Tag: Gerald Howarth

  • Gerald Howarth – 2012 Speech on European Defence and Security

    Mr Gerald Howarth MP, is the former Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the MOD (12 May 2010 to 4 September 2012). Mr Howarth was born in September 1947. He was educated at Haileybury and ISC Junior School, Windsor, and Bloxham School, Banbury (scholar). He read English at the University of Southampton (BA Hons) where he served with the University Air Squadron and was commissioned into the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve in 1968. Mr Howarth is the Conservative MP for Aldershot and is President of the Air Display Association. In 2006 he became a trustee of the 'Vulcan to the Sky' project which is restoring to flying condition a Vulcan bomber. Mr Howarth has been married to Elizabeth since 1973 and they have three children. In his spare time he enjoys flying (he has held a pilot's licence since 1965), photography and fishing, and is a church warden at the Royal Garrison Church in Aldershot. He also does the occasional DIY. Since 2002 he has served as a Shadow Defence Minister with responsibility for defence procurement and the Royal Air Force.

    Below is the text of the speech made by Gerald Howarth, the then Minister for International Security Strategy, at Chatham House in London on 23 January 2012.

    Introduction

    Thank you Caroline [Wyatt from the BBC] for that introduction.

    Defence and security in Europe is at a critical juncture. As relative economic power moves south and east we are beginning to see the geopolitical impact.

    As President Obama indicated in his speech at the Pentagon on 5 January, the Pacific region will consume a great deal more of the attention of the United States.

    European countries will have to take more responsibility for collective security whether the challenges are within Europe’s borders, on the periphery, or at a distance. Furthermore, the fiscal position of many countries in the north Atlantic region is driving a reduction in public spending, including in defence budgets. It means European countries have to do more with less.

    However, it is not all doom and gloom. Whilst there are weaknesses, we should not be blind to our strengths. Our greatest strength is the shared security agenda and shared values embodied in Nato, the cornerstone of our collective security, made up of inviolable sovereign nations.

    Another great strength is the range and depth of high technology residing in European defence companies. Our greatest weakness, however, is that, even in Nato, European countries are falling short of the capability, commitment, and resources which the maintenance of our collective security surely requires.

    Yet I see this as an opportunity. If European countries can rise to the challenge of deploying meaningful capability, we shall have no stronger ally than America.

    To aid us, those institutions and arrangements which are proven and strengthen Europe’s defence and security should receive our full support to make them work even better.

    But those which merely duplicate or distract are a dead weight on Europe, draining our increasingly scarce resources while the US looks on increasingly concerned. These themes will dominate your discussions over the next two days, as well as Nato’s Chicago summit in May, and I’d like to set the scene this morning.

    Strategic shift

    If there was ever any doubt that we live in a volatile world, this was surely laid to rest in the last twelve months. Bin Laden and Gaddafi were removed; we had the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and financial crisis in Europe; we saw long-surviving regimes across north Africa swept away, challenging long held strategic calculations in western capitals.

    What will this year bring? What will be the consequences of the political unrest in Syria; dynastic succession in north Korea; an assertive and nuclear determined Iran? How will newly developed economies assert themselves? How will mature economies respond?

    Even the United States is being forced to re-think its posture and prioritise like the rest of us. Its defence budget will be cut by at least 500 billion dollars. Its armed forces will be leaner, though (unlike many European countries) fully deployable. And it has chosen to reflect the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region in its strategic posture.

    Of course, US and European vital interests regularly coincide outside the north Atlantic area. This includes the Pacific region where it is in all our interests that the emerging powers become responsible members of the international community and help provide stability to the global system.

    But this should not mean that the historic trans-Atlantic alliance is no longer of vital interest to both the US and the rest of Nato, far from it. Nor does the importance of the Pacific region in the coming decades lessen the requirement to co-operate elsewhere. Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan are not to be found in the Pacific.

    Nato

    All of this should compel us to strengthen north Atlantic bonds, in particular, the European strand, rather than weaken them. For the British government, this means Nato above all else when it comes to defence and security.

    Nato is the best vehicle to advance our shared security agenda, it is established, proven, and based on shared values. It remains the cornerstone of north american security as well as Europe’s: Nato borders the Pacific as well as the Atlantic.

    And it remains the organisation which many other countries look to. When the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973 on Libya, who did they think would implement it?

    When sustained multi-lateral action was required, Nato had the only realistic co-ordinating structure prepared for joint and combined operations. Most importantly, Nato remains a community of allies with values, willing to back principles with power.

    But Libya showed that the alliance as a whole, and the contribution of some of the allies, fell short of what Nato’s Strategic Concept demands. Let us be very clear. Despite the limited nature of the campaign, the nations of Europe could not have undertaken the operations over Libya without the US.

    It is unsurprising therefore that the United States is asking whether it’s sustainable for the US to subsidise the defence of those who could invest more but choose not to.

    Why can Nato only generate a fraction of the capability nominally available to it? And it has reaffirmed wider concerns that a two or multi-tier alliance is starting to emerge with some allies less willing to participate in operations than others.

    All three of these issues, finance, capability, and political will, demand a proper response from Europe, using all the tools at our disposal.

    Finance

    First, finance. As the Soviets found to their cost, the lesson from history is that you cannot be secure if you’re broke. In Britain, we see debt as a strategic issue. It’s also undeniable that European defence spending has fallen by 24 billion euros in the last 3 years.

    This is set to get worse. We have to prove to a sceptical electorate that the threats to our security are genuine and that we’re making every pound count. In Britain, we’ve already made difficult decisions to bring our fiscal position, including the defence programme, under control. Others will have to follow suit. So in such challenging times, we need to make the case for defence spending.

    Even in these austere times, Nato’s 2% of GDP target for defence spending should be achievable. As the former US Defence Secretary, Robert Gates, said just before he retired,

    If current trends in the decline of European capabilities are not halted and reversed, future US political leaders, those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me, may not consider the return on America’s investment in Nato worth the cost.

    So it is frankly depressing that 25 out of 28 currently fail to meet the 2% target, despite reaffirming their commitment to it only last year.

    As politicians, we are acutely aware of the need to carry public opinion with us. Spending priorities, in many respects, reflect the politicians’ perceived assessment of public opinion.

    Those of us who understand the volatility of the modern world, and the dramatic shifting of the tectonic plates, do have a duty to ensure that those we represent understand the gravity of the situation so that they are in a position to re-prioritise.

    All the investment in our schools and hospitals, or indeed welfare, could be set at naught if we fail to provide adequate defence.

    Capability

    Of course, what we spend individually is only part of the story. As resources are squeezed, we need to spend more smartly and with a much clearer view on the collective capabilities the alliance requires. Making cuts in capability on the assumption that someone else will take the strain is not a viable long-term strategy.

    We simply have to find ways of re-balancing who generates and pays for capability, as well as who demands it. In Libya, the shortage of ISR capability could only be met by the US, and only 12 of 43 air-to-air refuelling aircraft came from other alliance members.

    The shortage of strategic lift capability is a real constraint on the deployability of EU battlegroups. Nato’s smart defence and the EU’s pooling and sharing initiatives go to the heart of this issue.

    The bottom line is that capability has to be additional and deployable without breaking the bank.

    So I welcome Nato’s continuing efforts to remove or disinvest in non-essential capabilities and avoid duplication in national inventories. It should help to reduce waste and prevent an uncoordinated rush to an as yet undefined bottom line. Nato must also highlight the worrying capability gaps across Europe which are being created as a result of budget reductions in almost every country.

    But this work fails to grab political attention because it is seen as being too “in the weeds”. We need to raise it up and give it a real political push. So we need to develop a far more clear-sighted focus on what we really need in terms of our core military capabilities to maintain our collective security. And set that against an even more objective and sophisticated assessment of how good we really are now.

    Political will

    The third issue facing European nations is the political will to commit force.

    In Afghanistan, Nato has demonstrated considerable flexibility by incorporating countries from as far afield as South Korea, Georgia, and Tonga. While in Libya, Nato’s swift and impressive agility in incorporating Arab states and other non-Nato countries such as Sweden was pretty remarkable.

    We should capitalise on this experience by making it even easier for non-Nato nations to contribute to Nato-led operations, to fight as well as facilitate, often without the caveats which some alliance members insist on.

    But with 10 Nato allies choosing to opt out of Libya and only six participating in air strikes, it reminds us that Nato is an alliance of sovereign states. Alliance solidarity, in respect of the Article V commitment, must remain sacrosanct. Outside Article V, I entirely accept the right of individual sovereign nations not to act if they believe their national interests are not served by doing so.

    But if Nato is going to remain relevant in the 21st century, is consensus at 28 essential when like-minded allies wish to operate together within the framework of Nato to implement the will of the wider international community? Non-Nato nations can invoke the ‘Berlin-plus’ arrangements to use Nato’s SHAPE HQ and assets on EU operations.

    Yet when some Nato allies don’t want to participate in certain operations, those who want to use elements of the Nato command structure (which they pay for and man) are not allowed to do so. Should we consider a ‘Berlin-minus’ arrangement where the few can use alliance assets on behalf of the many?

    Other defence and security arrangements

    I’ve focused on Nato this morning, as I firmly believe in its enduring role as the bedrock of European defence and security. But that doesn’t mean we should ignore the other components of multi-layered defence. We should encourage bi-lateral partnerships and regional groupings to flourish, not least where doing so could add value to the capabilities of the alliance as a whole.

    For example, the newly-formed northern group of nations, which includes the Baltic and Nordic countries, Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands, as well as Britain, is part of this process for us. So is the UK-France Treaty, which commits us to working together, and we would encourage others to do the same.

    And if we are to meet the challenges of a volatile world, we need the full array of economic, developmental, and security levers at our disposal. This means a deployable and interoperable military capability married to a comprehensive approach which is designed to encapsulate the civil and military engagement which I have just mentioned.

    Here the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), can complement Nato through its unique set of stabilisation tools, and in promoting further capability development. This allows it to play a useful role in crisis management.

    But talking up the EU as an alternative route and adding additional new structures does not address diminishing defence budgets. And there is absolutely no point attempting to duplicate structures which already exist or capabilities we already have.

    With two million men under arms in Europe, more manpower is not the issue. What Europe needs is manpower and capability it can deploy. Focusing on process and institution building while struggling to find a medic to support the European training mission for Somalia does not cast EU priorities in a positive light, to put it mildly.

    The European Defence Agency has a role in driving forward the EU pooling and sharing initiatives which I endorsed at the Steering Board on 30 November. I pay tribute to Claude-France Arnould’s efforts in these areas, in particular, the EDA helicopter training programme to which Britain has signed up.

    I know that, under her leadership, the EDA will concentrate on practical programmes such as this. These are good examples of collaboration within a small multi-lateral agreement to deliver capability with real operational benefit. But co-operation with Nato, not competition, should be the watchword on every European’s lips.

    Conclusion

    Ladies and gentlemen, this is indeed an important moment for European defence and security. European countries need to bring more to the table if Nato is going to remain relevant in what many are calling the “Pacific Century”.

    Bob Gates was clear about this when he said,

    In the past, I’ve worried openly about Nato turning into a two-tiered alliance: between members who specialise in ‘soft’ humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the ‘hard’ combat missions. Between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of Nato membership, be they security guarantees or headquarters billets, but don’t want to share the risks and costs. This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable.

    We know more money is not going to be the answer. The challenge is to maximise the capability we can squeeze out of the resources we have.

    We must ensure that Nato’s smart defence and EU pooling and sharing initiatives are mutually reinforcing. As our new Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond, has said,

    We must prioritise ruthlessly; specialise aggressively; and collaborate unsentimentally.

    The United States will be watching us closely. So too will our adversaries. The Chicago Summit provides the perfect opportunity to show them all that, when it comes to defence and security, Europe remains committed, capable, and solvent.

  • Gerald Howarth – 2015 Speech on Syrian Air Strikes

    Below is the text of the speech made by Gerald Howarth in the House of Commons on 2 December 2015.

    No one who has taken part in the debate today has approached it lightly and I think that we would all agree that anyone who suffers recriminations as a result of whatever decision they reach should have the sympathy of the House. There can be no recriminations and we must be free to express our views as we think fit. We are accountable to our constituents for what we say and what we do.

    Notwithstanding the enormous media hype about today’s debate, it is not about a decision to go to war. As my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) said, this is essentially an extension of the operations we have been carrying out in Iraq since the House decided last year by 524 votes to 43 that the Government should take that action.

    It is important to make the point that our intervention in Iraq has been critical. Without that intervention, there is no doubt that ISIL/Daesh would have taken control of the whole country. Had they taken control of Iraq, the consequences for the entire region, let alone us, would have been catastrophic. They would have been in charge of the entire oil output of Iraq and would have caused absolute mayhem. Since we joined the coalition partners in Iraq, at least 30% of the land taken by Daesh has been recovered. The contribution has been worth while and, as so many have said, it clearly makes no sense for Tornado aircraft and the Royal Air Force to have to turn back at the border.

    Many people have made the point—most effectively the Prime Minister, if I might say so—about the unique capability that the UK has and that France and the United States have asked us to contribute to this operation. I say to the right hon. Member for Gordon (Alex Salmond), who is no longer in his place, and to my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), with whom I am normally in agreement but am not on this occasion, that the Brimstone missile is a unique capability that only the United Kingdom can deploy. One other country has it, but the United Kingdom is the only one that currently can deploy it. That missile has been proven to have a precision strike that reduces the likelihood of civilian casualties to a minimum. Of course there will never be a complete absence of civilian casualties, but Daesh is attacking people every day of the week.

    It is also important to note that the United Kingdom has some of the most stringent rules of engagement. I know that from personal experience. I was a Defence Minister involved in the Libyan operations and the painstaking extent to which the military and the politicians act to ensure that the target is legitimate, that it is an important military target and that there is an absence of civilians is extraordinary. The House should be under no illusions: there is no cavalier approach to this. I make that point to the wider public as well.

    This is a complex issue but there are some simple truths. First, Daesh’s medieval barbarity is a threat to the region and to us. Secondly, the United Nations Security Council has called unanimously on all states to take all necessary measures. Thirdly, we have that unique additional capability to which I have just referred. Fourthly, we are working flat out on the diplomatic front, through the International Syria Support Group, and there is more that could be done, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) said. However, Daesh will carry on killing, beheading and raping until we stop them doing it to innocent people, and it would be immoral for us to stand aside.

  • Gerald Howarth – 2012 Speech on Greener Defence

    Below is the text of the speech made by Gerald Howarth at the Nordic Defence Industry Seminar in Copenhagen on 2nd May 2012.

    Good morning. And thank you Kristian, (Danish MOD Deputy Permanent Secretary for International Policy) for that kind introduction.

    It’s a great honour to be asked to address NORDEFCO.

    Effective defence calls for effective collaboration.

    This group is a good model for us all when it comes to practical hands on commitment and delivery.

    You are also very much on the front foot when it comes to pursuing a new and radical approach to achieving a Smarter and Greener Defence.

    I’ll be talking a little later about these two issues which, focusing as they do on the crucial issue of resources, are essentially both sides of the same coin.

    I hope I speak on behalf of the others when I say it is a particular privilege that you have also invited to this seminar colleagues from the wider Northern Group..

    A group which encompasses the Baltic nations, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands. And of course the UK.

    I think it’s fair to say that previous British Governments have not placed the same value on building relations with our fellow Northern European nations as we do.

    As Minister with the lead for defence diplomacy, I’m very clear that the nations of Northern Europe comprise a group of countries bound together with a shared history and shared values.

    In NORDEFCO you have, of course, recognised that for many years. It’s just the rest of us who have taken a little longer to wake up to the issue. Perhaps we in Britain took too long to recover from the Vikings, the only people successfully to have invaded the UK in 1,000 years!

    I’d like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to Norway, and the work they are doing around the clock to guard NATO’s North Eastern flank.

    While in Norway earlier this year at the invitation of the Norwegian MOD State Secretary, Roger Ingebrigtsen, I had the privilege personally to take the controls of a the P3 Orion and fly over the Polar ice cap. It gave me a very real appreciation of the sheer scale indeed, loneliness, of this challenge.

    This is an area which is going to become increasingly important, as the Northern Sea Route – which almost halves the transit time between Europe and the Far East – is likely to be open for several months of the year within the next 10 years. Within that time the retreat of the ice will mean the opening of energy supplies and passage of shipping which is potentially game changing.

    Norway’s work in safeguarding these routes is of vital strategic importance to us all – and it’s important we begin to think ahead about the challenges presented by climate change.

    The Northern Group provides such an opportunity to bring us together to discuss issues of relevance to our mutual security, without reference to any particular institutional framework.

    It’s very obvious to me that we as neighbours should work together to secure our own region, to keep our trade routes open, and together face threats as they arise.

    Coming here to Copenhagen is – for me – therefore very much a neighbourhood visit. And a wonderful opportunity to get together with like-minded friends and partners.

    Like minded friends and partners who, in common with the UK, are outward facing, aware that defence is also an international business, and with whom we have served on operations across the world stage in recent years.

    On last year’s Operation Unified Protector over Libya, for example.

    Denmark’s decision to maintain a stunningly high level of sorties (double the coalition average) throughout August proved critical to bringing an end to Qadhafi’s tyrannical regime. We much appreciated Danish Defence Minister Gitte Bech’s willingness to extend Danish operations.

    Likewise, the invaluable contribution of the Royal Norwegian Air Force, which flew more sorties than at any time since the Second World War.

    I was privileged – on my visit there in January – to have the opportunity to meet some of the commanders and pilots who spearheaded Norway’s contribution.

    An operation which also saw Sweden step forward to help enforce the No Fly Zone over Libya with eight of its Gripen aircraft and a C-130.

    This was the first time in over 60 years that Sweden – a non-NATO nation – had conducted an out-of-area operation with an offensive air capability.

    Indeed, there were times when the Swedish Air Force was providing something in the region of 40 per cent of the entire coalition air picture; an extraordinary contribution.

    Members of the Northern Group are also heavily engaged in counter piracy operations off the coast of Somalia.

    I know that Denmark’s counter piracy effort involves providing a naval contribution for six months of every year, plus an MPA contribution for up to two months of every year.

    And of course in Afghanistan where UK Forces have fought – and are fighting – alongside forces from Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Germany and the Netherlands.

    And many have very sadly lost their lives: a tragic total of 594 across all twelve Northern Group countries, of which the UK has suffered 410 losses.

    And I want to say something very briefly here about the contribution of Denmark and Estonia, who have been closely involved with us in Helmand Province.

    Both countries have borne a particularly high proportion of casualties in the light of the number of forces deployed.

    I have now been to Afghanistan 6 times, and had the privilege of meeting the Danish and Estonian military on a number of occasions when visiting our troops in Helmand. I am always impressed by their professionalism and commitment.

    Afghanistan has taught us all a lot about collaboration and the concept of everyone maximising each other’s strengths and capabilities.

    And on that note, I’d like to take this opportunity to say how much we are looking forward to working with Denmark in developing the Afghan National Army Officers Academy.

    This will be a crucial contribution to Afghanistan’s future security, and we are delighted to be working on it with our close comrades from Helmand Province.

    I know that NORDEFCO members are adamant that this is an initiative which isn’t about new military or political alliances.

    What NORDEFCO is about is sharing resources, driving down costs and enhancing interoperability. Doing more with less.

    You are a pragmatic and proactive group already leading the way on Smart Defence – or to use the EU term, ‘pooling and sharing’.

    Some here today are members of NATO, but not the EU. And vice versa.

    What matters to me is that all countries wanting to contribute to collective defence and security are able to do so without constraint by institutions.

    As an example, the UK has developed – and will shortly see enter service – a major enhancement to our air-to-air refuelling capability. This will give Europe a significant enhancement in an area which has a critical shortfall.

    Now, we didn’t wait for the EU or for NATO to tell us to develop that.

    We don’t plan to wait for either of these organisations to find us potential partners with whom to share the spare capacity we anticipate having when the system is fully in service.

    In fact under David Cameron’s government the UK has been actively driving forward bilateral and small group cooperation.

    We believe it offers a practical way in which the international community can respond to the strategic and financial challenges of the twenty-first century.

    Since the publication of our Strategic Defence and Security Review in October 2010, we have signed no fewer than three Defence Treaties and 27 Memoranda of Understanding, including with Norway. And more of these bilateral agreements are under negotiation.

    We are also working hard to ‘bottle’ the superb collaboration shared by the UK, Denmark and Estonia in Helmand Province.

    Particularly when it comes to sustaining the logistics relationships which have proved so fundamental to our success together in Afghanistan.

    Next month my own Policy Director will chair a meeting of Northern Group MOD Policy Directors to consider the Group’s role in delivering further Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing.

    And next year we look forward to working with Latvia and Lithuania and others on the UK-led EU Battlegroup.

    Whilst we recognise that the EU has a complementary role to play in supporting NATO, I want to take this opportunity to emphasise that as far as the UK is concerned, NATO will remain the cornerstone of our security.

    And that’s because the Alliance continues to be a community prepared to back principles with military fire-power, as we saw last year in its implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution on Libya.

    The reality is that when it became clear that sustained multi-lateral action was required, NATO was the only realistic co-ordinating structure prepared for – and with the mechanisms to deliver – joint and combined operations.

    However the Alliance does need to be revitalised.

    Libya was very successful, but as Robert Gates said just before he stepped down as US Defence Secretary last year: ‘NATO’s serious capability gaps and other institutional shortcomings were laid bare by the Libya operation’.

    The fact is that we all need to think – and act – Smarter.

    Smart Defence isn’t a random concept with a catchy title.

    Nor is it a shiny new strategy to be launched with a couple of Press Releases, posted on a website and quickly forgotten about.

    And it must certainly not become an excuse for individual countries to reduce national defence expenditure, which in many cases are already too low.

    Smart Defence needs to become the basis on which we collectively shape our defence capabilities in the future.

    And that’s why we are actively supporting NATO’s Smart Defence initiative, which will be an important focus of this month’s Chicago Summit.

    Embedding Smart Defence in the Alliance requires it to be clearly tied into the NATO Defence Planning Process.

    And we also need common standards. Because the reality is that multinational military operations still suffer from poor interoperability.

    It’s also – and I think all of us here today are very aware of this – about driving forward cultural changes.

    As the NATO Secretary-General observed to NATO Chiefs of Defence earlier this year, Smart Defence is essentially about changing mindsets.

    About getting nations to think in a more collegiate way, and take an objective approach about capabilities which many of us are more used to thinking of as sovereign.

    However, we need to understand the challenges faced by nations such as the UK, who cannot risk relying on an unreliable partner to provide a key capability.

    Smarter defence is actually about future proofing.

    Working together to make sure our resources go further.

    In the UK, we are currently going through a process of transformation, getting our budget back under control and putting the management of Defence on a sustainable footing.

    There also remains far too much inefficiency in both NATO and the EU. Too many headquarters, for example – and too many staff.

    None of us here can afford it – and we must address it.

    And of course one very important way of boosting our efficiency and being Smart, which is relevant to this conference, is to adopt a new approach to the way defence uses energy.

    It is a fact that the military have been – and will for the foreseeable future – be dependent upon energy for battle wining capability.

    Energy is a critical enabler – but, we need to make sure that it does not constrain us.

    Our experience in recent operations has highlighted this as a potential vulnerability. And just to put this into context – according to US military figures – a soldier in World War 2 used one gallon of fuel per day. Today the average American soldier on operations takes up 22 gallons every day.

    And take for example Afghanistan, where most of the fuel we use has to be imported and forms the bulk of the long logistics tail from Karachi.

    Those convoys have to be protected – and we have taken casualties in doing so.

    In tandem, not only is the global price of diesel going up, but the cost of bringing it into theatre can be ten times the original price.

    And these convoys are vulnerable to disruption, such as the closure of international borders.

    All of which impacts on our military effectiveness.

    We need to find ways of reducing the amount of energy we use, and you will shortly be hearing more about the UK approach from Admiral Neil Morisetti, the UK Climate and Energy Security Envoy.

    But I’d just like to mention a couple of examples of work the UK has been taking forward in this area:

    We have funded Qinetiq’s development of the Zephyr – an amazing solar powered high altitude long endurance UAV which has successfully completed a world-beating three and a half day flight. This is a tremendously exciting capability with a huge amount of potential. We also have a plastic bottle recycling plant in Camp Bastion.

    And we’ve also been looking at a range of energy management techniques to be deployed in forward operating bases – particularly in a harsh environment like Afghanistan. You’ll be hearing more about this MOD project – known as PowerFOB – over the course of the seminar.

    In all cases this has been achieved by working closely with our industrial partners.

    The military will always require a hard edged war fighting capability -and for the foreseeable future that means using fossil fuels.

    But, through energy efficiency and by opting – where appropriate – for alternative sources of energy, we can sustain operational effectiveness and address the wider issues of climate change, and the risks that poses to global stability.

    In other words, you can be smart and green.

    These are challenges we will – and must – face together.

    And they call for effective collaboration and strong partnerships. I know this is something this group can – and will – deliver.

    Thank you.

  • Gerald Howarth – 2007 Speech on the Future of the British Army

    On the 30th January 2007 there was a Westminister Hall debate on The Future of the British Army. 

    The following is taken from the Hansard report for the 30th January:

    Mr. Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con): I follow on from what the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Willie Rennie) said and pay tribute to one of Britain’s greatest success stories, Her Majesty’s armed forces, and particularly, in the light of today’s debate, the British Army. I do not believe that there is an army in the world that can match ours.

    I congratulate the hon. Member for Crosby (Mrs. Curtis-Thomas) on securing the debate. I am sorry that more hon. Members are not present, but I pay tribute to her because she is a tribute to the armed forces parliamentary scheme. She has clearly benefited from it and proven to the House and, we hope, to a wider audience—she has certainly done so to the Minister, although he needs no confirmation of this—that the scheme is an extremely good organisation and helps to ensure that Members of Parliament who do not have experience of the armed forces are introduced to what is, as I said, one of Britain’s greatest success stories.

    I shall not go through all the points that the hon. Lady raised, but she made two fundamental ones. The first was that the Falklands campaign illustrated the importance of being prepared to fight for one’s country, territory and interests. We must never forget that that is what our armed forces are for. Having come straight from a meeting with Baroness Thatcher and just discussed these issues, I can reinforce that remark.

    The hon. Lady’s second point was about Sierra Leone. That is a very different operation, but it is one in which the British Army is conducting itself magnificently. It illustrates the extraordinary versatility of Britain’s Army and particularly those who come from less privileged backgrounds. Some people come from very difficult home backgrounds and poorer parts of society, and it is a tribute to the British Army that it manages to train them and turn them into such stalwart citizens who are both brave and versatile. In theatres such as Sierra Leone, they are winning hearts and minds, as they are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is an enormous tribute to them. As Conservative Front-Bench spokesman on defence, but also as one who has the privilege of being the Member of Parliament for Aldershot, the home of the British Army, I have to say that this is a wonderful opportunity for me not only to extol the virtues of the British Army, but to highlight some of the difficulties. May I say to the Minister, who has been in post even longer than I have, that if I do highlight the difficulties, I do so because it is part of the constitutional duty of the Opposition to hold the Government to account? Much is being done that I am sure is good. New equipment is coming on board, and the Minister mentioned accommodation, but there are real problems. The hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife illustrated some of those. General Sir Richard Dannatt’s first intervention when he became Chief of the General Staff was to say:

    “We are running hot, certainly running hot. Can we cope? I pause. I say ‘just’.” Coming from the head of the British Army, that should send a shock through all Members of this House, not just Ministers, but it was a considered view and reflects what is happening on the ground. The trouble with the military is that when asked to do something by politicians, invariably their answer is, “Yes, sir. We can do it, sir.” We politicians then glibly say, “Okay, that’s fine. Let’s crack on with it.” The military are reluctant to say, “No, we can’t do it,” because they would feel that they were failures or that they had failed to deliver what was expected of them by the politicians. I think that what General Sir Richard Dannatt said is absolutely right. It is certainly borne out by my experience and by the figures.

    I remind the Minister that in 1997 the required strength of the British Army was 106,360. That had fallen by 2006 to 101,800. The trained strength of the Army in 1997 was 101,360. Last year, it was 99,570. We now have the smallest Army since 1930. The fundamental difference between 1997 and 2007 is that today we are fighting two wars. There is no point in pussy-footing around: when we say that people are going on operations, they are going into war zones. Iraq is effectively a war zone and Afghanistan is most certainly a war zone, as are the myriad other operations that the hon. Lady mentioned and to which we are committed.

    The fundamental basis of our criticism of the Government is that there are insufficient men to undertake those tasks. It is no good saying, as the former Secretary of State did, that platform numbers no longer count because we have such sophisticated equipment. Of course numbers count. One ship cannot be in two places, as Admiral Sir Alan West, First Sea Lord, said. Equally, soldiers are human beings. To take territory and hold it, one needs men, and that means numbers. It does not matter how sophisticated the weapons are, the physical presence of the soldiers is what counts. We cannot understand why the Government have cut four British Army battalions when General Richards in Afghanistan has called for precisely 2,500 men. What is that? It is four battalions. That is in addition to what they are doing to cap badges and to destroy much of the morale and ethos that is associated with the support for individual units. Men do not fight for their country; they fight for the man next to them. They fight for their unit, their regiment and that battle honour. Anyone who doubts that should watch the 3 Para video of Afghanistan, which is extremely well worth watching. It exemplifies the sense of camaraderie and ethos.

    In 2005, some 3,350 more people left the Army than joined up. Last year, the number was about 1,500. I agree that the problem is not so much with recruitment, although only two battalions are properly recruited—the Gurkha battalions—while the rest are under-recruited and under-strength. There is an attraction for young men and women in serving their country and taking part in the kind of operations that are under way. The problem is something else. When I go around and speak to people, many of them tell me, “I’ve done Iraq”—probably three times—and “I’ve done Afghanistan. It doesn’t get much better than that, so I’m quitting.” The people who are leaving are the backbone of the British Army: the captains, majors and senior warrant officers. They are the repository of the real experience in today’s Army. Their loss is potentially the most damaging, and something has to be done about it.

    I have two Guards battalions in Aldershot at present—the Irish Guards and the Grenadier Guards. Before Christmas, the commanding officer of the Irish Guards, Colonel O’Dwyer, told me, “Sir, we are not valued.” That is a serious wake-up call and we need to wake up. The colonel is a splendid chap, and he did not say that in any way politically, but it is an accusation against the political classes. It is our job to make sure that they are valued. I shall return to the military covenant later.

    Mrs. Curtis-Thomas: In what context was that comment made?

    Mr. Howarth: I protested to the colonel that there is not a Member of Parliament who does not stand up in Westminster and proclaim the virtues of the British Army. He said, “We get less telephone time than prisoners, and when we go on a train we have to buy a travelcard. Police officers just flash their warrants and don’t have to pay anything.” I realise that those are small things.

    Mr. Ingram: I shall respond to that now because I might not have time to deal with all the points that have been raised in detail. It is not correct to say that forces members have less telephone time than prisoners. We recently increased it to 30 minutes a week. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman can go back and correct the misunderstanding or misinformation that is being pedalled around.

    Mr. Howarth: I am happy to do that, but I want to make it clear that that is not the fundamental issue. It is more like the straw that breaks the camel’s back. If I am issuing a warning to the Minister, it is this: we are taking the British Army too much for granted. It is at a tipping point. Take the Grenadier Guards. In the 115 weeks between March 2006 and June 2008, they will be on operations for 48 weeks, doing field exercises for 20 weeks, and have 10 weeks of post-operational tour leave and pre-deployment leave. To anyone who thinks that that involves swanning around at home, I say that post-operational tour leave provides the process of decompression that is essential when men are taken out of a theatre such as Iraq or Afghanistan having seen what they have seen. It is not a holiday. We do them no service.

    Servicemen and women tell me that the negatives of service are the separation from their families and lack of adventure training—the kind of thing that used to make up part of the whole military package. It is now tilted in favour of duty, responsibility and work and less in favour of the benefits that made the whole package attractive. Yet these days, unlike in the cold war, those men and women are putting their lives on the line for us day in, day out. They are dying for their country. They are giving a real, not abstract, commitment.

    I pay tribute to those who have given their lives for our country and to their families, who deserve the biggest tribute because they supported them. They are the ones who have experiences like the lady who said,

    “When I put the children to bed, the house is silent.” She will live with that silence, and we need to bear that in mind.

    Mrs. Curtis-Thomas: Is the hon. Gentleman arguing that we should limit the exposure of the Army to a specific number of areas of engagement, or does he support the argument that while the Army’s diversified activity is positive, it is crucial that we have more people to deliver that diversity comfortably?

    Mr. Howarth: It is the latter. I simply do not think that there are enough people, and that is the generally held consensus. There are not enough people to do all the jobs that are being done. I have no desire for us to retreat into a United Kingdom shell and remove ourselves from the world stage. We are a power for good in the world and I want us to play that role. I am a Tory. I believe that strong defence is the first duty of any Government—certainly a Conservative Government. We are able to play a great role in the world. Anyone who compares British forces, and how we deal with people, with the American forces in Abu Ghraib can see that we are good. Personally, I have no wish to see our role diminished.

    I have written to Air Marshal Pocock about how the change in the allowances will affect the Grenadier Guards and they will lose £681,750. They are doing two operations—they just came back from Iraq in October and are going to Afghanistan in March—and they are uniquely disbenefited by the changes. I urge the Minister to look at that again.

    I want to address one or two issues about equipment, starting with armoured vehicles. We have been warning for years that the nature of the operations in Iraq, in particular, and now Afghanistan, puts our troops at grave risk from roadside bombs and sophisticated improvised explosive devices. I was told in Iraq, three years ago, that the insurgents there had achieved more sophistication in 30 months than the IRA did in 30 years.

    On my return from the armed forces parliamentary scheme visit to Iraq, on which there were no Labour Members, in 2005, I went straight to the Secretary of State and said, “You’ve got to do something about this.” I did not go to the press because my duty is not to spread fear and alarm among families. I have been criticised for not going public about it, but that was my view. The Government have made a mistake, although they are now bringing new kit on board.

    We have a duty to give the men the best possible protection, so I welcome the Cougars coming into operation, but we were told last July by the Secretary of State that they would be fully operational at the end of 2006. I do not regard having four Mastiffs, as I believe the British Army now calls them, in theatre in Iraq as being fully operational. Everybody knows the limitations of the Snatch Land Rover and it is time that the Government did more to recognise that they have a duty to protect our troops. Equipment exists that is able to do that—for example, the Pinzgauer, which I have been to see. Others dismiss it, and I do not think that it has the full armoured capability of the RG-31 or the Mastiff, but it will make a contribution.

    The second issue on equipment concerns helicopters. I understand that the Government have decided that the Danish EH101s are not available or that they will not go ahead with acquiring them. It is clear that we particularly need lift in Afghanistan, as it is insufficient. That which there is in theatre is being used at a far higher rate than had originally been envisaged, which is imposing a far greater toll on the maintainability of the helicopters. I gather that Eurocopter has put a bid before the Government concerning six Pumas; there is a possibility that three will be made fully theatre-prepared and available by July, with the rest available by the end of the year. The Government have a duty to do something about lift, because it is available, and I cannot understand why they are taking such a long time to deal with it. I know that there is a bit more time available so would it be in order for me to have another five minutes, if the Minister agrees, as he would still have time to reply, Mr. Gale?

    Mr. Ingram indicated assent.

    Mr. Roger Gale (in the Chair): The Minister is happy, so I am too.

    Mr. Howarth: I am grateful, because there are many other issues that I could raise about the British Army. Although I do not have time to raise them all, I want to mention the important matter of medical care. We have an inadequate system of dealing with the aftermath of military operations and the Government need to do much more. The issue of mental health problems arising out of operations is also of paramount importance. If the Minister could do anything to increase the support that he makes available to Combat Stress, he would be doing a great service and would be widely thanked. We know that there are insufficient numbers of nurses and doctors. They are about 43 per cent. under-recruited, and that will also have to be addressed.

    Mention has been made of the military covenant. There is not a person in this land who believes that Britain’s armed forces have not fulfilled their part of the bargain. They have done so in shed loads. They have met their duty under the military covenant, but the nation has failed them in return. We have not given them the kit, the sufficient manpower, the family support or the accommodation. Whatever the Minister is now doing, we have not done enough for our armed forces to enable us to look them in the eye and say, “We have fulfilled our part of the military covenant.” I want to make a point to the Minister by taking as my text the remarks made by the former Secretary of State, now the Minister for Europe, in supporting essay 2 to the Defence White Paper of 2003, “Delivering Security in a Changing World”.

    He stated: “Since SDR our Armed Forces have conducted operations that have been more complex and greater in number than we had envisaged. We have effectively been conducting continual concurrent operations, deploying further afield, to more places, more frequently and with a greater variety of missions than set out in the SDR planning assumptions. We expect to see a similar pattern of operations in the future”.

    In other words, we are imposing on our armed forces a commitment that is greater than was proposed in the strategic defence review. The SDR was never properly funded and this is not properly funded. The situation is, “Commitments of SDR, plus; funding of SDR, double minus.” That sums up the dilemma that the Government face.

    It is no good the Prime Minister saying, as he did against a military backdrop—on HMS Albion—in a wonderfully orchestrated and typically Labour spin thing, that we are going to spend more on defence. When the matter was raised in the other place—I raised this with the Prime Minister at Question Time last week—Lord Davies of Oldham said of the comprehensive spending review that “there will be a number of contributions to that debate. The Prime Minister’s contribution will, of course, be regarded very seriously and very importantly indeed.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 17 January 2007; Vol. 688, c. 647.]

    What have we come to when the Prime Minister of the land deliberately gives a stage-managed appearance on HMS Albion telling the armed forces, “Don’t worry boys, I am going to look after you. I give you a commitment” and that is a “contribution to that debate.”? That debate is presided over by, undoubtedly, the next Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who has betrayed the armed forces. He has failed to fund them to the level required to meet the commitments that the Prime Minister has imposed on them. He is as much a part of this Government as the Prime Minister, and he has failed abysmally in doing the job that he ought to do of supporting our armed forces.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames) and I offered a little challenge before the previous election. We offered a magnum, no less, of Pol Roger champagne—the favourite champagne of his grandfather, Sir Winston Churchill—to the first person to spot the Chancellor of the Exchequer arriving at, or leaving, a military establishment. The magnum of Pol Roger is still on my sideboard awaiting collection. I believe that the Chancellor has now been to Iraq and is trying to ingratiate himself with the armed forces, but he is a man who has never done anything to help them. He may say that the Tories cut defence spending, but we did so because the circumstances after the ending of the cold war, which was achieved by my noble Friend, Baroness Thatcher, meant that we had to have a rethink. To this Government’s credit, they had a review. We should have had a review, but we did not. We cut defence expenditure but the trouble is that the Labour party wanted to cut it even further. The Government should not tell us that we did not do the right thing by the armed forces because Labour wanted further cuts.

    There is an issue about the funding of our armed forces, and the hon. Member for Crosby raised it. On 30 October, The Daily Telegraph gave figures from an opinion poll that asked people whether they thought more or less should be spent on defence. Some 46 per cent. of people said that we should spend more on it, of whom 18 per cent. said that significantly more should be spent. Only 22 per cent. said that less should be spent on it. Interestingly, there was an opinion poll about Iraq in another column showing that 57 per cent. of people said that we should be out of Iraq either now or within 12 months. That illustrates the complete disconnect between the public’s opposition to the Iraq war and their support for the armed forces.

    We have a duty to support the greatest army in the world. It has served us well and I, like everyone else, is proud of it. We are not doing our stuff by the Army and, if we do not do so, the haemorrhaging of people leaving the armed forces will get even worse and experienced people will go. Such people cannot be replaced. The military covenant requires us to do our duty by our magnificent armed forces.

    The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Mr. Adam Ingram): I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mrs. Curtis-Thomas) for securing the debate. I will come to some of the points that she made, but I want to start by paying tribute to the members of our armed forces for their dedication and the invaluable contribution that they make on a daily basis to our efforts for global peace. She put that into context well.

    I also pay tribute to the families, particularly those who have lost loved ones. I was up in Kinloss yesterday for a most moving memorial service in recognition of the 14 brave men who lost their lives in the aircraft crash. It was a powerful event that brought home to me people’s resilience, dedication and commitment. I spoke only to RAF personnel and to some of the families, but all three services were represented.

    As an aside, I should say that I appreciate the comments made by my hon. Friend about the armed forces parliamentary scheme. I was one of the early participants in it, which is possibly why I have ended up in this job for six years. I wanted to spend my time with the RAF because my father had been in it, but as two places had been filled, I ended up with the Army. I am glad that I did, because it gave me an insight into things that I did not have much knowledge of, other than through family contacts of a vintage period from the second world war. However, the Army’s future is not dependent on the armed forces parliamentary scheme. If it were, more participants of that scheme would be taking part in the debate. It is to be noted that so few of them are.

    I appreciate my hon. Friend’s recognition of what is being done in the incredible training programmes in the armed forces and, considering who we recruit and where, particularly in the Army. People are lifted and become exemplars for others in their communities, and we give welfare to tens of thousands of younger troops. That is an example of what we are trying to do as part of the covenant. We want to create an ongoing ethos. What we have done is not new, but training is getting better, sharper and better funded.

    One of the baselines is how we bring on young people who come into the armed forces. In my six years as armed forces Minister, I have been dealing with the Deepcut issue—the four tragic deaths that occurred there. We have analysed it and now transformed the whole training regime, which has been independently audited and examined. Those in the armed forces who have had to deal with it must be given credit for transforming their approach, which will give the forces strength. The regime is not perfect, and there is still a lot to be done. There are accommodation issues to consider, but we have invested heavily in both financial and people terms to turn that around. If we do not get it right, we will not get right other aspects of what we are doing. I shall come to equipment, which is a key matter.

    Hon. Members have mentioned the Prime Minister’s speech on 12 January. It is wrong to diminish its importance, but I understand the political knockabout that takes place. It is worth while to read the speech: it was successful and examined where we stand. The Prime Minister talked about the transformation of the context within which the military, politics and public opinion interact. We are in a new climate and environment, and some changes are driven by events and some would have had to be made anyway because of circumstances evolving beyond our shores.

    Mr. Howarth: What the Prime Minister said on HMS Albion was:

    “For our part, in Government, it will mean increased expenditure on equipment, personnel and the conditions of our Armed Forces; not in the short run but for the long term.”

    It was a Minister in the other place, Lord Davies of Oldham, who said that that was merely a contribution to the debate. I say to the Minister that this is not knockabout stuff. If the Prime Minister’s words did not mean that the armed forces were sent the message, “We are going to increase expenditure,” what did they mean?

    Mr. Ingram: I have read the comments made by my colleague in another place, and knockabout is a word that I could use to good effect in describing them. The Prime Minister’s speech was more than a contribution; it was a substantial analysis of where we stand. We are not here to consider that speech, which covered matters beyond the future of the British Army, but it put the armed forces into context. The Prime Minister talked about public opinion, politics and where Her Majesty’s armed forces sit. He also mentioned the need to invest in our nation’s warfighting capabilities to pursue our foreign policy. The sharp end of that is the British Army.

    There are people who do not believe that we should be a warfighting nation, including some in the House and perhaps in the other place. I think that they are wrong, because that represents where we best position ourselves and where we have historically and traditionally given great effect at momentous times in world history. We are doing that in Iraq and Afghanistan today, and who knows where we will do it tomorrow? The Prime Minister set out a variety of security threats and challenges that we face and where the armed forces sit in relation to them. Much of what he said is what we have been addressing in the Ministry of Defence since the strategic defence review.

    I am grateful to the hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth) for admitting that the Conservatives failed in government to address what was coming after the end of the cold war. The downsizing and the changes that took place were not well structured. The Conservatives did not analyse what the needs of the future would be. They immediately reduced defence expenditure dramatically so that they could invest it in trying to win the forthcoming elections.

    Mr. Howarth rose—

    Mr. Ingram: I shall give way in a moment on that point, but I do not agree with the analysis with which the hon. Gentleman closed his speech.

    The incoming Labour Government considered where the armed forces should be positioned and how best they should be structured. That was an intensive programme, driven directly by the armed forces themselves. They knew that they had to get themselves better structured and positioned. On the back on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was clear that more needed to be done. There was not a full review, but more consideration needed to be given to how to structure the armed forces, particularly the Army.

    We considered the new technology that was coming in, which changed the relationship between the various services and how they could fight interdependently and flexibly, meeting new challenges and a different type of threat and enemy. All that had to be included in the examination process. Such a process will always be complicated while we are engaged in heavy commitments such as in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    Other countries where we are engaged have been mentioned, and it is interesting that people forget about Northern Ireland. Only a few years ago we had more troops committed there than to Iraq and Afghanistan put together. We have transformed Northern Ireland: when I was the Northern Ireland Office Minister with responsibility for security, we had about 15,000 troops committed. Some were on rear bases, but that was the total commitment, the vast bulk of which came from the Army.

    The peace process was required for a lot of reasons, one of which was the heavy resource commitment. We had been there for far too long and there was another, better way of doing it. We could never have solved the problem militarily, yet we had a large commitment. As of next year, we will have a commitment of 5,000 troops—not for the peace process, although a measure of support will be given to the civilian authorities, but overall. That is a major transformation and it has reduced pressure.

    Two parts of our re-examination were called future Army structure and future infantry structure. The future Army structure represents a complete overhaul of how we brigade the British Army. Virtually every Army unit establishment was subject to examination, and will be in the months and years ahead. Some 10,000 posts will be redistributed, which will reshape and restructure the Army and is intended to get a better balance between heavy, medium and light capabilities. We inherited an imbalance: the enemy and threat had changed, so we had to change accordingly. That required re-roling and people doing tasks other than those that they thought they would do when they entered the armed forces. We were committed to one objective: maintaining the high quality and standard of Her Majesty’s armed forces.

    A previous Secretary of State, now the Minister for Europe, commented on the matter on 16 December 2004, saying:

    “However, enhancements that we have already decided on include the creation of a new commando engineer regiment, a new port and maritime unit, an additional strategic communications unit and a new logistics support regiment for each deployable brigade. We are also creating a number of new sub-units for surveillance and target acquisition, bomb disposal and vehicle maintenance capabilities.”—(Official Report, 16 December 2004; Vol. 428, c. 1796.)

    In April last year, a new special forces support group was also formed to work alongside special forces tackling the terrorism that we face globally. I have visited a support group and spoken to those deployed in Afghanistan. I cite those examples because they are never recognised as part of the process of substantial change that we have seen. That process has been driven by a military imperative to get things right, and there has been political and financial support for it.

    Mr. Howarth: I entirely endorse that point, and the Minister is absolutely right, but we need to introduce changes to meet the circumstances of today, not the limbo in which we found ourselves in 1989, following the fall of the Berlin wall. It is absolutely right to do that, but the Minister’s problem is that he is still operating with an Army of less than 100,000. As far as I can work out, we would have to go back pretty well to the time of Wellington to find an Army as small as that. That is where the problem lies—not with the new units that the Minister is creating, which I applaud, but with the reduction in the Army below the critical 100,000 level.

    Mr. Ingram: Let us look at the figures. The hon. Gentleman said that trained strength was 101,300 in 1997. It dropped to 100,900 the following year and to below 100,000 the year after that. In terms of the figure being below 100,000 and the reference to 1935, therefore, he is wrong. The current figures are marginally below the 1999 level. Interestingly, however, recruitment grew at the height of the Iraq controversy, when there were massive demonstrations in this country.

    In 2004 and 2005, the figure went up to 102,400. That tells us something that is probably hard to analyse—recruitment went up against the trend, but we are now having recruiting difficulties. Tempo is unquestionably part of the issue, but people tend to forget the strength of the economy. The hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Sir Robert Smith) mentioned the strength of the Scottish economy and his own region. It is difficult to recruit from a particular cohort when the economy is strong, and especially when the demographics and all the higher and further education opportunities open to young people, which were not there before, are working against us.

    That is what this debate is about, and if people can find a solution to that problem, they should tell us. A lot of effort is being put into working towards the best conclusion. We offer young people immense opportunities not only in the Army, but in the armed forces, and my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mrs. Curtis-Thomas) mentioned the educational opportunities. We market and advertise the opportunities that the armed forces provide so that people are aware of them. Sometimes those recruiting campaigns work, but sometimes they do not. We are no different from any other major organisation that is trying to reach a market and attract people in.

    What militates against our efforts is people arguing that the British armed forces are underfunded, ill equipped, badly treated and badly looked after. There may be some underlying truth in terms of issues needing to be addressed, but no wonder we find it difficult to recruit when debates such as this present a picture of complete negativity, rather than highlighting the positive attractions for young people. That is why we are putting so much effort into our recruiting strategy and trying to lift the quality of the debate as best we can.

    Mrs. Curtis-Thomas: That is an interesting point. We have certainly seen that situation in the north-west, and particularly in Liverpool, which is a big recruiting area for young soldiers, although the economy and job opportunities have gone through the ceiling, which means that the Army is not as attractive as it was. However, I take my right hon. Friend back to my earlier point that the Army has made strong attempts to ensure that any qualification it gives has equivalent civilian accreditation. Many individuals were locked into the Army because their experience could not be marketed outside it, but that barrier has now gone. That means that they can gain fantastic opportunities and then say, “Where can I best use them?” That is quite an important factor, and I applaud the fact that we have taken those steps, but it does create retention problems.

    Mr. Ingram: It is probably a no-win situation. Not every young person who comes into the armed forces because of the opportunities that they offer—they are not all 16 or 17-year-olds, and some are a bit more mature—is focused on training and education, and some come in to do what they want to do with the Royal Marines or the Army, but they are all given every opportunity. I agree that that raises an issue, in that we are making people employable who were not employable before.

    I talked to RAF personnel at Kinloss yesterday, and several of them were looking at openings in the outside world. As a nation, we have give them that opportunity. Some would have taken it as a result of their own choice, but many will now be able to do so because we have provided the resources—the hundreds of millions that we pour into the education of our personnel.

    I want now to touch on equipment because we hear so much about equipment problems—indeed, that is all we are ever told about. When the issue arises, Defence Ministers try to take those who make such comments through the argument. Let me give a good example of what applies to the Army today and what will apply into the future. Four years ago, an eight-man fire team would have had roughly three SA80s; one light support weapon; an individual Mk 6 helmet, webbing and Bergen; enhanced combat body armour; the old Clansman; a light anti-tank weapon; an individual weapon sight; and a 51 mm mortar. Now, such a team has a light support weapon; a light machine gun; an underslung grenade launcher; thermal imaging sights; the Mk 6A helmet, which is an improved defensive aid; all-round Osprey body armour, which has saved lives; the interim light anti-tank weapon; the Bowman personal role radio; head-mounted night-vision sights; a long-range image intensifier; and an automatic lightweight grenade launcher and a 60 mm mortar in support.

    All those developments have taken place because of the theatre in which we find ourselves. That is what is happening on the procurement of equipment, and it is the same with armoured vehicles. I am really surprised that the hon. Member for Aldershot criticises what we are doing and says that we should do more. What more can we do, other than procure the numbers that we need and ask industry to supply us, which it is doing to a considerable extent? All that will place the Army in a better position in the years ahead.

    Let us just consider one fact: equipment valued at more than £10 billion has been delivered to the armed forces in the past three years. When people say that equipment is not being supplied to provide for force protection and wider capabilities, they are simply wrong. If they want more defence expenditure, let me hear where they want less expenditure. I shall advocate more expenditure as part of a spending Department’s approach with the Treasury—it is our job to do that—but let those who want more for defence say where they want a reduction. In health? In education?

    The issue is part of our covenant with the British people, and the Prime Minister set it out in his argument. Have we got the balance right? The argument is now out there, and the Prime Minister certainly made more than a contribution—his was a powerful examination of where we stand as a nation and what we need to do against unknown threats and enemies. However, we must get ourselves in the best position. I welcome this debate, and we should have more such debates, but I just wish that more hon. Members would participate in them.