Tag: Foreign Office

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 13 September 2024.

UK Statement for the Interactive Dialogue with the UN Working Group on Mercenaries.

Thank you, Mr President,

The UK would like to thank the Working Group for its report today which sheds light on the role of mercenaries and mercenary related actors in the trafficking and proliferation of arms.

The UK remains deeply concerned by the widespread human rights abuses carried out by mercenary related actors such as the Wagner Group, who have engaged in arms trafficking, while continuing to exacerbate conflict, inflict violence and undermine peace and security wherever they operate.

The UK condemns the killing of civilians, torture and sexual and gender-based violence carried out by the Wagner Group, which is now being replaced by new groups such as Africa Corps, PMC BEAR and no doubt others. These proxy actors profit from conflict while supporting Russia’s malign aims.

The UK will continue to use all tools necessary and appropriate to tackle these actors and to hold them to account.

Members of the Working Group,

Given the evolving nature of conflicts, coupled with the rising involvement of these malign actors carrying out mercenary-like activities, how can the Working Group assist States in enhancing their capacity to effectively address these challenges?

Thank you.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 13 September 2024.

UK Statement for Independent Expert on Older Persons. Delivered at the 57th Human Rights Council in Geneva.

Thank you, Mr President,

The UK welcomes the recent consensus adoption by the General Assembly of the Open Ended Working Group on Ageing’s recommendations.

We agree with the Independent Expert that there is still a lot of work to be done.

Critical data gaps globally need to be addressed for comprehensive policy development. Without quality, disaggregated data, it will be challenging to understand the extent of exclusion that many older people currently face.

The UK is working on addressing this challenge. We have been supporting the Titchfield City Group to develop standardised tools and methods for producing both data disaggregated by age and ageing-related data. The Group will issue a final report of their findings in 2025.

We thank the Independent Expert for her work highlighting the key gaps facing older people. Are there any particular thematic areas where older persons are most neglected?

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 13 September 2024.

UK Statement for the Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences.

Thank you, Mr President,

We thank the Special Rapporteur for his thorough report on how incarcerated and formerly incarcerated people are affected by slavery, and for bringing this important issue to the Council’s attention.

We are deeply concerned by the scale of sexual exploitation and abuse faced by incarcerated people.  Women, children and ethnic minorities are particularly at risk. We must end discriminatory laws and practices that enable a culture of impunity for such exploitation. Victims must have access to justice, and perpetrators must be held to account.

Individuals who have been incarcerated are often stigmatised afterwards. This increases their risk of becoming victims of modern slavery. We therefore welcome your recommendations on the importance of reintegration measures to enable access to education, decent work, adequate housing and financial inclusion.

In 2022, the UK changed legislation so that, for the first time some people with sentences of four years and over will no longer have to disclose their criminal record.

Special Rapporteur,

We would welcome your recommendations on what more can be done to strengthen reintegration measures for incarcerated people during and after their detention.

Thank you.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 13 September 2024.

Richard Crowder has been appointed as Head of British Office Sudan and UK Special Representative to Sudan in succession to Mr Giles Lever.

Curriculum vitae

Full name: Richard Crowder

Year	Role
2022 to 2024	Full Time Arabic Language Training, London and Amman

2020 to 2022

Deputy Director, FCDO London

2017 to 2020

Islamabad, Deputy High Commissioner

2014 to 2016

FCO, Deputy Director, Europe Directorate

2011 to 2014

FCO, Head, Economics Unit

2007 to 2011

Brussels, Seconded to Policy Unit, Council of the European Union and then External Action Service.

2006 to 2007

Masters in Public Administration, Harvard Kennedy School

2002 to 2006

FCO, Head, Gibraltar Team, Europe Directorate

1999 to 2002

Moscow, Second Secretary

1997 to 1998

FCO, Desk Officer, Birmingham G8 Summit

1996 to 1997

FCO, Desk Officer, Africa Great Lakes

1996	Joined FCO

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 13 September 2024.

Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki, UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on threats to international peace and security.

By calling this meeting today on ‘western weapons transfers to Ukraine’, Russia has, yet again, succeeded only in drawing our attention to its continued hypocrisy.

Just days ago, it came to light that Russia has received Iranian ballistic missiles for use in prosecuting its illegal war against Ukraine. The transfer poses a direct threat to European security and stability elsewhere and will increase the suffering of the Ukrainian people. It is this which should be the focus of today’s meeting, not Western support for a sovereign state’s legitimate and legal right to defend itself.

Iranian close-range ballistic missiles will soon reach European soil. The transfer will increase Russia’s capability to launch short-range attacks on the front lines, enabling it to use more of its long-distance missiles to strike deeper inside Ukraine. As we said earlier this week together with our international partners, we can be certain that the suffering of the Ukrainian people will increase as a result.

Colleagues, none of us need reminding of the atrocities Russia will inflict with the aid of these weapons. The UN has verified over 35,000 civilian casualties caused by Russia’s war – we suspect the real number is far higher. Russian missiles are hitting schools and children’s hospitals. Humanitarian workers are being killed. And Russia is cynically and brutally targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure, posing significant risks to the lives of millions of Ukrainians ahead of winter. It seems that only one member of this Council needs reminding that deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure is a war crime.

President, Russia also continues to purchase significant quantities of weapons for use in Ukraine, including ballistic missiles from DPRK, in violation of UN Security Council resolutions Russia itself voted for.

This increased military cooperation between Russia, Iran and DPRK poses an unacceptable threat to not only European security, but to global security. In return for weapons needed to prolong its illegal war, Russia is violating sanctions endorsed by the UN Security Council and building the capabilities of, and emboldening, both the Iranian and North Korean regimes. This contributes to further destablisation in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific.

Russia’s war in Ukraine is a flagrant violation of international law and the UN Charter. We will not be deterred from our unwavering support for Ukraine. We remain committed to providing the political and military support Ukraine requires to defend itself – in line with its Article 51 right – against Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked invasion, and to secure a just and lasting peace, in line with the UN Charter.

And President, let me conclude with the words of my Prime Minister yesterday: “Russia started this conflict. Russia illegally invaded Ukraine. Russia could end this conflict straight away. Ukraine has the right to self-defence.”

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 12 September 2024.

UK Ambassador to the IAEA Corinne Kitsell’s statement on behalf of Australia, the UK and the US to the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors on IAEA safeguards and AUKUS

Chair,

I take the floor on behalf of the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States to respond to comments made regarding Australia’s acquisition of a naval nuclear propulsion capability through the AUKUS partnership. We are again compelled to invoke our Right of Reply to address remarks that purposefully mischaracterise AUKUS partners’ intentions and attempt to undermine the independence, integrity, and authority of the IAEA. Under this item, the Board has repeatedly heard unsubstantiated claims that ignore or misrepresent the information we have provided in good faith, and assertions that disregard the statements made by the Director General.

I reiterate that this matter has not been adopted as a standing agenda item by this Board and has never enjoyed consensus support. It is regrettable that this unnecessary item has been added to the agenda for nearly three years, at the insistence of one member state, when there are pressing non-proliferation concerns requiring the Board’s attention.

Director General Grossi has expressed his satisfaction with AUKUS partners’ engagement and transparency and reiterated that he will continue to update the Board on naval nuclear propulsion as appropriate. The AUKUS partners have continued to engage consistently, openly, and transparently with Member States and the Secretariat on genuine questions, including at the 2023 and 2024 NPT Preparatory Committees. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have provided updates on relevant progress at all Board meetings since the initial AUKUS announcement in September 2021. We will do so again at this meeting under Any Other Business, where it remains most appropriate.

Chair,

The Director General has already provided clear answers to questions raised today and in previous meetings, including in his reports on Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program to the Board:

Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Article 14 of the IAEA’s draft Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) is the specific provision to support the right of states to use nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity, including for naval nuclear propulsion, within the safeguards framework.

The IAEA has the clear authority, under the IAEA Statute, as agreed by 178 Member States, to negotiate directly with Member States on the establishment, and application, of safeguards and verification arrangements – including those pertaining to naval nuclear propulsion. The NPT, IAEA Statute, Australia’s CSA, and Additional Protocol provide a firm legal basis for Australia to engage with the IAEA on the safeguards and verification approach for this program.

The Director General has clearly stated that the Agency has “the necessary experience to develop the arrangements related to the use of nuclear material for naval nuclear propulsion in accordance with the Statute and relevant safeguards agreements.” Despite these statements, it is concerning that some states persistently question the Director General’s ability to perform the functions vested in him by the Statute, by the relevant safeguards agreements, and by decisions of the Board.

It is untrue that the transfer of high enriched uranium from a nuclear-weapon State to a non-nuclear-weapon State runs counter to the spirit of the NPT. The transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level to a non-nuclear-weapon State, is not prohibited by the NPT and indeed such transfers have regularly taken place with IAEA oversight.

Under the Article 14 arrangement, the IAEA will maintain oversight of nuclear material. Australia’s Article 14 arrangement will include a package of robust verification measures that will enable the IAEA to continue to meet its technical safeguards objectives throughout the submarines’ lifecycle. Once the Article 14 arrangement is developed, the Director General will transmit it to the Board for ‘appropriate action’ – as we have said many times before. To suggest that the Board will somehow be bypassed is categorically false.

We would also like to draw the Board’s attention to the recent signing and publication of the AUKUS Agreement for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Provision. Upon entry into force, this Agreement will reaffirm Australia’s obligations under the NPT and make Australia’s other key non-proliferation commitments legally binding conditions for AUKUS partners’ ongoing cooperation. Importantly, under the Agreement, Australia cannot receive any nuclear material from the UK or the US for use in naval nuclear propulsion prior to having an Article 14 Agreement in place.

Chair,

Our three countries – along with the majority of this Board – continue to oppose any proposal for this item to be a standing agenda item or to establish any efforts that undermine and politicise the independent technical mandate of the IAEA. We encourage colleagues to continue to reject deliberate efforts to undermine the Agency’s independence and integrity.

We will continue to engage in good faith with Member States on genuine questions, consistent with our approach to maintaining open and transparent engagement, and welcome the Director General’s continued commitment to provide updates on naval nuclear propulsion, as he deems appropriate.

Thank you, Chair.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 12 September 2024.

Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki, UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on Yemen.

I’m grateful to the Special Envoy Grundberg and Acting USG Msuya for their briefings. And I also thank Ms Al Obahi for her vital insights that serve as a timely reminder of the importance of engagement with civil society and the Yemeni community, especially women, in order to achieve long-term stability and peace in Yemen.

I also welcome the participation of the permanent representative of Yemen in our meeting today.

Let me make three points.

First, I join the briefers in highlighting the plight of UN, NGO workers and staff and former staff of diplomatic missions who remain in Houthi captivity.

It is over three months since their detention; that’s three months of families being torn apart by the unprovoked and arbitrary act; and three months of reducing the humanitarian community’s capacity to be able to fully support Yemenis in need. There is no justification for this. We once again call on the Houthis to immediately and unconditionally release those detained.

Second, I join Ms Msuya in highlighting the severe constraints on humanitarian access in Yemen especially in Houthi-controlled areas. The reckless actions of the Houthis are further restricting an already complex and hostile operating environment, making it almost impossible to get aid to those who need it.

We must all be clear about the importance of safe and effective humanitarian access so that we can continue to deliver critical, lifesaving support to the Yemeni people.

Third, we once again reiterate this Council’s call for the Houthis to cease their dangerous and illegal attacks on maritime shipping.

The recent attack on the MV Sounion is a clear example of the Houthis’ disregard for the catastrophic environmental and economic consequences of their actions for both Yemen and the region.

We call for the immediate cessation of arms supplies to Houthis. The continued supply of advanced weapons which enables these attacks shows complete disregard for the UN Arms Embargo.

President, to conclude, the UK is grateful to Special Envoy Grundberg’s efforts to facilitate economic dialogue, de-escalate tensions and preserve space for a future peace process.

We are unwavering in our support to his efforts to secure an inclusive, sustainable peace in Yemen and we continue to call on all parties to de-escalate tensions and preserve space for negotiations under UN auspices.

Rather than pursuing reckless attacks and the detention of innocent civilians, we urge the Houthis to prioritise the needs of Yemenis by engaging with peace process negotiations.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 12 September 2024.

Following North Korea’s ballistic missile launches on 12 September, a Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) spokesperson gave a statement.

An FCDO spokesperson said:

North Korea’s ballistic missile launches on 12 September are another breach of multiple UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). Unlawful ballistic missile launches continue to destabilise the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula.

The UK strongly urges North Korea to stop such provocations, to engage in meaningful diplomacy and accept offers of dialogue.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 12 September 2024.

UK Ambassador to the IAEA Corinne Kitsell’s statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors meeting on Ukraine.

Chair,

The United Kingdom thanks the Director General both for his comprehensive report on Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine and for the recent report entitled: ‘Two years of IAEA continued presence at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant’. We are, as ever, grateful to the IAEA personnel working to help maintain nuclear safety, security and safeguards across Ukraine under the most challenging of circumstances. We also value the IAEA as the only reliable, impartial provider of information to the International Community on what is actually happening at ZNPP.

Chair

As the DG has said, the situation at ZNPP continues to be precarious. The report before us today identifies a numerous specific concerns, all consequences of Russia’s seizure, occupation and militarisation of a previously well run Ukrainian nuclear power plant. I would like to highlight three areas of particular concern:

First – that two years on, the ISAMZ mission cannot secure the access it requires to fully assess whether the DG’s 5 Concrete Principles for Protecting the ZNPP are being observed at all times. Russian armed troops have blocked access to the western parts of the turbine halls. What are they hiding? The ISAMZ team has also been prevented from accessing the cooling pond isolation gate and the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP) switchyard. At the same time, this report confirms the presence onsite of armed troops and military equipment including armoured personnel carriers and weapons mounted armed vehicles;

Second – that, two years on, the IAEA continues to identify major shortcomings in existing emergency arrangements, specifically the ability to ensure an effective response in the event of any emergency that warrants implementation of public protective actions off site. To be clear this is about protecting people and the environment in the event of an emergency.

Third – Water and Power – that the IAEA report describes the diminishing availability of water at ZNPP and the vulnerable state of the off-site power supply to the Plant. Two years on, ZNPP continues to rely on only two off-site powerlines. Only last week one of those lines (the 330 kilovolt back up line) was disconnected for nearly three days.

Chair

Across Ukraine’s NPPs, reliability of power supply remains concerning. On 26 August one reactor at Rivne NPP and one at South Ukraine NPP went into automatic shutdown, with reductions in operating power reported in the remaining reactor units at those plants, as a result of electrical grid fluctuations. On 26 August, Ukraine was enduring a massive Russian missile and drone attack, which targeted critical energy infrastructure. We welcome the DG’s 3rd September update emphasising the importance of protecting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure to ensure it does not impact nuclear safety and announcing planned IAEA assessments of damaged Ukrainian substations.

Despite these extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants remaining under Ukrainian control, continue to operate safely and effectively, carrying out scheduled maintenance, with reliable supply chains, and conducting large scale emergency exercises. We are aware of the toll this takes on the operating staff, hence our support for trauma risk management workshops in July aimed at equipping NPP managers, supervisors and psychologists with the skills to spot signs of distress and provide support.

Chair,

Mindful of the time, I apologise for adding a couple of additional points to the statement that I had planned to make but I must address some of the Russian propaganda that we have heard this evening:

First, drone attacks. The UK has made clear, including at the UN Security Council, our support for the DG’s 5 Principles for protecting the ZNPP – principles that have been necessary because of Russia’s seizure and occupation of a Ukrainian nuclear power plant. We do not condone any drone attacks at, towards, or from ZNPP.  In relation to alleged drone attacks – reports coming from Russian personnel exercising control over the Plant – we appreciate, and rely on, the fact based, impartial reporting of the IAEA  - our only source of reliable information.

Second, this Board must be clear that the situation at Kursk NPP and ZNPP are not comparable. Unlike Russia we have not witnessed Ukraine intentionally seize and endanger a NPP on another country’s sovereign territory. And we all heard our distinguished Ukrainian colleague make a clear statement to the Board this week that Ukraine has no intention of targeting a NPP.

With that, I take note of report GOV/2024/45 and ask that it be made public.

Thank you, Chair.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 11 September 2024.

France, Germany, the UK and United States (the Quad) gave a joint statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about Iran’s implementation of its obligations under its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement.

Chair,

France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States thank Director General Grossi for his report on the implementation of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement.

We commend the DG and the Secretariat for their continued professional, independent and impartial efforts to verify Iran’s implementation of its safeguards obligations, including the Agency’s repeated efforts to engage Iran to clarify information regarding the “correctness and completeness” of its declarations under its NPT-related Safeguards Agreement. Unfortunately, due to Iran’s failure over several years to address the outstanding issues, the Agency continues to report that it is unable to assure that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

Chair,

Yet again we have in front of us a report from the Director General that demonstrates there has been no progress. Iran has not provided technically credible explanations in response to the IAEA’s questions regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at Turquzabad and Varamin. Iran’s continued stonewalling runs contrary to its legal obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement and the commitments it made to cooperate with the Agency under the Joint Statement of March 2023.

We also find ourselves once more discussing Iran’s continued refusal to apply modified Code 3.1 as part of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. This is a legal obligation that Iran cannot unilaterally suspend or modify. As the Director General reminds us, report after report, Iran is the only State with significant nuclear activities that is not implementing modified Code 3.1. This refusal prevents the Agency from obtaining early design information for new nuclear facilities necessary to prepare its safeguards approach. This should not be taken lightly. Given Iran’s history of undeclared nuclear facilities, past and current unresolved questions, and several public statements made by current and former Iranian officials concerning Iran’s technical capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, Iran’s actions further fuel serious doubts over whether Iran’s nuclear activities remain exclusively peaceful.

Chair,

The report also highlights a number of other concerning issues, including the Agency’s determination that the amount of uranium contained in the solid waste sent from Jaber Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratory (JHL) to the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) for dissolution was less than had been declared by Iran in 2003-2004. We also note with concern that in August 2024, the Agency informed Iran that, with respect to uranium metal experiments conducted at JHL from 1995-2000, the amount of nuclear material the Agency found to be unaccounted for was greater than the amount the Agency had previously communicated. We commend the Agency for their diligent efforts so far and support the Agency continuing to investigate the discrepancy. In this regard, we urge Iran to fully co-operate with the Agency to clarify this matter.

We condemn the fact that Iran has confirmed it will not reverse its decision to de-designate several of the IAEA’s most experienced inspectors, despite repeated requests by the DG and the international community since last September. As the DG previously reported, Iran’s decision effectively made the Agency’s independent technical work subject to political interpretation, and seriously affects the Agency’s ability to effectively conduct its verification activities in Iran. Iran’s unjustified decision clearly runs counter to the positive engagement with the Agency that Iran claims to want. We hope that Iran will reverse this decision in line with the spirit of collaboration agreed to in the March 2023 Joint Statement.

Let us make clear once again: Iran must implement its safeguards obligations in full and without further delay. As long as such cases of concern exist, there remains reasonable doubt about the nature of Iran’s nuclear activities. The longstanding nature of these cases is also at risk of harming the broader global non-proliferation architecture, and risks setting dangerous precedents regarding the fulfilment of safeguards obligations.

Chair,

The E3 and the United States commend the DG’s long-standing efforts to remain open to constructive engagement with Iran. Yet instead of seizing opportunities to engage constructively to resolve all outstanding questions, Iran has failed to offer any immediate concrete actions.

For five years now, the Board of Governors has been asking Iran to engage in good faith to resolve the safeguards investigations. Indeed, the Board has passed four resolutions on this matter since 2020, most recently in June 2024.

We would like to recall specifically that in June the Board reaffirmed its decision in its November 2022 resolution that it is essential and urgent that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and reiterated its call on Iran to:

1. Provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin in two undeclared locations in Iran
2. Inform the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of the contaminated equipment,
3. Provide all information, documentation and answers the Agency requires for that purpose,
4. Provide access to locations and material the Agency requires for that purpose, as well as for the taking of samples as deemed appropriate by the Agency.

Since June, we have again seen no progress from Iran or any real indication of a change in its longstanding pattern of delay with which this Board is familiar. Instead, Iran has doubled down on its decision to remove Agency inspectors, has made no progress on the outstanding safeguards issues, has continued to withhold required design information, and has so far ignored requests from the Agency to service cameras all while further expanding uranium enrichment activities that go well beyond any legitimate civil needs.

This Board has shown considerable patience. But that patience has its limits, and we will not stand by while Iran continues to obfuscate. If Iran continues to fail to provide the necessary, full and unambiguous cooperation with the Agency to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues, further action by this Board will be necessary. This could include, in the coming months, a request to the DG to compile a Comprehensive Report. This report would provide a clear and updated assessment of all relevant information, allowing consideration of whether further steps would be needed, including making a finding under Article 19 of Iran’s CSA.

Iran could render this action unnecessary if, as we have long called for, it chooses to urgently, fully and unambiguously co-operate with the Agency. Our efforts aim to resolutely support the Agency to this end – for the sake of the integrity of the international non-proliferation architecture and ultimately, global security. We cannot allow Iran to evade its NPT-related safeguards obligations year after year.

Chair,

We once again thank the DG for his commitment and express our unwavering support to the Agency for its impartial and professional work on this issue. We encourage the DG to continue to report to the Board in a timely manner and ask for the report contained in GOV/2024/44 to be derestricted and made public.

Thank you, Chair