The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2014-06-25.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how much was spent on the Unmanned Sea Vehicle-based Mine Countermeasures Hydrographic Programme Sweep Demonstrator project.
Mr Philip Dunne
The Mine Countermeasures Hydrographic Programme’s sweep demonstrator project is in its pre-contract award stage; spending to date has been on technical preparation activities at a cost of approximately £40,000.
The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2014-07-15.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will estimate how much contract overruns in the Aircraft Carrier Alliance have cost the public purse to date.
Mr Philip Dunne
I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him on 8 November 2013, (Official Report, column 399W). The Major Project Report 2013 reported the cost of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers at £6.102 billion (£6.2 Billion less assessment phase costs that do not fall under the remit of the Major Projects Report).
The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2014-06-25.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when the Shallow Water Influence Minesweeping System was purchased; on what vessels it operated from; whether it is still operational; and what the total cost of the system has been.
Mr Philip Dunne
The Shallow Water Influence Minesweeping System was purchased as an urgent operational requirement in financial year 2002-03 to be operated remotely from Mine Countermeasures Vessels in the Gulf for 12 months, at a cost of approximately £3.5 million. It has been non-operational since 2004.
The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2014-07-15.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when Military Aviation Authority Regulatory Article 1210 replaced Ministry of Defence Business Procedure 1201 with regards to air safety.
Mr Philip Dunne
Military Aviation Authority (MAA) Regulatory Instruction 02/11, issued on 28 January 2011, mandated a Risk Management framework to support Aviation Duty Holder decision making and replace existing procedures. This was superseded by Regulatory Article 1210 on 1 August 2011.
The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2014-06-25.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the cost is of the Weapon Handling and Launch System and Submerged Signal Ejector support contract.
Mr Philip Dunne
The Weapon Handling and Launch System support contract, which includes Submerged Signal Ejector support, has an agreed fixed price of £22 million to provide defined technical and logistic support until 31 March 2019. The contract also allows for further tasking of the support contractor by the Ministry of Defence and the purchase of consumable spares when required at an additional cost.
The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2014-07-15.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many additional Merlin helicopters will be upgraded from Mk1 standard to Mk2; and what the total cost of each upgrade will be.
Mr Philip Dunne
The Royal Navy Merlin Mk1 fleet is being modernised through the Merlin Capability Sustainment Programme. A total of 30 Merlin Mk1 helicopters are being modified to address existing and forecast avionic obsolescence and will then be known as the Merlin Mk2. The approved cost of the Demonstration and Manufacture phases of the programme is £805 million.
The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2014-06-25.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether the Weapon Handling and Launch support contract includes an obligation on the contractor to provide waterfront support in the loading and unloading of (a) conventional and (b) nuclear weapons in (i) the UK and (ii) abroad.
Mr Philip Dunne
The Weapon Handling and Launch System (WHLS) support contract provides technical and logistic support for all WHLS equipment on Royal Navy submarines and at Royal Navy training establishments, including Weapon Embarkation Equipment (WEE). The actual use of WEE to load and unload conventional weapons in the UK and abroad is covered by separate commercial arrangements. The WHLS support contract is not used for any aspect of nuclear weapons.
The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2014-06-26.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what quantitative criteria have been used to set to remote the risk probability of a collision involving a Tornado aircraft.
Mr Philip Dunne
Military Aviation Authority Regulatory Article 1210 defines categories for quantifying the likelihood of a risk as follows:
“Likelihood is assessed with respect to the likelihood of the assessed consequence of a hazard. This is based on the likelihood of a single accident resulting in harm for a particular fleet. The appropriate category listed below must be used:
a. Frequent: Likely to occur at least several times a year.
b. Occasional: Likely to occur one or more times per year.
c. Remote: Likely to occur one or more times in 10 years.
d. Improbable: Unlikely to occur in 10 years.”
A panel of suitably qualified and experienced persons from the Tornado Force calculated the risk likelihood for the Tornado risk register based on this definition.
The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2014-06-26.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, which contracts with his Department worth over £50 million are behind schedule owing to the failure of suppliers to deliver to an agreed schedule; and in the case of each such contract, who the suppliers were.
Mr Philip Dunne
The Ministry of Defence currently has around 400 open contracts with a total value of more than £50 million. Current performance related information on each contract is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2014-06-26.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how much of the £1.2 billion underspend in his Department’s equipment budget in 2012-13 arose as a result of programme slippage; what programmes were behind schedule; and for what reason those programmes were behind schedule.
Mr Philip Dunne
Our analysis of the £1.2 billion underspend in 2012-13 in our equipment programme shows that it has been caused by a combination of factors, including better than expected outcomes from contract negotiations; budget being allocated for risks that did not materialise; and the impact of programme slippage against plans.
A detailed analysis of programme slippage by programme is not currently available, but further work to improve our detailed understanding of variations against planned spending patterns and the implications for project costs in future years is nearing completion.
Due to our improved financial discipline the Treasury have allowed us to carry over in-year underspends into our future year budgets. The last National Audit Office Major Projects Report showed an 88% reduction in overall project delays.
We now have the assurance of a stable and well managed budget and confidence that defence programmes are affordable and deliverable.