Category: Foreign Affairs

Julian Lewis – 2020 Comments on Expulsion from the Conservative Party

The text of the comments made by Julian Lewis on 16 July 2020, following his expulsion from the Conservative Party.

Because the ISC (Intelligence and Security Committee) is a special committee, I feel constrained in what I can say. However, the following points are relevant.

1 – The 2013 Justice and Security Act explicitly removed the right of the Prime Minister to choose the ISC chairman and gave it to the committee members. I remember this well, as I served on the committee from 2010 to 2015 and took part of the legislation through the Commons myself on behalf of the committee. There is no other Conservative MP in the House of Commons with any past experience of working on the ISC.

2 – It was only yesterday afternoon that I received a text asking me to confirm that I would be voting for the Prime Minister’s preferred candidate for the ISC chair. I did not reply as I considered it an improper request. At no earlier stage did I give any undertaking to vote for any particular candidate.

3 – In recent days, the official Number 10 spokesman explicitly denied that the Government was seeking to ‘parachute’ a preferred candidate in to the chair, stating that it was a matter for the senior parliamentarians on the committee to decide. It is therefore strange to have the whip removed for failing to vote for the Government’s preferred candidate.

July 16, 2020
Greg Hands – 2020 Speech on Sale of Arms to War in Yemen

The text of the speech made by Greg Hands, the Minister for Trade Policy, in the House of Commons on 13 July 2020.

The Secretary of State has retaken the licensing decisions, as required by the Court of Appeal. All existing and new applications for Saudi Arabia for possible use in the conflict in Yemen will be assessed against the revised methodology, which considers whether there is a clear risk that the equipment might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law.

The revised methodology was developed to address the Court of Appeal’s judgment. It considers all allegations that are assessed as likely to have occurred and that have been caused by fixed-wing aircraft, reflecting the factual circumstances that the court proceedings concerned. It remains the case, however, that it can be extremely difficult to reach firm conclusions as to whether specific incidents violate the principles of international humanitarian law. Therefore, where an incident is assessed as a possible breach, it is regarded for the purposes of the relevant analysis as if there were breaches of IHL. I emphasise that that analysis is just one part of the assessment.

In retaking these decisions, the Secretary of State has considered the full range of information available to the Government. Some of that information is necessarily sensitive and confidential. I am therefore not able to go into detail about individual assessments. The crucial point is that we have assessed that there were a small number of incidents that have been treated, for the purposes of this analysis, as violations of international humanitarian law. However, these were isolated incidents and our analysis shows that Saudi Arabia has a genuine intent and the capacity to comply with international humanitarian law and the specific commitments it has made.

It is on that basis that the Secretary of State has assessed that there is not a clear risk that the export of arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law.

July 13, 2020
Lisa Nandy – 2020 Comments on Human Rights in Bahrain

The text of the comments made by Lisa Nandy, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, on 13 July 2020.

In a case where the UK is clearly able to exert influence, the Government must not remain silent.

The torture of Mohamed Ramadhan and Hussain Moosa was horrific and clear evidence presented that their confessions coerced. The UK Government cannot claim to be standing up for pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong but fail to apply the same principles to Bahrain.

Last week Ministers acknowledged the ‘close and important’ relationship between the UK and Bahrain. The Foreign Secretary must come to the House of Commons on Tuesday and assure MPs that we will not be bystanders when we have the opportunity to demonstrate our commitment to defending human rights.

July 13, 2020
Priti Patel – 2020 Comments on Channel Crossings

The text of the comments made by Priti Patel, the Home Secretary, on 12 July 2020.

I have been in France today seeing first-hand the significant work undertaken on that side of the Channel to address the unacceptably high levels of small boats, alongside the efforts of Border Force and the National Crime Agency in the UK.

But despite all of the action taken by law enforcement to date – intercepting the boats, making arrests, returning people back to France and putting the criminals responsible behind bars – the numbers continue to increase.

This simply cannot be allowed to go on. Today, I have signed an agreement with the French to create a joint intelligence cell which will crack down on the gangs behind this vile people-smuggling operation and impressed on my French counterpart the need to stop these illegal crossings for the benefit of both our countries. This is the start of a new operational approach with the newly appointed French Interior Minister.

July 13, 2020
Dominic Raab – 2020 Speech at India Global Week

Below is the text of the speech made by Dominic Raab, the Foreign Secretary, on 10 July 2020.

Hello, and thank you for having me as part of India Global Week.

Covid-19 is a global challenge.

And the UK has been proud to stand alongside India in its international response.

As we have responded to this crisis, we have been privileged to have 25,000 Indian professionals working in our brilliant National Health Service here at home. We hugely value their contribution.

With India’s help, we were able to obtain vital supplies of paracetamol at the height of the crisis, critical in the fight against Covid-19.

Over the past few months, we’ve brought home UK nationals from India, and worked closely with the Government of India to get Indian nationals home safe and sound.

Throughout this crisis, we’ve worked together.

So I’d like to thank the Government of India, and my colleague and friend Dr Jaishankar for their invaluable assistance in this extraordinary effort.

As leaders in the international response, the UK and India have also co-authored the G20 Action Plan, providing an immediate package of $200 billion of global support to the most vulnerable countries around the world.

Even before Covid, UK was India’s second biggest research partner, with our joint research estimated to be worth £400m by 2021.

And with India’s contribution to the recent GAVI vaccine summit, together we smashed the target for vaccine funding, with $8.8 billion raised.

But we have the potential to do more.

A vaccine created by British scientists and manufactured in India, if successful in clinical trials, will reach 1 billion people across the developing world, thanks to Oxford University and India’s Serum Institute.

That would be an extraordinary achievement – benefitting not only the British and Indian people, but making it accessible for the most vulnerable people, right across the world.

Working together, we can make it happen.

Beyond the immediate challenge of Covid, the friendship between Britain and India is strong, and we want to take it to the next level.

Our trade relationship is growing.

Bolstered by entrepreneurs, business founders and innovators, it increased by nearly 10% to over £24 billion in 2019.

We issue more skilled work visas to India than the rest of the world combined.

And the number of Indian students in the UK has tripled in the last three years.

Bound by our shared aspirations, the UK and India will be energetic champions of free trade, to boost small businesses, cut the cost of living, and create the jobs of the future.

We also believe our friendship with India will be crucial, as the UK fulfils its ambition to be an even stronger force for good in the world.

When the UK hosts COP26 in 2021, we will be key partners in tackling climate change.

And as India returns to the UN Security Council next year and takes up the G20 Presidency in 2022, I look forward to deepening our cooperation on international issues.

Bound by the depth of friendship between our peoples, we will look to India as partners, not only in our response to this current crisis, but as we build back better and stronger than ever.

Britain will continue to be a part of India’s success story, and India will continue to be a part of ours.

Thank you.

July 12, 2020
Dominic Raab – 2020 Statement on the 25th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide

The text of the statement made by Dominic Raab, the Foreign Secretary, on 11 July 2020.

On the 25th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide, we remember the victims and the anguish of their families.

During my time in The Hague between 2003 and 2006, pursuing those responsible for this dark chapter in European history, I was reminded daily of the heinous cruelty perpetrated against the innocent.

The UK is determined to end impunity and help rebuild those countries affected – as our commitment to the ICC, and UK investment and support for Bosnia demonstrates.

July 12, 2020
James Cleverly – 2020 Statement on Prisons Under Sentence in Bahrain

Below is the text of the statement made by James Cleverly, the Minister for the Middle East and North Africa, in the House of Commons on 9 July 2020.

The UK and Bahrain continue to have a close and important relationship. We benefit from an ongoing, open and genuine dialogue in which we work together on mutually beneficial issues while also raising points of significant difference with one another.

It is because of this long-standing partnership that we are able to have candid conversations about matters of importance to the UK—in particular, our human rights concerns. Our relationship allows us to raise sensitive and difficult issues, both privately and publicly, in a constructive manner in order to uphold our moral responsibility on human rights issues. We have raised and will continue to raise the cases both of Mohammed Ramadhan and Hussain Moosa at senior levels with the Government of Bahrain.

On 8 January, British embassy Manama officials attended the final session of the Court of Appeal for the retrial of the two men mentioned. Both individuals were convicted of terrorist charges and given the death sentence again. On 8 January, the former Minister for the Middle East and North Africa, my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison), publicly stated our deep concern that death sentences were again handed out, and the UK’s position has not changed on this matter. We continue to actively monitor these two cases as they are taken to the court of cassation for final review.

The UK’s position on the use of the death penalty is long-standing and unequivocal: we oppose its use in all circumstances and in all countries as a matter of principle. The Government of Bahrain are fully aware of our view. This was made explicitly clear by the former Minister to a senior Bahraini counterpart last year. It was then reinforced by my noble friend Lord Ahmad in the other place, who issued a public statement expressing the UK’s opposition to the use of the death penalty, in response to actions taken in Bahrain.

I can assure the House that our efforts to raise these cases, and also the broader issues of the use of capital punishment, with the Bahraini authorities will continue. Bahrain is a Foreign and Commonwealth Office human rights priority country, in part due to its policy surrounding the death penalty. We continue to monitor developments on all matters that relate to human rights within the country. We remain absolutely committed to the promotion of universal freedoms and upholding human rights globally. That has been made clear only this week with the introduction of the UK’s first autonomous human rights sanctions regime.

July 9, 2020
Liz Truss – 2020 Statement on Export Licences to Saudi Arabia

Below is the text of the statement made by Liz Truss, the Secretary of State for International Trade, on 7 July 2020.

I want to update the House on the steps that have been taken to comply with the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 20 June 2019 regarding licences for military exports to Saudi Arabia for possible use in the conflict in Yemen.

The legal proceedings concerned the decisions of the then Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills of 9 December 2015:

Not to suspend extant export licences for the sale or transfer of arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia for possible use in the conflict in Yemen; and

To continue to grant further such licences.

The legal proceedings concerned Criterion 2c of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria—which requires the Government to assess Saudi Arabia’s attitude towards relevant principles of international law and provides that the Government will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law (IHL).

The Divisional Court found in favour of the Government in its judgment of July 2017, noting that we applied a rigorous and robust, multi-layered process of analysis to making our licensing decisions. Our approach has focused on a predictive evaluation of risk as to the attitude and future conduct of the Saudi-led coalition, recognising the inherent difficulties of seeking to reach findings on IHL for specific incidents where we do not have access to complete information. Even so, this analysis has always incorporated a detailed and careful review of past allegations of incidents of concern. This included analysis, to the extent possible, of whether there were patterns of concern, in particular arising from trends in the number of allegations of civilian casualties and of damage to key civilian infrastructure. The Court of Appeal broadly endorsed this decision-making process.

The principal issue in the Court of Appeal was whether this analysis needed to go further. In the Court’s judgment, the question of whether there was an historic pattern of breaches of IHL was a question which required to be faced. Even if it could not be answered with reasonable confidence for every incident, at least the attempt had to be made. It was because we had not reached findings on whether specific incidents constituted breaches of IHL as part of our assessment of clear risk, under Criterion 2c, that the Court of Appeal concluded that our decision-making process was irrational and therefore unlawful.

To address the Court of Appeal’s judgment, we have developed a revised methodology in respect of all allegations which it is assessed are likely to have occurred and to have been caused by fixed-wing aircraft, reflecting the factual circumstances that the court proceedings concerned. Each of those allegations has been subject to detailed analysis by reference to the relevant principles of IHL and in the light of all the information and intelligence available. An evaluation has then been made, in respect of each incident, whether it is possible that it constitutes a breach of IHL or whether it is unlikely that it represents a breach. For a number of incidents, as envisaged by the Court of Appeal, there is insufficient information to make this evaluation. Where an incident is assessed as being a “possible” breach, it is regarded—for the purposes of the Criterion 2c analysis—as if it were a breach of IHL. By setting the threshold as “possible” the IHL analysis has captured the widest range of relevant potential IHL breaches, to provide a base from which to assess the prospective risk for Criterion 2c.

The IHL analysis has now been applied to all credible incidents of concern of which we are aware. Some of these incidents have been assessed as “possible” violations of IHL. These have therefore been factored into the overall Criterion 2c analysis on the basis that they are violations of IHL.

We have sought to determine whether these “violations” are indicative of:

any patterns of non-compliance;

a lack of commitment on the part of Saudi Arabia to comply with IHL; and or

a lack of capacity or systemic weaknesses which might give rise to a clear risk of IHL breaches.

We have similarly looked for patterns and trends across the incidents which have been assessed as being unlikely to be breaches of IHL and those for which there is insufficient information to make an assessment.

This analysis has not revealed any such patterns, trends or systemic weaknesses. It is noted, in particular, that the incidents which have been assessed to be possible violations of IHL occurred at different times, in different circumstances and for different reasons. The conclusion is that these are isolated incidents.

I want to emphasise that the IHL analysis is just one part of the Criterion 2c assessment. In retaking these decisions, I have taken into account the full range of information available to the Government. In the light of all that information and analysis, I have concluded that, notwithstanding the isolated incidents which have been factored into the analysis as historic violations of IHL, Saudi Arabia has a genuine intent and the capacity to comply with IHL.

On that basis, I have assessed that there is not a clear risk that the export of arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia might be used in the commission of a serious violation of IHL.

Having now re-taken the decisions that were the subject of judicial review on the correct legal basis, as required by the Order of the Court of Appeal of 20 June, it follows that the undertaking that my predecessor gave to the Court—that we would not grant any new licences for the export of arms or military equipment to Saudi Arabia for possible use in Yemen—falls away. The broader commitment that was given to Parliament, relating to licences for Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners, also no longer applies.

The Government will now begin the process of clearing the backlog of licence applications for Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners that has built up since 20 June last year. Each application will, of course, be carefully assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria and a licence would not be granted if to do so would be a breach of the Criteria. It may take some months to clear this backlog.

Finally, as indicated in the statement made to the House on 20 June 2019, we sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court against the Court of Appeal’s judgment. Permission was granted by the Court of Appeal on 9 July 2019. In light of the revised methodology which I have just described, I will now be taking steps to withdraw this appeal. I want to update the House on the steps that have been taken to comply with the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 20 June 2019 regarding licences for military exports to Saudi Arabia for possible use in the conflict in Yemen.

July 9, 2020
Dominic Raab – 2020 Statement on the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime

Below is the text of the statement made by Dominic Raab, the Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons on 6 July 2020.

I have today laid before Parliament, under the powers of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020.

These regulations enable sanctions to be imposed on those who are involved in serious violations or abuses of human rights. This sanctions regime is not about punishing countries or peoples. It is a smart tool allowing the Government to impose both asset freezes and travel bans on specific individuals or entities in order to provide accountability for and deter serious violations of human rights around the world and prevent those responsible from coming to the UK or laundering their assets here. These sanctions will help to ensure that the UK is not a safe haven for those involved in serious human rights violations, including those who profit from such activities.

The regulations allow Ministers to impose sanctions on persons who are involved in activities that would amount to a serious violation of the right to life; the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and the right to be free from slavery, not to be held in servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour. The global human rights sanctions regime can be used to target different forms of involvement in such violations of human rights, including those who profit from them. The regulations allow for non-state actors as well as state actors to be designated.

The introduction of this autonomous human rights sanctions regime will give the UK an additional, powerful tool to support human rights across the world, and underpin global Britain’s role as a force for good in the world.

Today, I will also publish the first persons to be designated under this new sanctions regime.

July 8, 2020
Lisa Nandy – 2020 Speech on the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime

Below is the text of the speech made by Lisa Nandy, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons on 6 July 2020.

May I start by strongly welcoming this statement and the advance sight of it? It has been, as Bill Browder rightly said, a long and difficult journey to persuade the Government to take this step. I know that it has been personally frustrating for the Foreign Secretary to be repeatedly challenged by me over recent weeks about the delays when he has spent the last eight years as its champion. For too long the UK has been a haven for those who use corruption, torture and murder to further their own ends. Today, I hope, sends a strong message that the UK is not their home and that their dirty money is not welcome here.

I pay tribute, too, to Sergei Magnitsky and his family, who have waited far too long for this day. Magnitsky worked for a British company, and it is right that, today, in his honour, we start to clean up the global corruption that he exposed and that cost him his life. I also put on record our support for ensuring that some of those responsible for his murder are the first to face consequences. The time for action against Russian Government officials who oppress LGBT people, Muslims and other minorities and who use chemical weapons on the streets of the UK is long overdue. This is a profound act of solidarity with the Russian people over those who have made their lives a misery for far too long.

I welcome, too, the Foreign Secretary’s action against those involved in the appalling murder of Jamal Khashoggi. I gently say to him that, although today is not the day for sparring across the Dispatch Box, it would be welcome if it marked the start of a more consistent approach from the Government towards Saudi Arabia, and in particular the arms sales from this country that are being used to harm innocent civilians in Yemen.

Similarly, we are grateful to the Foreign Secretary for including the Rohingya in Myanmar in today’s announcement. I hope that he will use his new remit to consider why the UK investment arm, CDC, continues to invest in those who are complicit in silencing people who speak out against human rights abuses in Myanmar.

I welcome the inclusion of trafficking in the measures; the former Member for Bishop Auckland would be delighted to see that, as the Government have previously resisted it. I express serious concern, however, that the Foreign Secretary has not yet been able to persuade his colleagues of the need to include corruption in scope. Corruption and human rights abuses go hand in hand and that must be urgently resolved. The former Prime Minister, David Cameron, expressed regret that he had not acted on the issue earlier:

“I soon realised…the advantages of working together—with other countries—under a common heading…You get extra clout from coming together across the world and saying with one voice to those who are responsible for unacceptable acts: ‘We are united’”

The Foreign Secretary mentioned the USA and Canada and our desire to stand closely with them. They have included corruption in scope and the UK must follow suit.

Can the Foreign Secretary confirm that the measures apply to UK overseas territories and Crown dependencies? We must not create a back door that allows the laundering of blood money in the United Kingdom.

Will all names be published, including those subject to visa bans? I am sorry to do this to the Foreign Secretary, but I refer him to his earlier words. As he put it:

“If we are dealing with people who are complicit in torture and there is enough evidence to substantiate and justify a visa ban, what possible countervailing reason can there be, whether it is to change their behaviour or otherwise, for not making their name public? Would not making their name public deter others?”—[Official Report, 2 April 2014; Vol. 578, c. 300-301WH.]

He also tabled an amendment to the Criminal Finances Act 2017 seeking a public register of people who are subject to such orders, and he rightly set out in that amendment to ensure that third parties could refer to the list. We agree with him. There must be a clear mechanism for civil society to refer in line with the criteria. Can he give us an assurance that that will be forthcoming?

Similarly, will the Foreign Secretary reflect on arrangements in the United States that provide a congressional trigger and allow our Select Committee Chairs to make referrals to the list as well? I can see that the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee is nodding; I would expect him to agree with that suggestion. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will agree too.

Finally, as the Foreign Secretary has long championed, we must have transparency in the process. There has been serious concern about the influence of big money on politics. It is essential that there is independent oversight of the list to ensure that nobody can buy their way out of British justice. Will he commit to parliamentary scrutiny of the list and the way that decisions are taken? I know that he will face resistance from colleagues, but we will strongly support him in that endeavour.

Today is a day that we stand up against corruption and dirty money and for our values with the full support of this House. There can be no ambiguity and no double standards. The UK must lead the way at home and abroad.

July 7, 2020