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Tag: Stewart Hosie

  • Stewart Hosie – 2023 Speech on Energy Support Package for Businesses

    Stewart Hosie – 2023 Speech on Energy Support Package for Businesses

    The speech made by Stewart Hosie, the SNP MP for Dundee East and the party’s economic spokesperson, in the House of Commons on 9 January 2023.

    Happy new year, Mr Deputy Speaker.

    I thank the Minister for his statement and for early sight of it, although I suspect businesses will be as underwhelmed and disappointed by it as they were frustrated by the delay in making it. I am disappointed that the higher level of discount will be removed after March this year, which is less than three months away; it does not give businesses the time or opportunity to plan.

    There is also a degree of sleight of hand. I do not think the public will buy the £5.5 billion budgeted between March 2023 and March 2024 being portrayed as a year’s worth of support given that, as the Minister said, the cost of the package for six months to March this year came in at £18 billion. To dress that up as fiscal prudence simply will not wash.

    The key thing is that the Minister said that no Government anywhere in the world can permanently shield business from the energy price shock—that mirrors what the Chancellor said a few days ago—and he went on to say that levels of support were time limited and intended as a bridge to allow businesses to acclimatise. May we have an assurance, however, that if this turns out to be not a short-term price shock but a medium-term price problem, this package and the level of the discount will be reviewed before next winter so that we do not have businesses that manage to survive this year falling over next December, January or February because they cannot afford to heat or light or power their workshops?

    James Cartlidge

    There will have been 18 months of support for non-domestic accounts for businesses, charities and the public sector, in which time we have emphasised—I was very open about this—the need to adapt to the new environment we all face. Everyone is having to do that —households and businesses, and so on. In the autumn statement, the Government announced a new long-term commitment to drive improvements in energy efficiency and to bring down bills for households, businesses and the public sector, with an ambition to reduce the UK’s final energy consumption from buildings and industry by 15% by 2030 against 2021 levels. Alongside existing support to 2025, the Government committed an additional £6 billion from 2025 to 2028 for energy-efficiency schemes across households, businesses and the public sector.

    On the right hon. Member’s point about the £5.5 billion, I do think that we need some perspective, as £5.5 billion is roughly the cost of a 1p cut in income tax. That remains a significant fiscal intervention. It may be that, because of the huge amount of support that has been needed by our country, particularly since the pandemic—we have seen £400 billion-worth of support, and potentially close to £100 billion on energy—a figure such as £5.5 billion does not look as large. Perhaps that is understandable, but, compared with any normal fiscal event, it remains a very significant intervention. As I have said, it could still be worth up to £2,300 for a pub next year and, in our energy and trade-intensive sectors, up to £700,000 for a typical medium-sized manufacturer. That remains very significant support.

  • Stewart Hosie – 2022 Speech on Alcohol Duty

    Stewart Hosie – 2022 Speech on Alcohol Duty

    The speech made by Stewart Hosie, the SNP MP for Dundee East, in the House of Commons on 19 December 2022.

    I welcome the statement. I have long supported an alcohol content duty regime, and I hope that it delivers the fairness that the sector needs. As a gentle aside, may I say that we did not need Brexit to bring in this regime? The UK could have applied for a derogation, but it chose, over decades, not to do that.

    I have some technical questions. The previous Chancellor, the right hon. Member for Spelthorne (Kwasi Kwarteng), announced a one-year freeze on alcohol duty in “The Growth Plan 2022”; that was due to cost £545 million in 2023-24. The current Chancellor scrapped that, but anticipates an additional yield of £1.3 billion in 2023-24; that was in the autumn statement 2022. First, how can a one-year freeze cost £500 million, while its cancellation in the same year suddenly generates £1.3 billion of additional yield? Also, we have been told that the freeze is being reintroduced and will last until August. How much will that cost the Exchequer?

    The proposals following the post-2021 Budget consultation have been reported as having a modest cost of only £25 million next year—that was in the autumn statement Green Book. But this statement seems to suggest that the cost to the Exchequer of the draught beer relief scheme alone will be £100 million a year. Will the Minister explain what the net cost of this measure will be either to the Exchequer, or to the industry? As things stand, the numbers are not clear and in some cases do not add up.

    James Cartlidge

    I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman supports the principle of the reform package that will come into place next August. I hope Members across the House can do so. The cost obviously depends on what decision is made in the Budget next year. That is a matter for the Chancellor at the time. We know that that will be on 15 March, so there is not too long to wait.

    The right hon. Gentleman made the point that it was not necessary to leave the European Union to make these changes. To be clear, EU law does not allow member states to differentiate beverages on qualitative characteristics such as whether the product is on draught. EU law actively discourages any attempt to support the on-trade through the duty system. That is also true for a system based on ABV; by and large, that would have been very difficult as well. The fact is that this is a radical reform and it has been made possible by Brexit.

  • Stewart Hosie – 2022 Speech on Independent Adviser on Ministerial Interests

    Stewart Hosie – 2022 Speech on Independent Adviser on Ministerial Interests

    The speech made by Stewart Hosie, the SNP MP for Dundee East, in the House of Commons on 30 November 2022.

    When the Government published their policy paper on revisions to the ministerial code on 27 May, it said that there would be “an enhanced process” for the initiation of investigations under the ministerial code, that the independent adviser could initiate his or her own investigations, that there would be a more specific reference to the adviser in the ministerial code, and that there would be a duty on Ministers to provide all the information necessary to allow the adviser to discharge his or her duties. However, it turns out that the Prime Minister is not offering potential candidates any enhanced powers, meaning that advisers will not be able to launch their own investigations, and that confirms the blocking of the expansion of powers by his predecessor. So it is a simple question: why are the Government reneging on their own policy statement of May this year, making it more difficult to appoint an independent adviser?

    Alex Burghart

    I refer the right hon. Gentleman to the answer I gave a few moments ago. He seems terribly well informed, but he seems to have stopped short of reading Lord Geidt’s response to the changes in the terms of reference, where he said that

    “this would be a workable scheme”.

  • Stewart Hosie – 2022 Speech on Scottish Independence and the Scottish Economy

    Stewart Hosie – 2022 Speech on Scottish Independence and the Scottish Economy

    The speech made by Stewart Hosie, the SNP MP for Dundee East, in the House of Commons on 2 November 2022.

    Several very interesting things have been said today. I have never taken a single vote for the SNP in Dundee East for granted. However, I heard the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine)—she is no longer in her place—talk about Orkney and Shetland, and if I lived on one of those island groups, I would be very cross indeed that the Liberal Democrats took them so much for granted and considered them so much of a personal fiefdom.

    We had the Secretary of State for Scotland talk about funding delivered by the UK Government. Indeed, the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (David Duguid) spoke about several other UK policy decisions and read out their cost. I thought that was interesting because it was almost like it was discretionary largesse from Whitehall, almost ignoring the fact that Scottish individuals and businesses pay tax. It is almost as if they do not realise that almost every penny is borrowed and that Scottish taxpayers contribute their full fair share to the debt repayment costs. I find that extraordinary.

    We have heard other talk during the day about the debt Scotland might have. The Scottish Government cannot borrow. They have no debt. All the debt comes from the UK. The UK borrows all the money, no matter where it is spent. When there is a £500 million overspend on a single tube station, we pay our share of that debt. There is no Union dividend.

    We then heard the Secretary of State make some extraordinarily disparaging remarks about education. Scotland has the highest proportion of people with a tertiary education—the best educated country in Europe. Instead of talking it down, why do we not celebrate the pupils and the students, the teachers and the lecturers, and the schools, colleges and universities? He then went on—he must have been having a really bad day—to talk about crime. We have the lowest crime—[Interruption.] Ah, he has come in. Welcome, Governor-General; take your seat. Scotland has the lowest crime rate since 1974. It was reported in the last week that barely 5% of reported crimes in England even have somebody charged. To talk down the criminal justice system in Scotland while allowing the utter failure of the criminal justice system in England to go by the book is absolutely disgraceful.

    We then had the bizarre sight of the Better Together parties—the Tory-Labour coalition party—pretending to dislike each other, but when I see Labour’s immigration mugs and the “Make Brexit Work” slogan, all I see is a red Tory. Whether they are red Tories or blue Tories, it does not matter. They are exactly the same.

    We then had—I might not even get to my speech proper, Madam Deputy Speaker—some straw men thrown up about how much Scotland’s foreign currency reserve would have to be when we become independent. I checked and the UK’s foreign currency reserve is 6.4% of GDP, Ireland’s is 2.7% and Finland’s is 7%. To be fair, Denmark’s is higher at about 20%, but how can it be that a modern advanced economy with huge natural resources and a balance of trade surplus, such as Scotland, would somehow uniquely be expected to hold 50%, 60%, 70% or 80% of GDP in foreign currencies?

    Ian Blackford rose—

    Stewart Hosie

    I think my right hon. Friend spoke enough earlier on, but of course I will give way.

    Ian Blackford

    I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend—I will see him later. He is making a powerful speech. It is worth pointing out to the House that the UK has a current account deficit of more than 8% of GDP. If there is a country that cannot pay its way, it is the UK.

    Stewart Hosie

    That is absolutely true. There will come a time, when we have the referendum next year, to enter into proper, calmer and sensible debates about the minutiae and the technical detail regarding all that—long may that continue.

    Basically, what we saw today was a rerun of Project Fear: Project Fear 2. I was struck by the comments of the hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr Perkins), who is also no longer in his place. At one point, he genuinely seemed to suggest that the determination as to whether Scotland should have a referendum should be based on opinion polls rather than real votes. I will take seven, eight, nine or 10 mandates in a row over an opinion poll any day of the week.

    Project Fear 2 took me back to the 2014 independence referendum. The yes campaign was characterised by one thing: the absolute determination to answer every question and provide as much information as possible to the people of Scotland. We did that in the face of the constant refrain from Unionism that there was not enough information. Even when detailed answers to every question were tripping off people’s lips, we were still asked for more.

    We tried to ensure that the answers we gave about the future shape of the Scottish state and policy for an independent Scotland were, to the best of our ability, in the best interests of the people of Scotland and those in the rest of the UK. Nowhere was that clearer than in our proposals for what was then a formal shared currency and our determination to service a negotiated share of the UK’s national debt. Both those plans were designed to protect sterling and stop the rest of the UK falling victim to a technical default on its debt obligations. To provide that certainty, clarity and detail, we drew, if not exclusively, certainly heavily, on the 670-page “Scotland’s Future” White Paper.

    We need to recognise the way in which Unionism behaved and campaign differently and smarter this time. The first thing to recognise is that no matter how detailed and precise our answers were, Unionism continued and will continue to ask the same questions over and over again to give the impression that there are no answers. It was false then and it is false now.

    Secondly, we need to recognise that Unionism acted and continues to act irrationally. Next time, next year, whatever policy decisions are finally determined to be best for Scotland, they must be not only technically robust, but politically bomb-proof, so that no indyref2 policy area can ever be held hostage by a Westminster veto.

    Thirdly, while we must of course answer every single question that the public put to us, we should make our fundamental case on principle, not detail. That is why the first three papers published by the Scottish Government are first class. A mix of democratic principle and a vivid picture of what Scotland could be is hopeful, upbeat and takes yes campaigners away from the miserable drudge of Unionist whataboutery—we have seen it in spades today—that so characterised the 2014 referendum campaign.

    I have one final thought at this point. We know how successful Scotland can be. Is it not time that Unionism was finally challenged? Beyond Brexit, is this really as good as it gets? The first thing we have to do is deliver Scottish independence, and the second, and in many ways more important, is to describe the kind of Scotland we seek. We have laid out the mechanism by which we will deliver it, we have gone to the Supreme Court to test the legality of the referendum and we have the wonderful fall-back position that the next Westminster election will be a de facto referendum, meaning that the Scottish people’s voice will be heard one way or another.

    The answer to the second question—what sort of Scotland will we deliver?—is implicit in the motion. Our critique of the botched experimental, Tufton Street economics that crashed the economy in the mini-Budget is stark, and our demands for action to help those most in need are clear, but let me end by answering the question of what sort of Scotland we seek in a slightly more succinct way. The Scotland we will deliver will be the one that the people of Scotland want and choose, because it is with independence and only with independence that Scotland will always get the Government and the policies it votes for.

  • Stewart Hosie – 2020 Speech on the National Security and Investment Bill

    Stewart Hosie – 2020 Speech on the National Security and Investment Bill

    The speech made by Stewart Hosie, the SNP MP for Dundee East, in the House of Commons on 17 November 2020.

    I start with my ISC hat on because it was the ISC that first investigated UK Government powers and processes for scrutinising foreign investment in sensitive areas of UK industry, found them lacking and called for more powers. In its 2013 report, “Foreign involvement in the critical national infrastructure”, the Committee looked into the issue of

    “foreign investment in the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)”

    and concluded:

    “The difficulty of balancing economic competitiveness and national security seems to have resulted in stalemate.”

    That is not a criticism and it is not meant to be contentious. This issue has arisen over the past few years and most, if not all, advanced economies are now grappling with it. I therefore welcome the Bill, in principle, or certainly a measure like it.

    While on the subject of the ISC, I offer the apologies of its Chair, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), who is self-isolating having been contacted by the English version of Trace and Protect, and is sadly missing this debate.

    The Bill is designed to bring additional scrutiny of foreign investment that may have an impact on national security. I say from the outset that not only is there ​nothing wrong with having a national security eye on investments in critical areas—it is in fact absolutely vital.

    Currently, as we have heard, the ability of the Government to scrutinise investments on national security grounds contained within part 3 of the Enterprise Act—that is, the mergers provisions—is rather limited. In practice, it means that the UK Government are unable to scrutinise on the grounds of national security without the investment first meeting competition concerns or, in very limited circumstances, a public interest test. We know this concern and similar concerns are shared globally. A number of other countries have been tightening up their investment security regimes in response to changing national security-related threats, enabling technology, the loss of intellectual property and the increasing crossover between sectors, which I may touch on later. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States is largely seen as setting the standard. We have also seen tightening in Japan, Canada, Sweden, Germany and France at least, with the Japanese regime extraordinarily strict, in some cases limiting ownership to barely 1% of active management or, more accurately, to barely 1% of a company in certain circumstances.

    In the UK Government’s proposals, if both the trigger and the threshold are met, the individual investment can be called in by the Secretary of State for approval. The powers can be retrospective; it can be called in after it has occurred. However, the time to conduct the national security assessment—30 days, with potentially an extra 45—might be deemed to be a little short, given how shrewd, or clever, certain institutions, organisations and individuals are at hiding genuine beneficial ownership. One thinks how long it took to find where beneficial ownership existed for some entities in the UK. Were it not for the Panama papers, we would probably still never know. I therefore question whether that maximum of 75 days is actually sufficient.

    The Bill adds a mandatory notification scheme whereby investment interests in certain sectors and asset types—which I do not demur with—must be pre-emptively or retrospectively declared, but it removes notification of call-ins from the competition authority to a direct serve from the involved parties. In the interests of transparency, I seek clarity from the Government on the reasons why notification via the CMA is being removed.

    The Bill also introduces new powers to increase screening in respect of health and preventing hostile acquisition through strategic buying of health supplies, for example. I welcome that, but the scope of activities that might be caught is very wide. There may be a good reason for that, but it is worth exploring. The statement of policy intent describes the core areas as including things such as advanced technology, which is perfectly reasonable, but it also contains a much wider definition of national infrastructure. The impact assessment for the Bill estimates that the new regime would result in between 1,000 and 1,830 transactions being notified per year. That is very specific and it is also an eye-watering number, given that only 12 transactions were reviewed on national security grounds since the current regime was introduced 17 years ago. The necessary resources, as the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) said, and access to intelligence agency assessments, as the right hon. ​Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) said, must be available in the proper manner in order to carry out the work.

    Mr Kevan Jones

    Does the hon. Gentleman share my concern that the Bill sets out a voluntary reporting and a notification system, but it is not clear how the security services enact any concerns they may come across into this system? I shall be making the point that I do not think this should sit within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Does he have concerns on that issue?

    Stewart Hosie

    I absolutely agree that these services should not sit within another Department. I am not sure whether it would be appropriate for them to be able to request call-ins directly, not least because where the information came from would then become abundantly clear, but there must be a mechanism whereby information that an agency comes across can be fed in to the proper people in order for this call-in to happen.

    It is also self-evident that Members considering this legislation need to have far more information to understand the reasons for the Bill and the changing nature of the threat it is designed to counter. We also need carefully to assess the impact the Bill will have on sectors and infrastructure, not just in the UK as a whole, but in the devolved Administrations and in the English regions, in the light of the future economic opportunities they see and the plans they are already putting in place. It is far too soon to seek assurances, but I hope the Minister will wish to take a little time just to convince himself that there are no unintended consequences, either for the UK or for the Scottish Government’s inward investment plans, when Government agencies of all sorts are out actively seeking investment in some of the areas that may be deemed to be critical national infrastructure. As an example, let me cite the whole of Scotland’s tech sector, but that of Dundee in particular. It now has a digital ecosystem that spreads out across academia and through gaming, software design and development, and data centres. Many of the component parts of that have cross-sectoral application, some of which, depending on who owns them and who wishes to use them, could certainly raise a national security concern, depending on how bits of tech are deployed. How do we ensure collectively that the Bill does not impede growth or investment in such areas?

    I also briefly wish to raise, at this early stage, some issues about implementation. The Bill is set to radically overhaul the UK’s approach to foreign investment, at a time of significant economic uncertainty. On leaving the EU, the UK Government cannot afford to get their global Britain approach wrong and suffer what has been described as the “chilling effect” on investment if this appears heavy-handed. So let me turn briefly to some of the possible implications and costs of these measures.

    First, the impact assessment suggests a net cost to business of £43 million. Can the Government confirm whether that is the direct cost, or whether the figure includes the cost of lost investment? I suspect that it is the former because the latter is incalculable, but if the Government get this wrong, the true figure in lost investment, and the concomitant loss of output and productivity, could be substantial.​

    Secondly, the impact assessment suggests that microbusinesses are in scope. As the Secretary of State will know, some of those businesses develop high-tech, cutting-edge intellectual property, and their business models include selling tranches of shares to raise cash throughout the development and life of the business. What assessment has been made of how these measures might stifle that investment and growth?

    The third point is specifically on universities and academia. Throughout the whole UK, universities all have incubators, start-ups, spin-outs and commercialisable research. What assessment has been made of their ability to continue to thrive if the measures in the Bill inhibit investment by proposed sales being called in—because word will get out—or even investment being put off because of the potential additional risk of those sales being called in? We do not yet quite know what the impact on academia would be. There are some wider concerns about the possible impact on essential investment in energy, particularly renewable energy, and the possibility of retaliatory action against UK investors overseas, but I think they can be explored later in the Bill’s progress.

    Let me return to one particular issue. I said earlier that the impact assessment suggested notifications of up to 1,800 transactions a year. In clause 7(4)(c), the Bill describes a qualifying asset as

    “ideas, information or techniques which have industrial, commercial or other economic value.”

    I know that this is not the Government’s intention, but wielding a hammer or welding a pipe are techniques that have economic value, and my concern is that companies erring on the side of caution will refer or notify themselves when they need not.

    I have three brief questions that were sent to me by the Photonics Leadership Group. I intend to ask these questions now because they will be typical of what many industrial and new tech sectors are asking. First, there will be a huge number of research groups and businesses for which this Bill is relevant. Has the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy considered the number involved, and is it ready for the volume of submissions? Secondly, the information that has been sent out to relevant groups includes a flow chart, which suggests that businesses currently engaged in relevant business have from 12 November until this Bill is passed to register. This would suggest that the process is live already, but there appears not to be a template to allow businesses to contact BEIS and ask the question. Thirdly, since many in the sector cannot rely on foreign investment, how are the Government planning to replace this should there be the chill on investment that some fear?

    I am pleased the Secretary of State said that the assessments would be based on information gathered from around and throughout Government, because I think we need to make our own geopolitical assessments. But the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) quoted the Henry Jackson Society. It would be unfortunate if we found that our assessments of which investments may or may not be aligned were being driven, pushed or prodded by someone else’s geopolitical assessment. I say gently to the Secretary of State that we need to guard against that to ensure that national security is protected, but that we do not have the chill on investment that is possible if we get it wrong.

  • Stewart Hosie – 2020 Speech on the Trade Bill

    Stewart Hosie – 2020 Speech on the Trade Bill

    Below is the text of the speech made by Stewart Hosie, the SNP MP for Dundee East, in the House of Commons on 20 May 2020.

    May I start by agreeing with the Secretary of State that it is absolutely vital that we keep trade open and recognise the importance of the supply chain, and that it is absolutely essential that we stand against protectionism? We need to do that, because right now there are three main threats to trade. The first is self-evidently from the covid crisis, which the World Trade Organisation has suggested might cause a fall in global trade of something in the order of 13% to 32%. That is a substantial reduction, no matter where on the scale one looks. The second is the impact of Brexit. Assessments suggest that the UK could lose a substantial chunk of its global trade. The third is the more systemic problem that the right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), the ex-Trade Secretary, was speaking about, which is the continued implementation of new and the continuation of existing trade restriction measures, with tariffs valuing somewhere around $1.6 trillion in force.

    I am not confident that those problems will be resolved any time soon, not least because there is as yet no cure for coronavirus and restrictions of one sort or another may well remain in force for some considerable time, because of the highly publicised lack of progress on the Brexit negotiations, and also, sadly, because of the absence of a functioning World Trade Organisation appellate body. This Trade Bill does not address any of those matters, other than perhaps at the margins, by trying to roll over and maintain the trade the UK has with third countries via membership of the EU and thereby minimise the losses from Brexit.

    The Bill does do a number of other things, as the Secretary of State set out. It creates procurement obligations arising from membership of the GPA—the agreement on Government procurement; it creates the Trade Remedies Authority; and it gives powers to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to collect and share data. However, it is not without its problems. Let me deal with the powers relating to the devolved Administrations first. The previous Trade Bill, which was under consideration in the previous Parliament, contained provision for regulation-making powers to be available to the UK Government within areas of devolved competence. That Bill also contained a provision that prohibited devolved Administrations from using powers to modify retained direct EU legislation or anything that was retained EU law by virtue of section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) 2018 Act in ways that would be inconsistent with any modifications made by the UK Government, even in devolved areas. As a result, the Scottish Government could not consent to that, and that view was shared by the Scottish Parliament Finance and Constitution Committee.​

    That Trade Bill did not complete its passage and fell, and the good news is that those provisions have been removed from this reintroduced Trade Bill. However, there remains no statutory obligation for the UK Government to consult or seek the consent of Scottish Ministers before exercising the powers they have in devolved areas. However, during the partial passage of the previous Trade Bill, the UK Government made a commitment to avoid using the powers in the Bill in devolved areas without consulting and ideally obtaining the consent of Scottish Ministers. The then Minister of State at the Department for International Trade, the right hon. Member for Bournemouth West (Conor Burns), subsequently restated those commitments in his letter to Ivan McKee, the Scottish Trade Minister, on 18 March, and I hope that the Minister we hear from today will restate these non-legislative commitments.

    The Bill is not without its problems, and they do not relate simply to the devolved Administrations. It allows the UK Government to modify retained direct principal EU law, and it appears to me that there are no legislative limits on such modifications. The second problem is the description of an “international trade agreement” in clause 2(2)(b), which states that it may be

    “an international agreement that mainly relates to trade, other than a free trade agreement.”

    As we know, modern agreements are as much about regulation, standards, conformance, dispute resolution or food safety as they are about quotas and tariffs. Many people will uncomfortable that Ministers can modify existing agreements in the way in which this Bill permits, particularly without scrutiny and consent.

    That leads me to the fundamental problem with the Bill. The absence of parliamentary scrutiny and a parliamentary vote on significant changes or modifications, or, indeed, in the future, on new trade deals as may be envisaged by the Government, is a huge problem. Modern democracies need to have full scrutiny of trade agreements, from the scope of the negotiating mandate right through to implementation. That is absent from this Bill, as is any provision for scrutiny other than through the voluntary scrutiny proposed by the Government in the Command Paper published in the previous Parliament, to which I will return briefly at the end of my speech.

    These issues also highlight the absence of any formal input into trade deals or significant modification of existing ones by the devolved Administrations—a problem replicated in the membership of the Trade Remedies Authority, where no formal ability exists for the devolved Administrations to propose or nominate a member with expertise in regionally or nationally significant trade.

    I shall turn briefly to the Command Paper that was published in 2019 and covered the previous Trade Bill. Does it still apply? Does the commitment to publishing our negotiating objectives and scoping assessments still exist? Even if it does, does the Minister recognise that that still does not give Parliament or the devolved Administrations any role in approving them? Is it still the intention of the UK Government to provide sensitive information to a scrutiny Committee? Would that be the Select Committee on International Trade, which is ably chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil)? If it is, will any papers provided be publishable, or will they be restricted? ​If they are restricted, that will still leave Members of Parliament, exporting businesses and other interested third parties none the wiser about the Government’s real intentions. I am conscious of the limited time, Madam Deputy Speaker, so let me end simply by saying—

    Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)

    Order. I ask the hon. Gentleman to bring his remarks to a close. I thank him for his contribution, but we must move on. I am now introducing a time limit of five minutes, and I advise hon. Members who are speaking virtually to have a timing device visible.