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  • Jim Shannon – 2022 Speech on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

    Jim Shannon – 2022 Speech on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

    The speech made by Jim Shannon, the DUP MP for Strangford, in the House of Commons on 30 June 2022.

    It is a real pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison), and I thank him for his contribution. I also thank the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) for setting the scene so very well, and other hon. Members for their contributions. It is good to see the House united, by and large, in the statements we try to make.

    I have spoken about the complexities of the Iranian nuclear question on a number of occasions, and it is clear that we are fast coming to the stage at which we will need to do more than simply discuss or debate it in this House. We must register our concerns, but we need to act, and act urgently. I said the same thing six months ago, and I reiterate it today. Let me put it on the record that I am unashamedly a friend of Israel. I was a member of the Northern Ireland Friends of Israel group when I served in the Northern Ireland Assembly, and I am a member of the Friends of Israel here in this great House. I also have a close working relationship with the Iranian Government in exile, to which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe) referred earlier. That is a good working relationship, and an opportunity to hear about human rights abuses and deprivations, which I will mention later.

    There are many in the world who despair at the actions of Iran. On 8 June, the International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors voted overwhelmingly to adopt a resolution introduced by the United States, Britain, France, and Germany, censuring the regime in Tehran for non co-operation with the agency’s inquiry into nuclear traces found at three undeclared sites. Iran has a blatant disregard for democracy, freedom, and liberty, and for truth and honesty—it is as simple as that. They will tell lies ‘til the cows come home, as we often say. Indeed, the authorities in Tehran rejected the draft of that resolution, even before it was adopted. The May 2022 IAEA report, perhaps the most detailed and damning since its November 2011 report, made it clear that the regime had not been entirely open and honourable—what a surprise. I have heard it characterised as playing games with the agency. It did, and it must be made accountable for that.

    Other Members have referred to the three locations that the IAEA had requested to visit. The regime razed the buildings, and removed structure and soil, yet the IAEA still found traces of nuclear material. The regime did not do the job terribly well, and that badly executed cover-up left an evidential base, which tells us as much as any sample could ever have told us. Action is needed as soon as possible. There are actions that have taken place that the regime does not want us to know about, and in light of the IAEA’s report stating that it has not provided explanations that are technically credible in relation to the agency’s findings at those locations, the only conclusion is that actions have been carried out contrary to the agreement. Again, that must be addressed.

    I am pleased to see the Minister and the shadow Minister in their place, and I ask this: is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action dead, as the regime continues its nuclear provocations and breaches? Perhaps the Minister will answer that when he winds up the debate. Although the IAEA’s position had already come to be regarded as a potentially insurmountable obstacle to the JCPoA’s revival, each of the participants in that agreement remained unwilling to abandon the negotiations.

    That situation did not immediately change in the wake of the IAEA board of governors resolution. Tehran even appeared to test that reaction before the censure was formally adopted, turning off two monitoring devices that the IAEA relied on for monitoring the enrichment of uranium gas at the Natanz nuclear facility. The measure was accompanied by a statement from the spokesperson for the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, urging western nations to “come to their senses”—perhaps it is time for Iran to come to its senses and see that it is time for decency, honesty and truth, and for it to drop the censure.

    When that did not happen, the AEOI initiated plans to remove 27 surveillance cameras from several nuclear facilities. Many commentators described Tehran’s reactions as a final or fatal blow to the JCPoA. Those changes come at a time when Iran is already planning to install two new cascades of advanced enrichment centrifuges at Natanz, which could substantially speed up the rate at which uranium is enriched to Iran’s current high level of 60% purity, and potentially beyond that, even to 90%, or to weapons-grade. That should reiterate to all Members of the House that time is of the essence, time is short, and we cannot wait to take action.

    On Monday 20 June, Reuters news agency, citing a confidential IAEA report that it had seen, reported:

    “Iran is escalating its uranium enrichment further by preparing to use advanced IR-6 centrifuges at its underground Fordow site that can more easily switch between enrichment levels.”

    Again, that is a very worrying development that we must be aware of and concerned about. According to Reuters:

    “IAEA inspectors verified on Saturday that Iran was ready to feed uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas, the material centrifuges enrich, into the second of two cascades, or clusters, of IR-6 centrifuges installed at Fordow, a site dug into mountain, the confidential IAEA report to member states said.”

    The work was done on a mountain, in easily hidden places and under darkness.

    On 7 June, in a joint statement to the IAEA board of governors addressing the regime’s implementation of its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA, the United Kingdom, France and Germany said:

    “We are deeply concerned about the continued nuclear advances that the Director General documents in his report. As a result of Iran’s nuclear activities in violation of the JCPOA for more than three years, its nuclear programme is now more advanced than at any point in the past. This is threatening international security and risks undermining the global nonproliferation regime.”

    The risk is at its highest ever. The axis of evil of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran threaten the very stability of the world. It is time, as others have said, to refer the matter to the UN, which is the body responsible, and it is time for a collective response. The world must unite against Iran. It is, as has been said, a rogue state that must be controlled. It cannot be allowed to roam free. Iran has disregard for human decency, as we all know.

    In Iran, we witness some of the worst human rights abuses in any part of the world—I declare an interest as chair of the all-party parliamentary group for international freedom of religion or belief, which I have a particular interest in—with the persecution of Christians and of Baha’is. It is also about the rights of women to be women and to have freedom and liberty, but in Iran they face acid attacks on a daily basis. It has high rates of poverty and deprivation, yet it seems to find immense amounts of money to spend on its defence and nuclear programmes. Iran sponsors terrorism across the world and is involved in terrorism in the middle east, in the far east and elsewhere. It is time to bring it to book for what it does.

    The dire situation could not be clearer, so our corresponding action must be just as clear, firm and immediate. I respectfully ask the Minister and her Department to act appropriately. I am keen to hear what more action we can take. Strongly worded statements are not enough. It is vital for the future of the planet and this world that nuclear arms are kept away from unstable nations and Governments such as those in Iran who have proven themselves not to be honest and open when it comes to their aims. Iran seeks the wanton destruction of Israel and other parts of the western world. We need to be vigilant, prepared and ready. We look to our Minister for a satisfactory response.

  • Andrew Murrison – 2022 Speech on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

    Andrew Murrison – 2022 Speech on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

    The speech made by Andrew Murrison, the Conservative MP for South West Wiltshire, in the House of Commons on 30 June 2022.

    It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe). I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) on giving us this opportunity. I listened carefully to everything he said, and I agree with all of it.

    In June 2019, I went to Tehran as Middle East Minister while Tehran was sinking shipping throughout the Gulf. I went there to remonstrate at its malign regional activities and to insist that it meet its JCPOA commitments, including the limits imposed on its enriched uranium stockpile. In hindsight, it was probably not the best use of my time; the truth is that the deal had been moribund since President Trump withdrew in 2018. Attempts to revive it have failed, and now it is comatose.

    I suppose we should not turn off the life support entirely, but in my view we have no need to bust a gut trying to revive the plan. What we need is a stronger, longer deal. Indeed, with every day that passes, the JCPOA becomes less attractive: while Iran’s technical capabilities advance, the original terms become redundant and sunset clauses loom large. Some of those clauses have lapsed or shortly will—the UN arms embargo from October 2020; restrictions on ballistic missile-related goods next year; and, the year after, restrictions relating to Iran’s advanced centrifuge R&D. In 2031, the ban on weapons-grade uranium ends.

    That said, we should not be seen to be a guilty party or a co-author of the plan’s coup de grâce. We have to stick with it, I suppose, to the bitter end. Iran too—at least, the potentially reconcilable part of it—wants to be perceived as keen to talk, but, with artful duplicity, says one thing and does another. The reported tenor of ongoing discussions is very much true to form. On Sunday, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited poor Josep Borrell of the European Commission to Tehran. His plaintive line following the meeting was that

    “the more supply of oil, the better for the energy prices.”

    How pathetic is that? It looks as though the European External Action Service, in its quest for purpose and relevance, has been all too eager to swallow a pro-Iran line that conveniently gets its members out of a tight temporary fix. Not for the first time, it is grossly misreading the Iranians in a disappointing display of naivety and self-service.

    Borrell’s line suggests that the EU is prepared to swap Russian for Iranian energy, so the Doha talks go on with the Americans and the Iranians, bizarrely, in separate rooms. The reality is that Iran’s demands for compensation and guarantees are intractable. Those who believe Iran will settle for a deal in order to trade with the west misread the ideological basis of the regime and its President. They seek nothing less than the complete Islamisation of society and the elimination of western influence. Tehran has no desire to be our partner, even less our friend. Let us be quite clear in separating the good and great people of Iran from the regime: the two are plainly different things, as recent shows of unrest have demonstrated, and we should encourage the one and not the other.

    Meanwhile, Iran ratchets up its pressure on the international community through the expulsion of IAEA officials. The day after Borrell’s meeting in Tehran, it showcased a missile launch, and we contemplate a uranium breakout time probably in weeks, certainly not months. The Iran of 2022 is very different from the Iran of 2015. Hardliners and the IRGC have tightened their stranglehold over the state and the economy. President Raisi has populated Ministries with Guards commanders responsible for atrocious acts of terrorism. We recall, as has been recalled already today—correctly so—his participation in the 1988 death committee, and in the extrajudicial murder of some 4,000 political prisoners.

    Sanctions work. Tony Blair’s Institute for Global Change has revealed that, following the first wave of sanctions relief in 2014, Iran’s terrorist and military activity increased significantly. Kasra Aarabi writes:

    “The number of militias created by the IRGC surged after this period, and the Guard’s presence abroad peaked, with the Quds Force expanding its operations in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.”

    If that occurred under the previous relatively benign regime, what effect will sanctions relief—estimated to mean an immediate $90 billion windfall, and as much as $800 billion over five years—have on the zealots now in control? I suggest that sanctions relief at this time would not be a good move at all.

    US special envoy Rob Malley called for a “stronger and longer” deal shortly after his appointment, and he is right. Alternatively, we could offer less for less, but we cannot offer more for less. The integrated review points the way. It says:

    “Alongside our allies, the UK will hold Iran to account for its nuclear activity, remaining open to talks on a more comprehensive nuclear and regional deal.”

    There is no specific mention of the JCPOA, which is very sensible. If we managed to reheat the JCPOA in its current form, we would have a stop-gap agreement at best, but the prospects of definitive talks and a long-term solution led by Washington will evaporate. Iran expert Professor Ali Ansari suggests we play it cool, and I agree.

    Although we should not be complacent, we should not be worried about a no-deal scenario. The Iranian regime is struggling to rid itself of Israeli infiltration, which is preventing it from advancing its nuclear apparatus and security state. We all remember the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh last year. Most recently Hossein Taeb, IRGC head of intelligence, has been dismissed, and on 22 May IRGC colonel Sayyad Khodaei was shot dead outside his home.

    Nobody goes to Iran without being lectured about Britain being the source of all the country’s woes; the grievance culture stoked by the regime makes the SNP look rather like rank amateurs. It is mildly flattering to think that Iran’s rulers believe we are still so influential, albeit in their minds entirely malignly. Historically, however, the villain has been seen to lie elsewhere. This debate takes place amid Putin’s imperial war. He invokes Peter the Great, by reclaiming lost territory and advancing autocracy. There is no doubt that revanchist Russia and Iran have grown closer under Putin’s leadership. It has developed from a transactional, military relationship to one of shared ideological outlook, in so far as both countries despise the western world order and its culture, have a theological sense of mission for their countries, and talk in Anglophobic terms of grievance and resistance. Their shared paranoia about democracy has grown collaboration and suppression at home—and also abroad, notably in Syria.

    However, it has not always been so. Professor Ansari points out that

    “the greatest sleight of hand achieved by the Russian state with respect to Iran has been to reinvent its relationship from that of imperial predator to a fully fledged member of an axis of resistance against the west.”

    Indeed, there is a strong argument that Russia—certainly not Britain—has been the chief cause of historic Iranian humiliation, imposing capitulatory treaties in 1808 and 1828, which lasted until 1921. Nascent Iranian democracy was stamped out by Colonel Liakhov of the Cossack Brigade in the early 20th century, as he shelled the Majlis in Tehran and executed constitutionalists. The parallels with the present day are pretty clear.

    Lord Curzon described “avowedly hostile” Russian activities in Iran, and pointed out that

    “piece by piece, partly by open war and partly by furtive nibbling, Russia has appropriated more and more of Persian soil.”

    There are historic continuities in the Iran-Russia relationship, namely in Iran’s junior status, and Iranian popular sentiment against Russia. The 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay ensured that Iran became a de facto vassal state, with strictures outlining Russia’s preference for the Qajar succession. Now, as then, Iran’s presidential candidates and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders court Putin for his approval. In line with that junior status, we learn from Minister Javad Zarif’s leaked audio tape on the war in Syria that Russia

    “entered the war by air force, but dragged Iran’s ground force to war too. We didn’t have ground forces in Syria by then.”

    It is a candid assessment of Putin’s disregard for Iranian life, and reluctance to spill blood when he can use those he sees as inferiors. We see that, too, in Putin’s feeding the Ukrainian meat grinder preferentially with troops from east of the Urals.

    But if the regime wants that kind of partnership, the Iranian people do not. The popular mood in Iran is antithetical to the Russians; we have seen that most recently in protests against Russia’s invasion. Meanwhile, the regime blunders on, blaming NATO and the west, and defending Russia and the UN. Again, that bifurcation has precedent. An Iranian member of the Majlis once wrote of the

    “dislike of the Persian people for the Russians,”

    which was based on

    “wars…cruelty and aggression…encouragement given by them to the extravagancies of the Persian court…the ascendency they had gained by promising to maintain the succession…the many concessions they had obtained from the Persian Government…the undue influence exerted by them.”

    He concludes that Russia is

    “the home and centre of autocracy and ancient foe of all liberal ideas.”

    That was more than 100 years ago, but it resonates with us today. That is why it is so important—so imperative—for us to call this partnership out, reveal its weak foundations, learn from the past, and support the good and great people of Iran in their struggle against a wicked regime.

  • Steve McCabe – 2022 Speech on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

    Steve McCabe – 2022 Speech on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

    The speech made by Steve McCabe, the Labour MP for Birmingham Selly Oak, in the House of Commons on 30 June 2022.

    I thank the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) for securing the debate and congratulate him on an excellent speech. In the interest of transparency, I am the chair of Labour Friends of Israel and a member of the British Committee for Iran Freedom.

    I suspect that the outcome of the talks in Vienna will be crucial in shaping the future of the international community’s relations with Iran. Whatever that outcome, however, we must develop a clear-sighted and comprehensive strategy to tackle the challenges we face, including the many that the current talks are unlikely to resolve. As we have heard, the malign activities of those who control the Iranian regime extend far beyond its nuclear ambitions and include: its ballistic missile programme; support for terrorist proxies across the middle east; the dangerous influence and activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; Tehran’s insidious disinformation campaigns; its policy of state hostage taking; and the suffering of the Iranian people over four decades.

    In the face of those challenges, the JCPOA, which was negotiated in 2015, looks pretty limited. Despite the name, as the right hon. Gentleman pointed out, it is clearly not comprehensive and, as we heard, it actually exacerbated certain problems by freeing up extra resources for the mullahs. The Trump Administration’s unilateral withdrawal in 2018 dealt a severe blow to the deal, but Iran’s record of systematically violating the agreement had already highlighted its inadequacy.

    Those violations include, as we have heard, the decision to enrich uranium beyond the agreed cap and the deliberate obstruction of the IAEA inspectors. Iran had already made clear its contempt for the agreement by turning off some of the inspectors’ monitoring equipment. Officials said a couple of weeks ago that they expect to lose any continuity of knowledge regarding the progress of Iran’s activity because of the obstruction they are facing from it. Even if we had a deal up and running, the inspectors would not be able to do their job.

    Some believe that a new agreement might provide a measure of medium-term restraint on Iran’s nuclear programme; others have their doubts. As we have heard, the Institute for Science and International Security has concluded that it is on the verge of obtaining the bomb. The appointment of Mohammad Eslami, the main liaison with Pakistani freelance nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, as the new head of Tehran’s Atomic Energy Organisation is the clearest signal we could have of Iran’s real intentions. That is why I am sceptical of the idea that those people will negotiate in good faith and keep their word.

    As the LFI argues in its recent pamphlet on the subject, the UK needs to develop realistic strategies to address the nuclear threat and the other Iranian issues. Iran’s ballistic missile programme is the biggest in the middle east and makes it the first country to develop a missile with a 2,000 km range without having first developed nuclear capability. It is also the only country that routinely threatens to wipe another nation off the face of the map—the destruction of the state of Israel is the official policy of Iran’s leaders.

    As we have heard, as well as threatening Israel’s existence, Iran is responsible for waging war, terrorism and violence—mostly through its proxies—in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and the Palestinian territories. The UK has rightly banned some of those proxies, but not all their front organisations. The Government should do more and look at proscribing Hezbollah and Hamas.

    As we have also heard, Iran’s terrorist activities are supported by the regime’s ideological army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which not only leads on meddling in the region but brutally represses ordinary Iranians. Its influence has expanded rapidly in recent years, including over a variety of operations across Europe. I believe, as others do, that the UK should join our allies the United States and proscribe the IRGC for the dangerous terrorist group it is.

    Iranian disinformation efforts, run by the IRGC, have significantly expanded since 2015. There is mounting evidence of interference in UK domestic politics, including last year’s Scottish Parliament elections. The UK Government should urgently draw up proposals for how they intend to combat and disrupt that interference.

    Iran’s policy of arbitrarily detaining foreign nationals, most prominently Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, demands co-ordinated international action. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office must be bold enough to call this activity what it is—state hostage taking. We should use the UK’s position at the UN to lead and develop a proper response from the international community.

    We should also never forget that the Iranian regime’s most long-standing and long-suffering victims are the Iranian people themselves. We can and should do more to support the victims of some of the most unimaginable human rights abuses. I think it is both curious and shocking that, nearly two years since it was established, the Magnitsky Act is yet to be applied to a single Iranian individual or entity. There are many Iranian politicians and officials guilty of human rights abuses, including prison governors, military personnel, regional governors and others. Ebrahim Raisi himself stands accused of being responsible for a programme of mass killings in Iran.

    Whatever the outcome of the nuclear talks in Vienna, the threats posed by this regime to the Iranian people, the peoples of the middle east, our own country and democracies around the world will not go away. UK foreign policy should reflect the reality of the situation. Any revived JCPOA that only deals with the nuclear programme is probably not worth the paper it is written on. The desire of those who wish to resurrect the JCPOA should not detract from the urgent need to recognise and develop a smart, proportionate and comprehensive strategy to resist Iran’s terrorist activity around the globe.

    Should it prove impossible to secure a satisfactory deal, which I think is pretty inevitable, I concur with the right hon. Member for Clwyd West (Mr Jones) that the UK and other western participants should refer the regime’s nuclear activities to the UN Security Council, and we should immediately seek to reinstate the six resolutions that were suspended in good faith because of the JCPOA.

  • David Jones – 2022 Speech on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

    David Jones – 2022 Speech on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

    The speech made by David Jones, the Conservative MP for Clwyd West, in the House of Commons on 30 June 2022.

    I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe) on securing the debate, and I thank the Backbench Business Committee for facilitating it. It is, for all the reasons set out by my right hon. Friend, a timely debate. It is also timely because it comes after the report of the board of governors of the IAEA on 30 May and the subsequent resolution of 8 June, which censures Iran for non-co-operation with the agency’s inquiry into nuclear traces found at three non-declared sites. That action on the part of the agency is certainly a step forward, but it goes nowhere near far enough.

    Iran’s nuclear programme has been known about since 2002, when the existence of the facilities at Natanz and Arak were revealed by the Iranian democratic Opposition, the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The Iranian regime has always asserted that its programme is for civilian purposes only and has always denied that it is attempting to produce nuclear weapons. That simply defies belief. As we have heard, despite the terms of the JCPOA, Iran started enriching uranium to 20% in 2010, and later the same year it moved to 60% enrichment. As my right hon. Friend pointed out, that is considerably beyond anything that is needed for civilian purposes.

    In its report of 1 June, the Institute for Science and International Security concluded:

    “Iran’s breakout timeline is now at zero. It has enough 60 percent enriched uranium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) to be assured it could fashion a nuclear explosive. If Iran wanted to further enrich its 60 percent HEU up to weapon-grade HEU, or 90 percent, it could do so within a few weeks with only a few of its advanced centrifuge cascades.”

    Clearly the time pressure is enormous. The report went on to note:

    “Whether or not Iran enriches its HEU up to 90 percent, it can have enough HEU for two nuclear weapons within one month after starting breakout.”

    That is, by any standards, a very worrying state of affairs.

    It is made all the more worrying by Iran’s increasingly erratic and aggressive stance in the region and, indeed, the wider world. As my right hon. Friend rightly pointed out, Iran is an active state sponsor of terrorism—probably the world’s leading state sponsor. Its proxies are engaged in fomenting conflict in Yemen, Syria and Lebanon. My right hon. Friend mentioned the Istanbul incident; I would like to mention the incident in June 2018, when a bomb plot targeting a gathering of Iranian pro-democracy supporters in Paris was disrupted by the French and Belgian authorities. An Iranian diplomat accredited to the embassy in Vienna was subsequently convicted for leading the conspiracy and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. Three accomplices were convicted, and their sentences were upheld, with two years added, by the court of appeal in Antwerp in May. Iran is certainly exporting terrorism not just throughout the region, but across the world.

    Dr Offord

    I feel the need to correct my right hon. Friend on that point. It was not just Iranian politicians and Opposition members who were targeted; five of us from the British Parliament were at risk of being blown up in that terrorist incident.

    Mr Jones

    My hon. Friend is entirely right: it was a gathering of supporters of the NCRI, which takes place every year in Paris and attracts supporters from all round the world. As he points out, had that conspiracy been successful, its consequences would have been catastrophic.

    My right hon. Friend the Member for Newark mentioned Iran’s revolutionary guard corps. That is, in effect, a state within a state. It directs, leads and executes the terrorist activities of Iran. As he pointed out, it is a proscribed organisation in the United States, and many will wonder why it is not proscribed in this country. I believe that it should be. Iran is already a global danger, but a nuclear-armed Iran is an appalling and unacceptable prospect.

    The IAEA report makes it clear that the Iranian regime has, effectively, been playing games with the agency for many years. At three locations that the agency requested to visit, the regime razed buildings to the ground and removed structural material and soil, clearly in an effort to disguise what was happening there. Nevertheless, the agency discovered traces of anthropogenic nuclear material. The report states that the regime has

    “not provided explanations that are technically credible”

    for the presence of nuclear material in those locations. The Tehran regime has clearly shown by its actions that it has no intent whatever to co-operate in good faith with the IAEA. Not only is the regime taking steps to advance its enrichment programme by installing more advanced centrifuges; it is doing all it can to restrict the ability of IAEA inspectors to monitor its nuclear sites. It has turned off two devices that the agency relied on to monitor the enrichment of uranium gas at Natanz and initiated plans to remove 27 surveillance cameras from other nuclear facilities.

    On 20 June, Reuters cited a confidential IAEA report, which revealed that:

    “Iran is escalating its uranium enrichment further by preparing to use advanced IR-6 centrifuges at its underground Fordow site that can more easily switch between enrichment levels”.

    In a joint statement to the board of governors of the IAEA on 27 June, the UK, France and Germany expressed their concern about the continued nuclear activities in breach of the JCPOA. They pointed out that the alarming accumulation of enriched material is cause for great concern and is further reducing the time that it would take Iran to break out towards its first nuclear weapon.

    The position, therefore, is that it is clearly known that Iran is taking active steps to produce highly enriched uranium, the only credible purpose of which can be to produce nuclear weapons. The question must be whether there is any purpose in continuing to urge Iran to fulfil its obligations under the JCPOA when it is perfectly clear that it has no intention whatever to do so. The continued efforts to engage with Iran and go the extra mile may be laudable, but, frankly, seem increasingly futile. Iran clearly regards the west as weak and is almost openly laughing at us.

    A new course is called for. Consideration should be given to whether seeking to adhere to the JCPOA as the basis for our future dealings with Iran is realistic or sensible. Rather than clinging to vain hopes that Iran is capable of mending its ways and responding to the IAEA’s censure, the UK should work with the United States and other international partners to refer Iran to the UN Security Council with a view to reinstating the six sanctions-imposing resolutions that were suspended with the JCPOA’s initial implementation.

    Iran must learn that flouting the JCPOA has real consequences, and the west should unite to apply the most intense pressure possible on Iran to wind up its nuclear programme, since it is now abundantly clear that it is not for any peaceful purpose, but is aggressive. Quite simply, Iran is a rogue state, and a rogue state in possession of nuclear weapons is not a prospect that the west can happily contemplate or, indeed, tolerate.

  • Jeremy Corbyn – 2022 Speech on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

    Jeremy Corbyn – 2022 Speech on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

    The speech made by Jeremy Corbyn, the Independent MP for Islington North, in the House of Commons on 30 June 2022.

    I compliment the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) on obtaining this debate and I particularly endorse the last point he made about looking forward to the ultimate day when there will be no sanctions against Iran, because that surely is the place we would want to be.

    We should have a slight passing interest in the past British relationship with Iran, which is not much discussed in this country, but is discussed a great deal in Iran. There are memories of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, later BP, and the promotion of the coup in 1953 by Britain and the CIA together to get rid of the secular progressive Government in place at that time. It might seem a long time ago, but it is very real to people in Iran, and the arguments about it are rehearsed many times over.

    The 1979 revolution in Iran was obviously a massive event in every respect. It was a total revolution. A very authoritarian regime was installed. There was a massive killing rate by that regime and universal and total abuse of human rights. Many people from Iran came and sought asylum in this country and many others—indeed, a considerable number came to live in my constituency. In anything I say, I am well aware of the systematic abuse of human rights in Iran for many years. Any discussion with Iran must include a discussion of human rights. Obviously, that includes the dramatic horrors of executions and public executions, but the restriction on rights of assembly and freedom of speech are to me equally important.

    It is also worth remembering that the Iranian people have lost relatives and thousands and thousands of soldiers in conflict since 1979. The appalling and disastrous Iran-Iraq war, which ended up achieving hardly anything for either side, cost hundreds of thousands of lives on both sides, wrecked both economies and has led to a continued economic problem for both sides. In discussing the nuclear issues, one should have regard for the longer-term history of Iran and the relationship of this country with Iran.

    We are coming up to the non-proliferation treaty review conference this August in New York. Iran was a member of the non-proliferation treaty. Successive meetings that I have been to on the non-proliferation treaty have always concluded with the hope that there would be the declaration of a middle east weapons of mass destruction-free zone, which would give the opportunity for Israel and Iran to be included in the negotiations for a non-nuclear future for the middle east. While I fully appreciate that Iran clearly has developed centrifuges and enriched uranium almost to weapons-grade, two other countries in the region either have nuclear weapons or could. One is Israel, which clearly does have nuclear weapons, and the other is Saudi Arabia, which could quickly develop nuclear weapons if it wanted. The urgency of having a negotiation and a revamped version of the 2015 agreement, or something like it, is important if we are to try to preserve the peace of the region.

    I was part of a delegation from the all-party group on Iran in 2014, and it was a fascinating experience, because the members of the delegation were Lord Lamont, a former Conservative Minister and Chancellor, Jack Straw, a former Labour Home Secretary, the current Defence Secretary, and me. The four of us divided up our roles in the delegation very clearly early on. Lord Lamont talked about economic issues, Jack Straw talked about global issues and trade, and I relentlessly and endlessly raised a lot of concerns about individual and collective human rights cases with the people we met in Iran. We were quite well received at universities and so forth, and we had serious negotiations. It was clear to me not only that such negotiations are tough, but that, if the Iran nuclear agreement was to succeed—this was pre the agreement, by the way; that is why we were there—it had to be accompanied by two things: the lifting of sanctions, which were very severe, particularly the medical sanctions being imposed at that time; and a human rights dialogue. The Iranians made it clear that they were prepared to have a human rights dialogue with the EU, or with other parties.

    We have to strive for the lifting of sanctions, and that means there has to be a renewed effort to bring about an agreement with Iran to end the enrichment of uranium to anywhere near weapons-grade. I am not a great fan of nuclear power, but the Iranians are legally entitled to develop nuclear power if that is what they want to do. Personally, I do not think it is a great direction to go down, but obviously they can legally choose to do that. We should be well aware that, if we do not succeed in rejigging the 2015 agreement, we have problems ahead.

    Steve McCabe (Birmingham, Selly Oak) (Lab)

    Does the right hon. Gentleman seriously believe that a country with a secret nuclear programme that is hidden from the IAEA inspectors and a country that is obstructing those inspectors is serious about negotiations? Is that his genuine belief?

    Jeremy Corbyn

    Iran has to be serious about negotiations and we have to be serious about negotiations. That is the whole point of this debate and the whole point of the joint agreement. If my friend has a better alternative, I would be interested to hear it. We should be aware that the agreement with Iran was made with the support of the United States under President Obama and of this country and many others. It is an international agreement. It was Donald Trump who said it was a bilateral agreement and the US should walk away from it. That is essentially the situation we have reached at the present time.

    I hope that there will be strong negotiations with Iran. They will obviously be led by the US, the EU and other countries, including this one. That is an important way forward. Perhaps the non-proliferation treaty review conference is an opportunity to start to explore that way forward, because what is the alternative? The alternative is we increase the number of nuclear weapons within the region. I hope to goodness that Iran never develops nuclear weapons, as I wish other countries did not. We have to remember, though, that this country has nuclear weapons and this Government have just announced an increase in the number of our nuclear warheads, so it is not as if we are on the moral high ground when saying that nobody should ever develop nuclear weapons.

    There is added urgency because of the situation in Palestine, the occupation of the west bank and the siege of Gaza. There is also the war in Yemen, where thankfully there is now a ceasefire. I hope the ceasefire becomes permanent and that the people of Yemen are able to live in peace, but our supplying weapons to Saudi Arabia has made the situation much worse.

    We have to look towards a future in which there can be relations with Iran and a serious programme of improvement in respect of the human rights abuses in Iran, so that sanctions can gradually be lifted. That would allow the Iranian economy to develop and living standards to improve. Many people in Iran lead very poor lives, partly because of the sanctions and partly because of the level of resources taken up by the military, as was pointed out by the right hon. Member for Newark.

    In his intervention, my friend the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe) asked whether we were serious about negotiations. We were very serious about negotiations when we were trying to get Nazanin Ratcliffe released from her appalling detention in Iran. Eventually, she was released and the parallel agreement was made about the repayment of money by this country to Iran. However, other people were not released. I would be grateful if the Minister let me know, either when she responds or later in writing, about the situation facing Anoosheh Ashoori and Morad Tahbaz, both of whom should have been released with Nazanin but were not. They are still there and apparently the British Government are supporting their release. Those negotiations that were brought about for one person—a very special and wonderful person—had a good outcome, but there are other detainees who should be released.

    This debate takes place at a time of peril, with the appalling war between Russia and Ukraine, and the resulting loss of life, and the increase in arms expenditure, with NATO proposing a huge increase. If we succeed in re-engaging with Iran and have a good outcome, good work will have been done and we will have helped to bring about a more peaceful middle east. If we do not, the pressure of the militarist hawks in Iran will become even more enormous and even more resources will go into nuclear and other weapons technology, with obvious dangers for everybody in the region. Surely our whole focus should be on nuclear disarmament and peace through negotiation to bring about a better standard of living for the people of Iran and, indeed, of all other countries in the region.

  • Robert Jenrick – 2022 Speech on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

    Robert Jenrick – 2022 Speech on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

    The speech made by Robert Jenrick, the Conservative MP for Newark, in the House of Commons on 30 June 2022.

    I beg to move,

    That this House expresses grave concern at the imminent prospect of a nuclear armed Iran; calls on the Government in its ongoing negotiations in respect of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) agreement to seek to extend the sunset clauses, enact a stricter monitoring regime, retain terrorist proscriptions, and expand its scope to include Iran’s other destabilising activities in the region.

    There are significant concerns, as set out in the motion, at the negotiated deal that is apparently about to be signed. I have been actively seeking an opportunity to raise those concerns over Iran’s destabilising activities for a number of months. I give thanks to the Backbench Business Committee for granting time in the main Chamber, and to my many cross-party colleagues who supported the application.

    This debate could not come at a more important time. On 9 June, the UK, Germany and France released a joint statement saying that they are ready to conclude a deal with Iran that would restore the joint comprehensive plan of action, and urging Iran to seize the diplomatic opportunity it presented. On Monday, indirect talks between the United States and Iran resumed in Doha.

    This is by no means the first time that we have debated Iran in this place, and I dare say it will not be the last, but today’s debate could perhaps be the last opportunity to evaluate the merits or otherwise of a return to the JCPOA nuclear agreement. I firmly believe that, whatever one’s view—we will hear a range of them today, no doubt—it is vital that, before any deal is signed, our Government hear the opinions of Members of this House.

    Anxieties over Iran are felt acutely by many across the House, as I am sure we will hear. I am on the record as having been very sceptical of the original 2015 deal, believing it to be too limited in scope to prevent Iran’s malign activities and far too weak in enforcement to prevent a nuclear Iran, should Iran choose that path. That view was shared at the time by many—including, we have subsequently learned, a number of those who were close to the negotiations. I think, for example, of the noble Lord Hammond and the former Defence Secretary Sir Michael Fallon, who have both subsequently expressed their concerns at the limited nature of the deal that was ultimately signed.

    Whatever one’s thoughts about the JCPOA, the fundamentally different circumstances we face today must be confronted. It is always easy to stick with what one has been involved in for a long time; of course there is pride among those who have negotiated relentlessly on this issue, both here in the UK, in the Foreign Office, and particularly in the Biden Administration, among those officials who were previously in the Obama Administration. However, it is time to appreciate what has happened in the seven years since the deal was signed.

    Iran’s nuclear programme has continued apace. While the terms of the JCPOA restricted Iran’s enrichment of uranium to 3.67% fissile purity and a stockpile of only 300 kg of uranium, as of last month the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran has been enriching uranium up to a purity of 60%—a short technical step from weapons-grade levels of 90%.

    Theresa Villiers (Chipping Barnet) (Con) rose—

    Gareth Davies (Grantham and Stamford) (Con) rose—

    Robert Jenrick

    I am spoilt for choice, but I will give way first to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Theresa Villiers).

    Theresa Villiers

    My right hon. Friend is making a powerful speech. Does he agree that, far from the JCPOA-minus that seems to be in prospect, we need a tougher deal with Iran that reflects its transgressions in compliance with the current agreement? We must reflect those transgressions in a deal that is actually powerful in preventing Iran from developing its nuclear programme.

    Robert Jenrick

    I agree wholeheartedly with my right hon. Friend, who has been interested and engaged in this issue for a long time. The point she makes, which I hope I will make over the course of my remarks, is that we do want a negotiated settlement and agreement, but it must be one that is robust and has the effect of preventing both Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and its wider malign activities in the region that are harming our key partners, our friends and ourselves.

    Gareth Davies

    I am grateful to my right hon. Friend and neighbour for giving way. He mentions that Iran has developed uranium to 60% purity. Is he aware of any country on Earth that has enriched to that level for peaceful purposes?

    Robert Jenrick

    No, and I do not think anyone would believe that that is Iran’s ultimate intent. The latest intelligence, for example, showing that bunkers have been constructed underground in which to hold some of that material, makes clear what the ultimate intent of Iran is on this issue.

    Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con) rose—

    Robert Jenrick

    I will give way one last time, and then I shall make some progress.

    Dr Offord

    I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. Many people have focused on transgressions against the JCPOA, but because of the infamous sunset provisions in the 2015 deal, Iran will be able to legitimately undertake a full nuclear programme. That means that we could be facing a nuclear Iran as early as 2025. Without doing anything, we are already in a very difficult and dangerous scenario.

    Robert Jenrick

    My hon. Friend is correct. I will make this point in a moment, but there is no harm in restating it now: the original deal contained a number of sunset provisions, and the proposed deal, as reported, merely keeps those sunset provisions in exactly the same form. Even if we were to sign the deal tomorrow, it would begin to fade away in 2023. One really has to question the point of signing up to the proposed deal.

    Iran stands on the verge of possessing a nuclear bomb. In fact, intelligence suggests it has sufficient enriched uranium today for at least two nuclear weapons. It has progressed far beyond the parameters of the JCPOA, so restoring Iran to the old deal has none of the benefits we once thought it would. The JCPOA’s time has been and gone; the Rubicon has been crossed.

    After earlier talk of a longer and stronger deal, more recent rounds of the nuclear talks have seen US negotiators make concession after painful concession in an attempt to bring Iran back to the deal. We now see before us the contours of a shorter and weaker agreement—one that many have taken to dismissing as JCPOA-minus. In that agreement the Iranian regime will be reintegrated into the international community and afforded huge economic benefits that, crucially, will be channelled not into education, healthcare or infrastructure projects but into supporting and promoting terrorist activities, for instance through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran’s web of proxies across the region, and the restrictions on its nuclear programme will last for a fraction of the time. It is unclear whether this stands to strengthen efforts for non-proliferation.

    I believe that a new framework is required. Proponents of the JCPOA spoke of its ability to restrict Iran’s break-out time to one year. In view of the reduction of this to as little as a few weeks, we need the Government to recognise that this is simply not going to work, and that any agreement that could obtain the consent of this House—certainly of Members who take my view—will need to have very significantly longer sunset clauses.

    Bob Blackman (Harrow East) (Con)

    My right hon. Friend is absolutely right in everything he has said. However, it is not only the potential for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons that is a concern, but its ability then to deliver those weapons through ballistic missiles. Clearly Iran has enhanced its capability in that regard and could, if it has nuclear weapons, deliver them now. What would he say about how we need to restrict Iran’s capability to develop such weapons?

    Robert Jenrick

    My hon. Friend makes an important point. The JCPOA contains the word “comprehensive”, but it was anything but comprehensive. It certainly did not speak to the malign activities of Iran throughout the region, but nor did it address the seeking of enriched uranium, the weapons that would be able to deliver the nuclear weapons or the other infrastructure and equipment that is required in the process. Any deal that we now sign needs to address all those matters. In fact, as I said, on the pursuit of enriched uranium, the ship has already sailed because Iran already has it.

    The agreement as reported in the media seems set to include the same structural problems as we saw in the 2015 deal. Unless the new nuclear terms are expanded in scope to allow a more rigorous inspection regime, I fear we will repeat the same mistakes. Iran has reached the nuclear threshold under the watchful eye of what was supposed to be the most intrusive inspection regime ever. By its own admission, the UN’s nuclear watchdog is “flying blind”—the IAEA chief said as much in June 2021. One year on, Iran has taken a series of steps to further restrict IAEA access to its nuclear sites, including the deliberate removal of cameras from its most sensitive facilities. Years of tolerating Iran’s flagrant breaches out of fear of the talks collapsing has led us down this path.

    A glaring weakness of the JCPOA was that it did nothing to address Iran’s wider activities throughout the world. Our failure to address Iran’s support for its network of proxies continues to reverberate to this day. Iran was and remains the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism—a point I was pleased to hear my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary acknowledge in front of the Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday. The regime’s commitment to exporting the Islamic revolution has been underwritten by an active embrace of violence since it first came to power in 1979. In recent weeks, Istanbul has been the setting for an extraordinary Iranian terror plot. Thanks to the close co-operation between the Israeli and the Turkish security services, an Iranian terror cell attempting to kidnap and kill Israeli tourists—innocent civilians—was thwarted. In one incident, several Israeli tourists visiting a market had to be intercepted before they returned to their hotel room, where their would-be assassins were reportedly waiting for their return.

    The Iranian threat is very clear and present here at home. In 2019, it was revealed that British intelligence services had identified a Hezbollah cell stockpiling 3 tonnes of highly explosive ammonium nitrate in residential north-west London for use in a terror attack—the very same chemical that was recently inflicting such terrible damage in Beirut. The misplaced notion that the JCPOA would moderate the Iranian regime was dispelled when its Intelligence Ministry sought to bomb an opposition rally in Paris in 2018 with the help of an Iranian diplomat.

    Behind all these examples—and there are many others I could cite—sits the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s premier agent for terrorism. The organisation funds, trains and provides the ideological underpinning for many of the world’s terror organisations, from Hamas to Hezbollah to the Houthis. Reports from the previous round of negotiation that the Biden Administration was considering delisting the IRGC from its foreign terror list have been worrying, to say the least. Quite simply, it would be a grave miscalculation and a great dishonour if our Government were to support any such action. It would make a mockery of the efforts that we have made in recent years to proscribe Hamas and Hezbollah if we signed up to a deal that legitimises the very organisation that funds Hamas and Hezbollah. That really would be a perverse and absurd outcome.

    The negotiations in Doha cannot be detached from the broader geopolitical landscape. A dangerous new dynamic is at play in the latest round of nuclear talks. As the EU desperately tries to wean itself off Russian hydrocarbons, we see an ill-advised pivot towards Iran for energy supplies. In a visit to Iran over the weekend, Josep Borrell openly called for Europe to seek new sources of oil and gas following its move away from Russia and spoke of the high potential economic benefits awaiting Iran. At the G7 summit in Germany, Macron pointedly called for more Iranian oil to enter the market. The west can ill afford to end its dependency on one rogue regime merely by pivoting towards the religious fundamentalists in Tehran. How ridiculous would it be for us to invest so much time, effort and energy in defeating Vladimir Putin merely to make an advance—an opening—towards Tehran, Venezuela or other authoritarian regimes? It is troubling enough that the talks have been mediated by Russia, the world’s only nuclear-armed state currently threatening to actually use those weapons. If restrictions are lifted, Russia will receive a financial boost from sales of military equipment as well as the construction of nuclear power plants in Iran.

    Iran’s list of nuclear transgressions is as long as it is troubling and has long necessitated an urgent response. The UK Government were right to say in March:

    “Iran’s nuclear programme has never before been this advanced, and is exposing the international community to unprecedented levels of risk.”

    At this critical juncture, the west urgently needs to change its strategy. We valiantly pursued diplomatic avenues to their limit, and beyond. Dedicated officials here in the Foreign Office, and in the Obama and Biden Administrations, have invested immense time and resources in negotiating the JCPOA, but that is not a reason to sign a bad deal. As Iran continues to stall negotiations, it is time for a more robust approach reimposing snapback sanctions on Iran and tightening the economic screw until it is willing to countenance the serious proposals that I have shared here today.

    This position is no longer that of ultra-hawkish Republicans. In March, despite a polarised political climate in the United States, 70 Democrats and Republicans in Congress wrote to the National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, to demand that the new deal signed with Iran must include an extension of the sunset clauses that we discussed earlier, retention of the IRGC proscription—I would like the UK Government to proscribe it as well—and a toughening of the monitoring regime, with an extension in scope to include Iran’s other destabilising activities such as its ballistic missile programme. President Obama can press ahead with a weak deal, but if he does, there is a strong likelihood that the Senate and the House of Representatives will do everything in their power to frustrate it, and were there to be an incoming Republican President, which seems quite likely, it would be their day-one act to end the agreement. Why would we do something that is of such a short-term benefit, if any? In doing so, we weaken our relationships with some of our oldest friends and key partners, whether that be the state of Israel, the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia or others, all of whom publicly or privately are pleading with our Government to listen to their concerns and not to proceed with this agreement.

    Those countries in the middle east already fear that the west is retrenching and is an unreliable ally, particularly having seen the events of our messy and embarrassing retreat from Kabul a year ago. To impose this agreement in addition, against their best wishes, merely pushes them further away from us and towards new friends and relationships, whether that be Russia or China. That would be a very sad outcome.

    To conclude, the Iranian regime brutally represses, persecutes and tortures its own people. It wastes the Iranian people’s resources on terrorism, foreign aggression, missiles and nuclear-weapon capabilities. I hope to see the day when we and our partners have no need for sanctions on Iran or the proscription of its affiliates. I hope to see the day when the UK and Iran can enjoy normalised relations and when the people of Iran have a Government who respect human dignity and exist in peace with their neighbours, but that day will not come if we provide sanctions relief to fuel the regime’s corruption, incompetence and terrorism. Nor will the day come through weak and naive responses to the pursuit of and now the establishment of nuclear-weapon capabilities. I humbly urge the UK Government to change course, to learn from the first JCPOA’s failures, to listen to the concerns of many across the House and our partners in the region, and to work with us and them to impose maximum pressure on Iran.

  • Grant Shapps – 2022 Statement on Government Support for the Aviation Industry

    Grant Shapps – 2022 Statement on Government Support for the Aviation Industry

    The statement made by Grant Shapps, the Secretary of State for Transport, in the House of Commons on 30 June 2022.

    The majority of UK flights continue to be on time and without disruption. However, some passengers have faced significant disruption, which has also occurred in the aviation sector across Europe and globally. The outcome for too many consumers has been unacceptable.

    I have made it clear to the sector that they need to operate services properly and according to schedule or provide swift, appropriate compensation. I have already announced a one-off amnesty on airport slot rules, enabling airlines to plan ahead and avoid last-minute cancellations.

    I expect airlines to use this one-off amnesty now to ensure they are giving consumers certainty by offering schedules they can deliver. By the end of the slot handback period, I expect airlines to be offering services they are confident of delivering, and I will continue to seek reassurances from them that this is the case.

    We have been extensively engaging with industry at ministerial and official level since the beginning of the year. As part of this engagement the aviation Minister established a weekly strategic risk group. This brings together CEOs from airports, airlines and ground handlers to work through the issues ahead of the summer.

    Today, I am setting out all of the 22 measures the Government are currently taking to support the aviation industry, including: to help recruit and train staff; ensure the delivery of a realistic summer schedule; minimise disruption; and support passengers when delays and cancellations are unavoidable. The Government recognise that these issues are primarily for industry to solve, but this series of targeted measures will support their efforts.

    The measures are:

    Ensure industry deliver a realistic summer schedule

    1. We and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) have set out five specific expectations to the industry to deliver a successful summer operation:

    1. Summer schedules must be reviewed to make sure they are deliverable;

    2. Everyone from ground handlers to air traffic control must collaborate on resilience planning;

    3. Passengers must be promptly informed of their consumer rights when things go wrong and—if necessary—compensation in good time;

    4. Disabled and less mobile passengers must be given assistance they require;

    5. Safety and security must never be compromised.

    2. We have introduced new regulations on airport slots give airlines the tools to ensure that schedules are manageable and reduce flight disruption over the summer peak.

    3. We have strengthened industry-Government working, by establishing a new weekly strategic risk group, chaired by Ministers and attended by airline, airport and ground handler CEOs to ensure they are prepared for summer and can meet the schedules.

    4. We have established a weekly summer resilience group with airline, airport and ground handler operational directors to help them work through their pinch-points in the aviation system as they emerge and work collaboratively on solutions.

    5. We have established a joint Home Office and Department for Transport ministerial border group to identify and prepare for high levels of demand at the UK border.

    6. We have worked with the major airlines and airports to get weekly updates and assurances to Government that they can run their schedule of summer flights.

    7. We are working with international partners, neighbouring countries and EUROCONTROL, to ensure that disruption is minimised through co-ordinated planning and cooperation across airspace boundaries.

    8. We are undertaking a review of the ground handling market to seek out opportunities to improve quality and consistency of service.

    Supporting passengers

    1. We will launch a new aviation passenger charter, a one-stop guide for passengers informing them of their rights, responsibilities and what they can reasonably expect of the aviation industry when flying.

    2. We have worked with the CAA and industry to publish and promote guidance for passengers as part of a joint campaign of activity to communicate things they need to know and do when travelling by air this summer, helping to speed up processing time and reduce queues and delays.

    3. We have written to airlines to remind them of their legal responsibilities in providing information, care and assistance, refunds, and compensation.

    4. We are working with the CAA reviewing airlines current practices to ensure legal responsibilities in providing information, care and assistance, refunds, and compensation are being met and encouraging best practice.

    5. We intend to strengthen consumer protection for air passengers such as additional enforcement powers for CAA, our proposals are set out in the aviation consumer consultation.

    6. The CAA has written to airports to set out their plans for additional measures to improve provision of assistance to disabled and less mobile passengers and support the sector by providing guidance.

    Supporting industry to recruit, retain and train staff

    7. We changed the law so industry has more flexibility to train staff and allow them to deploy staff quickly and flexibly while maintaining security standards.

    8. We are launching a Generation Aviation campaign, working with industry to promote awareness of aviation careers and increase the number of people applying for jobs in the sector.

    9. We are working with the CAA to launch a £700,000 skills funding competition this autumn to support outreach across the sector and raise awareness of aviation careers to young people.

    10. We have launched the aviation skills recruitment platform to support skills retention and recruitment in the sector.

    11. We are building partnerships with colleges and universities to ensure students are attracted to and prepared for a career in aviation—and to support this we have launched the Talentview Aviation platform to connect students to aviation sector employers.

    12. We are working with the Department for Work and Pensions to promote aviation roles and recruitment via job centres and training for jobs coaches.

    13. We are delivering our Reach for the Sky outreach programme, supported by our aviation ambassadors to promote diversity, inclusion and accessibility in the sector.

    14. We introduced the airport and ground operations support scheme (AGOSS) to support commercial airports and ground operators with fixed costs, through £161 million in grants.

    There have been calls for a seasonal worker scheme to allow EU workers to fill vacant roles in our aviation sector. However, the Government are clear that more immigration is not an obvious solution. The aviation sector’s issues are not confined to the UK. Disruption is happening across the EU and in the USA due to staff shortages, and the Government are committed to building a robust and dependable domestic aviation industry, launching the aviation skills retention platform to help develop and hold onto UK workers. Similar schemes in other sectors experiencing shortages, such as the HGV sector, have not been widely used and have not significantly contributed towards a solution. Building a resilient, well-paid British workforce will prove a far more effective, sustainable and long-term solution.

    The Government have taken action to support the industry, now the sector itself needs to take the appropriate steps to ensuring they deliver realistic summer schedules, work together as an ecosystem, and put the consumer first.

  • James Cartlidge – 2022 Statement on Criminal Legal Aid

    James Cartlidge – 2022 Statement on Criminal Legal Aid

    The statement made by James Cartlidge, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice, in the House of Commons on 30 June 2022.

    In December the Independent Review of Criminal Legal Aid made clear the need for fee reform. Among a number of recommendations, the review called for an immediate pay increase of £135 million across the various criminal legal aid fee schemes. In response to these recommendations, in March, we consulted on proposals that would mark the most significant reform to criminal legal aid in more than a decade—and would include an additional investment of £135 million.

    Our reforms are twofold. First, addressing the immediate fee increase as called for by the representative bodies, and second, focusing on longer term systemic change. We took this approach precisely because we recognise the urgent need for fee reform, and so we can act swiftly and decisively in the interests of our criminal legal profession. We have been working hard to analyse the responses of all stakeholders, so all our decisions are rooted in evidence. We will be publishing our formal response in due course, but I can confirm that we will be implementing a fee increase of 15% across the majority of fee schemes.

    As set out in the consultation, there are a small number of schemes we are not uplifting at this stage. This includes the uplift to payment related to pages of prosecution evidence which the review found to encourage “perverse incentives”. We will be looking at how to address this as part of our longer term reforms and have set aside £20 million for those reforms initially. As well as reform to fee schemes we are considering wider issues, such as the potential roll-out of the successful “opt out” pilot for children, currently taking place at Brixton and Wembley police stations.

    We want to make sure practitioners get paid properly for all the work they do. So, in addition to increasing fees, we are extending the scope of payment for pre-charge engagement work to cover work done ahead of an agreement, or where an agreement is not reached, in appropriate cases, in line with the Attorney General’s disclosure guidelines. We also intend to abolish fixed fees where individuals elect to have their case heard at the Crown court, and go on to plead guilty. We will lay a statutory instrument by 21 July, which will bring these changes into effect on 30 September this year. Considering the parliamentary process and operational changes required to do this, this is the quickest we are able to deliver this uplift. Solicitors and barristers will start to receive increased fees this year and our modelling suggests that over two thirds of the additional funding will have entered the system within the first year.

    Our response to the longer term proposals, including details on the longer term funding and structural graduated fees schemes reform, will be published in the autumn, driven by the evidence in our consultation. Of course, we want to continue engaging with key stakeholders, including the Bar Council and Law Society as we develop our final policies. We are also considering the role of an advisory board as recommended by the review and plan to work closely with the Law Society and the Bar Council to design it with the intention of ensuring legal aid keeps pace with a modern justice system. Further details on the board including a terms of reference will be published in the autumn. If implemented, our longer term changes are good news for the criminal legal profession, helping us to build a sustainable sector that is fit for the future. Most importantly, they are good news for victims and everyone relying on the criminal justice system.

  • Sajid Javid – 2022 Statement on Gender Recognition Disclosure of Information

    Sajid Javid – 2022 Statement on Gender Recognition Disclosure of Information

    The statement made by Sajid Javid, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, in the House of Commons on 30 June 2022.

    Today, I have laid the Gender Recognition (Disclosure of Information) (England) Order 2022 in Parliament. This statutory instrument will make a minor change under the Gender Recognition Act (GRA) 2004 in order to facilitate the invaluable research being undertaken as part of Dr Hilary Cass independent review of gender identity services for children and young people (the Cass review).

    Under the Gender Recognition Act 2004, it is an offence for a person acting in an official capacity to disclose information about the gender history of a person with a gender recognition certificate (GRC). The Act calls this “protected information”, with some existing exemptions, such as where disclosure is to prevent or investigate crime, or the subject of the information agrees to the disclosure.

    The order I have laid today will add a further exemption to the GRA so that a closely defined class of people who facilitate, assist and carry out the research for the Cass review will be able to disclose protected information to each other during the course of their work. Without access to information currently protected under the Act, a significant portion of the available data on health outcomes would have to be removed from the study. This would subsequently prevent Dr Cass review from being able to provide robust recommendations rooted in the best available clinical evidence about how this care can best be provided.

    This data will allow us to plan the provision of these services from a world-leading clinical evidence base, to promote better health outcomes for those who use these important services. I firmly believe that this will help enable further debate on these issues to be informed by the best available clinical evidence which will better serve everyone, not least children.

    I remain committed to upholding the rights and privacy of transgender people, so this data will be carefully controlled. Only those working for a small number of organisations listed in the order and who are involved in the research will be able to access protected information and share it with each other. Furthermore, those within this closed circle will only be able to access and share the data if doing so is genuinely necessary in order to facilitate, assist or carry out research as part of the Cass review.

    As an additional safeguard, the order will expire after a period of five years which is the maximum amount of time that we believe the project will take. The order does not allow patient identifiable information to be made public through the course of this research, and any research outputs subsequently published will be fully anonymised.

  • Simon Clarke – 2022 Statement on the Customs Undervaluation Case

    Simon Clarke – 2022 Statement on the Customs Undervaluation Case

    The statement made by Simon Clarke, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, in the House of Commons on 30 June 2022.

    In March 2018, the European Commission launched infringement proceedings against the UK, alleging that between 2011 and 2017 the UK had failed to prevent undervaluation fraud involving importations of Chinese textiles and footwear, leading to approximately €2.7 billion of customs duty going uncollected. Since leaving the EU, the UK has continued to engage with these infringement proceedings as per the legal obligations set out in the withdrawal agreement. Throughout the case, the UK argued that we took appropriate steps to tackle the fraud in question and that the size and severity of the alleged fraud had been overstated. The UK has since taken proportionate and increased steps to combat this fraud without impacting legitimate trade, liquidating suspect traders through enforcement action, and substantially eliminating the illegitimate trade with significant investments in new inland customs infrastructure that opened in October 2017.

    On 8 March 2022, the CJEU published its judgment, finding against the UK on most liability points. Importantly however, the Court found that the European Commission overstated the size of its losses, by expanding its claim for losses prior to 2014 beyond those originally claimed and by ignoring action taken by the UK in raising assessments for the period from 2015 onwards. The judgment did not endorse the €2.7 billion claim, instead limiting the Commission’s claim for imports from 2011 to 2014 to the amount of certain customs assessments issued and cancelled in error and, for imports in the period January 2015 to 11 October 2017, instructing the European Commission to recalculate the figure. We understand this exercise to be under way and we have not yet received the Commission’s revised estimate of the liability. These calculations are likely to be complex.

    Following the judgment, the UK is liable for both outstanding customs duties and interest. This could potentially be 16% plus Bank of England base rate and accrues in the absence of any payment. With this in mind, and in order to protect UK taxpayers from significant continued interest accrual, the UK made a payment on 10 June 2022 to the European Commission of €678,372,885.63. This paid in full the amount due regarding cancelled customs assessments to the end of 2014 and, in respect of the subsequent period, represents the amount the UK considers due at this time, in light of the CJEU judgment, thereby stopping interest accruing on this amount. When the UK receives the Commission’s recalculation for the period 2015 to October 2017, we will examine their methodology closely and will not hesitate to reject any claim should we believe it to not be accurate or in line with the CJEU’s judgment, to ensure we protect UK taxpayers’ interests.