Tag: Denis Healey

  • Denis Healey – 1972 Speech on Rhodesia

    Denis Healey – 1972 Speech on Rhodesia

    The speech made by Denis Healey, the then Shadow Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons on 19 January 1972.

    May I first thank the right hon. Gentleman for his statement and ask him for an assurance that he will make a further statement to the House tomorrow in the light of any information he may receive between now and then?

    May we be told the names of the three Africans who have been arrested with Mr. Todd and his daughter? I assure the right hon. Gentleman that my hon. Friends are not just concerned but are appalled by the arrest of Mr. Todd and his daughter, particularly against the background of the firm promise conveyed to the House by the right hon. Gentleman from Mr. Smith that normal political activities would be permitted throughout the period of consultation.

    Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Mr. Todd is one of the few Europeans in public life in Rhodesia who has won the confidence of the Africans, that he is an ex-Prime Minister aged 63, that Mr. Smith may have taken a step which will lead to the very violence that he purports to hope to avoid and that many of us will feel that this may well have been his purpose in carrying out the arrests, for it is already evident that all the evidence produced to the Pearce Commission by Africans in both the urban and tribal areas shows that there is overwhelming opposition to the proposals for a settlement?

    Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that my hon. Friends and I must rely entirely on newspaper reports for our understanding of what is happening in Rhodesia at this moment? Is he further aware that reports in newspapers which cannot be considered to be hostile to Her Majesty’s Government—newspapers like the Daily Telegraph and the Financial Times—make it clear, first, that all the shootings and bayonetings which have taken place in Rhodesia in recent days have been carried out by the security forces responsible to the Smith régime and not by the Africans; secondly, that the violence in Gwelo followed and did not precede the use of tear gas against a peaceful demonstration by Africans who were seeking to present their views to representatives of Her Majesty’s Government in the Pearce Commission inside Gwelo; and, third, that all the newspaper reports show that representatives of the African National Council did their best.
    even after the use of tear gas by the Rhodesia forces, to prevent the use of violence by the demonstrators?

    Has the Pearce Commission yet had an answer to the question it put to the Smith régime almost a week ago about the complaints made by the African National Council of interference by the Smith régime in its attempted activities in the tribal and urban areas?

    Will the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that unless Mr. Smith can produce satisfactory evidence that Mr. Garfield Todd, his daughter and the three arrested Africans have already taken action calculated to disturb public order in Rhodesia, he will insist on their immediate release.

  • Denis Healey – 1972 Speech on India and Pakistan

    Denis Healey – 1972 Speech on India and Pakistan

    The speech made by Denis Healey, the then Shadow Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons on 18 January 1972.

    First, I should like to join in welcoming, as the Foreign Secretary did, the wise statesmanship of President Bhutto in releasing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and sharing in his wish for close and friendly relations with the new Government of Bangladesh. I think that the whole House will want to take this opportunity to wish the people of the new State a peaceful and prosperous future after the tragic ordeal through which they have passed in recent years.

    I should like to ask the Foreign Secretary two questions. First, many of us will be disappointed that the Government do not feel in a position to give diplomatic recognition to the new Government of Bangladesh. Will the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that the real reason is that he is seeking to arrange for the largest possible number of European and Commonwealth Governments to give diplomatic recognition at the same time and that this is well understood by Sheikh Mujibur himself?

    Secondly, on the question of economic aid, the Foreign Secretary will recognise that the scale of aid required for the new State will dwarf in magnitude even that required to deal with the problem of the refugees in India not so long ago. Will he assure the House that he will meet what I am certain is the unanimous wish that Britain should take the lead in organising international support of the new State as we took the lead, under the right hon. Gentleman’s initiative, in dealing with the earlier problem?

  • Denis Healey – 1972 Speech on Malta

    Denis Healey – 1972 Speech on Malta

    The speech made by Denis Healey, the then Shadow Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons on 17 January 1972.

    While thanking the Foreign Secretary for his statement and welcoming the signs that negotiations may now be resumed, and even more the statement by the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Defence that there is now a 50 per cent. chance of solution, may I say that many on this side of the House will have been surprised by the sour and ungracious tone in which the right hon. Gentleman referred to the contributions which have already been and may yet be made by our N.A.T.O. allies? We on this side of the House agree that there should be no increase in the British contribution. Indeed, if any money is available to create jobs, we believe that it should be used to create jobs in Britain rather than in Malta. But now that the other N.A.T.O. countries are clearly prepared to make a financial contribution commensurate with their interest in Malta as members of the Alliance, will the right hon. Gentleman tell us why the Government were so angry and embarrassed last week when the Americans finally came forward with a contribution, why they attempted to conceal this offer, which was made at least 12 days ago, from the Maltese Government, and why it took the rather improbable alliance of the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O. and my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) to get communications restored?

    The Foreign Secretary has rightly stated a point which was pressed on the House by myself as Secretary of State for Defence and hotly contested by the Conservative Party some years ago, that Britain’s and N.A.T.O.’s interest in Malta is not so much to have forces there ourselves as to prevent the Russians having a base there. Will the Foreign Secretary recognise in the course of the negotiations that a solution is much more likely if it de-emphasises the political and military alignment of Malta with N.A.T.O. and concentrates rather on eliminating the possible use of the base by Soviet forces? An agreement along these lines is more likely to receive the continued support of the Maltese people as well as being compatible with progress towards conciliation between the West and Russia in the Mediterranean.

    Sir Alec Douglas-Home

    The right hon. Gentleman has got this wrong. So far from concealing any offer made by an ally towards a solution with Malta, we have been pressing our allies month by month to raise some extra money over and above what we ourselves are willing to subscribe. Therefore, the right hon. Gentleman really has got his facts wrong on this matter.

    There are to be further talks, so I do not want to go further into the finances now. However, there is this important question of aid in the future which I have no doubt would be available from allied countries. This would be of enormous value to Malta if Mr. Mintoff would take it in that form.

    Mr. Healey

    The right hon. Gentleman must not seek to present the facts other than as they were—[HON. MEMBERS: “Oh.”] Is the Foreign Secretary denying that the American Government made this offer of an increased financial contribution at least as long ago as 8th January, that the British Government declared themselves extremely annoyed when the Maltese Government were informed of this offer by the American Government, that it took several days of persuasion by the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O. to convince the British Government that they must start negotiating again with the Maltese Government, and that the attempt to establish these negotiations did not in fact begin until Friday and Saturday of last week?

  • Denis Healey – 1978 Statement on Inflation

    Below is the text of the speech made by Denis Healey, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the House of Commons on 21 July 1978.

    With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement on the Government’s policy for winning the battle against inflation.

    The policy I announced on 15th July last year comes to an end in 10 days’ ​ time. It has been an impressive success. Inflation has been reduced to 7·4 per cent, well under half the rate a year ago, the lowest inflation rate for six years and far lower than that which the present Government inherited in March 1974. In fact, Britain’s inflation rate is now about the average for industrial countries—about the same as that of the United States, lower than that of France and Canada, although still higher than that of Germany and Japan.

    The standard of living has not simply been maintained, as I then promised. It has risen by some 5 per cent. for most men and women in Britain during the current pay round, partly as a result of the tax cuts and improvements in social benefits which the falling rate of inflation has enabled the Government to make. Some of these tax cuts and increases in benefit have still to take effect. In particular, retirement pensions will be worth £31·20 for a married couple in November—an increase of almost 20 per cent. in real terms compared with the level we inherited four and a half years ago, and the child benefit will amount to £4 a week for every child when the increase next April is added to that in November. As a result of all the fiscal changes since last October and taking account of child benefit changes, a family on £75 a week with two children, will have an increase in net income of some 12 per cent. by next April—equivalent to a wage increase of about 15·5 per cent.

    The fall in our inflation rate has also made possible a substantial increase in national growth. Industrial output was rising at an annual rate of well over 4 per cent. in the last three months. Unemployment has been on a falling trend since September last year.

    The nation owes a debt to trade unionists and employers alike for the common sense they have shown in observing the Government’s guidelines in the last 12 months.

    Inflation will remain around 8 per cent. for the rest of this year at least. We must now ensure that it does not rise into double figures again next year. This means that earnings must increase substantially less in the coming pay round than in the current round.

    Our aim should be to keep the increase next year to half what it has been this ​ year. The climate for pay negotiation is now very much more favourable to moderate settlements than it was a year ago. Nevertheless, the Government cannot rely on this alone. They must give a clear lead: they must accept the responsibility for fixing guidelines which will enable us to keep inflation in single figures. The White Paper to be published today therefore sets a guideline for pay settlements for the coming round at 5 per cent.—half the level of the guideline in the current round.

    The White Paper sets out some limited exceptions to this guideline. The form of the guideline offers negotiators the same flexibility as they have had in the current round to structure their settlements in the way best suited to their particular circumstances. I hope employers and unions will use this flexibility according to their needs—in particular, to restore differentials where appropriate.

    In a small number of cases in the public sector the Government have already recognised that some exceptional increase is required. The increase in national earnings resulting from these exceptions is expected to be only about 0·15 per cent. in each of the next two years. There may be a small number of other groups for whom similar treatment might be appropriate when they reach their settlement date. But it would be self-defeating if more than a few groups were accorded such treatment and the Government will therefore carefully examine any proposals put forward in this area to see how far the same considerations apply.

    To help those on the lowest incomes, the Government would be ready to see higher percentage increases where the resulting earnings were no more than £44·50 for a normal full-time week, which is the present-day equivalent of the minimum pay target set by the TUC four years ago plus the 5 per cent. The Government expect those on higher earnings in the same or other industries to accept the relative improvement in the position of the lowest paid which follows.

    The Government will expect negotiators, as in the current year, to respect their existing annual settlement date. In the very exceptional case which may arise where a highly fragmented bargaining situation needs to be rationalised, the Government will be prepared to consider synchronising settlement dates providing ​ that the overall level of the settlement takes account of any costs involved.

    Self-financing productivity deals will be permitted on the same conditions as in the current round.

    Much attention has been focused on the possibility of reducing working hours and the contribution this might make to increasing job opportunities. We welcome the recent TUC initiative on the reduction of overtime working. However, if a reduction in hours led to an increase in labour costs the result could only be to reduce employment. In general, therefore, the Government could accept a reduction in hours as part of a pay settlement only on condition that the settlement as a whole does not lead to any increase in unit costs above what would have resulted from a straight guideline settlement on pay.

    As in the current round, the Government will do everything possible to ensure that the guidance set out in the White Paper is observed throughout the public sector. In the private sector the Government rely on employers and unions to act with responsibility and moderation as the CBI and TUC have assured us they will. However, the Government will, if necessary, take account of any failure to observe the guidelines in exercising their discretion in the fields of statutory assistance and other appropriate discretionary powers. The pay clauses in existing Government contracts will remain in force and will continue to be included in new contracts. The Government will, of course, as promised in March, be ready to hold discussions with the CBI about the operation of these arrangements for the future.

    The Government regard continuing price control as an important part of the battle against inflation. Over the coming months the Price Commission will maintain an active programme of investigations into individual companies and will also examine, at the direction of the Government, pricing practices in different sectors of industry. The Commission not only has a duty to identify excessive price increases and to recommend the steps needed to correct them, but in doing so to take full account of the wider economic background against which such price increases are put forward.

    The present statutory powers to control dividends expire on 31st July 1978. The ​ Government will introduce a Bill to extend the statutory control for a further 12 months from 1st August 1978 on the present basis, with the present provisions for exceptions and one new provision. From 1st August 1978 no company will be required by the controls to increase its dividend cover above the highest level achieved since the current controls began. This will enable companies to increase their dividends in line with profits or in line with the statutory limit, whichever is the higher, but they will not be permitted to distribute funds accumulated in the past. A separate announcement giving details of this provision will be made.

    The Government are convinced that the British people will not throw away the gains they have made over the last three years in the battle against inflation. The guidelines laid down in the White Paper offer negotiators the opportunity to use their freedom in collective bargaining to reach settlements with responsibility and moderation. By doing so they will encourage the regeneration of British industry, maintain living standards and make possible a continuing fall in unemployment.

  • Denis Healey – 1978 Budget Statement

    Below is the text of the budget speech made by Denis Healey, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, on 11 April 1978.

    Since the Financial Statement and Budget Report gives a full account of events in our economy over the last twelve months, I do not propose to begin my speech this afternoon with the usual historical preamble. And I shall follow the precedent I set last October by wherever possible putting detailed material about my proposals into supplementary documents which are being published this afternoon. I shall therefore confine my speech to the central features of our economic situation as we enter a new financial year and to the budgetary measures which I am asking the House to adopt in consequence.

    The whole of the industrial world has found the last four years by far the most difficult since the war. The enormous increase in oil prices and the reaction to it of the industrial countries have plunged the world into the deepest and most prolonged recession since the 1930s combined with an unprecedented inflation. The period has been particularly difficult for us in Britain because we entered it in 1974 with our economy already badly out of balance, a growing deficit on our current account and severe inflationary pressures.

    Four years of painful and difficult decisions have now got the economy into much better balance. Our current account has moved into surplus. Our financial position has been transformed. The year-on-year rate of inflation is well into single figures and still falling. Interest rates are far below the level of four years ago. The money supply is under firm ​ control and we have exceptionally high reserves. All this is reflected in the fact that the fourth quarter of last year saw a rise of nearly 5 per cent. in real personal income after tax and national insurance—the biggest quarterly rise in living standards for nearly six years.

    But this transformation in our financial situation has not yet been reflected in an adequate growth of output. In consequence, unemployment remains intolerably high, though it has been falling slowly since September. It is the first purpose of this Budget to encourage a level of economic activity sufficient to get unemployment moving significantly down. But like all other countries—and more than most—we cannot isolate ourselves from the rest of the world. And here the outlook still leaves much to be desired.

    Two years ago it looked as if the industrialised world was emerging from the severe recession which followed the increase in oil prices. But that recovery proved more sluggish than expected. 1977 was a disappointing year for nearly all the world. Economic growth in the OECD area was well below the average rate obtained in the 1960s. World trade in manufactures increased only 3½ per cent. compared with 9½ per cent. in 1976. Although with an increase of 8 per cent. in the volume of our manufactured exports we increased our share of world trade, in general as well as in manufactures, there was very little growth in our economy during 1977.

    The problems created by the slow growth of the world economy have been made worse by the big payments imbalances between the oil-consuming countries. Some oil-producing countries cannot in the short run eliminate their surpluses through trade, so the oil consumers as a group must face a corresponding deficit. The total current account deficit of the OECD countries rose to around 30 billion dollars in 1977. But this total includes a large increase in the deficit of the United States and a large increase in the surplus of Japan.

    One reason for these disparities is that other strong countries have been slow to follow the expansionary lead of the United States. These payments imbalances are at the root of the currency instability of the last few months which is itself a further threat to world growth.

    If we are to solve this country’s problems we need to take action on a world scale, because no single country can lead the world out of its difficulties. Indeed, no single country can by itself solve even its own problems. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the President of the United States recognised this fact together when they met at Easter to discuss a programme for concerted action designed to attack simultaneously all the five major problems which are now damaging the world economy—low growth, currency instability, the trend towards protectionism, over-dependence on imported energy and inadequate flows of stable long-term capital and aid from the surplus countries to countries in deficit, including many in the developing world.

    Yesterday the Heads of Government of the seven leading world economies agreed to develop their policies so as to promote a concerted approach to this group of problems in the months leading up to the Bonn Summit meeting in July.

    The European Council agreed on Saturday to work with determination for the higher economic growth that this approach requires.

    This Budget represents a first British contribution towards that common effort as well as meeting our national needs.

    I shall now say something about our balance of payments and overseas debt.

    Between 1973 and the middle of last year we borrowed large sums overseas to meet the consequences of the oil price increase and the deterioration in our terms of trade. Most of these loans have to be repaid in the six years from 1979 to 1984, but as we moved into balance of payments surplus and rebuilt our reserves last autumn, the Government were able to start tackling this hump of debt. It then stood at over $20 billion.

    It would not be sensible to aim to pay off the whole of this debt from current account surpluses earned over the next six or seven years. That would add to the problem of current account imbalances in the world and it would not be consistent with the need to expand our own economy. The Government’s aim is therefore to combine net repayment of debt year by year, with new borrowing to spread the maturities.

    As part of this policy we are now repaying large amounts of debt ahead of time. In January I announced the prepayment of $1 billion of our drawings from the International Monetary Fund. Arrangements for this payment have recently been completed. I can now announce that I shall be arranging to prepay a further $1 billion to the Fund this year. This further step is made possible by our own improved position and we hope that it will assist the IMF to help other countries. This should be a useful contribution to the concerted approach to world problems to which we have committed ourselves.

    In addition to these IMF prepayments, we have since October repaid or arranged to repay ahead of time $1 billion of private market debt. Thus our repayments ahead of time, made or already planned, now total $3 billion. We shall also repay a further $1 billion in 1978 on the due dates as other debt matures in the ordinary way.

    The other part of our policy is to make progress with new borrowing. Since last October we have contracted new loans totalling about $630 million from the European Investment Bank and the European Coal and Steel Community. In addition, I can now tell the House that we propose to make a British Government bond issue in the New York market. The issue will be for a total of $350 million in two tranches of seven and 15 years respectively. So it will mature well after the hump of existing maturities. The United States rating agencies have said they will rate such an issue triple-A, the highest credit rating they can award.

    I believe that by spreading the burden of debt repayment forwards and backwards in this way we can ensure that it does not unduly restrict our ability to expand our economy and to make an appropriate contribution to world growth.

    Our main objective in the coming years, like that of other countries, must be to reduce the intolerable level of unemployment by stimulating demand in ways which create jobs at home without refuelling inflation. The temporary employment subsidy and other special employment measures which have now been in operation for three years are already providing 320,000 jobs or training places.

    My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment announced a powerful reinforcement to these measures on 15th March which should increase this figure to 400,000 by March next year. I believe that in a period of world recession such measures bring immense human and social benefits. Their value is shown by the fact that although the number of men and women available for work has been increasing by 170,000 a year, unemployment has been falling slowly for the last six months and job vacancies have been rising.

    But we cannot expect to see the rate of unemployment moving down at an acceptable speed unless we can create new jobs particularly in profitable firms in manufacturing industry and so strengthen the industrial base on which our whole economy depends.

    A Budget stimulus by itself will not necessarily achieve this, because unless British industry can produce and sell the goods required to meet the demand created by any Budget stimulus, that increase in demand will be met by imports and set inflation going again. It will create jobs in other countries rather than our own. After some years in which the level of investment has been lower than normal it is not easy to judge the point at which a demand stimulus may prove self-defeating for this reason, both in terms of jobs and prices.

    But two things are clear. The key to growth and high employment must lie in an improvement in our industrial performance. And we must design this Budget, like the measures last October, as part of a programme for steady and sustained growth which must cover a period of many years.

    If the bulk of the additional demand created by this Budget is to be met by British goods then we must make sure that the products of our industry are more competitive in terms of design, delivery and price. An improvement in these fields is the prime objective of the tripartite industrial strategy to which the Government, the TUC and the CBI committed themselves afresh last month when they approved the programmes of the sector working parties for this year. Our main job now is to carry the industrial strategy down to the managers and workers in individual companies and plants throughout the country. I hope that the whole House will endorse these efforts because the future of our economy lies ultimately in the hands of those who work in British industry.

    If industry is to become more competitive and unemployment is to fall, we need better product design, better marketing, more efficient use of plant and materials and more investment in new capacity. The main responsibility must fall on management and work force in the individual firms and plants. But the Government have a responsibility for providing an environment which encourages their work.

    The Government will therefore continue to support the industrial strategy through industrial assistance, training schemes and the National Enterprise Board and by helping to provide a favourable economic climate. Moreover, we are now giving industry priority across the whole range of Government policies—for example, in education and local planning.

    I believe that small businesses have a special role in improving our industrial performance. They have always been a prime source of innovation in British industry. The development of small businesses often produces more additional jobs more quickly than development in the larger firms. They can also play a vital role in regenerating our inner cities and our countryside. For this reason, this Budget will give a special importance to the needs of smaller businesses.

    Now that our economy is in so much better balance and our financial situation ​ is transformed, an improvement in our industrial performance must be our overriding objective, since this is a precondition for restoring high employment. But this improvement is bound to take time. To the extent that our performance falls short in design, delivery and productivity of that of our competitors, we shall have to concentrate on making ourselves competitive in price.

    It remains as true as ever that inflation is the main enemy of full employment. Monetary policy will be one decisive factor here. But our price competitiveness will also depend crucially on reducing industrial costs, of which wages are bound to remain much the most important element.

    Over the last three years, the British people have given overwhelming support for pay policy, and this has played an indispensable role in keeping our industry competitive and in bringing the rate of inflation down. The country owes a lasting debt to our trade union movement for its invaluable contribution here.

    I believe that the Government can help to support common sense and moderation in pay negotiations both by controlling prices and avoiding unnecessary increases in indirect taxation and by cutting income tax. But the main responsibility here again must continue to lie with the trade unions and employers who actually negotiate on pay.

    In deciding how much stimulus I can afford to give the economy this year, I have to make a judgment about the rate at which our industry can increase its output to meet the consequent demand and about the competitiveness of the goods it produces. I must also consider the likely development of the economy over the next year or so if I take no further action at all in this Budget.

    These are all difficult questions of judgment on which the margin for error is uncomfortably large. Economics, after all, is about the behaviour of human beings—the most unpredictable of all creatures. It is a useful tool of policy but still far from being an exact science—if it is a science at all. As I have warned the House on many occasions, economic ​ forecasts, like weather forecasts, become increasingly unreliable as they look further ahead, particularly if precise figures are attached to them—as must be the case, for example, with the forecasts which the House has instructed me to provide. But some trends are fairly clear.

    Now that the inflation rate is stabilising at a level well below the increase in earnings, living standards and personal consumption should both rise substantially. Private investment in manufacturing industry rose about 14 per cent. in volume last year and is expected to show a similar increase this year. Public expenditure on goods and services is planned to rise significantly.

    It is more difficult to forecast how our trade performance will develop since assumptions about our competitiveness are crucial here. But it is reasonable to expect that exports will continue to increase substantially, though higher domestic demand will probably lead to faster growth in our imports of manufactures.

    This leads me to conclude that without any stimulus from the present Budget the economy might grow in the coming year by 2 per cent. to 2½ per cent., if, as is still the case, we make these calculations at the prices which ruled in 1970. If, on the other hand, we value the contribution of North Sea oil at the relative prices of 1975, after the oil price explosion, which we plan to do for all national income statistics later this year, then the increase in oil production would, of itself, add a further ¾ per cent. to our growth rate.

    Against this broad estimate of the likely growth in the economy without a Budget stimulus, the increase in demand which I can afford to generate this year depends critically on the outlook for inflation. This, in turn, will depend primarily on two factors—our monetary policy over the next 12 months and the outlook for wage costs. So far as the immediate future is concerned the outlook is now firmly established and our success is evident in the figures already available.

    Our year-on-year inflation rate reached single figures in January—months earlier than we predicted last November. Over the last 10 months, the month-to-month increase in inflation has been running at an annual level below 8 per cent. The yearon-year inflation rate is likely to reach 7 per cent. in spring or early summer. ​ Unless there is some quite unforeseeable catastrophe, it seems likely to remain fairly steady at around 7 per cent. for the rest of this year—at about the average rate for most industrial countries and lower than that of some of our competitors whose inflation rate has been rising rather than falling in recent months. But if we are to be sure of maintaining at least this level in 1979, then we must have appropriate policies for dealing both with the money supply and with pay and prices. I shall deal with each of these factors in turn.

    Monetary policy will continue to play a central role in our attack on inflation. The money supply figures for banking March will not be published until Thursday, but I think it right on this occasion to tell the House in advance that sterling M3 grew in March by only ½ per cent. and M1 slightly less. This confirms that the trend of monetary growth has come back into the desired range, as I predicted it would after the exceptional but expected jump in January. The figure for 1977–78 as a whole will probably be just above the 9 per cent. to 13 per cent. range but under 14 per cent. But this was a year in which the money supply in Britain, as in Germany, was substantially increased by inflows of foreign currency—a factor which we took action to correct last October.

    For the coming year, 1978–79, I intend to continue using monetary targets, with certain changes. Over the last year, as we have moved into surplus on our balance of payments, greater attention has rightly focussed on sterling M3, the wider measure of money supply, rather than DCE—domestic credit expansion. It is right to recognise this by making a target range for sterling M3 the focus of our monetary policy.

    I also intend to adopt a system of rolling targets, in which the target is rolled forward once every six months. This will enable me regularly to reassess progress on the monetary front in relation to developments in the rest of the economy and either to continue with the existing target range or to modify it. For example, if events have moved as I would hope on ​ counter-inflation policy, it would be appropriate to consider in the autumn whether to lower the target range.

    The target range for sterling M3 for 1978–79 will be 8 per cent. to 12 per cent. The corresponding level of DCE will be below the £6 billion which was set out in the Letter of Intent I wrote to the International Monetary Fund in 1976. This will provide both for a reduction in the rate of inflation and for an increase in economic growth. It should provide ample room for the likely increase in bank lending to industry.

    In Britain, as elsewhere, the rate of growth of the money supply is bound to fluctuate significantly from month to month. As last year, it is likely to be significantly above or below the desired range from time to time. In so far as it is possible now to identify the sort of factors which may cause such fluctuations, I would expect the growth to be higher at some stages in the first half of the year than in the year as a whole. In particular, the timing of central Government receipts and payments may cause jumps in certain months such as banking May similar to that which we had in January this year.

    I will, of course, use whatever instruments of monetary policy are appropriate as the year proceeds. I would hope that gilt-edged interest rates will fall later in the year as it becomes clear that we are making further progress in the fight against inflation. At the moment, however, sterling short-term interest rates are on the low side, both in relation to controlling the domestic money supply and by comparison with United States and Eurodollar rates, given recent developments in the exchange markets.

    With my approval, therefore, the Bank of England is this afternoon raising its minimum lending rate from 6½ per cent. to 7½ per cent.—far below the level that I inherited four years ago.

    Within the framework of this monetary policy, we must also do our best to ensure that rising prices and earnings do not make our industry uncompetitive. ​ This will require co-operation from employers and trade unions alike. We must start with a collective determination to ensure that we do not allow the rate of inflation to begin rising again from the levels we expect to reach this summer. On the contrary, we must aim at a further fall.

    This will not be easy to achieve. Over the last 12 months we have been helped in getting the rate of inflation down by the appreciation of our currency and by the fall in world prices which accompanied the fall in world growth and trade. We cannot rely on similar assistance in the next 12 months. That is why the forecast in this year’s FSBR shows an increase of 1 per cent. in the inflation rate by the middle of 1979, even assuming that earnings increase only half as much in the next pay round as is likely in this round. Earnings in fact will be the key to the inflation rate next year. Although earnings have increased in the current round far less than most observers expected a few months ago, they are still growing faster in Britain than in most of the countries which compete with us, and our productivity is growing more slowly.

    So we shall be unable to prevent our rate of inflation from rising significantly next year unless we can achieve much lower levels of increase in wage costs than we have achieved this year. If we fail to achieve this, then, whatever the size of the stimulus I give to the economy in this Budget, we cannot expect to keep control of prices or to see the faster fall in unemployment at which we aim.

    I therefore propose early discussions with the representatives of both sides of industry to see, first, whether they agree with the Government that we must keep inflation moving down next year and, second, what policies are appropriate in the field both of prices and of earnings to ensure that we achieve this objective.

    I believe that the success we have achieved in fighting inflation over the last few years both through our control of the monetary aggregates and through our policy for pay and prices provides reasonable grounds for confidence that we can continue to make progress in the fight against inflation in the next 12 months.

    It is on this assumption that I have made my judgment about the size of the stimulus which I can deliver to the economy this year. The total size of the stimulus must, however, depend not only on the assumptions about inflation but also on the nature of the stimulus itself. It can be larger to the extent that it is clearly designed to improve our industrial performance and to strengthen our prospects of success in the fight against inflation.

    The objective of the measures in my Budget today is to provide additional support for our industrial strategy partly in the form of direct help for business, particularly for small firms, and partly by strengthening the incentive to effort at all levels in industry through cuts in income tax. I also believe that by using tax cuts to increase the real value of the pay packet during the coming year I can encourage further moderation in pay settlements and a continuing fall in the rate of inflation.

    I recognise, too, that if the Budget measures are to generate the support of working people for the nation’s economic objectives they must also contribute directly towards the relief of poverty, to the fight against unemployment, to the improvement of our social services and to the achievement of a more compassionate and fair society. The measures I am about to describe are designed specifically to achieve these objectives.

    I have, therefore, concluded that it would be right to give a full year stimulus to the economy of some £2½ billion—or about £2 billion in 1978–79. The measures should raise output by another ¾per cent. in the next 12 months and, as a result, GDP should increase by about 3 per cent. at 1970 prices—the highest increase for five years. I am satisfied that this can be done without either prejudicinging our monetary objectives and refuelling inflation or overstraining our productive capacity.

    As a result of this Budget stimulus the PSBR this year will be within the ceiling I set in my letter to the International Monetary Fund last December. The forecast shows a PSBR of £8½ billion or 5¼ per cent. of GDP, reflecting a general ​ Government financial deficit which at 4 per cent. of GDP would be no higher than that, for example, of Germany. In fact, the PSBR for 1977–78 as forecast in last year’s Budget was exactly the same as the current forecast for 1978–79—£8½ billion. The estimated outturn for last year, however, is now £5·7 billion—nearly £3 billion lower, despite additional cuts in taxation during the year.

    Of all the elements in the forecast the PSBR is the most difficult to estimate correctly. But even if this year’s PSBR is as high as forecast, the higher level of government debt needed to finance it will be counter-balanced by the reduced need to sell gilts to offset the domestic effects of inflows across the exchanges, which were very substantial in the last financial year.

    The funding of the PSBR outside the banking system will be helped by direct sales of certificates of tax deposits, mainly to companies, and of national savings to individuals. A new issue of savings certificate is announced today, with a yield of just under 6·8 per cent. per annum over its four-year life, and a maximum holding for any one saver of £2,000.

    This will mean that the forecast requirement for gilt sales will probably be much the same in money terms as the sales achieved in the last two years and somewhat smaller in relation to the institutional funds which are likely to be available. Thus I foresee no difficulty in financing the PSBR for 1978–79 consistently with the new monetary guideline of 8 to 12 per cent.

    I now come to the Budget measures themselves.

    Last October I announced an increase in our plans for public expenditure in 1978–79 of £1,000 million at 1977 survey prices, including £400 million on construction and over £300 million on raising the rate of child benefit to £2·30 from this month. These increases were included in the Government’s expenditure plans as set out in the public expenditure White Paper last January. The White Paper also made provision for the statutory uprating of the main social security benefits in line with earnings or prices as appropriate.

    ​We have therefore decided to increase in November the rate of pension by £3·20 to £31·20 for a married couple, and by £2 to £19·50 for a single person. This is likely to represent an increase of over 4 per cent. in real terms. The real value of the pension will thus have risen by over 20 per cent. since this Government came to office when the married pension was £12·50 and the single £7·75. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Social Services will shortly be announcing the full details of the uprating, including the increases in short-term benefits. Altogether, these improvements will be worth around £500 million in 1978–79 and £1,300 million in a full year. The revised national insurance contribution rates for 1978–79 now in payment were announced by my right hon. Friend the Minister for Social Security last December.

    The Government’s plans provided a contingency reserve of £750 million at 1977 survey prices to cover additional public expenditure measures in 1978–79. We have decided to allocate now a substantial part of the contingency reserve to such measures.

    The first call on this sum is for the employment measures which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of Stale for Employment announced last month. The extra cost of these additional measures to United Kingdom employment programmes in 1978–79 is estimated at about £156 million and in 1979–80 at about £144 million. As I said earlier, these additional measures, combined with the others previously announced, will protect or provide about 400,000 jobs or training places by March 1979.

    The Government are also making available further sums in 1978–79 to expand other programmes which are of particular social and economic importance at this time. Within the social services we are giving on this occasion the highest priority to health and education. There will be an allocation of £50 million in 1978–79 for the Health Service in the United Kingdom for specific improvements in services for patients. These will vary from place to place but there will be, for example, extra resources for the full opening of newly completed hospitals, facilities to cut waiting lists, more staff to help care for the elderly ​ and handicapped, and over 400 extra kidney machines, Education will receive £40 million to cover a higher rate of capital expenditure by local education authorities on schools and colleges and there will be additional funds for retraining teachers in subjects like mathematics, science and crafts where there is a shortage.

    There will also be £20 million for environmental services, including building small factories in rural areas by the Development Commission, and for preserving the coastline. There will be provision for higher expenditure on law and order—such as police and prisons and the probation services; special assistance for certain areas affected by early steel closures; and a small extra sum for sea defences in addition to the help announced for farmers affected by storm and flood damage earlier this year. Finally, funds will be made available to promote insulation of private houses and to launch a further scheme to promote energy saving in industry and commerce. I think that this will make a helpful contribution to the energy objectives of the concerted international programme I have mentioned.

    These decisions will provide useful additions to a wide range of public expenditure programmes and will also bring some further help to the construction industry. Further details will be announced by the Ministers responsible in each case.

    The other increases in expenditure are designed to help the family budget. The Government have decided that the autumn increase in the charge for school meals will not take place. We have also decided to take advantage of the Common Market subsidy for school milk by enabling local education authorities to provide free milk for 7-to-11-year-olds. The net cost of these two measures is about £68 million in 1978–79.

    Finally, we are raising child benefit again. As I announced last summer, child benefit was raised this month to £2·30 a week for all children, and the premium for the first child of one-parent families doubled to £1. The Government have now decided that the child benefit rate will be increased in April 1979 to £4 for all children. Meanwhile, as a first instalment of this increase, the Government ​ have decided to increase child benefit by 70p to £3 for all children this November. In addition, the premium for children of one-parent families will be doubled from £1 to £2 in November.

    The cost of these increases in 1978–79 will be around £165 million. They will give a further major boost to child support for working families. Those dependent on social security benefits will, of course, gain from the general social security uprating which I have just announced.

    In deciding on these measures of additional expenditure this year, the Government have regarded it as an essential principle that their cost should be met within the public expenditure plans published in January. Accordingly, the cost will be met from the contingency reserve for this year.

    It has been argued from many quarters, including by many of my right hon. and hon. Friends, that the Government should take major expenditure decisions on measures affecting people’s incomes, such as child benefit, at the same time as their main decisions on taxation. The two can then be seen in relation to each other. I believe it is right that the Government should have taken now their principal remaining decisions affecting 1978–79. Just under £200 million at 1977 survey prices remains available in the contingency reserve. Any contingencies requiring additional expenditure in the remainder of the year will be met within this figure.

    The Government will consider the programmes for 1979–80 and subsequent years in the public expenditure survey. It remains the Government’s firm intention to contain the growth of expenditure planned for those years within the growth which we can expect in the economy as a whole.

    I now come to my proposals for those taxes which most concern the individual man and woman.

    I think it is now generally recognised that, while the total burden of taxation in Britain is well within the international average, the proportion of total revenue derived from income tax is still too high although I have already reduced it significantly in the last three years. So cuts in income tax will account for almost all the £2½ billion stimulus which I have announced.

    I know that some hon. and right hon. Members think it would be right to cut income tax this year by a much larger sum and offset the additional costs by increases in indirect taxation. In principle I have some sympathy with this view. But I believe that this year we must consolidate and reinforce our success in the fight against inflation so that we can for good and all bring down the inflationary expectations which have damaged our economy in recent years in so many ways. In this situation I cannot believe it would make sense for the Government themselves deliberately to raise the inflation rate and increase the cost of living. I will, therefore, leave the indirect taxes generally unchanged on this occasion—with one small exception.

    To discourage the smoking of cigarettes which have a higher tar yield, I intend to introduce from 4th September a supplementary duty on cigarettes with a tar yield of 20 milligrammes or more. If the manufacturers fully passed on this increased duty in prices they would raise the price of 20 of these cigarettes by about 7p. About 15 per cent. of cigarettes will be affected.

    The House will recognise that this supplementary duty is not designed primarily to raise revenue—it could bring in only £25 million in a full year at most—and if it results in leading smokers abandoning these high tar cigarettes, no one will be more pleased than I. In any case, the effect on the RPI will be negligible.

    I have also been asked to consider an increase in the national insurance surcharge. The share of employer social ​ security contributions and payroll taxes in total revenue is a good deal lower in Britain than in most other countries of the European Community. But I do not believe it would be right to increase it so soon after it has been introduced, and at a time when unemployment is our major problem. It would increase industrial costs at a time when it is essential to improve our competitiveness and it would ultimately be largely passed on in higher prices at a time when the fight against inflation is at a crucial stage.

    The proposals I have announced so far leave £2,400 million for reductions in income tax. I have considered carefully how they should be distributed so as to further the objectives I have set myself, to increase the incentive for greater effort and to promote social justice.

    I believe it right to regard this Budget as the second phase in a process which I began last autumn. I told the House in October that, as well as increasing the plans for public expenditure in 1978–79, I was raising the level of the personal allowances fixed in last year’s Finance Act by 12 per cent. so as to ensure that their real value was maintained and that I was bringing forward this increase in tax thresholds by 12 months compared with the date provided for in the Act. In practice, this increase of 12 per cent. has turned out to be slightly higher than the increase in the retail price index over the calendar year 1977.

    The question I have had to decide for this Budget is whether I should devote the hulk of the tax relief now available to raising the tax thresholds still further or whether I should introduce a lower initial rate of tax. Since I have already more than fulfilled my obligation to index tax thresholds. I have been particularly impressed by the argument that the rate at which people become liable to enter income tax is too high. It is, indeed, the highest in the world. It means that many of the low paid are little better off in work than on the dole. I cannot believe that this makes sense in either economic or social terms.

    I propose, therefore, to introduce a lower rate of tax, at 25 per cent., on the first £750 of taxable income. This new lower rate will be the marginal rate of tax for some 4 million of the low paid. Most taxpayers now caught in the poverty trap will find its impact that much less ​ severe because their tax will be nine percentage points lower than now. Other taxpayers will be £1·30 a week better off as a result of this change alone. I hope it may be possible to extend this lower rate band in future years.

    I still believe, however, that it is necessary to raise the tax threshold as far as possible above the main social security benefit levels and to take as many people as I can out of tax altogether. I therefore propose this year to raise the single person’s allowance and the wife’s earnings allowance by a further £40 to £985 and the married allowance by £80 to £1,535.

    This increase in tax thresholds will help widows and also provide the family man with special help during the second stage of the transition to the child benefit scheme. The additional child benefit which mothers are now receiving will in general more than offset the effect on family income of the reduction in the child tax allowance which we have already announced.

    But I believe it also important to ensure that this change does not reduce the father’s pay packet, and for this reason I am increasing the married allowance by twice as much as the increase in the single allowance. I propose, as last year, to ensure that the allowance for one-parent families is kept in line with that for two-parent families by increasing the additional allowance by £40 to £550.

    Pensioners with a modest additional income have a special problem, which I expect all hon. Members will have come across in their constituencies. I therefore propose to increase the age allowance a little more than personal allowances generally—by £50 for the single person and £100 for the married—and to raise the age allowance income limit to £4,000.

    The cost of these measures will be £2,150 million, of which nearly £1,600 million is attributable to the lower band and just over £550 million to the increases in the personal allowances. As a result of these increases 360,000 people who would otherwise have been paying income tax in the coming year will not now do so.

    Although last October I increased the thresholds for the basic rate of tax by 12 per cent., I did not at that time similarly index the threshold for the higher ​ rates of tax. If I did not raise this now, people with no more than one and a half times average earnings would move into higher rate liability this year. I propose, therefore, to raise the upper limit of the basic rate from £6,000 to £7,000. This will mean that a married man with earnings of £8,500 will not be liable to tax at the higher rate, even if he is entitled to no allowances other than his married allowance. As a result, 450,000 people who would otherwise be paying tax at the higher rate will not have to do so. This will be of particular advantage to highly skilled engineers, foremen and middle managers.

    I propose also to increase the thresholds to the successive higher rate bands. The 40 per cent. band will, as now, be £1,000 in length. This will be followed by two bands of £1,000, two of £1,500, one of £2,000, one of £2,500 and one of £5,500. The 83 per cent. rate will thus be reached at a taxable income of £23,000 as compared with the present £21,000.

    There is a similar case for raising the thresholds for the surcharge on investment income. I propose, therefore, to raise the general threshold to the 10 per cent. rate of surcharge from £1,500 to £1,700 and the threshold to the 15 per cent. rate from £2,000 to £2,250, in line with the rise in prices.

    However, it is significant that nearly half of those liable to the surcharge are over 65, and two-thirds of these have incomes below the higher rate threshold. I therefore intend, in addition to the increase I have already announced, to help those elderly people living on relatively modest income from savings by increasing the real value of the surcharge thresholds for them. I propose that for those over 65, the thresholds for the 10 per cent. rate should go up from £2,000 to £2,500, and for the 15 per cent. rate from £2,500 to £3,000. Finally, I propose that maintenance payments should be wholly exempted from the surcharge with effect from this year.

    The changes in the personal allowances will take effect under PAYE on the first pay day after 10th May. Single people and earning wives earning over £19 a week will in general then get a refund of £1·30, and they will thereafter pay 26p a week less in tax. The refund for married men earning over £30 a week will ​ in general be £2·60 and the weekly reduction for them will be 52p. The new tax tables giving effect to the changes in rates of tax, including the lower rate band, will operate from mid-July. There will then be a further refund of about £18 and a further reduction in tax of £1·30 a week.

    Let me now explain the effect of this Budget on living standards.

    With the usual Budget tables, I am arranging to have published this year, as in the last two years, tables which show the effect of my tax changes on individuals at different levels of earnings. In order to illustrate this, let me take first the example of a man earning £75 a week who has a wife and two children under eleven. The tax reliefs in today’s Budget will give him an extra £1·82 a week in his pay packet.

    As I have said, however, these tax reliefs are only the second phase of the process which I began last October, when he got an extra £1·05 a week. From the beginning of this April, the new provisions for child benefit and child tax allowances have come into force, as well as the increased national insurance contributions. Taking all these into account, the £75 a week family is better off by £3·32 and, when the child benefit rises in November by a further 70p for each child, the family will be better off by a total of £4·72 a week.

    But these calculations do not, of course, take into account the effects on living standards of wage increases over the current pay round. Taking again the man on £75 a week, if his earnings rise by 10 per cent. in accordance with the Government’s guideline, his standard of living will rise by nearly 6 per cent. in real terms between August 1977 and August 1978 as a result of last October’s measures and those I have just described.

    The man earning £50 a week will do even better. His living standards will rise by nearly 7½ per cent. On the same basis, a single man on £75 a week will be about 4¾ per cent. better off, and on £50 a week will be just over 6 per cent. better off.

    Thus I do not in this Budget make any call for sacrifice. With the rate of inflation remaining low, and with these substantial tax reliefs, modest increases in earnings should ensure that real living standards can continue to rise over the year ahead without unduly increasing our industrial costs. This is the best possible recipe for commercial and industrial success. It is the only recipe for curing unemployment.

  • Denis Healey – 1986 Speech on the Strategic Defence Initiative

    Below is the text of the speech made by Denis Healey, the then Labour MP for Leeds East, in the House of Commons on 19 February 1986.

    I beg to move,

    That this House regrets Her Majesty’s Government’s support for the Strategic Defence Initiative.

    In some ways the strategic defence initiative is probably the most important issue in the field of foreign and defence policy, disarmament and high technology that the House has discussed for many years. Its supporters and opponents will at least agree on that.

    On 23 March 1983, President Reagan made a speech in which he asked for a fundamental change in the basic policy upon which western security has been built since the second world war. He made this speech without any consultation with any of his allies, although NATO’s nuclear planning group was meeting at that time. He said that the

    “human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations by threatening their existence … peace could not rest much longer on the threat of mutual suicide.”

    The President dedicated himself to produce a defence against nuclear ballistic missiles which would make:

    “nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”

    Later in Baltimore, he told schoolchildren that “the hand of providence” inspired that speech.

    The President never explained how ballistic missile defence would protect the world against nuclear bombs which were carried on aircraft, such as those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, by cruise missiles, by individuals or in the hold of ships. He never explained how abolishing nuclear weapons would control conventional forces, which in an all-out war could inflict horrific damage, or how he could achieve any of his objectives without reducing the political tensions that have been the cause of the arms race. However, we can all agree that at least it was a noble vision, which has been endorsed by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

    The strategic defence initiative that we are now discussing is very different from what President Reagan proposed nearly three years ago. The American Administration now say that the purpose of research is not to replace nuclear deterrence but to enhance it—to make the mutual suicide pact even more binding than it is today, and to threaten the survival of other nations more effectively. It is already clear that the Administration’s aim for the next 30 years at least will be to protect not the peoples of the world, but American land-based missiles, which are one of the components in America’s strategic nuclear triad.

    “For the foreseeable future,”

    the official American apologia for SDI now recounts,

    “offensive nuclear forces, and the prospect of nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of deterrence.”

    Therefore, simultaneously with SDI, the United States Government are beginning to deploy a whole arsenal of ​ new strategic nuclear weapons—the MX missile, the D5 submarine-launched missile and the Midgetman mobile missile. They foresee an immense increase in funding for research and development into what they call advanced strategic missile systems, which are a new arsenal of weapons that will enter service in the late 1990s when the first strategic defence is planned to be available. That must mean a stupendous acceleration of the arms race, greatly increasing the risk of nuclear war and making disarmament more difficult.

    Indeed, the case against the President’s present proposals was made most eloquently by the President in his original speech when he said:

    “If defensive systems were paired with offensive systems they could be regarded as fostering an aggressive policy, and nobody really wants that.”

    The point that the combination of defence and offensive forces would appear to increase the possibility of a first strike against an enemy was repeated by him in his interview with Soviet journalists only last October, when he pointed out that it would make a first strike more feasible. The point was put most dramatically by ex-President Nixon when he said of the SDI:

    “Such systems would be destabilising if they provided a shield so that you could use the sword.”

    That is the basic case against the attempt to produce a ballistic missile defence, which is the purpose of the SDI.

    It is not surprising that the SDI has been opposed in a somewhat coded way, not only by our Foreign Secretary in his remarkable speech in the middle of last year, for which I paid him tribute, but by two of the past three American Presidents—Presidents Carter and Ford—three of the past four American Defence Secretaries —Secretaries Brown, Schlesinger and McNamara—and all six of the surviving American Defence Secretaries who are opposed to breaking the ABM treaty, which would be necessary if a star wars system were to be deployed.

    Faced with that threat which, to use President Reagan’s words, could make a first strike by the United States more likely, it is not surprising that the Soviet Government have made it clear that they will not sit on their hands. If SDI proceeds, they will increase the number of offensive missiles in the hope of swamping American defences, as the United Stated did by introducing multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles when the Russians first began deploying ballistic missile defences in the late 1960s, and, as Secretary Schlesinger, in a powerful. article attacking SDI, pointed out, as any Western Government would do in similar circumstances. Indeed, the Chevaline programme, which was introduced by the Conservative Government in the early 1970s, was introduced as a response to the Soviet deployment of an ABM system around Moscow.

    That is not the only Soviet response. The Soviet Government will also seek to develop weapons which would either put the American space-based system out of action—the most likely weapon for that would be some sort of space bomb which would circle the world permanently—or make the system ineffective, for example by introducing fast burn into their intercontinental missiles so that the boost phase, which is the first target of the American system, would be reduced from five minutes to 50 seconds, and would take place entirely in the atmosphere, which it is much more difficult for the ​ proposed American laser weapons to penetrate. Finally, the Russians have made it clear that they would plan to develop their own space-based defensive systems.

    Dr. Alan Glyn (Windsor and Maidenhead)

    I have listened carefully to the right hon. Gentleman and I agree with him. But he has not mentioned the time scale for the development of the SDI by the Americans.

    Mr. Healey

    From discussions with General Abrahamson and others I understand that the Americans hope to start deploying some sort of ballistic missile defence within about 10 years, although the first system may be based on land rather than in space. The fact that the Americans are known to be researching into such systems makes it sensible for the Russians to start preparing against them now, just as western countries, faced with the possibility of Soviet systems, immediately started taking action either to swamp them or copy them.

    Mr. James Couchman (Gillingham) rose—

    Sir Antony Buck (Colchester, North) rose—

    Mr. Healey

    I shall give way from time to time, but I do not wish to conduct a seminar. I have no doubt that you, Mr. Speaker, will note the anxiety of hon. Members to speak.

    American official sources have made it clear that in the next 10 years, if the arms race proceeds, the Soviet Union will be able to increase the number of its missiles much faster than the United States simply by keeping existing production lines open. Indeed, it could increase the number of its warheads from about 9,000 to 30,000 within 10 years, especially if the United States abandons the SALT II agreement, which would restrict the number of missiles, as the American Defence Department has asked the President to do.

    Even that is not the full horror of the prospect before us. The United States has now admitted that it is examining the possibility of putting nuclear weapons into orbit to use as pumps for X-ray lasers. It has already carried out many tests for that purpose on its testing grounds in Nevada. It is already exploring nuclear weapons as an element in its SDI, although earlier it always said that the SDI would be an entirely conventional system.

    We must never lose sight of the fact that the technologies that are now under examination could be used for offensive as well as defensive purposes. In response to papers produced by several American university teams, a spokesman for the American strategic defence initiative has already admitted that any laser weapon powerful enough to destroy a missile in the atmosphere could, with some redesigning, be used to incinerate a city. Even the non-nuclear lasers contemplated by the United States could produce climatic effects as horrific and catastrophic to humanity as the nuclear winter—a concept with which people are now becoming familiar.

    Faced with that terrifying prospect, any European Government should be using all their efforts to stop the arms race from entering that new phase while there is still time. Despite the publicly expressed hostility of the French Government to the SDI, and despite the deep and public divisions in the German Government about the SDI, the ​ British Prime Minister decided to jump the gun on all her European allies and not only to endorse the programme but to offer to put British scientists at its disposal.

    The Prime Minister sought to justify that sell-out by two arguments. First, she told us that the President gave her satisfactory undertakings at their meeting in December 1984 on the deployment of a space-based system. The second argument was that it was impossible to monitor an agreement to ban research into such a system. However, it is already clear that the American Administration have not the slightest intention of honouring three out of the four undertakings that they gave to the Prime Minister in Washington 14 months ago.

    The first condition was that America would seek not to achieve superiority but to maintain the balance of strategic forces. On 1 February 1984, Secretary Weinberger told Congress:

    “If we get a system … which we know can render their weapons impotent, we would be back in a situation we were in, for example, when we were the only nation with the nuclear weapon.”

    He considered SDI as effectively giving the United States the monopoly that it had in 1945. That is not maintaining a balance in strategic forces.

    Secondly, the President undertook that the deployment of a system related to the SDI— in view of the obligations that America accepted under the ABM treaty —would have to be a matter for negotiation with the Soviet Government as a fellow signatory of the ABM treaty, and with America’s allies. President Reagan was clear about the matter. On 6 November last year, in answer to questions, he said that if Russia did not agree to amend the ABM treaty to permit the deployment of a space-based defence system, he would go ahead and deploy it anyway. When asked by journalists whether he would permit the Soviet Government a veto on deployment, he said, “Hell, no.”

    Mr. Weinberger made the same point in less colourful language. A year ago he stated:

    “I am ruling out the possibility of giving up on strategic defence, either in the research stage or if it becomes feasible in the deployment stage.”

    He refused to give up the possibility of deploying SDI under any circumstances if it proved feasible.

    As the House will recall, it was that refusal even to consider negotiations that blocked all progress at the recent Geneva summit on disarmament of strategic nuclear forces. That in turn makes nonsense of the fourth undertaking, that East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

    Both sides are now planning to increase greatly the number of their offensive systems and to increase new types of defensive weapons. There is no chance of progress on strategic nuclear disarmament unless the United States is prepared to negotiate about the abandonment of the strategic defence initiative. The tragedy is that that has become clear just at the time when the new Soviet proposals for disarmament—perhaps engendered to some extent by the fear of the SDI deployment—represent major concessions in the Soviet position, not least on intermediate nuclear forces, where the Soviets have accepted the zero option, which was first put to the Russians by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Foot) and myself when we met Mr. Brezhnev in 1981. It was also put forward by President Reagan on behalf of NATO in discussions with ​ the Soviet Union about a year later. Since the war there has never been a time when the prospects for progress on disarmament have been more propitious. There is now a real chance of doing that to which the American and Soviet Governments committed themselves when Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko agreed a year ago to end the arms race on earth and to prevent an arms race in space.

    The Prime Minister’s excuse for supporting the SDI as a research programme is that it is impossible to monitor or verify a ban on research and that the Soviet Union is carrying out research into ballistic missile defence in any case.

    As I pointed out when we previously debated this subject during the debate on the Queen’s Speech in November, although research carried on inside people’s heads or inside laboratories is impossible to monitor without access to those laboratories, such research cannot go far without physical tests, or “demonstrations” as the Americans call them. Tests of components in a possible system that take place outside laboratories can be monitored by satellite photography and other means and are continuously monitored by the American and Soviet Governments at present. The Russians have at last offered to draw a distinction between research in laboratories and brains and the type of tests outside laboratories that can be monitored, without which such research cannot proceed very far.

    The Americans have listed such tests as having been carried out by the Russians. They have described some of the preparations that they say the Russians are making to produce a ballistic missile defence. However, I understand that their interpretation of the Krasnoyarsk radar—their prime exhibit—is not shared by the British Government. I hope that the Secretary of State will come clean on that matter in his reply. Evidence given to the Defence Committee by some officials made it clear that we do not endorse the American interpretation of Krasnoyarsk. The Russians have agreed to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk system if Britain dismantles similar systems at Fylingdales and Thule. Many people believe that they are as contrary to the ABM system as is the Krasnoyarsk radar.

    Mr. Michael Heseltine (Henley)

    The right hon. Gentleman was responsible for many years for Fylingdales. Was it part of an ABM system?

    Mr. Healey

    No, it was not then, but the right hon. Gentleman and his Government agreed to develop Fylingdales as a phased array radar of a type very similar to that at Krasnoyarsk. That is a new development which the Russians have already claimed is contrary to the ABM treaty, on exactly the same grounds as the Americans claim that Krasnoyarsk is contrary to the treaty. I am glad to see that the right hon. Gentleman does not dispute that fact.

    Mr. Heseltine

    Perhaps I would if the right hon. Gentleman gave me the chance. I was deeply involved in the matter. The purpose of the modernised Fylingdales is no different from the purpose over which the right hon. Gentleman presided.

    Mr. Healey

    That is precisely what the Russians argue about Krasnoyarsk: that its purpose is to track objects in space, not to—[Interruption.] Mr. Deputy Speaker, I would love to conduct a seminar because I know that education and instruction is widely required by Conservative Members.

    Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood) rose—

    ​Mr. Healey

    No, I have dealt with the question of the right hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine)—

    Mr. Heseltine

    The right hon. Gentleman is getting carried away. The essential difference is that Fylingdales existed before the ABM treaty and Krasnoyarsk did not.

    Mr. Healey

    Of course Fylingdales existed before the treaty, but it is being developed in a way that is incompatible with the treaty. That is precisely the complaint made by the Soviet Government. If the right hon. Gentleman is sensitive about his complicity in the matter, and if he believes, like the Americans, that the Krasnoyarsk radar violates the treaty, let the British Government agree to the Soviet proposal to cease development at Fylingdales, Krasnoyarsk and Thule, which seem to be a perfectly sensible proposal that would not harm Western security and would relieve many people of what I believe to be legitimate anxieties.

    If the West is really worried about Soviet research into ballistic missile defence or anti-satellite systems, where in some respects the Soviet Union is further advanced than the United States, it could kill those systems stone dead by accepting a ban on observable tests. None of the Government’s excuses for supporting such tests hold the slightest amount of water, since they are fully capable of being monitored.

    The strategic defence initiative has become the major obstacle to stopping the arms race. It is widely agreed that it would be possible with existing means to monitor a comprehensive test ban, especially since the Soviet Government have agreed to on-site inspection. But the SDI requires nuclear tests underground of X-ray laser bombs, some of which have already been carried out in Nevada. Mr. Miller, a top scientist at Livermore, has argued in public that even the non-nuclear components of the proposed SDI require testing in a nuclear environment which can be produced only by the explosion of nuclear weapons.

    The tragedy is that this opportunity to stop the arms race may be the last unless we can pop this genie back in the bottle now. What must worry many hon. Members is that the major obstacle to a reduction in strategic weapons is the American attachment to the SDI, just as the major obstacle to accepting the Soviet proposal for the zero option on intermediate nuclear forces is the British Government’s determination to go ahead with the Trident programme, although there is growing opposition even in the services to continuing that programme, since, as the right hon. Member for Henley will recall, one reason why our forces cannot afford helicopters produced by Westland is that, in a few years’ time, 30 per cent. of the new equipment budget will be taken up by Trident.

    Her Majesty’s Government and the American Government together have erected a massive road block on the way to peace. All this has been compounded during the past few months by the grubby conspiracy of the British Government to encourage British scientists to leave vital British programmes of civilian research, such as the Alvey programme, and work instead on SDI research for the American Government. It is yet another sell-out to American pressure— one of vital importance to the future of British industry.

    My right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) will deal at greater length with some problems surrounding the agreement made by the Secretary of State ​ for Defence, which General Abrahamson was pursuing during his recent visit to London. I hope that he will tell us a little more about the agreement, since I understand that he met General Abrahamson yesterday.

    The memorandum of understanding that the Government signed with America on this matter is scarcely worth the paper on which it is written, because such memoranda can be overridden at any time by the American Congress, as Congress overrode the wartime agreement to share nuclear technology when it passed the McMahon Act, and as the Americans overrode another agreement when they cancelled the Skybolt project on which an earlier Conservative Government were relying to replace the aging V bombers. As the right hon. Member for Henley may remember, a few years ago, the Americans unilaterally broke the memorandum of understanding to produce an airfield attack weapon, the JP233. Indeed, it may have been before his time. That memorandum was signed by his predecessor, the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Pym) whom he has joined on the Government Back Benches. They seem to be a depository for former Defence Ministers.

    But even if the memorandum of understanding is not overridden by the United States, it is vital that the House should know what its provisions are. We know only one thing about the memorandum: that the former Secretary of State completely failed in his stated objective to guarantee $1,500 million-worth of work for Britain. We must rely entirely on leaks, most of which are coming from the United States. However, some have come from the familiar source—the Department of Trade and Industry —which let it be known during the negotiation of the agreement that it was unhappy about the right hon. Gentleman’s failure to obtain satisfactory assurances on intellectual property rights and on technology transfer.

    Connoisseurs of British politics will be intrigued by the fact that there was what psychologists call role-reversal on that occasion. The right hon. Member for Henley was trying to sell out to the Americans, and his comrade in adversity, the former Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, was trying to protect European technology. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that circumstances alter cases, although I found his posing as a great European odd when I considered his record on the memorandum of understanding on the SDI and his position on the purchase of the Trident missile.

    We have been told by leaks that the Department of Trade and Industry was immensely unhappy about the provision to enable British scientists to use the knowledge which they acquire in this research and to produce products which can be transferred to other countries in commercial sale.

    No information is available to the House about the provisions. There are no military security grounds for denying the House this information, and there is every reason for its having the information. Is it the case, as one of the American leaks has claimed, that intellectual property rights and technology transfer will have to be settled case by case in company-to-company contracts, and therefore the British Government have acquired no guarantees whatever in this field which will protect British interests?

    The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany have said in advance— they have not yet signed the ​ memorandum of understanding—that they will not cough up any of their own money. One of the leaks I have read says that Her Majesty’s Government have agreed to provide one third of the money for any Government-to-Government contracts from the British Treasury. That is a matter of immense importance to the House. Hon. Members have every reason to be told the truth, yet we are denied it.

    We are also told that there are penal cancellation clauses in this agreement in an attempt to bind any future Government to implement its provisions. I am certain that any future House of Commons will demand the same right as the American Congress has often exercised, to override a memorandum of understanding about which it has been given no information whatever.

    The central issue on this agreement is a general and simple one. We all know that Britain has a substantial lead over the United States in some of the new technologies, particularly those relating to fifth and sixth generation computers which, it is hoped, will have artificial intelligence and be capable of learning. It is essential—I hope the right hon. Member for Henley agrees, in the light of his recent speeches—that we should use this unique advantage in high technology to build a European base so that Europe can compete on equal terms in these areas with the United States and Japan.

    We should not sell out to the United States, and particularly to American defence interests from which there will be only a small commercial spin-off, even if we are allowed under the agreement to make use of the spin-off. I noticed the other day that the assistant head of research at IBM, who can be regarded as a fairly independent authority on these matters, says that the right word is not “spin-off’, but “drip-off.” The amount of commercial advantage which even the Americans will get out of this diversion of research and development from civilian to military research will be small compared to the colossal resources which it is planned to invest in it.

    In an earlier debate my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Monklands, East (Mr. Smith) said that to make these points is not to be anti-American; it is anti-British not to make them. It is time that this Government got off their hind legs and started putting Britain first. The Prime Minister and the Government as a whole have shown a feckless indifference to British interests. That has characterised the whole of their industrial policy, which we have been debating at length in recent weeks, and it threatens the very survival of the manufacturing side of our economy. Feckless indifference to the interests of peace by supporting the SDI is even more dangerous.

    I ask the House to vote for the motion. At least it is one means of stopping the sell-out to American pressure which is corrupting every area of our public life, both at home and abroad.

  • Denis Healey – 1985 Speech on Foreign Affairs and Overseas Development

    Below is the text of the speech made by Denis Healey, the then Shadow Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons on 8 November 1985.

    Like the Foreign Secretary, I want to concentrate on the forthcoming Geneva summit where the leaders of the two most powerful countries in the world will meet. Our survival will depend in part on how that meeting goes. I strongly endorse the Foreign Secretary’s closing words in that regard.

    I shall not talk about the economic problems facing the European Community, although the outlook is as depressing as I can ever remember. The Foreign Secretary referred to Spain and Portugal joining the Community just six weeks from now, but the last meeting of Community Finance Ministers failed utterly to take account of that in arrangements for the budget next year. We shall have an opportunity to discuss the Common Market budget next week, I believe, so some of those issues can be left until then.

    I shall not talk about South Africa, which we debated a fortnight ago. I am sure that we shall return to the subject many times in the new Session. I do not applaud the choice of Lord Barber as the British representative on the Commonwealth mission—I do not think that the chairman of Standard Chartered Bank can be regarded as ​ totally without bias in these matters. I can only hope that the noble Lord distances himself as much from the Prime Minister on South African matters as he did from the Prime Minister’s views on monetary problems when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer.

    I should like to say just a word about Argentina. Even The Times welcomed the recent meetings between my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, me and the leader of the Liberal party and President Alfonsin on the grounds that they had decisively broken the taboo on discussions of Falklands problems. I hope that, in spite of what he said today, the Foreign Secretary will exploit the opportunities that we have offered him to produce an environment in which we can at least reduce the heavy burden on our economy and defences imposed by the Prime Minister’s Fortress Falklands policy.

    The Foreign Secretary must recognise that practical co-operation with Argentina on matters such as fisheries and communications with the Falkland Islands are bound to depend on our readiness to discuss all aspects of the Falklands problem.

    Let me pass to the summit meeting. I deplore the tendency by newspapers and the Government to treat this essentially as a propaganda battle and to pay excessive attention to who is winning the propaganda war. I gather that when the Prime Minister last conversed with President Reagan she asked for a repackaging of the American proposals, as though they would be more acceptable if presented in gift-wrapping rather than brown paper.
    The Foreign Secretary was curiously evasive in telling us whether the proposals which the NATO council discussed on Wednesday last week were the same as those put to the Soviet Union on Friday. My understanding is that they were not. The NATO council has not, so far, discussed the proposals as they were presented last Friday to the Soviet Government.

    The real issues that underlie this so-called propaganda war are of vital importance to the people of Britain no less than to the people of the United States and the Soviet Union. Like the editor of the Financial Times, I could only see as a profound let down the speech at the United Nations in which President Reagan trailed his approach to the summit. Even as a propaganda effort it was clearly aimed at the right wing in his own Republican party rather than at world opinion.

    Of course it is important that the Soviet Union and the United States should discuss regional problems that might bring them to blows. I welcome the talks on these matters which have already taken place, at least at official level, although I doubt that the President was wise to talk in September about joint Soviet-American “intervention” in the Third world. But in his United Nations speech the President’s choice of issues was gravely one sided and his description, especially of what was happening in Nicaragua, was ludicrously distorted. Above all, he left out entirely the regional problems of the middle east where the risks to world peace are the greatest and where the Soviet Union and the United States are already directly and militarily involved.
    In half of the middleeast—the eastern half—Russia and the United States have reached a close understanding about the Gulf war which has already been responsible for the loss of one million lives. They should be trying to bring it to an end rather than acting simply as co-belligerents ​ with Iraq. Surely they need to reach an understanding with the other half of the middle east on how to get peace between Israel and her neighbours.

    I shall mercifully draw a veil over the lamentable diplomatic shambles that attended the recent visit of two PLO representatives to London. I shall draw a veil also over the American achievement in undermining America’s two best friends in the Arab world—King Hussein, by banning a contract to provide him with arms, and President Mubarak, by skyjacking the Egyptian aircraft and failing to apologise for doing so.

    Now that the dust has settled, it is clearer than ever that no progress on the problems separating Israel from her Arab neighbours can be made without involving the PLO —both King Hussein and President Mubarak restated that during the past few days—nor can progress be made without the acquiescence, if not the positive co-operation, of both Syria and the Soviet Union. Until, somehow, diplomacy can create a framework that takes account of those two facts, all purely Western efforts to encourage a settlement are bound to fail. I hope that the Minister for Overseas Development will tell us precisely what the Prime Minister meant at Question Time the other day when she talked about the need for a framework for a new initiative for such talks. I believe that the framework must include the PLO, Syria and the Soviet Union.
    I welcome the indications that Prime Minister Peres is now in contact with the Soviet Union and is seeking diplomatic recognition of Israel and the release of more Jews who wish to settle in his country. I hope very much that the summit at least assists in that regard.

    The central problem facing the summit—the problem which has made it the focus of interest for thinking people all over the world—is whether it will help to bring the nuclear arms race to an end. My concern, which I have expressed many times to the House, is that the nuclear arms race is moving into an area that will make arms control more difficult and war more likely, unless it can be stopped now. It is a staggering fact that the United States and the Soviet Union between them now have 20,000 strategic nuclear warheads and well over 50,000 nuclear warheads, if one adds the intermediate and tactical weapons that they possess. Those 50,000 nuclear warheads amount to more than 1·5 million Hiroshima-size atomic bombs. If those arsenals of nuclear weapons were ever used there would be an eternity of nuclear winter.

    Yet neither side has gained one jot in its security by pursuing this arms race during the past 40 years. Both have wasted colossal sums of money which would have been far better spent on improving the lot of their peoples and, indeed, the lot of the world.

    So far, the stability of the nuclear balance between Russia and the United States has proved invulnerable to wide variations in their relative capabilities. It is now universally recognised, even by Mr. Richard Perle of the Pentagon, that there is broad parity in strategic nuclear weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States. For this reason deliberate aggression by one or the other is well nigh inconceivable at the moment.

    However, the colossal size of their existing arsenals has encouraged both Governments to think more and more about the possibility not just of deterring but of fighting a nuclear war. Each suspects the other of hoping to win a nuclear conflict if it can destroy sufficient of the enemy’s retaliatory forces in a first strike, so that each side is also thinking about pre-empting an enemy first strike. Mr. ​ Richard de Lauer, the Pentagon’s chief of engineering, recently recommended the Trident D5 missile to Congress on the ground that it was a counterforce weapon which might give the United States a pre-emptive capacity. That is the weapon that the British Government are planning to buy at colossal cost from the United States for Britain’s forces.

    The Soviet Union and the United States are developing, and beginning to deploy in some cases, two or three new inter-continental ballistic missiles, new strategic nuclear bombers, new air-launched cruise missiles and new missile-carrying submarines. The United States is planning to replace its obsolete nuclear weapons in Europe with new nuclear missiles and artillery warheads, and no doubt the Soviet Union is doing the same.

    Fears on both sides of a first strike are bound to increase rapidly if these developments continue. A report of the recently published unclassified version of the latest CIA national intelligence estimate stated that Soviet air defences would not be able to

    “prevent large-scale damage to the USSR”

    by United States nuclear bombers and cruise missiles for at least the next decade— that is bombers and cruise missiles alone. More important, Trident D5 is said to offer the United States for the 1990s the capacity to destroy 95 per cent. of Soviet inter-continental ballistic missiles if it strikes first. The same CIA assessment reports that, at least until the year 2000, Russia could pose “no significant threat” to American atomic submarines.

    Those figures from American sources take no account of the enormous destructive power of America’s ICBM force, which is based on land. In addition, President Reagan is planning to equip the United States with a ballistic missile defence, through his star wars programme, and is inviting the Soviet Union to follow suit. He told a BBC correspondent that his message to the Soviet Union was:

    “We wish you well with your defence plans.”

    That is a different story from what the Foreign Secretary told us today and the President could have fooled me, because a welcome and goodwill for the Soviets’ ballistic missile plans are the last views I have heard from Secretary Weinberger or Mr. Shultz.

    President Reagan’s personal attitude to star wars has not wavered since he first made a speech recommending it in March 1983, when he said:

    “The human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence.”

    The President said that he was determined

    “to find a way of defence which will make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”

    Bruce Kent and Joan Ruddock could not have put the case for nuclear disarmament more forcibly. The President added that if

    “defensive systems were paired with offensive systems they could be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy—and nobody wants that.”

    The tragedy is that that is exactly what the President’s star wars programme is leading to. When the President made his speech in March 1983, nearly all the experts in the United States believed that it was nonsense, but when he made it clear in the following months that he was not to be shaken, they all switched round. In fact, there has never been such a mass conversion since a Chinese general baptised his troops with a hose.

    Today, no one who is involved in the star wars programme shares President Reagan’s view of it—not ​ General Abrahamson, who is in charge of the whole project, not Dr. Yonas, who is the chief scientific adviser to the programme, and not Dr. Keyworth, who is the President’s chief scientific adviser.

    The State Department’s official pamphlet on star wars, published a few months ago, said that the project is designed not to replace nuclear deterrence, but to enhance it. In other words, it is designed to threaten the existence of other nations and human beings more credibly. Its purpose is not to make nuclear weapons obsolete or to give the peoples of the world immunity from nuclear attack; its purpose, as has been welt described in speeches by Dr. Keyworth and in a speech by Dr. Yonas that I heard in Ottawa recently, is to protect America’s land-based missiles, rather than to protect the American people. For that reason, it is bound to accelerate the arms race in both offensive and defensive systems and will lead exactly to the consequence against which President Reagan warned in his speech two and a half years ago. It will also lead to a situation in which, to use the recent words of Mr. Nitze, the

    “growth of defences could support rather than discourage a first strike.”

    That is why the star wars programme has been publicly opposed by the last three American Presidents—by Republican Presidents Ford and Nixon no less than by the Democrat President Carter—and by at least three of the last four American Defence Secretaries—by Republican Secretary Schlesinger no less than by Democrat Secretaries Brown and McNamara. In fact, the SDI programme in the United States is supported only by those who reject arms control in principle, such as Dr. Weinberger and Mr. Perle, and, of course, by those who cynically hope to get a lot of money out of it. As the House knows, star wars is described by the military and industrial community in the United States as pennies from heaven.

    The President is sticking doggedly to his original vision, but he is alone. In spite of his words on the BBC, no one really believes that President Reagan’s successor —it will not be a decision for the present President—will give the Soviet Union the secrets of the star wars programme if it turns out to work.

    After all, only the other day the American Administration forced the British Customs and Excise to take a child’s computer off the shelves of the duty-free shop at Heathrow because it might find its way to the Soviet Union.
    Indeed, both American law and the ABM treaty forbid the United States to give information about ballistic missile defences even to its allies, including the United Kingdom. That fact casts an odd light on the idea of the Secretary of State for Defence that British firms could get great benefits from doing research for the United States into the SDI programme.

    President Reagan told Soviet journalists last week that he would not deploy star wars until both sides had destroyed their offensive weapons, but on the very next day he was forced by his advisers to withdraw that undertaking. He then went to the other extreme and said that the United States would deploy star wars unilaterally if it could not get other world leaders to agree to an international system of defence against nuclear missiles. So much for the undertakings that the President gave to our Prime Minister in December. He now tells us not that he will consult or negotiate about deployment, but that if it proves feasible he will deploy unilaterally unless everybody else in the world agrees with him.

    The European allies had grave misgivings about the star wars programme from the word go. Those misgivings were superbly listed by the Foreign Secretary in the speech to which he referred earlier and for which, I am told—I hope that I am wrong—the Prime Minister later apologised to President Reagan. If that is not true, I hope that we may be told so. The Foreign Secretary does not rise to respond to that challenge.

    The tragedy is that the European allies did not make their position crystal clear in time. On the contrary, the Washington correspondent of The Sunday Times and The Guardian told us from American sources in September that the Prime Minister had used her support for SDI to try to get President Reagan’s support for buying the Ptarmigan project and threatened to withdraw her support for SDI if she did not get the Ptarmigan contract. The House will agree that The Times showed unusual innocence recently in asking why President Reagan delayed until this week publishing the decision, which must have been taken long ago, to buy the French system instead, even though President Mitterrand has openly opposed the star wars programme from the start.

    Of course, the reason for the delay is obvious. The President wanted to be sure that he had our Prime Minister in the bag at the NATO meeting before he announced his decision. He took her for a ride. She gained nothing by sucking up to President Reagan except to explode the myth of a special relationship with the United States. Her only reward was another spillage of rancid bile from the Prince of Darkness, Mr. Richard Perle, who, according to The Sunday Times last week, accused her of following Baldwin and Chamberlain in appeasing the Soviet Union. He did so because she had dared to question Mr. Perle’s propaganda about certain alleged Soviet violations of the ABM treaty.

    I agree with the Foreign Secretary that it is still possible for America’s European allies to exert a decisive influence on American policy in this area, provided that they are united and honest on a clear policy. There is always a power battle in Washington between the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and various parts of the Congress about almost every element of American foreign and defence policy. That power battle can be swung in Europe’s direction provided that Europe makes its views known in time. The best example of that was when united European pressure on the American Administration gave victory to Mr. Shultz over Mr. Weinberger on the interpretation of the ABM treaty on testing. I congratulate the Foreign Secretary on the part that he must have played in mobilising European support for that interpretation.

    I strongly support the Foreign Secretary’s view—I have said so many times—that a collective European approach to the defence and diplomatic problems facing the Alliance is essential if we are to proceed in the direction of peace rather than war. It is important that Europe should constitute an independent pillar within the Alliance. I shall devote my remaining remarks to what Britain and Europe should be pressing the United States for in relation to the arms talks and the forthcoming summit.

    The greatest danger of the arms race lies in the quality of the new weapons being planned rather than in the quantity of the old weapons. By far the best objective in the arms talks would be to seek a freeze on the testing, ​ development and deployment of new nuclear weapons. A nuclear freeze already has overwhelming popular support on both sides of the Atlantic as well as almost unanimous support in the United Nations.

    Of course, a freeze is not without its own difficulties. There is a problem in deciding the point at which one cuts off programmes already under way. I believe that, since the two sides enjoy rough parity, that problem should not be difficult to overcome. Certainly it would be much easier to negotiate a freeze than a reduction in existing weapons when the pattern of the two sides’ deterrence is so different. Moreover, a freeze would be much easier to verify than a reduction in forces because it is easier to tell whether a new weapon is being tested than to know whether a weapon photographed by satellite is within a permitted ceiling.

    The Prime Minister has made a great deal in the House of saying that it is not possible to verify a ban on research. She said that again the other day. That is true in relation to research in brains or in laboratories, but it is possible to verify a ban on the external testing associated with research, especially since public sources tell us that western satellite intelligence photography has a resolving power which enables its possessor positively to identify objects as small as 150 cms. across.

    The United States Defence Department has already published a list of the tests that it plans to carry out as part of its SDI research programme, because it knows that Russia can and will observe them. Surely our objective, which we should press on our European allies to press on the United States, should be to tighten the ABM treaty so as to ban all tests relating to space defence—on both sides. That would kill not only the SDI before its birth but the possibility of a Soviet breakout.

    I agree with the Foreign Secretary that the Russians have indulged in a great deal of activity in space defence in the last 15 years, but none of that activity could come to fruition in a new space defence system if tests were banned now.

    If one seeks a ban on observable tests relating to SDI, one must also ban the development of anti-satellite systems on both sides. I remember Mr. Richard Burt, when he was still working at the State Department last December, saying that the United States would be proposing such a ban. However, the United States has not put forward such a proposal and Mr. Burt is now ambassador in Bonn. One can only guess at the new American policy.

    Surely the United States has a major interest in banning anti-satellite systems now because it claims that the Soviet Union is ahead. Indeed, as the Foreign Secretary said, the Soviet Union is the only country which has a working ASAT system, although I believe it is a primitive one. Moreover, nothing would be more dangerous than for each side to acquire the ability to rob the other of its eyes and ears in a crisis. Dr. Keyworth, the President’s main scientific adviser, pointed out the other day that if America develops an anti-satellite system it will enable it to test its technologies for each of the three layers of space defence. If we do not reach agreement on a ban on anti-satellite activity now it will soon become very difficult to verify because the Americans plan to carry their anti-satellite weapons on F15 aircraft. They will be difficult to detect by what the Russians call “national means”, satellite photography.

    By far the most important single contribution to a freeze would be a comprehensive test ban treaty. No one would deploy new nuclear weapons if they had never been tested in real life. It is only three years since the Prime Minister told us that negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty were going, alas, far too slowly and should be speeded up and completed. I hope that the Minister can assure us that the Government are now pressing for a reconvening of the conference for a CTBT because it would command overwhelming support in the rest of the world. The non-proliferation treaty review conference in Geneva the other day called upon the nuclear powers to start negotiations for a comprehensive test ban in the next six weeks—before the end of the year.

    The only excuse offered for not proceeding to the signature of a comprehensive test ban treaty is the alleged inability of science to detect very small underground tests. However, this week’s issue of Modern Geology contains a long article by the leading British seismologist, Dr. Leggett of Imperial college, in which he demonstrates that there is no chance of the Soviet Union successfully evading detection if it breaks a comprehensive test ban. That chance has been further reduced since that article was written by the fact that in the last few days India, Sweden and four other neutral countries have agreed to make their territories available for monitoring a comprehensive test ban and to man seismological stations in the Soviet Union —which in principle the Soviet Union has already agreed to accept as part of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

    Another contribution which Britain could make, especially since the United States believes that the phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk is intended to control a ballistic missile system, is to take up the Soviet offer to stop the development at Krasnoyarsk in return for stopping work to produce a phased array radar at Fylingdales and at Thule in Danish territory.

    If the American Government are worried about Krasnoyarsk, here is an opportunity to get rid of both. There is no question that if such phased array radars, whether in the Soviet Union, Britain or Greenland, were used as battle management stations for ballistic missile defence, they would be a flagrant violation of the antiballistic missile treaty. I suggest that the Foreign Secretary should immediately approach the United States and say that we insist that the United States should negotiate on the Soviet offer to stop development in Krasnoyarsk in return for stopping development at Fylingdales and Thule, and will refuse to proceed with the development until and unless such negotiations begin.

    The correspondent for The Times in Washington reported last week that diplomats and politicians are asking two questions about President Reagan. Can he cope? Does he know what he wants? The second question is unfair. He knows exactly what he wants from the star wars system, and he described his desires eloquently in his interview with the BBC. The trouble is that nobody believes that what he wants is attainable. He has been deceived by his advisers on star wars as he was deceived by those who told him that there is no word in the Russian language for freedom. That is another remark that he made in his BBC broadcast. Those who share his yearning, as I hope all of us in the House do, to base the security of the human race on something other than mutually assured destruction know that star wars is not the answer. To pursue the star wars mirage means only an accelerating arms race in both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.

    The truth lies elsewhere. We need a freeze on all new nuclear weapons as the basis of our negotiation on the more complex but less urgent task of reducing the number of existing weapons. I agree with what I hope the Foreign Secretary implied, that that task, at least in Europe, could be achieved quite quickly, certainly if the British and French Governments would agree to let their forces be counted in the balance.

    I regret that the Prime Minister, as the Foreign Secretary told us, has refused to talk directly to the Soviet Union about British weapons, but I welcome the fact that she has agreed to let the Foreign Secretary talk to Mr. Shevardnadze about wider aspects of disarmament on a bilateral basis. I am asking the British Government to take a lead in bringing the world back to sanity, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and to offer us a future to which out children can look forward with hope rather than with despair.

  • Denis Healey – 1952 Maiden Speech to the House of Commons

    Below is the text of the maiden speech made by Denis Healey to the House of Commons on 14 May 1952.

    In rising to address the Committee for the first time, I am very conscious of the need for that indulgence which the Committee is accustomed to afford so generously to maiden speakers. I have noticed that long familiarity with this peculiar ritual of the maiden birth has given the Committee the somewhat clinical attitude of a midwife towards a maiden speech. But I can assure the Committee that for the initiate concerned the act of parthenogenesis is quite as painful an experience as any that he is ever likely to endure in his life. And I count myself very fortunate in enduring this agony at a time when the midwife is in a state of twilight sleep induced by an all-night Sitting the night before.

    Although I have chosen to speak on a subject which is bound to be controversial, I hope that I shall not be considered unduly partisan in anything I say, because I agree very much with the right hon. and gallant Member for Kelvin-grove (Lieut.-Colonel Elliot) that opinion on the problem of Germany is divided irrespective of party lines, and I hope I may succeed in steering a course some way between the obvious and the offensive.

    The present policy of the Western world is to prevent a third world war by deterring Soviet aggression. I suggest that this policy will not be possible if the manpower and industrial resources of Germany are lost to the Western side and become available to the Soviet side, because if that happens, the balance of world power would shift to the Soviet side, and a third world war would become inevitable.

    The Western world might lose Germany either through force or through the free choice of the German people themselves. The immediate danger, of course, is that we should lose Germany through force, and it is because of that danger that we of the Western world are committed to build up on the ground in Europe sufficient armed strength to defend Western Germany; that means very heavy burdens on us now, and I fully agree with those hon. Members who have expressed the view that sooner or later the Germans themselves must carry their share of that burden.

    But we can also lose Germany to the Western camp through the free choice of the German people themselves, and we should be very unwise indeed to underestimate that danger when we look at the history of the last 30 years from Rapallo to the German-Soviet Pact of 1939 and watch the activities of the Soviet Union with certain nationalist and right-wing German circles at the present time.

    I do not think that it is sufficiently recognised in this Committee that the destiny of Germany, now that seven years have passed since the defeat of Hitler, is certain to be decided in the last resort by the German people themselves. The victorious Powers are no longer in the position of deciding the destiny of Germany against the wishes of the German people—indeed, Western Germany alone is already, in fact although not in law, the strongest single Power on the continent of Europe—and if and when Germany is united, as in my view is certain and is desirable, Germany will once again be a world Power of the same order as Britain herself.

    The problem we face in the Western world now is not, as once it was, to ensure that Germany will never be powerful again. The time for that has gone, if it ever existed. The problem we now face is how to ensure that a Germany, which is certain to become powerful, works with the Western side by its own free choice and not with the Soviet Union. As I say, it is only the German people themselves who can make that choice.

    No one has realised that better than the Soviet Government because its recent notes, although ostensibly addressed to the Western Powers, were in fact directed to the people of Germany herself. We should be unwise also to underestimate the difficulty of keeping Germany on the Western side. National unity will soon become the over-riding aim of the Western German people, and Germany will go to the side which offers her the best chance of getting national unity on acceptable conditions, and she will leave any side which denies her the chance of unity under conditions which she considers acceptable.

    In the long run, Russia holds all the cards because it is only Russia which can give back to Germany her unity, including not only the Soviet zone but also the provinces lost to Poland. And she would not hesitate to do so if she thought she could get an agreement with Germany.

    Moreover, we have to face the additional difficulty that any agreements we make now with the Western German Government are bound to be provisional. The Germans themselves do not regard the Federal Republic as a permanent affair any more than they regard Bonn as the permanent capital of Germany. Dr. Adenauer has recently stressed this point, greatly to the dismay of the French, that any agreement accepted by Western Germany will have to be negotiated again if and when Germany becomes united, even if unity comes about under the Basic Law, because we cannot bind 70 million people to agreements which were accepted by only a majority of 47 million people.

    On the other hand, the cards which Russia holds are by no means so strong at the present time, because Western Germany is extremely conscious of its weakness and its inability to defend itself. Hatred and distrust of the Soviet Union are the dominating emotions throughout Western Germany, and for that reason the German people would not at this time accept national unity if the price of national unity were the rupture of their lifeline to the West.

    Like the right hon. and gallant Member for Kelvingrove and other hon. Members, I also visited Germany recently and had an opportunity of discussing this question with members of all German parties. I was surprised to find that there was almost unanimity between the Government and the opposition on the fact that a united Germany at this time could not afford to be neutral, nor could Germany accept unity without the guarantee of security.

    The only thing I would suggest, and on which there is disagreement in Germany, is that we should not now commit ourselves to a united Germany having security in the form of a military alliance with the West. One criticism I would make, if it is permitted to a maiden speaker, of the reply to the Soviet note is the reference to the all-German Government being allowed to make “such defensive arrangements as it wishes.” I think that we would be unwise to insist on that, if the phrase means a military alliance. If, on the other hand, it means security against the possibility of a Soviet coup or invasion, we must insist on it, and the Germans would be united in supporting us in insisting on it.

    My conclusion is that, at the present time, German unity will only be acceptable to the German people on conditions that we ourselves would be the first to insist on. Indeed, as the Foreign Secretary has already said, the Western reply to the Soviet note in insisting on these conditions has been welcomed unanimously in Western Germany.

    I am extremely glad that I should be able to make my maiden speech on a day when all the doubts created by Western policy in the last few weeks have been dispersed by the reply to the second Soviet note. There has been a great danger that the Western Powers’ reluctance to enter on a new series of Palais Rose discussions with the Russians will be interpreted in Germany as a reluctance to see Germany united again. I would say that at this moment, above all, we can afford to take the offensive on the question of German unity. We shall gain much and lose nothing by doing so.

    There has been a good deal of discussion in the Committee this afternoon about the dangers in the delay of the carrying out of E.D.C., and there is no doubt that many people are concerned lest the delays inevitably imposed by talks with the Russians on German unity will lose us what is considered to be the last chance of getting an early German defence contribution to E.D.C. Here I come on to ground which may be considered very controversial, but I assure the House I have no intention whatever of being polemic or partisan, and I hope that my contribution will be received as a sincere effort to think the problem out.

    The first point is that if it is really true, as the Foreign Secretary seemed to suggest in his speech, that public opinion is moving so rapidly against E.D.C. that unless we can get the agreement in the bag within the next 12 months we shall lose the chance for ever—if it is a question of now or never—then the agreement will be worthless even if we get it. I apologise if I have misinterpreted the Foreign Secretary’s remarks on that matter.

    The second point is that both the demand for an early German defence contribution and the agreement to treat E.D.C. as the right framework for a German defence contribution—I hope it is not impertinent to remind the Committee of this—were accepted against the will of the British Government of the day and only under very heavy pressure from our Allies.

    The decision taken by N.A.T.O. in 1950 to seek an immediate German defence contribution at a time when almost none of the European peoples wanted it, including the Germans themselves—the only exceptions were the Dutch and the Danes—would never have been taken then had it not been for very strong and insistent—and legitimate—American pressure. The agreement last September to treat the European Defence Community as the right framework for a German contribution would never have been accepted by N.A.T.O. had not our French ally said that they would not accept a German defence contribution in any other framework.

    I hope it is not impertinent to remind the Committee of that fact, because my view is that the present commitment of the Western world to E.D.C. and to an immediate German defence contribution arises out of the panic induced by Korea. It represents a false start in solving the German problem, and we should be prepared to welcome the pause imposed by events in order to get back on the right road.

    On the question of a German contribution, I believe that General Eisenhower was quite right in his immediate and instinctive response to the suggestion when he took up his command, when he said, “I do not want any unwilling soldiers under my command.” It is the case that, for whatever reasons—and for very many varied reasons—at present the majority of the German people, and the overwhelming majority of the Germans of military age, do not want a German defence contribution. Incidentally, the Western Powers have got into appalling difficulties by treating the Contractual Agreement, as the Foreign Secretary said, as a sort of bribe in order to buy unwilling German soldiers. We should have got the agreement through without the slightest difficulty if it had not been tied to the European Defence Community.

    On the other hand—I disagree with some of my hon. Friends on this point—although public opinion in Germany is at present opposed to a defence contribution, public opinion will change very rapidly and very dramatically, possibly within the next 12 months, and once the Germans want to re-arm we shall not be able to stop them even if we want to. In other words, German re-armament in the short run is impossible; in the long run it is inevitable. It is entirely a matter of timing. “Ripeness is all” in the case of the German defence contribution.

    What I suggest we should do is use the time still available to us, before the Germans want to make a defence contribution, in order to consider very seriously and quietly, and not in a panic, what framework will be best suited to contain a German defence contribution. No one can fail to recognise that, although a German defence contribution would bring great gains to the West, it would also carry very great dangers. We must choose a framework which will be strong enough and large enough to attract the Germans and to hold them for good. It is no good trying to force Germany now into a mould which she will crack when she becomes stronger.

    Last September the Western Powers agreed to use E.D.C. as the framework for a German defence contribution only because France would accept no other. However, I suggest that it is becoming quite clear that the French themselves, who were the only people who wanted it in the first place, have now lost faith in E.D.C. as a means of controlling German re-armament.

    E.D.C. can control a German defence contribution only if the non-German components are stronger than the German components. It is already evident that Western Germany alone would be stronger in E.D.C., in fact if not in form, than France, because of France’s great commitments outside Europe in Indo-China, and, indeed, stronger than all the other members of E.D.C. put together. The result is that the French are beginning to realise that E.D.C., which they first saw as an instrument to control Germany, will turn out to be an instrument by which Germany can militarily dominate Western Europe.

    In any case E.D.C. cannot offer a longterm solution to the German problem because, as Dr. Adenauer has said, when Germany is united she will have to renegotiate all the agreements which she has made, whether E.D.C. or otherwise, and it would be very dangerous if we got into a position where the importance of a German defence contribution through E.D.C., once it was set up, became such that we were compelled to oppose German unity for fear of losing that contribution under those conditions.

    There is a French proverb—I shall not try to give it in French—which says, “There is nothing which lasts like the provisional.” That proverb will not be very popular in Germany, and there is a very great danger in creating at this stage vested interests in a provisional solution which cannot possibly last into the future

    The French see only one way out of their dilemma, and that is to get Britain into E.D.C. to balance the power of Germany. But Britain cannot join E.D.C., first, because of its federal structure and secondly, because it has become a cardinal principle of British policy since the war not to accept additional commitments in Europe which might be treated by America as an excuse for reducing American commitments. That principle can be differently expressed as “We should try to avoid accepting new commitments in Europe which we cannot get the Americans to share.”

    The French are quite right in thinking that, if Germany is to be controlled in the future, Britain and America must have a hand in the controlling, but a guarantee from Britain and America to E.D.C. of such a nature as to prevent a German secession would be both impossible to frame and impossible to fulfil. There is only one way by which the French can get what they want, and that is by having Germany re-armed within the only framework in whose integrity Britain and America have a direct and vital interest, and that framework is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

    I see the Foreign Secretary pursing his lips. He is right. That prospect at the moment dismays the French. But surely it is not beyond the resources of the Foreign Secretary’s diplomacy to show the French that, if they really want Britain and America involved in the longterm control of re-armed Germany, they must put Germany into the organisation in maintaining whose integrity Britain and the United States have an absolutely vital and permanent interest.

    I do not suggest that we should now invite the Germans to enter the Atlantic Pact. This is entirely a matter of timing. It will be some time before the Germans themselves want to be re-armed under any circumstances. What I suggest is that we should use that time to strengthen N.A.T.O. so that it is capable of receiving this formidable new recruit. On the other hand, we must have more N.A.T.O. troops in Europe and, in particular, more French troops; and, on the other hand, we must tighten and more closely integrate the structure of N.A.T.O. I personally would not exclude tightening the military structure of N.A.T.O. in S.H.A.P.E. on the technical lines already found practical in E.D.C. That is the only way out of the problem.

    To sum up, the problem of keeping a united Germany in the Western camp and out of the Soviet camp is the most crucial and urgent problem facing the whole of the West for many years ahead. In my opinion, in the panic following Korea, the Western Powers made a false start; but a pause is now imposed by events. It is our duty to make it creative. I am one of those who believe that the ever closer unity of the Atlantic peoples is one of the most fruitful developments of the postwar era. And I am convinced that it offers to us the one real chance of solving the perennial problem of Germany.