Tag: Speeches

Grant Shapps – 2020 Statement on the Rail Network

Below is the text of the statement made by Grant Shapps, the Secretary of State for Transport, on 23 March 2020.

In these uncertain times, the railway has a vital role to play in ensuring Britain’s key workers can travel and vital supplies are kept moving. My absolute focus is on making sure services continue so that journeys that are vital in tackling this crisis can continue to take place, so today (23 March 2020), to make sure our railways stay open, we are providing train operators on franchises let by my department the opportunity to temporarily transition onto Emergency Measures Agreements.

These agreements will suspend the normal financial mechanisms of franchise agreements, transferring all revenue and cost risk to the government. Operators will continue to run day-to-day services for a small, pre-determined management fee. Companies entering into these agreements will see a temporary suspension of their existing franchise agreement’s financial mechanisms for an initial period of 6 months, with options for further extension or earlier cancellation as agreed.

Today’s offer will provide greater flexibility to the train operators and the government and make sure the railway can continue to react quickly to changing circumstances and play its part in serving the national interest. It will ensure vital services continue to operate for key workers who are keeping the nation running and that we are able to reinstate a normal service quickly when the situation improves.

In the longer term these agreements will also minimise disruption to the rail sector. The railways have already seen up to a 70% drop in passenger numbers, with rail fares revenue reducing as people increasingly work from home and adopt social distancing, and total ticket sales down by two-thirds from the equivalent date in 2019. Suspending the usual financial mechanisms will not only guarantee that services can be sustained over this difficult period, it will also provide certainty for staff working on the railways, many of whom are working hard every day in difficult conditions to make sure we keep the railway running.

This is not a new model, it is a temporary solution, taking the steps necessary to protect services now in a cost-efficient way, and ensuring current events have as little impact as possible on the railway in the longer term. Allowing operators to enter insolvency would cause significantly more disruption to passengers and higher costs to the taxpayer.

Fees will be set at a maximum of 2% of the cost base of the franchise before the COVID-19 pandemic began, intended to incentivise operators to meet reliability, punctuality and other targets. The maximum fee attainable will be far less than recent profits earned by train operators. In the event that an operator does not wish to accept an Emergency Measures Agreement, the Government’s Operator of Last Resort stands ready to step in.

Alongside our focus on keeping the railways open to support key workers, we recognise there will be many who have heeded government advice and chosen not to travel. We don’t want people to lose money for doing the right thing, so I am also announcing today that passengers will be able to get refunds for advance tickets they aren’t able to use while the government advises against non-essential travel.

We have agreed with all the train operators that passengers who have already purchased an advance ticket will be eligible for a refund without any charge. Those holding a season ticket that they no longer wish to use will also be eligible for a partial refund, determined by the amount of time remaining on the ticket. Ticket holders should contact their retailer for further details.

Given the significant timetable changes that have put been in place we are also asking operators to use discretion to allow passengers with advance tickets to travel on an alternative train at a similar time or date if their ticket is technically no longer valid as a result of cancellations, but they still wish to travel.

We are operating in extraordinary times, but today’s announcement will make sure key workers who depend on our railways are able to travel and carry on their vital roles, that hardworking commuters – who have radically altered their lives to combat the spread of coronavirus, are not left out of pocket, and it will provide certainty to the industry’s staff who are still working hard every day to make sure the railway plays its part in tackling this crisis.

March 23, 2020
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach – 1884 Speech on General Gordon’s Mission

Below is the text of the speech made by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach in the House of Commons on 12 May 1884.

Notwithstanding the remarks that have just fallen from the two hon. Members opposite, and certain symptoms of impatience which other hon. Members who sit on that side of the House have shown on the occasion of previous debates this Session on Egyptian affairs, it will, I think, be generally admitted that the subject which I am about to bring under the notice of the House is one of urgency, that it is one on which there is a strong feeling and a deep interest in the country, and that the terms of my Motion present a clear and definite issue to the House of Commons. I do not now intend to question the decision of Her Majesty’s Government to evacuate the Soudan, or the means by which they proposed to carry that decision into effect. I take their own policy in this matter as it was described by them to the House in February last, and I propose to address myself to the question— How have the Government carried out, not our policy, but their own policy, and what is their conduct in the present condition of affairs in the Soudan? I hope that before I sit down I shall be able to show some cause for the regret which I ask this House to express—

“That the course pursued by Her Majesty’s Government has not tended to promote the success of General Gordon’s Mission, and that even such steps as may be necessary to secure his personal safety are still delayed.”

When Her Majesty’s Government, in the celebrated despatch of the 4th of January last, shattered the Egyptian Government and compelled them to abandon the Soudan, they were at once confronted with the serious danger which menaced the large number of Egyptians, military and civil, who remained in the Soudan. It was impossible that this country could avoid a sense of responsibility for the safety of those people, because that danger was mainly due to the calamity which overtook the unfortunate expedition of General Hicks, an expedition which was permitted by Her Majesty’s Government, although they had the power of preventing it. Therefore it was, I suppose, that the Government repeatedly suggested to the Egyptian Government the employment of General Gordon to conduct the evacuation of the Soudan. At last the Egyptian Government consented to the employment of that officer with full civil and military powers to conduct the evacuation. It is not too much to say that no officer over left this country charged with a more important or more difficult mission, or possessing, to all appearance, more perfect freedom as to the means by which he should carry out that Mission. It was a material element in the satisfaction with which the country received the news of General Gordon’s appointment that he was to have, as it has been described, “a free hand,” and was not to be interfered with by Her Majesty’s Government, who had already so lamentably failed in their conduct of affairs in that part of the world. I will venture to add that this interpretation of the appointment of General Gordon had no slight influence in saving the Government from that Vote of Censure which my right hon. Friend near me proposed in February last. What was the policy that General Gordon was appointed to carry out? It was shortly described by the Prime Minister as “rescue and retire.” How was General Gordon to carry out that policy? Undoubtedly by pacific means —if that was in any way possible—but that is a very material qualification. No one could have desired or have tried more earnestly than General Gordon to carry out the mission with which he was charged by pacific means.

The keystone of his plan was essentially of a pacific character. It was to establish some kind of local government which should be more agreeable to the populations of the Soudan than the Egyptian Government from which he was sent to deliver them, and which, when established, might be able to conduct affairs, at least for a time, during which the evacuation of the country by the whole civil and military Egyptian administration might take place. Well, various suggestions were made by him to Her Majesty’s Government in connection with his mission. One after another those suggestions were negatived, and some were negatived precisely at the very moment when Her Majesty’s Government were sheltering themselves from the indignation which was felt in the country at the abandonment of the garrison of Sinkat, on the plea that they were compelled not to undertake an expedition that could by any possibility be contrary to General Gordon’s wishes, or that would interfere with the success of his pacific mission. What were those suggestions? In the first place, it is perfectly clear that from the very first General Gordon never desired to go to the Soudan as an official of the Egyptian Government. What he wanted to do was to appear in the Soudan from the side of Suakin as a deliverer of the people from the Egyptian Government. Well, Her Majesty’s Government sent him to Cairo. They sent him from Cairo as an Egyptian Governor General over the Soudan. He proposed, again, to undertake the hazardous task of an interview with the Mahdi in order to exercise upon that individual his wonderful personal influence. Why, Sir, a braver proposal than that was never made by an Englishman. General Gordon is a man who does not consider his own safety or his own life as worth a moment’s notice when the interest of his country is involved; but Her Majesty’s Government negatived that proposal also.

Again, he wanted to commence his operations by first dealing with the Equatorial Provinces. He got a peremptory command not to go south of Khartoum. And lastly, after full consideration of the difficulties which attended his original proposal to establish a certain number of local Sultans throughout the country, he recommended to the Government the appointment of Zebehr Pasha as Governor of Khartoum. I do not wish for a moment to underrate the objections to that proposal. It ran counter to one of the strongest sentiments of this country. It was objected to by persons entertaining all kinds of political opinions—by some of the leading Members of the Party to which I myself belong; but I must say that I think that if the very strong arguments which appear in the Papers which have been published had been before the country at the time this proposal was made there would have been, at least, a considerable feeling in the opposite direction. I do not wish, however, to underrate the force of popular sentiment, which in such matters is inaccessible to reason. I am not blaming Her Majesty’s Government for declining to assent to the appointment of Zebehr Pasha, or to any of the other proposals to which I have referred. But it should be remembered that those proposals came to them recommended in no ordinary way. The appointment of Zebehr Pasha was recommended by Sir Evelyn Baring, the trusted Adviser of Her Majesty’s Government in Egypt, as well as by General Gordon. Now, what was the Prime Minister’s own opinion of General Gordon? On the 12th of February he told the House that—
“General Gordon is no common man… It is no exaggeration to say that he is a hero. It is no exaggeration to say that he is a Christian hero.…that in his dealings with Oriental people he is also a genius; that he has the faculty of influence or command brought about by moral means, for no man in the House hates the unnecessary resort to blood more than General Gordon.”—(3 Hansard, [284] 722.)

This was the man who recommended the appointment of Zebehr Pasha. In seconding that recommendation, Sir Evelyn Baring gave a remarkable hint to Her Majesty’s Government. He evidently had in his own mind the past history of their Egyptian policy; and he said to them that if they were unwilling to assume any responsibility in the matter they might give full liberty of action to General Gordon to do what seemed best. Well, Sir, with their usual inconsistency, Her Majesty’s Government, having promised a free baud to General Gordon, thought that, not only on the other points to which I have referred, but even in this instance, they were obliged to interfere with him. After long hesitation—indeed, so long that a military demonstration had to be recommended as well as the appointment of Zebehr Pasha—they finally declined the proposal. Now, I have admitted most fully the strength of the objections to it, and I wish to give Her Majesty’s Government the full benefit of their arguments. Let us admit, for the sake of argument, that they were right in their decision. But that decision, imposed upon Her Majesty’s Government an enormous responsibility. The appointment of Zebehr Pasha was recommended by the authorities I have quoted as the essential means for establishing that temporary local government without which the peaceful evacuation of the Soudan was impossible. Her Majesty’s Government felt it right to negative that proposal. If they thought it right to do so, they ought to have accepted any alternative proposal that was made, or to have made some other proposal themselves to carry out their policy.

Sir, they did neither of these things; but what they did was something even worse than inaction. While they were insisting upon a pacific policy in one part of the Soudan, and negativing the plans by which alone that policy could be carried out, they went to war in another part, and by those military operations they effectually destroyed any chance which General Gordon might have had of carrying out the policy he was sent to accomplish by the pacific means which they themselves desired. What did General Gordon say when he heard of their refusal to appoint Zebehr Pasha? On the 26th of February he telegraphed to Her Majesty’s Government as follows: —

“Telegram of the 23rd February received respecting Zebehr. That settles question for me. I cannot suggest any other.”

You throw upon your Christian hero, who is averse from the unnecessary shedding of blood, the necessity of suggesting military action in order to carry out your own policy—

“When evacuation is carried out, Mahdi will come down here, and, by agents, will not let Egypt be quiet. Of course, my duty is evacuation, and the best I can for establishing a quiet Government. The first I hope to accomplish. The second is a more difficult task, and concerns Egypt more than me. If Egypt is to be quiet, Mahdi must be smashed up.… Remember that once Khartoum belongs to Mahdi the task will be far more difficult; yet you will, for safety of Egypt, execute it. If you decide on smashing Mahdi, then send up another £100,000 and send up 200 Indian troops to Wady-Halfa, and send officer up to Dongola under pretence to look out quarters for troops. Leave Suakin and Massowah alone.”—[Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 115.]

Well, now, that was his suggestion. I suppose we shall be told that any such suggestion was beyond the scope of his mission. How is that? The Prime Minister, on the 3rd of May, stated that General Gordon’s mission involved the use only of pacific means. I challenge that statement altogether. I maintain that General Gordon’s mission contemplated the use of pacific means; but it was perfectly clear, from the very beginning, both to General Gordon and to Her Majesty’s Government, that pacific means might be insufficient, and that a resort to force might be required. Now, what was the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government themselves on the 4th of January last? In that despatch directing the evacuation of the Soudan, Sir Evelyn Baring was directed to urge on the Khedive that all military operations in the Soudan, excepting those for the rescue of the outlying garrisons, should cease—except on the ports of the Red Sea, where assistance could be afforded by Her Majesty’s Naval Forces. There- fore, at that time, they thought that the Egyptian Government might be compelled to employ force in rescuing the outlying garrisons in the Soudan. What was General Gordon’s opinion after his appointment? In the Memorandum of the 1st of February, written by him before his arrival in Egypt, he examined the proposal to transfer the lands to the local Sultans, and states his opinion that they will not accept the supremacy of the Mahdi—

“If this is agreed to, and my supposition correct as to their action, there can be but little doubt that, as far as he is able, the Mahdi will endeavour to assert his rule over them, and will be opposed to any evacuation of the Government employés and troops.… What should he done should the Mahdi’s adherents attack the evacuating columns? It cannot he supposed that these are to offer no resistance; and if, in resisting, they should obtain a success, it would be but reasonable to allow them to follow up the Mahdi to such a position as would insure their future safe march…. Paragraph 1 fixes irrevocably the decision of the Government— namely, to evacuate the territory, and, of course, as far as possible, involves the avoidance of any fighting…. I will carry out the evacuation as far as possible, according to their wish, to the best of my ability, and with avoidance, as far as possible, of all fighting. I would, however, hope that Her Majesty’s Government will give me their support and consideration should I be unable to fulfil all their expectations.”—[Egypt, No. 7 (1884), p. 2.]

Sir, I should like to know what moaning Her Majesty’s Government attached to the words “support and consideration” when they received that despatch? Did they really suppose the position to be that General Gordon would only be allowed to use those Egyptian troops who had already suffered so terribly at the hands of the Natives of the Soudan, and that if he should, as would surely not be unlikely, incur defeat, the Government were not to be liable to aid Mm? Is it possible that Her Majesty’s ‘Government can have saved themselves by sending General Gordon into danger with the understanding that when he got into danger from which he could not escape they were not to save him? Well, but that Memorandum was received, was considered, and was accepted by Her Majesty’s Government as embodying the means by which General Gordon should carry out their policy. More than that, they knew that he had been appointed as Governor General of the Soudan with full civil and military powers; they knew that in the Firman appointing him he was directly authorised to retain the Egyptian troops in the Soudan as long as he liked, and to regulate the time and manner of the evacuation in the mode which seemed to him to be best and most politic. They knew all this; and on the 12th of February what did the Prime Minister say to the House on the subject of General Gordon’s plan? He said—

“At Cairo General Gordon formed his plan. …. It was evidently a well-reasoned and considered plan: it was entirely pacific in its basis; it proceeded on the belief—a belief which would have been fanatical or presumptuous in my case, or in the case of most of those in this House, but which in the case of General Gordon, with his experience and gifts, was, I believe, neither the one nor the other— not that he certainly must, but that he fairly might hope to, exercise a strong pacific influence by going to the right persons in the Soudan; and it was his desire, quite as much as ours, that this should be done without any resort whatever to violent means…He went for the double purpose of evacuating the country by the extrication of the Egyptian garrisons, and of reconstituting it by giving back to those Chiefs their ancestral powers, which had been withdrawn or suspended during the period of the Egyptian Government…He had in view the withdrawal from the country of no less than 29,000 persons paying the military service to Egypt. The House will see how vast was the trust placed in the hands of this remarkable person. We cannot exaggerate the importance we attach to it. We were resolved to do nothing which should interfere with this great pacific scheme, the only scheme which promised a satisfactory solution of the Soudanese difficulty, by at once extricating the garrisons and reconstituting the country upon its old basis and its local privileges.”—(3 Hansard, [284] 724–5.)

Admirable resolutions these, if they could only have been carried out. Well, on the 13th of February arrived the Memorandum of General Gordon containing a scheme for organizing the well-disposed tribes of the Soudan against the pillaging tribes, with the idea of “forming the firm Conservative Soudanese Government which I believe Her Majesty’s Government have in view,” which obviously would be likely to lead to fighting. I am bound to say that if Her Majesty’s Government wanted to form a Conservative Government nearer home than the Soudan, they have taken the very best means of doing so. The right hon. Gentleman again addressed the House in reply to the Motion of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson); but he did not say a word qualifying those expressions of confidence in General Gordon and the acceptance of his plans which he had before stated to the House. On the 14th of February the President of the Local Government Board addressed the House. He said—

“Our views with regard to the evacuation of the Soudan are General Gordon’s views as well as our own.”—(Ibid., 957.)

On the 18th Lord Granville stated in “another place” that the confidence of the Government in General Gordon was rather increasing than diminishing. Well, to my mind, these documents and statements conclusively prove that Her Majesty’s Government in the middle of February fully understood that General Gordon’s mission might very possibly involve fighting, and that, so understanding it, they accepted it. Yet now what do they say? That it was not in contemplation that the duties assigned to General Gordon should be of a nature that would require the despatch of a British Expedition to the Soudan. [Ministerial cheers.] Well, if those hon. Gentlemen who cheered that statement can reconcile it with the facts I have quoted, I shall be glad to hear them do it. That is not all. General Gordon is now openly accused of promoting a policy not of defence or of rescue, but of conquest. What have Her Majesty’s Government said in their telegram of the 23rd of April? They accuse him distinctly of a desire to undertake military operations beyond the scope of his mission, and at variance with the pacific policy of evacuating the Soudan. I will venture to say that the most malicious libeller never coined a more unfair or more ungenerous accusation against a public servant than that which these grateful employers have given currency to against General Gordon. Let General Gordon speak for himself.

Do hon. Members recollect the statement which appeared in The Times of the 10th of March coming direct from him? What did General Gordon there say? That he was dead against the sending of any British Expedition to reconquer the Soudan; that it was unnecessary; that he would not have a single life lost; that it was his firm conviction that none would be lost by the plan that he proposed, while our honour would be saved; that he liked the people who were in rebellion as well as he did those who were not; and he added—

“I thank God that, as far as I am concerned, no man has gone before his Maker prematurely through me.”

Will the verdict of history on these transactions acquit Her Majesty’s Government of the blood guiltiness which General Gordon disclaimed? Well, Her Majesty’s Government, having driven General Gordon to make this proposal of smashing the Mahdi, negatived it. But, as I have said, they did something worse; they deprived him of any chance of carrying out pacifically the commission with which they had intrusted him by their own military operations in the Eastern Soudan. What was General Gordon’s opinion upon those operations? It is perfectly clear from these Papers that he never approved of them. On a memorable Saturday the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) asked this House to express its opinion that no reason had been shown for those military operations. Sir, I spoke in favour of that Motion, and I supported it by my vote. And why did I support it? I said plainly that, unless Her Majesty’s Government intended that some result in the way of material assistance to General Gordon should follow from those operations, they were unjustifiable. No such result did follow; and I never gave a vote in this House to which I look back with more satisfaction than the vote that I gave in support of that Motion. I have said that General Gordon never wanted you to undertake those operations. When you consulted him, he gave up the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar as lost; he said that he had not the least apprehension for Khartoum or Berber being in jeopardy from events at Suakin; and that the forces which defeated General Baker would remain in their tribal limits. Her Majesty’s Government were very grateful for that message; and on the 12th of February they sent their thanks to him for this expression of opinion, which, they said, “filled them with increased confidence in him.” But having done so, of course they proceeded to act in direct opposition to his views. A little later he told them that—

“As to Tokar and Sinkat, you can do nothing except by proclaiming that Chiefs of tribes should come to Khartoum to the Meglis (council) of Notables, when the independence of the Soudan will be decided.”
And on the 23rd of February he telegraphs—

“I think if Tokar has fallen Her Majesty’s Government had hotter he quiet, as I see no advantage to he now gained by any action on their part; let events work themselves out. Fall of Tokar will not affect in the least state of affairs here.”—[Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 97.]

Of course, the Government were not quiet. They undertook those military operations under General Graham which resulted in the loss of many valuable English lives and the massacre of thousands of brave Arabs, but in no permanent good whatever; while, on the other hand, they tended greatly to weaken General Gordon’s power of peaceful negotiation. General Gordon naturally supposed, on hearing of the victories of General Graham, that as the Government had vetoed his proposals for carrying out his pacific mission, and had themselves undertaken military operations in the Soudan, they would take care that his difficult and arduous task should in some way benefit from the victories that had been achieved. He did not know Her Majesty’s Government. They can undertake costly and perilous expeditions, but only after the object of those expeditions has been hopelessly sacrificed. He recommended again that a few troops should be sent to Wady Halfa and Dongola, adding that General Graham’s victory, if followed up by an advance of two squadrons of Cavalry to Berber, would settle the question of Khartoum, for the people between there and Berber would not think of rising. Now, what did Her Majesty’s Government know of his position at that time? On the 13th of March they heard from him that—

“There was no probability of the people rallying round him, or of paying any attention to his Proclamation.”—[Ibid., p. 161.]

He told them that if they would not appoint Zebehr Pasha or send British troops to Berber it was no use holding on to Khartoum; for it was impossible for him to help the other garrisons, and he would only be sacrificing the whole of the troops and employés there. He suggested that he should be instructed to evacuate Khartoum, retreating to Berber, and sacrificing everything except Berber and Dongola. He asked for a prompt reply; but he was asking for that which is an impossibility to Her Majesty’s Government. In a few days the opportunity was lost. He went on to say that he would resign his commission and start for the Equator. He added these remarkable words—

“If I could have given any hope to the people as to the future Government, probably things might have been better. It is evident that no one will throw in his fortunes with a departing Government.”—[Ibid., p. 162.]

In reply, Sir Evelyn Baring directed him to stay at Khartoum, pending instructions from Her Majesty’s Government.

Then Lord Granville telegraphs to Sir Edward Malet—though we are in doubt as to how many of these telegrams readied General Gordon—stating that Her Majesty’s Government declined to send either troops or Zebehr. He goes on to say—

“If General Gordon is of opinion that the prospect of his early departure diminishes the chance of accomplishing his task, and that by staying at Khartoum himself for any length of time which he may judge necessary he would be able to establish a settled Government, he is at liberty to remain there. In the event of his being unable to carry out this suggestion, he should evacuate Khartoum, and save that garrison by conducting it himself to Berber without delay.”—[Ibid.]

Then, on the 16th, Sir Evelyn Baring comes to the front and tells Her Majesty’s Government that—

“It has now become of the utmost importance not only to open the road between Suakin and Berber, but to come to terms with the tribes between Berber and Khartoum.”—[Ibid., p. 165.]

What is the reply? On the 16th Earl Granville says—

“Her Majesty’s Government are unable to authorize any advance of British troops in the direction of Berber until they have received further information with regard to the military conditions of such an expedition, and are satisfied that it is necessary in order to secure the safety of General Gordon… If General Gordon agrees with you that the difficulty of establishing a settled Government will increase rather than diminish with time, there can be no advantage in his remaining, and he should, as soon as is practicable, take steps for the evacuation of Khartoum.”—[Ibid., p. 166.]

In the whole of these telegrams from General Gordon, I venture to assert that there is not a single trace of a desire for aggression. What he wishes to do is simply this—to place himself in the only position in which, Zebehr having been refused to him, he could carry out the orders of Her Majesty’s Government to rescue the garrisons. He required material help to maintain himself at Khartoum, to bring out the more distant garrisons, and even, as time ad- vanced, to evacuate Khartoum itself. For the matter is now reduced to this. On the 24th of March Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphs to Her Majesty’s Government—

“It appears to me that under the present circumstances General Gordon will not be able to carry out your Lordship’s instructions, although those instructions involve the abandonment of the Sennaar garrison on the Blue Nile, and the garrisons of Bahr Gazelle and Gondokoro, on the White Nile. The question now is, how to get General Gordon and Colonel Stewart away from Khartoum? In considering this question, it should he remembered that they will not willingly come hack without bringing with them the garrison of Khartoum and the Government officials…Unless any unforeseen circumstances should occur to change the situation, only two solutions appear to be possible. The first is to trust General Gordon’s being able to maintain himself at Khartoum till the autumn. …. This he might, perhaps, be able to do, but it, of course, involves running a great risk.”

How great the risk is we see now. The despatch goes on to say—

“The only other plan is to send a portion of General Graham’s army to Berber with instructions to open up communication with Khartoum…General Gordon is evidently expecting help from Suakin, and he has ordered messengers to be sent along the road from Berber to ascertain whether any English force is advancing. Under present circumstances, I think that an effort should be made to help Gordon from Suakin, if it is at all a possible military operation.”

Was it a possible military operation? The despatch continues—

“General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood, whilst admitting the very great risk to the health of the troops, besides the extraordinary military risks, are of opinion that the undertaking is possible.”—[Ibid., p. 186.]

Of course, there would have been risk to the health of the troops. But what does Sir Evelyn Baring himself say on this subject? When it was proposed to move English soldiers to Assouan, Sir Evelyn Baring, on February 28, used these words—

“I have only to say that we have undertaken the responsibility of preserving tranquillity in Egypt, and that it is impossible to execute the task without exposing our troops to whatever risks the climatic influences involve.”—[Ibid p. 116.]

Then we find, again, in the despatch of March 24—

“General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood think that General Graham should be further consulted.”—[Ibid., p. 186.]
But was he consulted? Did Her Majesty’s Government ask Graham, to un- dertake an expedition from Suakin to Berber? I do not believe they ever put it to him. We have no evidence of the fact; but on the 18th of March we have a telegram from General Graham—

“Present position of affairs is that two heavy blows have been struck at rebels and followers of the Mahdi, who are profoundly discouraged. They say, however, that English troops can do no more; must re-embark and leave the country to them; to follow up these victories and bring waverers to our side we should not proclaim our intention of leaving, but rather make a demonstration of an advance towards Berber, and induce a belief that we can inarch anywhere we please.”—[Ibid., p. 176.]

Now, Sir, I believe that if General Graham had been instructed to send the kind of forces that General Gordon desired to Berber it would have been found that such a force could have marched wherever they pleased. What does General Gordon himself say a few weeks later? He affirms that the insurrection at Khartoum had spread; but he urges that it is a trumpery insurrection that 500 determined men could put down. What is the reply of Her Majesty’s Government to Sir Evelyn Baring’s recommendation? I do not think that a more heartless despatch ever was written than that of the 25th of March; and yet that one, like the previous despatch, was sent openly, so that the news that Her Majesty’s Government did not intend to relieve General Gordon was in the possession of all his enemies, whether it reached him or not. The despatch says as follows: —

“Having regard to the dangers of the climate of the Soudan at this time of the year, as well as the extraordinary risk from a military point of view, Her Majesty’s Government do not think it justifiable to send a British expedition to Berber, and they wish to communicate this decision to General Gordon in order that he may adopt measures in accordance therewith. Her Majesty’s Government desire to leave full discretion to General Gordon to remain at Khartoum if he thinks it necessary, or to retire by the southern or any other route which may be found available.”—[Egypt, No. 13 (1884), P. 1.]

What does that mean? It means simply this—”We know you are in difficulties and in want of help, but we will not help you ourselves; we will not tell you what to do. You may stay in the trap if you like, or you may leave it as best you can; by yourself if you choose, or, if you are able, taking those who have trusted you along with you.” I will venture to say that a more disgraceful suggestion than the suggestion to a British soldier and a Christian hero that he should desert those who had placed themselves in peril for his sake was never made by a British Government. What sort of opinion has General Gordon himself of such a suggestion? What does he say on the 3rd of March? He says—

“Pray do not consider me in any way to advocate retention of the Soudan; I am quite averse to it, but you must see that you could not recall me, nor could I possibly obey until the Cairo employés get out from all the places. I have named men to different places, thus involving- them with the Mahdi; how could I look the world in the face if I abandoned them and fled? As a gentleman, could you advise this course? It may have been a mistake to send me up, but having been done, I have no option but to see evacuation through, for even if I was mean enough to escape, I have no power to do so. You can easily understand this; would you do so?”—[Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 156.]

Would any hon. Member do so if he were in General Gordon’s place, except those who sit on the Treasury Bench? Then, later on, we have that well-known telegram of April 16, in which General Gordon says—

“As far as I can understand, the situation is this—You state your intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber, and you refuse me Zebehr. I consider myself free to act according to circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I can suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall retire to the Equator, and leave you the indelible disgrace of abandoning the garrisons of Sennaar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola, with the certainty that you will eventually be forced to smash up the Mahdi under great difficulties if you would retain peace in Egypt.”

Did any British Government ever receive such a telegram from one in their employment without the power of resenting it? And why have they not got that power? Because they know full well that the country agrees with General Gordon. So all help is refused, and that prophecy of Gordon’s is fulfilled which, on the 7th of March, was published in The Times newspaper—

“Be sure of one thing; if Her Majesty’s Government do not act promptly, Graham’s victory will go for naught, and, with the useless expenditure of blood, the effect of it will evaporate.”

Now we find how the net begins to close around him. On the 17th of March he is described as defending himself against the rebels around Khartoum with soldiers who are defeated simply because they do not desire to fight. On the 25th we hear of two Pashas being executed for treason, and General Gordon receives a hostile and insolent message from the Mahdi. On the 7th of April comes the first news of danger to Berber. On the 19th the massacre of the garrison at Shendy takes place, and on the 20th Sir Evelyn Baring reports that unless there is some prospect of help held out to Hussein Khalifa, there is risk that he will be thrown into the arms of the rebels, which would seriously affect Gordon’s position; and yet, on the 24th of April, having heard all this on the 22nd, the Prime Minister actually told the House of Commons that there had been no essential change in the position of General Gordon in consequence of the fall of Berber. I think that that is not an unfair instance of the extraordinary way in which, for weeks past, Parliament and the country have been misled by the obstinately optimist ideas of the Prime Minister and his Colleagues. Of course, I do not question that those right hon. Gentlemen believe what they told Parliament; but I find it absolutely impossible to understand how they can have derived from these published despatches, or from any confidential Papers in their possession— which, indeed, I fear are more likely to show a worse side of the case—impressions so diametrically opposed to those which, I venture to say, any unbiased mind must have derived from the perusal of these despatches. On the 21st of April Her Majesty’s Government at last discover that the danger at Berber appears to be imminent, and to suggest —and this is almost the only suggestion they have made—negotiations. On the 23rd the Governor of Berber reports that all the country is joining the Mahdi, and asks for troops, which obviously could not then be sent to Berber in time, inasmuch as, in the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government themselves, it would take 16 weeks to perform the journey.

Now comes the last telegram, which is a most remarkable one. I do not wish to do any injustice to Her Majesty’s Government. I am going to make an admission. Her Majesty’s Government are charged in many quarters with wilfully abandoning General Gordon. The admission I am going to make is this—that the Prime Minister has admitted to the full the obligation of Her Majesty’s Government to provide for General Gordon’s safety; but, unfortunately, in spite of all the proofs that the net has closed around him, Her Majesty’s Government, and first of all the Prime Minister, absolutely refuse to recognise that the General is in any danger at all. Why, Sir, on the 3rd of May the Prime Minister told the House that there was no military danger threatening Khartoum. But what did General Gordon himself think of his position? A month ago this bravest of soldiers telegraphed to Her Majesty’s Government—”God willing, I will never be taken alive.” Would General Gordon have used those words if he had recognised that there was no danger in his position? What are the facts? I have no doubt that we shall be told that Khartoum is amply supplied with provisions, although even that point does not now seem absolutely clear. My noble Friend near me asked this evening about a despatch from Sir Evelyn Baring relating to this matter, from which it is perfectly obvious that some material facts connected with this subject are not known to the House. It may be; and from the words of that despatch I fear it is only too likely that after all “the sufficient supply of provisions” at Khartoum is not more than enough to last to the end of the current month. But granted, if you like, that Khartoum is sufficiently provisioned until the autumn, famine is not the principal danger with which Khartoum is threatened. The principal danger which besets General Gordon is not famine, nor even, the attacks of the insurgents outside; but it is treachery within the town. The House will remember that a considerable number of the soldiers whom General Gordon sent down to Berber went over in a body to the insurgents. The House will remember that, when called upon to fight against the insurgents, General Gordon’s own soldiers were defeated simply because they declined to fight. The House will remember that General Gordon had to execute two Pashas for treason, who, of course, had friends in the garrison; while, if the last report be true, General Gordon has had to fortify himself within his own town against the disaffected part of the population. If it should happen that his position becomes so dangerous that he may wish to escape with his friends by the river, what chance has he of effecting such an escape? The Nile is low, and the insurgents have not only rifles, but they have artillery. They have six guns, besides the Krupp gun which they captured from General Gordon, which was said to have been spiked, but which we have since heard was not permanently injured. This constitutes a formidable danger to any chance of escape which General Gordon might have had. Yet, in the face of these facts, what are the terms of the telegram of the 23rd of April?

General Gordon, who is in this position, is asked in that telegram by Her Majesty’s Government to inform them, in reply to a question which will probably never reach him, not only as to any immediate, but as to any prospective danger to Khartoum. General Gordon, beleaguered in Khartoum by hosts of enemies, bound there even more strongly by those feelings of honour of which Her Majesty’s Ministers never seem to think, is asked to state to Her Majesty’s Government the cause and intention with which he continues in Khartoum. General Gordon, who cannot know anything that is passing outside Khartoum, except from the merest rumours, is asked to advise those who have never yet taken his advice as to the force necessary to secure his removal from Khartoum, the condition of the roads, and the proper time for the operation. Could anything exceed the cruel irony of that telegram? If anything could add to the astonishment and disgust with which it has been read by the country, surely it would be the concluding words expressing respect and gratitude to General Gordon for his gallant self-sacrifice and for the good he has achieved. What is the value of that respect and gratitude? This is a matter which cannot be trifled with by the Government.

I believe that the people of this country are determined, whatever Her Majesty’s Government may think of General Gordon’s position and claims upon them, that not a hair of his head shall perish, and that he shall be saved with those who have trusted in him. To rescue him you must rescue them also. What are Her Majesty’s Government going to do? It is not for me to suggest the course which they should take. What I have undertaken, however imperfectly, to show to the House is how, by their own conduct, by their own inaction, when action was possible, they have brought things to such a pass that it is difficult indeed for anyone to know how to carry out that which we all, I hope, desire to accomplish. There is one thing which Her Majesty’s Government ought to have done weeks ago, and which they ought to do, if it be not too late, to-night, and that is to proclaim, their determination that General Gordon shall be rescued; and they ought to follow up that statement by taking actual steps to place themselves in a position to carry out their intention— peacefully, by all means, if possible; but by warlike means if the work cannot be done without military co-operation. I venture to say that every hour of delay will only increase the danger of General Gordon, the difficulties of Her Majesty’s Government, and a still graver risk, because it is a risk of wider scope than anything that can happen to General Gordon himself. Sir, there is a very old quotation which I should not think of inflicting upon the House did it not contain a moral which, it seems to me, is never present to the minds of Her Majesty’s Government. It runs as follows: —

“Principiis obsta; seró medicina paratur
Cum mala per longas convaluere moras.”

As individuals, Her Majesty’s Government are men of decision and action; but collectively they are cursed with this fatal curse—that they are never able to make up their minds in time. It was but the other day that the Prime Minister pointed out to Parliament the success which General Gordon had achieved in putting a stop to the onward movement of the troops of the Mahdi. That statement was perfectly true. The personal influence of General Gordon did achieve, for a time, very material success in this direction. I believe that if General Gordon had been supplied with material assistance, at a time when it could have been sent to him at a comparatively small risk, he would have been enabled absolutely to stem, at Khartoum, that wave of religious fanaticism and social anarchy which we call the movement of the Mahdi. But what is the position now? General Gordon lies helpless and beleaguered at Khartoum. The advancing tide has surrounded him. It has overwhelmed Berber; it is rapidly approaching Dongola, although its approach is concealed by the euphemistic words of the Under Secretary, who said that near Dongola there is a very considerable movement among the population. Notwithstanding this, all that we have heard of any preparations for meeting this rapidly-advancing and terrible danger is that two or three battalions of the Egyptian Army may possibly be despatched to Upper Egypt, and a rumour that Her Majesty’s Government intend to send a great British expedition to Egypt in October. Why, Sir, if the recent news be true, long before October our small British garrison in Lower Egypt may be fighting for their lives. This danger must be stemmed somewhere. It is a duty incumbent upon us by reason of our position in Egypt, and a duty the fulfilment of which will rightly be exacted from us by the whole of the civilised world.

Have Her Majesty’s Government the faintest conception of their responsibility in this matter? In the debate which took place on the Motion of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition in February last, some right hon. Gentlemen sitting on the other side of the House, who were naturally anxious to find a reason for supporting Her Majesty’s Government, told us that they would give their votes on the side against which they spoke, because they believed that the policy of hesitation which the Government had up to that time pursued had been discarded, and that energetic action had taken its place. I should like to know whether the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), or the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) are quite satisfied, after reading these despatches, that the expectation which they then formed has been fulfilled? I am quite aware that votes on a Motion such as that which it is my duty to propose are often decided by a feeling of general confidence in the Government of the day, which it is now, perhaps, somewhat difficult to justify, and which, therefore, is more likely to be privately entertained than openly avowed. It is a remarkable circumstance, however, that, either in or out of this House, it has been impossible up to this time to find any expression of complete approval of the policy of Her Majesty’s Government in the particular matter which it is my duty to bring before the House.

The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) may be congratulated upon the fact that he has, for once in a way, been able to formulate a proposition with which everyone in the House must agree. We must all, of course, regret with the hon. Baronet that General Gordon has not yet succeeded in bringing to a successful conclusion the mission which he has undertaken; but I do not think Her Majesty’s Government will be able to agree with the rest of the hon. Baronet’s Motion — I mean the part in which he asks the House to express its objection to any course which will involve the taking of any military steps in connection with General Gordon’s mission — for the Government have already admitted their obligation to provide for the safety of General Gordon. Then comes the Amendment which has been put upon the Paper by the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell). The phrases of the hon. Member are a little involved, as is not unusual; but, as far as I can understand, what the hon. Member means is that General Gordon should be ordered to abandon the expedition on which he has embarked, and to abandon also those with whom, and in defence of whom, he has stated his determination to remain at Khartoum. Her Majesty’s Government have been competent to suggest such an abandonment; but I do not think that even they would venture to order it. Then the hon. Gentleman the Member for Grimsby (Mr. Heneage) begins with a censure on Her Majesty’s Government, for he expresses his regret that General Gordon has not been recalled. He goes on, however, to express his confidence that Her Majesty’s Government will take all possible measures to insure the safety of Generals Gordon and Stewart. I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on his confidence; all the more because the only basis on which it can be founded is, that they failed to take steps in time to relieve the abandoned garrison of Sinkat, and that they have themselves declined, in the despatch of April 23, to recognize the danger of General Gordon, or to do anything to relieve him until they receive information, which there is hardly any chance of their being able to obtain. We do not ask that Her Majesty’s Government should undertake an impossible task; but we do ask, and I will venture to say the country demands, that Her Majesty’s Government shall not call measures impossible simply because they are unwilling or afraid to try them. The Motion which I make cannot, I believe, be met by the Prime Minister with any comments, however free, upon the repeated Votes of Censure which have been brought forward in Parliament, or be put aside by appeals to that popular feeling which it is very difficult to excite in favour of a more rapid progress with the legislative proposals of the Government. No, Sir; the Motion can only be met by Her Majesty’s Government undertaking and proving that they will leave no stone unturned to avert from this country the intolerable stain which would be left upon her honour by any injury inflicted upon General Gordon, and that they at last have made up their minds, in a moment of supreme difficulty, to do what they ought to have done long ago—namely, to grasp this Egyptian Question boldly, as becomes the Government of the Queen. Sir, if the Prime Minister cannot satisfy the country upon these points, I will venture to prophesy that in spite of his great career, and in spite of his commanding abilities, he will not long escape the condemnation of an outraged people. The right hon. Baronet concluded by moving the Resolution, of which he had given Notice.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

“That this House regrets to find that the course pursued by Her Majesty’s Government has not tended to promote the success of General Gordon’s Mission, and that even such steps as may be necessary to secure his personal safety are still delayed.”—(Sir Michael Hicks-Beach.)

March 23, 2020
Ernest Armstrong – 1978 Speech on Playground Safety

Below is the text of the speech made by Ernest Armstrong, the then Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, in the House of Commons on 21 March 1978.

My hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr Rose) has raised an important subject tonight, one which I know has concerned him for some time. I for my part welcome this opportunity to discuss a subject which closely affects families throughout the country, particularly those with younger children. I want to set out the steps the Government are taking to deal with the question of children’s playgrounds. I assure my hon. Friend that I will read carefully the report of what he has said tonight. We are both on the same wavelength. I take on board what he has said and will discuss his proposals with him.

There is no doubt that children have a deep and strong motivation for play. Play is one of the essential elements in growing up. We must therefore, ensure that opportunities for play, suitable and safe for each stage of development, are available as far as possible to all children.

There are certainly dangers, as my hon. Friend has said. The great majority of accidents to children in playgrounds are not of the same severity as those that occur daily on the roads. Fortunately, few playground accidents give rise to more than slight injury. But, as my hon. Friend has made perfectly clear, in some cases the damage from accidents in playgrounds can be very serious. For the child and the family any accident, wherever it occurs, which maims, perhaps for life, represents a terrible tragedy which we want to avoid.

I agree with my hon. Friend that we must do everything we can to ensure that the risks from injury in children’s playgrounds are minimised. Being realistic, I do not suppose that it will be possible to prevent children from finding new ways of using—or abusing—equipment. If we close playgrounds they may well find more dangerous things to do. But I am sure that a lot can be done to keep the risks within reasonable bounds.

My hon. Friend has suggested a number of improvements. Many of these have been recommended by the Research Institute for Consumer Affairs as a result of research which was funded, in part, by my Department. When we contributed to the research project, we were expressing our concern to find out more about accidents and we are anxious that the RICA recommendations should generally be carried into effect. They are of course, largely a matter for implementation by local authorities, and it was with this in mind that we reprinted the report and sent copies of it to authorities to ensure that they were aware of its findings and could take the necessary action.

We do not know with any accuracy how many accidents there are each year. At the time the RICA report was made, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer Protection was launching the new accident surveillance system. That is concerned with collecting information about accidents in the home. The RICA suggested that the scheme be widened to embrace playground accidents. To have done this then would have delayed the existing scheme, and I am sure that my hon. Friend would agree that it was perhaps better to get on and get the scheme established. I am, however, pleased to be able to tell him that the new scheme has now settled down and that there are to be discussions between Departments about bringing other types of accidents, including play accidents, into the scheme. The scheme is already providing information about play accidents in private gardens.

Perhaps, however, the most important aspects for us to consider in seeking to reduce the toll of accidents are those of the design and maintenance of the equipment itself, as my hon. Friend said. A major step here lies in the work now being carried out by the British Standards Institution. It is reviewing the current British standard relating to the design of play equipment. My Department is represented on the appropriate technical committee and has taken an active part in promoting safety as an aspect of the standard.

The standard will take account of new evidence on safety and the results of work in other countries. It will, therefore, cover such matters as the height of equipment, and ground clearance, so that limbs are not trapped. It will also include guidance on the construction, siting, installation inspection and maintenance of equipment, and the nature of the surrounding surfaces. The new standard will, therefore, represent a major step forward.

The timetable for the production of the new standard tends, however, unfortunately to be fairly long. The BSI, under its charter, must have regard to all the views put to it as a result of its public consultation as well as the views of its technical committee. I hope, however, that the new standard can be published later this year. Indeed, in order to help matters along, my Department is now making accommodation available for additional meetings of the BSI technical committee.

We shall certainly set in hand a review of the existing advice about safety given by my Department and other Departments so that we can consider the question of new advice following publication of the new standard.
But, in the meantime, with much in the way of safe equipment already on the market, authorities should clearly have close regard to safety in providing new equipment or in replacing existing pieces of equipment. All the help that my Department can give is, and will continue to be, available to them. We have for some time advised that slides should be built in to natural or artificial mounds so that, if a child does fall, it does not fall too far. I was glad to hear my hon. Friend’s comment on that. There is also some expertise about the use of impact-absorbing surfaces surrounding equipment and of the siting of such equipment as swings away from other equipment to minimise the risk of children being hit.

There is, too, as I am sure my hon. Friend will agree, scope, for imaginative creative work by manufacturers. Many pieces of equipment now available are likely to meet the requirements of the new British Standard. I hope that manufacturers will continue to rise to the challenge of designing for safety and will not wait for a new British standard before considering the wider implications of the new approach that the BSI is showing.

Perhaps a bit more difficult for some authorities are questions about maintenance and supervision. The RICA rightly attached some importance to this, though it also made clear that there was little evidence to suggest that anything but a small proportion of accidents in a survey had actually been caused by poor maintenance or by vandalism.

I hope that authorities will consider whether they have adequate arrangements in this respect, although I fully appreciate that there are staffing and resource implications which may make the full implementation of the recommendations very difficult. The RICA did, for example, find evidence of neglect of some equipment, and, while this may not have made it unsafe when it was seen, it could quite quickly have become unsafe. At best, therefore, I hope that authorities will aim for some arrangements for regular supervision of inspection of equipment.

Let us not forget that parents have a part to play. They can help authorities by drawing attention to equipment which is in need of repair, and they can also help to prevent accidents by going with young children to playgrounds or by making sure that children are accompanied by a responsible adult. If equipment is really unsafe, parents will, surely, want to stop their children from using it.

My hon. Friend made a forceful plea for legislation requiring minimum standards. Frankly, I doubt that we need to go that far. Most equipment is provided by local authorities. They are responsible bodies, and I have no doubt that many of them are already heeding the advice given in Government circulars and more recently in the RICA report.

We shall soon have, too, the new British standard which has specific regard to safety. I am confident that that will mark the beginning of a new determination, on the part of manufacturers and local authorities, to remove the anxieties of parents wherever their children go off to playgrounds. Risks cannot be removed overnight, but there is, I believe, much that can be done to bring early improvement.

I have concentrated on the question of safety, as this was uppermost in my hon. Friend’s speech this evening. But I do not wish to overlook another aspect of the subject—that of ensuring that there is adequate provision of acceptable play and recreation facilities for our children.

In this decade, for example, there has been a marked improvement in the level of provision for children at play in new council housing developments, and there is no doubt that the subsidy that my Department gives for this purpose has made a major contribution to this end. We are also making significant progress in relation to the proper landscaping and layout for playgrounds.

However, in many areas there are still insufficient facilities for children to play safely and happily. This problem is particularly acute in some of our inner city areas, where all too often the only spaces for children to play are derelict houses, vacant sites, streets and pavements—places which can expose a child to more horrifying dangers than a playground ever can.

The advice given in DOE Design Bulletin 27, issued to local authorities in 1973, is particularly relevant here. It emphasised the importance of providing supervision for children’s play, particularly for the young and the deprived. Supervision can extend the range of play activities, help to compensate physically and socially deprived children, and for some provide opportunities for acquiring language and social skills. Skilled play leaders can enable the resources of built-up inner areas to be used to better and fuller effect by children.

This is one of the reasons why supervised play schemes have always been a major beneficiary of the urban programme, and projects concerned with children in inner city areas will continue to form an important part of the programmes being prepared by the partnership areas and the programme authorities, and grant-aided by my Department.

I hope that I have indicated this evening that the Government share my hon. Friend’s concern that there should be sufficient opportunities for children to play safely and happily. Next year, 1979, has been declared by the United Nations as International Year of the Child. I hope that this will provide an opportunity not only for the Government but for all bodies concerned with the welfare of children to make a special effort on their behalf, and particularly on behalf of those children most in need. If we can see in 1979 a reduction in the number of children hurt at play, a significant contribution will have been made to making IYC a success.

I congratulate my hon. Friend on raising this matter. I assure him of my concern. We shall continue to monitor very carefully the progress that is being made.

March 23, 2020
Paul Rose – 1978 Speech on Playground Safety

Below is the text of the speech made by Paul Rose, the then Labour MP for Manchester Blackley, in the House of Commons on 21 March 1978.

In past debates and at Question Time I have frequently expressed a concern, which I know is shared by many hon. Members, on the subject of industrial safety and, indeed, road safety. More recently there has been an upsurge of interest in the dangers associated with the rather over-publicised pastime of skateboarding and the need to provide proper facilities away from traffic and other hazards.

It is a curious fact, however, that the House has spent very little time considering the provision of leisure facilities in general and, more particularly, for the very young and even less time—if any time at all—upon the hazards associated with existing playgrounds provided for young people.

I express my appreciation at the reversal by the Minister of State, Home Office of his original decision to end the grant to the organisation Fair Play for Children, which has done much valuable work in this area.

Similarly, I welcome the initiative of the Minister with responsibility for sport and the Sports Council in promoting suitable recreational projects in inner city areas. I also endorse the Government’s view that grant aid ought to be given by the Sports Council to such projects with the emphasis upon priority for these deprived areas. I hope that the series of conferences in the regions being held by the Minister with responsibility for sport, and indeed other Ministers in the Department of the Environment, will bear fruit in alleviating the lack of facilities in these deprived areas. What troubles me, as a former chairman of the North-West Sports Council, is that in the past we have neglected the needs of the very young and that there is a paucity of research into the dangers associated with the equipment that is at present provided.

In February the Department of the Environment announced to me, in reply to a Written Question, that the British Standards Institution is now proposing a new standard for play equipment as well as including advice on its maintenance, construction and installation. These are welcome advances, but they highlight the lack of attention previously accorded to the problems which afflict our concrete jungles and waste lands and the 150,000 accidents annually which require medical attention, which take place in the playgrounds which we currently provide in our towns, cities and rural areas.

Large areas of waste space exist in our cities, not least in the central areas. Some are privately owned, some are publicly owned, and others belong to local authorities. Many can be converted into temporary or permanent play spaces. Dual use of school facilities has long been advocated by sports councils all over the country—this is a delicate topic—but there are still many recalcitrant local authorities.

There is scope under the job creation programme—a matter for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment—for play leaders and supervisors. There is the advantage to the whole community of creating within those areas a sense of community, an easing of some of the racial and inter ethnic tensions which exist, and permitting an outlet for the energies of youngsters in a society where nearly half the crime today is committed by juveniles.

Criminal statistics are published annually. Yet the Department of Health and Social Security does not consider it practicable to keep statistics on the numbers or, indeed, the types of injuries caused to children who suffer accidents in these playgrounds.

There are no mandatory provisions for local authorities. The furthest the Government have gone is to issue guidance to local authorities on the provision of play equipment on housing estates, as well as advice about accident prevention. There is no means of enforcing any of this guidance, any more than there is any real Government initiative in using waste lands in towns and cities for projects involving playgrounds, or projects involving gardening, or for some of the more adventurous projects such as introducing farm animals into inner city play areas, or helping local groups or individuals to find and secure waste land for such projects. Many of these projects have proved to be self-financing.

Adventure playgrounds very often have an entirely new concept of creative play, and they do not require the expensive equipment that is often provided in the older type of playground. They avoid many of the hazards associated with swings, slides, roundabouts and rocking horses. They need play leaders and participation by the community in the most advanced projects, but tonight I should like to concern myself primarily in the latter part of what I have to say with the question of safety. RoSPA and the Research Institute for Consumer Affairs have provided much of the useful data in an area where so little research has been carried out. Indeed, it is astonishing how little attention has been paid to this subject among researchers and by this House.

Clearly, the maintenance of playgrounds leaves a great deal to be desired. One has so many examples of playground surfaces littered with rusty metal, broken glass—only tonight I heard of one such example—old bricks, splintered wood on swings and see-saws, wobbly climbing frames and ladders, missing handrails, jagged metal and missing bolts on slides. Those are just a few things. One could go on and catalogue hundreds of the results of failure to maintain and supervise many of our conventional playgrounds.

I know, for example, that in my own native Manchester supervision is left to the parkkeepers. They do an excellent job, but they have so many other duties that they cannot possibly pay attention to this matter in the way that is necessary. Supervision is one of the most important factors in cutting down risk—and this is one area in which I do not believe it is right to cut back on public expenditure—not least from vandalism and from the misuse of equipment.

The greatest single cause of accidents, from the available studies that one can lay one’s hands on—and there are not many—is swings. The most serious accidents arise from falls on to hard surfaces from climbing frames or ladders, and it was always a matter of amazement to me, I think ever since I was a youngster playing on a playground myself, that if I fell I would fall on concrete and not on to a softer surface. Roundabouts and rocking horses with exposed mechanisms can lead to trapped limbs. Nevertheless, three-quarters of the serious accidents today involve head and face injuries, fractured skulls and concussion, and a recent study at University College Hospital shows that three-quarters of the youngsters admitted there fell on to hard surfaces, most commonly from a climbing frame.

The British Medical Association Journal of 8th November 1975 did a remarkable study of 200 accidents. The mean average age of the youngsters who were involved was 6·3. Swings accounted for 61 of those 200 injuries, and 13 of them were fractures. Climbing frames accounted for 54, including 14 fractures. These were the most serious accidents.

Slides accounted for 39 accidents, including 14 fractures. Roundabouts accounted for 15 injuries, including six fractures. All the researches I have been able to do bear out this general pattern in relation to the type of accident.
Above all, therefore, softer surfaces around equipment would eliminate a high proportion of that type of accident.

Grass and sand are difficult to maintain, perhaps, but there are now many synthetic surfaces on the market. Rubber tiles, for example, can be fitted beneath climbing frames. They do not need to cover the whole playground. Impact-absorbing swing seats, rubber cushioning around the edges or simply rubber tyres can cut down a whole number of accidents where children run close behind a moving swing. The siting of the swing is particularly important. All that may sound obvious, but it is not done. Slides often involve the risk of a youngster falling to his death from 20ft. Yet all that needs to be done is to build them on mounds following the contours of the ground or on artificial embankments to ensure that there can be no serious falls.

Moving equipment should be designed and installed so that fingers, arms or legs cannot be trapped between the stationary and the moving parts or between the moving parts and the ground.

I was particularly interested in the graphic and horrific examples, which any factory inspector would be more familiar with in the industrial context, in the magazine Design. If the law lays down mandatory safeguards in respect of factories, it should do so in respect of children.

One example was the six-year-old boy in Fife killed falling from a 20 ft.-high playground slide—about the height of the one I take my youngest child on. I nearly have a heart attack every time, but he seems to enjoy it.

A girl was scarred for life by a piece of metal on a slide penetrating her leg from the knee to the top of her thigh. Another girl was scarred for life and knocked unconscious by a swing in Walthamstow.

However, it is right to say that the GLC playgrounds are probably the safest in the country, as there is permanent supervision and regular inspection. Elsewhere, however, too often the pattern is of ancient, rickety equipment, protruding, rusty nails, inadequate supervision, bad siting away from first aid equipment or a telephone, and virtually no inspection. The separation of equipment for older children from that provided for younger children, intelligent siting, barriers by swings and the exclusion of bicycles are all obvious safety factors which are too often ignored.
Design concluded that the most important contribution to playground safety would be to raise the level of selection and overall supervision of playground equipment within local authorities. Too often this is just one more task for an overworked parkkeeper or grounds-man.

Government guidance is necessary. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Minister for what has been done in recent times. But I should like to see mandatory standards in design, manufacture, installation, maintenance and supervision of playground equipment. Children no longer work in factories or in mines, but they are entitled to the sort of protection afforded to those who do. They have no protection at all. It is time to attack obsolete equipment, to produce official statistics, and to take immediate action to remedy the dangers I have outlined, by the comparatively simple methods which I have sought to suggest.

Of course, playgrounds prevent more serious dangers than the alternative of playing on the roads, railways or canals and other dangerous spots. I accept that there are dangers wherever children play. But there is a growing awareness of the problems I have raised. I believe that voluntary and official bodies must press for greater and safer provision.

Children do not have votes, but their parents do. I hope that this debate will stimulate more parents, local authorities and voluntary organisations into taking a long, hard look at what I believe to be a neglected topic. I hope that they will try to instil some greater sense of urgency into Government action.

We cannot leave safety to voluntary bodies or uneven patterns of concern. We need positive, mandatory standards, and they should be linked to a more generous approach to the provision of new and more exciting facilities to provide broader horizons and space to breathe and develop for those children confined to an environment of tawdry tower blocks or, as is so often the case in the North of England, crumbling Coronation Streets in twilight areas of our cities and towns.

I hope that my hon. Friend will be able to give a positive response to this appeal.

March 23, 2020
Clinton Davis – 1978 Statement on Tanker Amoco Cadiz

Below is the text of the statement made by Clinton Davis, the then Under-Secretary of State for Trade, in the House of Commons on 20 March 1978.

The “Amoco Cadiz”, an American-owned tanker registered in Liberia with a cargo of 223,000 tons of light Iranian and light Arabian crude oil, lost steering control on 16th March off Ushant. It was subsequently taken in tow by a tug, but the tow parted and the tanker drifted ashore on rocks late that night some three miles from Portsall on the North Britanny coast and about 90 miles from both the Lizard and the Channel Islands.

As soon as it was clear on the morning of 17th March that there would be coastal pollution, we offered assistance to the French authorities and subsequently to the Channel Islands. We also sent to the scene of the casualty a pollution expert from Warren Springs Laboratory and a coastguard inspector to establish personal liaison with the French authorities. I have maintained close contact with them over the weekend through my Department’s emergency operations room which has been manned throughout.

About half the cargo is thought to have spilled from the tanker, which broke in two on Friday, and the rocks and shallow water near the wreck make pumping out operations extremely difficult. There is heavy pollution on the North Brittany coast and this has spread south-west and north-east on the French side of the Channel. Yesterday evening we agreed to a French request to send five spraying vessels to deal with the pollution to the north-east of the wreck, thus providing some protection to the Channel Islands as well as to the French coast. Three of the vessels, to be accompanied by a naval frigate, are now in position, but there is a Force 8 wind, which will make spraying operations difficult.

These vessels are being supplemented as necessary in consultation with the French authorities. Other vessels and aircraft are at readiness at Plymouth, though there is no immediate threat to our coasts.

I am sure the whole House will join me in expressing to the French authorities our profound concern and sympathy on the occurrence of this disaster, parallelled only in scale by the “Torrey Canyon” disaster 11 years ago. While the collaboration between our two Governments on Channel safety and anti-pollution measures is very close, I have made it clear that I should like to have an early meeting with my French opposite number to discuss all the lessons of this disaster.

Mr. Parkinson

Is the Minister aware that we join him in his expression of sympathy to the French authorities, and in particular to the people of Brittany whose fishermen and tourist industry may face a very bleak summer? May I also assure him that we welcome the Government’s decision to offer aid to the French Government?

Is the Minister satisfied that proper arrangements have been made to protect the Channel Islands and the West Country coastline? Does he agree that it was ironic in the extreme that this terrible accident took place on the eve of the first World Maritime Day? Does not this accident confirm the importance of the work of IMCO in seeking to raise international shipping standards? Does it not further underline the need to improve arrangements for shipping safety in the Channel?

Mr. Davis

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his remarks about the declaration of sympathy for the French authorities and for the people of Brittany, who have been afflicted by this disaster. On the subject of the Channel Islands and the West Country, I must inform the hon. Gentleman that we are doing everything possible to ensure that the maximum degree of protection is afforded to both areas.

I think that it is perhaps a bitter irony that this disaster occurred on World Maritime Day, but whenever it happened it would have been a disaster. It underlines the need for international action through the United Nations international body that is responsible for maritime affairs. Although it is much too early to judge, there is some satisfaction to be derived from the fact that at the last IMCO conference on tanker safety and pollution a consensus was reached about certain protections that should be afforded to the way in which tankers operate in future.

The hon. Gentleman asked me whether there is anything more that we can do. I believe that we have maximised the effort that we can undertake. The Royal Navy will participate to the full.

Mr. Prescott

My hon. Friend has noted the comparison that may be made between this incident and the “Torrey Canyon” affair. We are fortunate that there has been no loss of seafarers’ lives on this occasion, but will he recognise that yet again we are faced with the failure of a flag of convenience country to observe international conventions? That is why my hon. Friend should be addressing his attention to calling all European nations to come together to enforce regional agreements and to ensure that the standards and competence of the crews of such vessels are up to the standards that we enforce in this country.

Mr. Davis

There is to be an IMCO conference in June and July to deal with international standards of certification for seafarers to ensure that we achieve a higher standard of competence in future. That is warmly welcomed by the United Kingdom.

My hon. Friend should not expect me to answer the first part of his question. Obviously, there is bound to be an inquiry into this sad affair. It would be wrong of me to attempt to prejudge responsibility for the incident, which, of course, is bound to be a most difficult issue.

Mr. Stephen Ross

Is the Minister aware—I am sure he is—of the quite sickening effect that these continuing disasters are having on the populace in this country and throughout the world, as well as the sad effects on wildlife, which always suffer in vast numbers whenever there are oil slicks? Why is it that the United Kingdom still continues with the spraying of detergents and does not adopt the process of booms and skims that has been taken up by most countries throughout the rest of the world? Is the hon. Gentleman able to assure us that skims and booms will be available to protect Britain’s South Coast resorts? What is happening about the pumping out of the remaining oil from the tanker?

Mr. Davis

With respect, I do not think that the hon. Gentleman has applied his mind properly to these issues. It must be understood that we do not rely merely upon detergents. Indeed, we have a reluctance to use detergents. We have to adapt to meet different circumstances. The fact is that booms and skimmers would not operate in the prevailing conditions.

Mr. Stephen Ross

How do we know that?

Mr. Davis

Booms and skimmers would not operate off the French waters at present. There is a Force 8 gale. There has been a profound research study into booms and skimmers, which is nearly completed. I hope that the results will be published shortly. That does not mean that in the interim booms and skimmers are not available. The fact is that they are.

Mr. Norman Atkinson

My hon. Friend has referred to the international conference on tanker safety. Does he agree that the time has come when the maritime nations of the world can no longer accept the situation where good marine and ship design is sacrificed for the sake of transport economics? Does he agree that this disaster demonstrates that single-screw, single-steering gear ship designs of this sort, with crude tonnages of the sort involved in this disaster, are totally inadequate, and that Governments should now insist upon the sort of tanker design that would eliminate the vulnerability that this ship in distress demonstrated yet again? Will my hon. Friend consider the recommendations that have been made by marine engineers over the years for changing ship design in that direction?

Mr. Davis

I am not an expert on ship design. It would be presumptuous of me to make declarations about what is and what is not the right thing to do in the circumstances. There are international requirements dealing with steering gears. It would be wrong to convey a different impression. My hon. Friend is once again inviting me to make a comment that could easily have the effect of prejudging an inquiry that is bound to take place.

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker

Order. I ask for briefer questions. This is the time not for arguing the case but for seeking information.

Mr. Patrick McNair-Wilson

Is the Minister aware that at Fawley I have the largest oil refinery in Britain, which obviously creates much local concern? Is the hon. Gentleman further aware that in the White Paper that was published after the “Torrey Canyon” report it was suggested that IMCO would look at the practice and law regarding these accidents? Will he tell the House what action was taken as a result of the meeting of IMCO after the “Torrey Canyon” report? Finally, does he agree that when ships are crippled in such a way as was the “Amoco Cadiz”, the vessel should be towed into deeper water, rather than brought ashore, until the emergency services have been properly alerted?

Mr. Davis

I am being asked for detailed information on what I think should have happened. I am not at liberty to make such comments. The hon. Gentleman should know that there have been many deliberations at IMCO on this and other matters affecting tanker safety and the safety of other vessels. IMCO has a good reputation among United Nations’ agencies in that regard. The real issue is not so much the resolutions, declarations or conventions that are made at IMCO as the will of nations to enforce them. There is not sufficient evidence of such will among a number of countries. I do not believe that the United Kingdom is among those countries.

Mr. Faulds

One sentence—does not this incident point up the Government’s wrong-headedness in opposing the separate bulkhead concept at the recent London conference?

Mr. Davies

One word—”No”.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop

Will the Minister try to persuade our partners in the EEC to set a date after which single-screw tankers will not be permitted within the territorial waters of any EEC country so that they do not lose directional stability when steering gears fail? Will he fix a date for that to take effect within United Kingdom territorial waters, irrespective of whether there is agreement, so that avoidable hazards due to lack of steering may be put into the past? Is the hon. Gentleman aware that a multi-screw craft is able to steer even without its rudder?

Mr. Davis

I shall consider that matter, but I am bound to say that sometimes we have to differentiate between human error and the availability of proper facilities on the vessels. However effective those facilities may be, we are always subject to the element of human error.

Mrs. Dunwoody

Is my hon. Friend aware that it does not matter how many resolutions are passed, because, unless the United Kingdom leads a campaign against tax havens where standards of safety are not maintained, we shall not have any protection from these accidents?

Mr. Davis

I am aware that the vessels of some flags of convenience countries have a bad safety record. I repeat that if I were to condemn this Liberian vessel merely because of that, it would be grossly unfair in advance of an inquiry.

Mr. Wiggin

Will the Minister confirm that all requests from the Channel Islands are being fulfilled and that equal priority will be given to them as if the mainland were affected? Will Britain assist to break up the slick even though it may be in international waters?

Mr. Davis

The answer to those questions is “Yes”. We are providing additional assistance today at the specific request of the Channel Islands to provide them with concentrates if they are needed.

Regarding operations in international waters, we have in practice carried out our obligations to our partners, the French, in that regard. We have every intention of doing so in future should another calamity of this kind take place.

Mr. Adley

Is it not disgraceful that international oil companies should be allowed to cut corners literally by sailing within two miles of coastlines, be they in Brittany or elsewhere, to save half-an-hour or an hour’s sailing time with the appalling risks paid for not by the oil companies but by the communities concerned when things go wrong? Will the Minister set his mind urgently to reaching agreement with the French that these oil tankers should stay 12 miles offshore other than at times when they are coming into and going out of harbour?

Referring to the point made by the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. Ross), is it not also disgraceful that the oil companies should be the main manufacturers of the detergents which they sell at considerable profit after having caused the mess by allowing spills to take place?

Finally, dealing with the Warren Spring Laboratory, will the Minister look at the answer that was given to me after the “Urquiola” affair in May 1976, that

“Offshore trials have been planned and will be undertaken in the near future”

on international oil recovery equipment? These trials, two years later, have still not taken place.

Mr. Davis

The hon. Gentleman knows that there has to be a scientific assessment of these matters, and that takes time. I have already indicated, notwithstanding his exasperation, that the research is very nearly completed.

As for his taking up of Mr. Chirac’s suggestion—

Mr. Adley

It is not my suggestion.

Mr. Davis

I know that Mr. Chirac is waiting on every word from the hon. Gentleman. We must have regard to the fact that it would be difficult for tankers to remain 12 miles offshore when going through the Dover Straits.

March 23, 2020
Denzil Davies – 1978 Speech on the Economic Policies of the European Community

Below is the text of the speech made by Denzil Davies, the then Minister of State at the Treasury, in the House of Commons on 16 March 1978.

I beg to move,

That this House takes note of EEC Commission Documents Nos. COM (77) 620 final, R/2355/77 and R/415/78 on Economic and Monetary Union and Co-ordination of National Economic Policies.

These three documents contain proposals by the Commission to try to achieve a better and more balanced overall economic performance by the member States of the Community in the next few years. The document on the prospect of economic and monetary union, COM(77)620 final, outlines a five-year programme covering four main areas, convergence of economic policies, the completion of a common market, and structural and social policies. The communication on improved co-ordination, R/2355/77 covering COM(77)433 final, discusses a number of practical steps that member States might take to that end. The economic and monetary programme, R/415/78 covering COM(78)52 final, contains specific proposals for action this year.

Before referring to the content of the documents perhaps I may put them in an appropriate context with a brief account of how they are being considered in Brussels. Last December, the European Council took note of the document on prospects for economic and monetary union but agreed to await the advice of Finance Ministers before it attempted to form a view. All three documents are currently being subjected to a detailed examination by the specialist economic and monetary committees that advise the Finance Councils, and by the Committee of Central Bank Governors. Finance Ministers are expected to begin discussion of them shortly on the basis of reports from these Committees. The present debate will enable the views of Members to be taken into account at ministerial level, prior to further discussion at the European Council.

It may help the House if I outline briefly the background and scope of the present initiative by the Commission which is embodied in these documents. It is convenient to take as a starting point the Summit meeting of the original Six members which announced at the Hague in 1969 that plans would be worked out

“with a view to the creation of an economic and monetary union “.

From this beginning came the report of the Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Luxembourg, with its concept of a Community proceeding rapidly to a fully fledged economic and monetary union in a few years. In accepting this initiative in 1971 the European Council committed itself to making the Community a single economy by 1980, with, in effect, a single currency and a single authority for domestic and external monetary management.

The sequel to this undertaking is well known. Some of the first stage of the Werner scenario—notably the system of maintaining EEC currencies within certain margins, known as the snake—was implemented, though even this was not effective for the whole of the Community for more than a few months. The 1975 White Paper on renegotiation stated that

“events have shown that the programme of movement towards full EMU by 1980 … was over-ambitious and unattainable.”

Let me assure hon. Members, especially my hon. Friends that the objective of EMU has not been formally abandoned, but all member States accept that it has become what might be described as a more distant goal.

The Community countries had been forced to focus their own efforts to overcome the problem which, in a sense, came to a head with the oil price crisis. But the emergence of inflation and recession, with poor confidence, poor investment and mounting unemployment, has increasingly led Member States to consider whether there can be benefit from concerted efforts and more economic convergence within the Community. I believe that there is now a much greater recognition that we should be talking about practical action in these areas, rather than having fruitless arguments about the unattainable.

Our economies are becoming more interdependent. Nearly half the external trade of the Nine is carried on within the Community. As a result, we must cooperate with our partners in the EEC to ensure that we achieve faster growth and continuing control of inflation. This aim of convergence of the economies of the Nine is the connecting thread that runs through all the documents.

Convergence is rather a general term and it appears that there is no single definition. Some Governments tend to equate it mainly with greater equality of living standards achieved possibly through a transfer of resources within the Community. Others stress the need to devise complementary economic policies designed to achieve faster rates of growth for member States leading to lower levels of unemployment. Yet others think primarily in terms of greater price stability throughout the Community. These objectives of lower unemployment and greater price stability that all member countries share will be furthered if convergence in some of these senses is achieved.

Document COM (77) 443 is the most important document on convergence. It makes a number of specific proposals designed to achieve more coherent and consistent economic policies. I shall return to these later.

Document COM(77)620 discusses the prospect of economic and monetary union. Broadly, the Commission sees progress towards EMU as two-stage: first, persevering with and intensifying a gradual approach; and secondly, deciding on significant transfers of economic sovereignty. The second stage, however, the transfer of economic sovereignty, is seen as a longer-term goal, and the Commission recognises that it cannot be reached in the immediate future. So we are left with the gradual approach, a vital part of which, apparently, is economic convergence.

Finally, we have the 1978 economic and monetary action programme—Document COM(78)52—which is the first year of a five-year action programme foreseeen in Document 620. Again, an important part of this action programme concerns economic convergence, and the document therefore reflects a number of the themes in Document 443.
Document 443 argues for three things: first, the extension of the existing system of budgetary guidelines and their stricter supervision; secondly, the fixing of monetary guidelines for each member State; and, thirdly, developing consultations on exchange rate trends and establishing exchange rate guidelines.

Mr. Neil Marten (Banbury)

Will the Minister explain a little more about how it is proposed to give guidelines on and more control of the money supply, which is what he was really talking about just now?

Mr. Davies

I think that the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that the documents are not particularly clear as to how this state of affairs is to be achieved, but I thought that I had better set out for the House the main proposals in the documents and then listen to hon. Members’ suggestions as to how they were to be achieved.

Mr. Ian Wrigglesworth (Thornaby)

I hesitate to suggest that the Minister, has not, perhaps, looked right through the documents, but if he looks a little more closely, he will see that there are proposals for meetings of central bank governors and co-ordination of monetary credit in the individual member count-tries. There is a fair amount of detail that we have not seen previously.

Mr. Davies

There are suggestions for a large number of meetings. Whether the suggestions will lead to practical decisions is another matter.

The convergence proposals in Document 443 are, essentially, summarised in the part of Document 620 which deals with economic convergence as one aspect of the five-year action programme which, the Commission believes, will pave the way for economic and monetary union.

Sir Anthony Meyer (Flint, West)

Are we listening to a Front-Bench speech, or is the hon. Gentleman making a Back-Bench speech from the Front Bench?

Mr. Davies

It should be noted, however, that this does not in any way imply that economic and monetary union will take place in five years. In fact, no timetable is proposed and I imagine that many hon. Members will share my view that this is a very distant prospect.

Additionally, Document 620 referred to the possibility of a return to greater integration of Community currencies, but it does not make any specific proposal on this and again does not set a rigid and inflexible timetable. The document also suggests that an objective over the five-year period should be an increase in the financial resources available to the Community. These refer specifically to regional policy, social policy, industrial policy and energy policy.

The two other main areas that the document covers are the completion of a single market and structural and social change. The completion of the single market covers such issues as tax harmonisation and freedom for internal capital movements as well as full exercise of the right of establishment. The suggestions on structural and social change cover the Commission’s intentions for Community action in industrial policy, public investment and social policy.

It is the objective of each of the five one-year programmes to make specific proposals fitting in with the overall strategy of Document 620. This is what COM(78)52 sets out to do. It therefore has sections on convergence of the economies, the single market, structural policies and social policy. With the exception of the first section, on convergence, the Commission’s document is basically a list of Community proposals, which in some cases have been on the table for many years and which the Commission would like the Council to agree in the course of 1978.

The section on convergence works through a similar analysis of the reasons why the European economies have in fact diverged and suggests ways in which greater convergence might be promoted. To some extent these represent a development on the Commission’s thought in Document 443. For example, Document 443 calls for the extension of budgetary guidelines to the whole of the public sector. Recognising, as a result of discussion on this point, that this would be premature, Document 52 merely suggests some further work on qualitative or quantitative data as the first stage in extending the scope of these budgetary guidelines.

Following the discussion at the European Council of 6th December, Documents 620 and 443 were remitted for study by the various specialist economic and financial committees of the Community, and the convergence section of Document 52 has similarly been remitted. The rest of Document 52 has been remitted to the Committee of Permanent Representatives. The attitude of the Government will be determined in the light of these studies and the views of Members.

Naturally, there is scope for considerable debate within the Community about the detail of some of the proposals. We and some of our Community colleagues have, for example, indicated that too much weight should not be put on the specific convergence of intermediate objectives such as monetary or fiscal or exchange rate policy. The important thing is for these all to be seen to be fully consistent with the overall objectives of the Community’s economic policy. The discussions in the specialist economic committees so far show that this broad approach has a good deal of support. Member Governments of the Community are also thinking on these lines. My right hon. Friend the Chancellor took part in a wide-ranging debate at the Finance Council on 20th February, where the clear objective was to see how far co-ordinated action could usefully stimulate growth throughout Europe as part of the search for solutions which need to be on a world-wide scale.

I am, of course, aware that there are within the House differing views about the role that the EEC should play in these matters. I can only reiterate what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister told the House on 7th December:

“Let us see how this new system can be of benefit to the United Kingdom in its recession as well as to Europe”.—[Official Report, 7th December 1977; Vol. 940, c. 1395.]

Certainly, whatever our views about economic and monetary union, or about the EEC itself, there can be little doubt that action to stimulate growth at a Community level in the recession carries with it the prospect of greater effectiveness than action by individual Governments.

One solid achievement over the last year or so has been the agreement reached on the need for a new aid to help the relief of unemployment amongst the young. With the active participation of the trade union and employer organisations, studies are taking place on, among others, the employment effects of investment, and of work sharing. Work sharing, as the TUC recognises, is an area where unilateral moves by an individual country could undermine that country’s competitiveness. I am therefore pleased that this is an aspect of economic convergence which is due to be examined in the action programme for 1978.

Again, the European Council last December recognised that solutions to the structural problems which are common to some industries in all member States must increasingly be sought at Community level. This is particularly true of the iron and steel, textile and ship building industries. There are other spheres where a concerted response may pay dividends. Multinational corporations pose special problems. It is in no one’s interest that they should seek to bid up investment aids by playing one country off against another. EEC ceilings on the amount of regional assistance that can be offered to such a project have an important part to play, while the different national systems of regional aids can take account of special national problems.

These are some of the positive ways in which the Community can help. We should not allow ourselves to be directed by irrelevant arguments about the unattainable. I firmly believe it is in our best interests, as well as those of the Community, that working together we seek common answers to the serious economic problems facing us. Provided we are vigilant about our national interests, I believe that we can shape the Community policies outlined in these documents to serve the interests of all the Community’s members.

March 23, 2020
Roger Moate – 1978 Speech on Swale Hospital

Below is the text of the speech made by Roger Moate, the then Conservative MP for Faversham, in the House of Commons on 15 March 1978.

My object in seeking this Adjournment debate is specifically to draw attention to the need for a new general hospital in the Swale area. I emphasise that this is the ultimate target. If we could gain acceptance for that, by implication there would be acceptance for all the other elements in the long-term capital programme for hospital development needed in the Medway health district. That district includes much of the Swale area.

Essentially, what I am trying to do is to see whether we can get a commitment to a sustained programme of major capital investment in the Medway health district to cover the next 15 to 20 years. I understand that such a commitment has not been unusual elsewhere nationally, and particularly in the case of teaching hospital development programmes. Just such a programme has been set out in the district plan of the Medway health district, published in September 1977. I understand that this plan has been endorsed by the Kent health authority, and I hope that it will be approved by the region and the Government.

The background to the plan is one of serious deprivation in terms of hospital facilities in the Medway district. I do not think that there is any dispute about the facts. The case has been put strongly in Adjournment debates raised by the hon. Member for Rochester and Chatham (Mr. Bean) and more recently by the hon. Member for Gravesend (Mr. Oven-den). The case has been pressed frequently and tirelessly by my hon. Friend the Member for Gillingham (Mr. Burden), who is hoping to catch your eye later, Mr. Deputy Speaker. This emphasises very much the fact that this is in no way a party political matter. Its history spans many previous Governments, and I suspect that before it is solved many future Governments will be involved.

The debates we have had recently have concentrated largely on the serious shortage of revenue available to Medway health district for the maintenance of our existing services. On 3rd March the Minister of State acknowledged that this year only £78 is being spent per person in Kent compared with £108 in Greenwich and Bexley and £122 in Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham. Incidentally, the Minister of State said that he intends to visit the district later this year. May I say how welcome he will be? I hope that he will find time to visit us in the Swale part of the district and see how inadequate are our hospital facilities.

There is no doubt that Kent as a whole is relatively under-funded. It is acknowledged that, within Kent, Medway is one of the most deprived districts. It is worth emphasising that, compared with the target allocations under the formula of the Resource Allocation Working Party, Medway is under-funded by £4 million, Maidstone by £5 million and Canterbury and Thanet—which includes part of the Swale district—by £6 million, which Kent as a whole is under-funded by £22·2 million.

Comparatively, the teaching area of Lambeth and Lewisham is, in theory at least, over-funded by £23 million. I say “in theory” because in practice I am beginning to think that the RAWP formula is in many respects unworkable and should be reviewed. It might work well in a period of increasing resources, but I question whether it really can work in a period of restriction. Can it really work when poorer districts can be helped only by the closure of hospitals in other districts? I regret to say that in the short term we seem to have very little hope of any substantial improvement in the revenue situation.

The extent of our deficiency in hospital services is quite dramatic. According to Government standards, we should have over 1,900 hospital beds. We have about 1,000. That is a shortage of 900 beds. Looking at the figures for the average daily bed provision per thousand population, we find that Medway is right at the dismal bottom of the league table, both for Kent and the South-East Region, and we are way behind the Department’s own recommended guidelines. This means longer waiting lists and that many patients have to travel longer distances for treatment. It means that in our area we face acute shortages in geriatric and maternity services and in acute surgery and psychiatric services.

Looking at the provision of capital funds, we see that the region comes out badly. Apart from massive investment such as £45 million for St. Thomas’s Hospital and Guy’s Hospital alone, the region has regularly had the lowest share of capital per head of population of all the regions in the country. This year the figure is £3·3 per head, compared with £9·2 per head in the best region. No new hospital has been completed in the South-East Thames Region since the start of the National Health Service in 1948, with the exception of Greenwich Hospital.

How is this great gap in the Medway area to be filled, and what assurances can the Government give to the people of Medway that in future adequate hospitals will be available? A programme has been drawn up for Medway and for Swale. This programme includes a number of major hospital developments. It includes the long overdue expansion of the Medway Hospital to provide, among other services, for extra geriatric, psychiatric and acute surgical services. It includes the improvement of All Saints’ Hospital, with a first priority for the new special care baby unit. It includes the phased provision of a second major hospital, ultimately to have 500 beds, in the Swale area. As the plan puts it, the site acquisition for this “should be pursued immediately”.

I emphasise that the intention to develop Medway Hospital to its full potential as an 800-bed district general hospital was agreed by the regional board in the 1960s. My hon. Friend the Member for Gillingham knows all about this, because he has been involved in it for so long.

Today we only have phase one, with 213 beds, and it is likely to be the mid-1980s before we see phase two completed, if we are lucky. Also, the idea of providing a second major hospital within the health district is not new. It was recognised and agreed by the former regional hospital board. The only change is that it is now the view that this second hospital should not be built on a site which would have been fairly close to the Medway Hospital but should be situated within the Swale area, to meet the needs of that expanding population. There is a strong case for this.

The population of Medway itself has increased by 30 per cent in each of the last two decades, and the population of Swale has also expanded substantially. It is significant that there is an exceptionally high proportion of young people and that this is expected to increase the demand for hospital facilities certainly into the 1990s. Therefore, it makes sense to have a new hospital in Swale. We accept that this is something for the longer term, but there will be no hope of achieving it even for the next generation, let alone the present one, unless we earmark a site now for the hospital and take steps to secure it now.

It is very difficult for the health authorities to make such a commitment when they are so desperately concerned to find enough revenue to maintain existing services, but it is our job to look ahead. This is where the Government can give the necessary backing to the region and to the district by supporting this capital programme.

I think that the case for the Swale hospital has been made very effectively in the Medway plan for which we are seeking Government support. A plan has been agreed for the provision of a new 28-bed geriatric unit at the Keycol Hospital. There is a desperate shortage of in-patient geriatric services, and this unit is needed. There is no conflict there with the long-term idea of a proposed Swale hospital development. I do not know whether there is yet an indication that the money for the Keycol project will be made available, but I hope that it will be soon.

Although we are talking about new hospital facilities, there is no fundamental belief that the answer to health care is simply to build bigger, better and more hospitals. That point has been made clearly and emphatically in the health district report, and the health care planning team emphasises that it sees the provision of in-patient services as being combined with the equally important aim of reducing the need for hospital care and treatment by developing community and primary care. But our case is that the existing provision of hospital facilities falls far below the minimum needed to provide adequate and decent hospital services for the people of the Medway and Swale area.

Before allowing my hon. Friend the Member for Gillingham to make his contribution, I ought to say that, in emphasising the need for a new hospital and in making a plea for it by drawing attention to the inadequacy of our present services, I do not wish it to be thought that I am denigrating the staff in our present hospitals, who do a splendid job of work, and the many voluntary organisations which give so much of their time and effort to supporting the existing hospitals. Even if we get a new Swale hospital, when we get the expansion and improvement of the hospitals about which we are talking there will still probably be some sort of role in the National Health Service for many of those hospitals.

Although the Minister may not be able to promise us the money, I hope that he will at least be able to promise a sympathetic look at the need in the Swale area for a new district general hospital.

March 23, 2020
Boris Johnson – 2020 Statement on the Coronavirus 22/03/2020

Below is the text of the statement made by Boris Johnson, the Prime Minister, on 22 March 2020.

Good afternoon everyone

Thank you for coming, and thank you to Robert Jenrick, the Communities Secretary, and Dr Jenny Harries, the Deputy Chief Medical Officer.

I want again to thank everyone in the country today for the huge effort that we are collectively making.

I want to thank the amazing workers in the NHS, everybody working in social care, in every sector, in food distribution, transport, you name it – absolutely everyone who is keeping this country going today.

And I want to thank everyone who is being forced to do something differently today.

Everyone who didn’t visit their mum for Mother’s Day but Facetimed them, Skyped them, rang them instead.

Thank you for your restraint and for what you did.

Everyone who was forced to close a pub or a restaurant or a gym or any other business that could have done fantastic businesses on a great day like this.

Thank you for your sacrifice, I know how tough it must be.

And I can tell you again that this government will be standing behind you – behind British business, behind British workers, employees, self-employed – throughout this crisis.

And the reason we are taking these unprecedented steps to prop up businesses, support businesses and support our economy and these preventative measures is because we have to slow the spread of the disease and to save thousands of lives.

Today we have come to the stage of our plan that I advertised at the outset, when we first set out the plan of the UK government.

When we have to take special steps to protect the particularly vulnerable.

I said the moment would come where we needed to shield those with serious conditions. There are probably about 1.5 million in all.

And in a minute Robert Jenrick will set out the plan in detail.

But this shielding will do more than any other single measure that we are setting out to save life. That is what we want to do.

Also to reduce infection and to slow the spread of the disease.

We have to do more to make sure that the existing measures that we are taking are having the effect that we want.

So it is crucial that people understand tomorrow that the schools are closed.

And tomorrow you should not send your child to school unless you have been identified as a key worker.

And more generally in the view of the way people have responded over the last few days to the measures we have set out I want to say a bit more about how we interact outdoors.

Of course I want people to be able to go to the parks and open spaces and to enjoy themselves – it is crucial for health and mental and physical wellbeing.

But please follow the advice and don’t think that fresh air in itself automatically provides some immunity.

You have to stay two metres apart; you have to follow the social distancing advice.

And even if you think you are personally invulnerable, there are plenty of people you can infect and whose lives will then be put at risk.

And I say this now – on Sunday evening – take this advice seriously, follow it, because it is absolutely crucial.

And as I have said throughout this process we will keep the implementation of these measures under constant review and, yes of course, we will bring forward further measures if we think that is necessary.

Always remember that in following this advice- and I know how difficult that is – that each and every one of us.

You are doing your bit in following this advice to slow the spread of this disease.

The more we collectively slow the spread, the more time we give the NHS to prepare, the more lives we will save, the faster we will get through this.

And always remember – we will get through this, and we will beat it together.

Next Robert Jenrick to outline the shielding measures.

March 22, 2020
Anthony Kershaw – 1978 Speech on Overseas Students

Below is the text of the speech made by Anthony Kershaw, the then Conservative MP for Stroud, in the House of Commons on 13 March 1978.

I wish to call the attention of the House to the treatment which overseas students in this country are receiving. I shall argue that the policy of Her Majesty’s Government towards them is unjust, even illegal, and that the consequences are hurtful to the students and harmful to the interests of the United Kingdom.

In fact, it is difficult to know what the policy of Her Majesty’s Government is, because they have not at any time spelt out the basis of their approach. In 1976, the Secretary of State announced various increases in fees, the result of which is that overseas undergraduates pay £650 compared with £500 for home students, and graduates £850 compared with £750 for home graduates.

However, in November 1976 the Secretary of State said that it was her intention, in due course, to remove the fee differential. Even if this is a rather a hollow promise, because fee levels effectively apply almost solely to overseas students since the vast majority of home students have their fees paid by public funds, nothing has yet been done towards fulfilling that promise. The Minister of State last July was only able to say that increases for the coming year would be made to take account of inflation.

We have had inspired Press leaks which indicate that future policy will be towards positive discrimination in which rich students from richer countries will be charged very much higher fees, calculated to produce £120 million in a year, which will be used to subsidise poor students from poorer countries. I ask how it will be possible to determine the real income of students, how it will be possible to make it compatible with the free entry to universities of students other than those nominated by their home Governments. That is something I cannot understand.

How are the countries to be nominated? As someone pertinently asked, are we now to refuse education investment into the United Kingdom from the United States in projects such as those from the Brookings Institute?

How do we stand with regard to the EEC? Are we to continue to charge high fees and to keep on raising them against other countries—against countries such as Germany and France, who receive a far larger number of British students than we take from them and who charge nothing or almost nothing? If those countries retaliate, what will be the effect on our students wishing to go abroad? Has that been considered?

Is the conduct of the Government in this regard compatible with membership of the EEC? The only thing that the Government have done to mitigate hardship is to replace the widely used overseas students fees award scheme with the fee support schemes for postgraduates only. This has proved totally inadequate. The burden of easing hardship has been shuffled off on to local authorities, who are inappropriate for the job, and upon universities and polytechnics, who have struggled to help but without the slightest assistance from Government, except the so-called £1 million divided between universities and the State sector, which was not additional real money but was what would otherwise have been cut. What is certain is that the Government wish to limit the number of overseas students.

The public expenditure White Paper of January 1978 shows the decline in the number of overseas students anticipated, from 52,000 this year to 44,000 in 1981–82, in higher educational establishments, and from 28,000 to 22,000 in non-advanced institutions. Why have these figures not been made public by the Department responsible and justified by argument? Why do we learn of them from a Treasury table? I shall tell the Minister why this is so. These instructions about quotas come from the notorious and largely incomprehensible Circular 8/77. This circular not only imposes quotas but authorises differential tuition fees, local education hostel charges and admission charges. It encourages reclassification of certain categories of immigrant students so that they may be charged higher fees. The circular apparently includes in the quota students who are wholly paid for by their own Government, imposing no charges on the British taxpayer and bringing in investment earnings.

For example, 1,500 Nigerian students are due here in September, bringing in £7 million a year. But they are to be part of the quota, apparently, a quota presumably designed to limit our costs. In fact, they are a profit.

The reason why the Department of Education and Science will not explain its circular and give guidance to LEAs and others is that, paradoxically, it acts not in the name of common sense but for fear of offending against the Government’s Race Relations Act, which was designed to prevent, not promote, discrimination.

I call upon Her Majesty’s Government, who so recently worked themselves up into a phoney lather about immigration and race, to withdraw Circular 8/77, which I say is morally and legally offensive. There sit the racists tonight—in the Department of Education and Science.

The harassment of overseas students is becoming a scandal. Their hours of attendance are checked. They are forbidden to apply for continuation courses until their examination results are through, by which time they may well be too late to apply for the next course.

The Inner London Education Authority, that creature of this Government, fined two London polytechnics £50,000 for accidentally exceeding their quota of overseas students, though I understand that one has now been let off paying that amount. Referring to this shameful incident and to the whole matter, The Times Higher Education Supplement wrote:

“Either they’

—that is, the polytechnics—

“must work an unworkable racist quota, and thus perhaps fall foul of the law. Or they can refuse to work it and be fined.”

In short, overseas students in this country are being treated not as honoured guests but shabbily, as if every one of them was a potential illegal immigrant. This curmudgeonly attitude is directly contrary to the short-term and long-term interests of the United Kingdom.

In the long term, the kind of reception and treatment which students receive here will have an important influence on those who, in later years, will be prominent in the counsels of their countries. Our industrial, cultural and political influence in the world will to some extent depend upon what they have thought of us.

In the short term, the Treasury calculations of the costs of overseas students are manifest nonsense. These calculations appear to take no account of the money which students spend while they are here. The calculations depend upon the total costs of an institution being divided by the number of students to give a cost per head, ignoring that the buildings, the professors and the other overheads would still be there even if not one overseas student came. It is very arguable that, far from there being an expense, there is a net profit from overseas students.

Certainly, the calculations take no account whatever of the academic value to us, especially of post-graduates. Great institutions such as the London School of Economics would be lamed and crippled if their numbers of foreign students were drastically curtailed. It is not only a matter of academic benefits. The material benefits of post-graduate research can be demonstrated to have brought much benefit to us, notably, perhaps, in medicine.

No British student, so far as I have been able to ascertain, has been excluded from a course by too many foreigners. On the contrary—many courses from which British students take benefit could not be kept going without the foreign entry. But even if it were to happen that British students replaced foreign ones, that would bring not savings but extra expense, for we should be substituting subsidised British for fee-paying foreigners. The Government’s argument is economic nonsense, founded upon a false premise and wholly against the interests of this country.

What is to be done? The first thing is to decide who in the end is responsible for policy. At least eight Departments, starting with the Department of Education and Science, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Overseas Development and the Home Office, have different and conflicting interests and responsibilities in this matter. Someone must be found to take overall charge if the drift is to be stopped.

It is natural to look to the Secretary of State for Education and Science to do this, but she has been a great disappointment. When she came to office she was widely regarded as a person in whom people of differing opinions could place confidence. When she leaves office, as shortly she will, she will be remembered as the best receiver of delegations in the business. Everyone goes away satisfied, but after a bit everyone notices that nothing happens.

The Secretary of State gives the lie to the old saying

“There is no smoke without fire”.

With her, there is nothing but smoke. There is no fire of action, no flame of determination, and apparently no influence in the Cabinet. However, some Department must take the lead, whether the DES or another Department.

My second suggestion is that, as there are so many conflicting influences, a commission of all those professional, academic and voluntary bodies directly interested, perhaps with the right to summon civil servants, should be set up to give advice. Such a body would provide a focal point where the interests of the universities, of educationists generally and perhaps also of this House and of the Government Departments concerned could be thrashed out. The Minister would benefit as a result.

Certain it is that at present Government policy is obscure, unfair and contrary to the interests of this country.

March 22, 2020
Clinton Davis – 1978 Speech on Stansted Airport

Below is the text of the speech made by Clinton Davis, the then Under-Secretary of State for Trade, in the House of Commons on 10 March 1978.

The hon. Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. Haselhurst) has spoken eloquently about his fears concerning the future of Stansted Airport, but he has failed to give any proper recognition to the considerable effort the Government have deployed to develop sensible and realistic policies which take account of the views of those most concerned with airport development. I heard no word of that in his speech. He has attributed designs to the Government that I reject as being no part of our policy. I hope I shall be able to give him some reassurance on this point.

As to a debate on the White Paper, I would certainly very much welcome that possibility, but the hon. Gentleman knows what the agenda of the House of Commons is before Easter. I do not have to remind him about that. With respect, that was rather a fruitless effort on his part, but if the Opposition feel as devotedly about it as he does, there is the opportunity of a Supply Day. I look forward to seeing whether the Opposition want to take advantage of that.

The White Paper on airports policy is the result of unprecedentedly extensive consultations. We started the process in 1975, when we published the consultative document “Airport Strategy for Great Britain”, which sets out in the greatest detail the major issues involved in planning airport development for the future—the need for additional capacity in the London area, the problem of aircraft noise, the implications for the environment, for surface transport and for employment.

This was backed by an analysis or demand forecasts and by detailed supportive evidence on other technical matters. The Government’s intention was to lay the whole problem open to discussion and to involve all those concerned or affected by airport development in the policy-making process. In consequence of that, nearly 1,000 organisations and individuals contributed their views, and many took part in discussions—and in discussions with Ministers. It is from this thorough, painstaking, examination that the Government’s policy has emerged.

The Government never expected that its conclusions would be universally accepted. This is just not possible when there are so many conflicting views and interests. What we have sought to do, and I think succeeded in doing—I think this is generally accepted, despite the hon. Gentleman’s assertion—is to strike a balance and adopt a sensible, flexible approach to airport development. We have acknowledged that our conclusions, particularly as regards the London area, are based on demand forecasts which are inherently uncertain. Who could have forecast the changing developments which took place between 1970 and the present day?

The hon. Gentleman is inviting ms, in fact, to be more certain in my forecasting over the next 12 years. I cannot do that. But what we have undertaken to do is to keep these forecasts under constant review—another point that he failed to mention —and to lay the methodology of forecasting open to discussion, so that decisions about the future may be taken in full knowledge of the facts and of the uncertainties. I think that that is a particularly reasonable way of going about this matter. It involves open government in this area, and I should have thought that that would be welcome to the hon. Gentleman.

The White Paper is concerned with the 1980s. With regard to the longer term, the Government have undertaken to continue to consult consumers of air services, amenity groups, local authorities and others about the provision of capacity beyond 1990. There is no question of taking decisions about the longer term by stealth. Any further development must be subject to full and wide-ranging consultations, as I have said on a number of occasions. That is clearly stated in the Government’s policy.

I visited Stansted on 13th February to discuss the White Paper with representatives of the various interests concerned. The hon. Gentleman was there. I invited him to attend my discussions. There was nothing furtive about it at all. He will know from his attendance that I totally rejected any suggestions that the Government have a ready-made solution and have already taken a decision to develop Stansted Airport or that there are any ineluctable development. I confirm to the House what I said to the people of Stansted.

As explained in the White Paper, the problem we have to face in the London area is the shortage of airport capacity in relation to the expected growth in demand. The forecasts suggest that demand will range between 66 million and 89 million passengers a year by 1990—as the hon. Gentleman said—compared with a throughput of about 33 million in 1977. However, we have grounds for believing that the top end of the forecast range is too high.

The hon. Gentleman asked me to say something about the methodology of the forecasts and the discussions that took place on the forecasting. There was the most careful consultation between the CAA and the BAA. There was also discussion with British Airways and British Caledonian. Although I cannot tell the House today what their present views about the forecasting may be, they are entitled to have their views. One has to channel those views through the machinery that we are proposing to set up. We see no reason for being tardy or for delaying the establishment of the machinery. We need to do that as rapidly as possible.

Capacity at the four main London Airports—Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted and Luton—will be close to 50 million passengers a year by the end of 1978 when existing development work at Gatwick and Heathrow will have been completed. This should be sufficient to meet demand during the early 1980s, provided that a better distribution of traffic can be achieved between the respective airports.

Beyond that, the White Paper provides for expansion of capacity at the existing airports up to 1990; a fourth terminal at Heathrow, raising capacity to 38 million subject, of course, to the results of the public inquiry but no fifth terminal; a second terminal at Gatwick, raising the capacity from 16 million to 25 million, but no second runway—it is the view of the BAA that there is no need for a second runway—and smaller improvements at Stansted and Luton to enable these airports to handle 4 million and 5 million passengers a year respectively.

The White Paper expressly rules out any further expansion at Heathrow, Gatwick and Luton, but a major expansion at Stansted remains a possibility in the longer term if demand continues to grow. But that stands alongside several other options.

It is this which has led to the hon. Gentleman’s unease, because he would like a ceiling to be set on the expansion of Stansted and he believes—wrongly, as I said earlier—that the decision has already been taken to expand Stansted to an airport on a similar scale to Gatwick.

Mr. Haselhurst rose—

Mr. Davis

I shall not give way because I have rather a lot to say. The developments I have described are all subject to the normal planning procedures and, as appropriate, to a public inquiry, as in the case of the fourth terminal at Heathrow. They would provide a total capacity of 72 million passengers a year at the London airports. We believe that this will be sufficient to accommodate demand up to 1990, depending on the outturn of traffic. As I said earlier, we intend to monitor demand very closely, and to improve our forecasting methods, in order to base longer-term decisions on more accurate data, and to avoid being tempted by costly and grandiose projects which could turn out to be white elephants, as I believe Maplin would most certainly have been.

Some would have preferred the Government to commit more than £1,000 million of taxpayers’ money to the building of the first stage of Maplin, with all the necessary road and rail connections. But, as a responsible Government, we examined the proposition in great detail, in the light of the demand forecasts, and rejected this solution emphatically at the time.

The first stage of Maplin would have provided accommodation for 18 million passengers a year. But the proposals in the White Paper would provide the same level of passenger capacity at Gatwick, Stansted and Luton, at a cost of only £150 million. That is an important figure, an important difference. We believe that it is necessary, particularly in the light of current economic expectations, to continue to restrain public expenditure. We believe that that should be done in practice as well as in theory, although it is the theory which applies mostly to Opposition thinking.

Because of the uncertainty of demand forecasts and of the massive costs involved in airport development, we have decided to adopt a step-by-step approach to the provision of airport capacity. That means that we shall take the necessary decisions at the appropriate time.

As regards Stansted, I am only too well aware of the opposition of local amenity groups to any expansion whatsoever. I was told, when I went to Stansted, that the tom-toms of the natives were beating steadily. There are other views which have been put to me. As a Government we have to take a broad view and seek to balance the conflicting interests, taking a less jaundiced view of what the local interests are than some would have us take.

The aim of our strategy is to meet the expected growth in demand. There is no escaping the fact that 80 per cent, of all passengers using London airports have origins and destinations in the South-East. While the development of tourism in the region and the rationalisation of regional airport capacity should help to divert traffic from London in the longer term, it would be unrealistic to try to compel passengers to use airports remote from their homes or destinations. We have to face the fact that London airports will continue to bear most of the burden.

My right hon. Friend announced on 5th April 1977 that charter traffic would be banned from Heathrow starting on 1st April this year and that the Government and the British Airports Authority would pursue a policy of transferring scheduled traffic to Gatwick, with a view to sharing the load more evenly between these two major airports. We have already made some progress in that direction, and Gatwick is rapidly developing into a major international airport.

Part of the Government’s policy, as outlined in the White Paper, is to concentrate short-haul charter traffic at Luton, and, over time, long-haul charter traffic at Stansted, which at present is grossly under-utilised, as the hon. Gentleman accepted.

The aircraft noise situation at Stansted is less adverse than that of any other London airport. Moreover, the policy on night jet restrictions will ensure that noise disturbance at night is kept to a minimum, as traffic there develops. I believe that Stansted must play its role in helping to meet the demand during the 1980s. It would be quite inequitable to expect that other airports, which already handle considerable volumes of traffic, and the large number of people living in their vicinity, should accept a greater share to spare the Stansted area.

With regard to the future, I want to make it clear again that the Government do not at present envisage the expansion of Stansted airport beyond a capacity of 4 million passengers a year. In the longer term, beyond 1990, there is likely to be a need for additional capacity in the London area, if demand continues to grow. With the increasing use of larger aircraft, this should not involve the construction of a massive four-runway airport, as envisaged in the earlier proposals for Stansted, Cublington, or Maplin, but a more modest solution. It is that which represents the difference in the parameters of thought between what I am saying and what the hon. Gentleman was seeking to stipulate.

The White Paper sets out the three possibilities, to which he referred. We are prepared to consider these three possible solutions and the other options which might be proposed for meeting the demand. We shall shortly be discussing with local authorities and others concerned the setting up of a formal structure to advise on longer-term policies.

The Government have no preference for one solution over another. All of the options will be thoroughly examined before any decision is taken. We have given sufficient proof of our determination to continue the process of consultation which has worked well in the working out of the national airport strategy. Our intention now is to take the right decision at the right time.

The hon. Member has poured scorn on some of the propositions in the White Paper. I think that he has been less than fair. He is characteristically a very fair Member, but I understand that his thinking must to some extent be subjective.

There are obviously constituency interests which must impinge upon his consideration of these matters. I make no complaints about that. He is here, among other things, to defend his constituency interests. But what I want to establish quite clearly in this debate is that we have no intention of trying to ignore those constituency interests—of developing, as I have said, Stansted by stealth. That would be most unfair.

The hon. Member sought to intervene earlier. I have virtually completed what I want to say. In fairness, I let him intervene now.

Mr. Haselhurst

I am very grateful to the Minister. It was a question of the constructive intent of the Government rather than the deliberate intent, and if their forecasts are wrong the worry is that the inevitable consequence will be a further expansion at Stansted and that that is being made necessary by the strategy.

Mr. Davis

I understand the hon. Member’s concern, but we have neither an express nor an implicit design to go beyond what we have said in this debate or in the White Paper. I want to be absolutely fair to the people living around Stansted and working around Stansted. They have a right to be consulted. They will be consulted. Also, of course, the local authorities in the whole of the London area have a vested interest in ensuring that the development within the London area is sensible and pays heed to the various conflicting interests that apply.

March 22, 2020