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  • Kevin Hollinrake – 2022 Speech on Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

    Kevin Hollinrake – 2022 Speech on Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

    The speech made by Kevin Hollinrake, the Conservative MP for Thirsk and Malton, in the House of Commons on 13 October 2022.

    It is a pleasure to speak in this debate and a particular pleasure to speak after the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge). She has done incredible work in this area for many years, for which we should pay tribute to her, and I hope she will continue for many years to do the same. I know that she has talked once or twice about hanging up her political boots—if the accommodation Whip is listening, I would very much like to inherit her office if she ever does—but nevertheless I hope she continues in Parliament for many years to come.

    On a more serious note, all hon. Members deal with tragic cases and I want to refer to a couple of mine. Leah Heyes was a 15-year-old girl whose life ended in a carpark in Northallerton in 2019. Andrew Bellerby took his own life aged 35 in 2015. The connection between those two tragic cases is, of course, drugs. Lia suffered an adverse reaction to her first experiment with ecstasy, and Andrew’s life had been devastated by drug dependency. We also try to help families in those tragic cases, who are trying to pick up the pieces and make the best of what has happened to them, by putting in place measures to stop such things happening again. Too often we look at ways to try to deal with suicide cases more effectively or clamping down on people who deal drugs, but that is treating the symptoms, not the causes.

    The causes are linked to economic crime. Many people will have watched the television series “Narcos”. The big cartels make a huge amount of money distributing the drugs that result in those tragic cases. They make so much that they bury hundreds of millions of pounds, because it is difficult to legitimise the money. They are not supposed to be able to pay that dodgy money into a bank or buy a yacht or a house with it, because questions should be asked about where the money has come from. Without the ability to launder the money, it is pointless perpetrating those horrendous crimes and being the linchpins behind those tragic cases.

    The reality, however, is that many of our large financial institutions facilitate the laundering of that money. In 2012, HSBC, which we regard as a trusted organisation, was fined £1.9 billion for laundering money for the Sinaloa cartel, which was run by El Chapo. It is incredible that that would happen, but the obvious reason it does is money. The banks can make huge amounts of money themselves. My friend the right hon. Member for Barking mentioned the Danske Bank case. Normally a regional branch of a bank would have a profit margin of about 20% on turnover. The Estonian branch of Danske Bank that dealt with the £200 billion of Russian kleptocrat money had a profit margin of 460%, and that huge amount of money was the incentive. It is inconceivable that the people at the top of HSBC and Danske Bank did not know what was going on. It is impossible to make such extraordinary profits without those at senior levels knowing what is going on. But time and again we simply fine the bank and do not hold the individuals to account.

    Drugs are not the only issue. Some of them are problems that we are trying to solve, such as the small boats crisis. Traffickers are making huge amounts of money and they need to be able to move that money around. Paul Stanfield, the head of economic crime at Interpol, says that it is all about the money and

    “If you want to tackle organised crime, you have to go after the money”.

    But the reality is that the UK makes all this easier. Because of some of our lax regulations on shell companies, which allow money to be hidden behind the veils of different companies in different jurisdictions, and because of the expertise in London and our overseas territories, the UK is the destination of choice for money laundering. The money may go to different places but it is laundered through London.

    That is why many of the measures in the Bill are welcome, including those on transparency and Companies House. This is a big job. It is not only new companies whose directors must be verified, but existing ones. That is millions of companies. The Minister has been excellent in engaging on these issues, as was the previous Security Minister, but I would like to understand how that will be achieved. We may be putting £63 million into Companies House, but verifying the identities of people who have significant control over organisations will be a big job.

    The resources going to Companies House need to be beefed up, and it makes sense to increase the very low fee of £12 for setting up a company in the UK to £50 or £100. I have set up quite a lot of companies in my time, and a fee of £50 or £100 would not have deterred me. That could increase resources to make sure that the enforcement happens. Too often, we look at innovation and legislation but we do not look closely enough at implementation. Without that, it is pointless having this debate. Implementation is key, and resources are key to that.

    We are bound to focus on measures that are not in the Bill—that is what Back Benchers do. I have said many times that the No. 1 measure we need is an extension of the failure to prevent provisions on bribery and tax evasion, which have been so effective. People say that we talk a lot and never get anything done, but the bribery provisions have been massive in holding corrupt companies to account. The Serious Fraud Office has deferred prosecution agreements for Rolls-Royce for Airbus, with almost £1 billion in fines going to the Treasury. The SFO also prosecuted the GPT Special Project Management Ltd case. The SFO does not get many successful convictions but GPT Special Project Management Ltd pleaded guilty in Southwark Crown court in 2020, and paid £28 million in financial forfeitures as a result, on the back of the Bribery Act 2010.

    I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Mary Robinson) for her work on whistleblowers. It is an area that the Bill does not cover at the moment, but I hope that the Minister will introduce more provisions. My constituent Ian Foxley blew the whistle in 2011, resulting in a conviction 10 years later. He was well paid, operating in the middle east for GPT, but he has had 11 years without any remuneration. He was earning probably £200,000 a year, so he is millions of pounds down. We do not protect or compensate whistleblowers, and that is wrong. Those people do the right thing and come forward but—not to put too fine a point on it —we hang them out to dry.

    Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)

    Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there is a grave injustice when those who have done the right thing have a lifetime loss of earnings of millions of pounds, but when crooked accountants are called up before and disciplined by the Financial Reporting Council, their loss of earnings from being suspended for a short time, which could run into millions of pounds, is taken into account? The sentence is often more lenient if it will have a significant financial impact on an accountant who has given false information to the FRC. It appears that the crooks are better treated than the people who try to bring them to justice.

    Kevin Hollinrake

    The hon. Gentleman makes a very interesting point. We need to clamp down on enablers of all kinds, and we need to get tougher in lots of ways to crack down on this in the way that we would all like to see. I know that provisions on whistleblowers will not be part of this Bill—although there may be amendments in Committee to that effect—but we want those brought forward as quickly as possible.

    The failure to prevent is so important. It has to include the ability to hold an individual director to account, which would start to reduce the incidence of money laundering and the facilitation of all kinds of offences, including the huge profits made from drug dealing. An illustration of this is what happened with health and safety legislation back in 1974, when directors were made individually responsible and could go to jail if they did not prevent or seek to prevent serious injuries on their building sites. It became a health and safety offence that could be pinned on the individual. After that happened, deaths and serious injuries dropped by 90%. Of all the measures we have talked about today, this would have the biggest effect in terms of cutting down on economic crime, because lots of our financial organisations are complicit when it suits their interests to be so.

    There are many other things we should do. We should extend what we did with unexplained wealth orders in terms of cost protection to other elements of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 such as property freezing orders and recovery orders. Bill Browder, who is very outspoken in these cases, has come up with an interesting idea. If an individual is sanctioned, anyone who has dealt with that individual—whether it be an accountant, a solicitor or anyone else—should have to hand over their records in connection with that individual to the authorities, so that we can track down the money more effectively. I cannot see a good argument against that.

    We have talked about freezing and seizing assets. That is difficult to do, because we have to prove that there was a crime, and we believe in property rights and the rule of law in the UK, so taking these assets off individual oligarchs is tough. One thing that seems like an open goal is the fact that we hold about £30 billion in Russian foreign currency reserves. It is clear that Russia is guilty of international crimes in its invasion of Ukraine. We could legislate to ensure that that money is not just frozen, as it is currently, but confiscated, seized and used to pay reparations to Ukraine.

    There are many other things we could do, which I will talk about further during the later stages of the Bill. I may well table one or two amendments, which I know Ministers will continue to engage with and, I hope, will look kindly on, because all these measures will clamp down on economic crime, which is good for the UK and good for business. It is not bad for the economy—it is good for the economy—and it will drive out these heinous crimes all around the world, not just in the UK. We will then be able to point proudly at our record on tackling economic crime, and I hope the Minister will take credit for that as this legislation passes through the House.

  • Margaret Hodge – 2022 Speech on Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

    Margaret Hodge – 2022 Speech on Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

    The speech made by Margaret Hodge, the Labour MP for Barking, in the House of Commons on 13 October 2022.

    It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Cheadle (Mary Robinson), who has been a passionate and strong advocate on behalf of whistleblowers and the very important part they play in fighting economic crime, money laundering and fraud.

    Many of us have waited with eager anticipation for the Bill that the Government promised would enable us to rid Britain of the influence of oligarchs and kleptocrats and of the cancer of money laundering, fraud and other economic crime. That is particularly true of the large and ever growing group of Back Benchers who are working together across the House on these issues. Although we all welcome the fact that the Bill is now before us, many of us deeply regret that, yet again, the Government have failed to demonstrate the strategic vision, determination and ambition that are plainly needed if we are to translate our shared aim into reality on the ground and convert our warm words on economic crime into real action. The Bill contains good and important changes, but it does not allow us to make the big leap forward that we need to systematically drive this pernicious and pervasive illegal activity out of our economy and our society.

    Let me remind Members why tackling economic crime really matters. Bluntly, the cost to the UK economy is immense. People have talked about the figure of £290 billion a year, but a recent study by the University of Portsmouth gives us a figure just short of £350 billion. The mind boggles. That is somewhere between a quarter and a third of total public spending every year. It is the enormity of the sums that gives the UK the shameful and dubious distinction of being the jurisdiction of choice for oligarchs, kleptocrats and criminals around the world—people who choose us to hide and launder their ill-gotten gains.

    Governments of both the main political parties have long championed the UK’s financial services, and the success of our financial services has contributed significantly to economic growth over recent decades. We boast of our professionals, our institutions, a trusted legal jurisdiction, the English language, an attractive property market and the lure of London as a place in which to live and work—all things that help to create a vibrant financial services sector. At the same time, though, our weak regulations, our woefully inadequate enforcement capability, our relationship with the UK tax havens in the Crown dependencies and overseas territories, our lack of transparency and our deficient accountability protocols have meant that it has become all too easy to wash the dirty money along with the clean here in Britain.

    The human impact of this is beyond awful. We have all seen the horrific, heartbreaking images of Putin’s vicious assault on Ukraine and the effect that it is having on innocent Ukrainians. However, we must face up to the understanding that the dirty cash is laundered and cleaned by Putin and his kleptocratic friends both in and through the UK. Ukraine is now paying the price for corruption and economic crime. We are helping to enable Putin’s assault. Our corporate structures, our lawyers, bankers, company service providers and accountants, and our links with places such as the British Virgin Islands all facilitate the accumulation of stolen wealth and power that helps to fuel the criminal onslaught on an independent nation and its people.

    We have allowed that to happen. It is an utterly appalling truth that, since Putin came to power more than 20 years ago, there has not been one single prosecution for economic crime launched against any individual Russian oligarch—not one. Similarly, the explosion of fraud in Britain has led to endless instances of misery and harm, which other Members have cited. The authorities, as my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary said, reported 5.1 million incidents of fraud in the year to September 2021, and we know that much fraud remains unreported. The published figure means that at least one in 11 adults were the victim of fraud in that year. People such as Len, who, at the age of 96 and with a proud record of service in the Army and a successful career as a chartered surveyor, was getting 600 scam communications a month. Although he did not keep track of his total losses, he knew that in one 10-day period he had spent and lost £600. It is the lack of enforcement action that contributed to Len’s misery and that has allowed fraud to spiral into the most common crime in Britain today.

    The Government are absolutely right to bring forward legislation. In fact, I would argue that if we do not eradicate money laundering, fraud and other economic crime we will cause lasting damage to our financial services sector, because we will lose our reputation as a trusted jurisdiction, and the plentiful supply of clean money across the world will go to other more reputable countries. We will lose business, not attract it. Britain can never enjoy sustained economic growth on the back of dirty money.

    I welcome the good and important changes the Bill will bring about when it is passed into law. The reform of Companies House, which other hon. Members have talked about, is warmly welcomed and hugely important. None of us wants more regulation, but we do need much smarter regulation, and that is what these provisions aim to achieve. We need to tackle and stop scandals such as the Danske Bank scandal, where an Estonian branch of the Danish bank allowed $8.3 billion of suspect payments to move through the bank using British registered companies. Many of those companies were limited liability companies, and we now know that 90% of the more than 800 limited liability companies involved in the scandal were set up by one rogue company service provider and registered at the same address in Birmingham. We need to stop the practices that meant that in the FinCEN files leaks 3,267 UK shell companies were named—more than in any other country. We need to tackle the reasons that led to Transparency International’s finding in a 2017 investigation that 766 UK shell companies were involved in corruption and money laundering cases worth up to £80 billion, with half of those 766 companies registered at just eight different addresses.

    Kevin Hollinrake

    The right hon. Lady is making a fantastic speech, and it is always a pleasure to listen to her and to work so closely with her from our respective positions on the Back Benches. She refers to Danske Bank; the total amount of money laundering through that Estonian branch was €200 billion, much of it Russian money from kleptocrats moving the money out of Russia. The bank has not been fined yet. It will probably get a fine of £2 billion or £3 billion, but the likelihood is that not a single individual will be held to account. That is absolutely wrong. Fines are seen as a cost of doing business. I know she agrees that we need to extend the failure to prevent an offence to include economic crime and things such as false accounting, and we must have individual directorial responsibility.

    Dame Margaret Hodge

    Hear, hear! I completely concur with the hon. Gentleman, and it is a real pleasure to work with him on all these matters. He is completely right. The interesting thing about Danske Bank is that, were there to be any prosecutions, they would not happen in the UK. They might happen in other jurisdictions, particularly America, but they will never happen in the UK because of the weakness of our enforcement agencies.

    The provisions in the Bill are essential to help tackle some of the wrongs in the examples I have given, but I hope the Minister will assure the House when he winds up the debate that he will seriously consider amendments that we intend to table to strengthen the reform of Companies House and prevent potential loopholes. I also welcome the proposals to allow organisations such as banks to share information where that could help to prevent or detect wrongdoing, and the proposals to treat cryptoassets just like cash or any other assets for the purposes of seizure and enforcement.

    However, the Bill too often tinkers with the challenges at the margin instead of boldly adopting a more holistic and systemic approach to bearing down on dirty money. For example, instead of proper and much-needed reform of the supervision of the professional enablers who are responsible for implementing anti-money laundering regulations, we get new cost caps for the Solicitors Regulatory Authority and new powers for the Legal Services Board—piecemeal reform, not systemic reform.

    Instead of reforming the present outdated criminal offences in relation to the responsibilities of companies and their directors to prevent economic crime, which the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) referred to, so that we can really hold those who enable, facilitate or collude with economic crime to account, we get new pre-investigation powers for the Serious Fraud Office—important, but piecemeal reform. Instead of a systemic reform of the broken suspicious activity reports regime, we tinker at the edges by reforming part of the regime, the defence against money laundering SARs—again necessary, but yet another example of the piecemeal approach being taken.

    Not only does the Bill tinker at the edges; it also fails to address key matters that are all vital to a comprehensive approach to preventing, detecting and punishing money launderers and fraudsters. Where are the proposals to seize, as well as freeze, the assets taken from sanctioned individuals and states? We want the money that Putin and his kleptocratic cronies stole from Russia to be used to fund the reconstruction of Ukraine. We need similar powers to those that already exist in other European countries such as Italy and in nations across the world such as Canada.

    Where are the proposals for a sustainable funding regime for the enforcement agencies, so that they can use the powers they have? For instance, as the hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) stated, the cost of registering a new company with Companies House is a mere £12. It would still be a bargain at £50 or £100, with the extra income ringfenced to fund Companies House properly.

    Where are the proposals to do away with the requirement that our enforcement agencies pick up the tab for the legal costs incurred by individuals who succeed in resisting a prosecution for economic crime? The US enforcement agencies, which are far more successful in securing convictions, do not have to pay the costs of the person prosecuted if they lose a case. We should follow that example. Our system acts as a brake on our enforcement agencies. They fear the financial costs of losing, so they fail to prosecute aggressively, and because of that fraudsters, criminals and money launderers get away with awful actions.

    Where are the proposals, which the hon. Member for Cheadle called for in her contribution, to protect the brave whistleblowers on whom we are so dependent? Where are the proposals to ensure accountability to Parliament and the public, so that we can see whether our reforms deliver? Where are the proposals to tackle the abuse of our defamation laws by oligarchs who want to silence those of us wanting to hold them to account? Where are the proposals to close the loopholes on transparency for trusts and the ownership of land, which continue to act as secret ways to launder money into or through the UK? Where are the reforms to the SARs regime, to the supervision of AML supervision or to corporate criminal liability laws?

    In the wake of the 7/7 attack in Britain, we treated the reform of counter-terrorism as a mission requiring strong and comprehensive action, and we are now rightly proud of our capabilities in that area. The war in Ukraine should be our 7/7 moment in the battle to eradicate dirty money. It has helped us to understand the horrors that allowing illicit finance to infect our financial services sector, our economy and our society can bring, both at home and abroad.

    This Bill is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to put things right. We cannot and must not waste it. I look forward to working with my colleagues across the House and with Ministers in Government to achieve our shared and crucial objective: to show that we are a country that consistently demonstrates zero tolerance for all illicit finance and is determined to grow a strong, trusted financial services sector in a jurisdiction that boasts the smartest regulation, first-class enforcement of the rules, maximum transparency and strong accountability. There lies the way to economic growth.

  • Mary Robinson – 2022 Speech on Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

    Mary Robinson – 2022 Speech on Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

    The speech made by Mary Robinson, the Conservative MP for Cheadle, in the House of Commons on 13 October 2022.

    It is a pleasure to be called to speak on Second Reading of this important Bill.

    To maintain the UK’s role and reputation as an international banking and business hub, we must have a transparent system with robust defences against money laundering and fraud, backed up by legislation. As we have heard, the Bill introduces vital reforms to Companies House and to limited partnerships. It also brings forward measures to ensure that law enforcement is equipped to handle the modern challenge of cryptoassets. We have to keep pace with the inevitable changes that result from the development and recognition of cryptocurrency as it moves from niche technology to the mainstream. It is a policy area that poses a unique challenge to law enforcement, with constantly evolving technology creating intangible assets that are largely unregulated and increasingly used to hide and move the proceeds of crime and enable malign states.

    The value of losses from crypto-related scams reported to Action Fraud more than doubled over the previous year to £190 million in 2021. All fraud costs the UK economy £190 billion annually, with money laundering constituting an additional £100 billion.

    This is money from hard-working individuals and businesses taken by criminals and used to perpetrate wars and terrorism, and technology is only making that easier for them. The Bill’s stated objective, which I welcome, is as follows:

    “Strengthen the UK’s broader response to economic crime, in particular by giving law enforcement new powers to seize cryptoassets and enabling businesses in the financial sector to share information more effectively to prevent and detect economic crime.”

    Increased powers will bolster the National Crime Agency and Serious Fraud Office, as well as the regulatory bodies, and are welcome. However, the Bill misses an opportunity to refer to and support the important role of whistleblowers in the fight against financial crime. The impact assessment produced by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy references PricewaterhouseCoopers’ global economic crime and fraud survey 2022, which found that the UK has a higher than average proportion of serious fraud carried out by an external perpetrator at 57% versus 39% globally. It notes that fighting external perpetrators is distinct from handling internal fraud, with external forces being “immune” to traditional fraud detection and prevention tools—including workplace frameworks and whistleblowing procedures.

    The Government are in the process of reviewing whistleblowing guidance, which is welcome. However, the reality is that existing legislation applies only to employees— not to contractors, trustees, volunteers or many others who might hold vital information. It is estimated that just over 40% of fraud is detected through whistleblowing tips, and only half of those disclosures come from employees.

    By their very nature, money laundering and economic crime are more often than not linked to serious organised crime gangs and hostile states. Without adequate protections, the stakes for an informed insider blowing the whistle are simply too high. With cryptoassets existing outside the realm of a centralised or governed system, it is unlikely that anyone with information about financial crime involving them will be employees, and therefore they will not be covered by the provisions of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, which is the one that oversees the protections of whistleblowers.

    If protections are not to be afforded in this Bill, I hope the Government will support the aims of the all-party group on whistleblowing, which I chair, to create an office of the whistleblower to provide overarching protection for the very people we need to speak out and uncover the criminal activities that this Bill aims to curtail.

    I welcome this important Bill, and I know that it will receive support. There are changes that could be considered, particularly with regards to whistleblowing, so I look forward to seeing the Bill go through to Committee.

  • Alison Thewliss – 2022 Speech on Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

    Alison Thewliss – 2022 Speech on Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

    The speech made by Alison Thewliss, the SNP MP for Glasgow Central, in the House of Commons on 13 October 2022.

    I am glad to follow the right hon. Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds), whom I believe was the Minister who said he was not happy with the progress that had been made on tackling economic crime thus far. None of us in this place are happy about the situation on economic crime.

    SNP Members of course welcome this Bill, which is overdue. Many of its aspects could have been picked up in legislation years ago. Members of the anti-corruption coalition across the House have been clear in calling for more action from the UK Government on this, and all this delay has cost us very dearly; openDemocracy believes that economic crime across these islands costs us £290 billion a year—just think of the services we could all be enjoying if that money were not being plundered by those people engaging in economic crime. As with all things around dirty money, we have to ask: who benefits from this? Who benefits from action not having been taken for all these years? There is much to be done, and the panoply of agencies involved must be properly co-ordinated and resourced to tackle it.

    This is a big Bill and there is a lot more that could be said. My not saying something in particular now does not discount my saying something about it later, when the Bill goes into Committee. I thank everybody who has sent briefings ahead of this Bill, because that has been incredibly useful.

    The UK Government must go after not only those committing economic crimes, but those enabling it. Robust supervision and proper deterrents need to be in place for those responsible for economic crime. Directors and enablers of economic crime need to face proportionate sanctions, and effective anti-money laundering supervision needs to be carried out consistently across sectors. Legislation on economic crime needs to be futureproofed, as a failure to ensure that means that legislators are always playing catch-up with criminals. We see that particularly in the field of crypto.

    As Companies House reform is a significant part of this Bill, I will start with a few red flags from the UK Government that I would like to deal with straight up. Having lots of companies on the Companies House register is not the win that Ministers often seem to think it is, mainly because a good chunk of the register is absolute guff. It is like a kid in the playground with an impressive looking pile of football stickers for swapsies; but instead of getting an easy trade for the Kevin van Veen of your dreams, you find that the kid has a pile of doublers, triplers, old stickers from previous seasons, stickers from rugby and cricket, a few with Stormtroopers on and some they have drawn themselves. Sorting out that pile of stickers is pretty easy, but sorting out the millions of companies on the Companies House register is a much tougher task. Even the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy impact assessment, which I would draw everybody’s attention to, hints at the difficulty in unpicking the duplicates from the system. It is riddled with error, never mind the impact of those using it for nefarious purposes.

    Having looked myself up on the register, it appears that I am on it three times; three different Alison Thewlisses exist out there in the world—just imagine that! The register believes I am three separate people, rather than the same person having been a director at different points in my life. The Home Secretary, who, disappointingly, has disappeared out of this place before hearing from the third party in this House, is on the register in her own name and in her maiden name, with no link to suggests that we are talking about the same person. The BEIS Secretary is on it as the director of 11 companies with his surname hyphenated and a further three companies with it unhyphenated. I am unclear what the process is by which Companies House will set about tidying up this basic type of messiness within its register. It should not just be put on individuals to fix this; there needs to be some mechanism by which it is all corrected.

    The new objectives being given to Companies House are welcome—they are a step up from its being a passive recipient of duff information—but it is unclear how exactly they will work. The querying power must be a wider, separate piece of work to pick through in detail the existing register and figure out what is actually valid, rather than relying on helpful citizens such as Oliver Bullough, Graham Barrow, Richard Smith and David Leask to report in their concerns, as they often do.

    Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)

    There is, of course, only one Alison Thewliss. She mentioned Graham Barrow as one of a number of exceptional individuals who do a lot to expose the kind of things going on at Companies House that it should really be doing. I do not know whether she has followed his Twitter account recently. On 10 October, he tweeted that Companies House had just accepted the registration of a business called “Legat Business Limited”, which has a single director, called “Andrei Perezhogin”. His nationality is “Russian”, his place of residence is “Russia”, and he describes his occupation as “Men”. He claims to have set up this company with £100 million of capital. Does she share my alarm that it appears that a Russian living in Russia can invest £100 million in a British company and—this is without the powers in this Bill—nobody at Companies House thinks anything of it?

    Alison Thewliss

    I absolutely agree and share my hon. Friend’s concerns. Graham Barrow does great work on Twitter and in other places to highlight such scenarios. Whether or not that person exists, whether or not that company is valid, and whether that money is even being invested anywhere, never mind in this company—this exposes the nature of the garbage in the Companies House register. The Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the hon. Member for Watford (Dean Russell) should consider what he intends to do about that situation, because the register also contains abusive names and people being registered when they do not know they have been registered. How do such people go about correcting the register where companies have been registered in this way without their knowledge or consent? Home addresses are being used although the person who lives there has no knowledge that their address has been used until a whole wheen of paperwork from Companies House arrives at their door. These things are being regularly exposed; they should not come as news or as any surprise to Companies House or to Ministers in this place. In the interim between this Bill making progress through the House and its eventually coming into force, what will happen to stop these “companies”? They are among the thousands of companies registered every week at Companies House.

    The power to query company names where people might be setting them up to impersonate another company or for criminal purposes stands in contrast with the continued objective to allow companies to turn around their registration in 24 hours. There is a substantial industry in creating fake but similar names, and then using those companies to rip off the public. Without a vast increase in staffing in Companies House to assess and sense-check all these applications coming in, it seems that many will continue to slip through the net, even after these reforms. I suggest to the Minister that perhaps it would be better to build in a slightly longer application period to allow proper verification to take place. It is unclear—I seek confirmation from the Minister—whether the verification that is being referred to will be though the existing UK Government verify scheme used for passports, driving licences and tax returns, or whether a separate verification scheme will used. Using the existing schemes seems to work reasonably well for passports, driving licences and tax returns, and I am not aware of any particular issues being flagged for those—if there are, I shall stand corrected.

    The BEIS impact assessment dismisses the opportunity to verify the link between directors or persons of significant control and their companies. Again, this should be changed. Furthermore, we have a golden opportunity here to clamp down on opaque ownership structures and I cannot understand why the Government would not want to do so. The Bill must bring in provisions that prevent all companies from being controlled by opaque offshore entities, which do not need to disclose information on their owners or structures because of where they are based.

    I still seek to understand from the Ministers why Companies House cannot be an anti-money laundering supervisor in its own right; this is a huge gap within the system. The Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision has had mixed results in holding the AML supervisors under its wing to account; professional bodies have not done all they can to interrogate their members. That would perhaps fall into the area of a failure to prevent offence. Culpable directors, senior managers and other enablers of economic crime, including professional enablers, need to face sanctions, and rules on AML supervision need to be applied consistently. That is not currently happening.

    The non-governmental organisation Spotlight on Corruption noted that there are 22 industry bodies that currently oversee AML compliance in the legal and accountancy sectors. In 2021, OPBAS found that just 15% of supervisors were effective in using predicable and proportionate supervisory action; 85% were not. It also found that just 19% had implemented an effective risk-based approach to supervision. This disjointed approach to tackling money laundering is just not working: it is allowing too many to sail through the net.

    In the UK, an estimated £88 billion of dirty money is cleaned by criminals every year, compared with the lesser, but still significant, amounts of €54.5 billion in France and €51.53 billion in Germany. To tackle the issue, it is vital that support is offered to smaller firms, which are often targeted by those who wish to engage in money laundering, criminality and other illicit activities, to enable such companies to spot red flags in respect of potential clients.

    It is beyond me why the UK Government allow the verification process for company registration to be carried out by company formation agents when they are the very bodies that have to a large extent created the problem that the Government are trying to solve. As the Home Office report “National risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing 2020” pointed out:

    “Company formation and related professional services are…a key enabler or gatekeeper of TBML”—

    trade-based money laundering. We should be reducing their power, not endorsing it.

    Under the Bill, all third-party agents who set up a company on behalf of someone else will be required only to declare that the information they are providing on behalf of that person has been verified. I return to my verification question: what is the system for that? Without giving Companies House the ability to carry out independent checks to ascertain whether the “verified” third-party information is correct, it is just going to become a box-ticking exercise. The verification requirement in itself has no teeth and is unlikely to lead to any material change in how third-party agents carry out that key verification process.

    Before I leave Companies House, I should say that I am deeply disappointed that the UK Government seem to show no willingness to increase the ridiculously low company registration fee: £10 or £12 is nothing in the scheme of things. In Germany the equivalent fee is €400, and in the Netherlands it is around €52; I am sure the Minister would regard neither country as anti-business. Having a low fee is not the benefit that Ministers seem to think it is. I am open-minded as to what the figure ought to be, but in its economic crime report the Treasury Committee agreed that £100 would be perfectly reasonable and give Companies House more resources to deal with the huge challenges it faces.

    Improving relations between Companies House and the various law enforcement agencies is welcome. The Treasury Committee report on economic crime called the landscape “bewildering” and noted that both co-ordination and economic crime itself should be higher priorities for the Government. The scale of the issue is outlined in the BEIS impact assessment, with law enforcement referrals to Companies House rising from 1,400 per annum in 2015 to 9,300 in 2021. Given that we have heard how little economic crime is actually prosecuted, this feels like the tip of a very large iceberg.

    With talk of future austerity and cuts, it is important that the UK Government invest in the enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute economic crime. It is a specialist area and it requires well-paid specialist staff to tackle this scourge. The Scottish crime campus at Gartcosh is a great example of both efficiency and inter-agency working, but it can do this only if properly funded. A further round of Westminster austerity puts it all at risk.

    I feel like I have been raising Scottish limited partnerships forever, and I have no hesitation about doing so again. Because SLPs hold legal personality and can possess property, they have become a very popular mechanism. The BEIS analysis was quite stark: between 2010 and 2016 they had a growth rate—one that the Government would love—of 459%. That alone should have set off alarm bells from Companies House to the Government Front Bench, but nothing terribly much happened for a long time. BEIS figures also state that as of 31 March 2021, SLPs made up 64% of all limited partnerships on the Companies House register. If we compare that with the fact that companies registered in Scotland make up just 5% of companies in the UK, we can see that something is badly out of whack.

    SLP registrations have plateaued since the rules were tightened, but they have not gone away. They have also continued to be implicated in money laundering, arms running and sanctions busting, including in respect of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. They are set up with partners in secrecy jurisdictions, with companies named as persons of significant control, which is against the rules. Linking to an actual person with an actual address would be progress, as would limiting the number of times that an address or person could be a company director. To date, enforcement and fines for breaching the rules that the Government themselves set up have been few and far between. There is little point in having rules that are just not enforced.

    As I have pointed out before in this place, there are also knock-on effects to our neighbours in Ireland. As there has been a slight tightening of the rules here, registrations of Irish limited partnerships have soared. What conversations has the Minister had with his counterparts in the Republic to ensure that we are not just shifting criminal activity from here to there? All possible co-operation must be undertaken to avoid criminals shifting their business over the sea.

    I wish to ask about the links with other legislation that is currently going through this place. The Financial Services and Markets Bill has a significant section on the regulation of cryptocurrencies, which have become incredibly popular with organised crime incredibly quickly, as a means of shifting money as well as of scamming naive members of the public. It is unclear how the legislation before us interacts with that Bill and the halo effect that might be created by the regulation of certain cryptoassets but not others.

    When the Treasury Committee took evidence on the Online Safety Bill—which has disappeared but will hopefully come back at some stage—we were concerned about crimes being carried out via the internet and social media platforms. Currently, the banks of those who are scammed have to pay up, but the social media companies themselves are not held accountable. For example, scams conducted over Instagram or Facebook Marketplace, scam messages sent over WhatsApp and unregulated financial advice given via platforms like TikTok are not currently covered. They should be given an awful lot more attention.

    I was glad to hear from the Home Secretary that there have been some conversations with the Scottish Government about the implications of this legislation in Scotland, because Scots law is, of course, a devolved area. Registers of Scotland administers the register of persons holding a controlled interest in land, which was launched on 1 April and shows who controls the decisions of owners or tenants of land and property in Scotland. I would like a bit more information from the Government about the conversations they have had with Registers of Scotland and the interaction with the register of oversees entities. Scotland did not hang around waiting for the UK Government to make legislation on this issue; we got on with the job.

    I look forward to tabling amendments to try to improve this Bill, and I really hope that for once the Government will listen and be constructive on some of the issues we raise. We would not be in the situation we are in today had they done so during the debates on the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill or umpty other bits of legislation over the years. We are all clear in this place that robust supervision and proper deterrents need to be in place for those responsible for economic crime.

    We on the SNP Benches are looking forward to independence and setting up our own robust systems to register companies and to prevent economic crime. Nobody would choose the UK system as it stands, and it remains to be seen whether it can be adequately repaired.

  • Damian Hinds – 2022 Speech on Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

    Damian Hinds – 2022 Speech on Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

    The speech made by Damian Hinds, the Conservative MP for East Hampshire, in the House of Commons on 13 October 2022.

    I support this important Bill, which seeks to tackle this most international of criminal problems. The scale of global financial crime is mind-boggling, accounting for up to 5% of gross world product and, depending on which estimate we look at—we cannot say absolutely for certain—worth between $2 trillion and $5 trillion. On an optimistic view, the confiscation rate runs at around 1%.

    Economic crime is sometimes thought of as being in a separate category from other crime but, no, it is part of those other crimes. There is a particularly close link between fraud and cyber-crime. Money laundering, fraud and cyber-crime collectively—distance crime—make up the majority of crime by volume in this country. More broadly, virtually all crime with a financial motivation touches on money laundering at some level. There is a mix of organised crime groups pulling off huge cyber-crimes, down to individually small but cumulatively very large-volume frauds. Some groups have undergone a sort of vertical integration, controlling every part of the chain; others specialise in one particular part of the chain, such as ransomware as a service. There is a merging of criminal actors with a nexus to states. Then, of course, there are the kleptocrats who got filthy rich on plunder from their fellow citizens.

    There is a huge amount that needs to be done in this area. Much of it needs to be done globally, but countries such as ours need to be in the lead. The world has made quite some progress in this area, and in key aspects we have been a leader, but we have also had our lacunae. High on that list is transparency about who is really behind and ultimately benefits from corporate structures and economic assets.

    For some time, we have had a substantial and, in many ways, effective architecture to tackle money laundering, but there is an important question whether the suspicious activity reports regime is sufficiently efficient, and whether it is focused enough to make the most difference while minimising dead-weight. There is also the question whether we are fully harnessing the power and capabilities of banks, particularly if we compare our legislation with section 314(b) of the American Patriot Act. Should there be more direct intelligence sharing between banks, and if so, how do we manage the competition policy aspects of that? Finally, however much we improve and innovate, the criminals are doing the same, with ever more sophisticated technology, and they are increasingly bypassing the systems that we have been used to in the past by using cryptocurrency and cryptoassets.

    The most important thing about the Bill is that it moves to plug the transparency gap, with reforms to Companies House and limited partnerships as its backbone. It modernises seizure by bringing cryptoassets into scope of the civil forfeiture powers, and it moves from a compliance-driven anti-money laundering system to one that is more proactive and intelligence-led, with rationalised SARs and DAML—defence against money laundering—requirements.

    I welcome all the aspects of the Bill, but especially the information-sharing provisions, and in particular their broad scope to include all types of economic crime, including, importantly, volume fraud. I ask the Home Secretary and the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Watford (Dean Russell), to really test whether these powers go as far as they productively can. I press not just the Home Office and BEIS Ministers we have here today, but the Treasury, regulators and the private sector, to come together to ensure that we link up the different parts of our financial services sector and the wider professional services sector to best effect.

    Information and intelligence sharing could be so much more powerful if we reformed the way that payments are made so that in certain circumstances, where suspicious activity is detected, it is possible to slow down or pause payments and use the system not just to track down money laundering payments or fraudulent payments after the fact, but to stop them happening before the fact. That could be a genuine game changer. As I say, I strongly encourage the two excellent Ministers present today to communicate with the Treasury and others about that.

    I support the Bill and I wish Ministers well with it. It is of course part of a wider set of reforms that includes the sanctions regime, the creation of the National Economic Crime Centre, the kleptocracy cell, the overall economic crime plan, and, importantly, our international work with like-minded partners, the Financial Action Task Force, and the Crown dependencies and overseas territories. The reform of visas, which came up, is part of this too, and of course we recently passed the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. There will be more to come, I am sure, including on corporate criminal liability.

    Kevin Hollinrake rose—

    Damian Hinds

    On that point, I give way to my hon. Friend.

    Kevin Hollinrake

    I am very supportive of that, as my right hon. Friend knows, but I rise to make another point. He mentioned that putting some friction in the payments system might reduce instances of economic crime. At the moment, banks are refunding a much higher proportion of authorised push payment fraud, but all the onus is on the sending bank. Nothing is reimbursed by the receiving bank, yet it is the receiving bank where the dodgy account is held. Does he agree that we should look at that and create an incentive for the companies that host those bank accounts to tackle it more effectively?

    Damian Hinds

    I do think we need to look at this more closely, although it is even more complex than my hon. Friend suggests, because we get this ping-on system as well, where a body can be both a receiving bank and a sending bank, and so be a sort of transmission mechanism. We certainly need to look at this more broadly. Madam Deputy Speaker might get cross with me if I try to unpack it too much now, because it is a broader subject. However, as my hon. Friend rightly mentioned, we also have to address the questions of who is liable and how much of the liability now sits within the banking sector, full stop, as opposed to other parts of the consumer interface—different channels through which people come—that might reasonably be expected to share some of that burden too and be properly incentivised.

    I am going to close my remarks by saying that these reforms are important and they are not in tension with the success of our financial services sector—quite the reverse. These reforms are about enhancing the reputation of both British financial services and, more broadly, the UK and our reliance on and respect for the rule of law. They are about protecting and growing our business; and doing the right thing, ceding no space to the criminals and the kleptocrats. In the unlikely event that we divide this afternoon, I will be proud to vote “Aye” for this Bill.

  • Eluned Morgan – 2022 Statement on Progress Implementing the Out of Hospital Cardiac Arrest Plan

    Eluned Morgan – 2022 Statement on Progress Implementing the Out of Hospital Cardiac Arrest Plan

    The statement made by Eluned Morgan, the Minister for Health and Social Services, on 14 October 2022.

    On 16 October, we mark Restart a Heart Day. Save a Life Cymru and its partners will be encouraging us to learn more about life-saving cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR), using defibrillators and knowing how to help when someone has a cardiac arrest.

    I want to use this opportunity to provide Members with a further update about progress to implement the Out of Hospital Cardiac Arrest Plan and Save a Life Cymru’s work.

    The Out of Hospital Cardiac Arrest Plan was launched in 2017 and we established the Save a Life Cymru partnership that brings together organisations across Wales to help develop the Welsh public’s CPR and defibrillation skills so people feel confident to help if they witness someone experiencing an out-of-hospital cardiac arrest. Last year we increased the funding for this life saving programme.

    Earlier this month a new save a Life Cymru campaign was launched. ‘Help is closer than you think’ (Cofia, mae help wrth law) which focuses on increasing people’s confidence to intervene in a cardiac arrest emergency by highlighting the importance of calling 999 immediately, as well as the support provided by the call handler to do CPR and locate a registered defibrillator until an ambulance arrives. A TV, radio and social media advertisement went live from Monday 10 October.

    Save a Life Cymru has recruited a clinical out-of-hospital cardiac arrest programme manager who is developing an all Wales CPR and defibrillator framework to help communities become rescue ready and have the right resources in the right place to help someone having a cardiac arrest. It has also recruited four Save a Life Cymru community support coordinators, one of whom is already in post, and it is hoped the remainder will be in post before the end of November. They are also currently advertising for two Save a Life Cymru community support team leader posts.

    Save a Life Cymru is working with a range of organisations to support people of all ages and backgrounds to learn CPR and defibrillation skills, including:

    • Continuing to develop their partnership with the Football Association of Wales to broaden the reach of teaching CPR in Wales.
    • Following a successful pilot, Cardiff University has rolled out its model for all medical students who are trained in CPR to train all first year students.
    • Supporting One Voice Wales, which represents community and town councils, employing a person to co-ordinate CPR and defibrillator activity in communities across Wales, including ensuring defibrillators are registered and in good working order.
    • Appointing, in conjunction with Cardiff Metropolitan University, a post-doctoral research fellow who will develop research projects to initiate improvements in Out of Hospital Cardiac arrest outcomes in Wales
    • Partnering with Ospreys Rugby medical team to help raise awareness of CPR and defibrillation among its audiences.
    •  Producing a bilingual educational leaflet to support community CPR
    • Providing CPR training at the Welsh Government stand in some national events such as the Urdd Eisteddfod and Royal Welsh Show
    • Supporting Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board (BCUHB) to produce a bilingual Primary School resource, supported by BSL, which teaches children the sequence of CPR through song and dance.

    During 2021/22 I announced a further £1m to purchase 1,000 additional defibrillators which community groups and public organisation across Wales were able to apply for.  638 groups and organisations successfully applied for a defibrillator and so far about 238 have been installed in communities across Wales. There have been some delays in groups being able to purchase and install the cabinets so defibrillators are still being distributed.

    Communities and organisations which already have defibrillators are being encouraged to register them on The Circuit – more than 7164 are registered and now 72% have a guardian. We have seen a significant increase in the number registered and in the percentage with a guardian but there is still more work to be done.

    Additionally, the Welsh Ambulance Service partnered with GoodSAM app to improve mobilisation of clinically trained staff and volunteers to life-threatening emergency calls. So when an emergency call is received by the ambulance service and classified to be of a life-threatening nature, details will automatically be sent through to the GoodSAM app to alert the nearest approved volunteer responder. They will shortly be relaunching the GoodSAM app in Wales, which was paused during the pandemic, and this will open up being a GoodSAM responder to all eligible individuals who have signed up and been approved by GoodSAM and partner organisations. This will be a huge step forward in Wales.

    We have made substantial progress over the course of the last twelve months and have heard stories of the differences this work is making to people’s lives. We know that every second counts when someone goes into cardiac arrest. We can all help raise awareness of the importance of dialling 999 and giving early CPR and defibrillation.

  • Alok Sharma – 2022 Final Speech as COP26 President

    Alok Sharma – 2022 Final Speech as COP26 President

    The speech made by Alok Sharma, the COP26 President, at the Wilson Centre in Washington DC on 14 October 2022.

    Good morning everyone. It’s a pleasure to be here.

    I want to start by thanking Ambassador Green, and Ambassador Quinville, for the warm welcome that I’ve had here at the Wilson Center.

    I want to reflect back to nearly a year ago when the world came together, and we forged together the historic Glasgow Climate Pact.

    I have to say that what we agreed in that Pact went further than actually many people had imagined was possible.

    Thanks to the commitments made, both inside and indeed outside the negotiating rooms, by both the public and private sector, we left Glasgow with what I described at the time as a fragile win.

    The pulse of 1.5 degrees remained alive.

    And we did this against the backdrop of an increasingly fractious geopolitics, and we had nearly 200 countries come together to join forces in the face of a shared global challenge.

    Now almost a year on, it is just 23 days to COP27, the end of the UK’s COP Presidency, and the end of my time as COP President.

    And the transition to Egypt’s Presidency is coming at a profoundly challenging juncture in our current geopolitics.

    Vladimir Putin’s brutal and illegal war in Ukraine has precipitated multiple global crises: from energy and food insecurity, to inflationary and debt pressures around the world.

    These crises are absolutely compounding existing climate vulnerabilities, and of course, then the scarring effects of a once-in-a-century pandemic.

    But as serious as these crises are, we must also recognise a seismic structural shift that is underway.

    Our global political economy, built on fossil fuels for the last century, is in a state of flux.

    Concurrently, leaders and their citizens around the world are dealing with spiralling climate impacts.

    Climate catastrophes are becoming more frequent, and sadly they are becoming more ferocious.

    In recent months, as you know, an area the size of the United Kingdom has flooded in Pakistan, with death, disease and the displacement of millions of people following in the water’s wake.

    The reality is that these events are becoming increasingly connected.

    Extreme drought and heat, for example, amplify the drivers of migration, of supply chain fragility, and with significant disruption to major economic sectors, not least global grain production.

    And so I have to say this to you that this is no longer something that happens to other people, somewhere far away.

    Right here in the US, in recent weeks, Hurricane Ian has battered the East Coast.

    There are serious concerns about defending the Eastern seaboard, and the genuine possibility that entire cities will have to relocate away from the coast in our lifetimes.

    Earlier this summer, the Colorado River, which generates power for tens of millions of Americans and is a lifeblood for agriculture, was placed in an unprecedented state of emergency, due to falling water levels.

    So the future that scientists and climate activists have long warned us about, and which has frankly been a reality for some of the most climate vulnerable countries for decades, is now a reality for many millions. It is a reality for us in this room.

    And as the science continues to tell us unfortunately: the worst is yet to come.

    Catastrophe for many millions more lives and livelihoods.

    Costs soaring into the trillions.

    And entire sectors becoming stretched, and uninsurable.

    There was a report from the Australian Climate Council Study that came out this June that concluded that 1 in 25 Australian homes will become effectively uninsurable by 2030. 1 in 25.

    So friends, we are in a new world.

    And navigating this context is our defining challenge.

    And frankly, it is a challenge that we will rise to, or fall short of, in this decisive decade.

    And so today, from the vantage point of the ending of my time as COP President, I want to take stock of where we are.

    And I want to start by recognising, and indeed championing, the fact that, in some quarters, outstanding work is being done to cement the gains of the Glasgow Climate Pact, and to take us further.

    We are now part of an irreversible direction of travel.

    Yes, there is still oil, gas and coal in use and production around the world.

    But around half a decade ago, we passed a tipping point, when annual newly installed power from renewables surpassed that from coal, across the OECD.

    And estimates suggest that by the middle of this decade, renewable capacity is expected to be up 60 percent on 2020 levels.

    And leaders are across the world increasingly turning to renewables to guarantee cheaper, cleaner, and more secure power for their populations.

    We have the Inflation Reduction Act here in the US. Countries like Australia are back on the frontline of the fight against climate change.

    India has published a strengthened emissions reduction target, its 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution.

    And as you heard I was just in Kenya, whose remarkable geothermal potential is truly a vision of a cleaner future.

    Now people in my country talk about nuclear or fossil as baseload, but geothermal is doing that job in countries like Kenya.

    The plant I visited, Olkaria, was already producing 1 gigawatt of power. Kenya has the potential for ten times more geothermal power.

    And indeed if you look along that rift, there are many other countries that have potential as well.

    Now businesses are also stepping up. They are reimagining ways of working on sustainability, rather than plastics, pollution and waste.

    Just last week you will have seen that the world’s biggest reinsurer and underwriter to nearly a quarter of the global economy, Munich Re, turned its back on oil and gas.

    And civil society, represented in this room as well, is embracing the power of the collective, to make clear that it simply will not accept anything less than a net zero future.

    Now, in all of this work, we are realising the growth story of this century.

    A growth story that can deliver millions of green jobs in this decade, and economic development benefits.

    A story in which collective action and rapidly increasing scale deliver vast benefits in terms of cost and innovation.

    I mean just look at the extraordinary fall in the cost of renewables from which we are already benefiting.

    Solar costs down 80 percent since 2010.

    Wind power costs down by up to three-quarters since their peak just over ten years ago.

    And all whilst we have experienced the largest ever annual increase in the price of wholesale gas.

    And have a look at the sort of innovations that could see parked cars feeding energy back into the grid, or the electric cable cars I used to move around on my visit to Mexico City earlier this year.

    And it is a future of hope, in which our cities become more liveable, and more breathable, our energy becomes cheaper, and cleaner, and our ecosystems become more robust.

    But, despite all of this, I do find myself reflecting on three years in this role, and all the speeches and all the interventions I have given in literally every corner of the globe.

    And I am reflecting on conversations I have had here in Washington over the past few days, and they bear remarkable similarity to conversations I was having three years ago, as a fresh-faced COP President-Designate.

    And I’ve been reflecting on the G20 Climate and Environment Ministerial meetings in Indonesia, which I attended earlier this summer, where some of the world’s major emitters threatened to backslide on commitments they had made previously, in Glasgow, and indeed in Paris.

    And this all whilst the extreme weather events that I spoke about earlier, continue to batter and devastate countries and continents across the world.

    And indeed, these extreme climate events are impacting communities in the very G20 countries which were pulling back on ambition in that Climate Ministers meeting.

    So I have to say this very frankly to you friends, that there does remain a big deficit in political will.

    In that can-do spirit which is so badly needed.

    And I am left wondering what further evidence, and what further motivation, global leaders could possibly need to act.

    It is unfathomable to me that we are not doing everything in our power to respond to the inevitable structural changes that we are facing, and to prevent climate catastrophe.

    And we should be under no illusions.

    We are not yet doing everything in our power.

    So we have to ask ourselves: why are we not going further? Why are we not going faster?

    Competing priorities, and the need to do more than one thing at once

    Now, I do understand that leaders around the world have faced competing priorities this year.

    But you know, we cannot tackle any of the crises we face in isolation.

    And we cannot allow cyclical crises, as painful as they are, to distract us from the net zero transition.

    Or, as my friend Mark Carney has put it, we must not fall victim to the “tragedy of the horizon”.

    Now that unfortunately happened amidst the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, just a year after hundreds of IPCC contributors were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. And frankly many decided climate action could wait for the future.

    And so we lost critical momentum as a result.

    We must find the ability to focus on more than one thing at once.

    And I am reminded, when I was the UK’s Business and Energy Secretary.

    My team and I worked to support businesses through the darkest and most challenging moments of the pandemic.

    At the same time, the UK’s Vaccine Taskforce sat in my government department, and I chaired our Ministerial Investment Panel, deciding which vaccines to back.

    So, working around the clock for months, and supported by a team of outstanding civil servants, we delivered the UK’s COVID vaccine portfolio.

    And it was at the same time in that same year in my department we brought forward the UK’s ambitious 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution.

    So the point I am making is that it is possible to take on multiple challenges, and to succeed, even in the most challenging times.

    And indeed, as many climate vulnerable countries have been recognising for some time, we no longer have the luxury of choice. We have to try and do this simultaneously.

    But I have to say I think we also have to ask ourselves some more fundamental questions.

    We are approaching the 27th iteration of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change. The COPs.

    Over a quarter-of-a-century of work.

    I am at the end of my own three-year journey in this process.

    So I’m going to be frank.

    I think we do have to question whether all our current international institutions have fully internalised the grave urgency of our climate situation.

    And whether we are truly capable of delivering net zero, by the middle of this century.

    So, is one of our fundamental drawbacks that we are coming up against the limits of our existing structures?

    Now Prime Minister Mia Mottley, of Barbados, who is one of the world’s most powerful climate voices,

    and whose country is very much on the frontline of this crisis, set out her views on this particular question at the United Nations General Assembly last month.

    Her “Bridgetown Agenda” is a compelling call for an overhaul of our global financial architecture.

    And actually I agree with much of what she has set out.

    Institutions, like the World Bank, as admirable as their founding intentions are, were not set up with the purpose of tackling an existential climate crisis.

    Today, climate must be at the heart of everything that we do.

    The world cannot afford for such institutions to be cautious in how their considerable resources are deployed to tackle the climate crisis.

    That, I think, is a matter of social justice as well as environmental security.

    And yes, we also have to talk seriously about dealing with the debt crisis, in order to effectively tackle the climate crisis.

    As a climate friend said to me last week, the road to an ambitious outcome in Sharm-el-Sheikh, and indeed to all forthcoming COPs, will pass through this city, it will pass through Washington.

    And I know the sentiment of Prime Minister Mottley’s agenda commands much support.

    Secretary Yellen has also spoken, incredibly powerfully, on the issue of MDB reform last week.

    I was at Chatham House in London a couple of weeks ago, with some of the world’s biggest businesses, discussing the course to a 1.5-degree world.

    And they too were talking about the world order being ripe for a “Bretton Woods II” moment.

    So friends, the world is recognising that we cannot tackle the defining challenge of this century, with institutions that were defined by the last.

    We have to incentivise every aspect of the international system to recognise the systemic risk of climate change, and to make managing it effectively a central task.

    Whether that’s multilateral development banks or the private sector.

    Central banks or investment banks.

    Regulators or credit rating agencies.

    Finance ministries or philanthropies.

    There is frankly no logical reason why every single one of those institutions should not be adapting, to making tackling the climate crisis a fundamental part of their overall purpose.

    And ultimately, this is going to be absolutely critical to our efforts to deliver public, private and multilateral finance, including concessional finance, which is so vitally important, at magnitudes that are far, far greater than we are currently achieving, and which we frankly need.

    It will be critical to ensuring the multilateral development banks and the international financial institutions in particular show a willingness to innovate, and to stretch their balance sheets.

    The G20’s Capital Adequacy Review suggests ways in which they can do that, and many of us are expecting an ambitious response to that review.

    And it’s all going to be critical to ensuring the major philanthropies ramp up their contributions, particularly in areas of higher risk or lower return.

    Now of course, whilst finance is absolutely central, our political institutions, whether that is the COP process, the G7, the G20, the G77, they also all have a role to play.

    This is particularly true as we look for a genuinely effective multilateral approach to carbon pricing.

    Right now, credible estimates suggest less than four percent of global emissions are currently covered by a direct carbon price at, or indeed above, the level we would need to limit warming to 2 degrees or less.

    So that point, addressing one of the great market challenges of our time, is of course of particular importance.

    So friends, this programme of work is the only way we will fully deliver on the promises made in Glasgow, and in Paris before that.

    And yes, absolutely it is an overwhelming agenda of work.

    But it is commensurate with both the scale of the challenge, and the scale of the environmental and economic opportunity.

    And, as I reflect on the legacy of COP26, and the UK’s Presidency, I know that the world can rise to the challenge.

    Now of course, it will soon be time for our friends in Egypt to pick up the baton.

    COP is a process, and I want COP27 to build on the success of COP26, just as COP26 built on COP25, and COP24 before that.

    And yes there is much work to be done.

    At COP27, there will need to be serious conversations on mitigation.

    Yes, we have seen 24 new or enhanced Nationally Determined Contributions this year, including from the UK.

    But that is not enough.

    All Parties agreed in Glasgow to step forward on this issue by the end of this year.

    And as climate impacts spiral, loss and damage will of course again be increasingly part of the conversation.

    A conversation that should go even further than our collective progress at COP26.

    And there should be a new agenda item to consider how best to improve the global response, through funding and wider support, aligned with the Glasgow Dialogue.

    And countries must get access to the technical help they need through fully operationalising the Santiago Network.

    And we must also continue to set out precisely how the billions are going to be turned into the trillions, to go into climate-resilient infrastructure and to support a clean energy transition across the world.

    And so we will continue to press on with our Just Energy Transition Partnerships, the first of which, for South Africa, we launched at COP26.

    Now each of those partnerships will take on a different, country-specific shape, but they are, and will remain, a key legacy of COP26.

    So, with this work ahead, I hope all Parties come to Egypt with the same spirit of urgency, of collaboration and indeed compromise, that underpinned our success in Glasgow.

    I will be there as the UK’s negotiating minister.

    And I can tell you that we will certainly be stepping forward.

    So with that, friends, as we look ahead to COP27, and I look to the end of my COP Presidency, I want to end on a hopeful note.

    The last three years have been a unique privilege.

    I have been inspired by the urgency and the ambition I have felt in rooms like this one, around the world.

    And I am certain that, if we can align all of the work that I have seen and that I have talked about today, and adapt the systems that underpin it, the 21st century will not just be the century we pulled the world back from the precipice of climate catastrophe, it will be the century we unlocked a just and sustainable path to prosperity for billions of people around the world.

    Frankly what greater motivation could we need?

    Thank you.

  • Suella Braverman – 2022 Statement on Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

    Suella Braverman – 2022 Statement on Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

    The statement made by Suella Braverman, the Home Secretary, in the House of Commons on 13 October 2022.

    I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

    Following Putin’s unconscionable invasion of Ukraine we acted immediately, cracking down on dirty money in the UK by passing the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. I am very grateful for the way that the whole House got behind that effort and I hope we can come together on this Bill, too. I am very grateful to the shadow Front Bench for its constructive engagement on the Bill and to party colleagues for their considerable input. I hope we can send a united message that dirty money, fraudsters and gangsters are not welcome in the UK.

    Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)

    I just wonder why it took a war in Europe for action to take place on this matter, why for years and years and years the right hon. and learned Lady’s Government and their predecessors did nothing about it, and whether it had anything to do with the millions going into Tory party coffers from Russian oligarchs?

    Suella Braverman

    I am not sure what point the hon. Gentleman is making. Important strides are being taken forward in the Bill and we should all be getting behind the swift action the Government took in response to the invasion of Ukraine. I am very grateful that we were able to pass that legislation and take powers in the Act earlier this year, which included taking the groundbreaking action of sanctioning hundreds if not thousands of Russian individuals and entities, freezing assets and really excluding the influence of Russian finance in the UK. I am proud of that effort and I hope that he is too.

    Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op) rose—

    Suella Braverman

    If I can just make some progress, I will come back to the hon. Gentleman.

    Having acted immediately in response to Putin, we promised to go further. The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill will bear down even further on kleptocrats, criminals and terrorists, strengthening the UK’s reputation as a place where legitimate business can thrive but economic crime cannot. Economic crime is a serious problem. It threatens our prosperity, national security and global influence. The UK has one of the world’s largest and most open economies, and it is an extremely attractive place to do business. That is a good thing, but it also exposes us to economic crime, such as money laundering, corruption, the financing of organised crime and terrorism, and a growing range of state threats.

    Stephen Doughty

    I thank the Home Secretary for giving way. One issue I have raised with Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Ministers directly relates to the use of cryptocurrency and different mechanisms for those trying to evade sanctions or commit other crimes. There is a particular issue around mixers and tumblers—that is what they are called. The US Treasury took very, very severe action on this in August this year. My understanding is that we are yet to take that action. Will she look urgently at these issues with her colleagues in the Treasury and the FCDO to ensure that we bear down very strongly on those who are using crypto to avoid detection by our criminal investigation agencies?

    Suella Braverman

    The hon. Gentleman raises a really important and valid point. The Bill will go some way to dealing with cryptocurrency, but he is right that cryptoassets are increasingly being used for malign and terrorist purposes. We intend to crack down on that and will be bringing forward a Government amendment that will mirror the changes in Part 4 of this Bill in counter-terrorism legislation, but we are very happy to review that further.

    The Government have already undertaken unprecedented action to stop kleptocrats and criminals.

    Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)

    Just last year, as everyone in the House will remember very well, the Police Service of Northern Ireland seized £215 million from a money laundering scheme that started in eastern Europe, came right across into the United Kingdom and ended up in Northern Ireland. The Home Secretary said clearly that money laundering will be addressed directly. In Northern Ireland we seem to have a problem in relation to that. Will she enter into discussions with the Finance and Justice Ministers back home in Northern Ireland to ensure that they can work together to beat money laundering everywhere?

    Suella Braverman

    I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that point. I am very happy to build further and closer engagement with Northern Ireland on this particular issue. In the case of anti-money laundering and other investigations, and prosecutions in relation to standalone money laundering cases or where money laundering is the principal offence, the agencies have recovered considerable amounts. £1.3 billion has been recovered in those cases since 2015-16 using the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 powers. That is good progress, but of course there is further to go and, as I said, I am very keen to engage more closely.

    Catherine West (Hornsey and Wood Green) (Lab)

    On the agencies, does the Home Secretary accept that it has taken an awfully long for the Government to get around to reforming Companies House, which is very open to abuse and which the Royal United Services Institute has been mentioning for years now as a danger to our national security?

    Suella Braverman

    I am very pleased that we are taking this action now. I take on board the point that this has been a long-standing matter that Members and Administrations have been talking about for some time. There has been progress over several years. We have the National Economic Crime Centre and new legislation, so there are greater powers, but I am focused on ensuring that the reforms in the Bill are implemented as quickly as possible. On reforms to Companies House, we seek to ensure that the level of change is balanced to avoid causing any confusion for legitimate customers and to ensure effective implementation. So yes, speed is essential, but not at the expense of undue disruption.

    Some of the action we have already undertaken includes being the first G20 country to establish, in 2016, a public register of domestic company beneficial ownership; the publication of the economic crime plan in 2019 and the progress made against it; and establishing, as I said to the hon. Lady, the National Economic Crime Centre and the combating kleptocracy cell in the National Crime Agency. The Bill is just one component of a wider Government approach to tackling economic crime, including fraud. It sits alongside the National Security Bill and the Online Safety Bill, and the forthcoming second economic crime plan and fraud strategy.

    Layla Moran (Oxford West and Abingdon) (LD)

    One of the areas this place will struggle to scrutinise is golden visas. It has now been four years since that review was commissioned. We understand it is ready, yet we have not seen it to be able to scrutinise it and hold the Government to account on it. Will the right hon. and learned Lady be the Home Secretary who finally releases that review?

    Suella Braverman

    When it comes to golden visas, I was very proud of the action the Government took in relation to Russian individuals following the invasion, where we stopped the sale of golden visas to particular individuals—

    Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)

    The sale? You were selling them?

    Suella Braverman

    The issuance—excuse me—of golden visas to particular individuals from Russia. I agree that there is further work we can do and I am very keen to look at it.

    Chris Bryant

    I think the Home Secretary said the sale of tier 1 visas, as if the Government or the Conservative party were somehow selling these things. Is it not absolutely shocking that 10 of the people the Government sanctioned this year were people to whom the Conservative Government had given tier 1 visas? We were inviting crooks and Putin’s cronies to come into this country, make their lives here and carry on their criminal activities here.

    Suella Braverman

    I think the hon. Gentleman will find that this has actually been a long-standing issue for Administrations of both colours, and we have been vulnerable for some time. However, I am incredibly proud of and make no apology for the robust, tough and unapologetic action that this country took in response to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. That includes, along with the EU and the US, sanctioning thousands of Russian individuals and entities; taking aggressive, prohibitive action to stop them taking part in the UK financial system; freezing the assets of all Russian banks; barring Russian firms from borrowing money; and, importantly, ensuring that we take a strong stance to affect and disable, to a degree, the Russian economy. That is how we will win this war, not by cheap political points.

    Chris Bryant

    Look, some of us have been battling on this for a very long time. Some of us said in 2014 that if we did not sanction Putin properly then, he would not only take the Crimea, but try to take the whole of Ukraine. Some of us fear that the Government’s refusal to act in this area is part of what has emboldened Putin. The biggest problem is that, in many cases, the UK’s sanction regime has been much weaker than that of other countries. The Home Secretary is wrong: we have not sanctioned all the Russian banks. There are still others to be sanctioned. We have sanctioned 20% of the people who have been sanctioned by the United States of America. For most of the people we have sanctioned, we are relying on EU legislation—we are just copying it. Honestly, I think she needs to do her work a bit more carefully.

    Suella Braverman

    No, I disagree. I will not repeat the points that I have made, but I am very proud of our record. The action was tough, unprecedented and far-reaching, and I am very glad that other countries followed suit soon after.

    The Bill includes essential reforms of Companies House and measures to prevent the abuse of limited partnerships. It creates additional powers to seize cryptoassets more quickly and easily. The Bill will enable more effective and targeted information sharing to tackle money laundering and economic crime.

    Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)

    Late last year, NatWest was fined £265 million for facilitating money laundering through its UK branches. Sacks of cash, literally, were being taken into NatWest branches. Despite the £265 million fine, no person at NatWest has personally been held to account. Does my right hon. and learned Friend not agree that these fines are simply a cost of doing business, because this is profitable business? The only way in which we will clamp down on this is to hold individual executives at the top of organisations to account and, if necessary, put these people in jail.

    Suella Braverman

    I agree with my hon. Friend, who has a huge amount of expertise and has achieved a huge amount in Parliament to crack down on fraud and economic crime. I will come to the Bill’s anti-money laundering measures, so I will have to detain him a bit longer until I get there. I agree, however: we have to make sure that we can build on the regime, powers and law enforcement frameworks that are in place. We can go further.

    Dame Margaret Hodge (Barking) (Lab)

    If the Home Secretary does agree with what was said by the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake), with whom I have worked closely on these matters, why is she not reforming corporate criminal liability in the Bill to bring into effect the very change that he has promoted?

    Suella Braverman

    I accept what the right hon. Lady says, but the Government have already taken steps to establish the case for change on corporate criminal liability. In 2020, we commissioned the Law Commission to undertake a detailed review of how the legislative system could be improved to appropriately capture and punish criminal offences committed by corporations, with a particular focus on economic crime. The Law Commission published that paper on 10 June 2022. The Government are carefully assessing the options that were presented and are committed to working quickly to reform criminal corporate liability.

    Jim Shannon

    I thank the Secretary of State for generously giving way again. I understand that 929 companies registered with Companies House were identified as taking part in 89 economic crime incidents, which amounted to £137 billion of potential economic damage. I know that the Secretary of State, like me and others in the House, is keen to ensure that we get the change we want, but will that mean that that can no longer happen in relation to Companies House?

    Suella Braverman

    We want to ensure that there are more restrictions on who can register with Companies House so that we prevent the abuse of the regime. As I said, we have one of the most open, liberal and business-friendly economies, but we are exposed to some degree. The reforms in the Bill very much address the issue that the hon. Member raises.

    Furthermore, the Bill introduces a regulatory objective into the Legal Services Act 2007; removes the statutory cap on the Solicitors Regulation Authority’s fining power for disciplinary matters relating to economic crime offences; extends pre-investigation powers to all Serious Fraud Office cases; and streamlines the process for updating the UK’s high-risk third country list. The Bill will also ensure that we have more effective and targeted information sharing to tackle money laundering and economic crime. It provides new intelligence-gathering powers for law enforcement and removes regulatory burdens on businesses. Altogether, the Bill is a formidable tool in the fight against illicit finance.

    The Government have consulted widely on the Bill and won broad support from business and professional groups, law enforcement agencies and civil society. We are, of course, working closely with the devolved Administrations on this legislation, as the Bill contains several provisions that engage devolved powers in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

    I will now set out the Bill’s measures in more detail, turning first to Companies House reform. Companies House is one of the foundations of the UK’s business environment. It operates the UK’s open and flexible corporate registration framework. The UK’s business community enjoys a simple system for creating and maintaining companies and other legal entities. Information on those entities is made available for the benefit of investors, lenders, regulators and the public. The companies register was accessed 12 billion times last year. Inevitably, that makes it a target. In recent years, the Companies House framework has been manipulated, particularly with the use of anonymous or fraudulent shell companies and partnerships. That gives criminals a veneer of legitimacy to help them to commit crimes, ranging from grand corruption and money laundering to fraud and identity theft.

    We will reform the role of Companies House and improve the transparency of UK companies. The Bill will ensure that we can bear down on the use of thousands of UK companies and other corporate structures as vehicles for economic crime, including fraud, international money laundering, illicit Russian finance, corruption, terrorist financing and illegal arms movements. These are the most significant reforms to the UK’s framework for registering companies in 170 years. We will introduce identity verification for new and existing directors.

    Kevin Hollinrake

    It is very good news that we are moving from a register to a regulator. On the capacity of Companies House to do that, there are around 5 million companies in the UK, with probably two directors on average, and 500,000 companies are registered every year. Does Companies House today honestly have the capacity to properly verify the ID of all those directors?

    Suella Braverman

    Resourcing the agencies and organisations, such as Companies House, to better fight the threat of fraud and economic crime will be part of the equation. I am pleased to be in constant discussion with the various agencies, although, obviously, Companies House is the responsibility of other Departments. However, we have to ensure that it has the tools, operationally and from a resource point of view, to be able to carry out its legal duties.

    Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab)

    The Home Secretary is being generous in giving way. The point about institutions being able to carry out enforcement is immensely important. As well as Companies House, there is also an issue for the National Crime Agency. She may be aware that her predecessor asked the National Crime Agency to draw up plans for 20% staffing cuts. Has the Home Secretary now ruled that out?

    Suella Braverman

    Last year’s spending review settlement set out that the economic crime levy would provide funding totalling approximately £400 million over the spending review period. Law enforcement activity on economic crime is conducted by a number of agencies, including the National Crime Agency, as the right hon. Lady says. I want to ensure that those agencies have the proper resources, personnel and tools to be at the forefront of fighting crime effectively.

    Catherine West

    Will the Home Secretary give way?

    Suella Braverman

    I will make some progress. As hon. Members have said, I have been very generous, but I am struggling to get through my speech. I know that everybody wants to speak, so I will take no more interventions for now.

    We will introduce identity verification for new and existing directors, beneficial owners and those who file information with Companies House. That will improve the accuracy of Companies House data and will ensure that we know who is really acting for and benefiting from companies.

    Chris Bryant

    Will the Home Secretary give way on that point?

    Suella Braverman

    I am sorry, but I will not.

    The powers of the registrar of companies will be broadened, making the registrar a more active gatekeeper for company creation and a custodian of more reliable data. The registrar will receive new powers to check, remove or decline information that is submitted to or already on the company register. The Bill will improve the financial information on the register so that it is more reliable, complete and accurate, and enables better business decisions. Companies House will be given more effective investigation and enforcement powers, including by enabling it proactively to share information with law enforcement bodies about higher-risk corporate bodies, or where there is evidence of anomalous filings or other suspicious behaviour. To protect individuals from fraud and other harm, we will also enhance the protection of personal information and addresses provided to Companies House.

    We will introduce broader reforms to clamp down on the misuse of corporate entities. These reforms will support enterprise by enabling Companies House to deliver a better service for more than 4 million UK companies. They will help us to maintain our swift and low-cost routes for company creation. They will also improve the collection of data to inform business transactions and lending decisions across our economy.

    Catherine West

    The Witanhurst property, a 500-room mansion in Highgate, is the second largest property in the UK after Buckingham Palace. Its ownership is contested, so it has not been seized. Will the Bill cover such difficult and anomalous situations? Local residents feel that people should be brought to account. Considering the links with the regime in Russia, there is no way that that house was bought in an honest way.

    Suella Braverman

    Without knowing the details of that case, what is clear is that the reforms to Companies House will ensure not only that more investigation and enforcement powers are afforded to it, but that there will be new powers for checking, removing and declining information submitted to the company register if there are grounds for concern.

    Chris Bryant

    The Home Secretary is being generous in giving way; I am very grateful. I warmly welcome all these changes to Companies House, for which some of us have been arguing for a very long time. My anxiety is that Companies House will have a major change of role: as several agencies have said recently to the Foreign Affairs Committee, it will go from being a registrar to being effectively a policeman. To do so, it will need enormous additional capacity. Can she tell us how much additional money it will have to fulfil that role?

    Suella Braverman

    The transformation of Companies House has been under consideration for some time, and the Treasury Committee has done quite a lot of inquiring into the issue. We published a White Paper on corporate transparency and register reform earlier this year, which provided considerable detail on how these reforms will operate. It is a complex area of law. Resources will be needed for these extra powers.

    Chris Bryant

    How much?

    Suella Braverman

    The transformation is already under way, with £20 million invested in 2021-22 and a further £63 million announced up to 2024-25 at the most recent spending review. We have been thinking about this, and the money has been announced in spending reviews. It has been thought about.

    Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)

    Will the Home Secretary give way?

    Suella Braverman

    I am going to continue.

    The Bill will tackle the misuse of limited partnerships, including Scottish limited partnerships, and will modernise the law governing them. We will tighten registration requirements and will additionally require limited partnerships to demonstrate a firmer connection to the UK. Transparency requirements will be increased. The registrar will be able to de-register limited partnerships if they are dissolved or no longer carrying on business, or if a court orders that it is in the public interest.

    Nor does the Bill overlook cryptoassets. It will give additional powers to law enforcement bodies so that they can more quickly and easily seize, freeze and recover cryptoassets that are the proceeds of crime or are connected with illicit activity. That will ensure that cryptoassets cannot be a conduit for money laundering, fraud, ransomware attacks or terrorist financing. Most notably, it will mitigate the risk posed by those who cannot be prosecuted but who nevertheless use their funds for criminal purposes. I am sorry to say that cryptoassets are increasingly being used to fund terrorism; we will crack down on that by introducing an amendment to counter-terrorism legislation that reflects those changes.

    I turn to anti-money laundering. We will enable better sharing of information about suspected money laundering, fraud and other economic crimes between certain regulated businesses, allowing them to take a more proactive approach to preventing economic crime. As a result, businesses will be better able to detect crime taking place across multiple businesses and to prevent criminals from exploiting information gaps between them. We will also reduce the reporting burdens on businesses, enabling the private sector and law enforcement to focus their existing resources on tackling high-value and priority activity.

    Threats evolve and are changing, so the Bill includes a measure to streamline and allow faster updates to the UK’s high-risk third country list. The list will be updated and published on gov.uk for everyone to see, reflecting updates from the Financial Action Task Force, the international standard setter, when it identifies countries with weak anti-money laundering, counter-terrorist financing and counter-proliferation financing controls. By removing the need to lay a statutory instrument before Parliament every time the list needs to be updated, we will reduce delays in updating the list and free up parliamentary time.

    The Bill will add a regulatory objective to the Legal Services Act 2007:

    “promoting the prevention and detection of economic crime.”

    It affirms that it is the legal duty of legal regulators and professionals to uphold the economic crime regime. That will reduce the risk of lengthy and expensive challenges from regulated members over enforcement action. It will improve the ability of the Legal Services Board, as the oversight regulator, to manage the performance of frontline regulators in meeting that objective.

    The Bill will remove the statutory cap on the Solicitors Regulation Authority’s financial penalty powers for disciplinary matters relating to economic crime. That will align the SRA with other regulators that have such flexibility. Fewer cases will be referred to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, resulting in faster enforcement. There will be a credible deterrent and a more coherent response to breaches of economic crime rules.

    The Bill will enable the Serious Fraud Office to use its powers under section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 at the pre-investigation stage in any SFO case, including a fraud case—an ability that is currently limited to cases of international bribery and corruption. This measure will mean that the SFO can more quickly gather the information that it needs to allow its director to decide whether to take on a case.

    Cracking down on economic crime is a major plank of the Government’s beating crime plan.

    Andy Slaughter

    I am grateful to the Home Secretary for giving way; I know that she is about to finish her speech. There are 22 professional bodies overseeing compliance with anti-money laundering rules. Is the Home Secretary going to do anything about the resulting confusion, and the inadequacy of some of those bodies? May I also ask whether she intends to introduce—as her colleague the Secretary of State for Wales hinted earlier this week—a new offence of failure to prevent offences from being committed? I do not know whether she welcomes her colleague commenting on her brief, but as the Welsh Secretary has raised the question, perhaps she could respond to it.

    Suella Braverman

    The hon. Gentleman raises two issues concerning the regulators. We need to ensure that they strike the right balance in terms of their investigatory or prosecutorial powers, but also do not overstretch themselves to become a burden on legitimate and bona fide enterprise. This is a balance that legislation constantly seeks to strike. As for the offence of failure to prevent offences, it is something that we consider all the time, and I am always open to considering such possibilities.

    Far from being victimless, these crimes bring misery, fund other crimes and undermine our country’s reputation, and Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine raises the stakes even higher. The United Kingdom must ensure that we are doing nothing to aid Putin, and doing everything we can to support the courageous Ukrainian people.

    I urge the whole House to get behind the Bill so that we can make sure that the UK is a great place for legitimate business and a no-go area for crooks, and I commend it to the House.

  • Lindsay Hoyle – 2022 Statement on Anniversary of Murder of David Amess

    Lindsay Hoyle – 2022 Statement on Anniversary of Murder of David Amess

    The statement made by Lindsay Hoyle, the Speaker of the House of Commons, in the House on 13 October 2022.

    This Saturday marks the first anniversary of the death of our friend and colleague Sir David Amess, who was murdered in his Southend West constituency. David was an extremely diligent constituency Member of Parliament who died carrying out his democratic duties, which made his death all the more shocking. May I express, on behalf of the whole House, our sympathy with his family, friends and colleagues on this sad anniversary? David was a long-serving Member who was respected and liked on all sides of the House. We will not forget him.

    At this time, we also remember our colleague James Brokenshire, a dedicated, respected parliamentarian, and hold his family and friends in our thoughts this week.

  • Kemi Badenoch – 2022 Statement on UK-Gulf Co-operation Council Free Trade Agreement Negotiations

    Kemi Badenoch – 2022 Statement on UK-Gulf Co-operation Council Free Trade Agreement Negotiations

    The statement made by Kemi Badenoch, the Secretary of State for International Trade, in the House of Commons on 13 October 2022.

    The first round of negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA) between the United Kingdom (UK) and Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) took place between 22 August and 29 September. The negotiations were conducted virtually.

    In this round of negotiations the UK and GCC discussed their objectives for the FTA, and exchanged technical information. Technical discussions were held across 29 policy areas over 33 sessions. In total, more than 100 UK negotiators from across Government took part in this round of negotiations.

    An FTA will be a substantial economic opportunity, and a significant moment in the UK-GCC relationship. Government analysis shows that, in the long-run, a deal with the GCC is expected to increase trade by at least 16%, add at least £1.6 billion a year to the UK economy and contribute an additional £600 million or more to UK workers’ annual wages.

    Both sides have committed to secure an ambitious, comprehensive and modern agreement fit for the 21st century.

    The Government remain clear that any deal will be in the best interests of the British people and the UK economy. We will not compromise on our high environmental and labour protections, public health, animal welfare and food standards, and we will maintain our right to regulate in the public interest. We are also clear that during these negotiations, the NHS and the services it provides is not on the table.

    The Government will keep Parliament updated as these negotiations progress.