Tag: Angus Robertson

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2014-06-26.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how much of the £1.2 billion underspend in his Department’s equipment budget in 2012-13 arose as a result of programme slippage; what programmes were behind schedule; and for what reason those programmes were behind schedule.

Mr Philip Dunne

Our analysis of the £1.2 billion underspend in 2012-13 in our equipment programme shows that it has been caused by a combination of factors, including better than expected outcomes from contract negotiations; budget being allocated for risks that did not materialise; and the impact of programme slippage against plans.

A detailed analysis of programme slippage by programme is not currently available, but further work to improve our detailed understanding of variations against planned spending patterns and the implications for project costs in future years is nearing completion.

Due to our improved financial discipline the Treasury have allowed us to carry over in-year underspends into our future year budgets. The last National Audit Office Major Projects Report showed an 88% reduction in overall project delays.

We now have the assurance of a stable and well managed budget and confidence that defence programmes are affordable and deliverable.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2014-06-26.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the £72.3 billion allocated in the Defence and Equipment Plan 2013 supporting existing in-service equipment, how much of that allocation is devoted to (a) nuclear propulsion and (b) nuclear weapons.

Mr Philip Dunne

Of the £72.3 billion referred to in the 2013 Equipment Plan we plan to allocate to the support of in-service equipment over the next decade, £1.6 billion is for nuclear propulsion and £13.0 billion for maintaining the Trident Strategic Weapons System, including costs associated with the nuclear warhead.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2014-06-26.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what Russian Navy ships HMS Severn intercepted in the English Channel on 25 June 2014; and whether HMS Severn was assigned to the Fleet Ready Escort role at that time.

Mr Mark Francois

Two Russian Federation Navy ships transited the English Channel on 25 June 2014. These were the Ropucha Class Landing Ships Olengorsky Gornyak and Georgiy Pobedonosets.

As the hon. Member will be aware from my letter to him of 27 January 2014 (Official Report, columns 414-415W), there are usually a number of Royal Navy units available in UK waters at any one time and, if it is appropriate, one of those units could be reprioritised to undertake a required task. In this case, HMS Severn was better placed to respond, and it made the most operational sense to utilise her. At the same time the Fleet Ready Escort remained available at high readiness.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2015-01-14.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what discussions he has had with the Chief of the Air Staff on transferring responsibility for the risk of Typhoon mid air collision to that role.

Mr Mark Francois

In line with Military Aviation Authority (MAA) Regulatory Articles, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) briefed the Secretary of State in October 2014 that the Typhoon mid-air collision risk with commercial air transport aircraft had been elevated to CAS since June 2014.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2015-01-14.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to paragraph 7 of Director General, Military Aviation Authority, Air Safety Annual Report, August 2013-August 2014, published in January 2015, what assessment he has made of the implications of the conclusions of that report on his policy on mitigating mid-air collisions; and if he will require a full Airborne Collision Avoidance System to be fitted in all operational Typhoon aircraft.

Mr Mark Francois

Mid-air collision remains the top air safety risk. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has made considerable progress in reducing the risk of Mid-Air Collision, as the report highlights. Operating Duty Holders are well focused on the risk and are working hard to develop and evolve further mitigations.

Avoidance of collision in the air requires a multi-layered approach, including effective de-confliction planning; supervision of flying and equipment fitted to aircraft to aid situational awareness; employment of suitable radar services; and ultimately an effective lookout from the aircraft to "see and avoid" each other. A wide range of technical and non-technical mitigations are used to reduce the risk to a tolerable level which is as low as reasonably practicable. The risk analysis and associated mitigations are regularly reviewed and adjusted where required in accordance with Military Aviation Authority regulations. The procurement of a collision warning system for UK Typhoon is ongoing with a number of options being assessed using the extant MOD procurement process.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2015-01-14.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, which posts have held responsibility and for how long for the risk of mid-air collisions on each fast jet type in each of the last five years; and what the reason was for the change of ownership in each case.

Mr Mark Francois

The Operating Duty Holder, Air Officer Commanding No 1 Group has and continues to own all frontline fast jet mid-air collision risk except in the following two circumstances:

The mid-air collision risk for Tornado GR4 was held by the RAF’s Senior Duty Holder, Chief of the Air Staff in 2011, and then further elevated to the Secretary of State in June 2011. On commencement of the current Tornado Collision Warning System programme later that same month the risk was transferred back to Air Officer Commanding No 1 Group due to the programme mitigating the risk.

The Typhoon mid-air collision risk with commercial air transport was elevated to the Chief of the Air Staff in June 2014 following the conclusion of further risk analysis work conducted by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL). This analysis concluded that the risk level was unchanged but highlighted the potential for societal concern in the event of a collision.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2015-01-14.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when responsibility for the risk of Typhoon mid-air collision was passed from Air Officer Commanding No 1 Group to the Chief of the Air Staff; and for what reason that change was made.

Mr Mark Francois

The Typhoon mid-air collision risk with commercial air transport was elevated to the Chief of the Air Staff in June 2014 following the conclusion of further risk analysis work conducted by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL). This analysis concluded that the risk level was unchanged but highlighted the potential for societal concern in the event of a collision.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2014-06-25.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many fires have occurred onboard each variant of Joint Strike Fighter aircraft; and what the cause was of each fire.

Mr Philip Dunne

All aircraft variants of F-35 are currently within the Development Test phase of the overall programme. The aim of the Development Test phase is to reveal issues through testing so that solutions can be developed in order to deliver a capable aircraft to the Armed Forces.

There have been no fires on-board either the F-35B (Short Take Off & Vertical Landing Variant) or the F-35C (Carrier Variant).

There have been four fires on-board the F-35A (Conventional Take Off & Landing Variant) that the UK are aware of:

The first fire was within the Integrated Power Pack (IPP) and was due to an internal valve failure. Ground personnel extinguished the fire which resulted in minor aircraft damage. This incident lead to a minor design change.

The second fire was as a result of a hydraulic fluid leak onto a brake assembly following landing. Ground personnel extinguished the fire which resulted in minor aircraft damage.

The third fire was due to a hot brake condition after landing which was extinguished by ground personnel and resulted in a replacement of the wheel/tyre assembly.

Both brake fires remain under investigation with no immediate design change being considered as necessary.

The most recent fire occurred on 23 June 2014 at Eglin Air Force Base during a takeoff roll. The root cause of the incident is currently being investigated.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Angus Robertson on 2015-02-10.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many personnel are taking part in the Seedcorn initiative; what the location is of each such member of personnel; with what equipment those personnel are training; and what estimate he has made of the cost to the public purse of the Seedcorn initiative in each of the next two years.

Mr Mark Francois

I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 11 February 2015 to Question 223239, giving the number of personnel, their location, and type of equipment those personnel are training on, as part of the Seedcorn initiative.

The cost of the Seedcorn initiative in financial year 2015-16 is £2.5 million. Funding beyond that date is yet to be determined.