![PRESS RELEASE : Russia’s Militarised Economy and the Destabilising Effects on Regional Security – UK Statement to the OSCE [May 2026]](https://www.ukpol.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/newfco-150x150.png)
The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 13 May 2026.
UK Senior Military Advisor, Colonel Joby Rimmer warns that Russia’s selective ceasefires mask bad faith engagement, a war dependent economy, and growing militarisation, making Moscow more coercive and risk tolerant. Russia’s actions, not its rhetoric, demonstrate the absence of any genuine commitment to a lasting peace in Europe.
The United Kingdom remains unequivocally committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. We warmly welcome President Trump’s achievement in brokering a 3-day ceasefire and a substantial prisoner exchange. We fully support US-led efforts to secure a just and lasting peace and would emphasise that Ukraine has demonstrated its commitment to peace, including by agreeing to a full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire, and is working constructively with the US, UK and other partners towards that objective.
Unfortunately, Russia has failed to engage with peace efforts in good faith. Moscow’s rhetoric may suggest openness to restraint, but its actions demonstrate something very different: a non-committal, selective approach designed to serve their own short-term political and security objectives rather than a genuine effort to bring the war to an end. The limited ceasefire announced last week was not a step toward peace, but a pause timed to protect domestic political symbolism from increasingly capable Ukrainian long-range and unmanned strike capabilities.
The Kremlin’s primary concern was clearly the protection of high-profile commemorative events from disruption, not the cessation of hostilities or the protection of civilians. The fact that Russia could suspend certain operations for its own convenience, while refusing a broader ceasefire proposed by Ukraine and supported internationally, exposes the fundamentally instrumental nature of its approach to de-escalation.
This posture is closely linked to a growing structural challenge for the Russian system: an economy that is becoming ever more dependent on the continuation of war. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has become the central mechanism through which the Kremlin sustains industrial output, channels employment, protects regime-linked interests, mobilises society, justifies repression, and preserves the political narrative on which it increasingly relies.
The United Kingdom takes no satisfaction in the hardship imposed on the Russian people by their government’s decision-making. But the deterioration of Russia’s economy has direct implications for military sustainability, escalation dynamics and regional stability. A weakening Russia that remains committed to imperial aggression is not a less dangerous Russia. It is a more militarised, more coercive and more risk tolerant one.
Russia’s own data underlines this trend. Economic growth has stalled, investment remains weak and consumer demand is slowing. Fiscal pressures are intensifying as revenues decline and expenditure, particularly defence spending, continues to rise. Even where commodity revenues provide temporary relief, they do not address the deeper structural imbalances of a war-driven economic model that is approaching its limits.
This creates a dangerous feedback loop. As the civilian economy weakens, the Kremlin relies more heavily on defence spending and state procurement to sustain output, employment and political control. The greater this reliance becomes, the harder it is for Russia to disengage from the war without triggering internal economic and political costs.
Consequently, major components of the Russian system now have material interests tied to the continuation of the conflict: defence manufacturers, recruitment structures, regional patronage networks, sanctioned intermediaries, security services and state-connected businesses. This is an economy seemingly being actively reorganised around coercion, mobilisation and confrontation.
Such dependence on war increases risks across the OSCE area. A state under fiscal strain may rely more heavily on coercive bargaining and brinkmanship. A government whose conventional economic strength is eroding may turn increasingly to asymmetric tools: cyber activity, sabotage, disinformation, political interference, nuclear signalling, attacks on critical infrastructure and sanctions evasion.
The problem is not simply inefficiency, but choice. The Kremlin alone bears responsibility for this war. It chose to violate Ukraine’s sovereignty. It chose to reject peaceful settlement. It is choosing imperial ambition over the welfare of its own people. Its refusal to engage seriously on a ceasefire flows directly from these choices.
The United Kingdom will continue to expose the reality behind Moscow’s claims. Until Russia withdraws its forces, ends its attacks and returns to compliance with its OSCE commitments, we will not be convinced that Russia has any meaningful interest in a lasting peace.