UKPOL.CO.UK

Tag: Speeches

  • Giles Shaw – 1978 Speech on Bread Prices

    Below is the text of the speech made by Giles Shaw, the then Conservative MP for Pudsey, in the House of Commons on 18 May 1978.

    I beg to move,

    That this House takes note of the Bread Prices (No. 2) Order 1976 (Amendment) (No. 5) Order 1978 (S.I., 1978, No. 516), dated 31st March 1978, a copy of which was laid before this House on 31st March.

    We turn from the problems of Fleet Street and industrial relations at a fairly late hour at night to discuss another problem which is in no way related to it, namely, the maximum price orders for bread. We make no apology for seeking to have a debate on this matter. As the House will observe, it is not a Prayer but a motion to take note that we are debating.

    There are, we believe, very good reasons why we should set aside a little time to discuss questions concerning the pricing of bread and the methods under which the pricing is currently administered. Let me say at the outset that what we are not debating tonight is a motion which could result in a change in the bread price. This is not a debate to affect prices in the shops, as might be the case if we were to find ourselves asking the Government to tear up the order and reduce the price of bread by 2p, 3p or 4p.

    I suspect that hon. Members on each side of the House know full well that there is a substantial gap in the relationship between the maximum price order that we are debating and the prices which are charged for bread in the shops. This has nearly always been the case, so that we have to admit straight away that the maximum price order permits a range of prices in the standard loaf between 28½p and 31½p, according to the area of the country.

    We are not debating what the consumer should be charged for bread. We are debating the method by which the Government are using a maximum price order under the Prices Act 1974 to seek to influence that price. The maximum price order has been operating for some time. It came into effect, according to Statutory Instrument No. 516, on 3rd April 1978, so that any views we may seek to express about it now must be essentially retrospective. This is another ​ reason why we are not talking here about suddenly reducing overnight the price of bread in shops.

    There are, in my view, important reasons why we should have a discussion about the order and why we should question the wisdom and, indeed, the desirability of orders of this kind. I think it could be reasonably said that they seem to be sadly irrelevant to the real problems of the baking industry and the distribution, the pricing and selling of bread today.

    I think it right that I should remind the House of some of the actions which the Government have taken in recent years in the name of affecting the price of bread. There was the initial period of substantial subsidy, followed by the steady withdrawal of subsidy. After that came the maximum price orders, one of which we are now debating. Then we had the imposition of discount controls, which were subsequently removed. Then we had the price check scheme, involving a wide range of household foods. Then we had the implementation of changes in the Price Code. This was admittedly a code which had existed for some time back. The Price Code system was then replaced by the operation of the Prices Commission under the new legislation introduced by the Conservative Government.

    There have been frequent investigations by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission into the operation of the bread industry. It has considered the steadily reducing number of large bakers and whether they were operating within or without the public interest. I doubt whether there is an industry in the country which has been examined by the Commission as frequently as the baking industry.

    It is not surprising, therefore, that one could say about bread prices and the baking industry that there has been virtually no agency of the Government, no method of intervention or piece of legislation which involves pricing or regulation which has not been applied at some time, and in some strength, to the operations of the baking industry with particular reference to the price of bread. Our colleagues in the baking industry would say ​ that these various devices which Governments have introduced have been operated with great frequency.

    It is not just a matter of taking a quick dip-stick here and there. It is a matter of regularly examining in depth the way in which the industry operates and the prices for bread which it charges to the consumer. It is not surprising that in recent years the baking industry has been in some state of turmoil. It is also not surprising that many of those who work in the industry should feel that the scale of intervention and examination and the number of restraints placed upon the marketing operations for bread have contributed in large measure to the decline of certain sectors of the bread industry and to a general air of lack of confidence in the way in which the industry operates.

    As the Monopolies and Mergers Commission pointed out in its report last year, Government interference has played a major part in creating the industry’s present problems. Tonight we are discussing a maximum price order for the 28-ounce loaf which in area 1 involves a recommended price of 28½p. I should correct myself. It is not even a recommended price, it is a statutorily imposed maximum price. No loaf in area I should be sold at a price higher than 28½p. Within the area of variations the scale rises to 31½p in area 4. The standard recommended price, therefore, ranges from 28½p to 31½p. What a far cry that is from the 1974 General Election campaign when there were charges and counter-charges across the hustings of the possibility and threat of the “three bob loaf”. That was the way in which bread prices were talked about in the not-so-distant past. Now we are talking about bread prices reaching a figure double that operating at the time of the 1974 General Election. That reason alone justifies the opportunity to debate the pricing of bread in this House.

    A lot of howling took place when the threat of 15p per loaf was suggested. Indeed, from then on the price of bread has escalated rapidly in line with the general rate of inflation and with the hideous increase in costs which manufacturers have incurred. In my view the price of bread has probably for far too long been the talisman by which the cost of living is measured. One can understand ​ that. There has been the old concept of bread being the staff of life. It has been the diet of the English, Scots, Welsh or Irish for so long that it has become a traditional form of measuring the daily diet and the traditional way of describing the impact of prices or costs on the individual family.

    On would not deny that bread is an extremely important component in the housewife’s budget. But one of the penalties of being a talisman by which we wish to measure costs or prices in general as they affect the family is that Governments cannot leave the price alone. It has been one of the things which magnetically have attracted them to seek to influence the price, to subsidise it, to stabilise it, to control it, to regulate it or to offer, as we have in this order tonight, a means by which a maximum price, area by area, can be established. Yet, for the most part, in recent times the consumer has not been as besotted with the price of bread as perhaps Governments have. Let us face it—there has been a steady, consistent and long-term trend away from the consumption of bread.

    Since the war, the basic consumption has fallen from some 50 ounces per head per week—I make no apology for using the old Imperial measures, which now the Government have blessed—to 30 ounces per head per week. It is estimated that in April 1978, consumption was running at some 3 per cent. below what it was in April 1977. Frankly, there appears to be little expectation that this trend will alter.

    Therefore, I think that one can conclude that the days of an increasing bread market are now over and the days in which the consumer was, as it were, wedded to that particular form of nutrient are also over. There is too much competition in processed foods. There are too many other alternatives on offer to consumers in forms and at prices which they find attractive.

    Let us not deceive the House. Bread continues to be a very important commodity. But the trend of consumer expenditure and consumption of bread has clearly shifted, and in my view it has probably shifted permanently.

    Therefore, consumption has been affected, and therefore, the importance and the capacity of the industry have been affected.

    On 8th April there was an article in The Times entitled

    “Britain’s shrinking stomach for bread.”

    No doubt the Under-Secretary has read it with some care. It contains this sentence:

    “If people did not turn back to eating bread in the lean years of economic recession, they are hardly likely to start eating more of it when they have more money in their pockets.”

    Therefore, I think that one could turn to the prospects for the bread market and say that it is almost certain that the days of heavy or higher consumption of standard forms of bread will probably not return if what we hope is achieved—namely, an increase in the standard of living, with more money available for expenditure on the whole range of foodstuffs. The consumption pattern has probably moved on and moved down.

    However, given that particular climate of how the consumer behaves towards bread, Government policies on price regulations and profit control have been operating in entirely the other direction. In fact, Government policies in this area have been pretty disastrous. Can anyone really deny that if Spillers Company had been earning adequate profits on its baking of bread and bread products, 8,000 jobs would be available today which, alas, are not available, and presumably 14 or more of the 23 plants would now be available for work when they are now threatened with closure?

    Surely this is a sad commentary on the ways in which Governments have sought to intervene in the marketing of bread and the profitability of baking, to a point at which one-third of the industry, in terms of the three major plant bakers, has been forced to close. It is a very odd commentary on the Government’s attitude to this problem that the Secretary of State did not see fit to refer a change in the industry’s marketing potential, from three manufacturers to but two manufacturers, to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.

    Obviously, the Secretary of State took the view at the time that what was more important in the general interest, as he saw it, was the preservation of the maximum number of jobs rather than the preservation of optimum variety and availability to the consumer. We must take note that in relation to competition policy, ​ however strident the Secretary of State may be, when it comes to the crunch of decision, his decision clearly lies as it did in the case of sugar refining, in favour of maintaining the optimum number of jobs, even if this means that the consumer is put at risk of a reduced variety and a reduced availability of products. That is something to which we ought to return on another occasion.

    However, with the prices charged for bread and the costs incurred in the baking of bread, all of our major United Kingdom bakers are operating at unprofitable levels. Associated British Foods and Rank Hovis McDougal have made no secret of the fact that the baking operations of their groups are unprofitable.

    We are debating a maximum price order for the products of an industry in which at this time a year ago there were three major plant bakers. There are now two. That reduction has taken place with the blessing of the Secretary of State. The baking and the production of the product are unprofitable for each of the two remaining plant bakers.

    We have to hope that the so-called rationalisation, which is the polite word for what is now happening, will result in an improvement in the utilisation of capacity and in a reduction of overheads per ton of bread produced, which might help profit margins in baking. What we cannot accept is that maximum pricing is a sensible and relevant system of handling a market when the unprofitability of the lines on which we are seeking to impose prices has been so clearly demonstrated and has been taken to such inordinate lengths that major closures have occurred.

    Mr. Douglas Jay (Battersea, North)

    If the hon. Gentleman’s main complaint is the unprofitability of the industry, will he at least mention that wheat imports into the EEC are now bearing a 100 per cent. levy? Is it not natural that if the main raw material of the industry is artificially increased in price by 100 per cent., the industry will become less profitable for that reason?

    Mr. Shaw

    I think that that is so, but, as the right hon. Gentleman will no doubt agree, even under the restrictions pertaining now under the Price Commission, the recovery of those raw material prices is admissible by the Price Commission as ​ costs. Under the Price Code, which operated for most of the period under discussion, such recovery was freely admissible.

    Mr. Jay

    But that would mean passing on the 100 per cent. levy on the import price to the consumer, would it not?

    Mr. Shaw

    The right hon. Gentleman is correct. The argument that I adduce is that the price of bread has been held down for so long to a level that is clearly unprofitable that there is an inability to recover costs. The consumer has been encouraged to believe that there is a low and acceptable price for bread. That is not so.

    Only two policies can emerge from that situation. We either drive people out of work because the industry is operating unprofitably, or we seek to contain prices through subsidy and taxation. The Government have achieved some progress in that latter course—namely, their decision to reduce the subsidy and the level of taxation. However, they still seek to impose some control on the price of bread by means of maximum price orders. That is entirely artificial. It distorts the market for the buying and selling of bread.

    It has been long held on the Opposition Benches that, however skilfully we design intervention in the market place in pricing policy, the distortions that we create will inevitably come back in one form or another to rebound to the discredit of those who intervened. It comes back either in the unpalatable form of increased prices or in decreased jobs. It does not seem that there is any other way in which we can adequately have an effect on supply and demand of a product as sensitive as bread to import costs

    Mr. Jay

    Does the hon. Gentleman agree that at least one of the factors that has produced the distortion is the import levy that is now having to be paid?

    Mr. Shaw

    The right hon. Gentleman is probably quite right. Import levies have helped to increase the costs that the manufacturers have had to face. However, I do not think there is a food manufacturer who would say now that he would willingly withdraw from the Community. The food industry was totally in favour of entering the Community. ​ It has readily sought to alter its operating practices to compete effectively within the Community. I know of no influence in the bread baking industry, parlous though its state has been, that suggests that it would be materially helped if the industry were to come out of the Community and were to operate outside it.

    It may be that we are moving a little far from the maximum price order that we are debating. However, the lesson that I seek to draw has been satisfactorily put. We are talking about an intervention operation that has had a fairly miserable history for the baking industry. The fact that the bread industry is unprofitable today is almost sufficient reason in itself for objecting to the passage of the order.

    But there are other reasons why we think it right to have a debate on this issue and to offer the House an opportunity to discuss the system which is used. The use of maximum price orders is a hangover from the Prices Act 1974, which gave power to the Secretary of State to operate maximum pricing for those products—in particular, food products—which enjoyed subsidy. At that time, my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Mrs. Oppenheim) made it clear, with some reluctance I think, that maximum price orders should be accepted for subsidised products. We concede that, where the taxpayer is involved in paying an element in the price in order to restrict it, his contribution should not be pocketed for other purposes and the consumer should have the benefit clearly transferred in terms of a lower maximum price.

    Therefore, maximum price orders came about as an integral part of the food subsidy system, and we accept that.

    The fact now is that food subsidies have, with one exception, been phased out. Subsidy is no longer paid on bread.

    Indeed, the subsidy has not been paid since the spring of last year. Why do the Government seek to continue a regulatory system of maximum pricing for bread when no subsidy is being paid?

    I remind the House of the Committee stage of the Prices Act 1975 when the Under-Secretary of State, confirming the position, said:

    “The orders under Section 2 are necessary to ensure that the benefit of the subsidies is ​ passed on to retail prices. They will be required so long as any food on which subsidy has been paid is available for retail sale.”

    So far, so good. But later the hon. Gentleman went on to say:

    “The position, however, on the use of the powers outside the area is that the subsidised food remains the same as it was when the powers were taken last year. It is necessary to have them available for use if required, so that we are in a position to take action if there has been extraordinary inflationary pressure in a particular area. We have no intention at the moment of using the powers other than in the matter of subsidised foods, but we intend them to be kept as a reserve power if necessary to regulate prices in the shops for a limited number of products.”—[Official Report, Standing Committee B, 25th February 1975; c. 224.]

    That was the expression of policy that the Under-Secretary of State gave to the Prices Bill Committee in 1975, and that broadly resulted in an extension of the regulatory powers ad infinitum. Indeed, the Secretary of State now has powers for use of the regulation on any foodstuff or, as I interpret it, any other product if he deems it to be right.

    Therefore, we must ask the Under-Secretary to tell us why the Government are continuing to operate maximum price orders for bread when the subsidies have been removed. Is he using the regulatory powers which he obtained under the Prices Act 1975, for which, as I see it, there is no closing date? If so, we should have a statement on the Government’s policy on price regulation. If he feels that it is necessary for bread, there is no doubt in my mind that he may feel it necessary for many other products.

    The Minister may say that the Government intend to use this regulatory power on foodstuffs or, indeed, on other products or services in this election year as we come up to a decision. The hon. Gentleman owes it to the House, if he wishes to continue with maximum pricing on bread, to explain the policy under which he is operating, because it is clearly no longer related to food subsidy. The first serious question is what is the policy under which the Minister is operating, and why.

    The Under-Secretary will argue in the second place that it is necessary for him to have these price regulatory powers in order to control retailers’ profits. This is not an argument that can be adduced. Under the Price Commission’s operation, the retail trade has margin controls which ​ operate at the gross and net levels. There is no way in which one can adduce the necessity for a regulatory price power such as the one we are discussing in order to control retail margins. That is already available under the Price Commission.

    It is not just a matter of the way in which we are issuing price orders. There are other aspects of the old subsidy system which are continuing. The retailer has still to keep records of sales, even though there is no subsidy element involved in those sales. Therefore, the small shopkeeper is involved in an administrative load which is unnecessary.

    I put it to the Under-Secretary firmly that if he seeks to demonstrate that he recognises the problems of small shopkeepers and traders—or large ones, for that matter—to reduce the administrative burden of an operation such as maximum pricing and the maintenance of records would be simple. He could do it without fear of any consequence to the consumer, but in the knowledge that there would be a lifting of the load that is on the retailer—and that is something sensible and long overdue.

    One might argue that a maximum price order was a sensible form of consumer protection. I consider it to be a fatuous form of consumer protection. Originally these orders were all to be displayed, no doubt prominently, in shops. After various altercations with the Opposition on the Prices Bill, the Government eventually very grudgingly agreed that the maximum prices notices may be kept for reference and may be asked to be inspected rather than displayed, though the requirement for display is still in the Act. We now have the alternative of availability of them on request.

    The maximum prices notices are of no consumer value. No self-respecting housewife will go into a shop and ask to see the maximum prices order for bread before making her purchase. We have no right to expect her to work in that way. If the notices have no relevance to the consumer, what relevance have they to anybody?

    The maintenance of the regulation is in the hands of the hard-pressed weights and measures inspectors or the trading standards officers. They will have the right to ​ ask to see that retailers have these maximum prices orders available on request on their premises. But if we are merely producing orders in the House through the whole panoply of Government machinery in order to allow them to be examined when the occasional trading standards officer calls, we are not making a sensible contribution to the consumer or the retailer of bread. The matter has got out of hand and is ludicrous.

    Another reason for objecting to the maximum prices orders is that they get out of date so easily. The order that we are debating, which is order No. 516, is virtually already superseded by order No. 545, which, although it has not been discussed in the House, was laid on 11th April and came into operation on 2nd May.

    Mr. Nigel Spearing (Newham, South)

    Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that the numbers that he has quoted are related not to bread orders but to Statutory Instruments made in 1978?

    Mr. Shaw

    The Statutory Instruments are related to the general parliamentary process, but both orders Nos. 516 and 545 are related to bread prices, as I am sure the Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) recognises. The order that was laid before the House on 11th April and came into force on 2nd May relates to the metrication of loaves of bread.

    We are bound to ask whether the Minister expects that order to be withdrawn. If the Government are proceeding with an order that, as the explanatory note makes clear, withdraws the prescribed Imperial quantities in which certain whole loaves may be made for sale and replaces them with a net weight of 400 grams or multiples of 400 grams, how is that consistent with the new posture that the Secretary of State has taken up in regard to metrication? I hope that the Under-Secretary can give us a clean, crisp and definitive answer.

    It is self-evident that these orders get out of date quickly because prices and costs in the baking of bread continue to rise as general costs rise. Therefore, though there may be a holding of the price for a matter of months, there is no doubt that maximum price orders will have to be reviewed, probably several times a year as the price of a standard ​ loaf will rise. If that is the case, how valuable is the system to the consumer?

    We must recognise that for every order there is an administrative cost. Someone somewhere is preparing it, someone is printing it and someone is distributing it. Just how costly is this operation? How much money is tied up from public funds in the administration of such orders? The House would be interested to know.

    Without the element of subsidy in the bread price, the orders are nothing more than a disguised form of retail price maintenance. This is a new principle for the Government to adopt. Happily, the competitive nature of the industry is such that much lower prices than the maximum are available to the widest range of consumers, but if we are operating a maximum price system, that at least is a containment of the retail level and if it is an unprofitable level, it is a stupid level at which to contain the price. Again, it seems an absurd way of operating.

    I contend that it is no part of sensible Government policy to apply maximum price orders for a whole range of foodstuffs or other goods. Why should bread be singled out in this way? The only reason is that bread is a talisman, has a special place and is a magnetic field in which the Government seek to intervene.

    I think that we are discussing merely the tip of the iceberg of bureaucratic incompetence that is handling our affairs. I do not believe that it has any relevance to the consumer or an effective part to play in the Government’s total pricing policy. It is an unnecessary piece of bureaucracy, an irritant to the shopkeeper and another wretched chore to weights and measures and trading standards officers. It should be taken away and torn up. It is a piece of intervention which has long since outlived its usefulness.

    We take note of the order because that is the parliamentary parlance, but we take note of it because it is an order that is scarcely worth ignoring.

    Mr. Nigel Spearing (Newham, South)

    The hon. Member for Pudsey (Mr. Shaw) addressed the House for 35 minutes in his usual urbane, civil and reasonably pleasant manner—but that is the end of my praise.

    The whole of the hon. Gentleman’s speech was oriented around the convenience of the producer and distributor. There were references to the consumer, but the hon. Gentleman claimed that the order had no relevance to the consumer. No doubt the Minister will deal with that claim. I can think of one way in which it could be helpful.

    I can imagine someone who lives a long way from a bakery, perhaps in the Highlands of Scotland who, but for a maximum price order such as this, would have to pay a much higher price. I see the hon. Member for Pudsey nodding his head. He did not quote any of the figures in the order. The maximum price for a 28oz. standard wrapped or unwrapped loaf is between 28p and 30½p. I notice that the same sized wholemeal loaf or milk bread has a maximum price in most areas of 36p. I agree that for certain reasons—perhaps good reasons—prices might be below that. We welcome that. But what change will one get out of 50p if one has to pay 36p for a loaf of wholemeal bread?

    Bread is now becoming expensive. It ill behoves a party which supported the increase in bread prices when a century ago it was entwined by the Corn Laws to criticise an effort by a Government to keep bread prices down.

    Mr. Giles Shaw

    I understand the hon. Member’s deep anxiety to associate us with the Corn Laws, which are as relevant to this debate as the other matters that he will raise. He must address himself to a simple proposition: if the costs involved in the baking and distribution of bread go up, would he wish to see the price subsidised through taxation?

    Mr. Spearing

    We are not dealing with subsidies. I turn to the question of prices. The hon. Member for Pudsey mentioned the 1976 Price Commission report. I refer to table 4 of its 13th report. It shows that in 1976 the bakers paid about £413 million for flour and that the cost of flour was a high proportion of the total baking cost. In Great Britain the cost of flour was 7.3p for a 28oz loaf compared with a total production cost of 15.35p. A more up-to-date figure appears in the figures for September 1977. This shows that flour was 9.24p, out of a 21.21p cost of producing the same loaf.

    Unlike many processed foods and other food commodities, the cost of flour is relatively high. This is where we return to the Corn Laws. Flour comes from grain, which, in common parlance, is wheat or corn. The cost of wheat will to some extent determine the cost of flour.

    In his desire to deal with the order in his own way the hon. Member for Pudsey omitted one of the great mysteries of the bread market. I hope that the Minister will say something about it. There might be narrow margins and sometimes losses involved in the baking of bread. But we should like to hear about the millers’ margin—the difference between the cost of grain and the equivalent flour, making allowance for the side extractions of germ. Are the millers’ costs reasonable? Do they tie up? Is there, as many people suspect, a great deal of profit made by the millers because of the difference between the costs of grain and flour? That might offset some of the alleged losses involved in baking and distribution. The figures in the Price Commission report unfortunately do not show that. I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will be able to cast some light on that point—if not tonight, then in due course.

    I wish to draw attention to the cost of wheat. The cost of the raw material is a very high proportion of the cost of bread. The hon. Member for Pudsey may laugh off the idea of the Corn Laws, but he and his party, like many other hon. Members, alas, voted for the taxation of imported wheat. Wheat from the rest of the EEC does not bear a tax, but wheat from North America and our other traditional suppliers of bread wheats certainly is taxed. That fact is not as well known as it might be. I put a Question to the Minister of Agricluture on this matter on 19th April. He told me:

    “During 1977 1·5 million tonnes of common wheat mainly of breadmaking quality were imported into the United Kingdom from outside the EEC. The value of these imports before payment of levies was £117·6 million. The net revenue derived from import levies on common wheat during the same period was £45·1 million.”

    I do not know what the gross revenue was, but the buyers of wheat and, ultimately, the people who consume it paid ​ over £45 million in levies. We may surmise that a very high proportion of that money, if not all of it, went on the cost of bread.

    But that is not the end of the story. In past years a very high proportion of bread wheats consisted of American Northern Spring, or its equivalent Australian varieties. Millers were able to add a small proportion of soft British wheats. There is, however, a surplus of wheat in the EEC and it has been found desirable to increase the proportion of soft wheat in bread flour, thus reducing the amount needed to be imported. The resulting flour requires different processes and different mixes and probably adds to the problems of baking and of maintaining quality. But that change does not necessarily decrease the price of the flour. The EEC wheat which is used is much more expensive than the hard wheats that would otherwise be imported.

    I hope that the Minister will tell us, broadly, the proportion of EEC wheat as compared with non-EEC wheat used to make bread. If it is half-and-half, it means that we are paying about £90 million a year more than we need to for our bread grain. Perhaps the proportion is less or more than that. But, whatever the proportion, the ultimate additional cost has to be met by the consumer whom the hon. Member for Pudsey pretends to want to help, but in truth does not. If he did he would have mentioned some of the matters I have raised.

    I hope that my hon. Friend will be able to confirm the broad outline of the points that I have made, and that if the figures that I have produced are not correct he will send me a letter correcting them because I am sure that this is something that the other hon. Members will wish to follow up and that people who buy and eat bread will want to know the facts.

    Not only may we be spending between £40 million and £90 million a year more than we need to on our bread because of the new corn laws voted in by the Conservatives; the EEC is overflowing with wheat. In a Written Answer on 11th May—column 596 of Hansard—the Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, told me that in 1975–76 the EEC exported 9 million ​ tonnes of wheat, with a provisional figure of 4½ million tonnes for 1976–77, and that it was having to pay out about £158 million in the process for dumping it on world markets. Not only do we have to pay more in tax for our bread, but some of that tax is apparently going to help to dump wheat on a world market that does not necessarily require it.

    I hope that in taking note of this order we shall not only note the high maximum prices—although I welcome the limits, for the reasons that I have mentioned—but that in due course the Government, or the Price Commission, will disgorge the figures that will illustrate just some of the reasons why we are having to pay more.

  • George Thomas – 1978 Statement on Lord Selwyn-Lloyd

    Below is the text of the statement made by George Thomas, the then Speaker of the House of Commons, in the House on 18 May 1978.

    Right hon. and hon. Members have learned with deep sorrow of the death of Lord Selwyn-Lloyd, my immediate predecessor as Speaker of this House.

    I wish on behalf of all parties and of each and every hon. and right hon. Member to pay tribute to the memory of one of the most outstanding parliamentarians of our generation.

    Both in peace and in war, Selwyn Lloyd proved his utter devotion to our country. It fell to him to carry the burden of some of the highest offices of State and he never spared himself in fulfilling his responsibilities. When he became Leader of this House he very quickly earned both the unqualified respect and the abounding affection of hon. and right hon. Members in all parties. He was a doughty fighter for the rights of Back Benchers, and we shall always be in debt to him for the reforms he helped to initiate.

    Selwyn Lloyd was a man incapable of malice. He enjoyed the remarkable blessing of never nursing a grudge. His patent integrity and his massive loyalty both to our country and to all with whom he worked marked him out as a man of noble quality. He was always the quintessence of courtesy in his dealings with those with whom he disagreed. His five years as Speaker of this House are fresh in our memory. His compassion, his patience, his humour and his strength of character ensured that he will always have an honoured place as one of the greatest Speakers in our history.

    In saluting Selwyn Lloyd’s memory, we thank God for his life of selfless service and extend to his family our heartfelt sympathy in their sorrow.

  • Michael Neubert – 1978 Speech on Litter in London

    Below is the text of the speech made by Michael Neubert, the then Conservative MP for Romford, in the House of Commons on 16 May 1978.

    Well over 10 million people now come to visit ​ the British Isles each year, many of them to London. About 10 million people live in London, many of them working, as we do, in Westminster. At the centre of our capital city we are surrounded by a wealth of historic buildings and Royal parks, rightly renowned world-wide. Yet all too often the state of our streets is a disgrace. It used to be said that the streets of London were paved with gold. Too often these days too many of the streets of London are paved with plastic ​ bags, empty Coke cans and cigarette packets.

    As a Londoner, with some interest in travel and tourism, especially I regret the adverse impression that this must leave with many visitors to our city. There is one feature to which I particularly object and that is the new established practice of leaving refuse on public pavements and private forecourts for long periods for later collection. This has the effect of detracting very much from the London street scene. Unless it is vigorously resisted and arrested, the appearance of London can only get worse.

    It is not only the fact that we have litter in our streets that causes me concern. That is a more evident problem. At least the strewing of litter is usually thoughtless and inconsiderate, whereas the practice of dumping rubbish on our streets in plastic bags and cardboard boxes is deliberate and becoming more widespread. This process must not be allowed to continue. If it does, the contrast between our noble buildings and our slovenly streets will widen, and the disparity between taxpayers’ money spent on restoring the fabric of our buildings and ratepayers’ money spent on the cleansing of our streets will sharpen. The amenities of living in London will be severely damaged.

    For all these reasons, I seek to raise this issue tonight, in the hope that the process can not only be arrested but reversed. Unfortunately, even this apparently simple point, which I take the opportunity to put to the Minister, is not really as simple and straightforward as it might seem. There are many complex factors involved and it is not possible within the scope of this short debate to include all of them.

    What are the main reasons for this state of affairs? There are three major difficulties facing anyone attempting to maintain high standards of cleanliness in London’s streets: the nature of our historic buildings, the inadequacy of access to older property, and the traffic congestion which inhibits and slows down refuse rounds. These factors in themselves are not peculiar to London.

    There seem to be three other factors which are particularly pertinent to this problem. The first derives from the ​ origins of this practice, namely, the lowering of standards which took place in the 1969 “dirty jobs” strike, which is an illustration of how a strike can do damage that lives on long after the dispute is settled. The outward effects of this dispute were most unfortunate. It led people at that time, of necessity, to deposit their rubbish on the streets. They saw, day after day, rubbish and rotting refuse at their doorstep. They thought nothing of it. It became almost acceptable. Ever since that precedent was established there has not been the same resistance to such a state of affairs which there would otherwise have been and which existed before. In the past nine years or so this trend has been increasing.

    We have then to consider the inadequacy of the present law. Many of these matters are still governed by the provisions of the Public Health Act 1936. It is not surprising that, 42 years later, those provisions are not meeting modern needs. Circumstances have radically changed in so many evident ways and the regulations under that legislation are no longer satisfactory to deal with the problem.

    Let me give one example. “Waste” is defined as being in two categories—either domestic or trade. Hotels and restaurants are not apparently committed to the latter category, and they often enjoy a free service, whereas the demands made on that service by hotels and restaurants are by their nature exceptional and heavy. In the centre of London where we live and work that consideration is especially the case. There is a need to update the legislation, and I shall return to that matter later.

    There is a third thread which is important. In such a service as refuse collection, which is labour intensive, the attitudes of the men working that service will be critical. This will require a constructive and co-operative approach to the problem by trade unionists, members and leaders alike, if the problems, are to be solved, particularly in central London.

    I wish to draw the Minister’s attention to the implications of the Health and Safety at Work, Etc. Act. I know that that legislation is not his responsibility, but I think he will agree that he will need to take those provisions into account. The provisions of that Act, if fully carried through, could prove calamitous to refuse collecting services in central London.

    The principles of the legislation are unexceptionable, namely, the wish to ensure healthy and safe conditions for men and women at work. But the detailed provisions of the Act, if carried to the extreme, will prove highly costly and counter-productive in many respects in the service that is being undertaken. It is clear, for example, that any one of a number of objections could be made on present practice to dangerous steps to basements or to high rise buildings, defective back alleyways, low ceilings, inadequate lighting, ice and frost on stairs, rotting refuse, rodents, and broken handrails. Any one of those reasons could be taken by an eager beaver union representative, eager to make his mark, as an objection to carrying out the collection. If carried to extremes, it is clear that the practice of kerbside collections, so far from diminishing, will increase. Therefore, we have all these factors in the background.

    What needs to be done? First, a higher priority must be accorded to this Cinderella service. Attitudes to refuse collection have always been gently derisory, and probably always will be, but the service is the very essence of our standard of living. Amenities play a very important part in that standard of living. Living standards depend not just on the size of the cigar or on the cubic capacity of the next new car, or even on holidays in Spain. Standards of living depend on humdrum, everyday events which all too often we take for granted. I refer to the twice-daily delivery of post, the daily delivery of a pint of milk, and, of course, the regular cleansing of our streets and the collection of refuse.
    Greater priority must be given within local council budgets to this service. I pay tribute to the work that has been done in the face of enormous difficulties by the directors of cleansing in the three central London authorities which I have consulted. I refer to the City of Westminster, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and the City Corporation.

    Nothing in my remarks should be taken to disparage the work they are doing or the policy of their authorities. But it is clear from figures given to me of expenditure on the service in the past four years that, although expenditure has increased substantially in cash terms, in real terms it has shown a cut-back. ​ Although some of that may be due to special circumstances, or even perhaps to greater efficiency and achieving the same amount of work at smaller cost, I suspect that in a period of economic restraint inevitably this service has suffered, and it is all too easy for it to suffer.

    I should like to see a recording of priorities not only by the councils themselves but by the Department, too. I make the point to the Minister that, as local government nowadays is so much Government-directed, he, too, might play some part in reordering priorities in this matter. Although humdrum, commonplace, everyday and taken for granted, this service is vital to the well being of our community, and especially in central London.

    Second, and specifically, I draw attention to the fact that, four years after the passing of the Control of Pollution Act 1974, there remain outstanding provisions in Part I still to be implemented. It is regrettable that after this lapse of time they should remain unimplemented. The Act itself was a successor to the Protection of the Environment Bill introduced by the last Conservative Government, which fell at the time of the General Election early in 1974, and it is now time to consider early implementation of its outstanding provisions.

    Those provisions would allow powers to councils to ensure that there were adequate facilities for the storage of refuse and its eventual disposal and that there were adequate facilities for the disposal of waste. In addition, the councils could levy charges, in particular on hotels and restaurants, which are the principal, though not the only, offenders.

    Here is an example of how the present system works to the disadvantage of London. There is a small hotel in South Kensington which enjoys twice-weekly free service from the Royal borough, and it does so by means of an accumulation of bags of refuse which, during the course of the week, can total 500. There is a considerable amount of refuse, and there can be 250 bags at any given time, stacked neatly on the hotel’s own ground but none the less an eyesore to those who pass down that side street on their way to the hotel or going about their business or pleasure in London.

    If a charge were levied, it could provide revenue for a self-financing ​ scheme, or the potential ability to apply a charge could be used as a deterrent to encourage such hotels and commercial enterprises to invest in compaction equipment which could reduce the volume of such rubbish by a ratio of four to one, thereby making better use of their own space and also removing some of the worst eyesores when rubbish overflows on to forecourts and pavements. In that way, a great deal could be done.

    I call on the Minister tonight to bring about early implementation of those provisions. Although he is not directly responsible for the service, he has a vital role to play because only he can bring in the full implementation of Part I of the Act, and only he can effectively co-ordinate a campaign to improve the appearance of London. He must show a determination not to tolerate a lowering of standards in our capital city. I hope that he will take that opportunity tonight.

  • David Owen – 1978 Statement on Zaire

    Below is the text of the statement made by David Owen, the then Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons on 16 May 1978.

    The Government are making every effort, through the British Embassy in Kinshasa and other Western countries with communities in Shaba province to ensure the safety of the British community in the area of the fighting. The total number of British and Commonwealth citizens in the Shaba province—the area affected—is believed to be 171. We are in close touch with the mining companies, who employ a number of British subjects. The town of Kolwezi, where there are 24 British and Commonwealth citizens, is ​ reported to have been taken by the invading force. We have, so far, had no reports of harm to British subjects. The mining town of Tenke-Fungurume, east of Kolwezi, could be affected. Of the 19 British subjects there, six dependants were flown by their company to Kinshasa yesterday and other dependants are being flown today to Zambia.

    My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I discussed this question in detail with President Kaunda yesterday. The President has assured us that Zambia will give every facility to British subjects evacuated from Shaba province.
    This is a serious and threatening development to the stability of this part of Africa. I will keep the House closely informed and make all possible information available to the relatives of those concerned.

  • Michael Heseltine – 1978 Speech on Windscale

    Michael Heseltine – 1978 Speech on Windscale

    Below is the text of the speech made by Michael Heseltine, the then Conservative MP for Henley, in the House of Commons on 15 May 1978.

    You have asked, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that we be brief. I very much take the point made by the Secretary of State that we have already had a wide-ranging debate at which many hon. Members who are in their places today were present on 22nd March and that many of the issues were ventilated extremely widely and fully on that occasion.

    I understand the case pleaded by the leader of the Liberal Party that we should have more time and take another look at many of the questions that he put forward. But the fact is that there is no decision which has to be taken to which that kind of approach cannot be adopted. One can always argue that there should be more delay. No matter how detailed the investigation, the inquiry or the report which precedes the point at which we are to take the decision, ​ there will always be those who are against the decision that they think we are about to take, who argue that we should have yet further delay or who call in aid some future event which we should await before reaching our decision.

    I think that the House should approve the Windscale special development order. In doing so, we should remember what we are doing. We are not, as the leader of the Liberal Party suggested, taking an irrevocable decision to move into the plutonium age. We are taking a decision to give planning permission for certain consequences to flow.

    The consequence that flows immediately is work on the storage ponds associated with the Windscale project, and there is no risk associated with the development of the storage ponds. It would only be if we moved into the full-scale work that follows from THORP that the kind of contingencies about which the House is rightly concerned would have to be anticipated. It is not conceivable that that kind of step would be taken for perhaps another four or five years at the earliest. Therefore, I believe that the House should ask questions about the way in which it is to be kept informed of the developments that will take place between the passage of the order tonight, if that is the will of the House, and the irreversible decision which the Leader of the Liberal Party assumed would be taken tonight, but which in practice will not be taken for four or five years.

    I listened to what the Leader of the Liberal Party said about Concorde. I had certain experience of the problems connected with that project, together with many other former Ministers responsible for it. The fact of the matter is that practically no high technological decision which has to be taken by modern Governments would be taken today if we argued that some of the decisions taken in the past proved more expensive than people expected. The problem with the state of the art of high technology in which virtually all modern Governments are becoming deeply immersed, is that we cannot predict exactly what it will cost or how long it will take. The fact is that, for political or economic reasons, we decide that it is right that Governments should move forward in those areas. I and, I am sure, the Secretary of State would not want to put ​ a price tag on the Windscale development and claim that in 10 years we shall come back to this House and say that we got the figures 100 per cent. right.

    Mr. John Mendelson

    Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

    Mr. Heseltine

    No. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me. We are short of time. I am sure that he will want to make his own contribution.

    I was told of the reason why the Americans got their space budget so accurate. It was because, when all the experts had made their calculations, the President multiplied them by 10, and he turned out to be pretty close to the mark.
    We are deciding whether to grant planning permission, a consequence of which would be that certain work could take place. The work which is of concern to the House is connected with planning and design. In consequence, it should not be put in a position where it equates with it. As a consequence of the planning and design work, I believe that we keep open certain very large commercial options which are considered to be of importance to this country.

    If we were to decide not to proceed, I believe that one consequence would be that the commercial options which are open to us at the moment would diminish. We might find that by the time we wish to reconsider the matter in two years, the countries which at the moment are prepared to enter into commercial relationships with us for reprocessing would have developed their own facilities or gone to other parts of the world to seek the contracts which are conceivably on offer to us.

    We are deciding the degree of probability of developing certain reprocessing facilities. The Secretary of State rightly made the point that, whatever we do, none of us can be certain that the risks are totally eliminated. Indeed, the shattering statistic produced in the House not long ago was that in the coal mining industry some 53,000 people have died in this century. That indicates the scale of difficulties which beset anyone trying to forecast what is likely to happen.

    The fact is that at this time—no one can be sure that it will be so in future—the nuclear industry has a good record of safety. It is obviously of prime concern ​ in the decision that we take tonight to remember that and to maintain the high standards that have brought it about.

    In the debate in March the Secretary of State made the point that if, as the process and the investigation continue, he is not satisfied—I shall want to ask what information the House will get about his tack of satisfaction—he has every power to refuse to allow the procedures to go on. Therefore, it is vital for the House to remember that we are not saying that from this moment on this matter moves out of the control of the politicians. It does not. It remains totally within the power of the Secretary of State of the day. Indeed, on 22nd May—column 1542 of Hansard—the Secretary of State made it absolutely clear that he had all the powers that he needed to exercise the degree of control that everybody in the House would wish to see.

    I have examined the Secretary of State’s reply to the Parker inquiry and I wish to ask about the number of organisations and public bodies that will be involved in the next few years. I have made a list. I do not claim that it is exhaustive but it is sufficiently long to raise a number of questions. Those organisations involved include British Nuclear Fuels, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, the Health and Safety Executive, the local liaison committees, the Industrial Pollution Inspectorate in Scotland, the National Radiological Protection Board, the Fisheries Radiobiological Laboratory, the Radiochemical Inspectorate of the Department of the Environment and some independent person to check the security situation. There are also the Department of the Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Scottish Office and the Department of Energy.

    All those organisations have some specific role to play in the evolution of the Windscale project. What is the degree of co-ordination of all those organisations? For example, will there be—as I suggest that there should—either an annual statement to Parliament or perhaps a statement in two years’ time on the progress that is being made in all the spheres for which these organisations are responsible? If there were we should not have to wait for one report after another nor have to try to piece them all together. It should be the responsibility ​ of the Secretary of State to see that there is co-ordination of all the monitoring, checking and processing of information for which those bodies are responsible to the House.

    With the best will in the world and without wishing to indulge in the scare-mongering techniques which are so easy—the Friends of the Earth could not conceivably be accused of that—it is necessary for the wide number of bodies to be drawn together so that a co-ordinated view of their findings can be put before us.

    Can the Secretary of State explain which hurdles he thinks that this project will now have to jump before the final decisions are taken in four or five years’ time? The leader of the Liberal Party asked for a general review. This is not the time for that because we have reviewed the relevant issues thoroughly in what the Secretary of State rightly described as one of the most far-ranging public processes that any country has devised.

    But there is a case for a review before a final decision is taken. It would be helpful if the Secretary of State explained exactly what that will be and the way in which Parliament will be involved in that process. I hope that during that review we shall hear about the quest for alternative sources of energy, which must be an important factor in the decisions that we have to take. But I take the view that we shall come to the conclusion that nuclear power has a significant role to play in our industrial future.

    I praise the Secretary of State for his determined attempt to meet the conditions laid down by the Parker inquiry. In his written reply to the hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Johnson) he dealt with all the points raised. He has tried to find answers which indicate a great concern for the issues involved and do not lapse behind the phraseology of further reviews and more reports, which is an easy method of trying to escape from taking decisions.

    The leader of the Liberal Party raised the question of security. The Parker inquiry recommended an independent person. It has also been suggested that there should be a Select Committee to deal with the House’s anxiety about security. ​ I thought about this in the earlier debate and again today. I see no way in which this House can become involved directly in the security provisions at Windscale. I do not believe that it will be possible to divorce the security of the nation from the considerations and techniques that will apply at Windscale. I am convinced that one cannot meaningfully have a process whereby a Select Committee—however well-meaning its members—probes and checks security. Argument on the Floor of the House is not necessary to make the majority of hon. Members understand the vulnerability of a technique of that kind.

    The leader of the Liberal Party is naive to believe that one can expose the nation’s security to semi-public inquiry. Ministers of the Crown do not all have access to the security provisions of the nation. Only a small number of members of the Government have that in any Government. It would be wrong to extend it to the 80 members of the Government and impracticable to extend it to a Select Committee. I understand the need for independent scrutiny but in practice it would be difficult to go as far as has been suggested.

    The Secretary of State in his announcement dealt with the question of the independent commitment of environmentally minded people to the surveillance of radiation standards. It is not always possible to pick up the full details of an announcement, but I understand that the Secretary of State is to appoint to the advisory body representatives from all the main energy institutions and that there will be a majority of non-experts from outside. That is a satisfactory outcome and I am glad that the Secretary of State has made that decision.

    Any reasonable forecasts of energy requirements must assume a nuclear capability for this country. If we are to take a decision to move along that road, decisions will have to be made about the disposal of waste material, even if we pursue a nuclear commitment only for our own energy requirements. The moment that we take a decision of that sort, which was taken many years ago, we are faced with the choice of either storing or reprocessing waste. I accept the view of the Parker inquiry and of the Secretary of State that it is unlikely that one can conceive for all time that we ​ should want to go for storage. Reprocessing seems to be a safer and more efficient method of coping with the problems. It is right to move towards that decision as quickly as safety conditions allow.

    I ask the Secretary of State to consider my argument seriously. We should recognise that we are not taking an irreversible decision tonight. The Secretary of State should come forward with an argument that will satisfy the House and those who have legitimate doubts that there will be a final moment at which the House has another opportunity to look at the whole matter. He should take into account not only the promises and the optimism upon which British Nuclear Fuels’ submission is made but the facts and what has happened in the three or four years that separate us from that irreversible decision.

  • Peter Shore – 1978 Speech on Windscale

    Below is the text of the speech made by Peter Shore, the then Secretary of State for the Environment, in the House of Commons on 15 May 1978.

    After the Wind-scale inquiry took place and I received the inspector’s report I decided that it was essential that Parliament should debate the proposed development of the oxide fuel reprocessing plant at Wind-scale before any decision was reached. That debate, which ranged fully and freely over all the issues involved, took place on 22nd March, and although it was not my wish that any vote should take place at that stage, a Division was called and a substantial majority was recorded.

    Since then, under the special procedure which I told the House I intended to follow, I have made a special development order giving planning permission for the development subject to certain conditions. The House will tonight decide by its vote whether the Windscale development will proceed. None of us has any doubt about the importance of this decision.

    I shall comment on some of the remarks made by the Leader of the Liberal Party, the right hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. Steel) during the course of his speech but I will say at once, because I do not think that he was with us when we last debated this matter, that many of the issues on which he had, inevitably, simply to touch during a short speech were thoroughly dealt with in the House during the full day’s debate.

    Let me assure the right hon. Gentleman that those of us who are taking a different view have no contempt for those who have objected to the Windscale order. On the contrary, we have taken their objections with the utmost serioussness and we are trying to treat the matter with the concentration and concern which I believe it deserves. I do not think it right to argue or assert that the people of this country are being put upon by technical expertise when the one thing that has preceded the whole of this parliamentary procedure and public discussion has been the longest and most thorough investigation that has ever taken place into any project. This public discussion was held openly before a disinterested inspector. It has been the most open discussion on such a subject in any country.

    None of us has any doubt about the importance of this decision. When I spoke in the debate on the report of the inquiry on 22nd March I discussed very fully the three major considerations which had weighed with me in considering the recommendations of the report. They were whether the proposed development posed any unacceptable risk to the environment or to health, whether it presented security problems which would pose a new challenge to our democratic way of life and whether it would adversely affect our policy to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

    On these three immensely important issues, which I think we all agree lie at the heart of the argument on whether British Nuclear Fuels’ proposals should go ahead, I said why I found the inspector’s conclusions persuasive. I do not intend to recapitulate all the reasons I then advanced. I would like to recall to the House how I summed up my own approach on two of the major issues involved. Whilst fully aware of the energy and the economic case for proceeding I said then

    “that if I considered that reprocessing involved any significant radiological danger to the general public, to workers or to the environment, there would be no question of my giving outline planning permission for the proposals which BNFL has put forward.’

    There would be no question at all. On the reprocessing of foreign fuels I said:

    “this raises issues that go far beyond the calculus of economic gain, and we should need to be fully satisfied that by doing so we would not be undermining our major interest in making effective the non-proliferation Treaty. If we were not so satisfied we could not, and should not, proceed.”—[Official Report. 22nd March 1978; Vol. 946, c. 1541–7].

    That was my stance then and now. It is against that background that I have studied the arguments put forward in the course of the March debate and the anxious and critical comments made by individuals and organisations outside the House.

    Mr. John Mendelson (Penistone)

    The Secretary of State is laying great emphasis on the assertion which he certainly made, that if he could conceivably come to the view that there were radiological dangers he would not give planning permission. Surely that is putting the question the wrong way. What the House and the country have to know is that, beyond ​ any reasonable doubt, he is completely convinced that there can be no such danger before he commits himself.

    Mr. Shore

    Nothing is beyond any possible reasonable element of doubt. What we have to do, using all the knowledge and information that we have available to us, is to come to a judgment that will not imperil the interests and health of our people. To proceed in any other way would be wholly irresponsible.

    Since I am the responsible Minister I shall turn first to the whole question of radioactive waste management policy. Let me start with one point that commands universal agreement. Within the next few years, up to 20 per cent. of all our electricity will be generated by nuclear power stations. These stations, as they burn their fuel, will produce radioactive spent fuel. Clearly, we must find means for dealing with this. The choice is between storage and reprocessing. I remain of the view that reprocessing is the better way. With our Magnox stations we have been reprocessing spent fuels for the past 20 years—and no one has suggested that we should store them. We believe that our new fuels from our advanced gas-cooled reactors should similarly be reprocessed in the proposed Windscale plant.

    Against this two questions have been raised. First, if we do reprocess, can we be confident of safely disposing of the resultant highly active waste, solid and liquid? The solid wastes almost certainly present the lesser problem and if research now under way is successful, we may deal with them by separating out the highly radioactive content and putting it in with the liquid wastes. For the liquid wastes two steps are required.

    The first is to put them into a form suitable for permanent disposal and the second is actual disposal. On the first, we must carry through to a conclusion the extensive work—I say this especially to the right hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles—which has already been done on vitrification. This process has already been carried out successfully. A demonstration plant at Harwell vitrified high-level wastes from reprocessing 10 years ago. Work is now going on into a more advanced process.

    Doubts are inevitable in high technology but the doubts which have been ​ raised about the practicability of vitrification do not in my view match the facts and we have good reason to believe that the work will be brought to a successful conclusion.

    Mr. T. H. H. Skeet (Bedford)

    Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is an industrial plant operating in France which vitrifies high-level nuclear waste making use of borosilicate glass?

    Mr. Shore

    That is not the only country which has made progress in this technology.

    Research into disposal by deep geological or ocean burial must take longer. But there is no reason to think that its feasibility will not have been adequately tested by the time the vitrified waste is ready for disposal. I know of no scientific opinion which basically disputes this view.

    The second question is whether storage of spent fuel as opposed to reprocessing is a practicable alternative. The position can be simply put. The storage of unreprocessed spent fuel, whether in controlled water conditions or in gas and air, is surrounded by questions to which answers are certainly not now known. What is known—and this is based on the Atomic Energy Authority’s study for the inquiry—is that it would be wise to assume some failures after five years’ storage in water.

    The strategy proposed by the objectors to reprocessing would involve some elements being in store for at least 20 years. To move from storing spent fuel elements in water to storing them in gas and/or air would again require much further study. There are too many doubts to make it reasonable to require British Nuclear Fuels Limited to jettison all its experience, perhaps greater than anyone else in the world, in favour of the alternative system. I do not consider that this constitutes “assymetrical criteria of soundness”. It is simply prudence in matters of the utmost importance for the protection of man and the environment.

    I realise that there are many people who may accept the case for reprocessing but are still unhappy about the routine discharges of low-level radioactivity that may result, people who are anxious whether our control limits are sufficiently stringent, particularly by comparison with those which apply in the United ​ States. This was the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Central (Mr. Cook) on 22nd March and referred to by others.

    In reply I have placed in the Library of the House a copy of a letter that I have sent to my hon. Friend on this subject. As the House will know, the National Radiological Protection Board has recently published an appreciation of environmental radiation protection standards, which also compares the limits of the United States and the United Kingdom. Both discuss the subject much more fully than I have time to do now, but I want to emphasise some salient points.

    The first point is that both the United States approach and our own conform to the basic radiation protection standards recommended by the international Commission on Radiological Protection. Although our methods differ, in practice the end result is not materially different. Scondly, such comparisons need to have regard to major differences of circumstances in various countries. The American standards, for example, are based on the assumption that no liquid radioactive wastes will be discharged—they will presumably have to be converted to solids.

    Britain, however, is not a continent but an island, and we therefore are able to discharge liquid effluents to the sea where the radioactivity so discharged, although nearly 100,000 times greater in one particular case stated by my hon. Friend than the United States discharges to the atmosphere, nevertheless results in only a small additional dose to the population. Nor should it be thought that we fail to monitor the seas. The marine pathways back to man are very closely monitored.

    Finally, and this is most important, the comparison to which my hon. Friend drew attention is based on BNFL’s proposals. These proposals will be subject to the most rigorous scrutiny by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and myself with a view to reducing them as far as is reasonably practicable.

    Mr. Eric Moonman (Basildon)

    My right hon. Friend’s last remarks will probably cause concern among some of us. Will he enlarge on that point? Will he ​ accept that at present Windscale is leaking? It does not require any further establishment to prove that.

    Mr. Shore

    The occasional leaks that occur, and other incidents in our nuclear establishments are made public as soon as they occur under the policies pursued by my right hon. Friends and myself. However, they have not been of a character or of a scale to cause the sort of apprehensions that I think are at present in my hon. Friend’s mind.

    Much has been heard about the distinction between what is medically safe and what is publicly and politically acceptable. This last is a matter for our decision, and we shall have that consideration fully in mind when the time comes to frame the discharge authorisations, which have to be separately issued under the Radioactive Substances Protection Act.

    During the last debate the House stressed, and rightly in my view, the importance of the recommendations in chapter 17 of the inspector’s report. And I was asked to indicate the Government’s response to them before this debate. I have already announced that we have accepted 12 of the 15 recommendations outright. Together their implementation will still further tighten controls over radioactive discharges, will increase monitoring, and will strengthen safeguards.

    Particular interest may perhaps centre on the decision to press ahead with the development of a krypton arrestment plan for THORP, and also on the provision of whole-body monitoring facilities for local people. I believe that these are all welcome improvements in existing arrangements that will provide still further reassurance.

    The three remaining recommendations are those calling for an independent check on security precautions at Windscale—there are difficulties there, as I am sure the right hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles understands—the inclusion of an independent person or body with environmental interests in the system for advising government on the fixing of radiological protection standards, and for a single inspectorate responsible for advising on the limits to be placed on all radioactive discharges.

    The Government have accepted the underlying purpose of all three recommendations. They do, however, involve ​ organisational changes and we have to consider how best we might achieve what the inspector had in mind. We shall be doing this as quickly as possible, and I hope that the House will accept that the Government have made a full response to hon. Members who expressed concern about all these matters during the previous debate.

    The inclusion of independent advice on security precautions at Windscale and on the fixing of radiological protection standards is, of course, quite separate from the wider scientific advice that I aim to obtain on radioactive waste management policy from the radioactive waste management advisory committee recommended by the Flowers Report.

    I am now happy to be able to announce the setting up of the committee. Its terms of reference will be to advise me and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland and my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Wales on major issues relating to the development and implementation of an overall policy for the management of civil radioactive wastes, including the waste management implications of nuclear policy, the design of nuclear systems, research and development, and including the environmental aspects of the handling and treatment of wastes.

    We are fortunate to have as chairman of the committee Sir Denys Wilkinson, who is a Fellow of the Royal Society and Vice-Chancellor of Sussex University. I am sure that his previous background in nuclear physics—as head of that department at Oxford and chairman of the Science Research Council’s nuclear physics board—will be invaluable. We are aiming to keep the committee to a reasonable size with, in addition to the chairman, a majority of nine or 10 independent members with relevant scientific knowledge and experience together with one member each from the UKAEA, the BNFL, the National Nuclear Corporation and the electricity generating industry, and some members from the nuclear industry trade unions. I shall be announcing the names of these members as soon as I can. And the House may care to be reminded that the committee will be asked to submit an annual report, which will be laid before Parliament.

    As the Leader of the Liberal Party reminded us, non-proliferation is one of ​ the issues at the heart of the matter. The Government’s position was clearly stated by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs during our previous debate on these issues. It is our objective to establish a system of international management of plutonium under which plutonium produced—for example at Windscale—would be stored there and returned to its owner only under internationally agreed safeguards and supervision designed to prevent its diversion from civil use. This must be better than leaving those countries that have nuclear power, 27 with plants in operation or under construction now, and like us needing to reprocess their spent fuel, in a position that would induce them to embark on reprocessing themselves, thus multiplying the sources of plutonium supply.

    Linked with this question, as the Leader of the Liberal Party put it, was the further question: why not wait for the results of the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation programme—INFCEP—on which President Carter took the initiative a year ago?

    First, as I have already shown, we must have a reprocessing plant for our own spent fuel. Secondly, even if when INFCEP was completed and the result was a decision that precluded overseas reprocessing, it would still be possible for the company to review its position and to consider how best in terms of plant size and timing to provide capacity to deal solely with United Kingdom fuels. Finally, to assume that INFCEP will result in a decision that would preclude reprocessing of overseas fuel seems to me to rest on a misconception. As my right hon. Friend said in the last debate, these studies are primarily a clearing house for ideas and the evaluation of technical alternatives. It just is not sensible to proceed on the assumption that a ban on reprocessing agreed by all 40 countries concerned will necessarily come out of INFCEP.

    Finally, I want to say a word about the whole procedure which we have adopted for deciding the issue. The 100 days of the Windscale inquiry represent an event not just of national, but of international importance. No country in the world has had a more searching and serious inquiry into major nuclear issues than ​ we have had during that long process of inquiry and cross-examination before Mr. Justice Parker and his two very able assessors. Of course, the inspector’s finding and analysis have come under critical scrutiny and attack. Given the magnitude and complexity of the issues, it would indeed have been amazing if they had not. But I must reject the suggestion made by only a few opponents that the inquiry itself was a charade. I do not accept—nor do I believe will the House—that either he or his distinguished assessors discharged their duties other than honourably or faithfully.

    The Government and, I believe, this House and the country at large accept that the process of public inquiry is an essential element in the public debate on major questions of nuclear development. Further, we have established that the House itself must play a decisive role. As the House knows, the Government have declared their intention of devising a special procedure for use on future occasions when proposals for nuclear development are put forward. I believe that the procedure that we followed, or something comparable, is the only rational way to deal with these questions. But if we can devise a better procedure, we shall.

    I ask the House to reject the motion to withdraw the Windscale special development order.

  • David Steel – 1978 Speech on Windscale

    Below is the text of the speech made by David Steel, the then Liberal MP for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles, on 15 May 1978.

    I beg to move,

    That the Town and Country Planning (Windscale and Calder Works) Special Development Order 1978 (S.I., 1978, No. 523), dated 3rd April 1978 a copy of which was laid before this House on 3rd April, be withdrawn.
    I intend to be mindful of your statement, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

    This motion is in an updated form. The Prayer was signed by more than 50 hon. Members on both sides of the House earlier this year, and there is no doubt that some hon. Members who wish to take part in the debate will have more fundamentalist objections than I have to proceeding with the reprocessing plant at Windscale. Therefore, in my brief opening speech I do not propose to deal with either the financial or the technical arguments, which no doubt other hon. Members will wish to deploy and some of which were aired in the debate in March, although I have read the recent reports from the United States which cast doubt on the wisdom of proceeding on both the financial and the technical grounds.

    In my view, the arguments on both sides are finely balanced and contain many uncertainties. It is because of that that I believe the burden of proof ought to lie quite firmly on the side of those who are pressing this order and who argue that we should now be taking this firm step into the plutonium economy.

    In fact, I disagree entirely with the conclusion, although I agreed with many of the arguments, of this morning’s leader in The Times which, rather surprisingly, concluded:

    “The overwhelming importance of keeping the widest range of options open in the coming world shortage of power resources amply justifies going ahead at this stage. The relative novelty of the technology is itself a reason for pressing on, since success or failure will to a great extent define those options in future. But the project is a venture into political and technological waters that are very incompletely charted, and it is important that it should be kept under genuine and fundamental review as it develops, and that today’s vote should not be seen as setting it on an inflexible and irrevocable course.”

    My first argument is that, unhappily, in this Parliament we know that these matters too easily get set on an inflexible and irrevocable course. Perhaps I may take the mind of the House back to the discussions that we had on the Concorde project. I question seriously whether, if we knew in 1962 what we know today about the costs and the effects of the Concorde project, the House would ever have given approval for it. I have looked out the figures. In November 1962, the House was told that the project would cost us £150 million to £170 million. The latest figure, given earlier this month, was £1,137 million, not to mention the annual operating cost losses to British Airways of £8·5 million, none of which takes account of the small number of orders for the aircraft or the write-off of the capital costs.

    I say that merely in passing because, if one is to take The Times argument that we should not regard this vote as irrevocable—

    Mr. Michael Jopling (Westmorland) rose—

    Mr. Steel

    I hope that I shall not be pressed to give way, because I know that a great many right hon. and hon. Members are waiting to speak.

    Mr. Jopling

    Will the right hon. Member give way on that point?

    Mr. Steel

    Other right hon. and hon. Members can counter my argument in the debate. I promised to curtail my remarks as much as possible. We have only three hours. The hon. Member for Westmorland (Mr. Jopling) knows that usually I give way in debate, but this is ​ a debate of a rather special nature and I must proceed with my speech. If any hon. Member wishes to challenge my figures, he may do so later in the debate. However, I obtained the figures from the Library.

    Mr. Jopling

    They are wrong.

    Mr. Steel

    The first reason why I oppose this order is precisely that I think that it is not possible, once we are past this stage, easily for Parliament or future Governments to review it and draw back.

    My second reason is that I think that public opinion is increasingly concerned about the way in which we push forward technology at the dictates of the expert without adequate thought of safeguards given by the layman. On occasion, that concern turns into outrage when matters go wrong. I give three examples. There was the accident at the Seveso plant in Italy. Afterwards, a great many articles were written about it in which people said how tragic it was and what precautions might have been taken there.

    Then there was the crash landing of the Russian space satellite in Canada, which happened in an unpopulated part of Canada but which nevertheless caused concern about the release of radioactivity. Then, coming nearer home, we had the wreck of the “Amoco Cadiz”. Leaving aside the effects on tourism, which are temporary and ephemeral, the destruction of a total environment in part of the world surely gives rise to considerable public concern. Increasingly, people are asking what it is that we are doing to a world of which we are simply temporary trustees. I believe that the magnitude of the decision that we are asked to take today is greater than any of the examples that I have given.

    It must be said that the record of safety of our nuclear industry is excellent. In the course of my visit to the prototype fast-breeder reactor at Dounreay and when I was at Windscale, I was immensely impressed by the record of the nuclear industry, and it is right to resent implications that it is less safe and less scrupulous than other dangerous industries.

    Having said that, however, we are lucky in that we have never had a major incident in our nuclear industry. No one ​ can guarantee, no Government can, and no hon. Member can, that there might not be some incident in the future. The fact that 10,000 people were prepared to go to Trafalgar Square peacefully on a Sunday—[Interruption.]—and 3,000 to Torness on the South-East coast of Scotland—[Interruption.]—is an indication of growing public concern. I know that the groans coming from some of the Benches indicate precisely what alarms me, which is that these people are written off as cranks or political misfits. That is a wrong attitude to what is a genuine growth of public concern about these issues. A Parliament which is arrogant and sweeps these people aside is adopting entirely the wrong attitude.

    That is my second reason for suggesting we should think again about going ahead with this project.

    My third reason for opposing this order is that we still—and the evidence is in the Parker Report—require further investigation into the safety and security of nuclear materials both on site and in transit and of waste storage and that the information that we have so far on all these is inadequate.

    It was accepted by the Secretary of State for the Environment in his speech during our debate in March—and it was accepted by Mr. Justice Parker in his report—that there is no case for domestic reasons related to a future fast-breeder reactor programme for pressing ahead now with the Windscale reprocessing plant. Indeed, in its evidence to the inquiry, BNFL said that it could withstand a further delay of up to five years without its affecting the CFR programme.
    So we should not be pushed by arguments of urgency into agreeing to this order tonight. On the safety and security questions we should pause and consider what was said by the Flowers Commission. It said:

    “The unquantifiable effects of the security measures that might become necessary in a plutonium economy should be a major consideration in decisions on substantial nuclear development. Security issues require wide public debate.”

    In the debate in March there were many criticisms of the perfunctory manner in which the security question was dealt with by the Windscale inquiry and the Parker Report.

    In the Written Answer which the Secretary of State for the Environment gave earlier this month in the Government’s official reaction to Mr. Justice Parker’s recommendations, the right hon. Gentleman said:

    “The Government accept the principle that security measures at Windscale should be checked by an independent person not involved in their design or operation, and will examine how best to put the recommendation into effect (No. 1). There are, however, wider security implications which need further consideration before detailed arrangements can be worked out.”—[Official Report, 8th May 1978; Vol. 949, col. 337.]

    Bearing in mind the perfunctory way in which security matters have been dealt with, and considering the statement that there is still quite a lot to be worked out, there is a case for examining the matter further. I suggest, whether we proceed with the order or not, that the Government should consider the appointment of a Select Committee to consider these matters, because I accept that we are limited in the degree of public debate that we can have on them.

    If I may cite a precedent, the Select Committee on Services, of which I was a member a few years ago, which deals with security in the Palace of Westminster, is a model of how a delicate matter can be dealt with by private Committee. I believe that we would all be willing to trust our colleagues to look more deeply into these questions.

    It is not simply a question of holding material on site. There is also the question of the transporting of nuclear material to and from Windscale. The Parker Report recommended that the majority of the transport should continue to be by rail. No doubt that will be the case. However, there was a report earlier this year that some material was being ferried by air from Windscale to Dounreay. I do not know whether the Secretary of State can confirm that. This gives rise to some anxiety.

    When I visited Dounreay I was struck by the fact that if we are to have a commercial fast-breeder reactor in the future, and if it is to be at Dounreay, which appears to be the most favourable site, there is a case for examining again the Windscale project and for arguing that purely for domestic reasons the reprocessing ​ should be carried out where the material is to be used. This casts doubt on whether Windscale is the right place if, in the future, for domestic reasons, we want to have a commercial fast-breeder reactor programme.

    I suggest that we should have a Select Committee, whether or not we proceed with the order, to consider all the questions of security.

    There is still doubt about the method and location of storage. The Flowers Report says:

    “We are confident that an acceptable solution will be found and we attach great importance to the search; for we are agreed that it would be irresponsible and morally wrong to commit future generations to the consequences of fission power on a massive scale unless it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that at least one method exists for the safe isolation of these wastes for the indefinite future.”

    I notice the very careful words used by the Secretary of State in March when he was interrupted by the hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Blenkinsop). The Secretary of State replied on this point by saying:

    “The vitrification process has been subject to a great deal of research and pilot demonstration. I believe, again, that the evidence is clear that it offers a promising solution to the problem.”—[Official Report, 22nd March 1978; Vol. 946, c. 1544.]

    That does not strike me as being beyond reasonable doubt. We have yet to reach the stage at which we have on the necessary scale proved vitrification as a satisfactory process.

    There is also the question of the location of storage. Here I am slightly critical of the Atomic Energy Authority. It has been seeking planning permission and in some cases engaging in the boring of test holes in places such as Cornwall, the Scottish borders, Northumberland, the Highlands and the Orkneys. It appears to have made a tour of Liberal constituencies for that purpose, omitting for some reason Rochdale—a much more likely candidate.

    I believe that the authority has run slightly ahead of both Government decisions and public opinion and has needlessly stirred up much resentment and concern about the location of future storage, particularly when the method of storage has not yet been proved. I hope that this process will not be continued. ​ The public require much greater reassurance about the safe handling of all these materials, both active and waste, before we press ahead with the project.

    My fourth and last reason for opposing the order is that if we go ahead with it we shall be giving an international lead in the wrong direction. Even the Parker Report, which came out in favour of the project, said in paragraph 6.2:

    “A nuclear bomb can be constructed with the grade of plutonium recovered by reprocessing. A country, which had in its hands such plutonium, could produce a bomb or bombs more rapidly, and with less risk of its actions being detected in time for international diplomatic pressure to be exerted, than if it had no such plutonium.”

    Paragraph 6.6 says:

    “At present the system for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is founded on a number of agreements … and … the system of safeguards which they contain or for which they provide is essentially one of reporting and inspection. This system was acknowledged by everyone to be in need of strengthening and improvement.”

    The reason why we ought not to proceed with the order now is because of the international evaluation programme being conducted on the initiative of the United States. It is interesting to note that this is a bi-partisan policy in the United States which runs directly counter to what appears to be a bipartisan approach in Britain. President Ford initiated the programme in October 1976, when he said

    “The United States should no longer regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear fuel cycle.”

    He went on to say that

    “the avoidance of proliferation must take precedence over economic interests.”

    My hon. Friend the Member for Truro (Mr. Penhaligon), when speaking in the debate in March, quoted Mr. Justice Parker’s version of President Carter’s updating of that initiative of April 1977 when he talked about the

    “indefinite deferment of commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium.”—[Official Report, 22nd March 1978; Vol. 946, c. 1598.]

    President Carter said

    “Increasing United States capacity to provide adequate and timely supplies of nuclear fuels to countries that needed them ‘so that they will not be required or encouraged to reprocess their own materials’.”

    He then announced that what he was wanting was ​

    “an embargo on the export of equipment or technology that could permit uranium enrichment or chemical reprocessing.”

    He said that he was pursuing discussions on

    “a wide range of international approaches and frameworks that would permit all countries to achieve their own energy needs, while at the same time reducing the spread of the capabilities of nuclear explosive development.”

    When the Government refer to the INFCE they do so in strange terms. The Secretary of State for the Environment in March told the House:

    “We hope, however—and we shall work for it—that INFCE will recommend better safeguards with perhaps greater international participation, for sensitive nuclear plants and movements of nuclear materials.”—[Official Report, 22nd March 1978; Vol. 946, c. 155.]

    The Foreign Secretary said that after INFCE he hoped to convert the Carter Administration

    “to our view of reprocessing on non-proliferation grounds.”

    In that speech he argued what I thought was a completely false piece of logic when he said:

    “If we need to reprocess fuel irradiated in the United Kingdom on grounds of better use of our energy resources and better waste management, and there is a case to be made for that, it is only right that we should offer the use of the plant to other governments who share our view that reprocessing is a necessary part of the nuclear fuel cycle. In this way I believe that we shall reduce the need for other governments to build their own reprocessing plants. In offering our services to other governments we hope to satisfy their, and our, concern about the possible misuse of plutonium.”

    The emphasis must be on the word “hope”. That is a non-provable assertion and I should have thought it much more likely that, if we have an international evaluation programme involving 40 nation States, and if we decide to go ahead regardless of that programme. we shall simply encourage others to follow suit.

    The House has a straight choice between looking at the longer term results of a decision that we take tonight against the undoubted economic value of the Japanese and other contracts which we could acquire. I believe that the onus must lie heavily on the Government, who have brought forward the order, to persuade us that we are wrong. If they do not persuade us beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be right to vote in favour of the order being withdrawn.

  • David Penhaligon – 1978 Speech on Cornish Tin Mine Closures

    Below is the text of the speech made by David Penhaligon, the then Liberal MP for Truro, in the House of Commons on 11 May 1978.

    This is the story of two tin mines in my constituency and some 750 jobs. The background is that in 1971 the Consolidated Gold Fields Company opened a mine not many miles from the village where I live. In 1974 a company called the Cornwall Tin and Mining Company opened one no further than a mile from the first mine, called Mount Wellington. Between them they provided some 750 jobs. In our area they were good and well-paid jobs. They were welcome and represented the whole hope in an area where unemployment is nearly endemic. The last figures I saw gave the average unemployment for my county as 11 per cent.; for men it is over 14 per cent.

    I have elicited that there is not a labour exchange within 40 miles of Chacewater, the village nearest these mines, which has today a male unemployment rate of less than 10 per cent. In this area there simply are no other jobs. There is certainly not a single job on offer which pays anything like the national average wage.

    My involvement with this matter started about a week or so before the first mine announced its closure when certain things I heard made me put down parliamentary Questions to find out what was happening and whether the Government knew what was happening at the Mount Wellington mine. Eventually there was a meeting in Zurich where the directors announced that the mine was to close.

    No more than two or three days later the Consolidated Gold Fields company made a similar announcement that its mine also was to close. The reason given at the time by Consolidated Gold Fields was that the water which had undoubtedly been a substantial problem in Mount Wellington, pouring in at some 8 million gallons a day, would follow the laws of gravity and quickly invade its mine. The cost of pumping this water out was understood to be £500,000 a year.

    I must admit that it was this more than anything else which raised by suspicions and made me decide to launch a major attack in this place to find out what was happening.

    There is no doubt that Consolidated Gold could have applied for temporary employment subsidy, and, virtually at the drop of a hat, received some £420,000—at an annual rate. It would have given those in the locality some time to judge the matter and negotiate matters instead of looking down a gun barrel, as we have been doing ever since this announcement was made.

    Indeed, Consolidated Gold was recruiting labour up to two weeks before its closure and I have long suspected—we shall probably never know—that the truth is that the company has been running this mine for some seven years with considerable managerial difficulties. It has had four or five managers since I have been the Member for Truro.

    It is difficult to know whether mining is likely to be profitable; one never knows exactly what one will get until the mineral is dug out. Besides that, the pound is oscillating. But, for all that, last year some £6·8 million worth of minerals were produced—950 tons of tin, 3,300 tons of copper, 3,250 tons of zinc and just over 1·4 tons of silver. The value of this on the metal exchange was nearly £7 million. Besides that, it must be remembered that Mount Wellington was making its own contribution as well. These mines make a significant balance of payments contribution, especially bearing in mind the number of people involved. They have some strategic significance, too, as Cornwall has Europe’s only supply of tin.

    The absolutely horrifying secondary effects hardly need quantifying. The companies used outside contractors for all the painting, surface digging and building operations. They bought some £1½ million worth of supplies locally. The men themselves had a purchasing power of £2 million to £3 million.

    The local reaction was swift and strong. Some 600 miners and their families came to London. They announced that they were prepared to give up next year’s increment in pay—a substantial offer in these days of inflation.

    The Cornwall County Council, which is not famous for throwing away money, quickly offered some £20,000 to enable the pumps to be run for a more substantial period while the problem could be studied sensibly. No wonder: in my village, if these mines totally collapse, I shall have 40 per cent. male unemployment. In the villages of Threemilestone, Crofty and St. Day the situation will be little better. The issue has not been off the local radio and television screens since it was first announced.

    Cornwall has become cynical about the treatment given by the Government to its problems. Large sums of money are going to the steel and car industries. We argue that our problems are no different. This is a basic industry providing basic employment.

    We hope that our treatment will be different on this occasion. Certainly I must admit that the Minister has kept me extremely well informed since this saga started. I believe that on this occasion the Government are prepared and willing to give help. I know that they are now negotiating with other parties. There are problems of confidence in disclosing exactly what is happening and during the period of negotiation it is an absolute impossibility to give a blow-by-blow account publicly.

    I should like some assurances from the Minister making it clear to people in my part of the country that the local appearance that these mines are lost is not the case, and that there is real and genuine help on the way. One rescue plan mentioned is that the shafts that run from Wellington towards Wheal Jane should be plugged, and that some extra pumps should be installed in Wheal Jane to hold back the water that is bound still to leak. Obviously there would be some ancillary piping and this would cost a capital sum of some £600,000, including a considerable contingency in case some of the estimates have gone wrong. The actual operating cost increase in Wheal Jane is estimated at £100,000.

    Facts in this case have been difficult to elicit, but as I understand it—and I have been assured on this point by some of those who work for the company—in the quarter before this terrible thing ​ happened to my county the company was making a positive cash flow. Basically the company has developed and was ready to take the ore from what is called the ninth level in that mine. It had been driving a shaft down to the fifteenth level and had in fact reached a depth of 1,300 ft.

    There is now considerable anguish in the area, as the negotiations go on behind closed doors, about the company’s action in dismantling some of the facilities underground. There is a suspicion that the rescue operation is getting more difficult by the hour. There is no doubt that some substantial sums of money will be required. The company, Consolidated Gold Fields, negotiated, in June 1976, a loan of £2·5 million I have never been clear why that loan was not taken up, but it was negotiated and has never been used.

    Let me warn the Minister that the alternative will be the loss of 700 or even 1,500 jobs. The Department of Employment officials, in an interview, told me that if the mines closed, they might be prepared to use the area for a special temporary employment subsidy scheme. One can imagine the cost and the loss of income tax, rates and national insurance contributions.

    Above all, there is the fear of living in an area with 40 per cent. unemployment and of being defeated and demoralised. Because of Cornwall’s history, mining is more important than the number of jobs involved. There is all the mythology of mining—”Poldark” and the other series of which people are aware—and these mines represented in my area a feeling that there would be growth in employment. The mines were new and we welcomed the general upturn in the growth of the Cornish mineral industry.

    If nothing is done about these mines, I believe that the hope of any outside investment in Cornwall is finished. There will be no hope of persuading any of the large mining corporations to come to my county. The Government, despite my opposition, have saved a considerable amount of money by scrapping regional development grants for the mining industry in development areas. Perhaps some of that money could be used to assist my county.

    I wish to put a number of questions to the Minister. Where do we stand in regard to pumping arrangements? I take the view that we are still fighting this battle and stand a reasonable chance of winning so long as the pumps are kept running. Will the Minister let my constituents know precisely what are the future pumping arrangements? How hard are the Government trying to rescue the position? Will he give some idea of the progress of negotiations? I recognise the difficulties, but what progress has been made in real terms?

    Will the Minister also say what will happen if the negotiations with interested parties break down? What will the Government’s attitude be in that event? Will they keep the pumps going for a period while some other party may be interested in the operation? The important question to which my constituents would like an answer is “When will a decision be known?”.

    It is not difficult to realise the tragedy that hits a family in such an area when relatively well-paid employment is lost. One can imagine a family’s feelings when its income is cut off. In the village of Threemilestone scores of workers who have taken on mortgages in the last 12 or 18 months are now wondering where they stand. They are looking to the Government because they realise that there is nobody else who can give the guidance and assistance required to rescue this mining operation. I look forward with great interest to hearing the Minister’s reply.

  • David Ennals – 1978 Statement on Vaccine-Damaged Children

    Below is the text of the statement made by David Ennals, the then Secretary of State for Social Services, in the House of Commons on 9 May 1978.

    With permission, I shall make the statement on payments for vaccine damage referred to by my right hon. Friend the Prime ​ Minister on 16th March. My right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland wish to be associated with what I am about to say.

    The House will recall that last June the Government accepted in principle that there should be a scheme of payments for those seriously damaged by vaccination which has been recommended in the interests of the community. The details of the scheme could not be settled before we received the Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury.

    The Royal Commission has recommended, first, that in future there should be strict liability in tort for severe damage suffered by anyone as a result of vaccination which has been recommended in the interests of the community; and, secondly, that there should be a new weekly benefit for all seriously disabled children whatever the source of their handicap. These and other recommendations are being considered carefully by the Government. But this is bound to take time and, in view of the clear undertaking we have given in respect of vaccine damage, the Government have decided to bring forward urgently a scheme of payments.

    The scheme will provide for the payment of a lump sum of £10,000, tax-free, in respect of those, whether children or adults, who have, since 5th July 1948, been severely damaged as a result of vaccination which has taken place in the United Kingdom against diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, poliomyelitis, measles, rubella or tuberculosis (BCG), or smallpox up to the date when its routine use ceased to be recommended.

    In the interests of speed and ease of of administration we shall accept, as the initial, but not the exclusive, criterion of severe damage, the receipt of attendance or mobility allowance for conditions which could be attributed to vaccine damage. Decisions whether the severe damage was due to vaccination will be made on the balance of probabilities.

    There will be a right of appeal to an adjudicating body, made up of two medical specialists and a legal chairman, which would be fully independent.

    The scheme will cover existing cases and any which may occur while it continues ​ in operation. But I want to stress particularly that the fact that we are bringing it forward does not in any way pre-empt the decisions which we shall in due course have to make on the recommendations of the Royal Commission as a whole, and that it will not prejudice the rights of those who have suffered damage to take action in the future.

    Unfortunately, there is no prospect of parliamentary time in this Session for a Bill to cover the scheme I have outlined. However, we are determined to help these children and their families as quickly as possible. The payments will therefore be covered, in the first instance, by a new Vote sub-head in the summer Supplementary Estimates and a Bill will be brought forward as soon as parliamentary circumstances permit. The cost will of course depend on the number of awards but if that number were to turn out to be something like 700, it would be £7 million, spread over this and succeeding financial years.

    The Vote sub-head procedure, and the simplicity of the scheme itself, will enable payments to be made as early as possible to families who have already had a long wait. While finalising the arrangements and processing claims will inevitably take some time, we shall do our best to start making payments before the end of this year.

    I am sure that the whole House will welcome this announcement, which implements the Government’s pledge to that small minority of families who, in seeking protection from disease for their children and the community at large, have suffered such tragic consequences.

  • Andrew Faulds – 1978 Apology to the House of Commons

    Below is the text of the personal statement made by Andrew Faulds, the then Labour MP for Warley East, in the House of Commons on 8 May 1978.

    Last Thursday evening, towards the end of the debate on Southern Rhodesia, I was prompted by a momentary surge of annoyance to make a vulgar rejoinder to a comment from the right hon. Member for Knutsford (Mr. Davies) about hon. Members not having been to Africa. As you will appreciate, Mr. Speaker, in my earlier profession we indulge in exchanges which are more often candid and colourful rather than precise and parliamentary. But my importation of such phraseology into the Chamber was inexcusable.

    Unfortunately, I cannot expunge the offensive words, but I have already written to the right hon. Member for Knutsford apologising to him, and now I wish to extend my apology to you, Sir, and to the House for my regrettable lapse.