Tag: 2024

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 25 July 2024.

Deputy Ambassador Deirdre Brown says the fourth European Political Community summit held in the UK demonstrated strong commitment to Ukraine and on shared challenges like migrant smuggling and energy security.

Thank you, Chair. I would like to provide a brief readout of the meeting of the European Political Community last week at Blenheim Palace. At that summit, the Prime Minister reaffirmed our commitment to security, freedom, democracy and the rule of law – and to work with our European partners to meet the challenges we all face.

As you know, for the first time the OSCE Secretary General was invited to attend. Unfortunately, it was not possible for her to attend, but I hope that demonstrates our commitment to this institution and to ensuring a coherent approach to shared challenges from all the countries and institutions of Europe.

Front and centre of the Summit was clear and steadfast support for Ukraine among European leaders, who reiterated their commitment to do whatever it takes in the face of continued Russian aggression. We were honoured to host President Zelenskyy, to whom the Prime Minister personally committed the UK’s continued and deep support.

For the first time, migration was on the agenda with a roundtable discussion chaired by Italy and Albania. The UK was pleased to agree new deals with Slovakia and Slovenia to tackle organised crime; to increase the UK presence at Europol, playing our full part in the European Migrant Smuggling Centre; and to announce £84 million in support to tackle upstream migration.

Leaders also agreed on the challenge of increasing energy security through a roundtable chaired by Norway and Slovenia. There was a focus on resilience and interconnection, with particular emphasis on assistance to Black Sea countries, as well as discussing novel energy projects, sharing expertise, and accelerating the pace of electrification.

Leaders did not lose sight of the fact that European security is also under threat beyond Ukraine. A roundtable also discussions challenges around Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. The margins of the Summit also saw a meeting of the Friends of Moldova Group which underlined the international commitment to Moldova’s sovereignty and democracy.

Colleagues, the UK was immensely proud to host the EPC last week, and we look forward to continuing the work of revitalising our relationships with our friends and partners across the globe, and particularly in this room, as we place European security at the forefront of our foreign and defence priorities. And for the UK it was an opportune moment to make clear our government’s focus on resetting our relationships with our neighbours and friends across Europe.

Thank you.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 25 July 2024.

Deputy Ambassador Deirdre Brown underlines the increased scale and intensity of the hybrid threat now faced by many participating States.

Thank you, Madam Chair. The threat from the Russian Federation comes in many forms, so let me thank France for tabling this item, and allowing participating States the opportunity to put on record just how reckless it is becoming. As Russia continues to pursue its devastating war in Ukraine at ever greater cost to Ukraine and itself, Russia’s operations abroad have become more diverse and more widespread.

Russia’s use of disinformation and other malign tactics is well documented – deployed to advance its influence, sow discord and undermine global rules and norms. This is pervasive across the globe, but particularly in its near abroad. Alongside the US and Canada, the UK recently condemned Russian attempts to undermine Moldova’s democratic institutions in the leadup to the October presidential elections, and the referendum on Moldova’s EU membership. The UK will continue to stand firm with our friends, against Russia’s persistent attempts to undermine sovereignty and democratic processes, and to provide support to bolster regional resilience.

In Europe, participating States have seen buildings burned down. In May, five British men were arrested and charged in relation to an arson attack in London. Two of these individuals were arrested and charged under the UK’s new National Security Act including offences relating to a foreign intelligence service – with the Crown Prosecution Service confirming Russia as the foreign state involved in the sabotage incident. Similar incidents and arrests have taken place in Poland, Czechia, and Latvia, which we assess to be part of a covert and coordinated sabotage campaign, directed by Russia. It is clear that those behind this activity do not care who bears the consequences of their recklessness.

This year, there have been numerous reports of assassination plots allegedly prepared by Russia, including one which allegedly resulted in the death of a Russian defector, who was shot dead in Spain. This is nothing new; it brings to mind the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal by the GRU, which led to the death of an innocent British civilian in 2018, or the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006. What is new, is the scale and intensity of the hybrid threat now faced by so many participating States, signalling an increase in Russia’s readiness to use covert and illegal methods abroad to further its agenda, posing the most acute threat to European security and to global stability.

Such aggression requires a robust and collective response from all participating States who seek to uphold the core values of this organisation. We must make clear to President Putin and the Russian authorities that attempts to undermine our support for Ukraine will not work, by maintaining the assistance it urgently needs to defeat Russia on the battlefield. And we must work together to deny Russia’s attempts to operate inside our own borders, whether directly or through its proxies.

The UK has taken action to expel the Russian Defence Attaché, an undeclared GRU officer, and is working intensively to make the UK the hardest possible operating environment for Russian hybrid attacks. Such measures are vital to prevent Russia from destabilising those who stand in its way, and to send a clear message that we will not falter in the face of its belligerence. Thank you.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 25 July 2024.

Deputy Ambassador Deirdre Brown thanks head of OSCE mission in Kazakhstan Dr Frobarth for his and his team’s work, especially on human rights, transnational threats, and prosperity.

Thank you, Dr Frobarth, for your detailed report and a warm welcome back to the Permanent Council. I would also like to thank you for your support to the successful visits of Chairpersons-in-Office Osmani and Borg over the past year. The UK remains strongly committed to – and supportive of – the essential work that the OSCE field mission is doing in Kazakhstan and across Central Asia. We recognise the impact that failure to agree the Unified Budget is having on that work.

Kazakhstan is a key partner for the United Kingdom. The signature of the UK-Kazakhstan Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement by our then Foreign Secretary earlier this year demonstrates the importance the United Kingdom places on this relationship. The Agreement sets out a framework for closer cooperation, and we look forward to building on it across shared priorities including trade, climate, education and security.

Your report rightly focuses on the importance of ensuring the full implementation of reform in Kazakhstan, and progress on the Human Dimension agenda. Representatives of the Government of the United Kingdom have had constructive discussions on this with government counterparts and civil society leaders in Kazakhstan over the past year. We are, however, concerned by calls from some groups to limit the freedom of expression of LGBT+ people in Kazakhstan, and hope that the Government of Kazakhstan will reject such calls for restrictions on the rights of vulnerable minority groups.

I would like to draw particular attention to the report on Gender Based Violence, published by the OSCE Programme Office in advance of the criminalisation of domestic violence in April. This was an important step forward for Kazakhstan and we commend the OSCE Programme Office for its contribution. We also were pleased to see Kazakhstan refer the text of its new law on Mass Media to the Representative on Freedom of the Media for legal review.

The United Kingdom commends the OSCE for their excellent work on security and transnational threats. Ensuring that transnational threats to security are addressed and managed successfully, justly and openly, is of great importance. We fully support the OSCE in this field, and we are pleased to hear of the wide-ranging work undertaken on the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, internet freedom and digital rights, and border security.

We would like to thank the OSCE Office for their continued work in Kazakhstan on anti-money laundering, anti-corruption, trade facilitation, and support for small- and medium-sized enterprises, ensuring that opportunities in Kazakhstan are open to all; and that economies in Central Asia continue to attract investment and build prosperity.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Kazakhstan for their leadership and wide-ranging support for, and activity in, multilateral organisations. We underline the significance, importance and value of the OSCE mission in Astana.

Once again, thank you Ambassador Frobarth, and your team, for your crucial work. We and our colleagues at our embassy in Astana stand ready to support in any way they can.

Thank you.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 25 July 2024.

Ambassador Holland expresses concern at the mounting evidence of Russia’s violations of international law and demands answers on whether Russia stands by its OSCE commitments.

Thank you, Mister Chair.

On Monday 22 July, ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) released their fifth interim report on reported violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law in Ukraine.

The findings were disturbing but sadly not a surprise; they are consistent with findings by other international organisations. They are also consistent with the serious concerns that we and colleagues have repeatedly raised in this room.

For example, the report noted an intensification of attacks by Russian Federation forces since December 2023, resulting in increased civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, including critical energy infrastructure. It notes a continued disregard for the principles of distinction and proportionality. We have heard similar points in this Council almost every week.

The report covered patterns of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances of civilians in the territories Russia temporarily controls and “widespread and systematic torture, including sexual torture against civilian detainees.”

It cites evidence of the widespread use of torture and poor conditions of detention for prisoners of wars.

There was also further information in ODIHR’s report on Russia’s intensified efforts “to alter the status and character of the occupied territories in violation of IHL”.

Mister Chair, there are many more examples. The point is that ODIHR’s interim report is the latest contribution to the growing body of evidence detailing how Russia has executed this illegal war. It is right that the OSCE and its autonomous institutions should play a role in documenting these crimes and holding Russia to account.  It is also right that we – participating States – continue to use this meeting to confront Russia with the uncomfortable truth and highlight violations of OSCE principles which we all agreed to honour.

In this spirit, on 6 June I asked the Russian delegation whether they considered Russia’s actions in Ukraine to be in conformity with this first Helsinki principle and if so, whether they could explain how? Their response was to give an example – from 25 years ago – where they believed that others had failed to comply with the principle.  That did not answer my question. So I ask again – does the Russian Federation stand by its commitment to the first Helsinki principle on sovereignty?

On 11 July, we asked how Russia’s preconditions for negotiations with Ukraine conformed to several principles from the Decalogue. We did not get a direct response to this either. The speech by the Russian President called for Ukraine to withdraw completely from four oblasts that fall within Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders. So could Russia confirm that they still stand by their commitments in Article 3 which prohibit the demand for and seizure of part of the territory of another state? Could we also get a proper answer on how the invasion of Ukraine complies with Article 4 which prohibits making the territory of a fellow state an object of military occupation? Does Russia still stand by that commitment? And finally, could we also get a direct answer to whether Russia still abides by its Article 2 commitments on the non-use of force in the light of the invasion?

Mister Chair, we should all be deeply concerned at how seriously Russia treats its commitments when those commitments become inconvenient. If they are allowed to discard OSCE principles and the UN Charter on this occasion, how could any of us have faith that they would comply with their commitments, here or elsewhere, in the future? I think those of us who share the Helsinki commitments and a common geographic home deserve straight answers. Because these principles were designed to keep us secure and if we compromise on them, we undermine all of our collective security.  Thank you.