Tag: Foreign Office

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 15 May 2026.

Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki, UK Chargé d’Affaires to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on Syria.

We welcome the progress on Syria’s political transition, including the start of legal proceedings against former Assad regime figures.

These individuals committed heinous crimes. Their trials are a powerful step towards accountability and justice. 

We will continue to support the Syrian Government in their efforts to uphold the rule of law for all Syria. 

Of course, there is more work to be done to fully deliver an inclusive political transition. 

We encourage continued efforts to integrate North-East Syria into unified state structures. 

We also note that women remain underrepresented across Syria’s political and security institutions. 

We encourage this Council’s continued focus on the Women, Peace, and Security agenda to support Syria in addressing this vital aspect of the transition. 

Second, the UK offers our appreciation to the UN and all partners involved in the cross-border aid operations from Türkiye into Syria over the last 11 years. 

In that time, over 65,000 operations provided vital humanitarian support to communities across northern Syria. 

We welcome the operation’s successful conclusion and a shift to more sustainable commercial methods. 

However, as we’ve heard today, the humanitarian situation remains challenging with 15.6 million people still in need. 

So it is vital that humanitarian partners continue to enjoy unfettered access and a permissive operating environment. 

Third, we welcome Syria’s firm commitment to peaceful co-existence with its neighbours. 

Still, the situation in the region remains volatile with risks to Syria’s stability and economic recovery.

De-escalation and dialogue are more important than ever, and we urge a return to direct talks between Syria and Israel with the objective of supporting long-term peace.

President, the UN can play a vital role in supporting Syria’s reconstruction and stability. We look forward to the timely move of the Special Envoy’s Office to Damascus. 

The UK will continue to work with the UN, this Council, and the wider international community, alongside the Syrian government, to deliver a more peaceful and prosperous future for the Syrian people.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 15 May 2026.

Mrs Louise de Sousa has been appointed His Majesty’s Ambassador to the Republic of Colombia in succession to Mr George Hodgson, who will be transferring to another Diplomatic Service appointment. 

Mrs de Sousa will take up her appointment during August 2026. 

Curriculum vitae 

Full name:  Louise Amanda de Sousa   

2021 to present	Santiago, His Majesty’s Ambassador
2020 to 2021	Pre-posting training (including Spanish language training)
2016 to 2020	Tunis, Her Majesty’s Ambassador
2016	Pre-posting training (including French language training)
2014 to 2016	FCO, Head of EU (Mediterranean) Department
2011 to 2014	FCO, Head of Human Rights and Democracy Department
2007 to 2011	Nairobi, Deputy High Commissioner
2006 to 2007	FCO, Change Manager, Europe Zero-Based Review
2003 to 2006	Maputo, Deputy High Commissioner
2002 to 2003	FCO, Deputy Head of Environment Policy Department
1999 to 2001	FCO, Secretary to the Board of Management
1997 to 1998	FCO, Head of Section, Drugs & International Crime Department
1993 to 1996	Brasilia, Second Secretary (Political and Press)
1992 to 1993	Pre-posting training (including Portuguese language training)
1991 to 1992	FCO, Southern European Department
1991	Joined FCO

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 15 May 2026.

Ms Maya Sivagnanam has been appointed His Majesty’s Ambassador to the Republic of North Macedonia in succession to Mr Matthew Lawson.

Ms Sivagnanam will take up her appointment during August 2026.

Curriculum vitae 

Full name:  Maya Sivagnanam   

2025 to present	FCDO, Macedonian Language Training
2023 to 2025	FCDO, Deputy Director, European Political Community Summit
2021 to 2023	FCDO, Deputy Director, South Asia Region Department
2019 to 2021	FCDO, Head of Department, Europe North Department
2016 to 2019	FCO, Deputy Head, Northern & Central Europe
2015 to 2016	The Royal Foundation for The Duke and Duchess of Cambridge, Illegal Wildlife Trade Transport Taskforce
2013 to 2015	FCO, Deputy Head, Emerging Powers Department then Head, Illegal Wildlife Trade
2011 to 2013	FCO, Head of Training Skills, Human Resources
2009 to 2011	British Embassy Ankara, Head of Global Issues
2008 to 2009	FCO, Turkish Language Training
2007 to 2008	UK Permanent Representation to the EU, First Secretary
2006 to 2007	FCO, Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for Returns, Migration Group
2005 to 2006	Home Office, Head of Country Action Plan Team, Immigration & Nationality Directorate
2004 to 2005	Home Office, Head of Rapid Response Team, Immigration & Nationality Directorate
2002 to 2004	FCO, European Union Department (Internal)
2001 to 2002	Home Office, European & International Unit
2001	Joined Home Office

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 14 May 2026.

UK and 40 other OSCE countries invoke the Moscow Mechanism to investigate indoctrination of Ukrainian children by Russia.

[Delivered in French]

The Russian Federation’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine is in its fifth year. Russia’s illegal occupation of parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions is now in its fifth year, while its illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions is in its thirteenth year. There continue to be reports of large-scale violations and abuses of international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL), many of which may amount to the most serious international crimes. 

Against this backdrop, we are profoundly alarmed by credible and mounting reports that the Russian Federation is systematically subjecting Ukrainian children – especially those staying in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and those forcibly transferred to such territories or unlawfully deported to Russia – to militarization, indoctrination, coercion, and other repressive practices aimed at, inter alia, erasing Ukrainian identity and compelling loyalty to the occupying power. 

We recall that OSCE participating States, following bilateral consultations with Ukraine under the Vienna (Human Dimension) Mechanism, have invoked Paragraph 8 of the Moscow (Human Dimension) Mechanism five times in response to Russia’s aggression. Since 2022, Moscow Mechanism missions have documented violations of IHL and IHRL and identified patterns of serious international crimes. Notably, in 2023, a dedicated Moscow Mechanism mission reported on the forcible transfer and/or unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation, including their exposure to assimilationist policies and “military education”. 

We note, inter alia, that Ukraine, the UN and civil society organizations continue to document the unlawful deportation and/or forcible transfer of children and the severe harm inflicted on them. As of 23 March 2026, Ukraine’s official “Children of War” platform reports, among other figures, 20,000 children “deported and/or forcibly displaced” (Bring Kids Back UA figure), alongside other verified child-casualty and missing-person data.

In its latest report, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine concluded that the Russian authorities had committed acts “amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes of deportation and forcible transfer of children” on the basis of compelling evidence concerning the deportation and transfer of a total of 1205 children from five oblasts in Ukraine.

Building upon findings by previous Moscow Mechanism missions, as well as other credible reports, we are now confronted with a distinct and urgent human dimension question: the protection of Ukrainian children under occupation and/or in armed conflict against unlawful deportation, forced assimilation, re-education, militarisation, indoctrination, coercive propaganda, intimidation, and violence. 

“Credible open-source research has mapped an extensive infrastructure supporting these practices. For example, the Yale School of Public Health Humanitarian Research Lab reported in September 2025 that children from Ukraine have been taken to at least 210 facilities in Russia and temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, describing patterns of “re-education” and militarization.  

In addition to indoctrination and militarization, we underline our deep concern that Russia’s conduct towards Ukrainian children includes pressure, repression, illegal adoptions, and exposure to psychological and physical violence, especially in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and during forcible transfer or unlawful deportation. 

These acts strike at the very core of OSCE commitments and the international legal framework protecting children, including participating States’ obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law. 

Gravely concerned by these developments, the delegations of: 

Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, The Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, following consultations with Ukraine under the Vienna (Human Dimension) Mechanism, hereby invoke the OSCE Moscow (Human Dimension) Mechanism under Paragraph 8 of that document. 

We request that ODIHR inquire of Ukraine whether it would invite a mission of experts to build upon previous findings and to: 

1. Establish the facts and circumstances surrounding possible contraventions of relevant OSCE commitments, and violations and abuses of IHRL and IHL, related to the militarization and indoctrination of Ukrainian children by the Russian Federation, including in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and including in the context of forcible transfer and/or unlawful deportation; 
2. Collect, consolidate and analyse information on these practices, including patterns of coercion, intimidation, repression, unlawful deprivation of liberty, illegal adoptions, ill-treatment, and other forms of violence affecting children; 
3. Further collect, consolidate and analyse information on the legislative framework adopted by Russia for this purpose, and the school curricula imposed on Ukrainian children in the temporarily occupied territories; 
4. Assess whether such practices indicate a coordinated and systematic policy aimed, inter alia, at erasing Ukrainian identity of children, including through their illegal adoptions as well as alteration of their nationality, and conditioning children for service to the occupying power; 
5. Assess the impact of these practices on the rights of Ukrainian children, including the rights to life and development, health, education, family life, equality and non-discrimination, and protection from all forms of violence, and provide recommendations on urgent protective measures, prevention, and accountability pathways; 
6. Offer recommendations on relevant accountability mechanisms, including how OSCE participating States and OSCE institutions can support documentation, child protection, return and reintegration efforts, and international co-operation to end impunity for crimes against children. 

We also invite ODIHR to provide any relevant information or documentation derived from any new expert mission to other appropriate accountability mechanisms, as well as national, regional, or international courts or tribunals that have, or may in future have, jurisdiction. 

Russia’s refusal to co-operate with OSCE human dimension mechanisms in relation to Ukraine has been a persistent feature of previous missions. We nevertheless affirm that the Moscow Mechanism was adopted by consensus by all participating States and remains a vital OSCE instrument to establish facts, identify patterns, and issue recommendations to participating States when serious human dimension concerns arise.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 14 May 2026.

Ambassador Holland reaffirmed UK support for the OSCE Project Coordinator in Uzbekistan, welcoming progress across all three dimensions, including security cooperation, economic governance and human rights. He underscored the value of a strong field presence and urged continued focus on impact, sustainability and alignment with OSCE commitments.

Thank you Mr Chair and thank you Ambassador for your comprehensive report.

The UK expresses its strong support for the wide range of activities by your office, delivered across all three OSCE dimensions. We particularly welcome the Office’s assistance to strengthen resilience to transnational threats, including on border management, cybercrime and violent extremism. As chair of the Security Committee the UK stands ready to support this work. We also support sustained efforts to improve economic governance, anticorruption practices, environmental monitoring and inclusive growth. The scale of engagement on media literacy, youth participation, women’s economic empowerment and regional dialogue demonstrate the continued relevance of the OSCE’s comprehensive security approach in Central Asia and the value of a well‑embedded field presence.

In the human dimension, the UK welcomes the Office’s concrete contributions to strengthening the rule of law, preventing torture, advancing judicial reform and supporting gender responsive and child friendly justice, including through work on the Istanbul Protocol, investigative judges and trafficking prevention. We also note positively your role in facilitating regional co‑operation and exchange of good practice, including on Women, Peace and Security and youth engagement.

We remain a strong supporter of your mandate. As with all field missions we encourage continued focus on impact, sustainability and close alignment with OSCE commitments, particularly in a constrained resource environment.

Thank you.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 14 May 2026.

Ambassador Holland welcomed the US-brokered ceasefire and Ukraine’s efforts to pursue peace, condemns Russia’s mass attack on Kyiv and highlighted how Russia’s actions have undermined cooperative security, OSCE mechanisms and trust.

Thank you, Mr Chair.

The United Kingdom welcomes the US-brokered ceasefire of 9–11 May. We note Ukraine’s offer to extend the ceasefire on long-range strikes beyond 11 May. This offer fits squarely with Ukraine’s long-standing efforts to create a more conducive environment for negotiations on a just and lasting peace. Regrettably, Russia wasted no time in restarting long-range strikes – once again choosing the path of destruction over the path of peace.

We saw the consequences of this overnight, with Russia launching over 600 drones and nearly 60 missiles, predominantly at Kyiv. A residential building, a school and a veterinary clinic were damaged. We condemn these barbaric attacks.

Mr Chair, children have been among the most gravely affected by Russia’s decision to choose war. Thousands of Ukrainian children have been forcibly transferred or deported, subjected to indoctrination, and, in some cases, exposed to militarisation.

That is why the United Kingdom has imposed a package of targeted sanctions against individuals and entities involved in the forced deportation, indoctrination and militarisation of Ukrainian children. These measures form part of a coordinated international response alongside our partners, including the UK’s participation at the High‑Level meeting of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children in Brussels, reaffirming our commitment to accountability and to the safe return of children to their families and communities. We will, of course, return to this subject later in our meeting.

Mr Chair, this Council exists because participating States once shared a clear vision of security in Europe. The Helsinki Final Act spoke of security built “through cooperation” rather than confrontation, and the Charter of Paris committed us to a Europe “whole, free and at peace”. The OSCE was designed to translate that vision into practical tools: dialogue, transparency, restraint, and verification.

Russia’s actions over many years have steadily eroded that model. The continued presence of Russian forces in Moldova and Georgia against the host countries’ will, the illegal attempted annexation of Crimea, and Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine have all struck at the foundations of cooperative security. Alongside this, Russia has hollowed out the OSCE’s instruments: obstructing confidence- and security-building measures, disregarding requests under the Vienna Document, and contributing to the wider erosion of the European arms control architecture.

The impact is visible in this very room. Weekly Permanent Council meetings are confrontational rather than problem-solving.  Agreed OSCE mechanisms for military transparency and risk reduction are weakened or unused. Trust has been replaced by accusation, and predictability has been replaced by escalation.

Russia’s treatment of this Organisation has also unfortunately extended to its personnel. We condemn the continued detention of our three colleagues: Vadym Golda, Maxim Petrov, and Dmytro Shabanov. This is emblematic of a broader pattern: obstruction of independent scrutiny and disregard for the spirit of commitments undertaken by consensus.

Mr Chair, none of this was inevitable. The OSCE does not require reinvention; it requires recommitment. A return to the founding purpose of this organisation would mean engaging seriously with OSCE mechanisms, restoring transparency and restraint, respecting agreed rules, and ending actions that fundamentally contradict them.

Above all, it would require Russia to end its illegal war of aggression and to withdraw its forces from Ukrainian, Moldovan and Georgian territory.  We urge Russia to do this. Above all, of course, because it is the right thing to do. But also because it is the only way to change the status of this organisation from a theatre for confrontation, which is a direct consequence of Russia’s actions, to something more recognisable to all of its founding fathers.

Thank you.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 13 May 2026.

UK Statement at the World Trade Organization’s General Council in Geneva.

Agenda item 5: Request for Observer Status by the African Union – Communication from Mozambique on behalf of the African Group (WT/MIN(26)/9 – WT/GC/W/995) – Request from Namibia on behalf of the African Group

The UK is a supporter of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and was the first non-African country to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the AfCFTA Secretariat in September 2021.

The UK is content with the request from the African Group for the African Union to be an observer, recognising the unique role of the African Union.

This should not, however, be a precedent for more regional and supranational groupings being observers. All requests should be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Agenda item 8. Preserving the Spirit of Open and Predictable Trade: Collective Restraint Against Actions Undermining Trade Liberalization – Request from the Republic of Korea

We agree with much of Korea’s analysis. The gaps in the WTO framework and the poor implementation frameworks have left us unable to address systemic issues that are leading to politically unacceptable outcomes.

These problems, including those connected with subsidies and overcapacity, have been debated in many different parts of the WTO. In disputes, in the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and elsewhere. 

We very much agree that these issues have long-standing and complex roots.

Yet all of our discussions, all of our conversations have not yielded any results. They have not resulted in any change.

It has left Members with no other option but to act. It underlines the urgency that we need to change our approach and get really serious about addressing the lack of a level playing field and move forward with reform.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 13 May 2026.

UK Statement at the World Trade Organization’s General Council in Geneva. Delivered by the UK’s Permanent Representative to the WTO and UN, Kumar Iyer.

Agenda item 1: Election of Chairperson

The UK would like to start by expressing our condolences at the passing of the Commerce Secretary, Mahbubur Rahman, a tragic loss. We would also like to bid a fond farewell to departing colleagues and to welcome new Members whom we look forward to working with. Importantly we would like to thank Ambassador Saqer bin Abdullah Al-Moqbel for the thankless task that you have taken on, and we would like to thank you as much as possible for having done so. As others have said your dedication and patience, and on a personal note, I am particularly grateful for your warmth and openness in the work that you have done.

A warm welcome to Ambassador Kelly. The UK very much looks forward to getting to work under your guidance, and you have the UK’s full support on the choices of beverages. I know that New Zealand has a very strong coffee culture. I also note that you have great Marlborough Sauvignon Blanc and that the UK is content with either beverage, at any time of day!

Agenda item 2+3: Follow-up to MC14 (Yaoundé)

The UK is grateful to Cameroon and the Secretariat for the organisation of MC14 and in particular for the genuine warmth, the reception and hosting of the event. We are however disappointed in the outcome. Something that the hosts could not control and is way beyond their ability to shape.

The outcome is what it was. We did not achieve substantive outcomes on any of the major decision items. We did, however, as has been mentioned, come very, very close. What is clear from the discussions is that the need for change is significant. The support for reform and change is also significant. As has been noted, we do have a document that has widespread support. I know from the UK perspective we do not currently have a mandate to engage in further process discussions. We are however ready to engage in further discussions with any and all countries who are willing and ready to do so. The UK will start to think about substantive policy papers that we will bring forward to this Council.

However, we want that process to be inclusive and orderly, involving all Members. That requires a process, we think that some of those ideas set out by the Chair are ones that we would fully support. Whilst the Work Programme is not everything that the UK wanted, to maintain order, if other Members are willing, the UK to voluntarily constrain its scope to the work programme as outlined at the end of Yaounde in the Chair’s statement.

We believe there are lessons to be learned from previous process. I think some of the points that you note are in the right direction in that regard.

There is also outstanding work to do in two areas where we missed an opportunity for decisions.

The first is IFDA. We thank South Africa and Türkiye for changing their positions, but we are still extremely disappointed that we did not reach consensus. We do celebrate the launch of the joint Ministerial Declaration which provides clear next steps to advance incorporation and implementation of the Agreement.

On E-commerce the UK is also disappointed at the outcome. We are now in a situation with no moratorium, no dedicated venue to discuss digital trade. This provides significant challenges for the reputation and credibility of the WTO and an important sphere for companies around the world. We do however welcome the ECA and the UK remains open and committed to providing certainty to businesses through this and other viable mechanisms in the interim period. Primary for us is to seek a multilateral solution in place for the moratorium. Finally, we were of course disappointed very significantly with the lack of outcomes on development and we are willing to support all areas of the LDC package including to find compromises on LDC Graduation. The UK would encourage all parties to continue to engage with an open mind on this topic.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 13 May 2026.

UK Senior Military Advisor, Colonel Joby Rimmer warns that Russia’s selective ceasefires mask bad faith engagement, a war dependent economy, and growing militarisation, making Moscow more coercive and risk tolerant. Russia’s actions, not its rhetoric, demonstrate the absence of any genuine commitment to a lasting peace in Europe.

The United Kingdom remains unequivocally committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. We warmly welcome President Trump’s achievement in brokering a 3-day ceasefire and a substantial prisoner exchange. We fully support US-led efforts to secure a just and lasting peace and would emphasise that Ukraine has demonstrated its commitment to peace, including by agreeing to a full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire, and is working constructively with the US, UK and other partners towards that objective.

Unfortunately, Russia has failed to engage with peace efforts in good faith. Moscow’s rhetoric may suggest openness to restraint, but its actions demonstrate something very different: a non-committal, selective approach designed to serve their own short-term political and security objectives rather than a genuine effort to bring the war to an end. The limited ceasefire announced last week was not a step toward peace, but a pause timed to protect domestic political symbolism from increasingly capable Ukrainian long-range and unmanned strike capabilities.

The Kremlin’s primary concern was clearly the protection of high-profile commemorative events from disruption, not the cessation of hostilities or the protection of civilians. The fact that Russia could suspend certain operations for its own convenience, while refusing a broader ceasefire proposed by Ukraine and supported internationally, exposes the fundamentally instrumental nature of its approach to de-escalation.

This posture is closely linked to a growing structural challenge for the Russian system: an economy that is becoming ever more dependent on the continuation of war. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has become the central mechanism through which the Kremlin sustains industrial output, channels employment, protects regime-linked interests, mobilises society, justifies repression, and preserves the political narrative on which it increasingly relies.

The United Kingdom takes no satisfaction in the hardship imposed on the Russian people by their government’s decision-making. But the deterioration of Russia’s economy has direct implications for military sustainability, escalation dynamics and regional stability. A weakening Russia that remains committed to imperial aggression is not a less dangerous Russia. It is a more militarised, more coercive and more risk tolerant one.

Russia’s own data underlines this trend. Economic growth has stalled, investment remains weak and consumer demand is slowing. Fiscal pressures are intensifying as revenues decline and expenditure, particularly defence spending, continues to rise. Even where commodity revenues provide temporary relief, they do not address the deeper structural imbalances of a war-driven economic model that is approaching its limits.

This creates a dangerous feedback loop. As the civilian economy weakens, the Kremlin relies more heavily on defence spending and state procurement to sustain output, employment and political control. The greater this reliance becomes, the harder it is for Russia to disengage from the war without triggering internal economic and political costs.

Consequently, major components of the Russian system now have material interests tied to the continuation of the conflict: defence manufacturers, recruitment structures, regional patronage networks, sanctioned intermediaries, security services and state-connected businesses. This is an economy seemingly being actively reorganised around coercion, mobilisation and confrontation.

Such dependence on war increases risks across the OSCE area. A state under fiscal strain may rely more heavily on coercive bargaining and brinkmanship. A government whose conventional economic strength is eroding may turn increasingly to asymmetric tools: cyber activity, sabotage, disinformation, political interference, nuclear signalling, attacks on critical infrastructure and sanctions evasion.

The problem is not simply inefficiency, but choice. The Kremlin alone bears responsibility for this war. It chose to violate Ukraine’s sovereignty. It chose to reject peaceful settlement. It is choosing imperial ambition over the welfare of its own people. Its refusal to engage seriously on a ceasefire flows directly from these choices.

The United Kingdom will continue to expose the reality behind Moscow’s claims. Until Russia withdraws its forces, ends its attacks and returns to compliance with its OSCE commitments, we will not be convinced that Russia has any meaningful interest in a lasting peace.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 12 May 2026.

Statement by the UK’s Permanent Representative to the WTO and UN, Kumar Iyer, at Singapore’s Universal Periodic Review at the Human Rights Council in Geneva.

Thank you, Mr President.

The United Kingdom welcomes the introduction of the Workplace Fairness Act and its decriminalisation of same-sex acts.

We urge Singapore to become party to the ICCPR, legislate against FGM, replace detention without trial with court trials and consider mental capacity in sentencing.

In the spirit of ongoing dialogue, we recommend:

Introduce a moratorium on executions and move towards abolition, and remove judicial corporal punishment;

Mandate rest periods and create digital recruitment and wage payment processes for foreign domestic workers;

Include protection against discrimination on the grounds of sexuality and gender identity in the Workplace Fairness Act and ensure equal treatment in government policies for LGBT+ persons

We thank the distinguished delegation for their constructive engagement today and wish them all the best for the rest of their review.