Tag: Foreign Office

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 11 June 2024.

The British Library reconnects historical recordings of cultural songs and stories to the people of Solomon Islands through the National Museum.

As part of the True Echoes project, the British Library and the Solomon Islands National Museum have co-researched digitised wax cylinder recordings from the British Library collection that were made in Solomon Islands between 1908 and 1914.

These recordings contain significant music, stories, speeches as important cultural records. These document the oral traditions, cultural rituals, and history of Simbo, Rannonga and across Malaita.

Through the True Echoes project, the British Library has donated audio equipment to the Solomon Islands National Museum to make these digital recordings accessible to the people of Solomon Islands.

British High Commissioner to Solomon Islands His Excellency Thomas Coward presented the equipment to Deputy Director of the National Museum, Lawrence Kiko, who upon receiving the kit, said:

The museum is so thankful to receive the equipment as it will certainly enhance recording on both culture and historical stories around focus communities in Solomon Islands through the True Echoes Participatory research project in partnership with the British Library and the Solomon Islands National Museum. Thanks to the British High Commissioner, His Excellency Thomas Coward, for his moral support towards the project. The equipment handover this morning marks another milestone in the development of cultural preservation programs in terms of digitizing and playback of the numerous collections of tapes deposited by researchers many years ago.

Principal Investigator on the True Echoes project at the British Library, Isobel Clouter, said:

The aims of the True Echoes project were to share intangible cultural heritage and reconnect the rich archival sources held by the British Library and other UK institutions with communities, researchers, and peer institutions across the Pacific region. We are grateful to the UK High Commission in the Solomon Islands for their continued support of the True Echoes Project and are delighted to donate this audio equipment to the Solomon Islands National Museum as a way of supporting long-term access to this rich collection of recordings.

True Echoes was funded by the Leverhulme Trust and the UK Government’s Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS).

The collection can be found online at https://www.true-echoes.com.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 11 June 2024.

Joint declaration of intent between the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, the UK, and other development partners.

Russia’s full-scale invasion has had an immense and devastating human impact in Ukraine. Ongoing Russian aggression has reversed 15 years of development gains – exacerbating poverty, deepening inequalities, and compounding social vulnerabilities. Ukraine has experienced a ‘demographic shock’ with over 4.9 million internally displaced people (IDPs) and another 6.5 million Ukrainians seeking safety abroad. Socio-economic consequences of the war are becoming more evident with growing poverty, a declining workforce, and widening inequities. An additional 7.1 million Ukrainians are living in poverty, with the poverty rate increasing from 5% in 2021 to more than 24% in 2022. Women, children, persons with disabilities, older persons, IDPs and marginalized groups have been disproportionately affected by the multi-sectoral impacts of war and face further reductions in resilience as the crisis protracts.

The full-scale invasion has had a devastating impact on human capital development, recognized as central to Ukraine’s economic and social recovery at URC 2023. The Government of Ukraine estimates that veterans and their family members could comprise more than 10% of the population, with a significant number of military and civilian casualties and rapidly increasing disability rates.  In addition to the immediate adverse effects of war, Ukraine risks losing out on its investments in a generation of children and young people with long-lasting impacts.

The government and people of Ukraine have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of the full-scale invasion.  With the support of international partners, the Government of Ukraine has continued to function effectively under extreme stress, maintaining the provision of social benefits and expanding the network of social service providers. Ukrainian society mobilised quickly and effectively, providing a wide array of support and services and demonstrating critical leadership from Ukrainian civil society organisations, women’s rights organisations and organisations for persons with disabilities. However, Ukraine’s social systems are under extreme pressure with increasing demand for support and services, limited resources, and a narrowing humanitarian space.

The Government of Ukraine has recognised that investing in people and the social support and services they need will be critical for Ukraine’s long-term recovery, socio-economic future, and pathway to EU accession. The Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine is actively pursuing an ambitious social reform agenda and has committed to building a more holistic, inclusive and efficient social system that encompasses the support and services needed to overcome vulnerability and accelerate human capital accrual. This includes work to improve the targeting and impact of cash assistance benefits, expanding and introducing new social services to address the impacts of Russia’s full-scale invasion, improving protection of the rights of children and persons with disabilities, supporting implementation of the Barrier Free Strategy for Ukraine, and ensuring equal rights and opportunities for women and men.

The ’Social Recovery and Inclusion Partnership for Ukraine’

The Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, the United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the European Union, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the World Bank Group and Development Partners commit to work together as part of a multi-stakeholder partnership that supports Ukraine in an inclusive, rights-based recovery that puts people at its heart and leaves no one behind.

This ‘declaration of Intent’ acknowledges the need to support investment, engagement, and collaboration with a ‘Social Recovery and Inclusion Partnership’ (hereafter ‘the Partnership’). Recognising the complex multi-sectoral challenges under the banner of ‘social recovery’, the Partnership will allow improved oversight, coordination and collaboration during this time of national crisis and beyond.

The Partnership will work closely with existing recovery architecture, including the sectoral working groups, the Gender and Inclusive Recovery Dialogue Platform, the Barrier Free Council, and the new URC alliances. The partnership will through its activities for social recovery and inclusion, complement and support the government’s implementation of the Ukraine Plan and its human capital dimension.

Ukrainian civil society and representative groups, as well as social partners, will be essential partners in this initiative, ensuring ‘the Partnership’ supports their development and amplifies their rights, voice, choice and visibility across Ukraine’s recovery. As the Partnership develops, we will utilise existing coalitions to support the full, active, and meaningful participation, representation and leadership of Ukrainian civil society organisations, social partners, women’s rights organisations, organisations for people with disabilities, child rights organisations, and other representative groups across decision-making processes for a more inclusive, participatory recovery.

Proposed activities under the ‘Social Recovery and Inclusion Partnership for Ukraine’

The Partnership will support improved coordination, communication, and collaboration across stakeholders and sectors, as well as shared learning, advocacy, and mainstreaming of social recovery and inclusion across recovery policies, programmes and architecture in Ukraine. Activities will include but are not limited to:

• coordination between Government of Ukraine agencies, donors, multilaterals, IFIs, civil society, social partners, and other actors involved or related to social recovery and inclusion in Ukraine
• support for development, implementation and monitoring of policies, programmes and services to ensure an inclusive, people-centered recovery in Ukraine that responds to demographic requirements
• identification of mechanisms, means and potential opportunities for partnership on social recovery and inclusion in Ukraine
• exchange and sharing of technical knowledge, skills, expertise and assistance to ensure best practice and evidence-based reform
• participation in Partnership High-Level Steering Committee, working group(s) and thematic events

The Partnership is underpinned by the following principles known as the ‘5 Rs’:

1. Rights: ensuring an intersectional, gender-and-child-responsive, age-and-disability inclusive recovery that respects, protects and fulfils the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Ukrainians across the life-cycle, including marginalised and under-represented groups
2. Resilience: strengthening the social and economic resilience and capacities of state, communities and citizens, and development of human capital for inclusive growth and sustainable recovery
3. Reform: laying foundations for efficient, accessible and inclusive social protection systems, including community and family-based support and services, that enable choice, autonomy, dignity and full participation in society for all
4. Research: building a more comprehensive, inclusive and participatory evidence base to inform policies, programmes, and services that meet the needs and priorities of target groups
5. Resources: fostering greater investment, engagement and coordination across stakeholders and sectors in support of social recovery and inclusion in Ukraine.

Joint declaration of intent

The purpose of this joint declaration of intent is to create a foundation for good faith cooperation in the field of social recovery and inclusion. While this joint declaration of intent constitutes an expression of the partners’ good faith intent to engage in the collaboration described herein, it does not imply binding legal commitments for any partner.

This declaration has been signed by the:

• Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine
• UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
• European Union
• United Nations Children’s Fund
• World Bank Group

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 11 June 2024.

UK announces £10 million aid this financial year to the Occupied Palestinian Territories to support the provision of basic services.

• UK to contribute financial aid to the Palestinian Authority, delivering £10 million this financial year
• funding will go towards the provision of basic services and the payment of salaries in the Occupied Palestinian Territories
• the UK will also contribute up to £5 million in technical assistance this financial year to support the Palestinian Authority’s programme of reform

The UK will provide vital financial support to the Palestinian Authority to support the provision of basic services, providing £10 million in aid this financial year. As the Foreign Secretary has said, a strong and effective Palestinian Authority is vital for lasting peace and progress towards a two-state solution.

This £10 million funding package will provide vital support for key services, for example through the payment of salaries for 8,200 health workers over 2 months, and will send a clear message to other donors to consider making similar pledges.

Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa has committed to implementing reforms across the Palestinian economy to fight corruption and tackle inefficiency. The Foreign Secretary has spoken with the Prime Minister on a number of occasions, most recently on 10 June, to reiterate the UK’s support for his agenda.

The Minister for the Middle East Lord Ahmad will discuss the funding package in a meeting with Prime Minister Mustafa at the Gaza Humanitarian Conference in Jordan later today.

The Minister of State for the Middle East Lord (Tariq) Ahmad said:

The UK remains committed to providing serious, practical and enduring support to the Palestinian Authority as they take much-needed steps to enact reform.

An effective Palestinian Authority is vital to ensure lasting peace and progress towards a two-state solution but without international support, it is on the brink of collapse.

Today’s meeting of vital regional partners will be another constructive step towards achieving tangible progress on this key issue.

The Palestinian Authority is facing a severe financial crisis – it has only been able to pay its employees half of their salaries, and Israel has withheld tax revenues from the Palestinian Authority, further deepening the crisis.

The financial aid will be delivered through a trusted multilateral mechanism, the World Bank’s Palestinian Umbrella for Resilience Support to the Economy (PURSE) Trust Fund’s Palestine Emergency Financing Facility (PEFF) project. A further amount of up to £5 million will be available in technical assistance to support the Palestinian Authority’s programme of reform, with the objective of increasing transparency, fighting corruption, and improving public sector efficiency.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 10 June 2024.

Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki at the UN Security Council meeting on UNOCA.

The United Kingdom welcomes the positive achievements made by UNOCA in confronting challenges faced by the subregion, including through use of its good offices and capacity-building to address the root causes of conflict.

I will make four brief points today.

First, we welcome the fact that Chad’s presidential election on 6 May took place under broadly peaceful conditions. But, allegations of irregularities and the denial of accreditation to 2,900 EU-trained electoral observers risk undermining progress towards a return to constitutional order. The UK urges Chad to now set a timeline for local and legislative elections, which are an opportunity to demonstrate commitment to good governance.

Second, as the Secretary-General report makes clear, Gabon stands at a critical juncture following its national dialogue. We commend the authorities’ cooperation with UNOCA so far. Delivering an inclusive process for the transition to constitutional order, in accordance with the roadmap to elections in August 2025, will be crucial for meeting the democratic aspirations of all Gabonese people.

Third, we encourage UNOCA to deepen its support to Cameroon in developing a political solution to the crisis in its North-West and South-West regions. The UK is also deeply concerned by the insurgent violence in the Far North region, including the growing use of improvised explosive devices, and we fully support the Multinational Joint Task Force in combatting jihadist groups in the Lake Chad Basin.

Finally, delivering stability in the subregion means tackling the drivers and enablers of conflict. The UK recognises that climate change impacts on peace and stability across the subregion, and we encourage UNOCA to strengthen collaboration with other regional actors to enable a more coherent response to this challenge.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 10 June 2024.

Mr Simon Day has been appointed British High Commissioner to the Gabonese Republic in succession to Ms Jo McPhail, who will be transferring to another Diplomatic Service appointment. Mr Day will take up his appointment during June 2024.

Curriculum vitae

Full name: Simon Day

Year	Role
2022 to 2024	FCDO, Head, China Strategic Analysis
2021	Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, Visiting Fellow
2019 to 2020	FCO, Head, AI Projects
2017 to 2019	Apptivism Govtech, Co-founder
2015 to 2017	Behavioural Insights Team, Senior Advisor
2015	Addis Ababa, Counsellor
2014	Rome, Counsellor
2010 to 2013	UK Mission to the United Nations, 2nd Secretary
2010	France, L’École Nationale d’Administration
2008 to 2010	FCO, Desk Officer

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 10 June 2024.

UK explanation of vote delivered by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, following the Security Council vote on resolution 2735.

The UK voted for this resolution as an important step in bringing about an end to the conflict that has raged since the horrific attacks on 7th October, and moving towards lasting peace.

The situation in Gaza is catastrophic and the suffering has gone on for far too long. The deal on the table is something that the UK has long-called for. It is the best way to get the remaining hostages out, bring about an immediate ceasefire leading to a permanent end to hostilities and enable a significant scaling up of much-needed humanitarian aid.

We call upon the parties to seize this opportunity and move towards lasting peace which guarantees security and stability for both the Israeli and Palestinian people.

Far too many lives have been lost already. There is desperate need for humanitarian assistance in Gaza and hostages have now been held for over eight months.

News of the rescue of four hostages will be a huge relief to their families. Our thoughts are also with families of those still captive, and all the innocent lives – both Palestinian and Israeli – already lost and affected by the conflict. We must secure the release of all hostages and end the fighting.

The UK applauds the diplomatic efforts of Qatar, Egypt and the United States in negotiating the deal that is on the table. We note that Israel has accepted the deal, and call upon Hamas to accept the terms and bring an end to the suffering of the Palestinian people and the hostages that remain in detention.

We must then see a rapid increase in the flows of humanitarian aid throughout the entire Gaza strip, with the opening of all border crossings and facilitation of the minimum operating requirements of the UN and international humanitarian organisations.

The UK remains in steadfast support of a credible and irreversible pathway towards a two-state solution with Israel and Palestine living side-by-side in peace and delivering security for both nations and the wider region.

As we have made clear, a sustainable peace must also include Hamas no longer being in control of Gaza and international support for the Palestinian Authority so that it can resume governance and security responsibilities across the West Bank and Gaza. The UK stands ready to support this.

President, the UK has long advocated for a deal such as the one on the table.

This conflict has gone on for far too long.

Now more than ever is the time for diplomacy.

Now is the time for peace.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 7 June 2024.

Statement by Australia, the UK and the USA (AUKUS) to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on naval nuclear propulsion.

Thank you, Chair.

I have the honour of speaking on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to provide an update to the Board of Governors on Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program.

Chair,

Australia and the IAEA are continuing to hold bilateral technical consultations on a robust safeguards and verification approach for Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. These consultations include negotiations relating to the development of an arrangement under Article 14 of Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Arrangement. The most recent round of formal consultations between Australia and the Agency took place in May. These discussions encompassed legal and technical aspects of an Article 14 arrangement for Australia. Discussions are continuing.

We thank the Director General and the Secretariat for the Agency’s productive engagement with Australia in these ongoing consultations, in exercising its technical mandate to engage with Member States on the implementation of their safeguards agreements. Bilateral, in-confidence engagement between the Secretariat and Member States is fundamental to the non-proliferation regime.

We are confident that Member States will see through the attempts we observed earlier at the current Board meeting, and indeed ever since AUKUS was announced, to sow doubts about the Secretariat’s engagement with Australia on naval nuclear propulsion. We thank the many Board members who earlier in this meeting noted with appreciation the Secretariat’s engagement with the relevant States on naval nuclear propulsion, as accurately reflected in the 2023 Safeguards Implementation Report.

I refer Member States to my recent, publicly available remarks delivered at the workshop organised and hosted by the Permanent Mission of China, outlining the well-established legal and policy framework through which Australia is engaging the IAEA.

As I made clear at the workshop, it struck me as highly unusual for one country to organise an event targeted at another country’s sovereign endeavour and bilateral engagement. I decided to speak at the event in the interest of transparency, but fully aware the forum was not one designed to facilitate impartial discussion.

The IAEA’s technical role is an integral part of the non-proliferation system. It is crucial that all Member States respect the independence, mandate and technical authority of the IAEA. This is why Australia has expressed serious concern about references to ‘an intergovernmental process’. Such a process could subject the IAEA’s technical work to the political deliberations of Member States. All Member States share an interest in protecting the IAEA’s technical mandate – as we all rely on its ability to carry out its mandate independently and impartially in these challenging times.

Chair,

The AUKUS partners recognise that the acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines by Australia carries with it a responsibility to ensure the highest standard of non-proliferation is upheld. Under Australia’s Article 14 arrangement, the IAEA will maintain oversight of nuclear material. We reiterate our commitment that Australia will not enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel as part of this program and to ensuring that the non-proliferation approach for Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program will enable the IAEA to fulfil its technical objectives for Australia at all stages of the submarines’ lifecycle. The Agency will continue to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material; no misuse of nuclear facilities; and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia.

The Director General has confirmed that, once Australia’s Article 14 arrangement has been developed, he will transmit it to the Board for appropriate action. As we have stated before, we fully support this approach.

Chair,

We remain committed to keeping the Board updated on relevant developments concerning our three countries’ cooperation on naval nuclear propulsion. Since we met in March, Australia has announced the selection of industry partners for the build and sustainment of Australia’s future conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. In April, our defence ministers released a joint statement which, in addition to providing an update on a number of initiatives, outlined readiness to begin engaging additional countries on specific advanced capability projects under AUKUS Pillar Two. AUKUS Pillar Two does not involve nuclear cooperation or capability. It is separate from the initiative under AUKUS Pillar One to support Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, which will remain exclusively trilateral between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Together, our defence ministers demonstrated our united approach, and reiterated our commitment to setting the highest non-proliferation standard. They also referred to AUKUS partners’ initiatives to build Australia’s capability to safely and securely maintain its future submarines. These include initiatives to support workforce skills and development, including a maintenance activity to be conducted on a US nuclear-powered submarine in Australia, which is scheduled to occur in the second half of 2024.

As the Director General has said in recent statements, Australia and the Agency are engaging to ensure that relevant technical measures are in place ahead of any such activity, under Australia’s safeguards agreements with the Agency. Such engagement on safeguards implementation is entirely consistent with the Agency’s mandate and with longstanding practice.

Chair,

The Director General has confirmed he will continue to provide reports on naval nuclear propulsion programs to the Board as the need arises. We fully support his prerogative to decide the appropriate time for this matter to be placed on the Board’s agenda.

The AUKUS partners will continue to update the Board on developments relating to Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program, and to engage the international community, including at the upcoming NPT Prep Com. We welcome the opportunity to address questions from interested delegations regarding our non-proliferation approach, at future Board meetings and in other fora, as appropriate.

Thank you, Chair.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 7 June 2024.

Statement by Australia, the UK and the US about AUKUS safeguards under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Chair,

I take the floor on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to respond to comments made regarding Australia’s acquisition of a naval nuclear propulsion capability. We expressed our position on this agenda item in our Note Verbale, dated May 30, 2024, and I will not repeat it here other than to reiterate that this item has never enjoyed consensus support and is not a standing agenda item. However, we feel compelled – once again – to invoke our Right of Reply to respond to the remarks made today.

In response to a request in March and last November from my distinguished colleague who requested this agenda item, I and my counterparts from the United Kingdom and Australia have, indeed, sat and attentively listened to the remarks made today, just as we have done for two-and-a-half years. Unfortunately, much of what I have heard today, and what I have in fact heard under this item for the last two-and-a-half years, are serious mischaracterizations and misleading assertions from certain countries.

These assertions continue to ignore or misrepresent the information we have provided in good faith, and to disregard the answers which the Director General has already provided in response to the questions asked. We express our deep concern about these mischaracterizations. We, and the large majority of Board members who have spoken in previous meetings on this topic, have expressed confidence in Director General Grossi’s handling and prerogative on this issue. Indeed, we note many member states expressed confidence in the Agency’s engagement with relevant parties on naval nuclear propulsion under Agenda item 6b at this Board. We have been clear that this agenda item is unnecessary.

Chair,

The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation have spoken multiple times over the last two days of the need to avoid politicization of the Board, particularly on issues that the Board and the Director General have deemed to be of significant concern such as Iran, the DPRK, and Syria’s failure to meet obligations in their Safeguards Agreements as well as on the nuclear safety, security, and safeguards implications of Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine. It is difficult to understand why these states do not apply their own logic to this issue. Why, when the Director General has expressed his satisfaction and a majority of the Board has expressed no desire for quarterly discussion on one country’s naval nuclear propulsion program, do we continue to have this item added to the agenda?

The Director General has repeatedly stated that the Agency has “the necessary experience to develop the arrangements related to the use of nuclear material for naval nuclear propulsion in accordance with the Statute and relevant safeguards agreements.” The Director General has also made clear that Australia’s Article 14 arrangement will allow the Agency to continue to meet the technical safeguards objectives established for Australia, and that, once developed, it will be transmitted to the Board for appropriate action. Despite these statements, it remains deeply concerning that some states continue to call into question the Director General’s ability to perform the functions vested in him by the Statute, by the relevant safeguards agreements, and by decisions of the Board.

One country has called for referring the matter to the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation, known as SAGSI. Obviously, we fully support the Director General’s use of SAGSI as he sees fit and on technical matters within its remit. We defer to the Director General to determine whether to seek SAGSI’s input on naval nuclear propulsion, or, for that matter, any other technical issue relating to safeguards implementation. It is not this Board’s responsibility to dictate whether or how the Director General receives input from his own advisory group.

Chair,

The AUKUS partners have and will continue to engage consistently, openly, and transparently with Member States and the Secretariat on genuine questions. We welcome that the Agency has repeatedly reported its satisfaction with Australia’s engagement.

Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have provided updates on relevant progress at all Board meetings since the initial AUKUS announcement in September 2021, and will do so again at this meeting under Any Other Business. We will continue to keep the Board updated on our engagement, as appropriate. Our three countries – along with the majority of the Board – continue to oppose any proposal for this item to be a standing agenda item or to establish any efforts that undermine and politicize the independent technical mandate of the IAEA. We reject any suggestion that the Agency does not have a mandate to engage bilaterally with Member States on issues relevant to the implementation of their safeguards commitments. We urge colleagues to continue to reject deliberate efforts to challenge the Agency’s independence and integrity. And we welcome the Director General’s commitment to continuing to provide updates to the Board as and when he deems appropriate.

Thank you, Chair.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 6 June 2024.

Ambassador Holland voices support for Moldova, as it pursues a bold reform agenda and builds its future in Europe, in line with the wishes of the Moldovan people – all while defending against increased attention from hostile actors.

Thank you, Chair.

The UK supports Moldova in its considered rejection of the claims made by the Russian delegation at the Permanent Council meeting on 23 May. The Moldovan delegation’s comments speak for themselves, but I would nonetheless like to voice the UK’s support for Moldova. This is a country which is pursuing a bold reform agenda and building its future in Europe, in line with the wishes of the Moldovan people – all while defending against increased attention from hostile actors.

Firstly, the measured and proportional steps taken by Moldova in recent years have been necessary to address unprecedented levels of Russian disinformation, in an attempt to undermine Moldova’s democratic process. All Moldovans are entitled to credible and transparent journalism, free from propaganda and foreign interference. And as noted by my Moldovan colleague, Reporters without Borders placed Moldova 31st on the World Press Freedom Index. A well-earned position which demonstrates Moldova’s clear commitment to a free and independent media.

Moldova’s commitment to OSCE principles on election integrity and election observation is similarly welcome, building on the commitments agreed by all participating States at Copenhagen. We commend Moldova’s longstanding and close cooperation with ODIHR, including Moldova’s recent request for a legal opinion on postal voting and their other work to follow up on ODIHR’s election recommendations.

Regarding the Transnistrian settlement process, Russia’s request to resume the 5+2 format makes no sense. We would dearly have liked the 5+2 to continue but, as Russia well knows, it is on hold because Russia has chosen to pursue its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, and will continue to be on hold until all sides agree to resume. The UK continues to support a peaceful settlement under the 1+1 format, and we are grateful to the parties on both sides of the Nistru for their persistence in seeking constructive dialogue despite Russia’s repeated attempts to instrumentalise the process.

Madam Chair, it is ironic that many of the accusations made by the Russian delegation are a thinly veiled attempt to criticise them for taking the steps necessary to protect its democracy and territorial integrity from the very hybrid threats that Russia alone is responsible for. The UK stands resolutely with Moldova as it seeks to safeguard the democratic choices of its people.

Thank you.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 6 June 2024.

Ambassador Holland calls out Russia’s failure to live up to the commitments it signed up to in the OSCE’s Decalogue with its illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Thank you, Madam Chair.  Each week in this Council, we confront the reality of what is taking place on the ground in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion.  And that is right. As long as it continues to fight this war, we should never stop confronting the Russian Federation with what their so-called Special Military Operation means for the people on the ground; the heroically brave Ukrainian Armed Forces, the first responders to Russian attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure or the innocent civilian victims of Russia’s aggression. We should express our opposition and disgust at what is happening in the name of Russia in Ukraine – and hold Russia accountable.

However, occasionally, it is also worth taking a step back to remind ourselves of what the Russian Federation has done to comprehensive security overall in our region by their violation in Ukraine of the principles, agreed at Helsinki, that sit at the heart of this organisation: specifically, the Decalogue. The Decalogue was adopted, by consensus – and that means all of us – nearly half a century ago.

Looking at the Decalogue again, it is striking what a good job our predecessors did. If we were starting from scratch today to design a set of principles that should govern relations between the states of our region, I think and hope we would come out in a similar place.

Take for example the first principle:

“The participating States will respect each other’s sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other’s right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.

“Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have equal rights and duties. They will respect each other’s right to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other States in accordance with international law and in the spirit of the present Declaration. They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.  They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.”

Who among us would not want that principle applied to our own country?  None, I imagine.  Then why should that principle apply to 56 of us but not to Ukraine? The standards should apply to all of us. But that is clearly not the view of the Russian Federation who in invading Ukraine has driven a coach and horses through the principle of territorial integrity that they signed up to.

So, Madam Chair, I would like to ask a direct question of the Russian delegation as to whether they consider Russia’s actions in Ukraine to be in conformity with this first Helsinki principle.  If so, could they please explain how?

Thank you.