Category: Trade

  • UK Trade Policy Observatory – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    UK Trade Policy Observatory – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    The comments made by the UK Trade Policy Observatory on 14 January 2022.

    Recommendations:

    Monitoring and Evaluation

    1. While the DIT quantitative modelling appears sensibly done, nevertheless, with regard to the scoping and impact assessment produced by DIT considerably more information could be provided (for example in an annex) to enable more comprehensive assessment and scrutiny of the model. In particular, it would be useful to have more detailed information regarding the reductions in market barriers at the level of aggregation at which the model is run, and then the results on output, trade, and prices to be given at the same level of disaggregation.
    2. Similarly for services trade and investment, there is a lack of information about the non-conforming measures. For a wide range of stakeholders, especially business stakeholders, listed restrictive measures and possible impacts on business should be explained and summarised.
    3. Scrutiny mechanisms for implementation of the Agreement, particularly those areas which are aspirational and made operational through cooperation, should be made public, monitored and evaluated.
    4. We strongly recommend that the government publishes ex-post empirical assessment of agreements signed five years after the implementation of any given agreement. Part of the role of such monitoring and evaluation would be to consider the actual impacts in the light of what was agreed, and what was assumed in the impact assessments, and to identify any unexpected consequences / impacts.

    Lessons for future UK FTAs

    1. Rules of origin: the lack of cumulation arrangements that go beyond bilateral cumulation (diagonal or extended cumulation) in the agreement is a missed opportunity. We strongly recommend that in future agreements improved cumulation arrangements are negotiated.
    2. Digital trade: while the digital trade chapter is expected to create business opportunities and innovation, there are some issues that could impact on public trust, such as the UK’s policy choice in terms of narrowing policy space for safeguarding public policy objectives and arrangements to ensure British citizens’ data privacy in Australia. We recommend open policy discussions which include a wide range of stakeholders.
    3. Environment, SPS measures and animal welfare: clarity on ambition for maintenance of standards in these areas would be useful going forward as well as how cooperation mechanisms will be implemented in the UK context.

    Summary

    The UK-Australia FTA is a steady step towards the Asia-Pacific region

    1. The main value of the Australia-UK Free Trade Agreement (FTA) lies in policy development which may help the UK join the CPTPP, and as part of the Indo-Pacific tilt more broadly, rather than in its direct economic benefits per se.
    2. The UK-Australia FTA is the UK’s first FTA made ‘from scratch’. It is a supposedly “deep” FTA, the scope of which is on the face of it comprehensive, and aspires to high standard of rules from the international trade policy spectrum. However, in several areas the agreement does not provide binding commitments but resorts to ‘best endeavour’ clauses which do not entail any obligations on either side to improve market access. While many of the chapters, the UK-Australia FTA appears to have used the CPTPP as a template, there are some provisions that go further than the CPTPP. In general, the Agreement signals that UK policy could be consistent with CPTPP rules. However, in-depth analysis is needed as potential conflicts can also be seen in some of the detail.

    Limited economic impact

    1. Economic impact of the Agreement is very limited. The range of estimates from the government modelling for the UK is an increase in GDP between 0.02% to 0.08%. UKTPO modelling suggests an increase in UK output between 0.05% to 0.07%.

    Tariffs and Rules of Origin

    1. The UK-Australia FTA provides substantial tariff liberalization for most of the UK exports to and imports from Australia. The share of UK exports and imports that would pay zero tariffs would be more than 99% when the agreement entered into force. However, the agreement only allows for the bilateral cumulation of the rules of origin. On the face of it the product specific rules of origin appear to be relatively generous, but considerably more detailed analysis is required to confirm this.

    Services trade and digital trade

    1. In terms of rules, the UK successfully concluded a high level of rules regarding services trade both at the horizontal and sectoral level. The rules are more comprehensive, and some provisions are more ambitious than those in the CPTPP. This would provide legal certainty to UK business and generally facilitate CPTPP’s accession. However, the number of Australia’s non-conforming measures under the UK-Australia FTA has increased from those under the CPTPP, which requires further analysis.
    2. The digital trade chapter used the Australia-Singapore Digital Economy Agreement as a template. The chapter is business friendly and more ambitious than the CPTPP. On the other hand, narrower policy space to achieve public policy objectives and unclear technical and legal mechanisms to ensure compatibility of data privacy between the UK and Australia may endanger the EU’s adequacy decision to the UK and public trust.

    Food standards and environmental issues

    1. Food standards and environmental issues have been critical areas of debate for the UK-Australia FTA. The UK Government’s negotiating objectives were to uphold the UK’s ‘high standards of environmental protection, animal welfare and food safety standards.’ The Environment Chapter is wide-ranging it its coverage, and while many commitments are aspirational, there are commitments to implement international environmental agreements and the inclusion of cooperation on the transition to a circular economy. The Environment Chapter is underpinned by a bespoke dispute mechanism. The SPS Chapter affirms the WTO SPS Agreement and includes provision for equivalence that ultimately rests with the importing Party. The Agreement contains an Animal Welfare Chapter resting on cooperation between the Parties in ensuring high levels of animal welfare

    Introduction

    1. Through the UK-Australia FTA, the UK has made some progress in its geopolitical strategy of “pivoting towards the Asia Pacific” and towards joining the CPTPP. This is in line with its stated negotiating objectives: “Strategically, the UK Government’s aim is to place the UK at the centre of a network of modern FTAs, turning our country into a global hub for businesses and investors who want to trade in dynamic areas of the world – especially in the Asia Pacific. Pivoting towards the Asia Pacific will help diversify our trade, make our supply chains more resilient and make the UK less vulnerable to political and economic shocks in certain parts of the world.” (UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement -The UK’s Strategic Approach, p6 -hereafter, UK’s negotiating objectives). However, as will be explained later, the economic impacts of the UK-Australia FTA will be small overall.
    2. Our written evidence mainly responds to the five questions that ITC set for this inquiry:
    1. How good a deal is the UK-Australia FTA for the UK?
    2. To what extent has the Government achieved its stated negotiating objectives?
    3. How are the terms of the FTA between the UK and Australia likely to affect you, your business or organisation, or those that you represent?
    4. What is likely to be the impact of the agreement on the UK’s economy as a whole (and particular sectors of the UK economy, the UK’s devolved nations and English regions, UK consumers)?
    5. What lessons and inferences for other current and future negotiations can be drawn from how the Government approached, and what it secured in, the FTA with Australia?
    1. Given the limited time available for responding to the Committee, in this response we focus on the following areas of the agreement: (i) tariffs and rules of origin; (ii) food standards and environmental issues; (iii) services trade; and (iv) digital trade. The evaluation provided in this evidence should be seen as a preliminary assessment. Other chapters of the FTA, such as technical barriers to trade or with regard to SMEs, have not been assessed for this submission.

    Economic impacts:

    1. How good a deal is the UK-Australia FTA for the UK?
    2. What is likely to be the impact of the agreement on the UK economy, sectors etc.?
    1. There are several points to note in response to these questions which we take together:
    2. First, the overall economic impact of this agreement on the UK is expected to be extremely small. This derives primarily from the fact that the share of Australia in the UK’s exports and imports of both goods and services in 2020 was only 1.6% and 0.8% respectively. [2]
    3. The small economic impact of the agreement can be seen from the table below which gives the government’s own assessments of the impact, and which compares the simulated outcomes in the scoping assessment with the recently published impact assessment:
    Macroeconomic Results Scoping Assessment

    (“Scenario 2”, 2018 values)

    Impact Assessment

    (2019 values)

    Change in GDP 0.02% £0.5 billion 0.08% £1.8 bn
    Change in UK exports to AUS 7.30% £0.9 billion 44.20% £5.4 bn
    Change in UK imports from AUS 83.20% £4.2 billion 66.10% £4.3 bn
    Change in total UK exports 0.30% 0.43% £3.0 bn
    Change in total UK imports 0.10% 0.36% £2.6 bn
    Change in real wages 0.05% £0.4 billion 0.10% £0.9 bn

     

    1. Note the ‘headline’ number for the change in UK GDP from the recent impact assessment was £2.3bn, as opposed to the £1.8bn in this table. This is because the core model used by the government generates the £1.8bn number. This is then adjusted on the basis of assumptions made about the changes in patterns of trade up to 2035. As these assumptions are much more speculative, we are using the unadjusted numbers here.
    2. Note too, the difference in the numbers between the scoping assessment and the impact assessment. This does not reflect any ‘massaging’ of the numbers, but is driven by some changes in the underlying data, by some of the modelling assumptions, and also by adjusting the degree of market access liberalisation being modelled. [3] Not only are the impact on GDP numbers different, but whereas the scoping assessment suggested that UK exports to Australia would increase by 7.3%, the impact assessment suggests that exports may increase by 44%. Similarly the scoping assessment suggested the impact on the overall level of economic activity in Northern Ireland could be negative, this is no longer the case with the impact assessment. This reveals that model results can be sensitive to the data used, the modelling assumptions, and the size of the policy changes which is being simulated. Overall, our assessment is that the modelling undertaken appears sensible and well done. However, considerably more information could be provided (for example in an annex) to enable more comprehensive assessment and scrutiny of the model, and to understand what is driving the difference in results between the scoping assessment and the impact assessment. In particular, we would have liked to have seen more information regarding the reductions in market barriers at the level of aggregation at which the model is run, and then the results on output, trade, and prices to be given at the same level of disaggregation.
    3. Nevertheless, the range of estimates from the government modelling is an increase in GDP for the UK of between 0.02% to 0.08%.  Using our own model, which is much more detailed / disaggregated sectorally than the government’s model, but which does not include general equilibrium effects (e.g. impacts on wages and thus costs), we find an increase in output of between 0.05% to 0.07%. Overall, therefore, the modelling suggests that the effects are indeed negligible.
    4. Second, if overall, the net impacts are very small, this raises the question of what would / could make this a ‘good deal’. There are three approaches one could take to this question:
    1. Are there particular industries/sectors which benefit from the agreement and relatedly did the UK secure progress with regard to its’ offensive interests? This could be with regard to specific sectoral interests, or policy areas: climate, digital, SPS; or ‘groups’ within society (gender, SMEs, regions). Hence, as opposed to focussing on the net (ie total impacts), one needs to look at the detailed impacts.
    2. In relation to broader objectives such as the pivot to Asia-Pacific, is the UK-Aus agreement a stepping stone to the CPTPP? Or
    3. as a means for establishing general principles for UK approach to policy areas (digital, climate).
    1. With regard to (i) it is worth looking at the simulated sectoral impacts, and also to consider whether any progress was made in broader policy areas (see discussion in section below on what was agreed in selected chapters of the agreement). The modelling results by sector are driven by the relative changes in market access barriers. The reductions in market access barriers in goods come from the reductions in tariffs and in non-tariff measures; and in services from any reductions in regulatory barriers.
    2. On tariffs the agreement is very comprehensive with tariff elimination on almost all products – some have a longer phase in period such as metals for Australia (five years). Prior to the agreement 66% of UK exports to Australia face a tariff, while only 7% of Australian exports to the UK faced a tariff. A key reason for this asymmetry is that over 80% of UK imports from Australia are in the category ‘gold and pearls’, and where the UK tariff is either zero or extremely low.
    3. If we take UK exports, out of 21 sectors there are 11 sectors where more than 80% of UK exports in that sector to Australia face tariffs with the highest shares being in textiles (99%, with an average tariff of 7.04%), leather (98%,  with a an average tariff of 1.39%), footwear (98%, with an average tariff of 7.8%), ceramics and glass (97%, with an average tariff of 2%) and wood products (91%, with an average tariff of 1%).  Analogously looking at UK imports, there are 8 sectors where over 80% of Australian imports face a positive tariff, with the highest shares in arms and ammunition (100%, with an average tariff of 1.6%), animal and vegetable fats and oils (99%, with an average tariffs of 1.8%), foodstuffs beverages and tobacco (98%, with an average tariff of 2.5%), animals and animal products (96%, with an average tariff of less than 1%), and footwear (96%, with an average tariff of 2.9%). These are therefore the sectors most likely to be affected by tariff liberalisation.
    4. Table 1 in the appendix below replicates the sectoral results from the scoping and the impact assessments. This table indicates that the UK sector that may gain the most from the agreement is motor vehicles and parts, followed by other machinery and equipment; and the sectors that see output decline by the most are semi-processed foods and agriculture. The modelling we have done is for 116 sectors covering agriculture, manufacturing and services, where we find that the sectors which appear to gain the most from the decrease in barriers to trade are iron and steel, and other electronic goods; while those with the biggest negative impact are wine and the processing of meat (note we do not model unprocessed meat separately). The results for the top 10 and bottom 10 industries with the largest positive and negative impacts can be seen in Table 2 in the appendix. What this illustrates is that while there are sectoral differences across the sectors, the effects are still nevertheless extremely small.
    5. Leaving aside the sectoral impacts, the agreement does include progress in certain policy areas (see discussion in section), such as the flow of workers for business purposes or with regard to digital trade.
    6. With regard to services (see fuller discussion below), the liberalisation commitments are more liberal than those under the WTO. However, there appears to be de facto little liberalisation as these lock in the existing applied levels of market access. The Agreement largely focusses on binding in each country’s existing applied levels of services barriers, thus precluding the possibility of these being subsequently raised. So while this does not represent an actual liberalisation per ser, by providing more certainty it is likely to facilitate more services trade to a some degree.
    7. With regard to (ii) it is probably the case that signing the agreement may make accession to the CPTPP easier. However, as there is a lack of detail and precision as to the governments aims in its free trade agreements on key policy areas (other than to be world leading) it is not possible to assess (iii).

    Rules of Origin:

    1. To what extent has the Government achieved its stated negotiating objectives?
    1. Negotiating objectives:

    Develop simple and modern Rules of Origin that reflect UK industry requirements and consider existing, as well as future, supply chains supported by predictable and low-cost administrative arrangements (DIT, UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement The UK’s Strategic Approach, p9) [4]

    33.   In answer to this question, we focus on some of the key areas in the agreement, and assess what has been agreed and the potential implications for the UK.

    34.   The tariff liberalisation discussed earlier depends on firms being able to satisfy or meet the rules of origin. Hence in assessing the agreement it is also important to assess the rules of origin – should they be set at a more demanding level it is less likely that firms will be able to take advantage of the tariff preferences. By way of example, in the UK-EU TCA and up to October 2021, the preference utilisation rate was only around 70%, indicating that 30% of UK exports to the EU that were potentially eligible for preferential access paid tariffs.

    35.   Leaving aside agricultural products for which the rule is normally that they have to be wholly obtained, there are three broad rules of origin typically used in trade agreements. These are (i) whether or not the intermediate inputs used to produce the good fall into a different tariff classification (CTC rule) to the final good; the value added (VA) rule specifies that there must be minimum level of value added from the partner country; and the specific production processes rule (SP), specifies certain production processes that must be used for the good to qualify. Note that the CTC rule can be applied at a very fine level of disaggregation which makes it easier to be complied with; or it can be specified at a much broader level of disaggregation which makes it harder to be complied with.

    36.   These rules can be used in combination. Hence, in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) for nearly 23.6% of the products the rule specifies that more than one rule has to be satisfied eg. a CTC rule and a VA rule. Clearly having to satisfy two rules is more demanding than just one rule. Conversely, a choice between rules can be specified eg. a CTC rule or a VA rule. This gives firms more options and is generally seen as providing more generous rules of origin which are easier for firms to comply with. In the UK TCA this occurs in nearly 35.7% of cases.

    37.   Given the preceding there are several features of the UK-Australia FTA (UK-Aus) rules of origin worth highlighting:

    1. The CTC rule is applied with regard to 36.6% of the products, whereas in comparison in the TCA the figure is 13.4%. Note that in the UK-Aus deal the wholly obtained rule is never used, whereas it appears in 9.5% of cases in the TCA. In the UK-Aus deal, however, in 22.6% of cases it is specified at quite an aggregate (HS 2-digit) level which thus makes it harder for firms to comply with and becomes closer to the wholly obtained rules which is used in 9.5% of cases in the TCA. More detailed work would need to be undertaken to assess what share of trade is thus affected, and whether the greater user of the CTC rule reflects rules of origin which are easier for firms to comply with However, this is particularly the case for Animal and animal products where 100% of the rules are the CTC rule specified at the aggregate level; vegetable products (91%), foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco where this is the case for 64% of products, and textiles and clothing where the share is 46%. These are probably the sectors where the rules of origin may be hardest to comply with.
    2. The need to satisfy more than one rule is never applied – and this is positive. In contrast to the TCA, in the UK-Aus agreement giving firms the choice of rules occurs in 63% of cases, and in nearly half of these cases the choice is between the CTC rule and the VA rule.
    3. The agreement only provides for the bilateral cumulation of rules of origin (ie that UK inputs can be used to produce a good in Australia and when the good is exported back to the UK, the UK input is classified as originating). However, there are no provisions for diagonal cumulation. There is just a clause encouraging this to be explored in the future (Article 4.29.2(e)). The lack of diagonal cumulation is a missed opportunity.

    Trade in Services

    38.   The following evaluation mainly answer the three questions:

    1. To what extent has the Government achieved its stated negotiating objectives?
    2. How are the terms of the FTA between the UK and Australia likely to affect you, your business or organisation, or those that you represent?
    3. What lessons and inferences for other current and future negotiations can be drawn from how the Government approached, and what it secured in, the FTA with Australia?

    General understanding

    39.   UK exports of services accounted for 54% of UK’s total exports to Australia in 2020 (ONS Pink Book 2021). Therefore, a substantive deal in services trade would constitute an important element of any agreement with Australia. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier the overall economic impact is likely to be small as Australia accounts for 1.72% of total UK services exports, and 1.17% of UK services imports. [5]. However, services trade both in terms of imports and exports between Australia and the UK has increased over 30% in the last decade [6] even without an FTA.

    40.   In the case of Australia, (as the DIT UK-Australia FTA -The UK’s Strategic Approach), Australia provides higher levels of market access under its FTAs than it provides under its GATS commitments in the WTO commitments. Many governments also unilaterally provide higher levels of market liberalisation than those provided under its FTAs. [7]  This means that there is policy space between the level of autonomous liberalisation and the level of bound liberalisation. In theory, therefore, there are two benefits of the UK-Australia FTA for the UK. One would be to lock in the current applied levels of autonomous liberalisation. Another would be to obtain preferential market access to Australia and bring gains to UK business which are currently doing business on the applied MFN basis.

    41.   To see the current level of access the OECD services trade restrictiveness index (STRI) provide useful benchmarks. Looking at the level of Australia’s regulatory restrictions in services trade, the STRI shows that Australia’s restrictiveness across 22 sectors is lower than the OECD average except for courier services, The OECD’s Digital STRI shows a similar result.  Australia’s restrictiveness in digital services trade is much lower than the OECD average and even lower than the UK’s restrictiveness. This indicates that Australia is de-facto liberal market, and the country provides a good business environment for services trade and digital trade. In contrast, Australia’s investment restrictiveness is much higher than the OECD average. [8]

    42.   We analyse the services trade deal in the UK-Australia FTA by looking at: (i) levels of Australia’s market access commitments and (ii) levels of bilateral regulatory cooperation both at the horizontal and the sectoral levels. We use the UK’s negotiating objectives and the CPTPP as benchmarks.

    Cross-border services

    Negotiating Objectives:

    1. Agree best-in-class rules for all services sectors, as well as sector-specific rules, to support our world-leading services industry, including key UK export sectors, such as financial services, professional and business services and transport services (DIT, UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement The UK’s Strategic Approach, p10)

    Rules

    1. The chapter on cross-border supply of services (Chapter 8) uses the CPTPP rules as a template. Some parts of the rules go beyond the CPTPP reflecting policy developments in other fora and evolving features of business. For example, domestic regulation (Article 8.8) is more detailed than the domestic regulation clause in the CPTPP by reflecting the WTO plurilateral reference paper on services domestic regulation, the negotiation of which was concluded December 2021. [9] In addition to cross-cutting rules, sectoral rules in detail are provided in its annexes: Express delivery services (Annex 8A) and international maritime transport services (Annex 8B). It is observed that these provide high standard rules and would provide a better regulatory environment for UK business. For example, Express delivery services (Annex 8A) provides rules regarding a postal monopoly and universal service obligation. Since courier services is Australia’s most restricted services according to the OECD services restrictiveness index, the clauses such as the ban on cross-subsidies by a postal monopoly and strict rules not to abuse a postal monopoly position (Ar. 3) are expected to facilitate UK services suppliers’ business.
    2. Financial Services: The Agreement has a standalone chapter on financial services. The rules of Financial Services (Chapter 9) can be seen as a comprehensive and high standard chapter. Whilst the Chapter is based on the CPTPP Chapter 11, it is observed that the text under the UK-Australia FTA was further developed from the CPTPP text to improve legal clarities and reflect business needs, financial regulatory authorities’ policy needs and consumer benefits. For example, prudential exception (Art. 9.3), financial data and information (Art. 9.12), electronic payments (Art. 9.16) and sustainable finance (Art. 9.19) are new provisions that are not in the CPTPP. Also, an Annex on Financial Services Regulatory Cooperation (Annex 9C) provides a framework for future regulatory cooperation between the UK and Australia.
    3. Telecommunications: The standalone chapter of telecommunications (Chapter 12) mostly replicated the telecommunications chapter in the CPTPP. The UK-Australia modernised the CPTPP text by reflecting certain technological developments.   For example, improved legal certainty in relation to the WTO’s rules is expected to facilitate UK telecommunication providers doing business in Australia.
    4. Transport services: The UK’s negotiating objectives include transport services as key sectors. One   development can be seen in the inclusion of the specific annex on international maritime transport services (Anne 8B). For example, the non-discriminatory treatment principle provides more legal certainty to UK services providers, such as UK shipping companies and ships flying the UK flag, in accessing ports and related services.
    5. Business mobility and temporary entry for business persons: The negotiating objectives underlined to “enhance opportunities for business travel and supporting the MRPQs”. It is observed that the UK government has achieved its negotiating objectives to a certain degree.
    6. The agreement includes a standalone chapter on professional services and recognition of professional qualifications (Chapter 10) for the first time in the UK’s FTAs. Given that the UK’s comparative advantage lies in professional services, developing the rules in the area could make a positive contribution to UK professional services.
    7. On the other hand, it should be noted that Australia is the least restrictive country regarding professional services at the outset.  According to the OECD restrictiveness index (2020), legal services in Australia are even one of the least restrictive among the OECD countries. And other professional services, such as accounting services and engineering services are also among the least restrictive services sectors of Australia. In this regard, there may be lower gains from an FTA unless the UK and Australia successfully achieve mutual recognition for specific professional services.
    8. The standalone chapter on professional services and recognition of professional qualifications simply encourages relevant bodies to establish and maintain systems for recognition of professional qualifications (Art. 10.3) and no mutual recognition seems to be agreed at this stage. Chapter 10. 4.3 stipulates that “A Party may consider, if feasible, taking steps to encourage its relevant bodies to consider implementing procedures for the temporary, or project-specific licensing of professional service suppliers of the other Party. That regime should not operate to prevent a professional service supplier gaining a local licence once that supplier satisfies the applicable local licensing requirements”. Also, recognition of professional qualifications of the other Party is a best endeavours clause as provided in Recognition of Professional Qualifications (Art. 10.5.1). Although the Professional Services Working Group is established (Art. 10.6), it is only the relevant bodies of specific professional services that are able to develop systems for the recognition of professional qualifications.
    9. Among professional services, it is in legal services in where concrete outcomes were achieved. as, for example, UK and Australian lawyers are guaranteed to be allowed to provide legal advisory services in home, foreign, and international law, using their existing qualifications (Art. 10.7). Also, legal services are the only professional services for which a regulatory dialogue is established (Art. 10.8).

    Liberalisation commitments

    1. Commitments for cross-border services trade and investment: The Agreement applies the negative list approach to liberalisation commitments. There are two types of non-conforming measures (Annex I: Schedules of Non-Conforming Measures for Services and Investment and Annex II: Schedules of Non-Conforming Measures for Services and Investment). The first type (Annex I) is existing measures that do not fulfil some or all of the six obligations: national treatment, MFN, market access, local presence (only for cross-border services trade), performance requirements (only for investment), and senior management and boards of directors (only for investment). The second type of non-conforming measures (Annex II) is that a Party “may maintain existing, or adopt new or more restrictive, measures that do not conform with these obligations” (Annex II Explanatory Notes).
    2. We compared the first type of Australia’s non-conforming measures under the UK-Australia FTA with those under the CPTPP. Simply looking at the number of measures listed, the number of Australia’s non-conforming measures listed under the UK-Australia FTA is more than triple times of those under the CPTPP, accounting for 47 measures versus 14 measures. This indicates that the degree of Australia’s services and investment liberalisation under the UK-Australia appears significantly less than the degree of those under the CPTPP.  Although there is an observation that many governments add non-conforming measures for transparency purposes, [10] why Australia listed more non-conforming measures under the UK-Australia FTA in comparison with the CPTPP will need further scrutiny.
    3. Second, Australia’s investment policy is more protective than its services trade policy under the UK-Australia FTA. In the UK-Australia FTA, non-conforming measures which cannot fulfil obligations for investment account for 37 cases while those for cross-border services accounts for 24 cases (note there are duplications since some measures applies to both investment and cross-border services). Under the CPTPP, the number of non-conforming measures for investment and for cross-border services is seven in each case. As noted before, Australia’s investment regime is relatively restrictive in comparison with other OECD countries, according to the OECD FDI regulatory restrictiveness index (UK government negotiating objectives, p46).
    4. As for the level of government that implements non-conforming measures in Australia, most non-conforming measures are at the regional level under the UK-Australia FTA. Among 47 measures listed, 34 measures are at the regional level and 16 measures are at the central level (note that some measures are applied both at the central and regional levels). This indicates that UK business may continue to face trade or investment barriers at the regional government level, as is currently the case. In contrast, most of the non-conforming measures under the CPTPP are at the central level, accounting for 13 measures out of 14 measures (note that one non-conforming measure is applied both at the regional and central level).
    5. Lastly, most of the non-conforming measures are sector specific. In the case of the UK-Australia FTA, 40 non-conforming measures out of 47 are sector specific. Similarly, 11 non-conforming measures out of 14 are sector specific under the CPTPP. Which sector specific measures would have negative impacts on UK business should be carefully examined.
    6. It should be noted that the number of measures does not reflect the degree of restrictiveness.  Further analysis would be need for each sector to assess the measures which are applied, what type of obligations are not fulfilled and the substance of measures to understand potential impacts on UK business.
    7. In short, our preliminary analysis indicates that the UK-Australia FTA has improved rules for services trade in comparison with those under the CPTPP in certain areas. This includes domestic regulatory disciplines regarding cross-border trade, financial services, maritime services and telecommunications. These improvements are expected to provide more legal certainty to business. The Agreement could also facilitate the UK’s accession to the CPTPP as it proves that the UK can abide by CPTPP’s services trade rules although some potential conflicts are identified in detail. The level of liberalisation commitments indicated that no gains are provided in terms of the six legal obligations relative to the CPTPP. Further analysis would be necessary to examine the impact of liberalisation commitments to business.

    Digital trade

    Negotiating objectives

    1. Shaping the rules for digital trade in a rapidly changing world: Australia has a track record of innovation on digital trade, having recently agreed the Australia-Singapore Digital Economy Agreement (DEA).12 An FTA with Australia provides the perfect opportunity to reduce barriers to e-commerce and stimulate investment in new technologies. (DIT, UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement The UK’s Strategic Approach, p7)
    1. Australia has a bilateral digital economy agreement with Singapore (Australia-Singapore DEA, hereafter DEA) DEA that underlines innovation, technology and promote free data flow. The coverage of DEA is more comprehensive and its approach is business friendly. The DEA can be seen as a more ambitious agreement in comparison with the e-commerce chapter under the CPTPP. Like the CPTPP, DEA’s approach is different from the EU approach to digital trade governance which takes into account public policy objectives to a greater extent. The UK-Australia FTA used the Australia-Singapore DEA as a template and reflected UK’s interest based on it. Although the coverage of the UK-Australia digital chapter is narrower than DEA, it covers important policy areas to promote digital trade between the two parties. Furthermore, the Agreement developed some provisions in DEA.
    2. The UK departed from the EU approach to digital trade governance in the UK-Japan CEPA. In the UK-Australia digital chapter, the UK made a further step by applying the Asia-Pacific style digital trade governance based on the DEA. What is good for business is that free cross-border data flow between the UK and Australia is ensured in accordance with the UK negotiating objectives. However, the technical and legal mechanisms to promote compatibility of different data privacy regimes are not clear. This may endanger UK citizens’ trust and the EU’s current adequacy decision to the UK.
    3. Scope: While the Australia-Singapore DEA does not set audio-visual services aside as an exception, the UK-Australia FTA does exclude audio-visual services from its scope. This follows the precedents set in the EU-UK TCA and the CEPA agreement between the UK and Japan. The reason for excluding audio-visual services ought to be clarified. We note that the CPTPP, in contrast does include audio-visual services. Also, it should be noted that there are no general exception clauses such as in the Australia-Singapore agreement (Art. 3) which takes the WTO approach (GATT XX and GATS XIV). General exceptions provide the legal base for an FTA signatory to adopt measures necessary to pursue public objectives, such as measures to protect public morals /maintain public order and human, animal or plant life/health under the certain conditions. The absence of general exception clauses suggests that the Agreement downgraded/downplayed the rights of governments to pursue public policy objectives.
    4. Core principles: As in the UK negotiating objectives, the imposition of customs duties on electronic transmissions is prohibited. The clauses are based on the DEA. The UK-Australia FTA does not include the provision of non-discriminatory treatment of digital products while DEA does (DEA, Article 6), as does the CPTPP. The UK, on the other hand, has not included non-discriminatory principle in its digital trade chapter in its previous FTAs, so the absence presumably reflects UK objectives, which align thus with those of the EU in this regard. Since non-discriminatory treatment consists of the core principle of the digital trade chapter in the CPTPP, a rational behind the UK government’s position should be clarified in relation to the CPTPP’s accession.
    5. Provisions that promote electronic authentication and electronic signatures: The approach taken by UK-Australia is basically similar to the DEA with some developments. The Agreement aims at facilitating business through digital means by including the provisions regarding conclusion of contracts by electronic means (Art. 14.5), electronic authentication and electronic trust services (Art. 14.6), paperless trading (Art. 14.8), and electronic invoicing (14.9).  In these areas the provisions appear to have achieved the negotiating objectives.
    6. Provisions regarding cross-border data in the digital networked environment:

    The provisions relating to cross-border data transfer, such as digital identities (Art. 14.7), cross-border transfer of information by electronic means (Art. 14.10), ban on data localisation (localisation of computing facilities) (Art. 14.11), and personal information protection (Art. 14.12), are based on the DEA with slight modifications in detail. It may be presumed that the UK government achieved its negotiating objectives by including these provisions that facilitate the free flow of data.

    1. Since the DEA applies the digital trade governance model that prioritises a market-led digital environment, the UK government’s policy shift from the EU style digital governance with its greater focus on public policy raises two issues. First, concerning the balance between economic objectives and public policy objectives. For example, the cross-border transfer of information by electronic means (Art. 14.10) and the ban on data localisation (Art. 14.11) are basically applying the DEA (WTO type) approach towards public policy objectives. This means that public policy space in the provisions relating to data flow provisions in the UK-Australia FTA are narrower than those in the UK-EU TCA and the UK-Japan CEPA. A wide policy discussion on whether this policy direction is good for the UK society as a whole is needed.
    2. The second issue is that the legal and practical policy mechanisms to protect personal information in Personal information protection (Art. 14.12) is not clear. The provisions slightly modified the relevant DEA provision (Art. 17.2) but do not provide clear safeguard solutions to ensure the protection of UK citizens’ data. For example, Art. 14.12. 2 only stipulates that “In the development of its legal framework for the protection of personal information, each Party shall take into account principles and guidelines of relevant international bodies, including collection limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security safeguards, transparency, individual participation, and accountability”. While the DEA provides references to the APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) System and the OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data to develop such a legal framework, the UK-Australia FTA deleted these references. Relating to this, the note for this provision (footnote 4) stipulates that “For greater certainty, a Party may comply with the obligation in this paragraph by adopting or maintaining measures such as comprehensive privacy, personal information, or personal data protection laws, sector-specific laws covering data protection or privacy, or laws that provide for the enforcement of voluntary undertakings by enterprises relating to data protection or privacy”. We note that this is just an endeavour clause rather than mandatory one. Furthermore, Art. 14.12.6, which is a copy of DEA, stipulates that “each party shall encourage the development of mechanisms to promote compatibility between the different regimes.” The way to promote compatibility is either the recognition of regulatory outcomes (accorded autonomously or by mutual arrangement) or broader international frameworks.
    3. The above indicates that the UK does not intend to use the APEC CBPR System, but is not clear from the Agreement whether the UK has established specific technical and legal mechanisms to ensure compatibility. This raises the question whether the two parties agreed legal and technical arrangements outside the FTA like in the EU-Japan’s case. [11] Since Australia does not have an adequacy decision from the EU, this may impact on the EU’s adequacy decision given to the UK.

    Environment, SPS and Animal welfare

    1. How good a deal is the UK-Australia FTA for the UK? To what extent has the Government achieved its stated negotiating objectives?
    2. To what extent has the Government achieved its stated negotiating objectives?

    Negotiating objectives:

    Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary standards:

    1. Uphold the UK’s high levels of public, animal, and plant health, including food safety.
    2. Enhance access for UK agri-food goods to the Australian market by seeking commitments to improve the timeliness and transparency of approval processes for UK goods. [12]

    Sustainability:

    1. Seek sustainability provisions, including on environment and climate change, that meet the ambition of both parties on these issues.
    2. Ensure parties reaffirm their commitment to international standards on the environment, climate change and labour.
    3. Ensure parties do not waive or fail to enforce their domestic environmental or labour protections in ways that create an artificial competitive advantage.
    4. Include measures which allow the UK to maintain the integrity, and provide meaningful protection, of the UK’s world-leading environmental and labour standards.
    5. Secure provisions that support and help further the Government’s ambition on climate change and achieving Net Zero carbon emissions by 2050. [13]

    70.   In addition to its negotiating objectives, the UK has an overarching legislative commitment to ‘maintaining statutory levels of protection in the areas of the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, animal welfare and environmental protection. [14] In respect of food standards, the Agriculture Act 2020 requires the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament as to how far a trade agreement is ‘consistent with the maintenance of UK levels of statutory protection in relation to human, animal or plant life or health, animal welfare and the environment.’ [15] The Government is also required to request advice from the Trade and Agriculture Commission on whether a trade agreement could result in a change to the UK’s statutory protections in relation to animal and plant health standards, animal welfare standards and environmental standards for agricultural products. [16] Notably this requirement is for ex-post scrutiny and does not include food safety.

    71.   Both the UK’s more detailed impact assessment of the Agreement [17] and the independent Sustainability Impact Assessment conducted for the EU-Australia negotiations [18], identify an intersection between trade liberalisation in the agriculture sector, specifically the beef and sheep meat sectors, and environmental protection. As the risk assessment reports set out, increased trade in these sectors may:

    1. increase Australia’s GHG and other emissions – these sectors already constitute a large share of Australia’s emissions
    2. increase land clearing – one of the most important biodiversity and climate change issues in Australia
    3. increase transport sector emissions – due to the large distance between Australia and the UK
    4. risk carbon leakage – Australia does not currently operate a carbon pricing mechanism.

    72.   The latter two points would also apply to other sectors.

    Environment (Chapter 22)

    73.   Like many trade agreements today, the Environment Chapter is wide-ranging it its coverage and includes provisions on climate change, environmental goods and services, circular economy, ozone depleting substances, air quality, ship pollution, marine litter, marine wild capture fishing, sustainable forest management, biodiversity, alien invasive species, illegal wildlife trade, corporate social responsibility. Echoing the CPTPP (CPTPP, Art 20.3), the FTA includes obligations to uphold ‘high’ and improving levels of protection and prohibits Parties from failing to effectively enforce domestic environmental law in a manner affecting trade or investment between them (non-regression/non-derogation). Each Party affirms its commitment to implement the the international environmental agreements to which they are party (Art 22.4.1) and ’emphasises the need to enhance the mutual supportiveness between trade and environmental law and policies’ (Art 22.4.2).

    74.   With some differences in wording, most commitments are aspirational, the focus being on cooperation (See Table 1). Notably, there are stronger commitments to taking measures to control ozone depleting substances (Art 22.8), prevent ship pollution (Art 22.10) and establish a fisheries management system to regulate marine wild capture fishing (Art 22.12). Provision for ‘cooperation frameworks’ is foreseen in relation to certain areas only, including climate change, circular economy, ozone protection, air quality, ship pollution and biodiversity. For each area, a non-binding and non-exhaustive list of potential areas for cooperation is given. It is unclear how cooperation will take place: commitments are vague, no specific mechanisms are provided for, public participation is not mandatory, and implementation is subject to the availability of funds (Art 22.20). The effectiveness of these Cooperation Frameworks will therefore be borne out in their implementation.

    75.   An Environmental Working Group is foreseen to oversee implementation of this Chapter and to coordinate with other committees (Art 22.21). A bespoke dispute mechanism for this Chapter comprises Environment Consultations, Joint Committee Consultations and Ministerial Consultations (Arts 22.23-22.26). Should Parties fail to resolve a matter under these mechanisms, the requesting party may request consultations (Art 30.7) or a panel (Art 30.8) under the main dispute mechanism.

    SPS measures (Chapter 5) and Animal welfare (Chapter 25)

    76.   Food standards are a significant political issue in the UK. [19] The Agreement provides for tariff-free imports of Australian agricultural products to be phased in over a number of years; beef quotas, for example, are applied for the first 15 years and are much higher than current import levels.

    77.   Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) objectives here aim to protect human, animal and plant life and health in respective territories while facilitating trade, ensure SPS measures do not create unjustified barriers to trade, reinforce and build on the implementation of the SPS Agreement and promote greater transparency in this area (Art 6.2). The Parties affirm their rights and obligations under the SPS Agreement (Art 6.4). SPS measures are to be based on ‘scientific principles’ and ‘risk assessment in accordance with Article 5 and other relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international organisations’ (Art 6.5). This contrasts to the CPTPP, which requires that measures are based on ‘objective scientific evidence that is rationally related to the measures.’ [20] Thus there is no explicit reference to the more restrictive precautionary approach to SPS measures currently applied by the UK, only to the more limited WTO version of the principle.

    78.   The EU-UK trade agreement did not provide for a mechanism assessing equivalence of agricultural product or process standards. Here there is provision for the recognition of equivalence of SPS measures (Art 6.7). Each Party, in determining equivalence ‘shall consider the relevant international standards, guidelines and recommendations’ and the exporting Party ‘shall objectively demonstrate that its measures achieve the appropriate level of protection.’ The final determination of equivalence rests with the importing Party and Parties may consider establishing a procedure for the recognition of equivalence. WTO rules allow for state discretion to meet human, animal and plant life and health objectives, such exceptions are not provided for in the Agreement text but are noted in the explanatory memorandum.

    79.   This Chapter establishes a Committee on SPS Measures, composed of government representatives, to monitor implementation, deal with SPS issues and recommend mutually agreed proposals for amendments to this Chapter to the Joint Committee; a Party may refer any SPS issue to the SPS Committee (Art 6.6). Dispute settlement does not apply to this Chapter (Art 6.18). This suggests a generally low level of priority given to the chapter. It contrasts with the application of CPTPP dispute settlement to its SPS chapter, although the provision for objective and rational scientific assessment is excluded (CPTPP, Art 7.18).

    80.   This is the first time an Australian trade agreement has a separate animal welfare chapter; a chapter on animal welfare is not included in CPTPP. It is recognised that ‘animals are sentient beings’ and there is a ‘connection between improved welfare of farmed animals and sustainable food production systems’ (Art 25.1). A non-regression clause on animal welfare standards is provided for via a recognition that Parties will endeavour to ensure high levels of animal welfare protection, and uphold existing domestic protections. The Parties’ right to regulate is preserved.

    81.   A Joint Working Group on Animal Welfare is established (Art 25.2) and the Committee on Cooperation shall consider issues arising relating to the Animal Welfare Chapter (Art 27.4). This Committee is composed of government representatives and will review and monitor the implementation of the areas of cooperation provided for in the Agreement, specifically in relation to the environment and antimicrobial resistance, inter alia (Art 27.2). The Committee shall facilitate information exchange and invite contributions from experts, stakeholders, non-governmental organisations or civil society ‘as appropriate’ (Art 27.2). The Committee may make recommendations or refer matters to the Joint Committee, but the dispute settlement provisions are not applicable to matters arising under this Chapter (Art 27.6). As such, the effectiveness of cooperation mechanisms will be borne out in practice.

    1. What lessons and inferences for other current and future negotiations can be drawn from how the Government approached, and what it secured in, the FTA with Australia?

    82.   While the role of trade in enhancing international cooperation is well recognised, levels of environmental protection, animal welfare and food standards would arguably be better implemented via more binding, specific and enforceable provisions in trade agreements. For example, ambition to strengthen standards of environmental protection, animal welfare and food standards could be included as overarching principles in the preamble in future UK trade agreements. Clearer provision for how far standards should be maintained, harmonised or strengthened for specific areas would provide clarity on ambition. Commitments to implementation of domestic and international environmental targets and food standards could be strengthened by more binding language, tariff conditionality for certain products, procedural guarantees and adequate institutional support for cooperation. Mechanisms for dispute settlement and non-compliance should provide opportunity for public consultation and public complaints mechanisms.

    Appendices

    Table 1: Results from DIT’s estimates:

    Results by Sector, % change GVA Scoping Assessment Impact Assessment
    Agriculture Below -0.05% (-) -0.70%
    Bev and tobacco products 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.10%
    Processed foods 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.14%
    Semi-processed foods Below -0.05% (-) -2.65%
    Chemical, rubber, plastic products 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.16%
    Electronic equipment 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.04%
    Energy 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.40%
    Manufactures of materials 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.23%
    Motor vehicles and parts 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 1.16%
    Other machinery and equipment 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.59%
    Other Manufacturing 0.05 to <0.5% (+) -0.03%
    Other transport equipment 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.20%
    Paper and printing products 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.20%
    Textiles, leather and wearing apparel 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.19%
    Business services 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.07%
    Communications 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.07%
    Construction 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.12%
    Financial services 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.06%
    Insurance 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.07%
    Other services (transport, water, dwellings) 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.08%
    Personal services 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.09%
    Public services 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.08%
    Wholesale and retail trade 0.05 to <0.5% (+) 0.12%

    Table 2: UKTPO simulated impacts:

    UK Top and bottom 10 sectors by simulated output changes (%)

    Top 10
    ISIC4 Code ISIC4 Name %
    2431 Casting of iron and steel 0.85
    2732-2733 Manuf. of other electronic 0.75
    2740 Manuf. of electric lighting equipment 0.41
    33 Air transport 0.40
    2394 Manuf. of cement, lime and plaster 0.40
    1101 Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits 0.39
    2399 Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 0.37
    1394 Manuf. of cordage, rope, twine and netting 0.36
    3212 Manuf. of imitation jewellery and related articles 0.36
    2816-2817 Manuf. of lifting and handling equipment 0.33
    Bottom 10
    ISIC4 Code ISIC4 Name %
    1102 Manuf. of wines -0.66
    1010 Processing and preserving of meat -0.45
    2012 Manuf. of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds -0.05
    3091 Manuf. of motorcycles -0.04
    31 Land transport and transport via pipelines -0.02
    3011-3030 Building of ships, locomotives and aircrafts -0.02
    2660-2670 Manufacture of electromedical eq. & optical instruments -0.01
    2811 Manuf. of engines and turbines -0.01
    2610-2620 Manuf. of electronic components 0.00
    3250 Manuf. of medical and dental instruments and supplies 0.00

    January 2022


    [2] Source, ONS Pink Book, 2021.

    [3] Details of the changes introduced by DIT can be found in Annex 1 of the impact assessment, p.59.

    [4] UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement: The UK’s Strategic Approach

    [5] ONS, Pink Book, 2021

    [6] DIT, UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement: The UK’s Strategic Approach (2019), p44.

    [7] Morita-Jaeger, M. and Winters, L.A. (2018). The UK’s future services trade deals with non-EU countries: A reality check: BP24-print-interactive.pdf (sussex.ac.uk)

    [8] By types of measure, measures relating screening and approval are major type of restrictions in Australia.

    [9] The text negotiations were concluded on 2nd December 2021. The text is available: directdoc.aspx (wto.org)

    [10] Adlung R. and Mamdouh, H. (2014). How to Design Trade Agreements in Services: Top Down or Bottom-Up?, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 28 (2). Pp. 191-218.

    [11] At the time of the EU-Japan EPA, Japan made a supplementary domestic law for private data comes from the EU (see detail in The UK-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement: Lessons for the UK’s future trade agreements « UK Trade Policy Observatory (sussex.ac.uk)).

    [12] DIT, UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement: The UK’s Strategic Approach (2019), p9.

    [13] Ibid, p12.

    [14] As well as employment and labour, data protection and the protection of children and vulnerable adults online. Trade Act 2021, s 2.

    [15] Agriculture Act 2020, s 42. This section does not apply to trade agreements with EU states, those negotiated before ‘EU exit day’ and where negotiations are concluded by 31 December 2022.

    [16] Agriculture Act 2020, s 42 (as amended by the Trade Act 2021, s 9).

    [17] DIT, Impact assessment of the Free Trade Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Australia (Dec 2021), p47.

    [18] European Commission, Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of FTA negotiations between the European Union and Australia (Mar 2020), p89.

    [19] D Webb, UK-Australia free trade agreement (Commons Library Briefing Paper No 9204, Dec 2021).

    [20] “Each Party shall ensure that its sanitary and phytosanitary measures either conform to the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations or, if its sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not conform to international standards, guidelines or recommendations, that they are based on documented and objective scientific evidence that is rationally related to the measures, while recognising the Parties’ obligations regarding assessment of risk under Article 5 of the SPS Agreement.” CPTPP, Art 7.9.2.

  • Scottish Government – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    Scottish Government – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    The comments made by Scottish Government on 17 January 2022.

    UK-Australia Trade Agreement

    I am writing in response to the International Trade Committee’s Call for Evidence as part of its scrutiny of the UK-Australia trade agreement, which was signed on 16 December 2021. It is vital that the outcome of the deal reflects the interests and priorities of all four nations so I am keen that the Committee is aware of the Scottish Government’s engagement in this process and our views on how this agreement will affect people and businesses across Scotland.

    Engagement

    1. As with other trade agreement negotiations, the involvement of devolved administrations has been limited. Scottish Government officials have been in contact with officials from the UK Department for International Trade (DIT) throughout the process to represent Scotland’s interests, priorities and concerns, and have articulated these through detailed written comments. However information sharing has been constrained and we have only seen sections of the draft mandate, or draft chapter text prior to agreement, in areas that DIT consider relevant to devolved competence.
    2. Scottish Government officials received regular briefings from DIT on the progress of negotiations, which were useful. However, as I have made clear to the UK Government, information is not the same as involvement, and we had no say in the decisions taken by the UK Government throughout the negotiations and saw no detail on key parts of the agreement, such as tariffs and tariff rate quotas (TRQs), until after they were agreed. Nor were we given the underpinning analysis or rationale behind the decisions.
    3. I have frequently made the case to the UK Government that reserved matters such as tariffs impact on devolved responsibilities, such as agriculture, and the Scottish Government will continue to argue we should have meaningful engagement in these areas to ensure that Scotland’s interests are taken into account.

    Agri-food imports

    1. You ask about the likely impact of the deal on various sectors of the economy. I wrote to the UK Minister for Trade Policy, Rt Hon Penny Mordaunt MP, in December to express our concerns at the agreement and in particular, the implications of this agreement on farming communities in Scotland. The significant level of market access that it provides for beef and sheepmeat imports is a particular concern. The year 1 tariff-rate quota (TRQ) for beef imports is 35,000 metric tonnes, which is seven-times the current level of Australian beef imports to the UK, and this rises to 110,000 metric tonnes by year 10. This significant increase in quota volumes is exacerbated by the fact that quotas will be based on product weight which makes it more advantageous to Australian producers, who can increase imports of premium cuts that will receive a higher price than lower end cuts of a similar weight, with no added effect on TRQ utilisation. High value cuts are where Scottish farmers derive most value, so a potential increase in imports is a concern for Scottish industry. Beyond year 15, Australian agri-food exporters will enjoy unfettered access to the Scottish agriculture market.
    2. We were concerned that the original scoping assessment showed the agriculture and semiprocessed foods sectors as losing out as a result of an FTA with Australia. Now we have seen the final impact assessment, this has been confirmed.

    Animal welfare and antimicrobial resistance (AMR)

    1. We have consistently called for imports of Australian agri-food to be produced to the same animal welfare and environmental standards that Scottish producers are required to meet. Whilst the agreement contains a non-regression clause on animal welfare, we are not reassured that this will protect Scottish and UK farmers as Australian animal welfare standards are already lower. The World Animal Protection Index1 ranks Australia as D for animal welfare, while the UK is ranked B, and the RSPCA2 has highlighted a number of welfare practices in use in Australia, which are illegal in the UK, such as the use of barren battery cages for poultry, sow stalls, hot branding of cattle, and mulesing of sheep (with anaesthetic only required in the state of Victoria). This means Scottish farmers, crofters and food producers will not be competing on a level playing field with their Australian competitors.
    2. While we note that the agreement contains provisions on tackling antimicrobial resistance (AMR), the detailed provisions do not go as far as we would have liked and represent a missed opportunity to have a meaningful impact on this significant threat to global health.

    Goods exports

    1. We recognise that the agreement removes the vast majority of tariffs on UK exports to Australia, and we expect this will benefit exporters, such as the whisky industry. It will be 1 World Animal Protection | Animal Protection Index 2 Protect UK farm animal welfare standards | RSPCA Scottish Ministers, special advisers and the Permanent Secretary are covered by the terms of the Lobbying (Scotland) Act 2016. See www.lobbying.scot St Andrew’s House, Regent Road, Edinburgh EH1 3DG www.gov.scot important to ensure that Scottish companies can take full advantage of new opportunities that arise from this agreement. In addition to tariff reduction, the issue of an enforceable definition for Scotch whisky in Australia is important to the whisky industry in Scotland, so it is unfortunate that the UK Government was not able to secure a commitment within this agreement.

    Services exports

    1. We are keen for Scottish companies to be able to take advantage of the provisions in this agreement on trade in services, business mobility and government procurement. While these are likely to have benefits for companies trading with Australia, it remains the case that the size of the Australian market and geographical distance are likely to be limiting factors. These measures will not compensate for the loss of market access that Scottish companies have faced as a result of leaving the EU.

    Environment

    1. The Scottish Government already has an ambitious target to meet net-zero by 2045 and Scotland’s Vision for Trade makes clear that trade must support this goal. It is concerning that the UK Government’s impact assessment points to a significant increase, of between 31 and 40%, in transport-related greenhouse gas emissions as a result of this deal. While it is welcome that there is a reference to the Paris Agreement in the environment chapter, we would have preferred binding commitments to comply with the Agreement and to take action to keep global warming to 1.5 degrees.

    Impact Assessments

    1. It was helpful to see the final impact assessment, however it would have been useful to see interim analysis before the agreement was finalised. We also believe it is vital that the UK Government undertake more detailed sustainability impact assessments, including more detailed analysis of the impact on the different nations of the UK and on different groups within society. The impact assessment shows a small increase in UK GDP over the long run of 0.08%, but this will not compensate for the 4% decline in UK GDP, which Office for Budget Responsibility analysis suggests will result from leaving the EU.
    2. It is unfortunate that the focus on long run impacts means that we have no analysis of the short and medium term impacts of this deal. The Scottish Government would be keen to know what measures of support the UK Government will make available to Scottish sectors and producers adversely impacted by the deal.
    3. I hope these comments are helpful to the Committee’s consideration of the agreement and I would be happy to answer any further questions the Committee may have arising from these.
  • Trades Union Congress – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    Trades Union Congress – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    The comments made by the Trades Union Congress on 10 March 2022.

    Written evidence from Trades Union Congress (TUC)

    Introduction

    The TUC exists to make the working world a better place for everyone. We bring together more than 5.5 million working people who make up our 48 member unions.

    1. The TUC welcomed the opportunity to provide oral evidence to the International Trade Committee’s enquiry into the UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on 2 March 2022.
    2. This submission supplements the oral evidence the TUC provided to the Committee, providing more detail on issues that were highlighted in the session.

    Involvement of trade unions

    1. When negotiations started between Australia and the UK, the TUC released a joint position with our Australian counterpart the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU). [1]  This statement called for UK and Australian governments to involve trade unions in negotiations to ensure that the agreement contained the key protections working people needed, including:
    • enforceable commitments to ratify and respect International Labour Organisation core conventions on labour rights, including for migrant workers
    • protections for all public services through a complete exclusion of all public services including such as health, education and transport; opening public services – using the ‘positive list’ approach
    • protections for personal data
    • exclusion of all kinds of special courts for foreign investors such as Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) or the Investment Court System (ICS), which allow foreign investors to sue governments for actions that are perceived to threaten their profits
    1. In June 2021, the TUC and ACTU released a follow up statement expressing concern that trade unions had been excluded from negotiations and the Agreement in Principle between the UK and Australia did not suggest the final agreement would have the protections unions were calling for. [2] These fears were confirmed when the final agreement was published.
    2. The TUC issued a statement on the publication of the final agreement in December 2021. [3] This stated that the deal posed a threat to workers, due to the fact it:
    • contained no effective mechanism to enforce respect for fundamental International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions – the agreement follows a similar approach to the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP) which has been condemned by trade union internationally for being ineffective to use in practice [4]
    • contained no protections for migrant workers’ rights in the mobility provisions
    • contained commitments to liberalise cross-border flows of data which could mean regulations to protect personal data from abuse and being used in a discriminatory way would have to be removed
    • contained inadequate exemptions for public services – using the ‘negative list’ approach – which could lock part-privatised services into privatisation
    1. The TUC calls on the government to meaningfully consult trade unions on all its ongoing trade negotiations to ensure that they contain the protections working people need.

    Gender

    1. The TUC believes it is crucial for trade agreements to prevent gender discrimination, promote decent jobs for women and protect quality public services.  It is crucial for trade unions to be involved in negotiations to ensure these outcomes.
    2. The TUC is concerned that the commitments to gender equality in the UK-Australia trade deal will not be effective in promoting gender equality as they are not accompanied by effective enforcement mechanisms.  Furthermore, the fact the Labour chapter of the agreement does not require Parties to ratify and respect all the fundamental ILO conventions means that Parties are not required to ratify and uphold convention 111 on non-discrimination which is central to addressing gender inequalities.   As noted above, the TUC is also concerned the UK-Australia FTA does not contain adequate exemptions for public services as it takes a negative list approach.  This means part-privatised services could be locked into privatisation.  This will particularly negatively impact on women as they are disproportionately likely to be caregivers relying on public services.
    3. The failure to involve trade unions in UK-Australia negotiations meant that trade unions were not able to advise the government on how the tariff offers and other provisions in the agreement would affect women workers.
    4. The TUC is concerned that a number of trade agreements and trade arrangements negotiated without trade union involvement have increased gender inequalities.  For example, the North America Free Trade Agreement signed in 1993 displaced women from stable jobs with good conditions in the manufacturing sector in the US.  The agreement also displaced women from stable jobs in agriculture in Mexico.  The European Parliament reports that poverty increased in female headed households by 50 per cent between 1992 – 2000. [5]
    5. Furthermore, it is well documented that tariff-free areas that have been established in a number of countries to process exports (Export Processing Zones) are sites where mostly women are employed on exploitative terms. [6] Workers have less protections in these zones with trade unions are frequently banned, as in Export Processing Zones in Bangladesh. [7]

    ISDS

    1. While the UK-Australia agreement does not contain an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism, the TUC is concerned that the UK government intends to join CPTPP which contains ISDS.  Unless the UK government asks for an opt-out from the ISDS provisions with all CPTPP members, the UK would be subject to this ISDS system.  The TUC is concerned the government has not indicated to date that it will ask for such an opt-out.
    2. If the UK is bound by ISDS provisions in CPTPP, it would mean investors based in all CPTPP countries, including Australia, would be able to sue the government for actions that they perceive threaten their profits. In the past, ISDS cases have been brought against governments that attempted to increase the national minimum wage or renationalise water supplies. [8]

    March 2022


    [1] https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/2020-09/ACTU_NZCTU_TUC_Statement_UK_Trade_Talks_p3.pdf

    [2] https://www.tuc.org.uk/australian-and-uk-unions-statement-uk-australia-trade-deal

    [3] https://www.tuc.org.uk/news/tuc-uk-aus-deal-poses-threat-working-people-while-contributing-almost-nothing-our-economy

    [4] https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/trans_pacific.pdf

    [5] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571388/IPOL_STU(2016)571388_EN.pdf

    [6] https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/export-processing-zones-symbols-of-exploitation-and-a-development-dead-end/

    [7] https://www.globalrightsindex.org/en/2021

    [8] https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid

  • UK Centre for Animal Law – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    UK Centre for Animal Law – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    The comments made by UK Centre for Animal Law on 15 January 2022.

    Written evidence submission from UK Centre for Animal Law

    1. Thank you for the opportunity to provide our comments on the UK Australia Free Trade Agreement. Having carefully studied this text, overall, from an animal welfare perspective, we find it to be a disappointment. For although the government has plainly heard from many sources including MPs, campaigning organisations, and members of the public, about the importance of strong animal welfare provisions, it has chosen to implement this in a half-hearted manner.
    2. We understand the importance that the government has attached to joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership but are particularly concerned that sticking closely to that text means not pursuing our own interests. While our comments are specific to the UK-Australia, many of them are also likely to apply to the impending agreement with New Zealand, others to come in the future, and the CPTPP.
    3. The following are the areas of greatest concern to us:

    Lack of animal welfare conditionality for tariff removal

    1. It has been widely reported that the complete removal of tariffs for beef and sheepmeat products was Australia’s top priority during negotiations with the UK. It is our view that this should only have been granted in return for meeting UK core standards on animal welfare, in particular that meat exported to the UK did not come from animals which had been subject to hot-iron branding or mulesing. Hot-iron branding is still permitted in all States and Territories of Australia but is banned in the UK. Mulesing is a painful procedure that involves cutting crescent-shaped flaps of skin from around the lamb’s breech and tail using sharp shears. The resulting wound, when healed creates an area of bare, stretched scar tissues which diminishes the attraction of blowflies thereby reducing the risk of fly strikes.
    2. Such conditionality, based around consistent core standards, would have been the single most significant measure that the UK government could have taken to support the global welfare of animals. We are further concerned that this FTA will create legal impediment to the UK taking future steps to ban meat products entering the UK which have resulted from cruel practices.

    Animal testing language within the cosmetics annex to the TBT chapter

    1. Paragraph 22 of Annex 7A on Cosmetics states that “Neither Party shall require that a cosmetic product be tested on animals to determine the safety of that cosmetic product, unless there is no validated alternative method available to assess safety. A Party may, however, consider the results of animal testing to determine the safety of a cosmetic product.” We are disappointed that this language does not recognise the rights of both parties to fully ban the production, import or sale of cosmetics tested on animals. Indeed, the testing of cosmetic products and ingredients used exclusively for cosmetics is banned in the UK and this includes a ban on the marketing and sale of such products. We are aware that the language adopted is consistent with language used in CPTPP, and as that negotiation proceeds would ask as a minimum, that the UK government make a clear statement that nothing within these trade agreements prevents the UK from maintaining and extending current policies.

    Reference to science in the SPS chapter

    1. We note that the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) chapter makes a direct reference to the need for regulations to be based on science, but not explicitly to the rights of the parties to set the appropriate levels of protection to them, or the use of precaution where the scientific evidence can be considered unclear. Given that the UK currently has rules pertaining to food sales that are based on a precautionary principle, which the government has stated will not be changed, this appears to be in contradiction to that commitment.
    2. Dispute settlement provisions do not apply to this chapter, thus any UK decisions that Australia considers not to be based on science cannot be challenged in this way. However, we can expect that Australia will raise issues such as hormone-treated cattle in the SPS Committee, arguing that under the terms of the SPS text this should be allowed for sale in the UK.
    3. It is important that the UK government explains the contradiction between the SPS text and their stated position on not changing UK food rules. This is particularly the case given similar text applies in the CPTPP. Further, as indicated above, the UK should be ensuring the future policy space exists to restrict products for sale based on their production methods, and we are concerned this will be affected by this text.

    Animal welfare considered less important than similar issues such as marine environment

    1. We welcome the agreement between the parties that animals are sentient beings, and the connection between improved welfare of farmed animals and sustainable food production systems, in paragraph 1 of Article 25.1 on Animal Welfare. The presence of text on Animal Welfare on Antimicrobial Resistance is welcome. Nonetheless, it is clear that the UK Government consider these issues less important than those included in Chapter 22 on Environment such as biodiversity, the marine environment, and sustainable forest management. This is because that chapter includes cooperation, public participation, a working group, consultations, and the potential use of dispute settlement. The Animal Welfare chapter by contrast only includes cooperation and a working group.
    2. Without wishing to establish a hierarchy of different issues, the approach of the UK Government seems not to reflect UK public opinion. We would therefore call for a consistent approach to be taken, in this and future UK FTAs.

    Weak language on CITES, and banned trade included in tariff schedules

    1. We welcome much of the content of Chapter 22 Environment, but find some of the commitments to be surprisingly loose. For example, we would expect stronger language on the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) than the parties merely endeavouring to implement this, as in paragraph 3c of Article 22.16.
    2. The CITES article could also have been expanded to other endangered species, particularly whales. Both the UK and Australia outlawed the practice of whaling in the seventies. Given the strong focus of the environmental chapter on marine conservation and ecosystems, the opportunity to include specific language on whaling was missed.
    3. We also note the presence in the tariff schedules for products whose trade is referenced in the text as requiring of particular conservation, such as “ivory, unworked or simply prepared, its powder and waste”, and sharks, marine turtles, seabirds, and marine mammals. These items should have been left out of tariff considerations.

    Conclusion:

    1. The UK-Australia could and should have gone further on a number of issues, including making tariff commitments conditional on core standards, providing greater protection to the UK’s rights to set our own SPS standards including through the use of precaution, and putting animal welfare alongside other similar issues in the Environment chapter. We would like to see specific government reassurance on these issues, as well as on animal testing on cosmetics. We would further wish to see further progress made in future UK FTAs, including consideration of all of these issues within the talks for accession to CPTPP.
    2. On the basis of this UK-Australia FTA text, we believe the UK cannot yet be considered to be a leader in animal welfare.
  • Federation of Small Businesses – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    Federation of Small Businesses – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    The comments made by the Federation of Small Businesses on 14 January 2022.

    Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) written evidence

    1. FSB is a non-profit making, grassroots and non-party political business organisation that represents 160,000 members in every community across the UK. Set up in 1974, we are the authoritative voice on policy issues affecting the UK’s 5.5 million small businesses, micro businesses and the self-employed.
    2. FSB welcomes the opportunity to respond to the International Trade Committee’s call for evidence on the UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement. We would be happy to provide further detail on any of the issues raised in this response.

    How good a deal is the UK-Australia FTA for the UK?

    1. Australia is an important market for FSB members – according to FSB research around 40 per cent of UK small firms who trade internationally do so already with Australia and around a third (31 per cent) of FSB members engaged in international trade indicated that Australia is important for their exporting ambitions.
    2. FSB believes that the FTA will deliver significant benefits for small businesses that are currently or considering trading with Australia and welcomed the signature of the FTA in December 2021.
    3. Free Trade Agreements are a powerful means of removing barriers to international trade for small businesses, and FSB has long championed the inclusion of provisions that will help small firms understand and take advantage of the opportunities that FTAs create. In particular, FSB supports the inclusion of SME-specific provisions, as well as trade facilitation provisions and measures to promote digital trade.
    4. FSB is therefore pleased that the final UK-Australia includes a dedicated SME chapter, as well as commitments on mobility, digital trade, and measures to tackle non-tariff barriers for goods.
    5. The success of the FTA will ultimately depend on its implementation and enforcement. FSB would have liked to see included in the FTA provision for an SME committee, which would ensure adequate representation of SME interests in the implementation of the deal.
    6. However, overall the FTA has the potential to make an important difference to UK SMEs that trade or are considering trading with Australia. FSB would encourage both the UK and Australia governments to move forward quickly with the implementation of arrangements that will facilitate bilateral trade in areas such as the mutual recognition of professional qualifications or conformity assessment.

    How are the terms of the FTA between the UK and Australia likely to affect you, your business or organisation, or those that you represent?

    1. Tariff and non-tariff barriers are both important factors considered by small businesses when deciding where to export to or import from. Previous FSB research has found that nearly one in three small businesses (29%) say that tariffs play a major role in where small business exporters trade while more than half of small firms stated that non-tariff barriers play a role in where they choose to export (53%) or import (59%).
    2. FSB therefore welcomes the commitments made in the FTA that will tackle these barriers, particularly with regard to trade facilitation, digital trade, technical barriers to trade and mobility.

    Trade facilitation

    1. Small businesses often do not have the necessary resources or expertise to comply with complicated customs procedures. However, they are highly dependent on moving goods across borders quickly, especially those who are part of a ‘just in time’ supply chain or business model.
    2. The FTA contains several welcome trade facilitation provisions, such as Article 5.15 which states that each party shall endeavour to develop or maintain a single window arrangement that will allow businesses to submit customs information through a single electronic entry point.
    3. FSB supports the work currently being undertaken by the Government to explore possible design choices for a UK Single Trade Window and has engaged with the Cabinet Office Border Protocol Delivery Group to provide a small business perspective.

    Digital trade

    1. FSB welcomes commitments in the FTA to promote the acceptance of electronic trade documents, electronic contracts and e-signatures and to ensure the interoperability of electronic invoicing systems.
    2. Facilitating paperless trade will generate enormous benefits for smaller firms trading internationally. According to research from the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), moving to a fully digital system at a global level could generate £25 billion in new economic growth by 2024 and significantly increase business efficiency for SMEs. [1]
    3. Data localisation requirements can generate significant costs associated with setting up servers or storing data, and can limit small firms’ access to cost effective cloud computing systems. FSB therefore welcomed commitments to remove unjustified data localisation requirements.

    Technical barriers to trade

    1. The FTA commits both parties to working cooperatively to increase acceptance of equivalent technical regulations. FSB welcomes the inclusion of provisions on the exchanging of information and increasing the harmonisation of technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures.
    2. FSB would encourage both parties to identify suitable technical regulations and processes and to agree mutual recognition agreements quickly, as Mutual Recognition Agreements can remove significant costs and barriers for smaller firms.

    Mobility

    1. As with the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the UK-Australia FTA encourages professional bodies and regulators to establish and maintain sectoral Mutual Recognition Agreements. This model has the potential to deliver significant benefits to professional service providers – and particularly the self-employed – but it will rely on the ambition and speed of the respective professional organisations and regulators. FSB encourages the relevant bodies in both parties, with the support of the Professional Services Working Group established by the FTA, to work quickly to implement these provisions for maximum benefit.
    2. Many self-employed small business owners delivering Mode 4 services fall into the category of independent professionals or contractual service providers. While FSB welcomes the inclusion of commitments around the temporary entry for business persons, we are concerned that in some cases these provisions are restrictive – for example, those wishing to make use of the market access granted to contractual service supplies, must in some cases possess at least six years’ professional experiences in addition to a university degree or equivalent qualification, as well as the relevant professional qualifications required under Australian law.
    3. FSB welcomes the parties’ commitments in relation to their Youth Mobility Schemes (YMS), which will be made available to nationals no older than 35 for a total stay of up to 3 years, without having to undertake specified work including agricultural labour. FSB has identified YMS youth mobility schemes with selected other countries, including Australia, as an important part of our future immigration system. FSB welcomes extending the upper age limit of the YMS to 35, as called for in the 2020 report A World of Talent.[2] More widely, the Youth Mobility Scheme should be extended to EU countries and should not include annual quotas.

    January 2022


    [1] Creating a Modern Digital Trade Ecosystem: The economic case to reform UK law and align to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records; United Kingdom International Chamber of Commerce; 2021.

    [2] FSB, A World of Talent (2020), p. 12 (available at https://www.fsb.org.uk/resource-report/a-world-of-talent.html)

  • Friends of the Earth – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    Friends of the Earth – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    The comments made by the Friends of the Earth on 14 January 2022.

    Friends of the Earth written evidence

    About us

    1.       Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland was established in 1971. We have local groups in around 130 neighbourhoods, and support more than 260 Climate Action groups. We are part of an international network of 75 national groups, counting over 2 million members and supporters globally. Friends of the Earth supports strong environmental standards and alternative approaches to trade, which put the needs of local communities and our environment at the forefront.

    Summary

    2.       The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed between the UK and Australia on 16 December 2021 is the first entirely new deal to be agreed since the UKs exit from the EU, and the most recent expression of UK trade policy. It is disappointing that the final text of the FTA confirms that the UK has rewarded Australia’s lower environmental protections and slow, unambitious climate action with tariff- and quota-free market access. In summary:

    1. Coherence: We remain concerned that the UK does not have an overarching, public trade strategy. Negotiating objectives for this deal were unambitious, narrowly interpreted, and could have been bolstered if supported by a wider strategy developed over time with civil society engagement.
    2. Evidence: Assessment of potential environmental impacts lacks range and depth. The low level of detail makes it hard to determine true environmental and social impacts of the deal. Impact assessments do not take account of the cumulative impacts of trade deals on the environment, nor the precedent-setting nature of the Australia trade deal.
    3. Impact: This deal undermines high UK standards on the environment and animal welfare by forcing UK farmers to compete with outdated, unsustainable, and industrialised models of agricultural production. It has the potential to increase the UKs global footprint and complicity in environmental harms including deforestation.
    4. Precedent: The UK-Australia FTA sets a precedent for all future bilateral trading agreements. The low level of environmental ambition combined with unprecedented levels of market access will make it more difficult for the UK to secure commitments from other potential trading partners in the years to come. Yet government appears unconcerned by this.
    5. Ambition: This deal does not lay down ambitious norms for international trade which promote sustainable development, prevent the exporting of environmental harms or ensure action on the climate and biodiversity. Key features of modern trade deals have not been developed upon – for example, derogation from or non-enforcement of existing environmental laws, or inaction in relation to Paris Climate goals, are unlikely to result in action under the FTA, unless conducted in ways impacting trade. The opportunity to require real delivery on these commitments was missed.
    6. Engagement: Civil society engagement has been piecemeal and transparency lacking. Limited improvements to parliamentary scrutiny are not enough to ensure that there is proper engagement with MPs and relevant committees.

    3.       Overall, the FTA suggests little negligible economic benefit and a number of risks, that are not adequately compensated for in terms of progressive provisions and ambition within the deal.

    To what extent has the Government achieved its stated negotiating objectives?

    4.       The stated negotiating objectives for the UK-Australia trade agreement were published in June 2020.  The final deal does broadly meet many of these. However, objectives appear to have been set based on areas in which Australia was already willing to take action, while the opportunity to secure more ambition in exchange for market access has been missed. Therefore the final FTA does not represent a development or improvement of existing practice and does not significantly or urgently further broader UK objectives.

    5.       Ahead of negotiations with New Zealand, the UK government set a headline objective to “seek sustainability provisions, including on environment and climate change, that meet the shared high ambition of both parties on these issues”. The version of this objective published in regard of the Australia negotiations omits the word ‘high’ from this sentence, suggesting that Australia’s poor track record on environmental issues has not only remained unchallenged in this FTA but has actively shaped what the UK government sought to achieve within it.

    6.       Objectives to ‘reaffirm’ commitments to international climate, environment and labour standards are secured in the FTA. However, these are a feature of all modern trade agreements and are present in many of the UK’s historic ‘rollover’ trade agreements. A stronger objective would have been to build upon these with additional support or enforcement related to achieving these international commitments. Yet the government neither sought nor secured such improvements.

    7.       While much has been made of the mention of the Paris Agreement in article 22.5, the clause does not reference limiting warming to 1.5 degrees nor make action which frustrates the agreement grounds to impose remedies under the FTA. The non-derogation clauses are also limited to actions taken ‘in order to encourage trade and investment’. Negotiators could have been set an objective to remove this caveat and more directly link trade benefits to ongoing compliance with domestic environmental law, but they were not, and therefore the FTA does not set the precedent it might have in this area.

    8.       Positively, the objective to secure ‘appropriate mechanisms for the implementation, monitoring and dispute resolution of environmental and labour provisions’ has been met through replicating the CPTPP approach, in which environmental disputes have access to the overarching dispute settlement mechanism of the agreement. This could offer valuable enforceability to these provisions. However, the animal welfare chapter remains unenforceable.

    9.       A number of objectives set by government pertained to the protection of environmental and food safety standards. Yet while the FTA itself does not require the removal of protections, it is questionable how far the objective of achieving “meaningful protection, of the UK’s world-leading environmental and labour standards” (emphasis added) has been secured.

    10.   In relation to the UK’s SPS objective to “uphold the UK’s high levels of public, animal, and plant health, including food safety”, the FTA permits bilateral SPS recognition. This means the agreement would pose no direct threat to UK import bans relating to hormone-treated beef or chlorine chicken. This is welcome and supports the stated objective.

    11.   However, in relation to wider standards related objectives, it is debatable if the FTA guarantees the “meaningful protection” promised. Australia has many lower environmental standards than the UK, and only a handful of these are covered by import bans. The rest are UK standards prohibiting procedures such as like mulesing (a painful process condemned by the RSPCA [1] where skin is stripped from the hindquarters of sheep to control pests), branding cows with hot irons, and using particular antibiotics and pesticides.  This FTA provides Australian products associated with the practices with far greater access to UK markets, with a phased introduction intended to cushion the economic impact of competition rather than address the longer-term potential for downward pressure from imports produced to lower environmental standards in Australia.

    12.   We welcome the inclusion of an animal welfare and antimicrobial resistance chapter, which recognises the worries organisations like the RSPCA, CWIF and Alliance to Save our Antibiotics have raised about welfare standards in Australia. However, we note that a focus on animal welfare was not initially highlighted as a key objective for the UK government, and the chapter stops short of including any concrete requirements for Australian goods to meet specific welfare standards, instead reaffirming the right of each party to establish its own policies and priorities for the protection of animal welfare.

    13.   In the Commons debate [2] on this FTA on January 5th, the Secretary of State repeatedly made reference to the fact that this deal marks the first time Australia had committed to either an animal welfare or an environment chapter. However, this is incorrect. A number of Australian FTAs contain environmental provisions, and some, including Australia -US and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnerships (CPTPP), contain full environment chapters, albeit of varying quality.

    What is likely to be the impact of the agreement?

    14.   The UK-Australia FTA as proposed would not impact upon existing import standards. However, as outlined above, provide tariff-free, quota-free access for goods produced to lower standards presents the potential for the undermining of existing standards in future. If UK producers are unable to compete while maintaining high standards, government will face pressure to downgrade these standards in response. This would present a huge concern for UK consumers, who consistently report a desire for high animal welfare, environmental and food health standards in trade deals. Which? Consumer Priorities survey 2021 found that maintaining food standards in trade deals is a top concern for 91% of people. 87% of respondents were also concerned about animal welfare standards, and 84% about environmental protection [3].

    15.   However, this agreement has the potential to increase the UKs global footprint and the environmental damage associated with supply chains, even if this does not come in the form of lower UK standards. The government’s impact assessment suggests overall greenhouse gas emissions “associated with UK-based production” are likely to be largely unchanged by this FTA, while emissions associated with transport are expected to increase by up to 0.3MtCO2eq a year. No mention is made of changes to the UKs consumption footprint, either in terms of emissions or ecological impacts, which means that opportunities to prevent or mitigate impacts may have been missed, and may be inadequately monitored in future.

    16.   The impact assessment suggests that the UK will import an additional £4.2bn worth of goods from Australia [4]. That means UK consumers will be made increasingly responsible for negative environmental impacts in Australia – where farmers used 16x times more antibiotics in chicken production (in the last year figures were available) than the UK [5], sediment from beef production has been linked to declines in the great barrier reef, and deforestation increased by 34% between 2016 and 2018 [6]. In Queensland alone, more than a hectare of bushland is cleared every two minutes, for beef and sheep production [7]. Australian agriculture also uses 71 highly hazardous substances, and thousands of other pesticides, that are banned in the UK [8], including neonicotinoids.

    17.   Australia operates a patchwork of state-level biodiversity offset schemes, applicable to various forms of development and extraction. A number of Australian mining companies have also opted to work towards carbon neutrality commitments reliant on the use of emissions offsetting. However, these offsetting approaches have been criticised for both failing to address the root causes of climate change and biodiversity loss and for ongoing inadequacy and mismanagement. [9], [10] It will be impossible to fully quantify the extra-territorial impacts of UK imports without a clear understanding of the functioning and efficiency of the Australian offsetting market.

    18.   Even where this FTA has the potential to increase the supply of goods and services necessary for a 1.5-compliant future, the potential consequences for nature are currently ill-understood. The impact assessment concludes that as the largest global producer of lithium, and third largest of cobalt, Australia could provide the resources to support “emerging UK industries”. However, it does not provide any further detail on the environmental impacts which might be associated with increasing UK imports of resources mined in Australia. These could be significant, particularly if production continues to expand as anticipated.

    19.   Mining concerns in Australia include failures to respect Indigenous rights, polluted waterways, land clearing and the legacy issues of abandoned mining sites and communities. Cobalt production is heavily dependent on fossil fuels, while high concentrations of cobalt have been linked to the death of crops and worms [11] vital for soil fertility. Lithium mining and processing are associated with the seepage of metals into groundwater. The Greenbushes lithium mine in Western Australia is located within an area defined by UNEP WCMC data as containing global critical habitat [12], and adjacent to a river considered a sacred site by the First Nations Noongar people, yet there is limited data available on existing and current impacts from the mine or measures taken to mitigate these.

    20.   Other minerals used in renewables technology, including iron and copper, are also linked to violations of environmental protections and free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples.  In 2020 Rio Tinto destroyed sacred Aboriginal rock shelters at Jukan Gorge and prevented local communities from mounting a defence through a gagging clause, highlighting the ongoing nature of abuses and provoking a standing committee inquiry [13]. Furthermore, Native Title law does not allow First Nations people to say no to mining or exploration [14].

    21.   Australian mining companies are already moving to take advantage of increasing global demand and rising prices by expanding production – and a number of new companies have been granted licenses for exploration in recent years. The combined impacts of this expansion on Indigenous peoples and the environment are currently unclear.  While some Australian mining companies have made sustainability claims, these are voluntary, and compliance is complex to substantiate.

    22.   If the sustainable extraction of resources necessary for ending UK reliance on fossil fuels is to be identified as an area of potential future trade growth, further data should be sought on the potential for increased and cumulative impacts, and assurances sought on the progress made by Australian regulators in preventing abuses. The UK should focus on limiting consumption, assuring the highest possible standards for imports to support a green transition, and ensuring full respect for the rights of local communities, rather than rushing to secure access to resources linked with further detriment.

    23.   This agreement is likely to negatively impact UK farming.  The lower production costs of agri-food products in Australia will increase competition, in addition to presenting challenges to standards as outlined above. DIT’s own Impact Assessment of the UK-Australia FTA suggests that “part of the gains [from the deal] results from a reallocation of resources away from agriculture, forestry, and fishing (around -£94 million) and semi-processed foods (around -£225 million). This is in favour of growth in manufacturing sectors, in particular manufacture of motor vehicles and manufacture of machinery and equipment.”

    24.   The UK Agricultural and Horticultural Development Board’s November 2021 modelling confirm this pessimistic view: “With Australian producers enjoying considerable cost of production advantages, the implications of lower priced material coming into the UK at some point (possibly quite soon) is very real and potentially substantial. When we include the change to farm support payments in the years ahead, the opening of trade represents a real risk to domestic farm supply chains. [15]”

    25.   It is unclear what impact the animal welfare and antimicrobial resistance chapter might have in practice, given its lack of enforceability and focus on cooperation over commitments to raise standards. The UK impact assessment does not consider the issue in detail, beyond noting the potential for collaboration. Given the lower baseline from which Australia begins and the tariff liberalisations discussed above, it appears likely that the overall impact of the deal will be to increase the complicity of UK supply chains in low welfare practices and those linked with growth in treatment-resistant disease unless further action is taken to guarantee import standards.

    26.   The first incarnation of the Trade and Agriculture Commission (TAC) recommended that government consider setting out core UK standards prior to further trade negotiations [16]. Such action could mitigate the potential for this FTA to negatively impact upon UK farming, standards or global footprint.  However, thus far the government has made extremely limited progress in progressing TAC recommendations. Government has also thus far failed to clearly set out to what extent and how the recommendations of the newly formed, permanent TAC will be applied to the FTA, if further possible negative agri-food impacts are identified. When questioned directly as to whether government would follow recommendations of the TAC in relation to the Australia deal in the Commons on January 5, the Secretary of State was able only to say that government would await the report and is ‘hopeful we will pass its examination well [17]’.

    27.   Neither the Government’s impact assessment, nor the brief of the TAC, allow for the consideration of the cumulative impact of trade deals the UK is planning to negotiate. This could be particularly significant in some areas given the precedents set by this FTA. The zero-tariff, zero-quota offer extended to Australian agriculture now represents a goal for US and Mercosur negotiators to aim for and could lead to significantly higher cumulative effects, which would not be caught by any single impact assessment.

    How well has the Government communicated its progress in negotiations – and how much has it listening to stakeholders during those negotiations?

    28.   Levels of transparency and meaningful engagement have been disappointing across the board, including in relation to negotiations with Australia. The lack of an overarching trade strategy or meaningful action to lay out UK core standards and guiding principles has also hampered efforts to consider or debate the cumulative impacts of and precedents set by new FTAs. Updates within parliament and via stakeholder forums have been extremely high level, indicating only subjects under discussion, rather than whether UK negotiators were taking an ambitious or a regressive approach on them.

    29.   There are some signs that the government is listening to civil society concerns – since the initial consultation on this FTA, the Department for International Trade (DIT) has set up further stakeholder advisory mechanisms and offered quarterly updates on progress. However, these have been marred by confidentiality requirements and a lack of clear feedback. Equally, while the establishment of a Trade and Agriculture Commission (TAC) to provide recommendations on maintaining standards, and the placement of the TAC on a statutory footing to provide future scrutiny were both welcome, progress on responding to recommendations and establishing the permanent body have been slow.

    30.   The extent to which civil society concerns have actively informed negotiations is also unclear. There is no clear feedback loop between concerns fed in during the consultation or stakeholder engagement sessions and the positions taken by the UK government, nor the outcomes of negotiations.

    31.   For example, Friends of the Earth was pleased to see that this deal will not contain an ISDS mechanism. Many NGOs raised concerns about the potential impacts of such a mechanism during the consultation and negotiation process, and in meetings with government departments. However, there was little transparency or discussion on the issue and public concerns were regularly dismissed by government. On May 27 2021 Trade Minister Greg Hands was asked to rule ISDS out of the Australia deal but did sot, saying “It is a live negotiation, and there will be a chapter on investment. We are huge investors in each other’s markets, and I remind him that the UK has never lost an ISDS case. [18]“ Weeks later, in June 2021, the Agreement in Principle was published without an ISDS mechanism, alongside Australian government FAQs clearly stating that Australian negotiators had no interest in pursuing ISDS [19].  It is therefore unclear whether ISDS was omitted to any degree due to public concern, or simply ruled out by Australian negotiators. It has proven difficult to engage with government to determine how ISDS may be approached in future negotiations, or to get clear feedback on the level to which stakeholder concerns and evidence are informing the government’s position.

    32.   The exact nature and timings of remaining parliamentary scrutiny is still unclear, as is the extent to which existing and new stakeholders will be engaged in scrutiny, impact assessment and the monitoring and oversight of the deal.

    How well has the Government communicated the possible impact of the FTA, to enable you or other stakeholders to prepare for its implementation?

    33.   Thus far, communications on the possible impact of the agreement have been extremely high level, with many possible impacts ill-explored. While the Impact Assessment recognises that agricultural activities, especially beef and dairy production, contribute to deforestation in Australia, it does not take into account emissions due to deforestation and land use change (p. 46), and limits consideration of impacts to a predominantly economic assessment within the borders of the UK.

    34.   The relationship between potential issues identified and planned mitigations or changes made over the course of negotiations is also unclear. For example, while the preliminary scoping assessment published in July 2020 suggested that a “resulting shift in sectoral output will marginally move the composition of UK output from sectors that are relatively less CO2-intensive towards sectors which are, on the whole, more CO2-intensive”[20] it is not clear if or how the government has used this information to reduce the impact of the deal, or what steps stakeholders might take to mitigate impacts.

    35.   Finally, impact assessments have not been published to a schedule which allows their findings to be considered by stakeholders before and during negotiations. This means that civil society has been unable to engage with potential impact or propose modifications to the deal which could mitigate concerns. UK trade policy should require environmental impact assessments (EIAs) are provided before negotiations commence and regularly updated during the negotiating process. These assessments must inform the development of trade policy at all stages and should affect how trade agreements are agreed, and how environmental impacts are understood and mitigated. EIAs should also be conducted periodically once deals are ratified to determine any modifications to existing deals or implications for future deals.

    What lessons and inferences for other current and future negotiations can be drawn from how the Government approached, and what it secured in, the FTA with Australia?

    36.   The UK-Australia trade deal highlights a number of inadequacies in the way the UK government is approaching trade policy, and a range of ways in which this could be addressed in future:

    1. The lack of a clear, published trade policy to inform consideration of negotiating partners, priorities and cumulative impacts means that the UK government risks undermining climate policy and international development objectives via trade deals. The UK should urgently set out such a policy to ensure a joined-up approach across departments, avoid friction and maintain credibility on the international stage.[21]
    2. The lack of early, detailed assessment of impacts, both within the UK and via the UKs global footprint, or consideration of the cumulative impacts of the multiple FTAs currently under negotiation, means it is difficult to fully comprehend and mitigate potential negative effects. This should be addressed in any future negotiations, with a full sustainability impact assessment and monitoring process embedded in the negotiation and implementation of all FTAs. Further consideration of under-explored impacts should take place before this FTA is considered for ratification.
    3. In removing tariffs and quotas on Australian agri-food products, without setting in place UK standards or mechanisms to prevent the import of goods produced to lower standards this FTA also sets a worrying precedent for future negotiations. It suggests that the UK will disregard the climate record of potential trade partners and the environmental impacts of their imports, while simultaneously allowing the undermining of domestic standards. The government should set in place clear UK environmental standards prior to any further negotiations, and make clear that no further market liberalisation will be agreed until protections are in place.
    4. The FTA text does not currently suggest a high level of ambition. Much of the text replicates existing trade agreements – particularly CPTPP – and achievements on animal welfare and climate have been marred by a lack of enforceability and reports of a rollback in the UK commitment to a 1.5 degree target within the text. If the UK government wishes to signal international leadership on trade and climate, it should look to build upon existing best practice and innovate new measures to ensure trade better supports climate objective in future deals.
    5. Transparency and scrutiny around this FTA have been extremely limited. Stakeholders and parliamentarians had no opportunity to review the details of the deal after prior to its signing, and parliament will have only limited opportunity to practically influence outcomes over the coming months of scrutiny. Greater parliamentary scrutiny in the formation of trade policy, alongside improved transparency in stakeholder engagements, would ensure FTAs can be developed in a way that supports rather than hinders measures to address the climate and nature crisis.

    [1] https://kb.rspca.org.au/knowledge-base/what-is-the-rspcas-view-on-mulesing-and-flystrike-prevention-in-sheep/

    [2] https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2022-01-05/debates/0D922D6F-9A97-455D-90DE-275AA45D1AEB/UK-AustraliaFreeTradeAgreement

    [3] https://www.which.co.uk/policy/euexit/8502/consumer-priorities

    [4] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1041629/impact-assessment-of-the-free-trade-agreement-between-the-united-kingdom-of-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-and-australia.pdf

    [5] https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/12245/pdf/

    [6] https://www.wwf.org.uk/sites/default/files/2020-07/RiskierBusiness_July2020_V7_0.pdf

    [7] https://www.beef.org.au/report

    [8] https://www.pan-uk.org/toxic-trade/

    [9] https://www.fauna-flora.org/app/uploads/2017/12/FFI_2015_Biodiversity-Offsets-Australia.pdf

    [10] https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/sep/08/coal-companies-allowed-to-delay-environmental-offsets-on-nsw-mines-for-up-to-10-years

    [11] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303871730_Biological_activity_of_soil_contaminated_with_cobalt_tin_and_molybdenum

    [12] https://www.researchgate.net/figure/4-Location-of-Australian-lithium-mines-in-areas-of-critical-habiat_fig5_354253801

    [13] https://theconversation.com/juukan-gorge-inquiry-puts-rio-tinto-on-notice-but-without-drastic-reforms-it-could-happen-again-151377

    [14] https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/native-title-issues-problems

    [15] https://projectblue.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/Market%20Insight/HorizonImpactofUK-AustraliaTrade_211019_WEB.pdf

    [16] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/969045/Trade-and-Agriculture-Commission-final-report.pdf

    [17] https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2022-01-05/debates/0D922D6F-9A97-455D-90DE-275AA45D1AEB/UK-AustraliaFreeTradeAgreement?highlight=australia#:~:text=I%20am%20very-,hopeful,-that%20we%20will

    [18] https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2021-05-27/debates/759585C3-375D-4EBA-BB6A-08B217C75017/AgriculturalExportsFromAustraliaTariffs#:~:text=Gentleman%20asked%20about-,ISDS,-.%20It%20is%20a

    [19] https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/aukfta/australia-uk-free-trade-agreement-negotiations-frequently-asked-questions-june-2021#isds

    [20] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uks-approach-to-negotiating-a-free-trade-agreement-with-australia/uk-australia-free-trade-agreement-the-uks-strategic-approach#chapter-4-scoping-assessment-for-a-bilateral-free-trade-agreement-between-the-united-kingdom-and-australia

    [21] https://greenallianceblog.org.uk/2021/06/10/how-can-the-uk-be-a-credible-trading-nation-without-a-trade-policy/

  • City of London Corporation – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    City of London Corporation – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    The comments made by the City of London Corporation on 15 January 2022.

    Memorandum from the City of London Corporation

    Submitted by the Office of the City Remembrancer

    Introduction

    1. The City of London Corporation welcomes the opportunity to respond to the International Trade Committee’s inquiry into the UK-Australia trade deal. The UK financial and professional services (FPS) industry contributes over 10% of the UK’s total economic output and employs more than 2.3 million people, with two thirds of these jobs outside London. It is the largest taxpayer, the biggest exporting industry and generates a trade surplus almost equivalent to all other net exporting industries combined.
    2. The City Corporation works closely with a wide range of stakeholders to promote the UK-based FPS sector. These include Department for International Trade, the Treasury, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and London and Partners.  The common goal is to sustain prosperity and stimulate economic growth in London and across the UK through global trade and investment.
    3. The UK and Australia enjoy a strong trading relationship with growing opportunities for financial and professional services firms in both markets. UK businesses traded £18.1 billion worth of goods and services with Australia in 2019. The UK is Australia’s seventh largest trading partner and second largest outside the Asia-Pacific region. The UK was the second largest direct investor in Australia and the second largest recipient of Australian foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2019. The stock of UK FDI in Australia was £35.6 billion in 2018, while Australia invested £15.9 billion in the UK.

    How good a deal is the UK-Australia FTA for the UK?

    1. The UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is strategically important for the UK. Australia is a ‘like-minded’ ally in the UK’s pursuit to establish global standards of openness. Due to these shared values, the FTA contains modern and forward-looking provisions in crucial services trade areas such as digital trade and innovation. This will enable the UK to set a high benchmark for subsequent trade deals and future international trade discussions.
    2. The Australian market also presents a gateway to further trade with the Asia-Pacific region. UK-based firms with operations in Australia will now be able to leverage existing agreements and mechanisms such as the Asia Region Funds Passport and the Trans-Tasman Closer Economic Relations Agreement to supply their services to a much broader range of clients. These agreements also provide further examples of potential mutually beneficial additions to the formalised FTA.

    To what extent has the Government achieved its stated negotiating objectives?

    1. For financial services trade the UK negotiating objectives committed to the expansion of opportunities, the reduction of friction to trade and investment, the removal of barriers and to build on the precedents of cooperation particularly on regulatory issues.
    2. Like many previous agreements, this FTA serves to lock in market openness and reduces certain frictions such as those surrounding the movement of financial data. The Corporation also welcomes these provisions and the emphasis on continued regulatory dialogue.
    3. As highlighted in the report, ‘UK Cross Border Trade in Services with Australia’ market access barriers in FPS are more usefully addressed through enhanced regulatory cooperation which fall outside FTA provisions.[1] Enshrining a framework for regulatory cooperation dialogues in trade agreements provides greater regulatory and market certainty for ongoing regulatory cooperation. It also signals a firm commitment to continued collaboration between the UK and Australia. Furthermore, the embedding of principles of such as deference is valuable in setting the tone for both parties and establishing an overarching goal for these discussions.
    4. Ensuring the success of the dialogue will require both continual government to government engagement at all levels and ongoing industry input. Accordingly, the City of London Corporation stands ready to facilitate industry input into the UK-Australia financial regulatory dialogue. This engagement and input should seek to emulate the mechanisms established surrounding the UK-US Financial Regulatory Working Group, the acting UK-US regulatory dialogue, which features the inclusion of financial and professional services industry input through the British American Finance Alliance.

    To what extent does the FTA deliver on the UK-Australia Agreement in Principle?

    1. The Agreement in Principle (AIP) contained limited detail on the provisions being agreed for services trade in the FTA. It is therefore not possible to critically assess the FTA against the AIP. In future trade negotiations, a greater level of detail in AIPs on services trade would be welcome.

    How are the terms of the FTA between the UK and Australia likely to affect you, your business or organisation, or those that you represent?

    1. The FTA serves to lock in market openness for financial services firms which is welcome from the perspective of business continuity. Having these provisions enshrined in law provides a degree of certainty for firms. This not only lays the groundwork for both countries to build upon in future discussions, but also allows for firms to make business decisions along a longer time horizon than would be possible otherwise.
    2. FPS firms have highlighted the challenges around business mobility and temporary visas. The movement of highly skilled professionals enables the transfer of knowledge and expertise which is often crucial for firms. Complicated mechanisms and immigration structures can create unwieldy administrative burdens for firms and hamper this movement. The relaxation of labour market testing as well as doubling the length of stay for intra corporate transferees from 2 years to 4 years should help alleviate some of the uncertainty and bureaucracy around the movement of people.
    3. The Corporation welcomes the emphasis on digital trade. The innovation chapter and accompanying commitment to establish a dialogue which plays a role in the development of international standards and facilitating trade in emerging technologies is very welcome. With the increase in digitalisation of trade, many firms are concerned that the patchwork of differing regulations will make cross border trade more challenging. The UK should aspire to play a leading role in developing international consensus around technology and trade policy approaches particularly in newer areas.
    4. On data, the UK and Australia make commitments to allow the free flow of data and ban data localisation. However, Australia does not have a data adequacy ruling meaning the respective data protection regimes of both countries are not interoperable. This is perhaps an area where greater cooperation between regulators through the mechanisms established in the FTA can lead to valuable changes for firms.
    5. For professional services, the FTA incorporates many of the legal services sector’s key asks for greater recognition of qualifications and mobility options. The accounting sector have also welcomed the included plans to give UK accountants guaranteed access to work visa and to mutually recognise qualifications. The commitment to establish dialogues in both legal services and professional services more broadly will help to assist in the realisation of these goals. As recognition of professional qualifications are determined at the sub-federal level and by domestic professional bodies, the practical success of these provisions will hinge on their collaboration. That being said, the FTA provides the framework for this increased cooperation.

    What lessons and inferences for other current and future negotiations can be drawn from how the Government approached, and what it secured in, the FTA with Australia?

    1. Engagement with industry is invaluable when approaching trade agreements and understanding the intricacies of business. The City of London Corporation has established a sustained programme of in-market activity which seeks to identify key market access issues to address, opportunities for alignment, and build the inter-institutional trust needed to underpin bilateral FPS relationships.
    2. For the FPS sector, where quite often the issues are regulatory in nature, market access barriers are by default quite technical. As highlighted in the report, ‘UK Cross Border Trade in Services with Australia’, these issues include sub-sector specific and wider cross-cutting considerations. [2] Although many FPS barriers may not be addressed though FTA negotiations it is important they are recognised as a basis for discussion in regulatory dialogues.
    3. The inclusion of regulatory cooperation dialogues within FTAs are a welcome development for the FPS sector. The City of London Corporation would welcome the inclusion and replication of these provisions within FTAs. Though discussions are often already occurring between regulators, the formalisation of the process with important markets for the FPS sector enables further certainty and potential gains.

    January 2022


    [1] City of London Corporation, UK cross-border trade in services with Australia, available at: https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/supporting-businesses/economic-research/research-publications/uk-cross-border-trade-in-services-with-australia

    [2] Ibid

  • Accolade Wines – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    Accolade Wines – 2022 Comments on the Australia Trade Bill

    The comments made by Accolade Wines on 15 January 2022.

    Dear Chair,

    Re: Response to International Trade Committee Inquiry – United Kingdom-Australia Free Trade Agreement [UK-AU FTA]

    I write in reference to the Committee’s inquiry on the Government’s FTA with Australia as part of the parliamentary scrutiny process.

    As you know from our engagement in recent years, Accolade Wines is a leading global wine company and proudly one of the largest wine and perry companies in the UK. Our portfolio includes some of the world’s most recognised and cherished wine brands, such as Hardys, the largest wine brand in the UK off-trade, and many others.

    While Australian products contribute significantly to Accolade Wines’ portfolio, our products extend beyond New World wines to include iconic non-wine brands such as Stone’s Ginger Wine and Lambrini. The company’s capabilities span a complex and international supply chain from wine supply and production, to sales, marketing and distribution, with an emphasis on quality, innovation and sustainability.

    Over the last three years, Accolade Wines has been heavily engaged in various consultations and discussions on the UK-AU FTA, including with your office, the Secretary of State for International Trade and President of the Board of Trade, the Minister of State for Trade Policy, and officials across Whitehall. We also continue to be engaged with officials on various trade-related matters following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

    As a globally integrated alcohol company, Accolade Wines maintains its position on the benefits of the European Single Market, and the UK’s withdrawal from the EU continues to cause the industry challenges. I recognise these issues have been discussed by the Committee at various points. Notwithstanding the obstacles posed by Brexit, we support the Government’s agenda to secure FTAs with other countries, and the company will continue to encourage the wine sector to contribute its voice to consultations on other bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations in the future.

    Accolade Wines in the UK

    While remaining rooted in its Australian heritage, the UK is a key strategic market for the company, its largest by value and a significant source of revenue. Accolade Wines has invested heavily in establishing its presence in the UK over many decades, creating jobs directly and across the supply chain.

    As you are aware, our UK facilities provide an important base from which the company can supply customers across Scotland, England, Wales, Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and mainland Europe. Accolade Wines also has a significant presence across the UK supply chain and through our European headquarters in Weybridge.

    Accolade Wines’ UK footprint includes:

    The Park, our award-winning bottling plant, able to process 1,200 bottles per minute or over 1 million per day. The Park is carbon neutral, powered in part by its own source of renewable energy; 500 employees and a further 2,400 indirect jobs across the supply chain.

    Accolade Wines’ Response to the Call for Evidence

    Accolade Wines is a member of the Wine and Spirit Trade Association [WSTA], which represents over 300 companies producing, importing, exporting, transporting and selling wine and spirits in the United Kingdom. Members range from major retailers, brand owners, importers and wholesalers to fine wine and spirit specialists, logistics and bottling companies.

    Accolade Wines has consulted with the WSTA and provided feedback on the association’s submission to the Committee. The submission is reflective of the company’s position and we are pleased to offer it our full support. I encourage the Committee to give the association’s response consideration.

    There are a number of issues, however, worthy of re-emphasising in this correspondence for their importance to the UK-AU FTA, Accolade Wines and the wine sector more broadly, including:

    The potential to negate the tariff benefits secured in the UK-AU FTA if the proposals for the treatment of wine in the ongoing UK Alcohol Duty Review are not reconsidered;

    That non-tariff barriers, such as the inability to significantly ‘transform’ an imported wine product in- market in Great Britain remain and that this is to the detriment of attracting increased Foreign Direct Investment from the wine industry.

    UK Alcohol Duty Review

    While Accolade Wines welcomes HM Government’s commitment to modernise alcohol duty through a simpler taxation system and we were also pleased to see the abolition of a separate rate for sparkling wine, there are a number of issues that the wine industry has identified with the proposed reforms. Among these, Accolade Wines is concerned about the unintended consequences for the wine sector of the proposed reforms, which, if implemented in February 2023, will introduce challenges for consumers and the wine trade alike.

    On all Australian wine exported to the UK annually, the proposed reforms, if they are ultimately implemented, would increase duty by at least £81 million per year. This increase, which would be disproportionately borne by wine-producing nations such as Australia with their naturally higher alcohol by volume [ABV] levels, would entirely negate the tariff-free benefit of the FTA, and has a very real likelihood of dampening trade in wine between Australia and the UK.

    In addition, Accolade Wines supports the government’s intention to introduce a single flat rate based on the pure alcohol content of the product. The proposed benchmark for the new duty on wine of 11.5% ABV, however, will see most wines attract a higher excise duty rate. In turn, it is likely that consumers will opt for alternative alcoholic beverages that fare more favourably under the proposals, undermining two-way trade as part of this bilateral agreement.

    While I recognise the Committee is focussed on the FTA, it is appropriate that consideration be given the domestic duty framework that may unintentionally discourage investment in Britain.

    Winemaking practices

    In addition to the FTA and as you know from the Committee’s work in this area, the UK and Australia continue to have a separate bilateral wine agreement which is likely to be updated over time via a Joint Management Committee [JMC] process. At multiple points in the FTA consultations, Accolade Wines and other producers raised the importance of securing liberalising winemaking practices as part of the FTA.

    At present, winemaking practices, such as blending, sweetening, carbonation/aeration, are not permitted to be undertaken in the UK on imported wine products under retained EU Regulation 1308/2008. These winemaking practices are commonly undertaken in Australia and at source in multiple other wine-producing countries as part of the ordinary winemaking process.

    These components comprise an important part of a favourable business operating environment which can attract investment from Australia and other countries. In the short term, these considerations should be addressed in the ongoing review of the wine regulations to encourage reformulation, investment, and innovation.

    Thank you for considering this correspondence and for your ongoing support for the wine sector to provide British consumers with greater choice of quality Australian wines in the years ahead. I would be delighted to provide additional information to the Committee or appear before an upcoming hearing. I would also welcome the opportunity to meet with you again to discuss the matters raised in this letter. Ms Brigitte Xelot, Government Relations Advisor, can assist in organising a meeting with your office and to provide any information on behalf of the company.

    Yours sincerely,

    Managing Director.

  • House of Commons International Trade Committee – First Report on Trade Deal with Australia

    House of Commons International Trade Committee – First Report on Trade Deal with Australia

    The text of the House of Commons International Trade Committee’s first report published on 22 June 2022.

    Text of report (in .pdf format)

  • Anne-Marie Trevelyan and Crawford Falconer – 2022 Evidence to International Trade Committee on UK/Australia Trade Deal

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan and Crawford Falconer – 2022 Evidence to International Trade Committee on UK/Australia Trade Deal

    The evidence given by Anne-Marie Trevelyan, the then Secretary of State for International Trade, and Crawford Falconer, the Second Permanent Secretary at the Department for International Trade, on 6 July 2022.

    Members present:

    Angus Brendan MacNeil (Chair); Mark Garnier; Paul Girvan; Sir Mark Hendrick; Tony Lloyd; Lloyd Russell-Moyle; Mick Whitley.

    Questions 251 – 345

    Witnesses:

    Rt Hon Anne-Marie Trevelyan MP, Secretary of State for International Trade; and Crawford Falconer, Second Permanent Secretary and Chief Trade Negotiation Adviser at the Department for International Trade.

    Examination of witnesses:

    Witnesses: Rt Hon Anne-Marie Trevelyan MP and Crawford Falconer.

    Q251       Chair: Welcome to this International Trade Committee evidence session on the “UK trade negotiations: agreement with Australia” inquiry. The Secretary of State for International Trade is giving evidence again—we saw you this morning. Thank you for coming to this final session. We have had words about this in the New Zealand session, so maybe we will skip over that. I just want to ask you a number of things about this. Following our report last week and what has happened, and the subsequent correspondence, can you tell us whether the Government will consider extending the CRaG period to allow the House meaningful time to consider the report?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: We will not be extending the CRaG period for this year, I am afraid. We want to crack on. We have followed the framework. I apologise for not having been able to read your report last night—circumstances overtook me. I look forward to doing so, and I will be reading it this evening and working with the team to give you a full and thorough response to it as quickly as we can. I have had a chance to have a quick look through some of the suggestions, and it looks like you have indeed pulled out some interesting and important questions: it being the first from scratch, there was a really important review to do. Thank you for what looks to me to be a very thorough review, testing some of those broader issues around trade deals, which we are very keen to accept.

    Chair: We accept flattery at any time.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: No, it is just an honest assessment.

    Q252       Chair: So you have said no to my first question. Will the Government then table a substantive motion on the agreement for consideration and debate between 13 and 19 July, so that the House can decide to delay ratification for the same purpose?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I know that we have exchanged letters on this already. We have been clear that we will seek a scheduled debate and continue to discuss that with business managers, obviously subject to available parliamentary time, and I hope that we will be able to have a general debate on that. We will continue to press the business managers, as I am sure that you and your Clerks will do too.

    Q253       Chair: That is somewhat unclear. Given that CRaG is due to expire in two weeks, when will you be clear and when will you be able to say?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: As I say, Chair, I am afraid that it is not within my gift to set a date, but we continue to ask business managers if available Government time can be found for that.

    Q254       Chair: You see the kind of difficulty that we have as a Committee.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I do, but sadly I am not all-powerful in matters of parliamentary time.

    Q255       Chair: Should you not be cracking the whip at the Whips inside Government? It is really the tail wagging the dog here—wagging a number of dogs.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: As I said, we continue, and we have set it out— you have raised it and we continue to raise it—with the business managers that we think it would be a good general debate to have and many colleagues would be interested in discussing what is a really interesting new part of Government policy and a new FTA. We continue to press, and we can work together. We can do it in a number of ways. We continue to do so, but we are always at the mercy of the available Government parliamentary time set by those other than departmental authorities.

    Q256       Chair: Would it help scrutiny of this agreement if the Chamber of the House of Commons were to decide to delay CRaG, given that the Australians would not have ratified it by the first or the second date anyway?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: The Australians are progressing. I had the pleasure of meeting my new counterpart, Don Farrell, in Geneva just a couple of weeks ago and was pleased to hear that they were very keen to crack on; they had no desire to reopen any parts of it; they were very comfortable with the treaty as it stands; and they would kick off with their parliamentary process—

    Q257       Chair: When do you expect Australia to ratify?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: He was unable to be fully precise but they hope to ratify through the course of the autumn. I think they will be ahead of us in that process. Obviously, we have to bring in the enabling legislation, and while we presented the Bill on 11 May, it is quite a small piece of legislation, as you know, but we need to push that all the way through the process, so that will be completed, with Royal Assent, probably after they have approved theirs. I hope that we will land as quickly as possible.

    Q258       Chair: It will probably be about 22 November that they would conclude. Why is this rush going on in the UK to do this without proper scrutiny? What is driving you? Are you driving the Whips or are the Whips telling you that scrutiny doesn’t matter, just get it through the sausage factory of Parliament and that’s it?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: No, quite the opposite.

    Chair: So you are telling the Whips to get it through the sausage factory of Parliament.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: No, I think that scrutiny is very thorough and intense. As I say, we have asked if they can find available parliamentary time for a debate, and we will continue to do so, but, sadly, I am not in charge of what is no doubt quite a complex juggling act. Not having been in the Whips Office, I have not experienced it personally, but it is an issue. We continue to do that and we hope that they will hear our request.

    Q259       Chair: Secretary of State, this is all being done against the background of Brexit. Page 124 of our report sets out how this agreement will bring about a 0.08% increase in GDP. That has changed. It is a fourfold increase on your first estimate of 0.02% increase in GDP. That is against a 5% loss as a result of Brexit. I put this to you, Secretary of State. If you went to the Stock Exchange, the bookies or horse racing, or whatever you do with £500, and you came back with £8 or £2, which is equivalent to the 5% loss resulting from Brexit, would you think that a good day?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Fortunately, our amazing British exporters are not gambling when they look to find new export markets; they are looking to grow—

    Q260       Chair: But they need the frameworks that you have replaced, and the frameworks that are in place mean that they have had a 5% hit and we know that trade with the European Union is down. So if you are given £500 and come back with £8 or £2—

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I am afraid that isn’t true. Exports to the EU are up—

    Chair: The trade gap is there.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan:—and continuing to go up, and we are seeing real growth—

    Q261       Chair: Since when?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Since before covid, and we are seeing real growth again, which is exciting, and as I mentioned earlier today, in the export support service that we provide we have seen both a drop in some of the practical problems that we saw at the turnover point, and also—

    Q262       Chair: We are going down a rabbit hole, Secretary of State. The reason I ask this question is that the Government are selling these trade deals as being something wonderful and there is bluster going out to the public about these trade deals, and about this first trade deal, because you do not have anything yet. You have committed yourselves in Brexit to losing 5% of GDP. You are coming back with the original figure of 0.02% of GDP and now you have 0.08%. This is equivalent to throwing away £500 and coming back with £8 or £2 and saying that you have had a good day. Does that strike you as being a good day?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: As I say, Chair, the question of EU trade continues to grow again, which is really good news. These FTAs are opening up new markets, making it easier for our businesses either to export more in those markets or to discover new markets. That is one of the charges that the DIT is given.

    Q263       Chair: People watching this will be amazed that the simple sum of losing 5% and gaining 0.08% does not strike you as a problem. Does this not strike you—

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: If you would be kind enough to let me complete the sentence, the EU trade continues, and is continuing, to grow now that we are past covid, and that is great news.

    Chair: So there is GDP growth from Brexit.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: However, when we look at the FTA programme that we are now able to roll out, as part of our freedom now that we have left the European Union, the Australia deal was our first and New Zealand the second, and we will be continuing to add to that. CPTPP will be, we hope, one that we will accede to this year where we open up enormous new markets where we see the growth for the years and decades ahead. We are building, and we have the opportunity with the freedom to own our own trade policy, to set in train vast new markets, stripping away market access barriers and tariffs, so that our UK exporters can find new economic opportunities so that we can see that growth in GDP across the board. Australia and New Zealand are just the first two in what will be a broad set of new tools to help businesses trade more easily across the world.

    We will continue to have, as our EU neighbours—our European neighbours—the opportunity to trade there, and we have, under the TCA, a framework under which businesses can continue to do that. As the opportunities and the growth in young people and in middle-class consumers across the rest of the world continues, I want to make sure that our UK businesses have as easy an access as possible to those markets so that we can extend our opportunities, and not only to our European neighbours but to the rest of the world too. That is what the FTAs are for, and Australia and the New Zealand are just the first two of what will be, we hope in relatively short order, a really broad range of access to those markets that we have not reached into before.

    Q264       Chair: I have heard a lot of words there, and heaven forfend that I use the phrase “Enid Blyton prose”, but let us go back to the numbers, Secretary of State. If you lose—and we accept the figures, as I think we must, given that these are Government figures—5% of GDP, and we equate that going to the Stock Exchange or wagering £500 and you come back holding 0.08% of GDP or £8, is it a good or a bad day for the UK that you have done that? This is what Brexit is equivalent to. When we strip away the words and we strip away the prose, you are losing £500, and for every £500 you lose for the UK you are coming back with £8 of this trade deal, at best, and maybe £2 at your other estimation. Is this good process or is there a better way of this being done?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: With these new trade deals that we are negotiating, we are opening up new markets. Australia is the first and New Zealand is the second, and there will be many more to come. These will be creating new opportunities to add to UK export growth and that is really exciting, and we will be there—

    Chair: Do they add up to 5% of GDP?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: The DIT will be there to support businesses in a number of ways as they look to expand into those new markets. The relationship with our European partners continues to be robust and solid. As I said, the export figures post covid are back beyond those, and that is really good news as markets start to stabilise. The reality is, however, that the economic growth opportunities for the long term do not sit with our European partners, where we see that growth in—

    Q265       Chair: Will you match 5% in GDP with all the trade deals that you can possibly imagine?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: No, I hope that it will be more than that in the medium to long term, of course—

    Chair: It can’t possibly be.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan:—because there are whole new markets to come. That is exactly why, in having this trade policy, we are working at pace to ensure that we free up those market access barriers—

    Q266       Chair: America is a quarter of the world’s GDP. What is your GDP gain from a trade deal with America?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: We do not have the details of it—

    Q267       Chair: It is 0.02%.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: When we come, we hope, to pick up and continue the negotiations that we started a number of years ago, we look forward to looking at what that offers, but the important thing is that those will all be tools to help businesses to export, more easily, fantastic British goods and services. That is DIT’s role, and the opportunity that we now have with the freedom of our own trade policy, to build that. What we will then be doing, of course, is supporting businesses to find and discover new export markets, to work in those growing markets in the Indo-Pacific, across Africa and growing mature markets like the one we have with America, to make sure that our exporters can reach everywhere where they want to export, with as few market access barriers as possible.

    Q268       Chair: If the DIT crunches the numbers and knows the numbers, can you come back to me? It appears that even if you got trade deals with every country in the world, you will not make up for the Brexit damage, and that is a matter of fact.

    Before I bring in Sir Mark, I have one other question, Secretary of State. You might think that Brexit is a done deal, and it may well be, but if it is not, where will this deal leave the Australians if the UK were to re-join the European Union? Has Australia been notified about that, or has that been any part of a warning, perhaps, given to Australia?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: No.

    Chair: No. Okay, thank you.

    Q269       Sir Mark Hendrick: Two very quick points. First of all, yes, I think that, no doubt about it, exports to the EU are up, but a lot of it is liquefied natural gas. I am looking at an article here that says, “The UK energy system is drowning in natural gas. There is so much of the stuff in this country that for the time being at least, no one is quite sure what to do with it.” We know what is happening. The Germans are moving away, obviously, from energy supplies from Russia and it is being topped up by the rest of Europe. It is a very unusual situation, given Brexit, that there is actually that increase there. This accounts for £0.5 billion of it, just in the months to April.

    The second point goes back to CRaG, and I wanted to intervene earlier before we moved on to exports. As someone who has served in the Whips Office, I know that there would be a good reason why you couldn’t move that date. Secretary of State, what reason have you been given as to why they cannot move the date so that we can get more time for scrutiny and the CRaG can be extended?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: We have set the process in motion, and that is the choice that we have made, but in terms of having the opportunity for debate we will continue to see whether we can afford that.

    Q270       Sir Mark Hendrick: But, you see, it is a meaningless debate, because nothing can be done. It is just discussion.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I hope that the debate would, as all our debates do, afford the opportunity to those who have particular constituency interests, or indeed sectoral interests, to discuss and share on the Floor of the House exactly what those are.

    As we move through—obviously, we will have the enabling legislation on the procurement side, which will come through, I imagine, in September and October—we will have the opportunity to look into that in detail. We will be having opportunities to look at the issues around the Australian FTA in particular, but also, on the point that you have demonstrated, there is a really effective Committee. This is the first one, so the importance of thinking across the piece about what we have in it and the breadth of areas of co-operation that we are bringing together set the marker for the rest of the world to understand what doing an FTA with the UK means.

    Q271       Sir Mark Hendrick: You understand as well that it sets a precedent for you to be able to do this again in the future because you have already made it such that you cannot do this the way that it should be done.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: We have set this out, and there has been plenty of time with those various steps all the way through, and we continue to do that. We will look forward to getting back to you on your report, for which I thank you. We are, as with all these things, working to progress—

    Q272       Sir Mark Hendrick: What reason have the Whips Office given you for not being able to extend the CRaG?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: We have had discussions with them about the opportunities for debate. Having been in the Whips Office, Sir Mark, you will perhaps know that the outward-facing messaging does not come very often; it is very much a question for Departments. We continue to press for what we hope will be a useful debate.

    Q273       Tony Lloyd: The agreement in principle noted that “neither side will seek additional access or faster tariff reduction through the UK’s accession to the CPTPP.” Why does the commitment not feature on the face of the agreement?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: This is a question to which I do not have an answer.

    Chair: We are hoping that you do, Crawford.

    Crawford Falconer: In theory, it could have, but in actual fact it seemed a bit of a heavy way in which to have what is effectively a bilateral understanding about something else. It is a category thing. It would not have been stronger if it had been in the agreement. It is not an enduring feature of the agreement. It is a bilateral understanding between Australia and New Zealand that, in respect of another agreement, this is how we will behave. It seemed more appropriate that it belonged in a technically different environment.

    Q274       Tony Lloyd: The agreement in principle looks particularly at additional access or fast tariff reduction. Are there any other areas where Australia could seek further concessions under the UK’s plans to accede to the CPTPP?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: No, because that is the way that we negotiated. Is that right?

    Crawford Falconer: It is very clear, not on goods and tariffs, but there are other things in CPTPP, like services market access, where, in fact, that would be an option, if the Australians wanted to try for that—and not only them; the New Zealanders as well, in theory. Theoretically, it could happen on services, but given that we have a pretty good balance on services, I would not expect it would be very significant.

    Q275       Tony Lloyd: You did not think it was necessary to have that placed in the agreement in principle for services.

    Crawford Falconer: No. The one that was most important to us and was a priority, and was worth paying for in the balance of the negotiation, was on goods. On services, the Australians might have services, but we are the services exporter par excellence. That is not to say that the Australians do not have services interests, but our view was that, on that, we can manage it, whereas on the goods there was no room for ambiguity because it was the most sensitive issue for us.

    Tony Lloyd: Thank you.

    Q276       Chair: Just picking up Tony Lloyd’s point and not getting things in the agreement that you might have wanted, you say it was not important enough. You said this morning that New Zealand was determined and dug in, and then we find out that it rolled over for the European Union on the same issue.

    On trade deals, you talk about winners and losers, and we know that there are losers in the United Kingdom, particularly in the agricultural sector; they have been vociferous about that. With that in mind, I wrote to the High Commissioner of Australia on 5 April to help us to find some of the losers in Australia and received a response on 8 April from the then High Commissioner, George Brandis, telling us, “I am not aware of significant opposition to the UK-Australia free trade agreement within Australia.” We couldn’t get anywhere on the search for losers in Australia. Is it concerning, as Tony has mentioned, that the UK has perhaps been signing free trade agreements in haste, with an eye to CPTPP, and losing areas against New Zealand and Australia due to that haste? Does that give you pause for concern at all, Secretary of State?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: No. I disagree with the premise, I am afraid, Chair. The frameworks around our agriculture are good. There are huge opportunities for export in a number of areas, but also, as Crawford said, in those most sensitive areas where we know that we wanted to provide protections, we have this triple-lock safeguard system which provides assurance and time—

    Q277       Chair: You are saying that there are no known losers in the UK.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I do not disagree that there has been some anxiety and, as someone with a rural constituency, I have spent a long time talking to—

    Q278       Chair: It is only anxiety; it is not a loss.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I genuinely believe that the safeguards that we have built in, which are extremely robust and can kick in should there be any kind of surge while the issues are resolved, are going to provide protection, should there be—

    Q279       Chair: Can you think of any sectors in the UK that wish you had not signed this trade agreement?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: None that have shared that thought with me.

    Chair: Okay, excellent; thank you for that answer.

    Q280       Mick Whitley: The agreement in principle referred to “best endeavours” commitments by Australia to tighten up its definition of whisky; and by the UK to implementing Australian proposals on technical barriers regarding wine imports, but these aren’t in the final agreement. Why is that, and what will you do to address these issues?

    Crawford Falconer: Again, this is another one of those categories. On the whisky one with Australia, we reached the conclusion that they were going to change their system anyway and they were resistant to putting it in at this stage. We figure that it is something that we will actually obtain afterwards anyway, once they have their legislative changes in place, and it was not worth squandering our negotiating capital on something that was most likely to happen anyway. Therefore, in reciprocity, we did not give them something that they wanted, on the wine. So we have a balance there, which is one of those things that didn’t quite get to an agreement. It happens sometimes in a negotiation, and that was it.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: That is a really interesting point. In every bilateral agreement—and we obviously now have a number running in different parts of the world—it is about the relationship and where you can land at this point in time with your bilateral partner. They will never all look the same, by definition. They will never all be as big or as small in different chapters because they are with the particular country with the political and legislative point that it is at, at the time. That is why I talk about the flexibility that we want in our trade policy. There is a really important framework that says we will set it out, and we are given a mandate from across Whitehall with the breadth of what we would like to achieve, knowing that the likelihood of achieving all of it is probably not realistic because we are going to be working with a bilateral partner for whom their own limitations or areas of sensitivity will require them to focus in on that.

    A really important lesson that we all have to continue to think about is why we build in those next stages. A really good starting point is the FTA as it stands. We build in the Joint Committees and the dialogues. In those areas there will no doubt be glitches on the way through and issues that need resolving, but also as each country develops its own economy there is the opportunity to grow those roots. It is really important to remember that each one is genuinely bilateral, and that means that it will be where both countries can comfortably land at the point that we sign them.

    Chair: It is a great privilege and pleasure to ask Mr Mark Garnier to take the stage.

    Q281       Mark Garnier: I turn to food production standards. The original Trade and Agricultural Commission and Henry Dimbleby’s national food strategy review had a look at agrifood standards and proposed that tariffs should only be liberalised for imports that meet UK standards. But in this Australian trade agreement that is not the case, and it is not the case in the Government’s new food strategy. Why is that the case? Why have you ignored or not taken the advice of Henry Dimbleby and the original TAC?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: We have been very clear that foods cannot be imported that do not meet our safety standards, so you have to meet the safety standards. That is very clear and unambiguous. Hormone-injected beef cannot be sold in the UK.

    Q282       Mark Garnier: That is the run-of-the-mill sanitary and phytosanitary agreement run by DEFRA, but this is a slightly different thing.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: In that overarching picture, the challenge is that we do not want to be importing foods that do not meet our standards. They will not, because foods must meet our food safety standards. That is very clear, and everyone is entirely unconfused by that. It is really important to bear in mind that it is not only Crawford and his team doing the negotiations. We also have experts from every part of the Government, including a number from DEFRA, the Food Standards Agency, and the veterinary and medicines groups, who are there to help us to ensure that what we are setting out in the complexity of the trade deal is very clear on that. I genuinely do not think that we are in a different place. I think the language sometimes suggests otherwise.

    Q283       Mark Garnier: In that case, just for clarity, because this is an important point and a lot of people do not necessarily understand the relationship between our SPS regulations and our trade deals, what you are essentially saying is that it does not matter, on this particular point, that you do not specify what the standards are because everything is overridden by the SPS standards, which can update at any given time anyway.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Yes, we may indeed change ours at a domestic level. That is always a possibility. What we embed in the FTA is that our food safety standards are the ones that importers would have to meet.

    Q284       Mark Garnier: Whatever those standards are.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Whatever those standards are. Crawford, do you want to expand on that?

    Crawford Falconer: The only thing I would add is to draw attention to the fact that that is the one message that comes through very clearly from the independent Trade and Agriculture Commission in its report, which makes it very clear that there is nothing in the agreement that in any way undermines the capacity of the UK regulators—the food safety experts if it is the food safety experts, the vets if it is the vets, or anybody else who regulates—to do so, provided that we abide by our international obligations, which we take as read.

    Q285       Mark Garnier: Moving on from that, the food and farming group Sustain says that UK farmers have voluntarily halved their use of antibiotics in the past five years, but that this progress could be undermined by liberalising imports produced to lower standards, forcing UK producers “to return to more intensive systems.” We were talking about this, I think, with Professor Bartels before, but it is this concept that if you have different environmental requirements on pesticides, for example, that is an environmental thing rather than a food standards thing. You could then have a different level. The idea is that they can produce more cheaply in New Zealand or Australia by having different standards set by environmental measures rather than food standards measures, and they then undercut UK producers. The implication from Sustain is that UK producers would then have to lower their voluntary standards in order to compete against imports from Australia or New Zealand or, in this particular case, Australia.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: This is a really important area, and one that is always worthy of discussion. Every trade relationship that we have within an FTA or otherwise is our exporters choosing to sell to another country and, within the limits that we have set very clearly of our food safety standards, imports coming in. We have made very clear statements with Australia about best endeavours to continue to improve those environmental standards. Also—this is really important—have you been to Australia, Mark? Have you eaten their meat, and was it delicious?

    Mark Garnier: Yes.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Precisely. You didn’t worry that, because—

    Mark Garnier: New Zealand food is very good too.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I am just trying to be nice to you now. Did you, for a moment, consider that their standards were so poor that you would not choose to eat there? The challenge is that, while the environmental standards might be different, because the environment is different and they use different pesticides because they have different pests, the way they farm is not the way we farm in the UK. The argument is valid. We farm in small farms because of our land, so the marginal costs are different. There is a perfectly fair discussion about the size of farms and how business models look different, but the important thing is to ensure that what we have sold to our consumers, from our shelves, is good and fit for them to eat. The food and safety standards ensure that.

    Q286       Mark Garnier: Anne-Marie, you have brilliantly avoided the question—

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I didn’t mean to. I am so sorry.

    Mark Garnier: So I am going to come back to the point. Let us use a neutral example. Let us talk about this wretched chlorinated chicken, where Kentucky Fried Chicken, if we do a free trade deal with America, might possibly actually come from Kentucky. The point there is that, in America, they have more intensive chicken-rearing methods than is acceptable in the UK because of our animal welfare standards. The result is that they chlorine-wash their chickens before they sell them. We find that offensive, for two different reasons. One is the animal welfare standards and the other is that we just do not want the chlorine, despite the fact that we wash ourselves with chlorine every time we go for a swim.

    The important point is that, were we to reduce those standards, then chicken producers in the UK would be undermined because they would not be able to meet those economic standards, which we abide by. This is the point with this question. There are methods of farming in Australia, because of different factors—huge farms, less productivity per headcount and all the rest of it—which mean that, for one reason or another, they adopt certain standards of welfare that we would not have here.

    But, on top of that, because of consumer pressure in the UK—because of the Waitrose brigade almost—our farmers have voluntarily increased their standards. You have a double-edged problem. One is a commercial challenge between our producers and their producers because of this, notwithstanding the food miles, and the other is what we as a society have driven through—Waitrose and other supermarkets chains with a conscience are also available—higher voluntary standards. That is the point. Are we now putting our voluntarily good, high-standard producers in jeopardy because of an economic imbalance in this trade deal?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I do not believe that we are, and we discussed this earlier. Some 81% of beef bought by your constituents and mine is British produced, and the consumer will have the choice, as they have now, and they tend to choose British beef. That is fantastic. They also buy other meat that is put on the shelf that already comes in through import methods. They all have to meet British food safety standards because the assurance that we as a Government provide is to ensure that they are healthy.

    On your point about chlorinated chicken, it is different if you swim in the pool or you ingest the chlorine. It is two different things. Our standards say no ingestion of chlorine, and that will continue to be the case. If, in due course, a US chicken producer wished to export to the UK, they would need to produce chicken that was not chlorinated.

    There are a whole series of things there, but the issue about how we choose to do our own standards is one for the UK, and we do that because we know that that makes our products the best in the world. That is why, as we create more, new export opportunities for our amazing British products, we will know that they will be wanted by those who want to have those higher-standard, fantastic products.

    Mark Garnier: We could go on about this for hours. The Chair is channelling his inner John Bercow and trying to get short questions and short answers.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Very politely, if I may say so.

    Chair: Yes, and the antibiotic resistance. Lloyd Russell-Moyle, you wanted to come in on this.

    Q287       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: I wanted to challenge your response, which I found slightly offensive, about, “Have you been to Australia and eaten their food?” It is a response that does not enhance the debate. I have been to Uganda and eaten their food and not got ill. Would I want Ugandan standards? That is a discussion about standards; that is not a discussion about going on holiday somewhere and eating their food. Those kinds of answers do not help us move the debate on.

    The second part of your answer was much better, so I did want to come in on that. Let us have the debate on some standards and how we import them into the UK. Sometimes, and what I wonder about this arrangement, is how the consumer can be—

    Chair: I am flagging this because it seemed to be only a statement. Now it has moved to a question.

    Lloyd Russell-Moyle: Sorry.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: There is always a question at the end.

    Lloyd Russell-Moyle: How can the consumer be reassured that products in produced goods—I do not mean if you are buying meat; that is very easy—pies, restaurants and so on, meet those high standards? You say the consumer will have choice. How do we ensure that the consumer has choice in restaurants and in produced goods?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: No restaurant can legally use produce that has not met its safety standards. Our food standards authorities visit and check restaurant suppliers just as much as the supermarkets are required to do the same.

    Chair: Thank you. Tony Lloyd, do you want to come in very briefly?

    Q288       Tony Lloyd: Yes, please. Were we, for example, to move from voluntary use of antibiotics to compulsion, which is quite a reasonable demand given the concerns about the overuse of antibiotics on a global basis, how would you protect the consumer? You are saying the consumer has choice. How will you protect the consumer under this FTA against the importation of antibiotic-laden Australian meat?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: The answer would be that if we changed to a legal framework and it is set for food safety standard reasons, which it would be, that would be the reason for doing it.

    Tony Lloyd: We would be entitled to under the FTA.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: That is the point. We would be altering our existing food safety standards in favour of different ones for food safety reasons, which are that we do not consider that ingesting that much antibiotic is good for us any more, and therefore changing that also. Those who wish to import would have to match our food safety requirements. Crawford, you might want to pick up on that one, in particular.

    Crawford Falconer: That is absolutely correct. Again, I refer you back to the Trade and Agriculture Commission. It is really important to get this clear. If anything comes into us that has something in it that is contrary to our standards, then we are entirely free to regulate it and we are entitled to. There is nothing that can detract from that.

    Q289       Tony Lloyd: We must have mechanics by which you can regulate it, Mr Falconer. It is not enough to say we are entirely free to do it, because clearly we are under the agreement. However, there have to be mechanics by which that freedom becomes operable.

    Crawford Falconer: That is correct. Those mechanisms exist in the UK; they are not part of our free trade agreement, per se. The free trade agreement makes allowance for them to operate. They are operated by our experts, which is our food safety authorities and our veterinary scientists, who apply that. There is a domestic regime that enforces the regime from domestic production as well as from foreign suppliers.

    Q290       Tony Lloyd: You are confident that it would.

    Crawford Falconer: I am certainly confident of it because that is the basis upon which I shop myself. I have that confidence the same as any British consumer, but it is not a trade agreement that affects that. The trade agreement cannot get in the way of that; it cannot override that. I am confident that this agreement does not do that.

    Chair: Paul Girvan, do you want to come in quickly?

    Q291       Paul Girvan: It is on the back of exactly what Tony has just said. Trade agreements should be used as a tool to drive up standards, to ensure that our product, the product that we have, meets that standard and that we become probably a world leader in setting those standards as opposed to what is going on. I know that in Northern Ireland we have a very strong agrifood industry; it is a major part of our economy. In doing so, it is vitally important that we do sell our product with the quality that we have.

    I will use the chicken industry. We have a major chicken producer that processes as well. Previously, chicken farmers were having to feed antibiotics. I mean that it was part of the feeding regime; it was added to the feed and chickens were fed it. As a consequence, we were consuming it. Whether or not you believe that that is going on, I believe it is going on throughout the world, but we made a conscious decision, “No antibiotics,” and changing our whole practice about density—all that process.

    How can we have confidence in Australia, which will have food produced to one standard for export on to the Chinese market, one of their big markets, and that food making its way to our market? It has happened where pallets have been processed and shipped halfway around the world. I cannot work out this carbon footprint issue that we had earlier; it just does not make any sense, but that is beside the point.

    It is frozen, put on to a refrigerated ship container and taken across the world, and a pallet of food that has made its way on to our market can well have been treated with all the antibiotics of the day. It might well meet our food safety standard, because you are not going to end up getting E. coli or whatever else from it, but potentially you are consuming drugs that we do not license. We have reduced the licensed numbers of antibiotics that can be administered; other countries have not reduced the numbers. There is now total resistance to various antibiotics because they have been so widely used.

    How can we have confidence that our trade deal with Australia is going to protect our industry to the degree that the standard that we are setting becomes a world standard? I want to increase the standards.

    Chair: And not cause pressures to push up the use of antibiotics.

    Paul Girvan: Absolutely.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I would suggest that you would want to get the Food Standards Agency experts in and ask them.

    Chair: You are the one who signed the trade agreement with a country that was—

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Let us be clear: we have signed the agreement and we set out very clearly where the food safety standards are. We are, as we are now, as Crawford says, for the food that we—

    Q292       Chair: The root of the question here is this: are we creating a situation that puts pressures on UK farmers to use more antibiotics? Do you think you are?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: No, I do not believe so.

    Chair: Okay.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Our farmers work to our UK standards and they are proud to do so. As Paul says, we want to continue to be world leaders and to help drive the change that provides sustainability.

    Chair: There are plenty of fact-checkers around to check the veracity of the answer. I am sorry, but I am going to have to move on to Mick Whitley, who has been waiting as patiently as ever.

    Q293       Mick Whitley: Agrifood stakeholders have suggested that this agreement will reduce UK food security by undermining domestic production and replacing imports from nearby countries with products from over 9,000 miles away. How do you respond to that?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I do not believe that it will. I also believe that consumers should have choice, as they do now. As you say, imports come from many countries. For instance, let us take beef. The vast proportion of the beef imported into the UK at the moment comes from Ireland. To your point that Australian beef might displace Irish beef, that is of course a possibility.

    The UK consumer is very clear on what they want to buy and they do so. We like to ensure that we can provide them with choice. In taking away things like tariffs, we ensure that that brings the cost down as best we can to assist with what we see now in the cost of living crisis.

    Importantly, we set the framework to ensure that there cannot be, from a producer’s perspective, the risk of a surge in an import for any particular reason. We have the safeguards in place so that there could not be an attack that would cause real harm to a particular sector in a short-term process. We have protected for that.

    More importantly, we continue to want to have around the FTA a great relationship formulated around reducing tariffs and barriers with a country with whom we want to build that bilateral trade relationship. Do not forget that we import all the time now from countries with which we may or may not have trade relationships.

    To your earlier point, the provision of protections that are available for our citizens, for yours and my constituents when they go to do their shopping, is that the Food Standards Agency, the customs people, do the checks that are set out to ensure that those things meet our standards. To protect any particular sector from any sudden surge in imports that might appear, we have built in a very robust set of safeguards to avoid that happening.

    Q294       Mick Whitley: How far will the cuts in food and drink tariffs from the agreement help to offset the cost of living crisis?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: That is a really good question. The reduction in tariffs is one of those key areas that can help do that. In the Australia case, it stripped away tariffs of about 5% on nearly everything. That will be a small contribution to the cost of living challenge for those imports coming now from Australia. The examples usually made to me are ones of wine, presumably for people who have quite a heavy shopping basket with bottles of wine. They are happy and excited at the prospect of buying slightly cheaper Australian wine.

    Q295       Mick Whitley: I accept the point, but fuel costs are going up and up with the cost of living. Obviously, that is going to make that product more expensive, is it not?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Overall, the assessments are that transport costs, clearly on an individual basis, are relatively there. We have seen through covid, where all the shipping supply lines became so disrupted, that the costs of shipping have increased. That would, therefore, presumably increase the cost of the goods. It will be down to the consumer to make their decision on what they want to buy when they are in the shops. I always buy my meat from my butcher around the corner. That is the choice I make. Others who go to a supermarket might want a different choice.

    Mick Whitley: And can afford it.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: For those who enjoy restaurant food, which, from a wholesale market, you might buy from different areas, those will continue to be consumer choices. The impacts of the fuel costs at the moment are being fed across the board, absolutely; I do not disagree with you.

    Q296       Mick Whitley: We spoke about this a couple of months ago when you were last here. The price of containers has gone up tenfold.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Absolutely—tenfold. It is terrifying.

    Mick Whitley: You have fuel and you have the price of containers. That is going to make that product much more expensive.

    Chair: Without a doubt.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: That will be a cost borne by the Australian exporter.

    Mick Whitley: Thank you, Chair.

    Q297       Chair: Before I move to Tony Lloyd, Secretary of State, you said the Australian trade agreement would offset the cost of living a little bit and might be offset elsewhere. If it offsets the cost of living and it is a couple of hundred times less than Brexit in GDP, the damage caused by Brexit must be harming the cost of living. By the logic you have just employed to say that the Australia trade agreement will help the cost of living, Brexit is surely damaging people’s cost of living.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: If you look at our basket of spending, there are costs that are putting us all under pressure. To Mick’s point, fuel is a very, very important one.

    Q298       Chair: Can I stick with your logic? We can go through several places. If an Australian trade agreement, as you have told us, will help the cost of living because it is helping GDP by between 0.2% and 0.08%, if something is damaging the cost of living between 250 and 67 times more, will that not also be damaging to the cost of living? If the logic says this little bit of help is good for the cost of living, then that lot of damage from Brexit surely has to be damaging to the cost of living and detrimental.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Chair, we are looking at the Australia deal. In looking at that, and we challenge ourselves how it can help in the cost-of-living crisis—

    Chair: You are the Secretary for International Trade.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: —the reason why—

    Chair: I would expect you to be across the brief on this.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: The reason why Australia will help is, because in the reduction and stripping away of tariffs, those goods that we import now or might choose to import that we do not at the moment, and indeed those exports, are tariff-free. Therefore, those costs have come down. We have a tariff-free environment with our European neighbours through the TCA. In that sense, there is no change to that situation in the goods that our constituents will buy.

    Q299       Chair: Although its leaders will be amazed that as Secretary of State for International Trade, you do not think there is a change in the trading regime.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: There is no tariff. The differential we are talking about is around what the FTA does. It strips away some of the cost that would have been tariff. The wider questions about transport costs and others, which are affecting every part of the import and export trade groups, are ones that we are all trying to work to solve at a macro level.

    Chair: Thank you.

    Q300       Tony Lloyd: The Committee has been told that, because you have negotiated relatively low local origin thresholds in the agreement, this risks Australia becoming, in effect, a route through which others can circumvent UK tariffs. How will you monitor this?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: That is a very technical question.

    Crawford Falconer: The best way to describe this is that everybody has rules of origin, apart from agriculture, on which we have followed this model. It is basically wholly produced, so therefore the rule of origin is UK or Australian wholly produced. It is not an issue for agriculture, by and large, because you do not have to worry about what the rest of the componentry is; it has to be 100%. That is very unusual in international trade. People do not make things in one country and sell them whole in another. International trade is now such that everybody uses inputs from everywhere. So you cannot have 100% rule of origin across the board, because otherwise nobody would trade according to normal patterns. You would be back to the 1940s.

    Everybody has a rule of origin. With that rule of origin, you pitch it at a level that you determine—and there is no abstract rule—makes the most sense for your industry to make sure they get the value-added component of the product, which will always be a percentage, in order to get the preference.

    We are a manufacturing superpower still; Australia is not. The balance of manufacturing on rules of origin and having a relatively low rule of origin is massively in the United Kingdom’s favour.

    Q301       Tony Lloyd: The problem with this, Mr Falconer, is precisely what you said: Australia is not a major manufacturer, but if Australia becomes a route through which a third party chooses to use the local origin thresholds, then they can avoid the bilateral tax by routeing through Australia. That has to be a consideration, and if it is a consideration, how do we monitor it? If it becomes excessive, what is the remedy? You have not really told us anything about that.

    Crawford Falconer: Every country has this across the board. In your report there are concrete examples of a hypothetical situation, which I think is, “The Chinese might set up a factory in Australia and they might put parts of their shoes into Australia. The Australians will assemble these shoes and export them to the United Kingdom. In that way, they would have a proportion of Chinese content.”

    For a start, there is a risk of that with everybody; you just carry that risk. It is not excessive. Frankly, China has no trouble trading over our MFN tariff for shoes. It would be an extraordinarily exaggerated situation to imagine that China would go to the trouble of setting up a manufacturing facility in Australia to get over a relatively low MFN tariff in the UK for its shoes. As always, I cannot rule out the theoretical possibility of it, but it is extremely unlikely. The Chinese would be perfectly happy to sell them as they are now over the MFN tariff into the UK.

    It is not getting around your question. It is saying that you have to look at it in context. In context, it is very unlikely that that is the case given that, for instance, we are selling mostly into Australia’s manufactured goods and they are not selling them to us. They are not likely to sell them in significant amounts. As in everything, it is a balance. You accept that there is always going to be some third country content in the process. The other trading partner has to accept the same, and that is just the price you pay.

    There is not a remedy for that except that, if it becomes intolerable, you have an unbalanced negotiation, but I do not think that is likely to be the case with Australia.

    Q302       Tony Lloyd: There are no mechanics for monitoring and no mechanics in the agreement for remedy other than to abrogate the agreement.

    Crawford Falconer: If there are false declarations of origin, which is a different matter, and people are mis-stating what the origin amount is, which is the real-world consideration, then you have recourse for that.

    Tony Lloyd: I am not talking about false declarations.

    Crawford Falconer: The only way you could eliminate what you described as a possibility is if you had 100% rule of origin, which nobody would have; otherwise you would not have trade.

    Q303       Tony Lloyd: For the record, there is no system of monitoring under the agreement and no remedy other than to abrogate the agreement.

    Crawford Falconer: For Australia, no, there is not. We are confident that there is not going to be anything grosso modo that would be disadvantageous in that, given the tariffs that are at stake. If there was a big tariff, you would be a bit more cautious about it. In a situation where the MFN tariff was not high, it is just not worth the trouble, frankly.

    Tony Lloyd: Thank you.

    Q304       Chair: I am going to move on to a couple of areas, Secretary of State. Our report, which of course I will praise, and I know you said you did not have enough time to look at it—

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I will do, of course.

    Chair: If you have a quick look at page 22, from some of the evidence we have there is an interesting sentence here, “Most tariffs will be removed on entry into force of the Agreement with phased liberalisation occurring only in respect of UK exports of steel to Australia.” Why has the UK not been so bothered about steel?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Do you want to pick that one up? You have been in deep in this recently.

    Crawford Falconer: It is just one of those things. As in any negotiation, it is a balance. As you are undoubtedly aware, we are applying bilateral safeguards to steel across the world.

    Chair: It is against that background that this jumps out.

    Crawford Falconer: That is why the Australians say, “Because you’re applying bilateral safeguards on steel, it is a bit steep if you are actually expecting us to liberalise our steel on year zero when we are not applying any restrictions to you.” There is nothing wrong with that.

    Q305       Chair: We had Australian diplomats appear in front of us telling us and assuring us that Australia was a very open economy with no tariffs here, there and everywhere, and it was all very easy to make a trade agreement with Australia. When it comes to UK steel, they seem to have a problem or the UK was unable to negotiate a solution.

    Crawford Falconer: I am not here to defend the Australians’ negotiating position, but I can describe it to you again, which is for that one product for five years there is a phase-in. I pointed out that for our sensitive products there was a quite lengthy phase-in. From their point of view, when they are facing market restrictions in the UK, they had a domestic political interest to manage so they got one exception. You can draw your own judgment about whether that is excessive or not.

    Q306       Chair: We will see what the EU manage when they come to their agreements with Australia.

    On the mobility of persons, Secretary of State, the UK and Australia do not give identical commitments on the mobility of persons. For those who want to know, it turns up at page 74 of the excellent report into the agreement, just to help you. Why is that? What does it mean that these provisions do not give the same economic benefits to both sides? There is a pattern developing. I hope I am just being paranoid here, Secretary of State. I would like some fleshing out. We have tried, as a Committee and as a staff, to find out what exactly is going on in this; it is quite opaque. We are looking for light and some explanation.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: There are two separate trade deals and, therefore, the negotiations were for two separate countries with different perspectives on mobility. What we have agreed with Australia is a really ambitious business mobility agreement.

    Q307       Chair: I am talking about UK and Australia only.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Absolutely. You said they were not the same. They are not the same for—

    Chair: No, between New Zealand and Australia, they do not seem to be reciprocal.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Between New Zealand and Australia?

    Chair: They do not seem to fully mirror or give identical commitments on the mobility of persons in the agreement. The commitments on the mobility of persons are not identical.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: No. One set we have negotiated with Australia and one with New Zealand. I am confused as to what you mean.

    Q308       Chair: The UK list and the Australia list are different. There are not identical commitments in this.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I am not quite sure what you mean.

    Chair: It is important.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: We have negotiated some really good new terms—particularly around business—with Australia.

    Chair: We know it will be good; we know its history.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Exactly.

    Chair: What we want to know is the list. Can you come back to us with answers, if not today—

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I am not sure I understand the question.

    Q309       Chair: But from what we understand as a Committee, the commitments on the movement of people between the UK and Australia are not identical.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Right.

    Chair: We do not know why that is; you seem unclear that that has been negotiated. We would like some clarity from the Government. This is one of the reasons why we want you here before we do reports, so we can clarify these things and before we go to Parliament with things. However, we do not know what this is; it is opaque. I would be grateful to you for clarity.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: We will come back to you and set out—

    Chair: Thank you. It may help us for time this afternoon. We are going to Mick Whitley.

    Q310       Mick Whitley: This is on digital data. If this agreement enters into force, what guarantees will UK consumers have that their data will be protected to the same high standard in Australia as it is in the UK?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: This is an area where the relationship is good and we have a very similar view. Obviously, we have secured the free flows of data that are necessary for those British services to be able to provide all those products and services to consumers. We have obviously locked in within the legal requirement that personal data protection in both countries. We have been very clear; it is very positive. We are not dealing with a country that has a very different perspective. We will be able to set that out and I can talk you through a number of ways that that works in practice. It is fair access for telecoms companies.

    Interestingly, as I talk about those next layers of how this will work, we are working in great co-operation on 5G on cyber-security. So, within that digital space, we are working together to try to solve those challenges of the future.

    What is really good and something that you will know, which is something that I believe is very important, is ensuring that businesses can benefit from the use of modern, digitised trading systems, which strip away costs. For SMEs, in particular, that is a really important set of tools to help them grow their businesses, saving time and money. We have both committed to promoting paperless trading and electronic transferable records. Again, all this is setting what we want to be those new international standards, something that we, the UK, led when we had the G7 presidency last year, setting out those digital trade principles that we believe are so important and that we want the rest of the world to set out.

    We have embedded in the Australia deal some of those really key elements which you also see in the Singapore digital economy agreement. As we come forward and start new trade deals, we are very clear that we think this is important for other countries beyond Australia. It was a very easy conversation with Australia. In that sense, we were on the same page in this space. We look to think about how we use both those flows of data and the digital tools to enable businesses to thrive and achieve their economic growth as quickly as possible.

    Crawford wants to add something else.

    Crawford Falconer: Can I just add, because it might lie behind your question, a concern about personal data rather than data generally? To be absolutely clear so there is no ambiguity about it—often this arises because data covers such a huge range—on personal data, in this negotiation we are not changing anything on personal data restrictions between the United Kingdom and Australia. That remains a matter that will be resolved and is a decision by DCMS based on our own data protection policy. This agreement does not affect that or take away from it in any way whatsoever. That is a separate, distinct judgment that was made by our authorities.

    In the meantime, or at the present time, they apply as they have applied yesterday, and they will apply, unless there is a decision that we could have a more liberal approach with Australia. But that will be made by our data protection authorities on the basis of their assessment of personal data protection. It is important that there is no misunderstanding around that personal stuff, because it has arisen in the past.

    Mick Whitley: Thank you.

    Chair: Thank you for that. I am sure that many people who are watching will be pleased with that answer.

    Q311       Paul Girvan: I apologise if I jump in on Lloyd’s question here. All politics is really local, even though it is an international trade agreement.

    Chair: That is the quote of the afternoon.

    Paul Girvan: I am going to use an example: diversion of trade. We are suffering from that within Northern Ireland at present because of another so-called agreement that has caused us severe angst.

    I am going to use the example where the DIT says it will monitor whether liberalisation of trade with Australia will cause harm to developing countries, where we have had preferential trading terms on goods such as sugar in the past. What threshold will the Department look at and will trigger that if there is a diversion of trade? What measures will be taken to address that to ensure that those developing countries are not left behind? Let’s be honest: we are a country that prides ourselves on being one of the leading economies of the world. We should be out there trying to help some of the more needy to climb the ladder. If we can use a trade agreement properly and set in place such tariffs and protections, it might help us in some way.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: It is a really important question. Paul, you are quite right. We are a country with a strong economy, but we also want to make sure that we use our trade as a force for good. I made a speech earlier this morning about how the UK wants to use its trade rules to help Africa’s economies grow and build trusted relationships with UK businesses and UK technical assistance to help their economies to get the real value out of their assets and human capital. It is a fair challenge. Crawford, I do not know whether in technical terms there is a risk that we should ponder.

    Crawford Falconer: We would not have entered into the agreement in an area where we knew that it would cause significant damage, and we do not believe it does. Therefore, this is for a trading partner which has pretty much the same outlook as we do on these matters. We have said, “Even though we have done best endeavours to make sure that it doesn’t have any unfortunate knock-on consequences, we want to make monitoring it a serious task,” and we will monitor it.

    Speaking for the UK, it will always be an item on the agenda of the Joint Committee. We have our people in post in those economies who will be keeping an eye on that. We also have people working in the FCDO who do the developmental work. We keep a very close eye on this and will now add this to the issues that they look after. Indeed, I have no doubt we will hear from the Governments concerned and the businesses involved if there is an issue, so we will be tuned up to deal with that. It is not a hollow commitment; it is something we will follow up.

    Q312       Paul Girvan: I appreciate that. I take on board what you are saying in relation to monitoring it, but with monitoring there needs to be some course of action to address. The key point is: what action can we take? I have used only one example of a potential area. For argument’s sake, let us say the Congo comes back to us and says, “You are no longer buying certain items from us.” It is a very wealthy country in terms of its minerals. Unfortunately, maybe the people are not getting much benefit of that mineral wealth, but Australia also has plenty of minerals. If we find that we are shipping more from one region of the world to another and putting people into starvation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, how can we ensure that we protect that? We need to have some mechanism to do that. If you are saying we are just monitoring it and waiting for somebody to raise it, we need to identify what action we are taking to address that.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: You see that through things like the Joint Committee and the sub-committees that will meet regularly. That is exactly where an issue like that, if it was picked up by one of our trade teams in Congo—

    Q313       Paul Girvan: Do we have one?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Not in the Congo as far as I know, but we have a large number across Africa; we have an amazing team. Those sorts of things will be highlighted. Those are the wider tools that we have and the conversations we would have with our businesses. The DIT is uniquely well placed to do that.

    When we look at the work we are doing on supply chain resilience, we are thinking about how we can help British companies to step away from some things. Let us take those areas where the Chinese are taking all the value in terms of the minerals. We want to be working with like-minded countries in those countries where that investment needs to be in their own countries so they see the value.

    In the round, this is the work that the UK does through the tools it has to support through things like UK export finance, where businesses want to work in those areas where the financial risk is higher. We can support them in that way. We work in the round. In a specific way, if there was something uniquely Australian-UK where the balance shifted dramatically, we would absolutely pick that up with the Joint Committee, but, more widely, it would be a conversation on which many other parts of government would want to weigh in.

    Q314       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: The environment chapter contains provisions about the parties’ environmental laws. Whereas for the UK this covers all levels, including our devolved jurisdictions, in Australia it only covers federal laws. We have already heard this morning that, while you feel you have had a lot of consultation with them, they challenge that narrative; I am not arbitrating on who is right or wrong. So the states are completely exempt from any of the environmental provisions in this. What action will the UK take if there is any weakening of environmental laws that are decided at state level?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: As you say, this is a UK Government to Australian federal state FTA.

    Q315       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: No; it is an all-UK state to an Australian federal Government.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: The UK is a country which has four separate parts to it. The DAs are clearly important in how they work to it, but the reserved power to make trade agreements sits with the UK Government.

    Q316       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: The powers to make trade agreements in Australia sit with the federal Government.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Yes.

    Lloyd Russell-Moyle: But this affects only federal Government laws, whereas this affects all laws at all levels in the UK. How will the UK Government take action if the environmental standards are weakened at a state level, which is actually where they are applied?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: We have agreed in what was the first environmental chapter for Australia the embedding of the commitment to the Paris agreement and, therefore, the route to net zero. It has been interesting to see, since the change in Government and since we agreed this, that there has been an uptick—if that is the right way to describe it—in the new Australian Government’s commitment to what that net zero path will look like and they have raised their ambitions.

    Q317       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: If a federal state or territory of Australia weakens its environmental rules and does not have to abide by the ratchet clauses in this, what action will we take?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: My point is that they are going in the right direction, and I think we are all committed—

    Q318       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: The federal Government are going in the right direction, but the states are of many different political hues. What do we do if and when states go in the wrong direction?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Because the commitment is to work together with best endeavours and continue to try to meet the Paris agreement, we would clearly be able to raise it through our Joint Committee discussions, if there was real anxiety. But also we are working together; as part of the FTA, that is a real commitment to work together. It will be UK businesses going to work in south Australia, for instance, to help put up offshore wind, or whatever those relationships are. Those bonds of business help to drive the commitment to the Paris agreement to keep 1.5 alive, alongside which we have our net zero path and Australia has theirs. As I say, theirs is going in a more ambitious direction than it was even when we negotiated this.

    I am confident that we will be working together. We have reduced tariffs on things like wind turbine blades and electric vehicles. Those relationships are strong. As we know, so much of meeting our net-zero challenge will be driven by both the businesses that produce the new and clean energy sources and the consumer, and we will continue to see that.

    Q319       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: In the negotiations did we seek a clause that would allow us to take action if federal states undermined that? It might not happen.

    Chair: It is a political agreement.

    Lloyd Russell-Moyle: A Labour Government is now in at federal level and a Labour Government is in most states. So things are probably turning around in Australia and are going in the right direction, because you have a decent party there, but the wrong thing may happen; it can happen anywhere. I buy your argument, Secretary of State, that things are going in a better direction now. I totally agree. I stood outside the Australian embassy numerous times during the elections canvassing for the Australian Labour party, but if things go in the wrong direction in a federal state, did we seek in the negotiations to put in clauses by which we would be able to protect ourselves?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: What we sought was to have an environment chapter where we had that commitment to the Paris agreement.

    On your point about political colours, I hope that pretty much all political colours are now on the journey to the net zero challenge, mostly because voters are very keen that their Governments meet it. The previous Government of a different political colour was the one that negotiated this. It is the first time that any Australian FTA has had any kind of environment chapter where these issues are highlighted and tariff reductions are made in order to facilitate and grow those relationships.

    Q320       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: We did not ask for any provisions that would allow us to take action if states were regressing on environmental clauses.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I look to Crawford on state-level discussion.

    Crawford Falconer: I do not think we were trying to negotiate with the states. That would be pretty bizarre.

    Q321       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: I am not asking whether we were trying to negotiate with the states.

    Crawford Falconer: Why do you take the view that the federal Government do not have an obligation to discharge towards the United Kingdom if one of the states does not act in accordance with what the Australian Government have committed to in the agreement with the UK? It is not clear to me why you take the view that somehow there is an exemption clause for the states.

    Q322       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: Tell me if I have got this wrong and then hands up, but my advice and what I am reading here is that this binds the federal Government. In a federal state, the Government have clear powers as to where they can and cannot intervene, so they have no ability to restrict states in a federal system on what they can do. This is a trade deal only with the federal Government, but some provisions on environmental matters are reserved to the state level in Australia.

    I was not asking whether we had entered into negotiation with the states; I was asking whether we had sought clauses to allow us to take protective action here in the UK if the state level was undermining the principles of some of the environmental agreements, even if the federal level was fulfilling its federal duties.

    Crawford Falconer: The answer is that we did not.

    Q323       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: Why not?

    Crawford Falconer: The reason we did not is that we think it is quite appropriate that in a sovereign state to sovereign state agreement, the emphasis and responsibility is on the Australian Government. You may well be right that in terms of the separation of powers in Australia—it has certainly been the case in the past, even with multilateral law—Australia is unable for a time to enforce a finding at multilateral level on one of its states, but we felt it was appropriate that the way to do this, which was achievable, was to put it as a responsibility of the Australian Government.

    That does not mean that if something was happening in New South Wales or Victoria we would not say, “We think this is inconsistent with your undertakings. What are you doing about it?” I do not for a minute think they would do nothing; as is the case with their multilateral obligations, undoubtedly they would need to go to the state and say, “Listen, this is in breach of our treaty obligations. You need to act accordingly.” That is a desirable and more practical way to get an agreement out of Australia; otherwise you probably would have got no agreement out of Australia. That was our judgment.

    Lloyd Russell-Moyle: I am sure that your analysis has a point. I do wonder why we do not ask for a reciprocal element that is not binding on all our levels, and why in the US, where we have done some state to state negotiations that have been agreed recently, we do not consider that. I will leave those questions for a future day when we can explore the utility of the UK as a whole negotiating with parts of states.

    Q324       Tony Lloyd: It would be worth adding that, in the event of negotiations with the US, where the states are very powerful, that consideration would have to be taken on board.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: These are issues that any bilateral FTA considers. As Crawford says, Canada is another example where we are now in discussions. We are making a federal to UK Government relationship, but there are issues. In the case of the US MOUs that we are negotiating at the moment at state level, they tend to be about mutual recognition of qualifications. That is an area where, if you like, we are able to unlock a series of market access barriers at a state to UK level. That is great, if we are able to do so, but it is an interesting question to consider. The Paris agreement challenge that the world has set itself is for countries, and countries then work out how to try to make that happen within whatever is the framework of their nations. It is an interesting question and I would be very happy to pick that up.

    Q325       Chair: When you look at page 90 of our report—

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Which I will.

    Chair: Unfortunately, you cannot respond to it because of the time, but it does say that it is applied at all levels of Government in the UK, but only at federal level in Australia. The point being made is a very good one; it is about reciprocity. The feeling—we have seen this—is that New Zealand gets one over the UK that the EU goes and sorts out. Again, it is a feeling that Australia has a different and perhaps more advantageous position. I am reminded of the old joke that I was told at the beginning of this—people are laughing less and less as this goes on—that if the UK was not in the room, would this agreement look much different? With stuff like that coming out, you get the feeling that maybe it wouldn’t.

    The UK would be best to reflect that, but where we could have reflected this a lot better is in the scrutiny time to do this. I am not going to open that wound again because my blood pressure will rise. To bring my blood pressure down, I turn to the great Mr Mark Garnier.

    Q326       Mark Garnier: On Government procurement, Australia and the UK are both part of the GPA of the WTO, but the FTA delivers access for UK suppliers to contracts of several other Australian public bodies, which I think comes under the Australian Financial Securities Authority opportunities. That opportunity is estimated in the impact assessment to be worth $10 billion a year, but Professor Sanchez-Graells has noted that it is very difficult to quantify that.

    The first question is: can you talk a bit more about how you quantify that? The second question, which is probably more important, is: how did you decide which areas of extra-Government procurement you wanted to go for? How did you select the other areas?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: On the technical question of the $10 billion, I will defer to Crawford because I cannot answer that question for you. You may need technical people to help.

    Crawford Falconer: That was my understanding, and I confess that I cannot give you a complete answer.

    Mark Garnier: It is a bit of a techie question.

    Crawford Falconer: Where the economists are involved I would hesitate to say there is a single, unanimous view, but they made their estimates based on what they thought, talking to business, the scope of these markets was essentially and the competitiveness that the UK had in those sectors. That is the general answer, but we can go into more detail for you.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: We will get you a better answer, if you like.

    Q327       Mark Garnier: That would be fantastic. How did you come to the conclusion that you wanted specific sectors? How did you choose those sectors?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: It covers procurement. Physically, all procurements are electronically covered. That is a very broad range; it is anything that is conducted electronically. The key is that UK suppliers will have the same access as Australian ones, so it is very broad in that sense. That is the offer; that is exactly your point. Drilling down on how that has been assessed, the $10 billion is the assessment of the opportunities that will be coming up, on which we will try to get you a much clearer and more detailed picture.

    Q328       Mark Garnier: It is the decision-making process.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: In doing that, hopefully it will answer how we got to $10 billion. Is that all right?

    Mark Garnier: That would be fantastic.

    Chair: I appreciate that, Secretary of State.

    Q329       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: Secretary of State, the agreement established various committees, working groups and dialogues at all different levels: the Secretary of State, officials and other interested parties. Some of them are able to make equivalence decisions that will impact on regulation. How will you be able to measure their effectiveness, and how will we be able to scrutinise them?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: That is a really good question. It is quite a complex picture. There is a big oversight board, if you like. You have the Joint Committee, which has representatives of both parties. That is ongoing, checking that we are all doing what we should be doing. It is also to assure smooth operation. It will be as much technical as anxiety-driven by some worst scenario coming at it—the day-to-day stuff.

    We have six sub-committees, breaking down the Joint Committee from a practical perspective. To your point about environment, that sits under the co‑operation sub-committee that looks at those broader issues. There is an IP sub-committee. Clearly, that is a very important one. That will be extremely technical. Then you are looking at services and investments. That is cross-border trade and services, trade in goods, professional business services, the temporary movement of people, telecoms investment and digital trade. That is probably the meat of the day-to-day activity that this opens up. There is a specific SPS sub-committee and there is a technical barriers to trade sub-committee. Those will be formal sub-committees to hone down in those particular areas.

    Then you have the dialogues, which are not formalised in any sense but there is the opportunity. You can look at dialogues that we have with other countries which may become a next-stage economic partnership. They are an opportunity to harness thinking, pick up anxieties and, importantly, bring new ideas to the fore.

    As I keep saying, this is the starting point. It is a really good platform and we want it to live and breathe and develop together as new technologies come through and businesses want to grow. The dialogues are there.

    A really important question is: how can you scrutinise this and see what is going on? If there is a big decision and the Joint Committee say, “We have to turn a bit right here because we have found that we need to do something else,” we would update the Committee, as we do with any number of other issues as they crystallise, and then there is the opportunity to discuss this.

    Q330       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: Will minutes or notes of these sub-committees be made available to our Committee?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: That is a very good question. Do we know the answer to that, Crawford?

    Crawford Falconer: We have not decided that yet, but it is quite possible.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: That is a really viable option.

    Q331       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: Will they be made in public? We all understand that sometimes they are made in camera. That is understandable, but it would be good to know.

    Will you be setting review timetables for each of these sub-committees to make sure they have covered areas and looked at different areas of the agreement and that there is a review of progress, or is the plan just to meet and put on the agenda whatever seems to be the pressing issue of the day? Does that make sense?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: It will have to have clear direction because we have committed to a two-year and then five-year review. Clearly, we will want to make sure that we have assessed in the round.

    Q332       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: Will that systematic timetable be provided to us?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: That is a very good question. I think the answer is that we have not decided that yet, but these are useful thoughts as we go through. It might be something we want to pick up in the autumn as we move towards bringing it into force. We will talk to the STAGs and others to get a sense of where the relevant level of interest lies. I quite like the idea of the Joint Committee, at least in part, being in public. That would put them all under pressure to make sure they are pushing themselves. There are some very interesting ideas. Why don’t we pick that up in the autumn? We will do that and think about it. This is the first one. Let’s try to get transparency and the opportunity for those to know—

    Chair: We are more than keen to work with the Government on this.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I think that would be an interesting discussion.

    Q333       Lloyd Russell-Moyle: If there is a two-year and then five-year review, I think that is something for us jointly to programme in when we are doing a two-year review hearing and what levels of officials we should be interacting with—of course, we will want to get your views—and what officials you will be making available to us to have either Committee discussions or more informal discussions. Maybe that would follow on from the discussion or agreement you had this morning where your senior officials and parliamentary team meet. Maybe that is one of the agenda points so that those things can be timetabled and trust can start to be rebuilt. That would be really appreciated.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I think that is a good idea.

    Chair: We are happy to help when we are given the time to help.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Noted.

    Chair: Before I turn to Tony Lloyd, I do not know whether there are any green bottles left, but, in the spirit of environmental awareness, a number of Ministers have resigned, with five resigning on one side of an A4 piece of paper this afternoon. They have been sitting on it. This is some sort of record. They are coming thick and fast.

    Tony Lloyd: Name names.

    Chair: I will after you have done your turn, but there are so many.

    Q334       Tony Lloyd: I want to turn to an area of very little controversy: our old friend the Northern Ireland protocol. Your deputy director of trade agreements analysis told us that your Department will “try to achieve” economic modelling for trade agreements to take into account the protocol. It is a fairly interesting question. How will you go about that given the uncertainty of where we go? Let us assume that there is certainty and that the protocol sticks in some way, shape or form.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: We hope that we will find a better landing zone.

    Q335       Tony Lloyd: It does matter because one of the concerns in the north of Ireland is that agriculture, on which Northern Ireland is massively dependent, will be impacted in a way that will not necessarily be seen in Great Britain, so that modelling will be absolutely fundamental in providing some kind of reassurance. Can you go about that at the moment given the uncertainty around the protocol anyway? Will this modelling take place at the earliest possible opportunity?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: That is a good question. I do not know the answer. Crawford, I do not know whether you have managed to speak to the team on that in the near term.

    Crawford Falconer: They can model on certain assumptions, but at the moment some of those assumptions will be a bit invidious to put out there as if they are serious assumptions. We have been able to model at the most general level—it is in the assessment that has been made of the agreement—the estimated overall impact on Northern Ireland as a region of the UK. Subtle variations of that, depending on how the protocol will be negotiated, revised or removed—however that ends up—are at a micro level which the modellers are just unable to deal with. They worked on the assumption that on that original model Northern Ireland was fully part of the overall impact of an FTA and it gave the kind of number that it does.

    If there is a variation to that, your computable general equilibrium modelling will not be able to give you that because it is too high a generality, so it is not even a matter of whether they can really fine-tune it. You would have to supplement it with a much more sector-specific model, which would not have the coherence of a comprehensive one. None of the models is a completely reliable prediction, but it seems to me that it would be very unlikely it will cast enormous light on this area that was not previously available. Experts can make a reasonable judgment about what the impact will be.

    Q336       Tony Lloyd: If I may make this obvious point, Northern Ireland is clearly a special case, whether one loves Northern Ireland or otherwise. It is a special case because its situation at the moment is different from the rest of the UK. Within that, given the sensitivities, can you give us some kind of modelling? I take Mr Falconer’s point that no model is perfect, but could we ask for your best endeavours to give us some early commentary along the lines that the deputy director undertook to give to the Committee, because at least it would be minimally helpful?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: It is a perfectly fair challenge. Let us take it away. I am not an expert in this space, but clearly given the position we hope to negotiate with the EU, or bring into the Bill, that clarity or landing zone might be one we could ask the team to look at from that perspective, as opposed to the situation as it is now. We will take that away and talk to them, if that is all right, and see what we can get them to tackle within the confines of what is at the moment a very moveable feast.

    Tony Lloyd: That is all I can ask at the moment.

    Chair: Just for information and in case we lose any viewers of the important Committee session we are having this afternoon because of the drama that might be unfolding elsewhere, for the benefit of Committee members the five latest resignations are: Kemi Badenoch, Alex Burghart, Neil O’Brien, Lee Rowley and Julia Lopez, who was once a very esteemed member of this Committee. We are sorry to hear that. We wish her especially well since she was on the Committee. We think we might have Julia back.

    Just for information, we have 23 resignations. Do not change to any other channel; keep watching the International Trade Committee. To keep us going and merrily entertained, Secretary of State, I will have to leave due to the nature of this reorganised afternoon. Hopefully, the Prime Minister is still in post, but I have to attend the Liaison Committee. No disrespect is intended to the Minister. I am sure you understand that I do not want anybody to think that I want to be outwith this room either.

    (Mark Garnier took the Chair.)

    Q337       Mick Whitley: Various stakeholders, particularly those within UK agriculture, have said that they would like to see an impact assessment for each UK trade agreement which estimates the cumulative impact of such agreements to date. What will you do to look into the feasibility of that?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: In the first instance, we have made an impact assessment of the Australian FTA framework as it stands now. They are a bit like balance sheet snapshots because you can make your assessment only on the basis of the picture. The New Zealand impact assessment has effectively incorporated the impact of Australia’s FTA into it. As we keep negotiating new FTAs, those that we have already brought in will be part of that overall assessment landscape, so they are by default, if you like, factored in as we add new FTAs to the UK business market opportunities and the impacts it will have and where it will impact. Therefore, we start to be able to see that patchwork of impacts, if that is the right way of describing it, layer upon layer as we do them. Each time we do a new FTA, we will be able to have a holistic perspective on the impact of the new one having incorporated those that we have already negotiated.

    Q338       Sir Mark Hendrick: Many of the agreement’s provisions entail parties aspiring to achieve things or committing themselves to co-operate in various ways, as opposed to having a binding commitment to do something. What will the Department do to monitor and evaluate those elements of the agreement to ensure that good intentions turn into action?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: That is a really important question. For Australia, a lot of these chapters are about co-operation and working together to try to help improve international standards and work in those international fora together. The dialogues, if you like the non-binding parts of the committee structure, will be there precisely to stimulate and bring in voices to try to drive those forward. We are not necessarily in exactly the same place as two countries by virtue of our own journey so far, but the commitment is that we want to work together in the wider international fora where trade has a strong voice for setting standards to do that together. The dialogue where we see that will probably go on in the near term.

    I have no doubt at all that, across civil society, the binding commitment we have made as two nations together will afford it the opportunity to use that as a challenge to both of us to push on and do better together. It will be a powerful element in that. It is a really good thing, because I always say that FTAs are the tool. It is about people, businesses and societies where the goods, services and commitments that we make land together. I think it is going to be really interesting.

    Quite a lot of it, particularly in the environment chapters, is completely new for Australia. This is a new way of building on the gritty trade relationship. Stripping away tariffs on turbine blades is a practical trading issue, but those commitments we have all made to Paris, what that means in practice and how we think about how to use our trade flows to help meet a different goal from one that is, if you like, a straightforward trading one, will be really powerful.

    I think the dialogue in the first instance will be where we see those opportunities for discussions on co-operation and that nudge in the right direction to make good on them. If in due course there is an opportunity where we might want to embed something else, obviously it would be through the Joint Committee. For additional perspectives on the FTA, we would have the opportunity to bring that through in due course.

    Q339       Sir Mark Hendrick: What you describe is a good co-operation process and good dialogue. The impression you are giving is that it is more of a qualitative assessment of how it might work rather than necessarily a quantitative assessment of how you might try to measure those achievements and turn those intentions into actions. Will you look maybe at logging certain actions or agreements and add tick-boxes, or some method of trying to measure the degree of co-operation you get, rather than just saying, “There is pretty good co‑operation and we are getting on very well”?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: That is a fair challenge to the point about how we publish minutes and think about how we push this forward, because the point of these FTAs is that we want them to be agile and have room for co‑operative development. That is an interesting challenge. How might the dialogue co-ordinators harness what are clearly particular issues that might be either a concern or an opportunity and find ways to push that forward?

    This is instinct really. You say, “We have talked about this and this is great. Actually we want to go to the Joint Committee and set a new challenge for ourselves.” All of this still needs to be set out in gritty terms, but that is a really interesting challenge. Do we try to formalise a flow which says where a co-operative decision is made which will generate a real trade outcome or new opportunity? We should be finding ways to measure it properly. I think that is an interesting challenge.

    Q340       Sir Mark Hendrick: Connected with that, the agreement allows the parties to amend the text of the agreement through the Joint Committee in some circumstances without engaging in formal parliamentary scrutiny here in the UK. Those changes that you can make obviously work in the direction of the approach you are talking about. One example you gave was regarding the amendment of tariff schedules. In that specific example, how will Parliament be involved? How will we be informed?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: In the same way that tariff schedule changes are ongoing—I look to Crawford—we update on a regular basis on weird and wonderful things that are going on outside the Committee, but in terms of tariff schedules is there a particular format?

    Crawford Falconer: They would still have to go through the same processes with any tariff change as we do at the moment. Usually, they are done by secondary statutory instruments, so those processes presumably will continue. They will be exactly the same. It is hard to predict. We are not going into this negotiation with a whole long list of things, once we have concluded this, that we want to change within a few months of actually having done it. Let us hope not.

    It is hard to imagine, but obviously there will be some things that come up after a period of time and we will make some changes. If there was amendment outside that rather straightforward example, it is something that we would have to consider and a judgment would have to be made on a case-by-case basis about what is required. If it was meaningful change that would normally pass through scrutiny, then it would need to pass through scrutiny; if they were just making minor drafting changes to the agreement, maybe not, but that is not something you can answer in the abstract in advance.

    We have quite a lot of existing agreements. Up to this point we have never had the need to make a change to them. I do not think there will be a lot of changes, but sooner or later it might well happen and we will just have to make a judgment as to the appropriate way to go about it. Clearly, if there is a significant change, it would be dealt with.

    Q341       Sir Mark Hendrick: If there was a sudden jump in tariff rates, we would want to know about it and we would want to know why. What sort of reporting mechanism would you have for that, other than just pushing through an SI?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: I guess it is an opportunity for you to discuss it with us at that point. I have not had any in my tenure so far, so I cannot speak from experience, but I guess that would be the logical process.

    Sir Mark Hendrick: It is a bit of a new ball game.

    Chair: Before we turn to Mick Whitley, there is breaking news: Mims Davies has resigned.

    Q342       Mick Whitley: The agreement does not contain language on the protection of human rights either in the preamble or the main text. The Government have told the Joint Committee on Human Rights that this has been tackled in other ways in the agreement. How did this come to be negotiated?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Issues about human rights are, in an advocacy way, managed and run by the FCDO. That is something that our diplomats do when they are raising issues and continuing to promote those universal human rights that we as the UK believe are absolutely critical. That is not an area that sits within DIT’s competence at all; it is very much a Foreign Office activity.

    There are aspects of trade policy where there is an opportunity to address some of the issues in a bilateral trading relationship. With Australia, we do not have concerns around forced labour or some of the issues that one might otherwise have. We are working with a similar economy and like-minded Governments and citizens, so we are in a very good place. As a nation, we will always continue to set out through the FCDO our view of human rights and anxiety around human rights abuses, but from the trade agreement perspective we would not include something like that because in and of itself it is not an area of policy that is directly relevant to trade.

    Q343       Mick Whitley: In the New Zealand agreement there is a chapter on indigenous people. What about the indigenous people of Australia?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: As I have always said, these are bilateral agreements and each party comes to it with the mandate of what it wants. Australia was not looking for any kind of indigenous peoples chapter, so we have not done it. It was a particular request of New Zealand, which we were very happy to accommodate. It was something that for them, within their own communities, was really important. They were very keen that the Māori voice and those cultural roots should be embedded in the FTA, as they have done with other FTAs of their own, but Australia was not asking for that, so that was not an area we looked at.

    Q344       Chair: Can we turn to our Asia-Pacific tilt? Obviously, this helps us with CPTPP. How would you describe it in terms of the wider Asia-Pacific tilt and our exploiting, which is probably the wrong word, or taking advantage of the opportunities there?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: We are very focused on looking for those new export markets which can help our UK businesses to grow. Part of the challenge the Prime Minister set of taking us to £1 trillion is that that is growing our economy. There is only so much UK businesses can sell to domestic citizens, or to one or another country, so the opportunity to find those new markets has driven us to this, as set out in the integrated review on the Indo-Pacific market opportunities.

    There are others. Obviously, we will continue to work with Canada and the USA. Canada sits within the CPTPP family as well, which is why Canada and Mexico are in my early bird five stars this year, because they are important members of CPTPP. They wanted to be able to have an early upgrade of their FTAs which came through the EU roll-over programme.

    That is a huge market opportunity; it is a growing market of some 2.3 billion people. We want to make sure that UK businesses have as good and as easy access to it as possible, hence the important focus on CPTPP. Those figures are sitting on a market of £9 trillion. It is an enormous market with a young population and massive growth in middle-class consumers, with opportunities for the sorts of goods and services at which the UK is world-class. We want to make sure that they have as much access with as few market access barriers as possible. That is why there has been a huge focus there. We are hopeful—we are in the throes of negotiations with them now—that we will be invited to accede around the end of the year. Anything is possible, but we hope that will afford the opportunity for all sorts of new business expansion.

    We are already seeing businesses having interesting conversations with airports. They want to make sure that their routes match what will be offered when we have CPTPP accession hopefully, because those are the sorts of practical tools that help businesses to be able to reach new markets, which is where we can see that growth coming as quickly as possible.

    Chair: Fantastic. Last but not least, Tony Lloyd.

    Q345       Tony Lloyd: Secretary of State, the FTA has similarities with parts of the Australia and UK digital economy agreements with Singapore. Those digital economy agreements go a little bit further in some areas—for example, on online harm and so on—but where do you draw the line in negotiating what goes into a free trade agreement and what goes into a digital economy agreement? This is not meant as a philosophical question. Are there practical reasons for making that differentiation?

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: The digital chapter, which, as you say, is broad and extensive, is what we negotiated with them. The DEA with Singapore is, if you like, a new layer. We have an existing FTA with Singapore.

    Tony Lloyd: It is a stand-alone.

    Anne-Marie Trevelyan: It is a stand-alone. In the nicest possible way, it is not the most exciting FTA in the world, but under WTO rules you cannot do what I call extra agreements unless you have an FTA. The digital area is very important to Singapore and they are also world leaders on it too. We have created this agreement and what is in it is genuinely world-leading. This is effectively the UK’s poster child of what a digital economy would look like.

    I would be very content—Crawford probably would be too; it means less work—to put that into every FTA we ever negotiated. That would be fantastic. All of that digital economy thinking in an FTA would be great. The reality is that, when you are doing a bilateral agreement with a particular country, they will not always be in a place where you can have that sort of negotiated position which would cover all those areas. Every FTA will be negotiated within the limits of each country’s mandate and capacity to move towards that stage.

    Australia is pretty good and we have negotiated something that is great. It might lead to your point about doing more later, thinking, “There is some stuff in the UK-Singapore digital economy agreement that is good.” At the time, 2021, that seemed too far, but by the time we get to 2025—I do not know—in those areas that their businesses want to develop we would be open to doing that.

    In my ideal world, from an efficiency perspective, every UK FTA—name a country—could have as much as is in the DEA in their digital data chapter, but the realities are the limitations of negotiation that each country has at any point.

    At the moment we are talking to Ukraine, with which we have an FTA—it has a very digitally savvy environment, a very extensive, young population and it is very keen on digital development—on whether we can do a digital economy agreement of the type that we have with Singapore. It is very keen to leapfrog with a lot of these technologies and use those tools and work with the UK to help grow those economies. As you know, we are very keen to support them in every way we can, not only militarily but in helping them sustain and grow their economy.

    The DEA in its present form is there to use as a template for other countries that already have FTAs with us and that might want to take this step. For us as the UK, driving as we did the digital trade principles through the G7 last year, we are absolutely of the view that this is so important to helping businesses, particularly SMEs, to move forward, jump to that next generation and strip away cost by using those digital tools in their business activities. This is in a way our poster child. This is the ultimate that we have with Singapore. It came into force just last week, so we are excited to see how businesses make use of it and take those opportunities.

    Chair: Fantastic. Secretary of State and Crawford Falconer, thank you very much indeed. It has been a mammoth session combining one and a half hours this morning and two hours this afternoon. So it is quite something. Sadly, I suspect the Liaison Committee will probably occupy more space on the news wires tonight than this Committee. We appreciate your coming to see us. Such a long session is hard work; it certainly is for us and almost certainly for you as well. With that, we will draw this to a close.