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Category: Technology

  • Jamie Wallis – 2022 Speech on the Computer Misuse Act 1990

    Jamie Wallis – 2022 Speech on the Computer Misuse Act 1990

    The speech made by Jamie Wallis, the Conservative MP for Bridgend, in Westminster Hall on 19 April 2022.

    I beg to move,

    That this House has considered the Computer Misuse Act 1990.

    Before I begin, I draw Members’ attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, and in particular to my stakeholding in a firm that has offered digital forensic services in the past, but which I understand does not plan to offer such services at least for the next three to five years.

    It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Mark. I am grateful to have secured this important debate of national security significance, especially considering this morning’s headlines about the potential spyware attack on No. 10. The need for this debate has become more urgent of late, especially considering the barbaric and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, which has placed a spotlight on the pressing requirement to strengthen the UK’s cyber-security.

    The UK Government have achieved a great deal in developing our cyber-capabilities, spearheading the creation of the National Cyber Force and putting aside a total of £2.6 billion for cyber and IT, which is a significant funding increase on previous years. I strongly welcome the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport working more closely with cyber-security firms, through £850,000 of funding to support the establishment and activities of the UK Cyber Cluster Collaboration.

    Given this Government’s strong record developing our cyber-capabilities, it is surprising that 32 years after its introduction as a private Member’s Bill, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 remains the primary piece of legislation covering cyber-crime in the UK. I am sure we all agree that the technological landscape has altered drastically over the last 30 years. Our existing legislation must urgently be updated to reflect those monumental changes. When the 1990 Act came into law, Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister, the first website was yet to be published and I was just a toddler.

    The CMA was brought into law to criminalise unauthorised access to computers. In other words, hacking without permission became illegal, irrespective of motive or intent. However, the CMA came into force before the modern cyber-security industry, which now employs more than 52,000 people across 1,800 firms. In 2022, the methods used by cyber criminals and cyber-security professionals are often very similar—sometimes the same. Individuals who work in cyber-security are frequently required to perform actions for which explicit authorisation is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.

    Contemporary defensive cyber research into computer system vulnerabilities and threat intelligence often involves the scanning and examination of compromised victims and criminal systems to lessen the impact of future attacks—pre-empting what such a hack might resemble to prevent its success. It strikes me as woefully naive to think that criminals will explicitly authorise access to their systems. To do so would be akin to a policeman asking permission to arrest an individual.

    British cyber-security professionals are at risk of being taken to court for obtaining actionable intelligence, which means that as a country we are dissuading vital research from being conducted at a time when countries such as Russia and China are increasingly deploying hostile technologies against us and our allies. Consequently, even though the CMA has been amended several times since 1990, its major flaw is that it fails to allay fear of arrest and/or prosecution among cyber-security professionals as they carry out essential threat intelligence research against cyber criminals and agents of rogue states.

    We find ourselves in a perverse situation where industry specialists who are acting in the public interest—often dealing with issues that are critical to our national security infrastructure—are at risk of being designated a criminal. Even with responsible policing, the CMA can still be used by non-state bodies to pursue individuals through the civil courts, causing considerable financial and emotional injury to well-intentioned professionals. If situations such as these remain possible, future generations of cyber professionals could be deterred from pursuing a highly rewarding career, precisely at a time when we should aspire for Britain to continue its reputation as a global cyber leader.

    In urging for reform of the CMA, I have worked closely with the CyberUp campaign, which argues for updating the law and makes the case that failure to reform is holding back our cyber defences and preventing the upskilling of our workforce. In the “Time for reform?” report published by the CyberUp campaign and techUK in November 2020, analysis of a survey showed that the industry overwhelmingly suggested that the CMA was not fit for purpose. More than nine in 10 respondents said that they

    “did not believe that the Computer Misuse Act represented a world leading example of 21st century cyber crime legislation.”

    With Russia frequently targeting infrastructure through cyber-attacks, it is becoming increasingly urgent that we resolve the contradictions in the CMA. We need only look at the 2017 Russian state-sponsored NotPetya virus, which caused billions of pounds-worth of damage, to appreciate how devastating such attacks can be. At the epicentre of this digital hydrogen bomb in Ukraine, national transport infrastructure ground to a halt, people were unable to withdraw money from ATMs and even the radiation monitoring system at Chernobyl went offline. The current situation is an immense security risk.

    The national cyber strategy, which was published in December 2021, sets out a commitment to improving our resilience to cyber-threats, but currently the strategy is clearly hamstrung because of the CMA. I have spoken to threat intelligence researchers from leading UK cyber-security companies, who have stated that they come up against CMA-related barriers three times a week on average. In those situations, researchers must seek guidance on whether they can investigate without breaching the provisions of the Act. In 80% of such cases, investigations cannot be undertaken. Where investigations can go forward, there is a significant benefit, with the average number of victims who can be identified, and thus warned and supported, varying between a handful and often up to hundreds per investigation.

    We can extrapolate the figures to try to develop a national picture of what is going on. Using data obtained in the DCMS sectoral analysis 2022, the list of CREST threat intelligence providers and statistics from the DCMS cyber breaches survey 2021, we can surmise that the CMA is an active consideration in relation to at least a hundred, but potentially up to 3,000 investigations, each week across the UK in cyber-threat intelligence firms; that is, of course, assuming that all the other firms are similarly conscientious about staying on the right side of the law. That means that up to 2,400 investigations could be abandoned due to sensitivities around the CMA, which in turn could mean that up to 1 million victims remain unidentified and thus under threat from cyber criminals. Financially, it is estimated that the outdated CMA is costing our economy at least £30 million a week.

    Our digital economy is being held back by a law that came into existence when less than half a percent of the population used the internet. We need to make the case that Britain, with its impressive track record in computing, networking and cyber, is a fantastic place to invest, create jobs and upskill our workforce. As it stands, we risk losing out to global competitors with more liberal legislative regulations, such as France, Israel and the United States.

    What practical changes need to be made to the CMA for it to be well placed to rise to the challenges of 2022 and beyond? Industry representatives have directly conveyed to me a strong desire to see the inclusion of a statutory defence for cyber-security professionals who are acting in the public interest. Although I understand the need to ensure an effective balance between protecting legitimate cyber-activity and being able to prosecute genuine criminals effectively, one thing that struck me in my meetings with industry representatives was that even among those who felt relatively at ease about the prospect of prosecution, there remained a strong and genuine fear of arrest, which would involve the seizure of their work devices—the tools of their trade—and cause significant stress to individuals who are proud of their contributions to keeping Britain safe.

    Currently, the only protections in the Act, beyond a few cases where a warrant is obtained, are extendable only to actions undertaken with explicit authorisation. Consequently, for the law to work for 21st-century Britain and its need to defend itself from cyber-attacks, reform should include a legal mechanism and clarify legal ambiguities in order to put professionals at ease.

    Sir Paul Beresford (Mole Valley) (Con)

    I apologise for not being here at the very beginning. My hon. Friend is absolutely correct about a statutory defence, but I understand that that could be achieved without changing the current legislation, particularly if it were done in co-ordination with the Crown Prosecution Service.

    Dr Wallis

    It is important that we respond directly to the concerns of the cyber-security professionals; this is what they have asked for. Meaningful engagement with them will lead to a potential compromise. There is also a need to balance how we act against genuine cyber criminals, and I think that meaningful engagement and working with them will be the way to find that suitable compromise.

    Updating the CMA has widespread cross-party support, with the all-party parliamentary internet group first calling for reform of the CMA in 2004—18 years ago. Since then, the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia report has recommended that the CMA should be updated in response to the heightened risk of malignant Russian cyber-activities.

    Although cyber professionals across the country and I greatly appreciate the announcement by the Home Secretary last year of a review looking at the CMA, progress has seemingly been slow. Some 66% of respondents to the Government’s call for information had concerns over the existing legal protections of the CMA, so I hope that the Minister will update us as to whether the review is being expedited, especially considering that there has been an increase in hostile cyber-actions undertaken by rogue states and given this morning’s headlines on potential spyware attacks on No. 10. I would also be grateful if the Minister would meet myself and others from the campaign to discuss the matter further. I look forward to hearing contributions from hon. and right hon. Members.

  • James Cartlidge – 2022 Comments on Court Decisions Made Available On-line

    James Cartlidge – 2022 Comments on Court Decisions Made Available On-line

    The comments made by James Cartlidge, the Justice Minister, on 19 April 2022.

    As we continue to build a justice system that works for all, the National Archive’s new service is a vital step towards better transparency. It will ensure court judgments are easily accessible to anyone who needs them.

    Our first official Government record of judgments is a modern one-stop-shop that will benefit everyone, from lawyers and judges to academics, journalists and members of the public.

  • Nadine Dorries – 2022 Statement on Online Safety

    Nadine Dorries – 2022 Statement on Online Safety

    The statement made by Nadine Dorries, the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, in the House of Commons on 17 March 2022.

    Today the Government are introducing the Online Safety Bill. For most people, the internet has transformed relationships and working environments, but illegal and harmful content appearing online is a growing problem. This groundbreaking Bill will keep users safe while protecting freedom of expression and democratic debate online. Under the new laws, in-scope services will need to:

    Tackle criminal activity—There will be no safe space for criminal content online. Platforms will have to remove terrorist material or child sexual abuse and exploitation quickly, and will not be allowed to promote it in their algorithms.

    Protect children—The strongest protections in our new laws are for children and young people. They will be protected from harmful or inappropriate content such as grooming, bullying, pornography and the promotion of self-harm and eating disorders.

    Enforce their terms and conditions—The largest online platforms with the widest reach, including the most popular social media platforms (category 1 services) will need to set out clearly what harmful content accessed by adults is allowed on their sites, and enforce their terms of service consistently, while protecting freedom of expression and democratic debate.

    The strongest provisions in our legislation are for children. All companies in scope of this legislation will need to consider the risks that their sites could pose to the youngest members of society. This Bill will require companies to take steps to protect children from inappropriate content and harmful activity online, including from content such as pro-suicide material. The Bill will also require providers who publish or host pornographic content on their services to prevent children from accessing that content, including using age-verification technology where appropriate.

    Furthermore, this Bill will ensure companies take robust action against illegal content. We have included a new list of priority offences on the face of the Bill, reflecting the most serious and prevalent illegal content and activity, against which companies must take proactive measures. These will include, amongst others, revenge pornography, fraud, the sale of illegal drugs or weapons, the promotion or facilitation of suicide, people smuggling and the illegal sex trade. The Bill will also introduce a requirement on in-scope companies to report child sexual exploitation and abuse imagery detected on their platforms to the National Crime Agency. This will ensure companies provide law enforcement with the high-quality information they need to safeguard victims and investigate offenders. The updated Bill will also tackle scam adverts, by requiring the largest platforms to put in place proportionate systems and processes to prevent fraudulent adverts from being published or hosted on their service.

    This legislation will not prevent adults from accessing or posting legal content. Rather, the major platforms will need to be clear what content is acceptable on their services and enforce their terms and conditions consistently and effectively. We have refined the approach to defining content that is harmful to adults, so that all types of harmful content that category 1 services (the largest online platforms with the widest reach, including the most popular social media platforms) are required to address will be set out in regulations subject to approval by both Houses. This will provide clarity about the harms that services must address and will reduce the risk of category 1 services taking an overly broad approach to what is considered harmful. In addition, these companies will not be able to remove controversial viewpoints arbitrarily, and users will be able to seek redress if they feel content has been removed unfairly. Both Ofcom and in-scope companies will have duties relating to freedom of expression, for which they can be held to account. Category 1 services will also have duties for democratic and journalistic content. They will need to set in their terms and conditions how they will protect this content on their platforms explicitly. This will ensure that people in the UK can express themselves freely online and participate in pluralistic and robust debate.

    The Bill provides Ofcom with robust enforcement powers to take action when platforms do not comply. Options available to Ofcom include imposing substantial fines, requiring improvements and pursuing business disruption measures (including blocking). The Bill also includes criminal offences for senior managers who fail to ensure their company co-operates with Ofcom, and gives them the information they need to regulate effectively. The Government have also announced additional information-related offences, including ensuring employees do not give false information during interviews, which will further help ensure that companies give Ofcom full and accurate information. We will bring these criminal sanctions into force as soon as possible after Royal Assent (generally two months, in line with standard practice), to further promote strong compliance.

    The threat posed by harmful and illegal content and activity is a global one and the Government remain committed to building international consensus around shared approaches to improve internet safety. Under the UK’s presidency of the G7, the world’s leading democracies committed to a set of internet safety principles. This is significant as it is the first time that an approach to internet safety has been agreed in the G7. We will continue to collaborate with our international partners to develop common approaches to this shared challenge that uphold our democratic values and promote a free, open and secure internet.

    We are grateful for the extensive engagement and scrutiny of the Bill from the Joint Committee, DCMS Select Sub-committee and the Petitions Committee, which has helped us to create a framework that delivers for users and maintains the UK’s reputation as a tech leader. The Bill is sustainable, workable, and proportionate, and will create a significant step-change in the experience people have online.

    We are also publishing the response to the report of the Joint Committee on the draft Online Safety Bill alongside publication of the Bill, and we thank the Committee once again for its work and its recommendations.

  • Julia Lopez – 2022 Statement on Digital Identity and Attributes

    Julia Lopez – 2022 Statement on Digital Identity and Attributes

    The statement made by Julia Lopez, the Minister for Media, Data and Digital Infrastructure, in the House of Commons on 10 March 2022.

    I wish to inform the House that the Government have today published their response to the digital identity and attributes consultation.

    In our increasingly digital world, and as technology devices become ever more integral to everyday life, being able to prove identities digitally is a tool which will give people more convenience, choice and security in how they access products and services. From making purchases, starting a new job, or moving house, it is important now more than ever that people and organisations can trust who they are dealing with as easily when transacting online as they do when dealing with others in the physical world.

    Published in July 2021, the digital identity and attributes consultation sought views on three main proposals that could achieve a safe and secure digital identity system for the whole UK. Extensive engagement informed these proposals and the contents of the consultation response. We are determined to put the needs of individuals first with a strong focus on privacy, security and inclusion.

    Based on the views received from respondents to the consultation, our response details the Government’s intent to legislate, when parliamentary time allows, to enable the development of a secure and trusted marketplace for digital identities and attributes across the UK economy.

    First, the Government will seek to introduce legislation that will establish a digital identity and attributes governance function. This will help to build a trusted ecosystem in which digital identities and attributes can be used safely and securely across the economy. The governance function will have oversight of the UK digital identity and attributes trust framework and will be responsible for the issuance of a trust mark to organisations certified against it. This will give confidence to individual users of digital identities and attributes that they can trust certified organisations to offer safe and secure digital products because they have a trust mark to show they are adhering to the standards of the UK trust framework.

    The Government will also seek to introduce legislation to enable public bodies to allow secure digital checks by trust-marked organisations against personal data they hold for the purposes of identity and eligibility verification. This will allow people and businesses to have confidence that digital identities in the UK can be built on trusted datasets in a way which upholds UK standards of privacy and data minimisation.

    Finally, the Government will seek to introduce legislation which will establish that data held by public bodies which are then shared digitally through the legal gateway, are equivalent to the same data shared through traditionally accepted forms of identification, such as physical passports. This will provide all parties that rely on these data with the clarity and confidence that digital identities and attributes can be trusted.

    Further details can be found in the consultation response, available at:

    https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/digital-identity-and-attributes-consultation/outcome/government-response-to-the-digital-identity-and-attributes-consultation.

    A copy of the consultation response will also be placed in the Libraries of both Houses.

  • Julia Lopez – 2022 Statement on 5G Deployment

    Julia Lopez – 2022 Statement on 5G Deployment

    The statement made by Julia Lopez, the Minister for Media, Data and Digital Infrastructure, in the House of Commons on 7 March 2022.

    Now more than ever, reliable digital connectivity is essential for people and businesses. We have committed to extending mobile geographical coverage across the UK. In order to improve coverage in rural parts of the country, the Government have agreed a £1 billion shared rural network deal with the UK’s mobile network operators to extend 4G mobile geographical coverage to 95% of the UK by the end of the programme. We also want to ensure that people and businesses right across the country can realise the full benefits of 5G as soon as possible. Through our £200 million 5G testbeds and trials programme, we are already seeing the benefits 5G can bring to manufacturing, farming, transport networks and healthcare.

    In order to realise these ambitions, it is essential that the planning system can effectively support the deployment of new mobile infrastructure, as well as network upgrades. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities—formerly the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government—have been consulting on proposed changes to permitted development rights for electronic communications infrastructure in England. Following an initial consultation in 2019 on the principle of the reforms, we published a technical consultation last year on implementing the proposed changes.

    Having reviewed the responses to the consultation, we believe that the proposed changes will have a positive impact on the Government’s ambitions for the deployment of 5G and extending mobile coverage. In considering the reforms, we have sought to ensure that we find the correct balance between facilitating improved connectivity, minimising impact in protected landscapes and ensuring that the appropriate environmental protections are in place.

    The Minister for Housing, my right hon. Friend the Member for Pudsey (Stuart Andrew), and I can announce that today the Government have published their response to the consultation, which sets out that we will make the following changes to permitted development rights:

    Enable the deployment of small equipment cabinets on article 2(3) land—such as national parks, conservation areas and areas of outstanding natural beauty—and allow greater flexibility for installing equipment cabinets in existing compounds, without requiring prior approval from the planning authority, while retaining prior approval for cabinets over 2.5 cubic metres;

    Allow for the strengthening of existing masts by permitting limited increases in the width of existing ground-based masts without the need for prior approval, and greater increases subject to prior approval, on all land. Also allow for limited increases to the height of existing ground-based masts without the need for prior approval outside of article 2(3) land, with greater increases on all land, up to specified limits, subject to prior approval;

    Enable the deployment of building-based masts by permitting these in closer proximity to a highway subject to prior approval outside of article 2(3) land. Permit smaller masts to be installed on buildings without the need for prior approval outside of article 2(3) land; and

    Enable taller new ground-based masts to be deployed—up to 25 metres on article 2(3) land and 30 metres on unprotected land, subject to approval from the planning authority.

    To balance these freedoms, we will introduce new planning conditions that will require operators to minimise the impact of all new development, especially for more sensitive areas, as far as possible. We will also make changes to the procedure for safeguarding aerodromes and defence assets, and technical changes to the definition of small cell systems. Following the consultation, we have decided not to allow any new ground-based masts to be installed without the prior approval of the planning authority.

    Improved mobile connectivity, especially 5G, will ultimately bring benefits to all communities and businesses throughout the country in support of our levelling-up agenda. The reforms will provide operators with the flexibility they require to upgrade existing sites in England for 5G delivery, enhance coverage and meet the growing demands for network capacity. They will also reduce the time, cost and uncertainty involved in upgrading mobile network infrastructure as well as encourage the use of existing infrastructure and promote site sharing to reduce the impacts of new deployment.

    Alongside the Government response, we have also published a new code of practice for wireless network development in England. This will provide updated guidance to ensure the impact of new and upgraded mobile infrastructure is minimised and that appropriate engagement takes place with local communities.

    In order to make these changes, we will shortly make amendments to part 16 of schedule 2 to the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015, as amended, through secondary legislation.

    As planning law is a devolved matter, the legislative changes will apply to England only, but we will continue to work closely with the devolved Administrations to ensure that the planning regime continues to support the deployment of mobile infrastructure across the United Kingdom.

  • Chris Philp – 2022 Statement on Online Safety

    Chris Philp – 2022 Statement on Online Safety

    The statement made by Chris Philp, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, in the House of Commons on 25 February 2022.

    The Government recognise the impact that online abuse, including anonymous abuse, has on people and their online experience. Too many people experience online abuse and protecting users is a priority for this Government.

    The Online Safety Bill introduces vital new protections from online abuse. The legislation will require all companies in scope to manage the risk of criminal abuse effectively, including anonymous abuse, on user-to-user services. Companies will need to assess the functionality of anonymous and pseudonymous profiles and the role they play in allowing illegal abuse and mitigate the risk associated with such functionality.

    All services likely to be accessed by children will also have to put in place appropriate measures to protect children from cyber-bullying and other forms of abuse, whether anonymous or not.

    Category 1 companies—those which are high risk and high reach—will also have to set out clearly what abusive content they accept on their platform for adults and have effective systems in place to enforce their terms and conditions.

    The Government recognise concerns that have been raised by the Joint Committee during pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, alongside the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, the Petitions Committee and others regarding the impact of online abuse and ensuring users have more control over whom they interact with online, while protecting the right of individuals to be anonymous if they choose. We thank the committees and campaigners for their scrutiny of the Online Safety Bill.

    As a result, I am pleased to announce that we will strengthen the duties in the Online Safety Bill by adding two new additional duties on category 1 companies to provide adults with optional user verification and user empowerment tools.

    The user verification duty will require category 1 companies to provide their adult users with an option to verify their identity. Ofcom will set out in guidance how companies can fulfil this new duty and the verification options companies could use. In developing this guidance, Ofcom must ensure that the possible verification measures are accessible to vulnerable users and consult the Information Commissioner, as well as vulnerable adult users and technical experts.

    The user empowerment tools duty will require category 1 companies to provide tools to give adults more control over whom they interact with and the legal content they see. Under the proposed new duty, for harmful content that category 1 companies do allow, they would have to provide users with the tools to control what types of harmful content they see. This could include, for example, content on the discussion of self-harm recovery which may be tolerated on a category 1 service but which a particular user may not want to see.

    In addition to the existing provisions in the Bill, the new duties will help provide robust protections for adults, including vulnerable adults, while protecting freedom of expression online.

  • Lindsay Hoyle – 2022 Statement on the Post Office Horizon IT System

    Lindsay Hoyle – 2022 Statement on the Post Office Horizon IT System

    The statement made by Lindsay Hoyle, the Speaker of the House of Commons, on 24 February 2022.

    Before the urgent question, I wish to make a short statement about the sub judice resolution. I have been advised that there are active legal proceedings in the Court of Appeal in respect of the quashing of convictions of postmasters and postmistresses which relied on evidence from the Post Office Horizon IT system. I am exercising the discretion given to the Chair in respect of the resolution on matters of sub judice to allow reference to those proceedings, as they concern issues of national importance. However, I urge Members to exercise caution in what they say and to avoid referring in detail to cases that remain before the Court of Appeal.

    May I also say that I am disappointed, as this urgent question could have been granted at other times over the past three days? I was promised there would be a statement. There has been a chance to convert it to a statement, but that has completely failed. Thank goodness that the hon. Member for North West Leicestershire (Andrew Bridgen) stuck with it by putting in for a UQ every day. If you are going to give me advice, I expect you to stick to it. I do not think it is a good reason.

  • Nadine Dorries – 2022 Comments on Huawei

    Nadine Dorries – 2022 Comments on Huawei

    The comments made by Nadine Dorries, the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, on 20 February 2022.

    The government is committed to ensuring the security and resilience of our phone and internet networks. Last year we brought in new laws to protect UK infrastructure from high-risk vendors and issue tough sanctions on providers which fall short of our high security standards. This consultation marks the next step in removing the risks posed by Huawei.

  • Julia Lopez – 2022 Statement on Project Gigabit Update

    Julia Lopez – 2022 Statement on Project Gigabit Update

    The statement made by Julia Lopez, the Minister for Media, Data and Digital Infrastructure, in the House of Commons on 9 February 2022.

    Today we have published the fourth Project Gigabit quarterly update. Thanks to the work of industry and our record investment, we are making phenomenal progress delivering the biggest broadband rollout in UK history.

    In this Project Gigabit delivery plan winter update, we share the news that over 65% of UK premises now have a gigabit-capable connection—a huge leap forwards from just over one in twenty in January 2019.

    This delivery plan update also reports on:

    newly launched regional supplier procurements in Cambridgeshire and the north-east of England, as well as local supplier procurements in rural Dorset, north Northumberland and Teesdale;

    16 local and devolved authorities which currently have live schemes to top up our voucher projects worth £10.5 million;

    details of upcoming procurements in Cornwall, Norfolk, Suffolk, Hampshire and Shropshire; and updates on how we are working closely with the devolved Governments to develop and deliver Project Gigabit plans in some of the hardest-to-reach areas in the UK.

    Since the launch of Project Gigabit in April 2021, we have connected over 3,500 public sector building hubs: places like Borrowdale Primary School in Cumbria, which is now able to take full advantage of online learning while also speeding up connections to surrounding homes and businesses. We expect to connect a further 100 hubs over the next quarter.

    To support this phenomenal progress, Building Digital UK (BDUK) will become an Executive agency of DCMS. BDUK will be based at a new head office in central Manchester, boosting the city’s credentials as a fast-growing digital tech hub.

    This Government are supporting access to the internet of the future—building broadband that is fast, reliable and future-proof, that supports 5G, and that paves the way for new and unexpected developments in commerce, trade and technology.

    I will place a copy of the Project Gigabit delivery plan winter update in the Libraries of both Houses.

  • Chris Philp – 2022 Comments on AI Technology

    Chris Philp – 2022 Comments on AI Technology

    The comments made by Chris Philp, the Minister for Technology and the Digital Economy, on 10 February 2022.

    The UK is already a world leader in AI. Today we’re investing millions to ensure people from all parts of society can access the opportunities and benefits AI is creating in this country.

    We are doubling the number of AI scholarships previously available to underrepresented groups to build a diverse and inclusive workforce fit for the future of tech.