Category: Trade

  • Angus MacNeil – 2022 Statement on Anne-Marie Trevelyan Not Turning Up to Trade Committee Session

    Angus MacNeil – 2022 Statement on Anne-Marie Trevelyan Not Turning Up to Trade Committee Session

    The statement made by Angus Brendan MacNeil, the Chair of the International Trade Committee, on 29 June 2022.

    Welcome to the International Trade Committee’s session on Australia. We had called the Secretary of State, Anne-Marie Trevelyan, but we are told that she will not be coming this morning, to the unanimous disappointment of all members of the Committee. We feel that this shows disrespect to the Committee, and we are very disappointed. We also feel that the CRaG report should be delayed to allow proper time for scrutiny. We think, unanimously, that this sets a very worrying precedent for the way the Government are dealing with scrutiny of their free trade agreements.

  • NFU, Tate & Lyle, Wine and Spirit Trade – 2022 Evidence to International Trade Committee on UK/Australia Trade Deal

    NFU, Tate & Lyle, Wine and Spirit Trade – 2022 Evidence to International Trade Committee on UK/Australia Trade Deal

    The evidence given by Miles Beale, Chief Executive, Wine and Spirit Trade Association, Robert Hodgkins, Shepherd, Gerald Mason, Senior Vice President, Tate & Lyle Sugars, James Russell, Senior Vice President, British Veterinary Association, and Nick von Westenholz, Director of Trade and Business Strategy, National Farmers Union, to the International Trade Committee of the House of Commons on 26 April 2022.

    Members present:

    Angus Brendan MacNeil (Chair); Mark Garnier; Paul Girvan; Sir Mark Hendrick; Anthony Mangnall; Martin Vickers; Mick Whitley; Mike Wood.

    Questions 196-249

    Witnesses:

    Miles Beale, Chief Executive, Wine and Spirit Trade Association, Robert Hodgkins, Shepherd, Gerald Mason, Senior Vice President, Tate & Lyle Sugars, James Russell, Senior Vice President, British Veterinary Association, and Nick von Westenholz, Director of Trade and Business Strategy, National Farmers Union.

    Examination of witnesses

    Witnesses: Miles Beale, Robert Hodgkins, Gerald Mason, James Russell and Nick von Westenholz.

    Q196 Chair: Order. Welcome to the second panel of the UK trade negotiations with Australia inquiry. We have a big panel this time. I issue a memo to colleagues to pick up the pace: be brief and quick if you can. I know that it is a big ask and a lot of you have things you need to say. I ask you all to introduce yourselves—starting on my left—with name, rank and serial number.

    Robert Hodgkins: I am Rob Hodgkins. I am just a sheep farmer, I’m afraid, in Hertfordshire. We farm 2,500 New Zealand Romneys, 16,000 acres of arable and have a sheep milking enterprise, as well.

    Chair: I look at you with great envy.

    Nick von Westenholz: I am Nick von Westenholz. I am the director of trade and business strategy at the NFU.

    Gerald Mason: I am Gerald Mason from Tate & Lyle Sugars. We refine cane sugar and have been doing so for just over 140 years, in two factories in east London.

    Chair: I visited there one time, a number of moons ago.

    Miles Beale: Good morning. I am Miles Beale; I am chief executive of the Wine and Spirit Trade Association, which does what it says on the tin, I think.

    Chair: An excellent line of work.

    James Russell: I am James Russell, and I am senior vice president of the British Veterinary Association—serial number 6314811.

    Q197 Chair: That is name, rank and serial number done. That is the first time I have had that response—very good. I had asked for it.

    I look to you, Robert, with great envy, as I have 32 or 33 sheep myself. The numbers you gave are not quite as bad as the Australians or New Zealanders, who tell me they have, “26”—pause—”thousand sheep”. That puts things in perspective.

    The agreement includes provisions to liberalise market access for Australian sheepmeat producers. What do you expect the impact of those will be on the UK sheepmeat sector? I should be clear and declare that my interest is small, but it is there—it is not as large as yours.

    Robert Hodgkins: Absolutely. At present, they do not import very much, and I expect that to continue in the short to medium term. The biggest threat to us as UK sheep producers is that we cannot produce as cheaply as they are able to. Nick will have the figures to hand, but when I was last looking through, I think it was quoted that, per hundred kilos of meat, the Australian figure was about $180, the UK figure was $450—those are New Zealand dollars.

    We did some back-of-the-napkin maths yesterday. We have an imported New Zealand sheep base, and I have a kiwi farm manager and Scottish shepherds—we like to have the best—but even so we were down at $250. I’d like to think we are a very efficient operator. We constantly rank in the bottom 5% on the Tesco cost of production schemas. My argument would be that if I cannot compete, not many other people will be able to.

    Q198 Chair: What weight of sheep of this?

    Robert Hodgkins: We have New Zealand Romneys, which we imported.

    Chair: That is $180 per—

    Robert Hodgkins: Sorry; $180 per 100 kilos of lamb meat produced was the Australian cost of production figures.

    Q199 Chair: Do you have any concerns about food security in the future? Although we mentioned food security in the Committee a year ago, it was glazed over very quickly. However, with the advent of the Ukraine war, people are more aware of supply chains. We have seen news in the last 24 hours that there will be 20% less grain sown in Ukraine this year.

    Robert Hodgkins: Absolutely. You only have to look at the current price of things. We are now selling wheat for £270 per tonne; a year ago, before the war in Ukraine, it would have probably been £150 or maybe £160. We simply cannot sell enough of it. We have real issues that are becoming apparent in the new global paradigm that were not here a year ago, or were not considered relevant or fashionable.

    Q200 Chair: Do you feel that this agreement gives Australia an emergency market? If any shocks come their way, they can use that emergency market for a while to dump, or to sell—”dump” is a pejorative word that I should not use—into the UK market. That could then destroy a sector—the sheep sector in this case—and then they could sell somewhere else.

    Robert Hodgkins: Yes, absolutely. That was what I was trying to allude to. We do not have any short-term issues at the minute. Australia export massively to Indonesia, China and the middle east—that is not a problem. However, if they do start having an argument with China and they suddenly have millions of tonnes of sheepmeat to drop off somewhere, we are probably the target. If there is a true free trade agreement, with no limits at all, we are probably quite a natural choice. As I said before when I was trying to put some figures around it, we would not be able to compete at all.

    Q201 Chair: My final point relates to the point you have just raised. Australia have several markets, and they have a thing called carcase efficiency, which I think the British Poultry Council also uses within Europe and the UK. There is a preference for different types of meat cut. Is part of Australia’s efficiency—$180 per 100 kg, versus $450 per 100 kg—accessing different markets about sending a cut to certain places?

    Robert Hodgkins: Absolutely, it would be. Part of it is, to be honest, that we operate a slightly different system. If I have a lamb die in a field, I have to go and pick it up. In Australia, you don’t have to. Seemingly, that is not a big thing, but on our size of operation, on an outside lambing system, we typically have about 10% to 15% lamb losses, so I am looking at having 300 dead lambs across Hertfordshire. You put that up against 25 million lambs, and that is 2.5 million lamb carcases across the UK, which I am sure from a public moral point of view would definitely not be acceptable. Those are the things that we are fighting with one hand tied behind our back.

    Chair: Thank you. I am sitting on 4% lamb losses, I have just realised.

    Q202 Mick Whitley: This is to Nick and Rob. The Secretary of State said that the agreement offers British farmers three levels of protection—namely, tariff rate quotas, general bilateral safeguards and product-specific bilateral safeguards. How adequate are those protections?

    Nick von Westenholz: They are clearly better than nothing. The intention of the way they are structured is to allow time for UK farming to adapt to the new trading arrangements. As you just heard from Rob, there is a question mark over whether, in any period of time, it is possible to adapt when there are such significant cost of production differences. Clearly, those three small “s” safeguards are designed at least to allow some time to do so.

    The first that you mentioned—the tariff rate quotas—are in some products very large. In beef, the first year is 35,000 tonnes. We think that, even in year 1—particularly if Australia were to export high-value cuts, so would need to fill boats with smaller volumes—well below 35,000 tonnes could start having an impact on the UK beef sector. They are big, and of course they disappear after a period of time. The longest quotas are for beef and sheep, and after 10 years they go.

    Then just for those two products, we have the second safeguards—the product-specific safeguards. At that point, those are getting pretty large. Those safeguards kick in for lamb at 75,000 tonnes, and at a higher tonnage for beef. You are talking really big volumes at that point. It is worth saying that we don’t know the degree to which the Australians will utilise the trade deal to increase volumes. It is an unknown, but if they were to, those are significant volumes before any tariff would be applicable, so they would be likely to seriously cause downward pressure on the UK market before you could reimpose tariffs through either the TRQ mechanisms or the product-specific safeguards.

    The final element is the bilateral safeguards, which are applicable to anything. They last for a further five years after tariffs are liberalised. For example, on something that is liberalised on day 1, you can use those for five years and then they go. The point is that after 15 years there is no safeguard available for any products. After 15 years, which may seem like a long time but in trade policy is quite a short time, there are not any safeguards. None of those three things will be in play under this FTA. You can use certain safeguards under the WTO agreement.

    It is also worth saying, on the bilateral safeguards—the third lot—that you need to evidence serious harm or the threat of serious harm to be able to use them. That, in our analysis, is a pretty tricky test, not least because you have to demonstrate that that harm is specific to Australia. Given that we are about to do a trade deal with New Zealand as well—or we have signed one and that is to be ratified—the impact on, for example, beef and lamb in the UK is likely to come about because of the cumulative effects of a number of trade deals that we are currently doing. If that is the case, it is quite difficult to see how you could use those bilateral safeguards, because they are country-specific. The short answer is that they aren’t totally meaningless, but we don’t think any of the three safeguard mechanisms are particularly strong.

    Chair: Okay, thank you. Anthony Mangnall has a 10-second question with a 15-second answer.

    Q203 Anthony Mangnall: Very briefly, one of the defences about the uplift in the tariff rate quota over the 15 years is that Australia won’t look to the UK in a sizeable way when, on their doorstep, they have the fastest growing region in the world. Is that a good defence or a red herring?

    Nick von Westenholz: Nobody knows. If we did, that would be great—you could speculate on the markets—but nobody knows the extent to which Australia are going to look to fill their quotas. They seem to me to be so big that it seems unlikely that Australia would fill those quotas.

    Q204 Anthony Mangnall: What does your analysis say about the expected impact cost of shipping or transporting that product over to the UK, and what impact does that have on your farm in those circumstances?

    Nick von Westenholz: That will clearly be a factor. New Zealand already ship considerable volumes of sheepmeat to the UK and EU, so clearly, if the price is right, shipping costs won’t be a problem. But it clearly will depend on the movement of global prices.

    Q205 Martin Vickers: This question is for Nick and Rob. What will be the main economic opportunities for UK farmers within this agreement? Rob?

    Robert Hodgkins: As a primary producer, we are fairly limited, to be honest. They produce so much cattle—beef—and sheep that we are not really going to be exporting over there, not sensibly. We can’t compete with their cost of production, and we would have to try to send it the wrong way around the world compared with where all the shipping containers are heading currently—from China to here. So, possibly processed foods, but nothing, really, that is going to impact farmers per se—

    Nick von Westenholz: I think that’s right. The other thing worth noting is that Australia is already largely liberalised, so under this FTA, there isn’t, for many products, any movement in tariffs. If we are not already selling beef and sheepmeat into Australia where it’s already zero per cent. tariff, this FTA isn’t going to change that.

    What I will say quickly is that the NFU are launching our export campaign tomorrow. You have all been invited to that; I hope some of you will be able to turn up. We are setting out a whole load of building blocks that we need in order to improve our export performance in agrifood across the world and export more. Some of the key elements of that will be around identifying target markets, where you need key criteria. For example, you would like countries to be net importers of food—certainly net importers of the sort of food that the UK is good at producing. You want countries who are not necessarily themselves producing those sorts of foods and who have a high degree of favourability towards British branding, etc.

    Essentially, it’s highly unlikely that Australia or, indeed, New Zealand tick any boxes that fulfil those criteria. There are export opportunities for UK farmers in the future, but countries that have relatively small populations, that are on the other side of the world, and that are very, very effective and efficient at producing the sort of food we produce and are already liberalised, are not really going to be presenting opportunities.

    Q206 Martin Vickers: But in the medium to long term, with successful marketing and so on, there are opportunities, even though they may be limited.

    Nick von Westenholz: Yes. Rob is right—maybe in some processed foods, some manufactured goods. There may be some opportunities in, for example, dairy. There are tariffs into Australia on cheese—we produce delicious cheese, obviously. Those tariffs will come down, and there may be producers out there who can capitalise on those opportunities and start selling a little bit more into the Australian market. I absolutely wouldn’t say there’s zilch. There are some opportunities, but they are modest. They are not going to be the sorts of opportunities that we are really hoping for, which can benefit farming as a whole in the UK.

    Q207 Chair: Just before we move to Anthony Mangnall, let me ask this. It was quite well known, in the early parts of this agreement and these negotiations, that the farming, sheep and NFU sector had concerns about this agreement. Do you still have concerns, and would you go as far as to say that it would be a lot easier and better for your lives if you didn’t have this agreement at all?

    Nick von Westenholz: The Government’s own impact assessment suggests there will be a negative impact on primary producers and the semi-processed sector, and that there will be a reduction in output. As it sits, this deal discretely, on its own terms, does not contain many benefits for UK producers, but it contains some serious risks. More broadly, there are legitimate arguments about how this paves the way for CPTPP, for example, where there might be more opportunities. Clearly, we are just looking at it from a farming point of view. There may be wider benefits for the UK economy, but as the NFU has clearly said, we do not see very much in this deal at all to benefit UK farmers. I do not think that is controversial.

    Q208 Chair: From a farming point of view, is it thumbs up or thumbs down?

    Nick von Westenholz: We would say thumbs down. We do not see where the huge benefits in this deal for farming, which some have suggested there are, lie.

    Chair: Thank you for that clarification. I am just checking up on your position now versus your position earlier.

    Q209 Anthony Mangnall: On that, the NFU wrote a positively emphatic report about UK membership of the GCC and the opportunity for farmers, but if we can’t scale up—we have just been hearing about the potential for us to scale up in a significant and meaningful way to increase our exports—where is the benefit of any of our trade deals for any farming group in the UK?

    Nick von Westenholz: Over time, we may be able to scale up. It does not have to be around volume. This can be around finding high value markets for our goods, particularly with the direction of travel here being around sustainability and high welfare and so on. Those are the sorts of things we excel at. What we want to do, like any business sector, is to increase our market opportunities and penetration. We need to do better on exports, and that will focus on countries such as those in the GCC.

    Q210 Anthony Mangnall: I think the Government’s impact report on the Australia trade agreement was produced before we were in the situation that we are in with Ukraine and our move towards food security. Does that change your analysis in any way?

    Nick von Westenholz: It may do. I was referring to the Government’s own analysis. I think it would be good. We have encouraged the Government to do a more serious deep dive on food security issues. In the current environment, a lot has obviously changed, and a lot could change again. If the conflict in Ukraine is ended, we will see another significant change on some of those issues. It is difficult to model on the basis of a very volatile geopolitical situation, but, clearly, what has happened in the last couple of months will have had some impact on global agri-food trade flows.

    Q211 Anthony Mangnall: It might be helpful if ELMs included something along the lines of public money for public good being farmers actually producing food.

    Nick von Westenholz: We have said that for a long time.

    Chair: I am starting to get worried about the time.

    Q212 Anthony Mangnall: James, the agreement that has been signed has got chapters on SPS, animal welfare and antimicrobial resistance. How effective are they and will they improve food production standards in relation to animals?

    James Russell: We are pleased to see an FTA that contains a chapter on animal welfare and AMR, and that includes a recognition of animals as sentient, which is something that we have called for—for it to be put in place in a very ambitious way—in any of these discussions that the BVA have had input into. That is a really welcome point. It is worth noting that it is the first time that Australia has committed to that, but I think the aspiration of that chapter is somewhat limited. That would be especially true given the amount of leverage that the UK has already given away in terms of tariff-free market access.

    On AMR, there are some welcome points about co-operation on welfare and antimicrobial resistance. There is also a welcome comment that there is a non-regression commitment on animal welfare standards, but we would welcome that more if we had confidence in the starting point in Australia. I am very happy to expand later on some of the concerns that we have and to pick up on some of the points that Professor Bartels made earlier.

    On that, we have the Animal Welfare Act that covers all animal keeping across the UK. There is no equivalent in Australia. There is no national strategy for animal welfare in Australia. There are moves towards that, but, as we understand it, those moves are quite slow, and therefore we just cannot see how we can have confidence in the implementation of standards and the continual improvement of those standards. We recognise as well that where those standards are being drawn up in regionalised ways, there is a comment—I put it no more strongly than that—that those standards may have been very heavily influenced by industry, perhaps, rather than by a direct animal health and welfare perspective.

    Q213 Anthony Mangnall: Are you talking to your opposite numbers in Australia about this? How soon would you want to see that body set up, and how quickly is it likely that you will see that body set up? Does the fact that this is not included in the dispute settlement chapter mean that this is just tinsel and virtue signalling?

    James Russell: Let me take those in order. We have spoken with the Australian Veterinary Association as well. Like us, they are not a regulator. They can only advise and comment, and, certainly, they have been very vocal around commenting. To that other point, there are genuine moves towards improving health and welfare standards and towards improving their consistency, but, I do not have, I am afraid, any kind of knowledge base on which to say that it will be done by then, and also on what the standards will be at that point. We just do not have that confidence at the moment.

    I think we can compare that with where we are at with New Zealand. We are building there on a pre-existing New Zealand-EU FTA, which does go further than this Australian deal, and it does have a much fuller statement on animal health and welfare in that chapter. There is a real commitment in there to mutually work together to broaden and develop the OIE animal welfare standards. That is what we feel is not present when we then look at the Australian deal.

    Chair: Thank you. We have a brief question from Sir Mark Hendrick.

    Q214 Sir Mark Hendrick: This is to Mr Russell. Professor Bartels earlier made reference to animals being given painkillers and to the fact that high percentages of animals have this sort of treatment to try to reduce pain and increase animal welfare. I noticed that, in the background, you were shaking your head quite vigorously at some of the figures being given by Professor Bartels. Can you touch on how you feel about that situation?

    James Russell: Absolutely. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on that. It is really important to get it on the record that we are absolutely confident that the TAC has done a good-faith assessment, but what we recognise—we recognised this in our written evidence to you—is that they have done that within very narrow legal terms of reference. I do not believe that they have answered the question of whether this FTA will have a positive or negative effect on animal welfare. What they have answered, as Professor Bartels has alluded to, is this: does anything in this document limit the legal space for the Government to respond to animal health and welfare challenges? The answers to those have perhaps become a little bit conflated. There is perhaps a feeling among the broader public that the former question has been answered rather than the latter.

    The reason I was shaking my head is that there is probably some disagreement around those figures. Again, I am not going to call into question the figures that Professor Bartels was quoting, but let us look at figures from the Australian Wool Exchange. We are looking just at those merino animals that have undergone mulesing, and there has been a voluntary opportunity since 2008 to notify at the point of sale whether mulesing has occurred and whether pain relief was used in the animals from which that wool was harvested.

    In July 2021, the national percentage of bales with a declared mulesing status was 74%, and, of that, the percentage that declared “non-mulesed” or “ceased mulesing” was 15% and 4% respectively. The percentage that claimed that analgesia was used was 41%. If we broaden it out and look at the whole piece, perhaps we can see where Professor Bartels’s figures come from, but if we just look at that wool sector, which Professor Bartels said that we do not need to worry about, because that is something that we are not producing here and therefore it cannot be factored into this free trade agreement, we are talking about a maximum of 41% of these animals that are mulesed having any pain relief at all. Let us just be realistic about what that might mean. That might mean a shot of local anaesthetic at the point where someone cuts the skin off the back of your legs.

    Q215 Mark Garnier: Thank you for that. Sir Mark was crashing around in the exact question that I wanted to ask, but I might move it on to Nick. The TAC seemed to suggest that you have been crying wolf over this idea that Australian lamb is produced at a lower standard. How would you respond to that?

    Nick von Westenholz: I would say we have not. If you look at the evidence that we have supplied to you, the main point we have made is around the economic impact of the market liberalisation and the points that Rob was alluding to in our ability to compete on cost of production. Our primary concerns are about the economic impact on UK farming, particularly the beef and sheep sector. Certainly, there is nothing in the TAC report because it does not cover those issues. It is not looking at the economic issues. The concerns we have raised primarily about this deal are totally separate to the issues the TAC has reported to.

    There are issues we have raised around differences in standards. First, it has primarily been on the basis of a principle. Where there are differences in standards, is there anything in this deal that allows the UK Government to exercise any additional import controls, for example, compared with what they can already do under their WTO obligations? The TAC very clearly set out that, by and large, the answer was no. If they are already able to do so, they can continue to do so. If they already find it difficult to exercise those WTO obligations, there is very little in this deal that allows them to go above and beyond. It is a very simple deal, in that sense. On differences in standards, the point was raised, for example, about pesticides. At the moment, if Australian farmers use certain pesticides that are banned in the UK and there are no residues or the residues are minimal on imports, they can come in. There is nothing that the UK at the moment can do to prevent imports of food that are grown using pesticides that are banned in the UK.

    The question then arises about whether that would be changed by the FTA. No, the FTA does not change that at all. The same would be true, for example, if the UK were to lift the ban on hormone beef; there would be nothing in the FTA that allowed the UK to specifically ban hormone beef from Australia. Professor Bartels has set out why that might be a reasonable approach. It is just a fact. The deal does not do anything.

    The third point is that we did look, as Professor Bartels spelled out and as did Mr Russell just now, at those issues where it relates to specific trade with the UK. For example, if you take an issue such as live animal exports, which is due to be outlawed here in the UK, it is very much a part of Australian farming, although I should say there is a strong debate there as well about whether to continue with live animal exports. However, at the moment, it is considered to be a very important part of the Australian cattle industry. We do not, obviously, import any live animals for slaughter from Australia, so even though there may be a competitive issue there, that was not something that fell within the TAC’s focus.

    It is worth saying that the TAC’s focus was very specific and narrow. On the good side, it found that there is nothing to prevent the UK regulating around animal welfare and the environment as it wishes. Equally, where there are differences in standards, it does not provide anything over and above what the UK is already either able to do or not able to do.

    Q216 Mark Garnier: Rob, you have 2,500 sheep. You talked about the difference of cost. I think it was $180 per 100 kg for Australia, and $430—

    Nick von Westenholz: $450.

    Robert Hodgkins: It is $450, I think, for a UK lowland farmer.

    Q217 Mark Garnier: How much of that difference can you attribute to different standards?

    Robert Hodgkins: Quite a percentage. We farm, as UK farmers, under a certain amount of social licence. To give you an example, one of our fields, where we outside lamb, is a site called Youngsbury. I counted, and on a bank holiday weekend, we have 150 people walk through that field every day.

    Q218 Mark Garnier: Is that a good thing or a bad thing?

    Robert Hodgkins: It is a very good thing. I have spent some time on Australian farms. On my friend Mark’s farm, he probably had 150 people go through his front door a year.

    Mark Garnier: A popular sheep station, by the sound of it.

    Robert Hodgkins: They are able to farm in a way that is not necessarily under the same amount of public scrutiny. Not only do we have to comply legislatively; as a social conscience, we have to be seen to be doing the right things. I talked earlier about picking up sheep carcases. If I had 300 sheep carcases littered around my fields, I would be phoning the RSPCA every week.

    Q219 Mark Garnier: There are some very significant economic differences. The cost of land in Australia is so much cheaper than it is here, although I know it is less productive. Similarly, if they were to pick up all the dead lambs, tragic though it is, there is an awful lot of space—you would need a helicopter to go and pick them all up.

    Robert Hodgkins: Absolutely. Because we have to check sheep every day, I have to have a shepherd. Our sheep units per shepherd would be much lower, I think. In New Zealand, they can typically operate on 3,000 to 4,000 sheep to one shepherd. At the moment, we operate on 1,000 to 1,200. That is very good, but you still need to have a Hilux and a house. Go to Hertfordshire and try to buy a house where you can have a pick-up truck and sheepdogs. There is a level of cost that we just cannot compete with.

    Q220 Mark Garnier: To take the example of shepherds, we require a shepherd per 1,000 sheep, and they can get away with a shepherd per 3,000 sheep.

    Robert Hodgkins: Absolutely.

    Q221 Mark Garnier: It is because of our regulation. Is that right?

    Robert Hodgkins: Yes. By law, we have to check sheep every day. We have to go through and look at every sheep every day from an animal welfare point of view, and that requires trucks, diesel and so forth.

    Mark Garnier: James, do you want to come in?

    James Russell: Yes. I am jumping the gun on answering your question, but I will pick up on a couple of bits of it. I will pick up on the bit around what this FTA gives us in terms of prohibiting imports from Australia. Our understanding is that, potentially, it enhances our right to say that we do not want this procedure to be carried out on goods that then come into this country. We would want to be pushing the Government to say that that has to come into play in terms of the next steps of discussions.

    If I may, I will pick up on the accusation of crying wolf. I really do not think that we have been, and I do not think that the report suggests we have. We probably started out asking slightly different questions. We recognise that there is fantastic veterinary involvement within the membership of Professor Bartels’s group, and we really appreciate the attention that has been given to the serious health and welfare concerns that exist in Australia, but I am afraid that I would point again to the level of consultation that has gone on between the TAC and the veterinary community. We were given the opportunity to put in two sides of size 12 Times New Roman—incidentally, as a dyslexic, it is impossible to read—and that is the limit of the communication that we have had.

    Q222 Mark Garnier: On exactly that point, this is the first time you have done this. Are you confident that this is a learning process in terms of the scrutiny of all this stuff? I think this is the first TAC report that has been produced. You are clearly not happy with the process, given the amount you have been able to put into it. Do you get the sense that the TAC will look at the next one in a slightly different way as things develop? Do you think it will evolve?

    James Russell: I sat and listened to Professor Bartels’s evidence earlier, and the thing that I heard was that the TAC is comfortable with its current terms of reference.

    Q223 Mark Garnier: Terms of reference are different from working practices, though, aren’t they?

    James Russell: Fair comment, but whether we will still be asking and answering the same questions is probably a conversation that we can have afterwards. Anthony pointed earlier to exactly that question of how far you are able to go in interrogating this from the point of view of protecting health and welfare standards.

    Mark Garnier: If you have any thoughts on this in the future, it would be very useful if you could write to the Committee and let us know if you do not think they are evolving in a Darwinian process.

    Chair: I noticed that the TAC was mentioned as being specific and narrow, and that feeds into our current struggles with the Department. On the 150 people a day, maybe you should have a mobile phone number that they can phone if they see a sheep lambing—if they know what a sheep lambing looks like.

    Q224 Martin Vickers: Could I turn to you, Gerald? There is an eight-year transition before the UK market opens up to Australian sugar. How will that affect your business?

    Gerald Mason: As a cane refiner in the UK, we welcome the agreement. We would have liked to be able to buy cane sugar from Australia duty-free and quota free much earlier than in eight years, because the way UK trade policy works allows EU sugar manufacturers unlimited duty-free, quota free access to the UK today, but it prevents us, as a UK manufacturer, competing with them, by limiting where we can buy cane sugar from. We would have liked to see duty-free, quota free earlier that eight years.

    It gives us a chance to start the relationships with the sugar cane farmers in Queensland again. The typical size of a sugar farm in Australia is 100 hectares, so it is not what you imagine when you think of Australia. Until 1973, we used to buy 20% of our sugar from them, but we lost the relationship when the UK joined the EEC.

    Contrary to a lot of what you have heard, the other really important thing for us is that it allows us, for the first time, to buy a much bigger share of the raw material for our business in the UK from suppliers who produce to the highest ethical and environmental standards. To give you some idea, around 40% of the sugar mills that we could buy from in Australia are independently certified to the highest standards, and the average among cane sugar producers globally is about 7%, so this is not an industry where we expect to buy vast armadas of cheaply produced, poor-quality sugar from them. The reason we want to buy from Australia is that it is an industry, at least in sugar—I don’t know a lot about all the other markets—that produces to the highest standards.

    Finally, it might surprise you to learn that the data we look at, and the calculations we have been working on for the last few years, suggest that the carbon footprint for bringing cane sugar from Australia to the UK and refining it in our operation in London is going to be pretty competitive with the best beet sugar producers in the EU. So we welcome the agreement, although we would have liked it to come before eight years.

    Q225 Martin Vickers: Do you think there will be benefits not just to yourselves, but to the UK economy generally?

    Gerald Mason: Yes, absolutely. The benefit to us is that it really helps us to ensure that our manufacturing business in the UK is competitive and, more importantly than ever, sustainable. Our customers—the retailers, the big food and drink manufacturers, the food service providers—all want us to be buying sugar from suppliers who take ethics and the environment seriously, so it will help us maintain those customers. It will help the UK maintain two different models of sugar production—beet and cane—which we think is good for consumers, choice and competition.

    Martin Vickers: Thank you, Chair.

    Chair: Now we have a short and sweet question from Sir Mark Hendrick.

    Q226 Sir Mark Hendrick: When I questioned the Secretary of State not long after she was appointed on the carbon footprint of transporting goods of whatever kind from Australia or New Zealand as compared to Europe, she gave the impression that there was very little carbon produced through shipping. I don’t quite know what technology she was proposing to use, but I found that difficult to believe, but you have just made a similar point about the carbon footprint from the EU as compared to Australia. How can it be even comparable?

    Gerald Mason: You have to look at the whole model of production, not just the freight element. The freight element of sugar that we could bring from Australia and refine in the UK would be about 25% of its carbon footprint. It is wrong to say that there is no carbon impact of transporting something 12,500 miles—there is. With sugar, you have to look at the whole chain.

    Sugar cane, for instance, is a grass. It gets harvested each year. You don’t have to move thousands of tonnes of soil a year to plough the field and replant it each year, whereas with sugar beet you do have to do that, so that helps offset that. In sugar cane, when the crop is harvested in Australia and then processed in the mills, it is the fibre from the plant that powers the mills—the bagasse—so they don’t bring in fossil fuel to power the plants, whereas in beet factories in Europe they will generally use either natural gas to power the factory or, in some cases, they still use coal.

    The models are completely different. There is more freight carbon with cane sugar, but there is a lot less agricultural and processed carbon. When you add it up, that is why the two are broadly comparable.

    Q227 Sir Mark Hendrick: So it is the production methods and not necessarily the transport—

    Gerald Mason: Yes. I would say that you should never see distance as a proxy for carbon footprint. Of course there is carbon with distance, but in all of our supply chains there are lots of other elements to it, and we’re all obviously learning quickly now how to measure and assess these things.

    Q228 Chair: Nick von Westenholz of the NFU, it’s not just sheep that you are dealing with, of course; there is more to farming. Last year the NFU said it was incredibly concerned about the opening of the UK market to Australian sugar, as a different rulebook applies to Australian sugar growers compared to UK beet growers. Can you flesh out your objection a little bit more?

    Nick von Westenholz: Yes. Actually, we have already touched on this. It doesn’t have to be specific to sugar; particularly with a view to pesticides—plant protection products—there is a difference in approach in Australia compared to the UK.

    It gets a little complicated when it comes to sugar because, as Gerald has just outlined, they are different crops: they have different agronomic requirements, and these are obviously different parts of the world. But the Australian system for approving pesticides is a risk-based system, and in the UK we use a hazard-based system. Now, there are advocates of both, but the upshot is that the hazard system is far more precautionary and generally will lead to less pesticides being available for farmers. In particular, the hazard-based system will say that if certain active ingredients have certain characteristics, they will not even be considered for approval, whatever risk mitigations you may be able to put in place to reduce risk.

    So there are products available in Australia for all sorts of different crops that are not available in the UK. I make no comment about whether that involves higher or lower standards; it’s just a different standard that allows farmers in Australia access to tools to help them to control pests and diseases that are not available to UK farmers. This is actually a really good example of where the Australian deal, as I was saying earlier, doesn’t introduce any sort of mechanism to address that clear difference in regulatory approaches.

    Q229 Chair: You think it’s undermining farming, particularly in Norfolk and East Anglia, or wherever?

    Nick von Westenholz: UK beet growers have had huge issues with pests over the last couple of years and they have had important pesticides removed from use, which has exacerbated that situation. So, yes, producing sugar in the UK is costly. There have been increased costs on it and some of those increased costs can be traced to the regulatory system under which UK sugar producers operate. That is the basic point that we are making.

    Q230 Chair: Gerald Mason, could you just respond to the NFU—as sweetly as possible, if you don’t mind the pun?

    Gerald Mason: When we first heard the farmers saying this—that somehow Australian sugar was illegal—obviously it made us concerned, and we wanted to take a look at the situation and understand it. We don’t want to buy sugar that is produced illegally. We spent quite a lot of time looking at it a few years ago, and what we found is that the situation is much more complicated than that, as I think the TAC outcome makes clear.

    Broadly speaking, it is not that the pesticides are illegal; it is that not every pesticide is approved for every crop in every geography, for good reason. We found that there were 20 active ingredients that were approved for use on cane in Australia that were not registered for sugar beet in the UK. That was the core of the farmers’ complaint. But, actually, when you look at it, seven of those 20 were registered for use on other crops in the UK. So it was not that they were somehow wrong; it is just that they were not approved for use in sugar beet in the UK, because they had no use. So there were 13 that were not registered for use in sugar beet production in the UK.

    When we looked at it the other way round, we also found that there were pesticides approved for use on sugar beet in the UK that were not registered for use on sugar cane in Australia, and six were not registered at all for any type of crop in Australia. So it works both ways—it’s a two-way street.

    The other important thing we found is that there was a huge difference in application rates, so it’s not just about what’s applied. We think that the application rate for pesticides on sugar beet in the UK is about 45% to 50% higher than it is on the sugar cane in Australia. So it’s not just the type of products you are using; it’s also the amount that you apply, obviously.

    For us, the other thing that is interesting is cost. The TAC work said, “Does this give a cost advantage to the sugar cane farmers in Australia?” If you are going to start talking about cost, you have to look at the whole model of agriculture, and of course the one big difference between sugar cane production in Australia and sugar beet production in the UK is that there is virtually no income support for sugar cane farmers in Australia, whereas in the UK at the moment sugar beet farmers get about 25% to 30% extra on top of the value of the sugar beet they sell from income support. All of that is due to change, obviously.

    Our conclusion from all of this is that it is true that there are different systems for different crops, because there are different genuses and climates. We are not suggesting that Australia is any better, although in some areas it is, on things like application rates; we are just suggesting that these are both well-regulated markets that are appropriate to their specific situations. It bothered us when we read that the farmers were saying that somehow Australian sugar was illegal; the conclusion that we got to was very similar to the conclusion that the TAC reached.

    Q231 Chair: The politics of sugar goes a little further than just the NFU or whatever; it also affects other countries, and it can quickly become quite bitter. To go with the flow of this, the Commonwealth Caribbean countries, or Belize and Fiji, to name but two countries—one with the Queen as head of state—are heavily reliant on exporting raw cane sugar under preferential terms granted by the UK. How far will the new market access for Australia be at the expense of such developing countries? It might also have a constitutional knock-on for the monarchy, of course.

    Gerald Mason: As the grantee of the royal warrant for Tate & Lyle Sugars, I will not get involved in a discussion about royal issues, Chair.

    Q232 Chair: The point I am trying to make is that there are a lot of knock-ons with sugar. We have heard from countries that will be affected by changes in sugar, with companies moving elsewhere. Such countries have tailored their economies, as they see it, to supplying people like Tate & Lyle, but then Tate & Lyle simply ups and vanishes. I could use the terms they used, but I will not.

    Gerald Mason: When I joined Tate & Lyle in 2004, you would have been absolutely right, because the vast majority of our sugar came from ACP countries and LDCs—countries like Barbados, St Kitts, Jamaica and all these countries that today do not export any sugar to the UK.

    Q233 Chair: What happens to them when you decide to go to Australia?

    Gerald Mason: Today, they do not sell sugar to us anyway. Only about 15% of all the sugar that comes to the UK today comes from ACPs—

    Q234 Chair: And what percentage was it before?

    Gerald Mason: It was 100% when I joined 18 years ago—

    Q235 Chair: Is that because you have gone elsewhere and forced them to move?

    Gerald Mason: No, that is because of changes that the EU made to the sugar beet regime. The way that the system worked is that it had to combine trade and—

    Q236 Chair: Will this make it worse for them?

    Gerald Mason: I do not think that it will make a great deal of difference at all. The big difference was made when the EU deregulated beet sugar production—

    Q237 Chair: You will still be getting 15% of your sugar from them?

    Gerald Mason: Yes, we will, roughly speaking, because that is the hard core—we are the biggest buyer of Fairtrade sugar in the world, and we can only get that from the smallholder model in some of the ACP countries.

    To reiterate, it is not us that has chosen not to buy from these countries over the years; the fact is, beet sugar production became deregulated in the EU. The thing that gave these countries the value of their preference was that a hole in the market was left for them by limiting beet sugar production, but that was ended in 2017; beet sugar producers can now produce as much as they want, and they did. They expanded their production in the UK and the rest of the EU massively. That has pushed the prices down, which means that most of those countries choose not to sell their sugar to us any more. It is not us choosing not to buy it.

    Q238 Mark Garnier: Do you import the cane, or the raw sugar, then refine in the UK?

    Gerald Mason: We import raw cane sugar: the sugar cane, the plant, is harvested and goes to a mill near wherever the sugar cane is grown, and it gets crushed and turned into a kind of rough brown sugar, which we bring in.

    Q239 Mark Garnier: You bring that in. My question really is, why is it economically better to do that, rather than to refine it in Australia and bring it back as refined sugar?

    Gerald Mason: There are a couple of reasons really. One is that most of the sugar mills that refine cane sugar cannot produce sugar to food grade standard. You would need a massive amount of investment in the dozens of mills that supply our one factory to do that, so it is more cost-effective. Another reason is that the freight cost is much more. You have to move refined sugar in food grade containers, whereas we move raw sugar in these big vessels. A third reason is that, once we get the sugar here, there are about 650 different products that UK consumers want from us, so if we were bringing in the processed product, we would still have to do a degree of transformation once we got it here. That is why the model works.

    Q240 Mark Garnier: But it is not to do with the weird anomaly that we see in the rice market where unmilled rice does not have any tariffs levied on it, but milled rice does. You are not arbitraging the tariffs.

    Gerald Mason: No, most of the free trade agreements that the UK has allow duty-free access for both raw and refined product. We would always say that we can compete with refined product because of those three reasons I just talked to you about.

    Chair: We are dealing with life’s goodies quite often in this session. We are moving away from sugar to something else.

    Q241 Sir Mark Hendrick: Could I ask a question to Miles Beale, who has sat very patiently throughout this session so far? Clearly, the sector that you work in, Miles—unlike some of the sectors we have discussed earlier—can see a great advantage in the deal we are talking about, particularly, I would guess, gin and whisky. Can you expand on what opportunities you see for the people you represent and how they see things going forward in this deal?

    Miles Beale: By and large, you are correct. The DIT trade strategy White Paper in 2017 made it clear that imports are almost as important as exports to GDP in the UK. Wines and spirits are two products where the benefit of a trade deal is clear. The UK is the largest exporter of spirits in the world. It is the second largest importer of wine by both volume and value. There are tariffs on spirits going into the Australian market. They are low but they will be removed if this agreement goes through. Equally, the good news for UK consumers is that there are tariffs on Australian wine. There is actually more Australian wine on the UK market than wine from any other destination, which might seem odd given that it is the other side of the world, but that is a fact. It is about 250 million litres a year and 330 million bottles. Getting rid of the tariffs will save between 6p and 9p per bottle.

    On the basic facts of an improvement in trade terms just on tariffs, there are huge benefits. There are some benefits in terms of technical barriers to trade. That is where we would say more could be done. The agreement in principle included some ideas around a wine and spirit annex. That did not materialise in the Australia free trade agreement, although it has in the New Zealand one. I think we would accept that there was a bit of a trade-off between speed and the perfect outcome.

    The only other thing I would say on technical barriers to trade is there are some things we would still like to be done outside of a free trade agreement. For example, mutual acceptance of wine-making practices would certainly open up both markets for both countries. That does not need to be done in bilateral trade deals; it could be done through CPTPP, but actually it could be done through things like the World Wine Trade Group, so there are ways that you could improve on this deal outwith it. Lastly and probably most importantly, there are things that the UK Government could and should do that would improve on a good base. We have had one example where they got it right, which was they abolished wine imports certificates, which has had, at least, the same benefit as getting rid of tariffs will have for trade in wine with Australia.

    On the other hand, one could argue that the Government have not shown a co-ordinated approach to some of this, because—just as one example—the most obvious practical technical barrier to trade for the wine sector would be if the Chancellor’s proposals on the alcohol duty reform go through. Just to bring that to life a bit, getting rid of tariffs will save about £22 million a year just on trade in Australian wine imported to the UK. That will be dwarfed by a new taxation regime in the UK, which will put about £92 million—almost £100 million extra—on to trade just in Australian wine imports to the UK, so the Government are not joined up in that respect.

    Sir Mark Hendrick: Chair, it is Anthony’s question next on technical barriers. Do you want to go ahead?

    Anthony Mangnall: Unless you have a follow-up.

    Sir Mark Hendrick: I think Miles has touched on the technical side.

    Chair: The only barrier I am wondering about is when will we see Auz-secco—or Oz-secco—on the market? That is the innovation we are waiting for.

    Q242 Anthony Mangnall: Let us go to a hypothetical scenario. When retirement is inevitably forced upon me and I retire in south Devon and set up my wine shop—

    Chair: Not long to go, Anthony.

    Q243 Anthony Mangnall: Not long to go, Chair. I decide to set up as a wine merchant. There I am, looking at this deal, saying, “Great, we have got rid of export certificates. Great, we have removed tariffs.” I am then being hit by the UK’s own duty on wine. Can you go into that a little bit more? We are talking most often about small farmers and the impact of this deal. We are now talking about this, being one of the things we most boasted about, and the wine industry saying, “This is fantastic—5% lost.” We are then saying that all our small wine merchants are going to be impacted because our own customs and laws are changing.

    Miles Beale: That is right. The tariffs have a benefit for you, if you were setting up that business. It is between 6p and 9p for every bottle of wine you import from Australia. The problem will be that the new duty regime will put up the cost and, therefore, the price of at least 93% of all Australian wines on the market. Australian wines will be hit harder than anything else. That is principally because the Chancellor wants to introduce something where duty increases with strength, and Australia has the hottest growing conditions on the planet.

    Q244 Anthony Mangnall: You will not thank me for saying that I am a prolific cider drinker, and I would have to be in the south-west. What is the share of Australian wine into the UK market versus French, Spanish or Italian?

    Miles Beale: By volume, Australia is No. 1. About one sixth of UK wine imports are from Australia. In fact, 20% of Australian wine imports are then re-exported to somewhere else in the northern hemisphere. That’s the thing that makes the UK the centre of the global wine trade. So it is very much about trading, not simply about importing for consumption. Australia is No. 1; even by value it comes in at No. 3. Italy and France are the next two, but Australia is No. 1.

    Q245 Anthony Mangnall: So it hits our small businesses; it hits our wine merchants who export. Why on earth were we getting evidence that this was good for the wine business?

    Miles Beale: The deal is good for the wine business. The problem is that the Chancellor’s domestic policy on taxation wipes it out and goes further. The point is that they need to be co-ordinated. There is obviously an error; it is not joined up. To give you a practical example, there are almost 1,000 independent wine merchants in the UK. On average, they will stock between 1,000 and 1,500 different types of wine. To give you a guide, Tesco, which does the most volume sales of wine, has only 500. So it is a disproportionate impact on small businesses, such as those 1,000 or so wine merchants.

    The other way to give the Committee an example is that 93% of Australian wines will become more expensive. An average Australian red will be about 15% ABV. That will be an extra 68p for that bottle, just in duty. That is additional—VAT is applied after duty. It is already at £2.23. I don’t wish to guess what the Committee likes to spend on a bottle of wine, but £2.23 is already tax. Another 60p on top would be quite a significant increase.

    Anthony Mangnall: For Angus, the answer is “never enough”. Thank you for that.

    Q246 Chair: Maybe moving on that theme a little bit, I have known many whisky drinkers in my time. Some have consumed a little and some have consumed quite a lot. The one thing they have in common is that they are able to define what they are drinking. They do know they are drinking whisky.

    Apparently, in Australia the definition of whisky is not very clear. Almost anything can be labelled as whisky, which is a strange circumstance. Will there be an agreed definition of what is whisky in Australia, so that it can be enforceable? There is also a feeling that the Australians run a discriminatory excise regime that favours domestically produced spirits, over the best stuff produced in Scotland.

    Miles Beale: If we take those two in turn—in reverse order, perhaps. There is a perfectly fair comment that says that the agreement in principle talked about protecting definitions of whisky, and Scotch whisky would have expected to benefit from that agreement. It hasn’t happened; it should happen. It can be done without reopening an entire free trade agreement, and I think it should be.

    Secondly, the definition is really about ensuring that people understand what they are drinking. So it needs to be clear to consumers when they are drinking Scotch versus a whisky produced somewhere else. There are, of course, other parts of the UK that produce decent whisky, and that will be different from Australian whisky. What I think is really important is that we do not fall into the same trap as the Australians, which is to promote through the tax system one particular product over another. As I am sure the Chair would agree, fair competition between the whiskies would see his favourite come out on top, I am sure.

    Q247 Chair: Absolutely. I can see a number of whiskies on the west coast of Scotland, in particular, doing well. We are rushed for time and there is a camera issue going on as well, but I have a final point on sugar. From 2017 to 2019, Belize exported 22% of its sugar to the UK, Guyana exported 14% and South Africa exported 13%, as did several of those ACP countries. Belize was about 88% dependent on the UK in the 2017-19 period, after the sugar beets stuff; Fiji was 38% dependent. Tate & Lyle was the one refiner. There is an issue being flagged by DIT that it could impact those countries quite badly if you substitute the higher-cost, lower-volume cane sugar from the LDCs and the ACP countries with lower-cost, higher-volume cane sugar from Australia.

    Gerald Mason: Fiji has no interest in shipping to us anymore. This year they are going to have the lowest sugar crop in 60 years.

    Q248 Chair: Might they be interested in coming years?

    Gerald Mason: We will always be there, but most of these industries are in decline. They are relatively high cost, and they cannot meet the ethical and environmental standards that our market wants now.

    Q249 Chair: Belize?

    Gerald Mason: We still buy a significant quantity from Belize. Actually, Belize is trying to develop its local market in the Caribbean. As lots of the other Caribbean producers decline, in places such as Jamaica, Barbados and Saint Kitts, Belize sees its future as switching to supplying direct-consumption sugars in the Caribbean. Tate & Lyle owns in Belize as well. If it made economic sense, we would bring the sugar here; it makes more sense to keep it closer to home where it is more valuable now as the other producers go out of business. I can write to the Committee separately about this, as you are clearly very interested in it. I will get some more detail to you.

    Chair: Thank you. I appreciate that. There is an offensive interest in making sure that the whisky gets its proper place in Australia, and maybe a defensive interest in sugar—or an offensive interest, depending on which way you look at it. Thank you all very much; time has been our enemy, but I appreciate the five of you giving evidence very much. It is particularly good to have a vet on the panel, who knows his serial number, especially as my daughter is studying veterinary science at Glasgow University. On that family note, it is good to have a vet here. I thank you all—sheep producers, NFU, sugar, wine, and vets—for coming along. It has been really useful—as was our earlier panel with Professor Bartels. Thank you.

  • Lorand Bartels – 2022 Evidence to International Trade Committee on UK/Australia Trade Deal

    Lorand Bartels – 2022 Evidence to International Trade Committee on UK/Australia Trade Deal

    The text of the evidence given by Professor Lorand Bartels, the Chair of the Trade and Agriculture Commission, given to the International Trade Committee on 26 April 2022.

    Members present:

    Angus Brendan MacNeil (Chair); Mark Garnier; Paul Girvan; Sir Mark Hendrick; Anthony Mangnall; Martin Vickers; Mick Whitley; Mike Wood.

    Questions 162-195

    Witnesses:

    Professor Lorand Bartels MBE, Chair, Trade and Agriculture Commission.

    Examination of witness

    Witness: Professor Lorand Bartels.

    Q162       Chair: Good morning. Thank you for attending the International Trade Committee’s oral evidence session in our “UK trade negotiations: Agreement with Australia” inquiry. We have two distinguished panels this morning. The first is distinguished in itself, as we have the chair of the Trade and Agriculture Commission, Lorand Bartels. Although you are known to the Committee, would you introduce yourself—name, rank and serial number—for the record?

    Professor Bartels: My name is Lorand Bartels. I am professor of international law at the University of Cambridge, and—relevantly for today’s session—I am chair of the Trade and Agriculture Commission.

    Q163       Chair: I should have congratulated you a long time ago on your position as chair of the Trade and Agriculture Commission. I hope that you find this worth while and useful in the scrutinising of the agreement.

    To kick off, you told Radio 4 in November that the Trade and Agriculture Commission is “toothless” but not “meaningless”. What did you mean?

    Professor Bartels: I think I said “toothless but hopefully not meaningless”. I think that is relevant to today’s session, and particularly to this Committee and other Committees in Parliament. We are supposed to advise. Primarily, we advise the Secretary of State for International Trade on the matters before us, which I am sure we will get into. Secondarily—this is what I am doing here—we advise Parliament and, more generally, we maybe not advise, but inform the public, so I guess the “hopefully not meaningless” bit is up to you, if I can put it that way.

    Q164       Chair: Very good. We plan to make time so that we can bring more meaning to your work. This is one of the arguments that we currently have going with the Department for International Trade. How do you feel about the time, scope and resources you had to do this?

    Professor Bartels: We were given three months. Actually, it is supposed to be three months between the date of signature of each FTA and the production of the report; we get three months to produce the report. In fact, for the Australia agreement we were given slightly over three months because of the Christmas and new year break; we had an extra two weeks in real days. I think that time was fine.

    I should say that it was quite hard work for the Australia agreement, because we needed to work out all our processes from scratch: how we were going to approach our questions and so on; who we were going to speak to; and how we were going to obtain evidence from people. All that needed to be done, so it was quite hard work, but it was a good amount of time. I think the advice shows that we managed to do our job in those three months.

    On the whole, the resourcing is fine. We get a small stipend, which not even all members of the commission have drawn. The expenses are probably more important, particularly for people who are travelling; that is obviously critical. All the fundaments are there. We are supported by a secretariat, which is firewalled from the rest of the Government, as far as our work is concerned. The secretariat is very helpful and useful. It organises meetings and so on—finds information that is factual.

    I think all that is fine, but one point I would make is that we weren’t given any resources to engage any outside consultants or any research. That meant that we were entirely dependent on information that we found, information that came to us through our consultation process or information from the Government. That did work, but it would have been useful to have had a small budget set aside for some of that work to be done for us. Of course, one could say that the secretariat could be doing that, but it is not an expert research body either. A small consultancy budget might have made life a little bit easier. Other than that, I think everything was fine.

    Q165       Chair: It is interesting to hear that you had three months, and then an extra two weeks, or 15 days, added on. Our quarrel at the moment with the Department—our moment of tension—is that we can’t get 15 days once they have responded to your report, and we are trying to take that further within Parliament through various devices.

    Finally, how were members of TAC appointed and how independent is it? Obviously, you are going to say, “Very independent”, but how independent do you think the commission was, given that it was Government chosen and appointed? Am I right in that?

    Professor Bartels: Yes, it was. Actually, I don’t know how the others were appointed and I didn’t know who they were until I turned up pretty much just before the first day on the job. How I was appointed was that there was an open application process. I sent in an application. I was then contacted and told that my name was under consideration, and then I was further contacted and asked whether I would like to be chair. I said yes at all stages. Then, after all of that, I had a chat with the Secretary of State. After that, I got the nod. I think it also had to go through No. 10. That seemed reasonable to me—particularly reasonable because the letter of appointment that I have is from the Secretary of State. Essentially, as an individual, I report to her, but of course we operate as a collective body. I would imagine that it is the same for all the others.

    On independence, most importantly, yes, we were independent of all outside influences, I would say. First of all, we were definitely independent of the Government. In fact, there was certainly no pressure on us to deliver any particular result—none that I perceived. I was in contact with the TAC secretariat—that is our independent secretariat, who are Government employees but, as I said, firewalled for our purposes. I didn’t experience any pressure at all. There was obviously interest—I got the sense there was some interest in what we might be doing, but nothing untoward, which was a good thing. I doubt very much that anybody else was under pressure; I certainly never had that impression.

    There is also independence from the other side. We are appointed for our expertise and interest in the subject matter. So, who were we? We had a variety of roles. Some were farmers. In fact, just about everybody seemed to have some farming experience except for me, which I didn’t mind, actually. I learned a lot. We had people who were working farmers. One of our members was unable to make or came late to a meeting because it was lambing season.

    Chair: I can’t imagine that ever happening!

    Professor Bartels: They were people who know what is going on. We had cattle farmers as well. We also had lawyers and an economist. Some people were there not as representatives of any organisation, but because through their roles as representatives of different organisations, including the NFU, they had gained expertise in the area.

    Through all of this, I can safely say—and everyone on the commission would agree with this—that we operated as a cohesive commission. We bonded well. We all agreed in the end on everything. We argued pretty heatedly over the facts, even on the last day, but it was a matter of trying to work out the facts. There was a bit of last-minute work in some cases, and there were a few questions where we battled a bit. People had different points of view on free trade and farming and this and that, but at the end of the day we were all happy with what we produced. Considering that we had people from such a wide variety of areas, I think that was quite an achievement, and it is also a sign that we operated as a body that was independent.

    Chair: On the basis of the old saying, “Success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan,” as you are a former adviser to this Committee, we take a measure of success at your appointment as chair.

    Q166       Anthony Mangnall: Thank you very much for being here. Is the Secretary of State listening to you?

    Professor Bartels: I don’t know. I hope so. I haven’t spoken to her since I was appointed, but as we all know and as the Chair has alluded to, it was not clear for some time when the advice would be released. Clearly, someone in the Secretary of State’s office—and no doubt the Secretary of State herself—has had a look at the report, and I think the early release of the advice shows that she probably is listening to us.

    Q167       Anthony Mangnall: You made the point in response to the Chair’s question that you are also here to help inform the public and that you want to see that done through the Committee, which is why you are in front of us. I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but let me try. I presume you see the value in this Committee having the time to be able to scrutinise your report as well as the Government’s response to it, so that we may inform the House in our report on the whole of the Australia agreement.

    Professor Bartels: I know, as I think everybody who has an interest in this matter does, that there has been an exchange of letters between this Committee and the Secretary of State on timings. The decision on how much time this Committee gets is obviously well above my pay grade, and I can’t really comment on it. What I can say in general terms is that, obviously, as with anything that I have ever written or contributed to writing, I am happiest when it has the biggest audience. Usually when I write academic work, there is no time limit. It can take many years for people to get around to reading what I have written, so I am flexible on time. Obviously, the more time that anyone has to read something, the better. It is an intelligent Committee, and I hope that the report is clear enough. I can help today to accelerate the process.

    Q168       Anthony Mangnall: An incredibly diplomatic answer. I really appreciate that. What we are doing now with the Australia trade agreement is setting a precedent for how we behave in this place for all future agreements. I presume that TAC is going to have a role in those future agreements, as you will with New Zealand and Brazil and whatever else comes forward. After all of this is done, will you be recommending any updated process or procedure that you would expect TAC to have?

    Professor Bartels: No, I won’t. That is because it is not within our jurisdiction or mandate to make recommendations of that kind.

    Q169       Chair: Would you make a plea for greater resources, as you mentioned earlier?

    Professor Bartels: Well, that is necessary for us to do our work. Actually, it is not even necessary, because we did our work without it, but it would be helpful for us to do our work. What happens to our work once it is done goes beyond our mandate to make recommendations on.

    Q170       Anthony Mangnall: On this point about resource, you mentioned that you didn’t have much access to outside resources, but you did it through consultation, the Government providing information and your own research. Was the level of information provided by the Government significant and comprehensive? Was everything you asked for supplied?

    Professor Bartels: Yes, it was pretty good. Sometimes the Government moves a bit slowly, and we did have to press a little. At the end of the day, we asked the Government to help, and it comes down to one person, usually, who has the job to figure it out. If the questions we are asking aren’t exactly questions that that person has dealt with before, it can take a bit of putting it on the agenda, let’s say. The TAC secretariat did a great job of saying, “This is important, and this needs to be done,” as opposed to that being a little unclear for any given civil servant. In the end, the Government came to the party and provided us with the evidence.

    Most importantly, there was not any reluctance to give us information. There was not any stymieing of our work. If occasionally we had to ask twice or three times for an answer, that really came down to a particular person not really getting the question and having other things to do—tedious work-related stuff like that.

    Q171       Anthony Mangnall: May I move on from resources, unless anyone else wants to come in on this? In your mandate, you were given the requirement to answer three questions. Do you want to tell us briefly what those three questions and the answers you gave to them were?

    Professor Bartels: Very briefly, we were given these questions in two parts. One is our terms of reference, which is drawn from language that is written in statutory form, which sets our overall framework for what we are supposed to be doing. The second document that sets out our mandate is the letter that comes from the Secretary of State, which asks us, within our mandate, to advise her on any given FTA. It was the Australia FTA in this particular case, and we have subsequently had a letter for the New Zealand one.

    Putting these two documents together, we constructed our mandate, which is in the advice that I have brought along. The three questions were essentially as follows. One was whether the FTA requires the UK to change its statutory protections in three areas. One area is the health and safety of animals and plants, which is in jargon known as sanitary and phytosanitary, or SPS, measures. The second area is animal welfare, and the third is environmental protection. The question was: does the FTA require the UK to change any of its statutory protections? Our answer to that question was: no, it doesn’t. I can elaborate on that and the reasons for saying it.

    The second question was: does the FTA underline—that was the word used, and we actually had to ask to see whether “underline” might mean undermine, but it turns out that it was underline, so we interpreted that, so as not to be confusing, as “reinforce”, which I think is a more English word for this—or reinforce the UK’s statutory protections? Our answer to that was: in part, yes it does. I can elaborate on that in the future.

    The third question was: what does the FTA do? We interpreted this question to mean: what about the future—the FTA as a living instrument? What should we look out for as the FTA develops? What does it mean in the future? Our answer to that question was: that is really a question of Government policy. The FTA does not constrain policy space for the UK, so that is really up to the Government. It can, as we said in answer to question 1, continue with its existing protections. We also explained what sorts of protections the Government might be able to adopt in the future.

    We also highlighted a couple of issues that we thought were important to note. One was that under the FTA it is possible for the UK and Australia to reach certain agreements. That is quite normal for international treaties—decisions that are made in the context of the treaty. This is common for all treaties. This Committee is, I think, probably quite conversant with those sorts of decisions. We just pointed out that those decisions need to go through the usual parliamentary scrutiny process because they can affect what the FTA means. One of those decisions is to interpret the FTA. You could say, “The FTA means—this word is a little bit unclear so we want it to mean x, y and z,” for instance. That decision, to interpret the FTA, is something that should go through normal scrutiny procedures. That was one of the key points there, but ultimately, we did not see any particular difficulties with the FTA in the future.

    We also, in that context, looked at a number of concerns that had been raised with us in the consultation process, which I think is what a lot of people are most interested in hearing about and that is why we took a very serious factual approach to those concerns. They were all about comparing what goes on in Australia in terms of agricultural practices, so what pesticides are used or whether there is the so-called practice of mulesing of sheep, for instance, to cite two well-known examples. Also, how cattle are transported and hot branding—all sorts of agricultural practices, which were of environmental, animal welfare and SPS interest and so on. Then we compared those practices with what goes on in the UK and we found that, in most cases, the concerns were a little bit exaggerated for one reason or another. What we concluded in just about all cases was that even if these practices did take place in Australia in a way that would not be permitted in the UK, they either did not affect products that would be imported at an increased rate under the FTA or they did not come with any particular cost advantage. At any rate, even if, in a worst-case scenario, both of those questions were answered in another way—in other words, that those practices were different in Australia and led to greater increases of products into the UK and they came at a great cost advantage—in almost all cases, except for a couple of cases where this was not true, the UK would be able to regulate in the same way as today and there should not really be a problem in the UK.

    So, hopefully, one of the main outputs to come from this advice was that, with a couple of exceptions, which we can speak about, there is nothing much to be scared of in this FTA. It should not change the picture all that much, in terms of standards. Obviously, there is going to be competition coming from Australian products.

    Q172       Anthony Mangnall: Professor Bartels, you said in an interview with Politico: “Some people are going to be a bit upset about our report”. Did you succeed in upsetting them, but did you also succeed in dispelling some of the rumours and misguided fears that were in this free trade agreement? I also want to put on record your emphasis on the point about the scrutiny and procedure of Parliament over free trade agreements, which you made in your previous comment.

    Professor Bartels: It does not seem to have upset people as much as I thought it might, which is probably a good thing. Maybe Easter had something to do with that. I do not know. When I said that, what I meant was that there might have been people who were hoping that we would say that the FTA is a disaster for British farming and not only in some generic way, because free trade is bad, but more specifically in terms of what we were supposed to look at, which is, at its extreme: “Australia engages in a whole lot of barbaric practices that were banned because the UK does not do this sort of thing, and it is done to save money and the Australian farmers are sort of raking it in because they are able to do all these things because it is the wild west out there. Therefore, the FTA should not have been signed with a country like that because we are going to be importing all these products that are made according to those appallingly low standards.”

    What we found in every case, except for a couple—and I would not call those practices barbaric; they involved pesticides and maybe genetically modified organisms to some degree—was that those concerns were overblown. Australian standards are not that different, in reality. I would like to talk about that a little bit more at some point, because the way it is regulated is different from in the UK but, in reality, what Australia does is not that different from what the UK does, in particular in so far as what we are talking about are products that are going to be imported into the UK. I think a lot of people were worried that that might be the case. So when I say “upset”, they might have wanted the FTA to be nixed because we said, “Yes, that is all true.” People who wanted that might be upset. But I would hope that the answer that we gave does the opposite and assures people that the FTA is signed with a country that has relatively similar practices in most cases, as far as the products coming into the UK are concerned, and there is not actually all that much to worry about. Different people will probably have different reactions to that answer, but I hope the assurance side of that, rather than the disappointment side, prevails.

    Q173       Chair: Before I go to Mark Garnier, I want to pick up on three small points that were raised with Anthony. You see the work of the TAC as feeding into the work of parliamentary scrutiny. Is that correct?

    Professor Bartels: Yes.

    Q174       Chair: Was food security considered in your report on the TAC? It is something that has raised its head, probably more so now since the advent of the Ukraine war.

    Professor Bartels: No, we did not look at food security. It was not within the scope of our mandate.

    Q175       Chair: Finally, mulesing is something that makes me wince, to be honest. I speak as somebody who has spent much of the last month, quite often, with my arm far up the back end of a sheep. That gives me no problems at all, but mulesing does make me wince. This is lambing time, in case anyone was wondering. What level of concern was there about mulesing within the committee? It just seems a pretty rough and barbaric thing to do.

    Professor Bartels: Look, it is pretty rough and barbaric. I think everybody agrees with that. I think in Australia, they agree with this too, on the whole. One of the interesting things that we found is that most mulesing in Australia is undertaken with pain relief. We found it a little bit difficult to find out exactly how much there was, and we have a couple of footnotes on this in the advice. We found one academic article that had put the figure at 79%. The auction data was a little bit different, and we had to break that down into which merino were being sold. There are different types of merino, and we did not have the time to get stuck into that, but a majority of merinos were being mulesed with pain relief. There is still a minority of merino sheep that are mulesed without pain relief, and our understanding is that in Australia various strategies are being considered and implemented to eradicate this, particularly through breeding.

    I do not know how much you want to get into what this actually involves, but it is done to merino sheep, which do not exist in the UK. It is all to do with the skin, which is very much folded in order to increase yields, but unfortunately that involves folded skin in areas of the sheep where mulesing is carried out, which is painful. It is all to do with flystrike. The people who conduct this do so for animal welfare as well as economic reasons. It is “We have to kill the village in order to save it”-type stuff. It is pretty barbaric and is not a great thing.

    Chair: I am wincing too much. They can use pour-ons for this stuff.

    Q176       Mark Garnier: I am just trying to shake that image of the Chair out of my head. You mentioned the SPS and the precautionary principle a little bit earlier. Can you talk a bit more about the precautionary principle? Your report says it is not entirely clear whether this agreement maintains the UK’s right to use the precautionary principle with regard to SPS. Can you expand a bit on that? I am also quite interested in what effect this would have on other trade deals, if any at all, because obviously trade deals lean on each other. Will this have any effect—for example, if the NFU are trying to export product to the EU? Might this affect that type of relationship?

    Professor Bartels: The precautionary principle originates in the area of environmental law, and it moved on into international environmental law. It also exists in trade law, but it has a slightly different definition in trade law. It is a little bit more limited in trade law. I will speak about that, because that is the version of the precautionary principle that is relevant to us.

    Q177       Mark Garnier: This is the WTO version.

    Professor Bartels: In the WTO, exactly. In the WTO, the precautionary principle exists in the SPS agreement, which is the agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary standards. I want to explain it by explaining first what it is not. The way that the SPS agreement works is on a science-based approach. If you want to protect animal and plant health and life and human health and life in certain areas that are covered by the SPS agreement, you are obligated as a state and a WTO member to base your measure on science, which means undertaking a risk assessment, basing your measure on a risk assessment and so on. That is all set out in article 5.1 of the SPS agreement.

    There are some cases where there just isn’t any science, which is where the precautionary principle in its trade law sense comes in—recognising that, in some situations, there might be a risk to human, animal or plant life or health, but there isn’t any really good science. Article 5.7 of the SPS agreement allows you, as a WTO member, to adopt measures on a provisional basis, but you are still under an obligation to keep your eye on the science. Sometimes you just haven’t developed the techniques: science evolves, right? However, as soon as there is science in this particular area, you are back in the world of science-based risk assessments and you have to base your measure on the science.

    It is not a precautionary principle in the sense that you can just throw scientific evidence out of the window and say, “Well, we want to play it safe.” It is very much the opposite. You are allowed to use the precautionary principle only when there isn’t science. If there is science that says that, actually, there is nothing much to be worried about, then you are not allowed to adopt your measure. There have been many cases in the WTO in which countries—EU countries, Australia, Japan, the US—lost cases because they had said, “We didn’t think there was science,” but it turned out that there actually was science, so they lost those cases. It is very much a science-based instrument, with the small exception of when there is not much good science.

    This FTA emphasises the science-based approach. It says that SPS measures will be based on science, effectively, in accordance with relevant provisions of the SPS agreement. We have said that it is not entirely clear whether that includes just the science-based part of the SPS agreement that I’ve been talking about, or whether it also includes that small exception to the science-based agreement—the precautionary principle in article 5.7. It depends a bit on how you read the provision. We don’t think it’s very well drafted; we think it should be drafted a little more clearly. At the end of the day, it doesn’t actually matter because this is not an enforceable chapter in the FTA, so it won’t really amount to anything, anyway. We thought that if you really wanted the part of the precautionary principle that is in the SPS agreement to also be incorporated in the FTA, it could have been done more clearly.

    Q178       Mark Garnier: If it was enforceable, it would be important.

    Professor Bartels: If it was enforceable, it would be important? Well, that depends a bit on the relationship between the SPS agreement and the FTA; it depends on where it’s enforced. That is itself an unclear question—how much are you allowed to deviate from WTO law in FTAs in that area? But, yes, in principle, you would have to start out from the assumption that that would be important.

    Q179       Mark Garnier: I know this is slightly irrelevant, but they don’t use the precautionary principle in America, if I remember correctly. Are you familiar with that?

    Professor Bartels: Somewhat.

    Q180       Mark Garnier: I remember, when I was a Minister, talking about exactly this issue in terms of how we approached the EU and then how we approached the US trade deal. Clearly, we are doing a lot of trade with the US and the EU. Ultimately, do those relationships lean against each other in a conflicting sort of way, or are they actually completely irrelevant? So that we can have a deal with the Australians that is unique in its own right, and we just transact that, and we can have another with the US that is unique, and similarly with the European Union. Is there going to be a knock-on effect on any of this stuff?

    Professor Bartels: I don’t really think so. It depends on segregation of product when it gets to the UK. If you had an Australian product that came into the UK according to rules that would not be acceptable to the EU, and that product was then disguised as a UK product that was made according to EU acceptable standards for export to the EU, then you would have a problem. Essentially, what we are talking about is smuggling. The risk is one of smuggling, and there are—or should be—processes to prevent that sort of smuggling from taking place. Among other things, the EU wouldn’t want that product to come into the EU without those sorts of controls because, for tax reasons, in any case, it would be an Australian product. It is a question of whether the product is washed as a UK product, which is illegal in a whole lot of ways. A lot of this talk of the UK not being able to be part of different regulatory systems ignores, or at least overlooks, that. You can’t just wash products once they are in the UK. They are still traced in some way.

    If they then get re-exported to other countries, there should be systems in place to stop that sort of washing and smuggling from taking place. That is not to say that those systems are always perfect, but it is a common problem.

    Mark Garnier: That is really helpful. Thank you.

    Q181       Mick Whitley: Good morning. Your report says that the agreement may lead to increased imports of Australian products produced to lower standards than those of the UK as regards products produced using pesticides banned in the UK and canola oil from genetically modified oilseed rape. What will that mean for UK producers and production standards?

    Professor Bartels: Those were the two areas that I was alluding to earlier, where we thought that, on balance, it was likely that we could identify products that would come into the UK at an increased rate under the FTA because tariffs had been lowered, where practices in Australia are materially different from practices in the UK and where there is a cost advantage to Australian farmers compared with UK famers, because being able to use pesticides that are cheaper and more effective in Australia than those that are allowed in the UK comes at a cost advantage.

    First, in the case of both pesticides and GMOs, when we said that we were not talking about any risks to the environment or animals from these products coming in, it was not within our mandate to say so, but it is the same with humans. That is an SPS issue that remains the same. The Government can protect its environment, people, animals, plants and so on from anything that it considers to be dangerous, provided that there is science or the precautions I talked about before; there are rules on that.

    We were talking about something different: the use of pesticides and GMOs in Australia in a way that, if it is harmful at all—to some extent, the jury might still be out on that—it is harmful in Australia, to Australian territory, to Australian animals and to Australian plants. That makes it Australia’s business and none of the UK’s business, from an international law point of view. One country does not get to tell another country what to do just like that; you need a reason for it. If Australia wants to destroy its animals and that doesn’t affect the UK, Australia can destroy its animals. There are minimum international law baselines, but in principle that is the way it works, which is something that not all the people who wrote to us fully appreciate.

    In those areas, Australian farmers may be operating with an advantage that UK farmers might not have, and there are some products, such as canola oil, that may come to the UK more cheaply. I think canola oil is imported into the UK anyway, so that probably will not have much of an effect on UK production, but in theory there could be a few cases of products like that where UK farmers would be suffering from competition from products made according to practices that are not permitted in the UK, but are permitted in Australia.

    Ultimately, as far as our mandate is concerned, we ended up by saying that in those areas there is nothing the UK can do if you want to stop that sort of thing from happening. Again, I want to emphasise that we are talking about a very small number of products—a couple—that are probably not even produced in the UK, so they are not suffering from competition in any economic sense, but there is nothing the UK can do in those areas in terms of saying, “Well, there is a problem with the standards.” If you want to stop products coming in that are made in those ways, then you have got to do it by not liberalising in the first place. So that is the lesson of that.

    That particular message didn’t come out in our report. What we were saying in our report was that, in terms of standards, you can’t complain about Australian standards when the effect of those standards—the different standards in Australia—is solely in Australia and does not affect the UK in any way.

    Q182       Martin Vickers: The FTA provides for certain “general exceptions” that are copied from WTO law. Could you elaborate on what these are and how important they are for upholding the UK’s statutory protections?

    Professor Bartels: This is fundamental. In legal terms, and in particular in terms of answering our first question, it is the most fundamental part of our report. The exceptions in the FDA, as you rightly say, are copied over from WTO law—in fact, they are incorporated by reference from WTO law, in particular article XX of GATT, which sets out general exceptions.

    There are three main exceptions of relevance, and each one is relevant to one of the areas we were looking at. To take them in order: one exception allows the UK to adopt measures necessary to protect animal and plant life and health. This is article XX(b) of GATT. This exception is then elaborated in WTO law in the SPS agreement, which is what I was talking about before—base your measure on a scientific risk assessment, with the exception for when there is no science, and a bit in the SPS chapter in the FTA as well. That is relevant for statutory protections, which are targeted at the protection of animal and plant life and health. So long as the UK can show that its measures are necessary for protecting animal or plant life and health according to the available science, that is perfectly fine under the agreement. That was fundamental to us. That is why there can be no fear in the UK that any dangerous products will come into the UK at an increased rate under the FTA, because the FTA permits the UK today, as yesterday under WTO law, to prevent those products coming in. Nothing changes. The legal position has not changed at all.

    The second relevant exception is article XX(a) of GATT, incorporated into the FTA. That permits the UK to prohibit imports of products in order to protect public morals. That is UK public morals. It is particularly relevant to the statutory protections that we were looking at in the context of animal welfare. Animal welfare, as has been established in WTO case law, can constitute the public morals of any given country, provided you can show that the legislative apparatus in that country, or public opinion, or some evidence about a particular animal welfare concern rises to the level of public morals. Provided you can show that, in principle, animal welfare concern can be public morals. What is also important about that is that it can stretch to the treatment of animals in other countries as well. There is an extraterritorial dimension to that.

    What we took from that is that this FTA, as before under WTO law, permits the UK to adopt the measures necessary to protect its public morals in the context of animal welfare—in other words, to the extent that the UK today, until this FTA is ratified, is able to have animal welfare-based import restrictions, it can continue to do this under the FTA, so nothing changes in the FTA.

    The third exception, which is relevant to environmental protection, is article XX(g) of GATT, again incorporated by reference into the FTA, which enables the UK to adopt measures that relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, which includes—the FTA specifies this, but it is in WTO law anyway—living resources. That is usually taken as an environmental exception. Again, this permits the UK to protect its environment. So long as the measure is directed at protecting the UK’s environment, it can continue to adopt measures, nothing changes and it is exactly the same as under the WTO.

    For these three reasons, because these exceptions have been incorporated into the FTA verbatim from WTO law, our conclusion was that the FTA does not change the UK Government’s ability to adopt its existing statutory protections.

    Q183       Martin Vickers: If there is a dispute about the general exceptions, what options are there for settling that dispute?

    Professor Bartels: As far as the FTA is concerned, this is what would happen. Let’s say that the UK adopted a new rule; I mean, it could be an existing rule. Let’s say the Australians say, “Well, we don’t much like the rule that you’ve got today”, and the FTA prevails over existing legislation in just about every case. There is an example of that in the advice. There are some examples where you might say that the FTA is based on or takes into account an existing rule, but as a general rule of treaty interpretation existing domestic law is a bit irrelevant; you just look at the FTA.

    So the Australians could say, “We don’t like your law”, or, “We don’t like a future law, and we think that it violates an obligation in the FTA, because you’re not allowing us to export to you. Right? You’re not allowing us to export this agricultural product, because you say that you want to protect your environment”, or something like that.

    Then the UK would have to defend itself under the FTA and it would say, “Well, in fact, yes, it’s true—we are violating the obligation to allow the product to come in. But the exception enables us to do this.” This is the way that all law works. I am sure you are familiar with this, but I will just say it anyway, namely, that it is a bit like self-defence in murder; yes, you have killed someone, but it does not matter because it is in self-defence and so you get off. I mean, it is just an exception to an obligation.

    So, the UK would basically say, “Well, it’s fine, yes, normally we would have to allow that in, but we don’t have to in this case, because we are doing this to protect our environment—article XX(g), as incorporated”, etc., etc. Then, the answer would be, and there are plenty of WTO cases along these lines, “Yes, that’s perfectly fine. No obligation violated.”

    Q184       Anthony Mangnall: May I make a clarifying point? That typically means that when we have had discussions in previous years about hormone-injected beef and chlorinated chicken, under our SPS—domestic laws—that would not change, because the obligation would be for people to respect our domestic laws.

    Professor Bartels: I want to be quite careful in how I answer that question. We did not say that every UK law is legal; what we said is that the legal position in relation to every UK law has not changed.

    Q185       Chair: And the effect of that could be what?

    Professor Bartels: Well, we wanted to be accurate in our advice and we did not want to be misleading by presenting only part of the picture. So we thought that, for the sake of accuracy, we needed to mention that the EU had lost one of the WTO challenges to its beef hormone ban, in 1998. We also mentioned—not too many people actually do mention this—that there was a later case in 2008 in which the EU actually brought the case, asking a WTO panel to declare—essentially, a declaratory action—that its changes to its beef hormone ban were now legal, and that case ended inconclusively, with the result that the result of the previous case continued in operation.

    In other words, the EU’s beef hormone ban remains illegal, but the reason for that is a little more complicated. So, it is not to say that the EU would necessarily have lost its case if it had been conducted slightly differently. There was simply no result; it said, “We don’t know and therefore we go back to the previous case”, because the case was not argued, or even decided, at first instance particularly well. So, it is a bit of a messy one.

    Now, we know that the UK’s beef hormone ban is a continuation of the EU’s beef hormone ban. Given the ambiguity in result of the second case on the EU beef hormone ban and given that the UK beef hormone ban has not been specifically targeted, we cannot say that the beef hormone ban is necessarily legal—I think that is just a fair reading of the current situation—but we also cannot say that it is necessarily illegal. We did not want to say either thing in this advice. What we did want to do was to give people the full picture, which we did; we have set all of this out in the advice. What we did say, which we think is accurate, is that whether or not the ban is legal or illegal, the FTA makes no difference to it.

    Q186       Sir Mark Hendrick: I just want to explore a little further the UK’s position with regard to the general exceptions provisions. Your report says that the agreement’s environment and animal welfare chapters contain provisions that actually give the UK a greater “right to regulate” than under WTO rules. Obviously, it also refers to the general exceptions provisions, in certain respects, giving it more leeway to override its trade liberalisation obligations than it would have under WTO law on its own. Could you explain that a bit more and say how significant you think it is?

    Professor Bartels: What this FTA does, which is pretty standard for modern FTAs, is that it has a chapter on environmental protection and then, which is quite novel—this is the first FTA to do this—it has a slightly weaker, but similar, chapter on animal welfare protection. That is something that the UK should be congratulated on—pushing forward this area of the law in the context of FTAs.

    In terms of the environmental chapter—this is quite standard for environmental chapters in FTAs—there are a variety of obligations, which require Australia and the UK not to lower their environmental protections in certain circumstances. One obligation is that they are not allowed to reduce, or rather, not implement, their existing environmental laws, if that is to gain a trade advantage. So, you cannot say, “We have got these laws in this area, but we are not going to apply them to this sector or to these particular agricultural products” if that is to improve trade. That includes against import competition. This is to stop a race to the bottom in terms of regulatory standards.

    In the FTA, you have an enshrining of obligations to prevent a race to the bottom—to prevent saying, “We have got this wonderful trade deal; let’s take maximum advantage by erasing our standards, so that we will be able to compete with the other side.” That stops Australia from doing this in order to gain an advantage in the UK, but it also stops the UK from doing this. It works in both respects—directly, in the sense that it stops the UK from reducing its environmental protections, which is all built into the TCA with the EU anyway, so the UK is not going to be doing that for a variety of reasons; it also stops Australia from doing this. In that sense, it also reinforces the UK’s statutory protections. It is the same with animal welfare, although that is slightly weaker because they are still feeling their way.

    Q187       Sir Mark Hendrick: I understand the principle and clearly it would not be an issue with the EU, but as far as the WTO goes, it may be. Could you give me an example? Could you also say how binding you think the environment and animal welfare chapters are?

    Professor Bartels: I don’t think these obligations cause a problem for WTO law in principle—

    Sir Mark Hendrick: I don’t mean they would cause a problem. I am saying they are going above and beyond.

    Professor Bartels: Yes, definitely.

    Sir Mark Hendrick: My point is about an example of how such a case might arise and how binding the obligations are in terms of Australia and the UK abiding by them.

    Professor Bartels: Sure. Let’s take Australia. Let’s say for instance that Australia decided that it wanted to—what’s an example of an environmental obligation?

    Sir Mark Hendrick: The use of pesticides.

    Professor Bartels: Well, the use of pesticides is a tricky one, because that is not necessarily covered by the FTA in quite the same way as the others. The environmental laws are not fully comprehensive in terms of everything. But let’s say it was something like pollution of a river.

    Let’s say that, as a result of pesticide use, there was some degradation of an Australian river. Let’s say that the effect—different terms are used in the treaty, which require interpretation, which we have done—and in some cases possibly the intent of a law allowed for greater use of pesticides leading to damage of an Australian river, which is of sufficiently serious levels to be legally relevant. Let’s say that all that was to increase Australian exports to the UK. Then the UK would be able to bring a case against Australia based on that obligation and say, if there is an environmental law that would prevent that from happening, which is important, “You have violated your obligation to implement your environmental law.” Therefore,  Australia would be in violation and the UK would essentially be able to adopt countermeasures.

    Q188       Sir Mark Hendrick: What if the law existed in this country but didn’t exist in Australia?

    Professor Bartels: Irrelevant. This is the thing that I think I needed to say. In international law, you cannot just say that your laws are the best laws and you cannot make other countries abide by them. The French are trying to do this at the moment with EU trade agreements. They are called mirror clauses. It is just not the way it works. I mean, you can make it work, but it is not normal. You can force it on other countries, but it is a form of, dare I say, colonialism. It is just not the system. Australia gets to have its laws. We get to have our laws. New Zealand gets to have its laws.  It is completely irrelevant what the UK does in these circumstances. The way these obligations are written is to say that your national laws are what you need to enforce, not that your national laws need to be the same as UK laws.

    Q189       Sir Mark Hendrick: No, but what if our standards are higher in terms of environmental law; theirs are lower and we are not happy about it?

    Professor Bartels: That is exactly what I am saying, it does not matter.

    Sir Mark Hendrick: All right, fair enough.

    Professor Bartels: That is the point; it doesn’t matter. You can negotiate that to begin with, but that is unusual. You can say, “We need a baseline of protection” but those baselines of protection are usually internationally agreed; they are usually multilateral rules. Then what you do is say, “You can’t fall beneath baseline provision”.

    Let me give you another example from the area of labour standards. There is a distinction between international rules or international minimum labour standards, including slavery, where everybody has agreed one way or another that you should not fall beneath those standards. That does not mean that you can say to another country, “If you don’t pay your workers our minimum wage, we are not going to accept your products coming in”.

    Q190       Sir Mark Hendrick: I accept the principle and you have given a different example there in another context. Just going back to the pesticides, how do you prove there that Australia has a competitive advantage?

    Professor Bartels: There was a case on this involving wider standards. It is actually the same issue, just slightly different facts. It is difficult to do. You need to show that there is at least a competitive effect of the reduction in, or failure to implement, domestic law. You would need to look at the economic result of what Australia is doing, or at least the projected economic result. You would need to work out whether that is likely to give Australian products a competitive advantage over UK products in either of the two markets and that would give you your result. Yes, that is difficult to prove, for sure.

    Q191       Chair: In the example you have just given about the river, could we argue that is a sort of ceding of sovereignty, or is the UK coming in at that point not through the agreement but just through domestic law? In what circumstance would another country get so het up about Australia damaging or destroying one of its rivers, or do you think this is more of a global, save-the-world look, rather than a trade look?

    Professor Bartels: It is fundamental to distinguish between things that countries do within their territory which have an effect on other countries, like climate change, for instance, or even loss of biodiversity. Secondly, there is a category of things that countries can do within their territories, which they have agreed are of concern to others. And you have international law on that—for instance, looking after your endangered species. They are your species, but you have agreed through CITES that other countries have an interest in that.

    Q192       Chair: Koala bears?

    Professor Bartels: Koalas, for instance, what’s left of them. And thirdly, things that countries do within their territories that might be damaging to their territories but are not actually of any direct concern to other countries. A lot of that includes pollution, for instance. Pollution is generally a domestic matter, and that is just bad luck. It is up to you. Those three categories need to be distinguished.

    Q193       Chair: Before I bring in Mick Whitley to mop up at the end, this is a slightly mopping up question, but on the procedure, what sort of improvements would you like to see in the involvement of the TAC in future trade agreements? As you know, we have battles at the moment with the Department over time, looking for a mere 15 days. From your perspective, what would you like to see? You have about 90 seconds.

    Professor Bartels: My wish list. Look, I have to say that I am pretty happy with the way things are, so I don’t have any big asks. We had to work hard to figure out how to approach this FTA and this does give us a precedent for how to approach future FTAs. They are, of course, all different. We will struggle to do a job like this if we are faced with CPTPP, because figuring out what goes on in Australia is difficult. Figuring out what goes on in 11 countries where we don’t even speak the languages, let alone have different legal and administrative cultures, is going to be completely impossible.

    Q194       Sir Mark Hendrick: What about the EU?

    Professor Bartels: There is a lot of experience with the EU, at least in legal terms. That one is easier. In terms of working out what goes on in Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, whatever, is going to be virtually impossible. We cannot write a report that is this big, in God knows how many languages, trying to figure out all of that. We are going to have to do a slightly different job on that one. However, on New Zealand—if we deal with other single countries, particularly if they are in a language that some of us can understand, it would be easier. I think the language might become a problem at some point.

    Chair: An exclusive here: the Australians say they can understand the New Zealanders, so we can maybe take that one to the bank.

    Q195       Mick Whitley: Is there anything that we have not already covered that you would like to mention, or write to us about?

    Professor Bartels: I think we have covered pretty much everything that is in the advice. I hope that what I have said is useful to your scrutiny process. We tried to write this advice in a way that would address different constituencies, from the Secretary of State to parliamentary Committees, Government negotiators and the general public. I do not know if we succeeded in all respects, but we hope that at least those aspects that people are most interested in are clear enough for them.

    My final point would be to say that we did all agree—I think this is fundamental—on this report; it was a collective piece of work. There was no suggestion of separate opinions, or anything like that. We are satisfied with it, and we think, ultimately, that the FTA does not make life difficult for UK agricultural producers in the way that was very much feared. That was, of course, the reason that we were established. We say that, of course, about the Australia agreement—we have not yet completed our work on any other agreement—and we hope that our work has assured people that that is the case.

    Chair: Thank you for that. Thank you very much, Professor Bartels, for being here this morning, and for your frankness. We will take a few minutes’ break before we flip over to the next panel. Thank you again.

  • Government Explainer to the UK/Australia Trade Deal

    Government Explainer to the UK/Australia Trade Deal

    The explainer issued by HM Government on the UK/Australia trade deal on 9 December 2022.

    Trade Bill overview

    The Trade (Australia and New Zealand) Bill enables the ratification and implementation of the UK’s free trade agreements (FTAs) with Australia and New Zealand.

    These agreements deliver an important benefit of leaving the European Union (EU) – the UK’s ability to conduct its own independent trade policy. They support economic growth and will benefit all the nations and regions of the UK.

    Specifically, the Bill will give the government the powers it needs to:

    • extend duties and remedies to suppliers from Australia and New Zealand in domestic law for procurement covered by the FTA
    • amend the domestic procurement regulations to bring them in line with commitments in the Australia agreement
    • make changes to stay compliant over the lifetime of the agreement, for example updating the names of government entities if these change in future

    Once the FTAs take effect, businesses and citizens all around the UK can start to feel the benefits, including:

    • a projected £2.3 billion boost to the UK economy from the Australia FTA and £800 million from the New Zealand FTA
    • the elimination of all tariffs on UK goods exports to Australia and New Zealand, from cars, chocolate, Scotch whisky and fashion to buses, excavators and ships
    • flexible rules of origin which mean UK businesses can use some imported parts and ingredients and still qualify for the new 0% tariffs when exporting to both countries
    • removal of UK import tariffs on goods from Australia and New Zealand including favourites such as wine, swimwear, surfboards, boots, manuka honey and kiwi fruits – paving the way for UK consumers to get more choice, quality products and lower prices
    • cheaper access to ingredients, materials and components from Australian and New Zealand for UK manufacturers – such as hydraulic power engines and pressure reducing valves from Australia and make-up and biscuit ingredients from New Zealand
    • unprecedented access to the Australian market for UK services, going further than Australia has in any other such deal, meaning businesses from architecture and law to financial services and shipping will be able to compete in both places on an equal footing
    • advanced digital provisions which allow UK tech and services firms, creative industries and many other sectors to break into new markets in Australia and New Zealand, including securing the free flow of data
    • making business easier through the use of electronic contracts and signatures
    • dedicated chapters to support small businesses and help them access opportunities in Australia and New Zealand
    • guaranteed rights for UK investors to invest across the Australian economy and a reduced need for them to pass investment review checks in both Australia and New Zealand
    • access for British companies to bid for Australian government contracts worth around £10 billion per year on an equal footing with Australian firms, including major infrastructure projects, financial and business services
    • new rules making it easier for Brits to live, travel and work in Australia and New Zealand.

    Read more about the benefits of the UK-Australia FTA and the benefits of the UK-New Zealand FTA.

    While the focus of the Bill is narrow, there are still many common misconceptions around the UK-Australia and UK-New Zealand FTAs, which are addressed below.

    Agriculture

    Myth: Providing generous market access to Australia and New Zealand will undercut the UK’s farming industry. The UK market will be flooded with foreign imports.

    Reality: Increased imports from Australia are more likely to displace imports from the EU – the source of 230,000 tonnes of UK beef imports in 2020 – than to hurt UK farmers.

    With respect to sheep meat and beef in particular, it is unlikely that large volumes will be diverted to the UK from lucrative markets in Asia, which are geographically closer to Australia. More than 75% of Australian beef and 70% of Australian sheep meat exports in 2020 went to markets in Asia and the Pacific.

    For the first 15 years of the New Zealand FTA there will be no new sheep meat access to the UK for New Zealand unless its WTO sheep meat quota into the UK reaches 90% utilisation. We do not believe this is likely to happen.

    Furthermore, we import far more beef from the EU than from New Zealand, all at 0% tariff and with no quotas.

    In addition, the government is committed to encouraging people to support British produce. 81% of retail beef sales in the UK are under the British logo (according to the National Beef Association) and several major high street retailers have committed to only using 100% British beef, notably Aldi, Morrisons, Marks and Spencer and Waitrose.

    Myth: UK farmers will not be protected by these free trade agreements.

    Reality: Both agreements include safeguards for the most sensitive parts of the UK farming community.

    The UK-Australia deal includes:

    1. Tariff-rate quotas – these last up to 10 years, depending on the product, and automatically apply higher tariffs to imports above a certain volume threshold (known as the quota). Additionally, on sheep meat, if volume thresholds under tariff-rate quotas are consistently filled in years one to 10, the UK can periodically reduce the volume thresholds of the quotas or safeguards by 25%.
    2. Product-specific safeguards – these have a similar effect from year 11 to year 15 of the agreement, imposing high tariffs – of 20% for beef and sheep meat – above a volume threshold. If the product-specific safeguards for sheep meat are triggered in this period, the UK can periodically reduce the volume thresholds of the quotas or safeguards by 25%.
    3. General bilateral safeguard mechanism – this applies to all products and will provide a temporary safety net for UK producers threatened with serious injury from increased imports as a result of tariff liberalisation under the FTA.  This protection will last for a product’s tariff liberalisation period plus 5 years in order to allow domestic industries time to adjust.

    The UK-New Zealand deal includes:

    1. Tariff liberalisation for sensitive goods staged over time to allow time for adjustment.
    2. Tariff-rate quotas and product-specific safeguards for a range of the most sensitive agricultural products, including beef, sheep meat, cheese, butter and apples. These measures will limit the volume of duty-free imports permitted and, in the case of beef and sheep meat, will be in place for 15 years.
    3. A general bilateral safeguard mechanism for all products, providing a temporary safety net for producers threatened with serious injury from increased imports as a result of tariff liberalisation under the FTA. For beef, the transition period is 15 years. For sheep meat, the transition period is 20 years. This will allow the farming sector significant time to adjust.

    Even after these protections expire, the UK will still be able to apply global safeguards under the WTO, as we have with steel.

    Myth: These FTA deals will not help British farmers export their goods.

    Reality: Australia is one of the most important destinations for UK food and drink exports and this trade deal will bring opportunities to boost exports from every part of the UK, in a sector which contributes £120 billion to our economy.

    UK food and drink exports to Australia have more than doubled in the last decade. They will benefit from the elimination of tariffs on all products, including biscuits, whisky and gin (previously 5%) and cheese (previously up to around 20%).

    The deals will also immediately remove all tariffs on UK exports to New Zealand, including food and drink such as gin (up to 5%), chocolate (5%), pork (5%) and wine (5%). UK exporters will be able to do business at lower costs and gain an advantage over international rivals in the New Zealand import market, a market which is expected to grow by around 30% by 2030.

    The agreements also prioritise helping more small businesses sell their goods to Australia and New Zealand for the first time. This could help resolve the barriers frequently cited by food and drink exporters, such as complex labelling and sanitary and phytosanitary requirements.

    Animal welfare and food safety

    Myth: Australia and New Zealand’s lower food safety and animal welfare standards will mean lower-quality produce ends up on UK shelves.

    Reality: All food and drink products imported into the UK will continue to have to comply with our rigorous import requirements as well as UK food regulations.

    For example, hormone-treated beef is banned in the UK and will not be allowed to enter the UK market. The Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland will continue to protect our food standards.

    Imports of animal products are also covered by the Sanitary Agreement and the UK’s imports regime.

    Both FTAs contain stand-alone animal welfare chapters and non-regression clauses. These mean the partner countries pledge not to lower their animal welfare standards to undercut each other.

    The independent Trade and Agriculture Commission (TAC) report on Australia concluded that unsafe Australian products were unlikely to be imported in most cases and that there were safeguards in the deal to maintain animal welfare and environmental standards.

    The TAC examined concerns about mistreatment of animals, mistreatment of the environment and dangerous practices with pesticides, with chairman Prof Lorand Bartels saying they were “just not well-founded, or they were a bit exaggerated or misunderstood”.

    The TAC’s report on New Zealand concluded that the UK-New Zealand FTA would not require the UK to change existing levels of statutory protections. In the case of environmental matters, the FTA goes beyond existing WTO obligations. The TAC added that New Zealand would not be able gain a trade advantage by lowering its standards of protection.

    The TAC examined concerns relating to antibiotic usage, pesticide usage and climate change and the report concluded that in all cases, including New Zealand’s use of pesticides banned in the UK, it was not a cause for concern. On pesticides, the report concluded the FTA did not reduce the UK’s existing rights under WTO law to regulate imports. It also gave the UK “enhanced rights under the FTA to ensure that New Zealand does not fail to ‘endeavour’ to maintain high levels of environmental protection”. The TAC also said it did not consider it likely that New Zealand’s existing pesticide rules would put it in breach of this obligation.

    Myth: Australia and New Zealand do not care about animal welfare.

    Reality: Maintaining our high standards is a red line in all our trade negotiations. Australian animal welfare standards are higher than many other countries around the world and are in some cases higher than those in the EU.

    RSPCA Australia worked closely with the Australian government to develop improved animal welfare guidelines and standards in 2016. The new standards are in the process of being enshrined in state and territorial law.

    Australian RSPCA-approved farms have animal welfare standards closer to the UK’s than current Australian legislation, including bans on tethering, hot-iron branding, sow stalls and veal crates and provide similar enrichments for meat and layer chickens.

    New Zealand is a global leader in animal welfare and shares the UK’s commitment to further improving and advancing our already high animal welfare standards. Both governments have a longstanding recognition of the sentience of animals. The Animal Protection Index ranks both New Zealand and the UK highly compared with others around the world across a range of animal welfare indicators.

    The UK and New Zealand already have a Veterinary Equivalency Agreement, meaning we trust and recognise many of their animal health standards as equivalent to the UK.

    Environment and climate change

    Myth: These trade deals do not contain environmental safeguards.

    Reality: The Australia FTA:

    • provides a vehicle for working with Australia to strengthen its policy response to the climate crisis
    • commits the UK and Australia to work collaboratively on climate change and reaffirms their commitments to upholding all their obligations under the Paris Agreement
    • ensures neither Australia nor the UK can deviate from their environmental laws to gain an unfair advantage in trade and investment

    Under the FTA, the UK and Australia will work together to:

    • combat illegal logging
    • control trade in products which contribute to the depletion of the ozone layer
    • prevent pollution from shipping and cooperate on addressing marine litter, including plastics and microplastics
    • promote conservation (including of sharks, turtles, seabirds)
    • tackle subsidies that contribute to overfishing, and enforcement to deter illegal fishing
    • conserve biodiversity and to tackle illegal trade in wild flora and fauna

    The New Zealand FTA:

    • sets new benchmarks on a range of issues, going beyond the precedent in several areas and supporting both UK and New Zealand efforts in important areas, from transitioning away from fossil fuels to deforestation and sustainable fisheries
    • contains the most comprehensive environmental goods list with liberalised tariffs in any FTA to date, with tariffs removed on products such as electric vehicles and wind turbine parts
    • includes ambitious commitments to end electricity generation from unabated coal, take steps to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies where they exist, and pursue an ambitious phasedown of hydrofluorocarbons
    • includes commitments to tackle environmental challenges such as illegal wildlife trade (including in ivory), air pollution, marine pollution and litter, and promote biodiversity, sustainable agriculture, and the transition to a circular economy
    • affirms our commitments to implement multilateral environmental agreements, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement and preserves the UK’s right to regulate including for net zero

    Myth: By signing this trade deal with Australia, the UK is encouraging poor agricultural practices, especially in relation to forests.

    Reality: Both the UK and Australia have committed to combating illegal logging and related trade, an issue of critical importance to the preservation of our natural environment and biodiversity.

    The environment chapter with Australia recognises the importance of sustainable forest management and strengthens bilateral cooperation and information-sharing.  We have also agreed provisions on promoting and cooperating on the transition towards a circular economy and reducing waste. These go beyond the terms of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, alongside cooperation on further areas including air quality and marine litter.

    Australia has also recently signed up to the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use at COP26 which includes a pledge to end deforestation by 2030.

    Australia has been reforesting rather than deforesting. The UK would be able to raise the issue of deforestation with Australia in the FTA’s Environment Working Group.

    Impacts of the deals

    Myth: Australia and New Zealand benefit more from these deals than the UK does.

    Reality: Australia and New Zealand are priority markets and valuable strategic partners in strengthening and increasing a UK network of trade agreements. By removing barriers, we generate more trade with Australia and New Zealand than if we had no agreement.

    These new partnerships with Australia and New Zealand are expected to increase bilateral trade by 53% and 59% respectively in the long run. They are expected to boost the UK economy by £2.3 billion and £800 million when compared to projected levels of GDP in 2035. The UK-Australia deal goes further than Australia has ever gone before in giving access to services companies. This means UK services from architecture and legal to financial services and shipping will be able to compete in the Australian market on a guaranteed equal footing.

    This could increase exports of UK services to Australia, which were worth £5 billion in 2020. UK investors will also benefit from more access than ever before to opportunities in Australia, with guaranteed rights to invest across the Australian economy. The majority of UK investments will no longer need to be reviewed by the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board – saving time, saving money and cutting red tape for UK investors.

    The UK-Australia deal is mutually beneficial in the long run, boosting both economies by £2.3 billion each when compared to projected levels of GDP in 2035.

    The UK-New Zealand trade relationship was worth £2.5 billion in 2021; the agreement is expected to significantly increase this by the equivalent of around £1.7 billion in the long run.

    Myth: These FTAs do not boost UK exports, only Australian and New Zealand exports into the UK.

    Reality: UK exports to New Zealand are estimated to increase by £0.7 billion, and UK imports from New Zealand are estimated to increase by £1 billion when compared to projected levels of trade in 2035.

    In terms of estimated growth in gross value added (GVA) in absolute terms, the largest contributions come from expansions in the manufacture of machinery (0.11% or £46 million) and motor vehicles (0.24% or £43 million).

    Services sectors are estimated to make the strongest contribution to the estimated growth in GVA as a result of the agreements, especially in terms of:

    • wholesale and retail services (0.04% or £105 million)
    • public services (0.03% or £82 million)
    • other services – transport, water, dwellings (0.03% or £82 million)

    UK exports to Australia are estimated to increase by £6.2 billion, when compared to projected levels in 2035 in the absence of the FTA.

    The agreement includes immediate tariff-free access on £2.3 billion worth of UK exports. 98% of estimated tariff reductions will come into immediate effect, on UK exports such as cars, Scotch whisky and ceramics. Once staging is complete, in year 6 of the agreement, 100% of UK exports will be eligible for tariff-free access.

    Duties of up to 5% will be eliminated on UK exports to Australia such as cars, whisky, some pharmaceutical products, motors, clothing and even Christmas decorations. Tariffs of up to around 20% on UK agri-food products such as cheese will also be eliminated.

    Based on historic trade flows, the total annual tariff reductions on UK exports to Australia are estimated to be £115 million at entry into force and £116 million in year 6. This is without considering potential increases in UK exports to Australia resulting from this agreement.

    Myth: We should be focussing on deals with bigger trading partners, such as the US or the Indo-Pacific region, as they will bring the biggest trade benefits.

    Reality: Both Australia and New Zealand are important partners in the Asia-Pacific region. These deals with both Australia and New Zealand complement the UK’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Australia and New Zealand are both leading members and have supported the UK’s bid for membership.

    These agreements will give the UK access to new supply chains and enable UK businesses to use Australia and New Zealand as a launchpad into Asia.

    These trade agreements are an important part in realising the government’s ambition to putting the UK at the centre of a network of modern deals spanning the Americas and Indo-Pacific.

    Myth: There has been no consideration of the impact these deals will have on UK nations and regions.

    Reality: These FTAs will deliver benefits to people, businesses and communities throughout the country and support economic growth.

    Playing to the strengths of all UK nations and regions, they:

    • benefit Scotland’s financial services industry
    • allow easier market access for engineering services firms in the West Midlands
    • provide new opportunities for Welsh fintech companies in Cardiff and Newport
    • help carmakers support thousands of jobs in the North East of England
    • cut tariffs for Northern Ireland’s textiles exporters

    The following table shows the projected GDP benefits for each part of the UK for each FTA:

    Nation or region Benefit from Australia FTA Benefit from New Zealand FTA
    East Midlands £90 million £20 million
    East of England £140 million £35 million
    London £400 million £130 million
    North East £65 million £15 million
    North West £189 million £55 million
    Northern Ireland £20 million £5 million
    Scotland £120 million £35 million
    South East £295 million £85 million
    South West £130 million £35 million
    Wales £60 million £15 million
    West Midlands £195 million £50 million
    Yorkshire and the Humber £100 million £25 million

    Parliamentary scrutiny

    Myth: The UK government has not fulfilled its obligations on scrutiny for these FTAs.

    Reality: Since the passage of the Japan FTA in Autumn 2020 the government has put in place more opportunities for Parliament to scrutinise free trade agreements.

    In the case of the Australia FTA, the government has exceeded its statutory obligations, passing the agreement text to Parliament almost 6 months before the start of the official Constitutional Reform and Governance Act (CRaG) scrutiny period in June 2022. The TAC report was passed to the IAC and ITC on 8 April – a week after it was received and in advance of its publication on 13 April 2022.

    In addition:

    • the full economic case and objectives were published at the start of the negotiations
    • full updates were provided at the end of every negotiating round
    • the full text of the treaties, including economic impact and explanatory documents were published as soon as possible after the agreements were signed
    • the Trade and Agriculture Commission and Food Standards Agency have independently reviewed the trade deals and reported on the impacts
    • the International Trade Select Committee has also undertaken a review of the trade deals

    We continue to review arrangements, ensuring they remain fit for purpose.

    Myth: The UK government has not accommodated requests from Parliament to scrutinise trade deals.

    Reality: CRaG provides an effective and robust framework for scrutiny of treaties that require ratification, including free trade agreements. While formally legislated for in 2010 under the previous Labour government, its origins date back almost 100 years.

    Under CRaG, the government must lay relevant treaties before Parliament for 21 sitting days before it can ratify them. Parliament has the power to prevent ratification and the House of Commons can do so indefinitely.

    In line with this government’s commitment to transparency, we have gone well beyond the statutory requirements of CRaG and provided comprehensive information to Parliament to support its scrutiny of our trade policy approach.

    In addition, no trade agreement can, of itself, alter our domestic legislation. Any changes to UK legislation that are required for our trade agreements will therefore need to be scrutinised and passed by Parliament in the usual way.

    The Lords Constitution Committee recommended in its 2019 report on scrutiny of treaties that:

    • existing parliamentary mechanisms, supported by the work of the designated treaties committee, should be sufficient to provide effective scrutiny
    • mandates for treaties should not be subject to parliamentary approval
    • the UK Parliament should be able to conduct scrutiny of our agreements in a way that is appropriate and bespoke to the UK constitutional context

    Devolved administrations

    Myth: The devolved administrations (DAs) have had no say in the negotiations of these trade agreements.

    Reality: While treaty-making powers are reserved and only the UK government can negotiate and ratify trade agreements, the DAs have been engaged regularly and extensively throughout trade negotiations.

    For example, in relation to the negotiations with Australia:

    • the Chief Negotiator/Deputy Chief Negotiator held discussions with their DA counterparts approximately 25 times over the course of negotiations
    • written information was shared with the DAs in devolved areas of competence
    • there were rolling policy discussions at official level – every chapter team held discussions with their DA counterparts at least every 6 weeks
    • ministers discussed the UK-Australia negotiations at the Ministerial Forum for Trade with regular updates and substantive discussion taking place in March and July 2021
  • Dominic Johnson – 2023 Closing Statement on the Australia/New Zealand Trade Bill (Baron Johnson of Lainston)

    Dominic Johnson – 2023 Closing Statement on the Australia/New Zealand Trade Bill (Baron Johnson of Lainston)

    The closing statement made by Dominic Johnson, Baron Johnson of Lainston, in the House of Lords on 9 January 2023.

    I thank noble Lords for taking part in today’s debate and for the contributions from all sides of the House: it has been absolutely fascinating. I am extremely grateful also that the Australian and New Zealand high commissioners made themselves available to watch part of the debate: I am grateful to them for their support, morally, in the Galleries. I also extend warm gratitude to the IAC and say how much I appreciate its involvement both before this debate and, I very much hope, in the next few weeks, as we go through Committee and Report.

    I join the long line of people congratulating my noble friend Lord Swire on his first-class maiden speech. He was certainly a better speaker and politician than he was a soldier, by the sounds of things, and I am very glad to have him behind me, as a result. Both he and the noble Lords, Lord Marland and Lord Howell, raised the Commonwealth. I totally agree with the importance we place on our links with the Commonwealth and the opportunities that our post-Brexit vision brings us in relation to the Commonwealth. I reassure my noble friends that the Government will and are making the most of the Commonwealth within our trade agenda. We have done 33 trade deals with Commonwealth members and we have a newly launched developing countries trading scheme, which I know my noble friend Lord Swire has discussed with me in the past. Total trade in goods and services between the UK and the Commonwealth was £121 billion in 2021, which I am delighted to report is an increase of 12% on 2020.

    I will answer some of the questions that have been raised and I will try to do so in as much detail as possible given the time available to me. I think this is a very important debate.

    The first point I would like to turn to is the question of why we are presenting this Bill to you today given that, in theory, there is a Procurement Bill that is being debated in the other place that will cancel this Bill. Well, actually, that is not completely true. All the provisions relating to Scotland are not in the Procurement Bill, so if we are to have consistency then we need to have this Bill relating to Scotland to follow through on top of the Procurement Bill, even when the Procurement Bill cancels this Bill—if that does not sound too bizarre.

    There is also an important point on timing. The Procurement Bill, rather than this procurement Bill called the Trade (Australia and New Zealand) Bill, will take many months to get on to our statute books. Following that, there will be a further six-month waiting period before the provisions in the Procurement Bill come into effect; that could be a year, or a year and a half, or it could be longer than that. Who would want to stand in the way of this opportunity to allow our traders and our citizens to benefit from this free trade deal when we are able to present to you today a very uncontentious tidying-up Bill around procurement that, as I say, will have to follow through in any event on the Scottish measures? The noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Purvis, my noble friend Lord Lansley and the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, all covered this point and I hope I have answered the reason for the logic of this Bill and the importance of it.

    I will also cover the issues surrounding negative versus affirmative statutory instruments. It is important to point out that, if you read the Bill, you will see that the powers therein are very specific—they are not intended to relate to procurement beyond the Australia and New Zealand trade Bill. The measures that we are considering that will be brought through as negative statutory instruments will be very procedural; they relate to things like the changing of names of government departments, so to assume—forgive my newness to this place and to Parliament in general—that we need to go through an affirmative process would be extremely cumbersome, time-consuming and really not relevant in this at all. As far as I am aware, the majority of the measures in this procurement Bill are effectively all being employed by procuring agents today anyway, so I am sure this brings much needed consistency, but in terms of changes it would not be significant. As a result, to have an impact assessment around this Bill would be unnecessary because the impact is to ensure that we can do our free trade agreement; it is not necessarily on the procurement processes that we are reforming. In fact, all the reforms seem eminently logical, and we should do them even if we were not doing a free trade deal.

    I was criticised for my tone. I am sorry if people think I am too optimistic about what free trade agreements can give us, but I am excited by what we have before us. I am excited by our post-Brexit vision of Britain, I am excited about the wealth that we can create for our citizens, I am excited about the opportunities that we are going to have for our businesses, and I am excited about enhancing our cultural, societal and citizenly relations with our sister nations in Australia and New Zealand. So, yes, I am excited, and I am frankly amazed that people are not more excited than me.

    Yes, every trade deal has give and take and it does revolve around change; I am aware of that and we should have a debate about it. I think what my noble friends Lord Hannan of Kingsclere, Lord Frost and Lord Udny-Lister, said about what great opportunities these are for us was right. I am a bit frustrated to some extent that we seem to think we are at a standing start with Australia and New Zealand when we are not and that this is the end of the road for our trade deals. We already trade with Australia and New Zealand; this is an improvement or enhancement; this is future-proofing our relationship and building it stronger. If we did not have this agreement, we could not deal with and look at in detail all the issues that people have purported to raise, like animal welfare, agriculture and the environment.

    We can provide the leadership through this process that we could not do without it. That is why it is so wonderful. It is everything that noble Lords opposite should want—the opportunity to encourage trade and wealth creation while showing leadership in our values. That is what this free trade agreement does. We talk about the engagement and scrutiny process. I have great sympathy with that. I am in two minds about the level of scrutiny that is useful when negotiating a free trade deal. It is useful for our counterparts to understand what our citizenry feels about certain important issues, and I know that the Australians and New Zealanders—certainly the Australians—are effective in engaging with their industry base.

    I was involved as a board director of the DIT in encouraging greater engagement with industry in the negotiating process and, frankly, we could continue to do more. I am not averse to suggestions. This is an iterative process and is the first of many deals, I hope. This is the simplest and most straightforward deal that we could have presented to the House, but we want to learn as much as possible from it. Therefore, while I would not look to change the process around the constitutional review that this House and the other place bring to bear on treaties in a specific and formalised sense, I am aware of and indeed desire greater engagement with business and the body politic. We otherwise end up with what we have today, a debate about any of the potential negatives of the deal, rather than people rejoicing in the huge opportunities that it presents to us.

    I am, to some extent, frustrated that not enough businesses have come out to say how much they are going to benefit from these deals when, in fact, they have spoken to me directly about the huge opportunities that there are. I want to try to build a bow-wave around our free trade agenda. I therefore take to heart the views that noble Lords have expressed today about engagement and scrutiny. As I say, while the processes should not change, there could certainly be more forward footedness in engagement. That is a good process, which helps to spread the power of these agreements and makes them more successful.

    I should make one important point. We are looking at these free trade agreements in the wrong way—through the wrong end of the telescope. We are used to trade agreements whereby one does a deal—some 1950s steel-type treaty on tariff allowances or whatever, such as allowing certain amounts of steel into the economy over a certain number of years—and that is it; one is stuck. The reason why the Ponsonby rule came into action was that Parliament was concerned that secret deals were being made that we could not get out of and that we did not know anything about.

    This is different. There has been a huge degree of scrutiny and discussion around these agreements—and this is not the end but just the beginning. They are structured to enable us to have intensive debate around each section, whereby all the key points that we have been discussing have committee and dialogue structures built into their mechanisms, to allow us to change and evolve these treaties. Scrutiny starts on day one. We will be able to make changes to these treaties if they do not suit us in the way in which they were intended to suit our economy and people. That is important. This is completely different from how conceptual treaties worked in the past. I congratulated the negotiators because flexibilities are built into this process to allow us not to be fearful of the outcomes of the treaties, because we can change them. That is at the core of the Government’s negotiating strategy and is why I am so enthusiastic about these treaties. Not only do they give us so much and allow us to lead the world in our value offerings but they are entirely flexible. If they do not work as we intend—it is hard to forecast everything—they can be altered through mutual agreement. That is enormously powerful.

    As to my final point on the impact assessment, we have a review at two and five years and of course I should be delighted to engage further with the House at those points. That is important; we have to assess the impact of these treaties because we want to learn how we can improve them. I very much support that process.

    I conclude on the scrutiny point by saying that I am sorry if noble Lords think that I am too optimistic about what these trade deals offer us. However, the reality is that, because of the way in which they have been structured, one has a high degree of scrutiny over the future of these trade deals and the Government have been forward footed in making sure that Parliament was part of the process, as it was always intended to be.

    I will cover three other points, one of which is the environment. These FTAs include environment chapters which recognise our right to regulate to meet net zero and reaffirm our commitments to the Paris Agreement. This is very important: at no point and in no area do these FTAs derogate our ability to control our own destiny. In fact, by having the negotiations with Australia, particularly before the Government changed, we were able to bring to bear on them the pressure to accord with our climate change ambitions. That is amazing. If the Greens want change in this area politically, this is a very powerful way of doing it—and we have done it. We were the first major economy to pass a legislative target to reach net zero by 2050. That was done by the Conservative Government, not by any other party. We lead the world in this area, and these trade agreements reflect that. In my view, this is another matter for us to rejoice in.

    The deal commits the UK and Australia to work together on climate change; that is very important. In other areas that have come up in the past—not necessarily in this debate—people have raised concerns about deforestation with regards to the FTA. I have mentioned my gratitude to the TAC for the work it has done in this whole process. It reports that, on a net basis, Australia has been reforesting rather than deforesting. Nothing in this agreement stops the Government taking domestic action on our side to deliver on our commitments to meet our climate objectives. I know there is some head shaking opposite me, but I can only go on the facts; I am slightly beholden by that.

    There is a view that Australia and New Zealand are far away, which they are. I like the idea that we are starting at the other end of the world and then working backwards. If you look at overall greenhouse gas emissions associated with UK-based production—largely unchanged from the agreement—you will see that there is a possibility of some increase in transport-related emissions associated with increased trade flows, but, according to the TAC, these impacts are likely to be negligible. This idea that we are going to have huge greenhouse emissions on account of transport increases is simply not being predicted. As my noble friend Lord Hannan pointed out, having a New Zealand lamb chop on your plate in the House of Lords restaurant is better for the environment than having one that comes from another part of the UK. Why can we not ask other parties to celebrate where we see environmental benefits from these trade deals? The assumption is that all trade deals are somehow negative for the environment; how can that possibly be the case? As my noble friend Lord Hannan said—I back up his point; it came from a Board of Trade report—the environmental impact of the production of New Zealand lamb is lower than ours in many cases, even if you include transport costs.

    My final point is very important: this agreement provides huge opportunities to boost trade in environmental goods which can speed the development and uptake of environmentally friendly production techniques. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, also raised this. Again, what are we trying to do with Australia and New Zealand? We are trying to sell them our technology on net zero, where we are global leaders, thus generating wealth for this country and improving our environment. If anyone thinks my tone is too rejoicing at the astonishing benefits that, factually, we bring through this agreement, I apologise again.

    I am very sensitive to the issue of agriculture, and I do not want there to be any sense of triumphalism about this trade agreement in that sense. The fact is that there is change and people are affected. However, it is important to note, first, that this agreement will have relatively limited negative impacts on certain agricultural sectors of the economy. That really is a fact, and I will go through that in a moment. The positives are also significant. We export more agricultural produce, in its broadest sense, to Australia than we import from it, so the gain is in our favour. We believe that the amount of meats which are competitive for us being imported from Australia into the UK will increase by very small amounts.

    As I have repeated, and repeat again, this is not an agreement starting from scratch. We already import New Zealand and Australian meats, and they are not using the quotas that we already have. Yes, we are liberalising our trade, and I think it is right to do that, but the fears that are being created among the body politic and the press are entirely unreasonable and, if I may say so, slightly disingenuous. There is no reason to fear this trade deal. If we did not have it, it would not make any difference in a negative sense on farmers. That is important for people to understand. This is actually an opportunity, because it unlocks—

    Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)

    Is the Minister saying that the impact assessment is wrong about the 5% and 3% reductions? The Minister has just said at the Dispatch Box that, if this agreement were not in place, there would be no negative impact. However, the impact assessment says that this agreement is bringing a negative impact. Will the Minister commit to revising the impact assessment before we reach Committee, because either he has just misled the House or the impact assessment is wrong? They cannot both be right.

    Lord Johnson of Lainston (Con)

    I am grateful for that point and would be happy to clarify. I will certainly work closely with the noble Lord in Committee.

    My point is that Australian imports already operate below the existing quotas. Even if we said that we were not going to have a trade deal with Australia and decided that we did not want to go ahead with a deal that I think will be hugely beneficial, we already have a quota system where the Australians are importing less. If we go to a new arrangement where, over 10 or 15 years, we gradually liberalise our agricultural imports, the very fact that we are increasing that higher level does not necessitate that we are going to put ourselves in a more disadvantaged position. I am not trying to suggest that the impact assessments are not correct. I have been sensitive about that; I said at the beginning that there are impacts and there will be change. We must be sensitive to that. However, I am saying that the claims that we are going to have a significant tsunami of Australian beef coming into the UK simply do not make logical sense when we are already importing less than the quotas imply. It is important to mention that.

    We have also touched on another relevant point. There are production differences between Australia and New Zealand; my noble friend Lord Hannan of Kingsclere mentioned this earlier. It is important that we take advantage of that fact. I will not be too much longer but let me quote the TAC, which states that

    “different production practices between countries are a function of different climatic, geographical, agronomic, environmental, economic and cultural conditions. Australian cattle and sheep live their lives outdoors, mainly on very large stations, which is different in the UK. It can never be assumed that what is normal in one country needs to be normal in another … Moreover, the international trading system, of which free trade agreements form a part, is predicated upon the understanding that countries should be able to benefit from advantages which they enjoy over their trading partners. Trade law, in principle, prohibits countries from restricting imports of products simply based on how they are made, whether this is by using their more abundant sunshine, land, educational skills or lower labour costs.”

    This is important. We are trying to do a trade deal where we have, enjoy and appreciate comparative advantage while at the same time being extremely firm on the controls that we will put in place to make sure that, if there is a significant increase in imports into the UK, we can restrict those imports and ensure that our farmers are protected. Following the 15-year point, we will still have WTO restrictions that we can fall back on.

    Baroness Young of Old Scone (Lab)

    Before the Minister finishes, I hope that he will give way for a microsecond. During my contribution, I asked whether he could let us have some detail of the systems that are in place to keep under surveillance the environmental, animal welfare and other standards on which he is giving us assurances, including how effectively they are operating. Will he agree to do that before we reach Committee?

    Lord Johnson of Lainston (Con)

    I thank the noble Baroness. I am about to go on to that exact chapter in making my final point on standards, which are important. I take this issue to heart.

    It is absolutely essential for everyone to realise that nothing has really changed in terms of our standards. In fact, we believe that, in some instances, we have increased our ability to protect ourselves. I want to quote from some of the important chapters in the Trade and Agriculture Commission’s report, if noble Lords will indulge me; I know that my noble friend Lady McIntosh wanted me to touch on these matters as well. The report states:

    “Importantly, all of these trade liberalisation obligations are fully covered by general exceptions, taken from WTO law, ensuring that the UK can regulate to protect animal or plant life or health … In addition, the FTA contains several rules in its environment and animal welfare chapters that expand on these rights to regulate, which gives the UK more leeway to override its trade liberalisation obligations—

    that goes to the whole friction between these points—

    “than it would have under WTO law.”

    This is very important. We are ironclad in our ability to control our standards.

    The concept of mulesing was raised. The TCA sees an increase in imports of mutton from mulesed sheep as negligible, and the FTA does not restrict the UK’s WTO rights to prohibit imports of products from Australia produced using the practice of mulesing without pain relief. I was told that 90% of all mulesing is done with pain relief. Yes, there are different practices and clearly, mulesing is not relevant in the UK because of flystrike and other conditions, but we have the ability to protect ourselves and we still have the ability to ensure that the food and goods we import conform to our standards.

    Also, in terms of animal welfare, these chapters are ground-breaking. It is worth using those words, which are appropriate. We have driven change there, and it reflects our values. New Zealand and Australia have a very strong commitment to raising animal welfare standards. It is also very important to point out that we still have complete control over pesticides and other such matters. Our approval process involves audit and assessment of a country’s system. Products entering the UK must be accompanied by certificates and a percentage are subject to physical checks to ensure that standards are maintained. We have worked very closely with the Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland. This is very important and—

    Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)

    My noble friend will be aware of a briefing from the Food Standards Agency, which is concerned about the increase in what is required of it. He might like to consider that.

    On a slightly separate point, my noble friend said that the purpose of the Bill is that the procurement provisions will apply in Scotland. My understanding is that the Scottish Government have withheld consent to the Procurement Bill so I am not quite sure how, constitutionally, we could not be seen to be circumventing the will of the Scottish Government and the Scottish people in this regard.

    Lord Johnson of Lainston (Con)

    I thank my noble friend for both her points, the first of which is heard. The assumption is that these agencies can police our borders. Clearly, if there are different requirements on account of this trade deal—although I cannot see why—certainly, we should look into that. We covered her second point in the debate. These are concurrent powers. We have consulted consistently and continually with all the devolved nations, and we are not requiring a legislative consent Motion to run those concurrent powers.

    I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to today’s debate. I reiterate my willingness to meet noble Lords and discuss this Bill further. Those who have spent time with me over the last month know that I am fully available to ensure that this Bill is a success. I am transparent and open to you and want to ensure that we learn in this iterative process to create even more effective trade deals into the future with different economies. This is not a “one size fits all” process. Just because we have an agreement with Australia and New Zealand does not mean that this agreement will be cut and pasted across to another country. Every country and economy is different and should be treated as such.

    Underpinning this Bill are two extraordinarily far-sighted trade deals between our sister nations, resulting in an estimated £10 billion increase in trade with Australia and £1.7 billion increase in trade with New Zealand. There have been discussions about how we get to those figures. Professor Minford suggested a £60 billion benefit for trade with Australia; our government forecasts gave us a figure of £10 billion. I am happy to discuss with the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, how to assess these trade deals more accurately. The impact assessment and the look back will help us in that regard.

    As I said to my noble friend Lady McIntosh, we have engaged with the devolved Governments at every stage of the process and have also allowed for greater parliamentary scrutiny than is prescribed in statute. We have shone the torch of the Trade and Agriculture Commission on these issues, and we have built two-year and five-year assessment breaks into the agreement. If we decide that we do not like these agreements, we can cancel them within a six-month notice period. These deals demonstrate our values and leadership on standards—that is very important and has come up in the debate today—how we operate with developing nations, labour rights, gender equality, the treatment of animals and the environment. These deals absolutely protect our agriculture industry and our standards in line with our values, while ensuring that we bring essential benefit to our consumers.

    These trade agreements are designed to be flexible, with a whole range of structures established to ensure proper dialogue and recourse. As I have said, they are not some post-war steel treaties. They are, thanks to our leadership and position as the new driver of our unique free trade mission, modern, future-proofed concepts which allow our nations to grow together in commerce and trade.

    These deals are being made between us and two allied Commonwealth nations, as has also been said, with the same Head of State and with those who died for our values in two world wars. We are their brothers, sisters, fathers, mothers and cousins. We already live and travel and own properties, businesses and farms in each other’s countries.

    As came up earlier, our levelling-up agenda plays an important part in how we will work together in the future. I ask Members of the House to talk to some of the firms and people positively affected by these deals. Your Lordships will see the palpable excitement, as I have shown, from chapters such as the ground-breaking one on SMEs welcomed by the FSB. All that is within a consumer protection section that will ensure that our consumers benefit from greater choice and lower prices in our shops.

    Contrary to critics’ view, the Government have thought out our trade strategy well. We want to ensure that our free trade agenda is indeed the framework that launches us on the path to give our citizens the choices and power to reach the ends of the earth. We should be proud of the decisions we have recently taken over our trading destiny and focus on creating a new world order, where we sit at the very centre of a series of geostrategic relationships and prosper from this network of trade and investment, shared culture and values, and build the wealth that gives us security and ultimately control over our destinies, which is at the very heart of our free, liberal and democratic-minded nation.

    The Government have taken the first major step on our journey. We are proud of the modern and comprehensive deals that we have negotiated, and I look forward to the passage of the Bill through your Lordships’ House.

    Bill read a second time.

  • Chris Lennie – 2023 Speech on Australia/New Zealand Trade Bill (Baron Lennie)

    Chris Lennie – 2023 Speech on Australia/New Zealand Trade Bill (Baron Lennie)

    The speech made by Chris Lennie, Baron Lennie, in the House of Lords on 9 January 2023.

    My Lords, I begin by declaring my interests in Australia. They are not about having relations who vote Labour in New Zealand, having the accent or being born with the accent, having been the high commissioner in Australia or having relatives in Australia. I was simply born there and, aged nine months, I was removed by my parents, brought to the UK, and have stayed here ever since. So there is no declaration of interest other than that.

    I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, to his first Bill as a new Minister for trade. I wish him not a long period in office but a reasonable time in office to get used to the seat and so on before the next election. I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Swire, on his maiden speech. He has much experience in Northern Ireland, the Foreign Office and elsewhere, and he will bring much to bear in this debate and others in this House. I welcome him. I also thank all other noble Lords for their contributions to the debate.

    It seems to me that we have identified two key issues: one is about strategy, or the lack of strategy, and the second is about scrutiny, or the lack of scrutiny. That seemed to be a running theme whichever side of the House, or none, people were speaking from.

    I am grateful for this opportunity to add my own remarks to the debate, which presents an opportunity to scrutinise the deals covered by this Bill, as short as it may be, with only four clauses and two schedules. But these are the first trade agreements made from scratch, as others have said, since the UK left the EU, and in the absence of a published government trade policy, this Bill, and the FTAs it helps to implement, represents the premier evidence available of the Government’s post-Brexit approach to trade. This is what we will be judged on. These deals set a precedent both for what the rest of the world will expect from us in this era and, to a certain extent, for the process that we can expect in parliamentary scrutiny of these and other trade deals that will follow. This is a proper precedent. This particular Bill may not have much life, and may be replaced by the Procurement Bill in a matter of weeks, but at least it sets a precedent. I have more to say on that point later.

    Before that, let me express our welcome that these trade deals have been secured, with the deepening of links with two old friends—Australia and New Zealand—and the elements of both deals which will be beneficial for our country. The Government have of course highlighted some of the key benefits of the trade agreements—indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, has not just highlighted them but been vociferous in his welcoming of their benefits, which we also welcome, such as the elimination of tariffs on all UK exports to Australia and New Zealand, creating new opportunities for UK professionals and businesses in both countries, and more. However, while they are welcome, it is impossible to ignore—as referred to by a number of noble Lords—that the financial impact of both deals is insignificant and, we might say, wrapped in a degree of uncertainty. As we have heard, the Government’s own assessment estimates that the Australia deal will increase UK GDP by only 0.08% by 2035 and the New Zealand deal by only 0.03% by 2035. So they are not a big deal for our economy, even though they are a big deal given the precedent that they set for deals that we might negotiate in the future.

    Given the significant uncertainty that the impact assessment openly admits, when paired with what is missing it is hard to disagree with the assessments of the Prime Minister, who called them “one sided”, or of the former Environment Secretary, who has been referred to, when he said that the best clause in our treaty with Australia is the one that allows us to rip it up with six months’ notice. They both also suggested that the UK

    “shouldn’t be rushing to sign trade deals as quickly as possible”.

    Given the lack of progress in deals with the USA and India—we had a Written Statement today on India, which says that there is no deal yet and that the seventh round of negotiations is under way, but nothing like a deal is in sight—that does not seem to be the issue, but may certainly explain the continuing stasis.

    These deals were supposed to pave the way for easier CPTPP membership. The Government have said that they hoped to conclude joining by the end of 2022. After 15 months of negotiations, that date has been and gone. What has happened to our purported membership of the CPTPP? Are we waiting to sign individual deals with as many countries as possible before that negotiation can be concluded? Which way is it? Are we trying to join the CPTPP or are we awaiting further deals before we push that attempt?

    As for what is missing from the deals, where do we start? Where is the leadership on tackling climate change, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, and others asked? The Australia agreement fails to set out specific commitments on climate change, with no sign of the reaffirmation of commitments under the Paris Agreement that was promised by the Government. Properly addressing this would enhance all our trade deals, not least because this is a key and growing market for international trade. This was the first opportunity to set the important precedent, and we missed it.

    An absence of engagement with workers’ representatives is clearly shown by the lack of a gold standard of workers’ rights found in these agreements. The TUC highlighted the lack of

    “commitments to ILO core conventions and an obligation for both parties to ratify and respect those agreements.”

    As I said, these deals set a precedent. When we turn to negotiations with countries with inferior worker protections to those of Australia and New Zealand, this will certainly not set a positive foundation for ensuring that workers’ rights are protected there.

    The hit to the agriculture sector has been well documented: the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, and others made this point. The Government’s own impact assessment shows a £94 million hit to farming, forestry and fishing and a £225 million hit to our semi-processed food industry from the agreement with Australia. This has rightly been criticised for both lowering standards and hurting British farmers, as others have said. The procurement provisions in the Bill, while certainly welcome, lack a requirement for the specific support that UK firms could benefit from in order to take advantage of the opportunities created by the agreements in both Australia and New Zealand.

    Turning to scrutiny, the elephant in the room is that both of the agreements which form the basis of this legislation are long overdue and have already been signed between the respective Governments. As a result, the scope for changes to the agreements at this time is extremely limited, and we anticipate that our amendments at future stages will show this, through a focus on better assessing the impact of the agreements. In that regard, I particularly thank my noble friend Lady Hayter. She is not in her place today, but I think five members of the International Agreement Committee have spoken in this debate. We are grateful to that committee for its excellent work in scrutinising the agreements themselves through two reports last year, both of which have been very helpful in examining these agreements. The Australia report also presented an additional opportunity for a very useful debate last July, and I understand we are expecting a response to the report on the New Zealand agreement from the Government, probably tomorrow: I await that with keen interest.

    This work has given us something of an advantage over the other place, where opportunities have been particularly lacking. It was deeply concerning that the Government limited the time available for scrutiny of the Australian agreement by tabling it late in the day and by the Trade Secretary delaying an evidence session. I understand that provisions in the Procurement Bill, currently in the other place—it has its Second Reading today—will also make Bills such as this one unnecessary for future trade agreements, further curbing available opportunities for scrutiny. I hope the Government will learn from this and not continue to avoid scrutiny in this manner. Ministers have been granted significant powers in trade negotiations and they can expect that we will continue to push for more scrutiny, so parliamentarians and wider groups can properly impact on the process.

  • Jeremy Purvis – 2023 Speech on the Australia/New Zealand Trade Bill (Baron Purvis of Tweed)

    Jeremy Purvis – 2023 Speech on the Australia/New Zealand Trade Bill (Baron Purvis of Tweed)

    The speech made by Jeremy Purvis, Baron Purvis of Tweed, in the House of Lords on 9 January 2023.

    My Lords, I think I followed the first eight minutes of the interesting speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, which were against government intervention, followed by four minutes of supporting state subsidies, but I will read Hansard tomorrow to see if I have got that wrong. I am also keen to find out how long the new year’s resolution of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, lasts. With all this optimistic chat about scotch whisky, my one for dry January will not be lasting very long.

    I thank the Minister for engaging with me and others before this debate. I note that he said in his opening remarks that he has a continuing financial interest in New Zealand. I wonder if he could provide some more information on what that is and place it in the Library. That would be useful to know, since he is the Minister for Investment implementing this series of agreements. I also welcome the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Swire. I can reassure him that if he marches in the wrong direction towards a different Lobby from that of his Government, he will not be roundly condemned by all sides. I welcome him to this House and look forward to his contributions.

    Last week was going to be a momentous week for us regarding trade. It was to be the week in which we secured, according to the promise in the 2019 Conservative manifesto, that 80% of our trade would be conducted through trade agreements, but that has been missed by a very large margin. Instead, we have seen new barriers and burdens on businesses trading with our nearest neighbours repeatedly increase, while trade with and imports from less free countries, such as China, also continue to increase. But we should take solace that this agreement, representing 0.08% over 15 years, will edge us that little bit closer to the 80% mark.

    I also welcome the Minister’s enthusiasm for these debates. He was giving full-throated support for FTAs, but I noted that just a few days ago it was reported that the Secretary of State, Kemi Badenoch, told MPs that she

    “wanted us to move away from the DIT being seen as the Department for free trade agreements and back to the Department for International Trade”.

    I am not sure how it can go back to being that department, given that there has been list after list of boosterism with regard to FTAs. I understand that her favourite quote refers to trade deals being like motorways. She has said that if cars are not going back and forth, then you might as well not have built them in the first place. The problem is that we are building one lane for exporters from the UK to their markets, and three lanes from theirs to us. As George Eustice highlighted in the debate, on this agreement we

    “gave away far too much for far too little in return”—[Official Report, Commons, 14/11/22; col. 424.]

    Agreeing with the Conservative former Secretary of State for Defra does not necessarily make you anti-free trade. It just means that you are concerned about poor negotiations in free trade agreements. They are not necessarily inconsistent. It is interesting that George Eustice, Liam Fox and others now say that it would strengthen their hand in these negotiations if Parliament approved negotiating mandates. I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Marland, on this. At the time, Ministers say that it will weaken their hand in negotiations. But when they are no longer Ministers, all of a sudden, they say, “I wish Parliament had approved my negotiating mandate because it would have been stronger”. How much precedent do we need to be persuaded about this?

    I have a collection of press releases on my desk in the Lords because I have been covering international trade for a wee while. Those press releases relate to agreements. There could be a quiz at the end of the year on which press releases relate to which trade agreements. “Gold standard” is one; “world leading” is another; “Brexit bonanza” is a third; “most advanced ever signed” is a fourth and

    “a major moment in our national history”—[Official Report, Commons, 14/9/20; col. 25.]

    is a fifth. If boosterism was a commodity, then we would be world leading. That does not necessarily bring about any extra GDP growth. My favourite one was from Anne-Marie Trevelyan, the former Secretary of State, when she was in Australia last year. She said that this agreement would bring down UK inflation. She said it as a Minister on a visit to Australia. I would be grateful if the Minister could write and say how much it is going to contribute to this and how.

    The Australians, probably quite rightly, referred from their perspective to this as a “once in a generation” agreement. It is not a good deal for us, as George Eustice has said, but the Australians, to give them credit, have negotiated a good deal. The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, is absolutely right that there was a degree of suspicion among government that extra scrutiny would not help the Government’s case on the agreement they signed.

    On the Grimstone rule, I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, that he is right. We debated the Australia agreement in Grand Committee, but the Commons did not have an opportunity to do it and had to call for an Urgent Question to have time to discuss it. What had then been the Grimstone rule—on cue, the noble Lord is soon to resume his place as I refer to him—no longer applies. When he gave that commitment with great sincerity in debate on 23 February 2021, he replied to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and me:

    “What have we done? It includes committing to allow time for the relevant Select Committees to report on a concluded FTA before the start of the CRaG process.”—[Official Report, 23/2/21; col. 729.]

    It is not before the conclusion, or during the scrutiny period, but before the start of the CRaG process. That is no longer in place, which is to be regretted.

    I asked the Minister a Question before Christmas on a separate agreement to incorporate human rights in all FTAs, which has now been reneged upon. The noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister—I was interested in his contribution today—asked a follow-up question and said that he hoped FTAs would not be “Christmas trees”. The Minister agreed with him. However, he is supporting a bauble of a Bill, because procurement is not trade but public finance policy. How Governments choose to spend taxpayer money is not like businesses doing business with others or the consumer. It is about public taxpayers’ money being spent; it is extra. If it is okay to have procurement, then it is also okay to look at labour standards, human rights, sustainability and indigenous communities. That is what makes these deep and comprehensive agreements about the trading relationship—and, critically, fair trade.

    I have to warn the Minister that his comment on setting aside trade and human rights, which I hope he will reflect on, will concern those in Northern Ireland, because human rights is hard-wired into both trade agreements and procurement rules within the United Kingdom. Moving dramatically away from that will mean that we will also have to change our development policy and strategy, because trade, human rights and trading with free nations with human rights standards is an integral part of the development strategy published by this Government. If that is no longer the case, we need a new development policy as well to remove this utter incoherence.

    A ridiculous element raised in this debate is that we are almost going through the last rites of a Bill before it is made deceased by the Procurement Bill, which is receiving its Second Reading in the Commons today. This is simply not the way we should properly legislate—but we will do our job and scrutinise it properly. But, yet again, we are debating a Bill that has a significant impact in devolved areas and that is introducing new concurrent powers. I remind the House that concurrent powers are the invention of this Government, where they say that, if a devolved Government do not make a decision to act in their areas of competence, the UK Government will do so if they want. This is not consistent with the principle of devolution, and it is therefore no surprise that there is significant concern in the Welsh Senedd and the Scottish Parliament. Due to the fact that statutory instruments will likely be brought forward to directly act on devolved policy—without LCMs themselves—we need to know what they are before the conclusion of the Bill in this House. So I hope that the Minister will be able to publish draft instruments expected from the Bill.

    As we have heard today, a question then arises about the impact the Bill will have overall. We know that it is likely to cause 0.08% to 0.1% GDP growth over 15 years, but I note what the former Secretary of State said about giving away “too much” for “too little in return”. From the contributions of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, and others, we know that some of these critical sectors—beef and lamb—will decline by 5% and 3%. This will disproportionately impact areas such as those in the lowlands of Scotland that I was elected to represent. The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, made the point, which I referred to, that that is okay because you can give state subsidies to those areas, presumably as long as it is consistent with WTO subsidy rules. But, as the noble Baroness indicated, what is the point of having a procurement policy that proactively supports purchasing from a sector of the economy that the Government know is being reduced by an agreement that they negotiated? This is utterly contradictory and pointless.

    On the procurement side, the Government’s press release indicated that the agreement

    “gives UK firms guaranteed access to bid for an additional £10 billion worth of Australian public sector contracts per year.”

    I was interested in this because, according to the Australian finance ministry, total public procurement spend in Australia was £46 billion. The UK equivalent is £379 billion, so there is no dispute about who is more attracted to getting access to a bigger market. But from that 81 billion Australian dollars, you deduct 10 billion for thresholds differences, 12 billion for things already procured by overseas interests and another 11 billion for defence. You are therefore left with a total market of £27 billion, which is already governed by the GPA. So I simply do not know where this extra £10 billion-worth of opportunity, which we were not able to access through global procurement, comes from. I would be grateful if the Minister could give a detailed breakdown, because I am interested in how we are able to get another £10 billion—which does not exist—from that £27 billion. Perhaps this is boosterism, but I will allow the Minister to write to me with a detailed breakdown.

    I would be grateful to know, because it has not been mentioned so far, why there is no detail in the Government’s impact assessment on the fact that the Australian approach is to allocate at least 20% of all their procurement to their SMEs, which means that that element of the market is still closed. I would also be grateful to know if the Government could say why we acquiesced to Australia’s carve-out for local government to be excluded from the agreement—we only found out about that in a side letter which confirmed it. Why is local government procurement, which the Minister did not mention, not included in the agreement?

    There is a very interesting contradiction between this Bill and the Procurement Bill, which the Commons is discussing at the moment: unique to the agreement on procurement with Australia, and to satisfy the Australians, we have increased the threshold for procurement. We did not receive any information on this from either the noble Lord, Lord True, or the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, during the many debates on the Procurement Bill. All procurement for subcentral government levels in the UK is £213,477, but for Australia that figure has gone up to over £350,000. I do not know why the threshold for procurement, as it stands in the UK across all areas of procurement, is different for the Australians. That is deeply confusing for all those procurement bodies, because they will likely need to state whether a source of procurement is from an Australian enterprise and therefore operating under a different threshold from all other procurement within the UK. I simply do not know how that will operate, but I would be grateful if the Minister could put us right on that or if we could pursue it in Committee.

    I will make two final points in drawing to a conclusion, one of which is a point of principle on some of the differences on agriculture we have heard in the debate. We have heard from some noble Lords—including the noble Lord, Lord Frost, and others—that the elements of agriculture should have been accelerated. It should not have been over a 15-year period, because consumers, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, indicated, should receive sooner the bounty of what this agreement was intended to give. Theoretically, that is an interesting argument for full liberalisation, but, as George Eustice has said, we already had full liberalisation from us to them; what we have done is given them full liberalisation to us with nothing in return.

    I checked the impact assessment during the debate, and paragraph 5.2 states that the total sum impact on UK consumers of the agreement with Australia is, in the long run, over 15 years, £2.4 million annually—thruppence per person a year in year 15. So what are the consumer bounty benefits that will come at the cost of our hill farmers losing 5% and our beef manufacturers losing 3% of procurement? I do not see the benefit for consumers; the benefits which have been presented today are mythical. But the Bill will go into Committee and there will be ample opportunity for us to learn more about the benefit of 3p a year per consumer while seeing our hill farmers being reduced.

    In conclusion, this leads us to a very clear case for a comprehensive trade policy which links to our rural economy sector and the need for parliamentary scrutiny. How many former Ministers in the Cabinet does it take for the Government to realise that Parliament approving negotiation mandates will strengthen the UK, not weaken it? We have FTAs that were a priority, but now they are not. Deadlines, which were previously vital for the agreements, are now not helpful. Human rights were integral to the agreements, but now they are not a priority. Data policy was consistent with the EU and then not, and now might be; we do not know where that stands. Dispute resolution mechanisms are different in Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Australia; they are utterly inconsistent. There is labour mobility in Australia, but the Home Office warns against it for India. There are other contradictory areas in what we are asked to approve by the Government. We need a government trade strategy with a policy that is approved by Parliament; that will help us do our job in this Parliament.

  • Daniel Hannan – 2023 Speech on the Australia/New Zealand Trade Deal (Baron Hannan of Kingsclere)

    Daniel Hannan – 2023 Speech on the Australia/New Zealand Trade Deal (Baron Hannan of Kingsclere)

    The speech made by Daniel Hannan, Baron Hannan of Kingsclere, in the House of Lords on 9 January 2023.

    My Lords, I refer to my declaration in the register of interests as president of the Institute for Free Trade and an adviser to the UK Board of Trade. I had not been aware prior to this debate that we were also expected to make familial or genetic declarations of interest, but for the record I have a large family in New Zealand, a lot of whom are Labour voters. We are about as distant as we could be geographically, but about as close as we could be in every other respect. Actually, some of them have moved to Australia, as many Kiwis have done, where they can very easily work under the terms of the ANZCERTA deal between the countries. I hope that we will work towards the long-term goal of going deeper than we have with these treaties and try lateralising ANZCERTA. We share extraordinary closeness and interoperability economically.

    It is also a huge pleasure to welcome the maiden speech of my noble friend Lord Swire, whose wit, effervescence and largeness of spirit will delight our debates and elevate our counsels.

    I am asked on occasion whether I have any regrets about Brexit. My chief regret is very easily stated: it is that it was followed by an unpleasant culture war through which prism we still judge almost everything. It is extraordinary that six and a half years after the debate, questions such as this are still being approached fundamentally by where people stood on the original referendum. I am not talking about people who are against trade in general. I am not talking about the Trumpsters or the Corbynites or those such as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, who has always been very clear that she does not much like free trade. She wants self-sufficient communities, and she sees the exchange of goods as a contingent necessity and a necessary evil—fine. She has been completely consistent in that position in all the interventions she has made in your Lordships’ Chamber.

    I would, however, address those who see themselves as generally supporting the liberal order and the free exchange of goods and services. I put this general question to them: would you judge the Bill in the same way if it were a trade deal between the EU and Australia and New Zealand? Would you still be talking about getting swamped by cheap food and so on, or would you be celebrating its provisions?

    When my right honourable friend Liam Fox was at the Department for International Trade, he did a series of opinion polls and focus groups and found a fascinating switch in opinion—a polar switch if you like. The kinds of people who had previously been the most in favour—the most open and liberal—in their attitude to commerce had now begun to associate global Britain with people and arguments that they did not like, and were therefore falling back into these protectionist and mercantilist arguments about standing up for our producers. Happily, the opposite was also true: a certain type of UKIP voter who, 10 years ago, would have been grumbling about whether the French should be able to own our energy companies had become much more in favour of international trade.

    Let me address the people who are in favour of trade in general; let us leave aside the people who think it is a bad idea. Is there anything in the Bill that you would seriously object to were it not for this ongoing culture war? I will not rehearse in full all its advantages; we have already heard them from my noble friend the Minister, who really knows his onions, as well as his Australian iron ore, his New Zealand lamb and his trade and tariff quotas—rarely has someone been so fitted to the ministerial office by their interests and enthusiasms. The fact that we have the removal of 100% of tariffs is, of course, a very good thing and has attracted more comment than almost everything else, but I would say it is virtually the least important aspect of the Bill.

    We are not in the 19th century, when we were mainly interested in foodstuffs and manufactured goods. We could look at the provisions of these treaties on mobility, which the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, was generous enough to acknowledge as a major positive: the ability of people who speak the same languages and have similar qualifications from, often, the same educational institutions to work without hindrance in each other’s economies. We could look at the provisions on services; we always think of financial services, but there is also shipping, architecture, and the audio-visual sector. We could look at the rules on cross-border data, on investment and, indeed, on procurement; it is extraordinary that the British companies will effectively be treated as if they were Australian or New Zealand companies for large measures of procurement in those countries. This is an extraordinarily successful negotiation. Yes, of course it could go further, and we will all find one or two aspects with which to disagree, but there is no world in which we are worse off after the Bill than before it.

    I would like to address some of the criticism that we have heard in this Chamber and outside its walls. Something that we heard from a number of noble Lords was the mercantilist objection. People have said that this is an asymmetric Bill; that we are lowering tariffs faster on this side than on the other side. Good—that is the advantage of trade; it means that you can buy stuff cheaper. I am amazed by how many people think of themselves as free marketeers but, in the post-EU context, struggle or affect to struggle with this point.

    I think of the number of times I have been asked, “We are letting in all this Australian beef—what are we getting in return?” The answer is that we are getting the beef: high-quality, nutritious and excellent beef. If you do not want it, do not buy it; that is the basis of how a market system works. The idea that you judge a country by its trade surpluses—that exports are the only thing that matter—was debunked by Adam Smith, but it continues to come back as a zombie argument in every generation.

    I have big trade deficits with all the pubs around me in the Hampshire-Berkshire borders—with the Watership Down, Bel and the Dragon, and the White Hart in Overton. Sometimes they engage in dumping; they will say, “Have a free glass of wine if you have a meal on a Monday,” or whatever. Who gets the better end of that deal? There is nothing wrong with getting cheaper imports; that is what drives the economy. It means that people spend less money on the basics so they have more resources to spend on everything else; that is what drives growth.

    That brings us, rather neatly, on to the farming or NFU objection. The NFU is in this curious position now where it opposes trade deals with everyone except the European Union. It does not phrase it like that, but that is the practical position it has taken. It does it by deliberately conflating what is allowed in other countries for domestic purposes, and trade deals. We have had a bit of that in the Chamber today: “Australia permits x or y and we do not like it”. Yes, but that does not affect our own standards of what is permissible and may be sold here. No country has ever tried to insist on exporting its own production standards, as opposed to its own food standards. The EU has never done so and, by the way, if we did so—if we consistently said we would not import food unless the production standards were identical—we would not have a free trade agreement with the European Union because we diverge in a number of areas from the EU. No one has ever done that, and it is mischievous to suggest that somehow, that could be done in this case. We are talking about countries with high welfare standards, countries very similar to our own.

    I ought to address the hill farms question because it is important. The people who are stewards of our upland areas perform a service for the rest of us that goes well beyond food production. They are looking after a common resource: a beautiful countryside. It is a difficult thing to monetise. We drive past it and it looks very nice. It is what economists would call an externality. If we regard that as an important service, then we should reward them directly for doing so, and that has nothing to do with the levels of tariffs on New Zealand lamb. In some cases, these hill farmers will be getting more than 50%—significantly more in one or two cases—of their income from the Government in direct grants. There is an argument for being more generous, but their income will not be affected by the levels of tariffs we have on Australia and New Zealand. Indeed, when it comes to beef, the beef currently being imported from Ireland and France will instead be imported from the Commonwealth. It will have almost no impact on our domestic producers.

    On food miles, the point was made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and others that we should not be trading with distant places, other things being equal, and we should try to do everything as locally as possible. We live in an age where geographical proximity has never mattered less. When the European Union was founded, there was an argument for regional blocs, but advances in refrigeration, the internet and cheap air travel have completely revolutionised the situation. There have been studies of the environmental impact of importing New Zealand lamb. Astonishingly, it turns out that New Zealand lamb eaten in London has a smaller carbon footprint than Welsh lamb eaten in London.

    That may seem counterintuitive, but think about it. First, the overwhelming preponderance of carbon production is in the food production phase—on the farm. The things that make the Kiwi farmers efficient, the economies of scale and so on, tend also to mean they use less fertiliser, less heating and so on. By being cheap, they also make themselves more environmentally friendly. The very same thing that noble Lords were complaining about—the imbalance—tends to make things cheaper. In terms of transport, if we think about the size of one of those tankers, the tiny proportion of it take up by one lamb chop, and the efficient route it takes it straight from port to port and then to distribution, that is a very different thing from driving a small number of bits of frozen meat from a remote hill farm. So, even in the transport phase, often, there is no difference. I wonder how much of the argument about food miles is results driven or based on resentment of the fact that we are in this situation at all.

    Finally, on the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Old Scone—whether trade deals should be about the environment and democratisation—we all share her concern about those things. Who does not want a cleaner environment and the spread of democracy? But we should be careful of a category error: these are not things to be squeezed into a trade deal as a coda. The more important they are, the more they should be dealt with in their own right with an international treaty. In fact, if I have a criticism of these two deals and of the DfIT’s approach so far, it is that it has been too ready to get into areas that have nothing to do with the removal of trade barriers and to have chapters on indigenous rights in New Zealand, or whatever. That is a perfectly valid and important issue but it does not belong in a trade agreement.

    Let us not lose sight of what we stand to gain. Your Lordships’ Chamber is, in a sense, our national institutional memory and it is our duty to recall the things that worked and that raised this country to success. Few things are more clearly in that category than free commerce and free exchange. We invented in theory with the writings of Adam Smith and David Ricardo; we then invented in practice as the first country to remove tariffs, from the 1840s. We did so unilaterally because we understood that the biggest advantage in trade was allowing prices to fall, so that our people were better off and would have more wherewithal to drive economic growth. Let us be worthy of the deeds of our ancestors. Let us pass on their success to our descendants.

  • Richard Fletcher-Vane – 2023 Speech on the Australia/New Zealand Trade Bill (2nd Baron Inglewood)

    Richard Fletcher-Vane – 2023 Speech on the Australia/New Zealand Trade Bill (2nd Baron Inglewood)

    The speech made by Richard Fletcher-Vane, 2nd Baron Inglewood, in the House of Lords on 9 January 2023.

    My Lords, I have enjoyed listening to this debate, with its splendid opening from the Minister and the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Swire. I have learned a lot about things I did not know much about before. But, since we are declaring interests rather like throwing confetti at a wedding, I ought to say that my cousin is married to a very senior New Zealand diplomat. I assure your Lordships that, when we meet on social occasions, we do not talk about the Trade (Australia and New Zealand) Bill but plenty of other more amusing topics. I should also declare that I am a Cumbrian farmer and we have a hill farming enterprise. I am also patron of the United Kingdom Livestock Auctioneers’ Association, president of the National Sheep Association and chairman of the Cumbria local enterprise partnership.

    I will divide my comments into three parts: scrutiny; free trade agreements; and the impact on farming. I am not sure that I have a lot more to say about Parliament’s role and the wider public scrutiny of trade deals. In the world we are in now, even if the letter of the law is followed, the wider process is inadequate and needs root and branch reform. The royal prerogative should not be used as a fig leaf to cover up important political and legislative initiatives, which have far-reaching domestic implications. In many ways, the process is worse than the criticisms of the workings of the EU. We need to revisit the whole thing, from the basis of not what happened in the past but what is necessary in the future.

    On free trade agreements, which I understand are being proposed as a replacement for the EU single market, the underlying problem is that they may be a replacement but they are not a complete substitute. Much of the criticism of the single market and its rules came from those who do not have supply chains of the kind many businesses have, in particular much advanced manufacturing. These supply chains are extremely complicated and often very long. Physical proximity is, on many occasions, very important. For example, someone in London must be more likely from choice to do business in Newcastle upon Tyne than with Newcastle, New South Wales. It is a reality. In this context, geography matters. Fine-tuning and dispute resolution are much easier when you are close to hand.

    Indeed, I had an example of this kind of problem only this autumn. My farm is replacing its dairy parlour. For the new system we are adopting, we decided that the best product was a New Zealand parlour, which we organised. It was due to be in the boat for three months—this is the kind of point that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, made. Bad weather got in the way and after about four months we were getting really very worried about the whole progress of our contract.

    In any event, free trade areas and single markets are distinctly different. Free trade areas do not of themselves permit goods allowed through the tariff wall of another country to be traded on an equivalent basis as domestically produced goods. Non-tariff barriers can be and are at least as significant as tariffs in inhibiting trade, as has been pointed out. In short, the point of a single market is frictionless trade. The purpose of the European single market, devised, as we know, principally by Lord Cockfield, a Conservative Cabinet Minister and European Commissioner, through the 1992 programme, was to achieve that. That was the purpose of the whole exercise, because the then European internal market was not delivering the benefits to the public which were hoped for and which it was felt capable of delivering, which had been advocated in perhaps too sanguine and hyperbolic terms—possibly, dare I say it, slightly along the lines of some of the Minister’s opening remarks.

    The evidence of trade in the 1990s clearly showed that this worked, which was endorsed by the Government’s helpful The UK and the Single Market topic paper of 2011, which predicted a similar trajectory along the lines of household income gains of 2% to 6% per annum. Clearly, this has gone into reverse. Interestingly, the recent statistics that I have seen for the Cumbrian economy, where, as I said, I chair the local enterprise partnership, suggest the general accuracy of that assessment from 2011. The new good things—let us not overlook the fact that there are good things—do not begin to off-set the damage that has been done.

    Clearly, although any free trade agreement with our friends—as has been said, Australia and New Zealand are our friends—is unlikely to damage our prosperity, it cannot recapture all that is lost. We have now left the European Union. There is a tabula rasa in front of us. The single market is not the same as the European Union, be it in whole or in part. As a matter of urgency, we have to try to seek a better trading relationship with our neighbours for the reasons that I have touched on.

    Finally, I turn to farming. As I explained, I am a farmer in the red wall area. I am a hill farmer; part of my business is hill sheep. I have done that for a lot of years—if I am allowed to give people some financial advice, if you want to make money, do not try that. The crucial point from the Cumbrian perspective is that farming is an important and significant part of the local economy, which together in harness with the visitor economy becomes a very important part of our economy, which is struggling under all the obvious and various difficulties these things face. This sector has to be a focus of the levelling-up agenda. It is just as important as some of those that have been specifically targeted. I am afraid that the Government have been extremely quiet about their approach to this important sector of the economy in a part of the country that is in need of all the help it can get at present. That is not to say that nothing good is happening; good things are happening, but there are still enormous problems.

    Against that background, I ask myself: what then are the Government doing even contemplating allowing agricultural products into our market which are produced to lower welfare and environmental standards than those stipulated here? I am not complaining, and I do not think anyone else can complain, about competition on a fair and even-handed basis in the marketplace, but this is not. It looks potentially positively discriminatory against the UK producer. I do not think we should forget quite how clear it was made in the debates in this Chamber on the then Agriculture Bill how strongly the country as a whole wants high environmental and welfare standards. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, made a point about mulesing. I just do not think it is an acceptable practice for farmers selling meat into this country. The public would not entertain it.

    What is more, there is the question of extraterritoriality. Here we are trying to stipulate certain conditions on trade which will have a direct impact on another country. That is something that is completely accepted. If we look back at the Ivory Bill, which we discussed in this Chamber not that long ago, we will recall that its whole point was to change a series of environmental activities and actions somewhere completely outside the jurisdiction. That is something that we are familiar with, and I do not think we should be concerned about taking steps to do so if it is right in the circumstances.

    The Government have said that all these animal welfare and environmental things are basically de minimis and we do not need to worry about them, but we all know that this is what Governments always say when they are skating on thin ice and cannot think of anything better. However, if that really is the case, why are the provisions there at all? If they actually do not matter, surely the counterparties will be only too happy to clarify things and to agree. I say to the Government: reassure the public and the farming community about this because if you do not, given what I am afraid to say is the mess of the current agricultural policy, it is kicking a man while he is down. I was told many years ago that one of the significant differences between France and Britain was that in France the ministry of agriculture was on the side of farmers and rural communities. Does this state of affairs not suggest that this may still be the case now? Like a number of other speakers in this debate, I have real reservations about a number of aspects of the Bill. However it is achieved, the outcome should be not as projected by the Government. Amendments are necessary, be they in this Bill or in the Procurement Bill.

  • Anne McIntosh – 2023 Speech on the Australia/New Zealand Trade Bill (Baroness McIntosh of Pickering)

    Anne McIntosh – 2023 Speech on the Australia/New Zealand Trade Bill (Baroness McIntosh of Pickering)

    The speech made by Anne McIntosh, Baroness McIntosh of Pickering, in the House of Lords on 9 January 2023.

    I welcome this opportunity to speak at Second Reading. I am delighted to follow my noble friend Lord Lansley and add my congratulations to my ever-youthful noble friend Lord Swire on his maiden speech. We look forward to many such contributions in future.

    I have no known relatives in Australia or New Zealand, but I have close friends there who are, bizarrely, of Danish heritage. The House will remember that I am half-Danish; obviously, I took great interest in the fact that, 50 years ago last week, Denmark, Great Britain and Ireland joined the European Union, on 1 January 1973.

    On a general note, I accept that no one can deny the importance of our relationships with Australia, New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries in relation to trade, security and other aspects. However, as noble Lords who have referred to the importance of those relationships will accept, those countries are a very long way away. Historically, geographically and perhaps more normally, our natural trading partners over the past 50 years—notably the European Union—have been closer.

    Although I welcome the Bill before us, it seems to lend itself to being fairly asymmetrical, favouring foreign imports over domestic producers here. While we are told that the Bill is necessarily largely technical in nature, it is thin in substance; the Minister used the word “flexible”. I echo the sentiments of others who have spoken—notably our two august former trade commissioners to Australia, both of whom spoke very eloquently—about the impact of the lack of scrutiny on trade deals, such as is enjoyed in large measure in the US legislatures and the European Union, which we left only recently. I also support the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Young, and others on the key role to be played in this Bill and others by the Trade and Agriculture Commission; we must ensure that it has all available resources and expertise.

    If one is in any doubt about the perhaps limited nature of the agreement before us, let me refer to the Government’s own impact assessment estimates. The impact assessment in relation to the New Zealand deal states that the UK’s

    “agriculture, forestry and fishing and semi-processed foods sectors are expected to experience a reduction”

    in gross value added

    “of around 0.35% (£48 million) and 1.16% (£97 million) respectively.”

    As regards Australia, that impact assessment states that the UK’s

    “primary agriculture and semi-processed foods sectors are expected to experience a reduction”

    in gross value added

    “of around 0.7% (£94m) and 2.65% (£225m) respectively relative to baseline growth in the sectors.”

    The Government estimate that as a result of the Australian deal we will see a reduction in gross output of around 3% for beef and 5% for sheepmeat due to liberalisation. This is equivalent to wiping £87 million off the output of UK sheep production and £67 million off the UK beef sector and does not take into regard the cumulative effect of agreeing similar liberalisation terms with New Zealand.

    The trade figures for October show a decline in trade with non-EU countries, which obviously is a source of concern in the context of the Bill before us. I had the honour of representing for 18 years in the other place a deeply rural constituency in North Yorkshire with a proud tradition of producing spring lambs and fatstock beef. I fear that with the potentially asymmetry in this Bill, they will be damaged in the long term by the lack of a permanent safeguard clause. I will revert to that as one of my asks of my noble friend and his department in the context of the Bill this afternoon. I echo my noble friends Lord Frost and Lord Udny-Lister, who recognise the concerns to be faced by sheep farmers and particularly by hill farmers and fatstock producers across the UK and that those concerns must be addressed sooner rather than later.

    In terms of Commonwealth trade, once Britain, Ireland and Denmark acceded to the European Economic Community on 1 January 1973, I understand that a trade deal was done with Australia, New Zealand and other members of the Commonwealth through the African, Caribbean and Pacific agreement. This has been updated periodically, most recently in European partnership agreements. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, said, initially mention was made of the importance of sugar in trade and obviously the vital importance of trade to certain Commonwealth countries. Initially, a stable price was set for sugar, which was replicated in other products.

    I again pay tribute to my mentor, the late great Lord Plumb, who was president of the NFU, the first and last British President of the European Parliament, and co-president of the assembly for the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. He played a central and crucial role in these negotiations. Can my noble friend clarify the position under the Bill, which was raised in Oral Questions this afternoon, regarding products emanating from Australia, New Zealand and other Commonwealth and, now we have left the EU, third countries? Will those products meet the same standards of production, particularly in terms of animal welfare and environmental protection, as our home-produced foods?

    I take great comfort from the commitment in the Conservative Party manifesto of 2019 that British high standards of animal welfare and environment would be maintained and that they would be replicated in imported food and food products. Can my noble friend the Minister take this opportunity to reconfirm and echo the comments made by our noble friend Lord Benyon, who, answering at Oral Questions, assured us that our free trade agreements, such as those before us in this Bill, will never conflict with stated UK policy in this regard?

    The promise of open trade was, as I said, mentioned in the manifesto. It was repeated during the Conservative Party leadership contest in summer 2022 by my right honourable friend Rishi Sunak, now the Prime Minister. He made a commitment at that time that 50% of all publicly procured foods supplying local authorities, our schools, hospitals, prisons and defence establishments would be locally sourced. He went further, and I will quote his letter following his meeting with the NFU during that leadership contest in terms of international trade:

    “I know that farmers are concerned by some of the trade deals that have been struck, including with Australia. I will make farmers a priority in all future trade deals. On my watch, we will not rush through trade deals at the expense of farmers. They will take as long as they take, and we will not water down our standards. We will also build on existing support mechanisms to help farmers export to the world’s emerging markets. We will maintain the high standards of animal welfare, environmental protection, and food safety.”

    I support those desires and wishes of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will also support them when winding up this debate.

    There is disappointment—as my noble friend Lord Lansley, other noble Lords and I discussed at length during the proceedings on the Trade Act, and more recently the Procurement Bill, during this Parliament—that the wishes of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister seem to have met insurmountable obstacles in meeting our domestic public procurement target for 50% locally sourced food. I hope that I can rely on my noble friend’s good offices to ensure that that target is met going forward.

    I conclude by seeking assurances from the Minister today that, for the wine and spirit producers—who welcome this Bill, as do I—a separate chapter will be opened and the Government will vigorously apply for export opportunities for UK wines and spirits to both Australia and New Zealand. I understand that the New Zealand agreement is preferable, as it allows for a committee to improve trade in UK products without reopening the agreement. I would be very interested to learn why that same provision was not available for the Australia agreement.

    I seek the further assurance for UK farmers and consumers that our high levels of food production will be maintained and that inferior products will not be allowed entry. We heard earlier from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that hormone-produced beef and pesticide-induced crops may form part of the produce to be imported under the procurement provisions of the Bill before us. Neither would be acceptable to UK home production.

    I also ask for the assurance that local authorities and military establishments will have the opportunity to source locally produced food to at least 50%, as previously sought by our Prime Minister.

    Finally, I seek the assurance that an adequate and permanent safeguard clause will be introduced and that all the relevant statutory instruments, flowing directly or indirectly from this Bill, will be adopted under the affirmative procedure.