentary Secretary. He described its conclusions in respect of subsidies for services of social importance; he described the recapitalisation of the railways and the writing off of a great deal of capital. He described in detail the proposals for reorganisation of the main board and the doing away with regional boards, and he went on to describe the special subsidies for bridges, level crossings and railway police.

    If that same correspondent wanted to summarise the Minister’s White Paper he could not do better than repeat his article of 26th June. This is a terrible reflection upon Her Majesty’s Government.

    One political correspondent suggests today that the right hon. Lady should become the next Foreign Secretary. On Press leaks, she puts Lord Chalfont completely in the shade, because every major proposal from the Ministry since she has been Minister has been leaked, in one way or another, beforehand. If these proposals were not leaked by the Ministry itself, the Ministry should have done something to give this House the White Paper, the details of which appeared in the Press in June, some time before November, a few hours before this debate. Instead, with the normal sense of priorities of this Government, the Press came first and Parliament came afterwards.

    The White Paper carries the report and recommendations of a very distinguished firm of accountants, Cooper Brothers, who have done a great deal of work, and of the steering group which contained a number of distinguished men from industry and the British Railways Board, and a distinguished professor of finance, under the chairmanship of the Parliamentary Secretary. The whole House will want to examine carefully its proposals, and we obviously have not had time to study some of the background facts and statistics; some of the figures, of course, are not available in the White Paper. But there are some questions which I should like to ask the Minister.

    First of all, she states in the White Paper, in rather strange wording; that, after consultation with British. Railways, the Government have decided to adopt the proposals. Do British Railways agree with the proposals? I know that they had representatives on the Steering Group, but it has been said that the Chairman and many of the Board disagree with the proposals. We should like to know whether this is true or whether it was purely consultation, without the Board fully supporting the proposals.

    One of the things which will dramatically affect British Railways is the Minister’s proposals for a National Freight Authority. This Steering Group contains the advice of one of the best firms of accountants in the world, with men of considerable ability who have looked in depth into the management and financial problems of British Railways. I therefore challenge the right hon. Lady to ask this same Steering Group, with all its knowledge, whether or not it is in favour of the creation of the National Freight Authority. If it is, that will give great support to her case. If it is not, it will show that her proposals are thoroughly irresponsible and against the future interests of British Railways. If the right hon. Lady declines that challenge to put that question fairly and straightly to the Steering Group, the country will realise why?

    The real problem for the railways is not the proposals in the Report, interesting though they are and correct as many probably are. It is easy to study and decide what should be done, but the test is implementing that study. Everything that has so far happened has given us absolutely no confidence in the Minister’s ability to bring this Report into being, because the essence is the attraction of top and good management. The railways today have labour relations problems, and a rising deficit, yet, for more than a week, 350,000 men employed by British Railways— an industry losing £150 million a year—have known that their chairman has been under notice to quit, but have had no idea who his replacement is to be. That is an appalling situation for any major industry.

    Also, almost every national newspaper reported that, in the middle of the most crucial negotiations with the unions, in which a major strike was a possibility, the chairman of British Railways was called out to be hold by the Minister that she was going to offer him another job. What a way to handle top management. If this did not happen, the Minister should immediately have issued a statement saying that it did not, instead of leaving this situation for a week.

    Everyone knows that the chairman has been offered another job but does not know his replacement. The vice-chairman has said that he will join a shipping company and has given notice to quit. Did the Minister tell Mr. Shirley that she would like him to go, after which he found another job, or did the reverse happen? As the Minister has constantly praised Mr. Shirley in the country for the wonderful way in which he has organised freight liner trains, why can she not provide him with the terms and conditions under which he could stay? Either he was important and successful, in which case it was her duty to see that he was kept or enticed to stay, or else he has been inefficient for some time, in which case she has been wrong to praise him all over the country. As well as the chairman and vice-chairman, Mr. Fiennes, one of the most creative thinkers of all the general managers of British Railways, has been sacked and has left the service.

    This is the position of top management in British Railways after the Minister has been in charge for a couple of years. She says in the White Paper that the real need is for stability of British Railways. What a lot of stability there is at present—an army without a general, a major industry not knowing exactly what will happen in terms of top management.

    Who will be attracted to take on the jobs of top management? What is this Minister’s record in this respect? Just look at the treatment of top management. First of all, the road construction units were created so that the county surveyors, who had been vocal critics of all Governments, would no longer have that same say. Then, Sir Alexander Samuels was removed from his position as road traffic adviser to the Minister because, as we knew, he was having a number of disagreements with her. Then, Sir Alfred Owen had views on the 70 m.p.h. speed limit and was removed from his position as chairman of the National Road Safety Advisory Council and replaced by the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Rochdale, who was Chairman of the National Ports Council, opposed nationalisation and was in favour of developing Portbury, so he was given another job and replaced by someone from one of the nationalised boards. This is a complete record of any person who disagrees with the Minister being removed to another job.

    Who will take on the job of Chairman of British Railways, with this sort of background—[HON. MEMBERS: “George will.”]—when the Minister has already stated that the track will remain at 11,000 miles, no matter what the commercial considerations? The new chairman will immediately inherit that fixed position. She has also said that she will take away from British Railways its most expanding element, the freightliner trains, and give it to the National Freight Authority. So the new Chairman will be told. “You will have to keep the track as it is and I am taking away the best potential for the future, but, apart from that, you have every freedom and may get on with the job.” This is an impossible position for top management.

    Any top management coming into British Railways while the present Minister remains will, of course, remember her words at the Labour Party conference. When pressed to set up various organisations, she said: No, friends, when it comes to transport planning, I have got to be the overall authority. The real trouble is that any person working under this Minister knows that he will always be subject to considerable political interference.

    The other proposal which will be in the Government’s Bill, the National Freight Authority itself, also has no friends and no supporters in industry. No one in the railways supports it, either. There has been no pronouncement from the Railways Board or from the railway unions saying that it wants such an authority. Sir Donald Stokes, who would not be quoted as an enemy of the present Government, has made his position clear. He said: If we are going to have restrictions for Socialist doctrinaire reasons, it is absolutely crazy. He went on: … if they are going to restrict road transport, it is still worse, because in Great Britain we need above all a competitive transport system. This is the biggest machine tool of industry. Sir Donald Stokes has clearly stated his view, and so has the C.B.I.

    The proposal for a national freight authority is a proposal to allow the nationalised industries to take over a large section of the road haulage industry without compensation. Seventy thousand vehicles will be subject to new tribunals. How many bureaucrats will be employed on those tribunals? What sort of people will decide, and what criteria will those people use?

    The Minister has stated that licences will be taken away or refused only if it can be shown that the railways are faster, less expensive and more reliable. Those are the three criteria. Will all three have to apply or will it be a matter of balance? Who will judge the speed of British Rail? Will British Rail have to prepare a time-table? A lot of tribunals would not take much note of that. Who will decide whether the reliability will be better or worse? Is this to be based on promises? Who is to decide on cost in its relationship with time?

    We on this side of the House have made our position quite clear. We believe that the best people to decide how best to send their goods are the customers themselves, and not some bureaucratic tribunal trying to decide for them. The position is that £150 million worth of assets belonging to private road hauliers are in jeopardy without any form of compensation.

    Let us just look at the handicap which the Government have put on those in the road haulage industry before they start: three increase in fuel tax, graduated pension contributions up, National Insurance contributions up, Selective Employment Tax, postage and telephone costs up, industrial training 1.6 per cent. up, road vehicles licences increased by 50 per cent. and investment allowances on road haulage vehicles completely taken away by this Government. The Minister has said that the N.F.A. would give the road haulage industry a good run for its money, and so I should think, with the handicap put on the road haulage industry before ever it starts.

    In every sphere of transport the performance is bad, and instead of the Government offering remedies for these performances they are embarking on a programme of public ownership of all our ports and docks, considerable ownership of the bus industry, interferences in the ancillary services such as taxis and coaches, and a considerable extension of the public section of long distance road haulage. We on this side believe that this will make no contribution to efficiency. It is yet another attack on free enterprise by a Government that by now should realise that they are doing great harm to the country by their constant attacks on free enterprise, and that they will bring about a considerable worsening, and not an improvement, of the nation’s transport system.

  • Douglas Haig – 1965 Article on Recent Transport Ministers

    Douglas Haig – 1965 Article on Recent Transport Ministers

    The article written by Douglas Haig, a journalist for the Birmingham Post, on 31 December 1965 following the appointment of Barbara Castle as the Transport Minister.

    Of the last three Transport Ministers to precede Mrs. Barbara Castle, men who tackled the problems of railways deficits, the introduction of motorways and systems of traffic engineering and control to reduce congestion and improve safety, Mr. Ernest Marples stands hand and shoulders above the others.

    He is now recognised, even by many of those who had the “Marples Must Go” stickers in the rear windows of their cars, to be the publicist, technocrat type of Transport Minister the country now needs.

    …….

    During his reign, despite heavy and faster capital renewal, the railways were disintegrating commercially. So, Mr. Marples, not satisfied with the report of an expert planning board to reorganise the railways under Lord (then Sir Ivan) Stedeford, brought in Dr. Richard Beeching. He also announced a complete financial reorganisation of the railways, and the break-up of the British Transport Commission into five separate boards, each to try to be self suppporting.

    His objective was to make them all commercially viable. This began to be achieved by reductions in the deficits of the railways under Dr. Beeching until (as he observes with regret) an increase in deficit of £20m under Mr. Tom Fraser. The object achieved – a much more business-like and economic running of all the nationalised transport undertakings, Mr. Marples used as his motto “The Boss Ought Know”. His method was to gauge the size of the problem, study the facts in depth, but above all act with deeds, not words.

    …….

    His rule – you must keep up the momentum in a Ministry, or it will sag. Mr. Tom Fraser, regarded as a sound, solid, but unimaginative Minister, let it sag. His main contributions have been the reversal of many Marples-Beeching railway closures, subsidising London Transport, the 70mph speed limit and the 30mph danger lights on motorways in difficult conditions.

    ……

    Mr. Fraser failed to make public a Labour transport road-rail co-ordination programme. In this, to Labour MP’s chagrin, he achieved nothing. Nor do transport experts believe it is possible properly to co-ordinate the two, without damage to industry and transport costs. They forecast that Mrs. Castle will be no more successful in this sector of Labour policy.

  • Barbara Castle – 1967 Statement on the Railway Network Map

    Barbara Castle – 1967 Statement on the Railway Network Map

    The statement made by Barbara Castle, the then Minister of Transport, in the House of Commons on 15 March 1967.

    When the House debated transport policy last month I was able to report on the progress which the Chairman of the Railways Board and I had made on the determination of the new basic railway network. I am now glad to be able to tell the House that the network has been decided. A detailed map of the network, with an explanatory foreword by the Chairman and myself, will be available in the Vote Office at 11 o’clock.

    In deciding which lines should be included I have taken account of my consultations with the planning Ministers, with the Economic Planning Councils, and with the railway unions. Above all, I have given full weight to the Government’s determination that broader social and economic needs, not just narrow profitability, should count when it comes to national decisions on priorities. The result is a basic network of about 11,000 miles—some 3,000 miles longer than the likely outcome of the policy of the last Administration.

    This will be a network of which the industry, and the country, can be proud. In itself, it will give a much-needed boost to railway efficiency and morale, but the Chairman and I do not intend that these 11,000 miles should simply remain in being; they must be a working system, continually developed with the aid of modern research and technology: and I shall see that this is done.

    The Railways Board will now be reviewing the future of the lines outside the basic network. For these lines, it will be up to the Board to publish passenger closure proposals under Section 56 of the Transport Act if it so decides. But I would remind the House that no such line will be closed without my individual consent, and only after a full examination by the Transport Users Consultative Committees and the Economic Planning Councils of the hardship and economic planning implications.

    The basic network is a landmark in carrying out the railway policy set out in the Government’s White Paper. It will help the railways to provide an efficient and flexible service to the public, fitted to the needs of the day. The Government are determined that a revitalised railway industry should play its full part in the integrated transport system of the country. This network will give them the right infrastructure to do it.

    Mr. Webster Is the right hon. Lady aware that it has been a growing practice, since morning Sittings began, to make Statements which are palatable to Government supporters in the afternoon and those which are unpalatable to them in the morning? Is she further aware that it is a monstrous discourtesy to the House to make a Statement at 10 o’clock, when the map which we are discussing, if we are to have any substance out of this Statement, will not be published for another 50 minutes, and that this is something which all my hon. Friends will wish to probe most deeply in relation to what is happening in their regions?

    How does the right hon. Lady propose to maintain lines which are running at a loss? To what extent will the local authority contribute and to what extent will the central Government? What sanctions does she propose to use if a local authority does not contribute, and how will she undertake to keep these lines going if they are running at a loss? Is she further aware that, for every seven miles closed in the period 1951–64, she is closing 10 miles under her present proposals?

    Mrs. Castle I cannot accept for one moment that this statement is unpalatable to Government supporters. On the contrary, they realise full well the plans which were afoot under the policy of the previous Administration for a constant contraction of our railway service to a mere skeleton of a system—

    Several Hon. Members rose—

    Mrs. Castle Hon. Gentlemen must not jump up at this stage. The hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Webster) has asked me half a dozen questions and I must take some time to answer them. Of course, when the railway map is available for detailed consideration, it will be open to any hon. Member to put down any Questions or to probe in any way he likes, and I shall be only too delighted to try to deal with any particular points.

    The hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare asked how unprofitable lines will be paid for. We have discussed this matter in the House; it was referred to in the White Paper and it was discussed in the debate on transport policy. There is at the moment a joint study going on between the Railways Board and myself, under a steering committee, of which the Joint Parliamentary Secretary is Chairman, and the job of which is to identify these socially necessary unprofitable lines and decide the amount of subsidy that will be necessary. We have made it clear that the Government, having adopted a policy of maintaining socially necessary lines—even if they do not pay—must, the Government having made that decision, give an open subsidy for those lines; and I am sure that the majority of hon. Members welcome this decision.

    The position regarding local authorities has already been outlined in the White Paper. We will be moving forward towards the creation of conurbation transport authorities and—

    Sir G. Nabarro On a point of order. Is it not a fact that, in accordance with the custom and tradition of this House, you ask for supplementaries to be brief, Mr. Speaker? That being so, should you—

    Mr. Manuel Sit down.

    Sir G. Nabarro I was asking, Mr. Speaker—[Interruption.]

    Mr. Speaker Order. There is too much morning enthusiasm.

    Sir G. Nabarro Are we to have inflicted upon us by Ministers long answers of this type? Cannot Ministers be brief, as back benchers are asked to be brief?

    Mr. Speaker Order. I allow a certain amount of latitude or longitude to the Front Bench spokesmen.

    Sir G. Nabarro There is too much longitude.

    Mrs. Castle As I have had a number of questions inflicted on me by the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare—[Interruption.]—presumably he wants them answered. It is intolerable if, when I am attempting to answer them, hon. Gentlemen opposite complain.

    I was explaining, regarding local authorities, that the new transportation authorities, under the new arrangements for the general help which the Government are giving to public transport, will take over responsibility for deciding which socially necessary lines they want as part of their local transport plans. In such a situation, the responsibility for maintaining those lines could gradually transfer to the local authorities. In the meantime, the subsidy will be a Government subsidy, although we leave it open to individual local authorities to approach the Railways Board and try to negotiate the retention of a purely local line on the basis that they will meet the particular subsidy.

    Mr. Manuel Is my right hon. Friend aware that there will be no discourtesies or competition for discourtesy from this side of the House arising from her statement? Is she aware that we welcome it and that we are, by it, redeeming some of the pledges which we made at the General Election? Is she aware that one of the important results of her statement will be the heartening effect it will have on railway workers throughout the country? I assure my right hon. Friend that she will have the full backing of the influential railway trade unions in this matter.

    Mr. Speaker Order. Even compliments must be phrased in an interrogatory form.

    Mrs. Castle I am grateful to my hon. Friend for those remarks.

    Mr. John Hall The Minister has made an important and interesting statement. Would not she agree—and, as a constituent of mine, I am sure that she will agree—that it is difficult to be sure exactly what she is stating without our having the advantage of having looked at the map first? I cannot believe that it is possible for any hon. Member to say unreservedly that he welcomes her statement without having seen the effect of it by having looked at the map. Would it not have been more convenient to the House—I say nothing about discourtesy because I am sure that the right hon. Lady would not treat the House in a discourteous manner—if the map had been published earlier, instead of at 11 o’clock, and her statement made this afternoon, since we would then have been able to examine the matter more closely, and—

    Mr. Speaker Order. Questions must be brief.

    Mr. Hall Would not the right hon. Lady agree that we would have been able to examine the matter more closely and been able to ask questions more intelligently than we are able to do without the map?

    Mrs. Castle It is possible to welcome unreservedly the two principles which I have laid down. The first is that the Government do not believe that we can have a satisfactory railway network in Britain on the basis of purely commercial considerations. This is, therefore, a fundamental change of policy and, on that principle, hon. Members can make up their minds. The second point to be welcomed is the fact that we are going to give a period of stabilisation to the railway industry on the basis of a railway network which is about 3,000 miles longer than it would otherwise have been.

    To answer the hon. Gentleman’s question about the availability of the map, even if it had been released earlier, this is inevitably such a detailed subject that at this stage it is possible to discuss only the broad principles. However, it will be open to hon. Members to put down Questions about details of the matter in the normal way.

    Mr. Tudor Watkins Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Central Wales line was examined by the T.U.C.C. about five years ago? Is it her intention that this line should again be examined by herself and the T.U.C.C.?

    Mrs. Castle Yes, Sir, that is so. The Central Wales line will be one of the lines on the map for further consideration. However, I repeat that those lines on the man which are not included in the basic network will not necessarily all be closed. They are simply lines which need further examination so that we can see whether they should be retained, whether they should be modified or whether alternative methods can be found to cater for the people of the area.

    Mr. Peyton Would not the right hon. Lady agree that it is rather odd for her to have made a statement like this without hon. Members having the map, particularly since the map will be available in only half on hour’s time? I do not wish to accuse the right hon. Lady of discourtesy, but I urge her not to follow the example of some other members of the present Administration, and to show at least some courtesy to the House of Commons.

    Accepting all she says about socially necessary things, is she aware that one socially necessary thing always competes against another socially necessary thing for the limited resources that are available? Will she, therefore, when making her judgments about what is necessary, at least bear in mind and examine carefully those instances where local authorities press for the preservation of a line—[HON. MEMBERS: “Too long.”]—I apologise to the Minister for the barking that is coming from her hon. Friends; it is making my question that much longer—at the same time as they maintain an uneconomic bus service in competition with it?

    Mrs. Castle I naturally do not want to be discourteous to the House, and did not think that I was being discourteous. It is quite normal practice for a Minister to make a statement and to draw attention to material that is being placed in the Vote Office. I repeat that this is inevitably a detailed matter which could not possibly, even if the map were available now, be examined in great detail in the form of question and answer following a statement.

    As to what is socially necessary, we of course recognise that there must be a balance here—a balance on the basis of social cost benefit. This is the principle that we are bringing into our consideration of these lines. One factor which we shall take into account—it is important that we should, because this country cannot afford to throw money about just for the fun of it—in examining the grey lines on the map is to consider what are the alternatives and whether a more integrated local policy might be able to make the line pay.

    Mr. Dalyell Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind the broader social and economic considerations in central and south Scotland? Is she in a position to say anything about the Edinburgh—Carlisle line?

    Mrs. Castle As my hon. Friend is no doubt aware, the Edinburgh—Carlisle line has already been proposed for closure and is already coming under the normal examination. [HON. MEMBERS: “Oh!”] This preceded the publication of the map, and whether in the end the Edinburgh—Carlisle line finishes up as one of the parts of the stabilised network must depend on the outcome of this examination.

    Mr. Alasdair Mackenzie While there is no reference to Scotland in the Minister’s statement, we welcome the fact that it says that social and economic needs will be considered in coming to decisions on closures, and so forth. Is she aware that this affects my part of the country, the Highlands of Scotland, very much? I should like an assurance from the right hon. Lady that there will be no further rundown in railway services in the Highlands of Scotland, because we are at the moment suffering a great deal on account of the rundown that has taken place in the past.

    Mrs. Castle I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will be delighted to know that as a result of my reversal of the previous Administration’s policy, the line routes included in the basic network map include the Perth-Thurso line, which would have disappeared, the Aberdeen-Inverness line, which would have disappeared, the Helensburgh-Oban line, which would have disappeared, and a number of others.

    Mr. Speaker Mr. Mendelson.

    Mr. Mendelson rose—[Interruption.]

    Mr. Speaker Order.

    Mr. Manuel On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I ask, with the greatest respect to you, why, if hon. Members on this side seem to be pulled up right away, hon. and right hon. Members opposite get the utmost liberty to throw remarks about in this Chamber.

    Mr. Speaker I call to order hon. Members who are misbehaving when I notice them. I happened to notice the hon. Member concerned. Mr. Mendelson.

    Mr. Mendelson I should like to ask about the decisions which my right hon. Friend reserves to herself after these matters have been before the Economic Development Council. Would she bear in mind that a conflict is developing between the actual need to save on certain local lines and the future economic development of the areas they serve? The general policy of the Cabinet to have diversity of industry and new industries in certain old industrial areas is now being contradicted by the decision to close or drastically revise certain lines that should be kept open on economic grounds.

    Mrs. Castle I am very acutely aware of the need to take into consideration possible industrial and housing development in an area. This is one of the facts which should be very much taken care of by the Economic Planning Councils, and the basic map has been drawn up in consultation with them. The responsibility for the final network is mine, but the councils with this kind of idea in mind, have put many proposals to me to which I have responded in drawing up the basic network. I repeat that when we examine the closures which will have to be considered in the next few months, I shall have this very much in mind as well.

    Mr. Edward M. Taylor As the present Government have either closed or plan the closure of 4,991 miles of railway line compared with 3,480 miles in the 13 years when the previous Government were in power, does not the right hon. Lady agree that it is outrageous that we should have this statement made without the map? Why could the map not have been given to us by 10 a.m., in time for her statement?
    Will the right hon. Lady also—

    Mr. Speaker Order. Supplementary questions must be brief.

    Mr. Taylor —try to explain what is meant by gradually transferring the burden to local authorities? Does this mean that the 11,000 miles target can be achieved only if ratepayers in certain areas accept a further heavy burden? If so, is this wise in view of the already heavy burden that exists?

    Mrs. Castle I hope that we can nail once and for all the mythology that hon. Members opposite had tried to build up about closures. The truth is that more mileage was planned for closure in the last year of Conservative government than there has been in the whole life of this Government. The right hon. Member for Wallasey (Mr. Marples) merely refused 10 closures during his period of office; my right hon. Friend the Member for Hamilton (Mr. Tom Fraser) and I refused 29 in our two years of responsibility. Hon. Members will be able to see perfectly clearly what we have done in fixing this basic network to reverse a situation under which, under the logic of the policy of the previous Administration, we should have had something like 4,800 passenger miles left on our railway network. That was a fact, and this is the policy we have reversed.

    As to local councils, the answer to the hon. Member for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Edward M. Taylor) is that it does not mean that the preservation of 11,000 route miles depends on the ratepayers’ carrying this burden.

    Dr. John Dunwoody May I congratulate my right hon. Friend on allaying the doubts and anxieties that have hung over the railway industry since the days when the present Opposition were in power? Can she assure the House that the basic railway network as it is to be published will remain for the foreseeable future? Will she agree that if local authorities are to play a part in financing the maintenance of unprofitable branch lines, it may mean some changes in the criteria by which the central Government support local government? Will she consider consulting her right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government with this end in view?

    Mrs. Castle I am grateful to my hon. Friend. As a result of this reversal of policy, new hope is being brought to the South-West, because included in the basic network will be the Plymouth-Penzance line, the Salisbury-Exeter and Okehampton-Barnstaple line, and the Castle Cary-Dorchester line. These are some of the examples of what will be in the basic network map. I can assure my hon. Friend that no proposals for the closure of any lines now in the basic network will be made in the foreseeable future.

    On the local authority point, quite clearly it would be ridiculous to transfer to existing local authorities the Exchequer burden that we are openly taking here. There must be a move towards the creation of wider transport authorities in the context of the grant policy for public transport as a whole before a transfer of the burden could even be contemplated. In addition, I repeat that some local authorities have said that there are purely local lines that might otherwise be closed under Section 56 but which they want a chance to try to keep open by local subsidy. I have made it clear that if they want to do that, it will be open to them to negotiate with the British Railways Board.

    Several Hon. Members rose—

    Mr. Speaker Order. We must cut down the length of supplementary questions and answers if possible. Sir John Eden.

    Sir J. Eden Before leaving this matter, Mr. Speaker, may we hear from the right hon. Lady at what time the map was given to the Press?

    Sir G. Nabarro Having regard to the open-ended subsidy to which the Minister referred, whatever that jargon may mean, has she calculated what this will add to the existing rate of loss on the railways of £130 million per annum, when she abandons a commercial enterprise in favour of a Ministry of Social Security exercise?

    Mrs. Castle Hon. Members opposite had better make up their minds whether their objection is that I am to subsidise too much or whether it is that no lines are to be closed at all. This has been the duplicity of the policy of hon. Members opposite for years—[Interruption.]—and it has bedevilled the case—

    Mr. Barber On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it in order for the Minister to accuse hon. Members on this side of duplicity?

    Mr. Speaker I think that the right hon. Gentleman is being unduly sensitive.

    Mrs. Castle It is—

    Hon. Members Withdraw.

    Mr. Speaker Order. We should be able to proceed more quietly.

    Mrs. Castle It is this which has be-devilled the creation of a proper railways policy. I do not know what the hon. Member for Worcestershire, South (Sir G. Nabarro) means by his reference to “open-ended subsidy”. I have made it clear that, on the contrary, in every case where the Government decide that a line is socially necessary, the joint survey to which I have referred will examine in great detail what economies can be brought into play in order to reduce the loss before deciding the size of the contribution which has to be made on social grounds by the Government.

    This will not add to the deficit of the Board, because the position at the moment is that, where closures are refused, the cost falls on the deficit anyhow. The right hon. Member for Wallasey refused certain closures on the one hand, while, on the other, lecturing the Railways Board about the need to pay its way. No one could hope in that way to get an efficiency target for British Railways that it could hope to reach.

    Mr. Ridley On a point order, Mr. Speaker. May we take it that my right hon. and hon. Friends will be allowed to ask longer supplementary questions in view of the disproportionate amount of time being taken by the right hon. Lady’s answers?

    Mr. Speaker I have already commented on that matter.

    Mrs. Castle The trouble is that I get such long questions, so I have to give long answers.

    Sir G. Nabarro On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. That jibe was directed at me. Is it not a fact that my supplementary question was a masterpiece of brevity?

    Mrs. Castle Well, it certainly was not a masterpiece of sanity.

    Sir G. Nabarro You have constantly ruled, Mr. Speaker, that supplementary questions should be brief. If my supplementary question had not been brief, you would have been on your feet in a split second. But you made no attempt to halt my question, which was a masterpiece of brevity. Would you, therefore, ask the right hon. Lady to withdraw her shocking innuendo that my supplementary was insane and not brief?

    Mr. Speaker The last question is not part of the hon. Gentleman’s point of order, the first part of which was a statement of fact.

    Sir G. Nabarro You agree with it?

    Mr. Speaker Order. The hon. Gentleman must contain himself a little. We must get on.

    Sir J. Eden Has the right hon. Lady made any assessment of the likely increase to the taxpayer of the Government’s policy?

    Mrs. Castle Perhaps I should explain what happens if a closure is refused even though the line is losing money. This cost falls on the deficit, although it is the Government and Parliament who have decided that the line should remain open. In such a situation, it is obvious common sense to have a separate social account so that, Parliament having willed a line to be kept open, Parliament will put it not on the deficit but under a special social subsidy. The amount involved cannot be foreseen until the joint survey has examined each socially necessary line, what economies can be made and what size of subsidy will be required.

  • Les Huckfield – 1968 Parliamentary Question on the Leamington Spa—Coventry And Nuneaton Rail Line

    Les Huckfield – 1968 Parliamentary Question on the Leamington Spa—Coventry And Nuneaton Rail Line

    The parliamentary question asked by Les Huckfield, the then Labour MP for Nuneaton, in the House of Commons on 27 May 1968.

    Mr. Leslie Huckfield asked the Minister of Transport what representations have been made by the Railways Board for a variation in the terms of the closure order made for the Leamington Spa—Coventry and Nuneaton railway line.

    Mr. Marsh

    None—apart from the application to delete some of the existing bus services referred to in the Answer given to my hon. Friend’s previous Question on 19th February, 1968.—[Vol. 759, c. 43–44.]

    Mr. Leslie Hackfield asked the Minister of Transport whether he is satisfied that the proposal to single the railway track between Nuneaton, Coventry and Leamington Spa, is in accordance with the terms of the closure order made on this line; and if he will make a statement.

    Mr. Marsh

    Yes. The official letter sent to the Board on 18th September, 1964 conveying the consent of the Minister to the withdrawal of rail passenger services from the Nuneaton-Coventry-Leamington line included a request that the Railways Board should notify the Minister if they decided to remove the track from any part of the line. I understand that the Board are now considering proposals for singling most of the track, and I have no doubt that they will inform me if they decide to do so. Freight services will in any case continue to operate over the whole length of the line.

  • Barbara Castle – 1968 Transport Act and Railway Closures

    Barbara Castle – 1968 Transport Act and Railway Closures

    The text of the 1968 Transport Act, as enacted, with regards to railway closures.

    54 Railway closures

    (1)In discharging any of his functions under subsection (8) or (10) of section 56 of the Act of 1962 or under subsection (5) of this section in relation to, or to a proposal by the Railways Board or the London Board for, the discontinuance of all railway passenger services from any station or on any line (hereafter in this section, as in that section, referred to as a closure), the Minister shall have regard to any matters which for the time being appear to him to be relevant, including any social or economic considerations, and shall not give his consent to a proposed closure—

    (a)unless he is satisfied that a reasonable opportunity has been afforded for the making to the Minister of representations with respect to the closure by or on behalf of persons who are employed by the Board concerned for the purposes of, or in connection with, the services in question and who appear to the Minister to be likely to be directly affected by the closure ; or

    (b)before he has considered any representations made while that opportunity remains available which he is satisfied are either made by such persons as aforesaid or made on behalf of such persons by an organisation appearing to him to represent such persons.

    (2)In the case of a proposed closure of a station from which, or of a line on the whole or part of which, railway passenger services fall to be provided by the Railways Board in pursuance of an agreement under section 20(2)(b) of this Act with the Executive for an area designated under section 9(1) thereof, the Board shall not publish a notice of that closure in pursuance of subsection (7) of the said section 56 without the consent of that Executive to its publication ; and if the Board publish the notice before obtaining that consent, the notice shall be of no effect unless before the expiration of the period fixed by the notice for objecting to the closure either—

    (a)the Executive have informed the Board in writing that they consent to the publication ; or

    (b)the Minister, on an application made for the purpose by the Board, whether before or after the publication of the notice, and after affording the Executive what the Minister considers a reasonable opportunity to make any representations, has directed that the notice shall have effect notwithstanding that the Executive have not consented to its publication ;

    but the giving by the Executive of their consent to publication of a notice in pursuance of the said subsection (7) shall not affect the right of the Executive under subsection (4) of this section to oppose the closure.

    (3)Where, in the case of any proposed closure, subsection (2) of this section does not apply but the proposal is for the closure of a station, or of the whole or part of a line, which is situated within an area designated as aforesaid, the Railways Board shall send to the Executive for that area a copy of the notice of the closure published by the Board in pursuance of the said subsection (7).

    (4)Where, in the case of any closure to which subsection (2) or (3) of this section applies, notice of the closure has been published by the Railways Board in pursuance of the said subsection (7) (not being a notice which under the said subsection (2) is of no effect), the Executive concerned may, within the period specified in the notice for objecting to the closure, lodge with the Minister a statement in writing that they oppose the closure and of their reasons therefor; and where the Executive lodge such a statement with the Minister they shall send a copy of that statement to the Board and, notwithstanding that no objection is lodged in accordance with subsection (8) of the said section 56, the closure shall not be proceeded with until the Minister has given his consent.

    (5)In the case of any closure requiring the consent of the Minister under the said section 56 or under subsection (4) of this section—

    (a)the Minister may give his consent subject to such conditions as he thinks fit, including conditions to be complied with after the closure ;

    (b)the Minister may from time to time vary or revoke the conditions for the time being required to be complied with in connection with the closure, whether the closure took place before or after the coming into force of this subsection;

    (c)those conditions may include conditions as to the provision of alternative services by, or by a subsidiary of, the Bus Company or the Scottish Group, or by some other person whether in pursuance of arrangements made by the Bus Company or the Scottish Group or otherwise; and

    (d)whether before or after the closure, and whether the closure took place before or after the coming into force of this subsection, the Minister may from time to time give such directions to the Railways Board or, as the case may be, the London Board and to the Bus Company, and the Secretary of State may from time to time give such directions to the Scottish Group, as he thinks fit in connection with the closure;

    and where any such condition or direction relates to the provision or assistance in the provision of alternative services, the Minister or, where those alternative services are to be provided by, or by a subsidiary of, or in pursuance of arrangements made by, the Scottish Group, the Minister and the Secretary of State acting jointly may refer to an Area Committee within the meaning of the said section 56 any matter relating to those services, and the committee shall consider and report on that matter to the Minister or, as the case may be, to the Minister and the Secretary of State.

    (6)Where any condition or direction such as is referred to in subsection (5) of this section requires the provision of alternative services by, or by a subsidiary of, the Bus Company or the Scottish Group or in pursuance of arrangements made by that Company or that Group, the cost of providing those alternative services shall be borne by that Company or, as the case may be, that Group.

    (7)For the purposes of subsections (5) and (6) of this section any conditions imposed under subsection (11) of the said section 56, so far as still required to be complied with immediately before the coming into force of the said subsection (5), shall have effect as if imposed under the said subsection (5).

    (8)Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Schedule 7 to the Act of 1962 (which contain spent transitional provisions with respect to matters pending at the date of the coming into force of the said section 56) shall cease to have effect.

  • David Webster – 1967 Comments on Dismissal of Gerry Fiennes by Barbara Castle

    David Webster – 1967 Comments on Dismissal of Gerry Fiennes by Barbara Castle

    The comments made by David Webster, the then Conservative Transport spokesperson, on 26 September 1967.

    The peremptory and humiliating sacking of Gerald Fiennes is in sharp distinction to the treatment of Lord Robens. In Lord Robens’ case he was, in my view rightly, asked to stay on after the disaster of Aberfan and after the tribunal had found the Coal Board, of which he was the head, to be seriously at fault and also to have been most unsatisfactory in their giving of evidence.

    In Mr Fiennes’ case, this distinguished and faithful servant of the railways has said what many people would heartily agree with in criticising the apparent lack of interest of the railways board to attempt to attain its financial objectives. He had been summoned to HQ and sacked immediately – with hardly time even to tidy his desk.

    At one moment a lifetime with the railways is suddenly severed, although acute shortage of top railways management is everywhere acknowledged. I suspect that in this case the hand that caused the sacking is that of Mrs Barbara Castle. We know that Mrs Castle has little interest in the financial objectives of the railways. We know that Mrs Castle is impatient of independent opinion, as in the case of the removal of the chairman of the British Road Safety Advisory Council and in her attempts to dominate the road research laboratory. We will demand an inquiry into this grisly affairs as soon as Parliament reassembles.