Category: Speeches

Below is the text of the speech made by the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, on 1st February 2007 at the offices of Wragge & Co in Birmingham.

Diversity and quality go together. The wider the pool from which lawyers emerge and judges are selected the higher the quality of the legal profession and the bench. We need to increase diversity in our profession and on the bench to maintain our strength. Because it is fair, and because it increases confidence in our justice system.

Bold statements. But unless bold statements are backed with decisive action on diversity we will not make genuine progress.

I’d like to do three things this afternoon; firstly, demonstrate why I believe improving the diversity of the judiciary is vital for delivering effective justice; secondly, illustrate that action on diversity is required across the legal profession, from attracting a broader group into the law, to promoting and developing opportunities for existing lawyers and judges currently in the system, and that this action needs to go further and faster than it is currently; and thirdly and finally, to look at some of the barriers to judicial office and some of the specific measures my department will be taking to ensure the high quality of our judiciary is maintained.

I believe that we are at an important point in the history and the development of our justice system. Increasing the ethnic and gender diversity of the legal profession and the judiciary is an enormously important step in the wider reform of our justice system. We need to continue to attract talent, in individuals of the highest calibre in terms of intellect, and probity.

I find it exasperating when I hear people express fears that increasing the pool from which our judges are drawn will somehow dilute its quality. As if the only people capable of holding judicial office are drawn from a narrow pre-existing group. That we have still too few women judges, or those from different backgrounds is a measure of how much we still have to do. A system that only selects judges from certain backgrounds misses out on a whole pool of people who have the necessary talent and skills in abundance. There should only be one common denominator when it comes to appointing people to judicial office – merit.

The importance of a more diverse profession is enormous. Lawyers serve communities whether that community is the City of London or the homeless of Leeds, or the small businesses of Bradford and Birmingham. They need to reflect those communities. Just as the legal profession does – so must the judiciary. Yet personal qualities of intellect, professionalism and probity are not enough. In a modern reflective system of justice, judges have a characteristic of equal importance – and that is understanding. Understanding of communities, of the people and the problems. Understanding, that in part, will come through more people from different ethnic groups, more people from wider social backgrounds, and more women entering the judiciary.

Courts have to be demonstrably independent and of the highest quality. But they also need to be able to demonstrate that they understand, in a profound way, the problems with which they are dealing. The Commercial Court in London is successful because the commercial community are impressed by the extent to which it understands the issues with which it deals. The Justice Centre in Liverpool succeeds for precisely the same reason.

The delivery of effective justice depends on a diverse judiciary. Increased diversity will lead to greater judicial understanding of the issues that communities face, day-in-day-out. The wider the diversity of the judiciary the wider the perspective from which decisions are made.

We should be enormously proud of our judiciary. It consistently displays the highest standards of probity and professionalism in dispensing justice. They are unquestionably of the highest quality and understanding. They are unmatched, I believe, in the world. But to retain that high standing the pool from which they are drawn must widen. Quality will only be maintained if we have diversity. Diversity based solely on merit.

There is an immense amount of talent out there that remains untapped, because of lack of awareness of the judiciary, or indeed simply the sense that ‘judges aren’t people like me’. We must overcome these barriers if we are to narrow the gap between those doing the judging and those being judged; this is not diversity for the sake of targets, or quotas or for diversity’s sake, it is indeed essential if we are to have a judiciary and a justice system of continued quality and one that inspires public confidence.

But the arguments for diversity need to move on. Our efforts should not be spent winning the case for diversity, but in making it a reality, by going further than we have gone to date. We need to recognise it is a long term issue. But we also need to identify areas where we can make progress in the shorter and medium term. We are making progress in terms of gender and ethnic diversity. Year on year the statistics are pointing in the right direction. In1999 only 24% of judicial appointments to courts and tribunals were women. By September 2005 this had increased to 46%. Positive trends; with the total number of female judges in courts rising from 14-18% in the last 5 years alone. More and more women are applying for and taking up judicial office, and I hope that increasing the profile of women in the judiciary, promoting more flexible working arrangements, and highlighting the new open, transparent selection procedure will encourage more women to consider a career on the bench.

A similar picture emerges with those from ethnic minority backgrounds with the percentage of appointments to courts and tribunals increasing from 5% to 17% in that same period. While the percentage of judges in courts from ethnic minority backgrounds has doubled since 2001 to nearly 4% by April last year.

While this is progress, it is not yet of the rate or amplitude that I would like to see. Public confidence in the justice system will grow when people start to see more women judges and more judges from ethnic minorities in the court room. In terms of ability, in terms of increasing public confidence, in terms of improving the connection with communities, in terms of making decision from a broader perspective – improving gender and ethnic diversity is a necessity.

Separate from judicial diversity, the legal profession also needs to attract men and women from a wider range of backgrounds to the law as a career. Initiatives such as Pathways to Law, a partnership between the College of Law and the Sutton Trust, to encourage young people from non-privileged backgrounds into the law should be commended. I am sure that this scheme and others like it will be wholeheartedly supported by the legal profession. Not only for the economic benefits of drawing a bigger and better pool into law as a career, but for the undoubted benefits that it will have, in time, on the makeup of our judiciary. The Sutton Trust believes that we need to take proactive steps to widen the basis of the profession. Holding career days, offering work placements, giving advice on applying to law courses, mentoring through school and university – all simple steps. But what the Pathways initiative shows, is that they work. As with women, as with minority ethnic individuals – unless we take steps to widen the educational funnel through which people become lawyers we are missing out on quality. We need to connect to people who are more than bright enough for a career in the law – we need to connect with them and to help them through the process.

The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 rightly transferred responsibility for judicial appointments from the person of the Lord Chancellor to an independent body. The JAC is entirely independent, and while my recent predecessors and I appointed judges scrupulously on merit, the introduction of an independent commission should encourage applications by bringing transparency to the selection process, and by allowing the hitherto closed process to become more open. The JAC has a statutory duty to encourage diversity in the pool of candidates. I know they are committed to making this real. That deeply held commitment needs to be demonstrated by all of us; from law firms to the Lord Chancellor. The creation of the JAC is an important milestone. Improvements to the application and selection processes are already being made to make the process more user friendly much less off-putting. The JAC running and promoting a transparent and manifestly independent application and selection process will encourage more people to apply. It is a significant step. And it represents an important opportunity to change the climate; to provide much needed momentum.

But the promotion of diversity needs to occur at every key point of the cycle. True, we need to attract a more diverse group into the law as a profession. But I do not accept that we need to wait to see the benefits of these longer term strategies before we start to see real, meaningful improvements in judicial diversity today.

I am delighted that Wragge and co has hosted this event today as a small measure of your commitment to promoting diversity in your own firm, the wider legal profession and now the Judiciary. I hope that many more firms will follow the active lead set by Wragge and co.

There are currently deserving barristers, there are currently deserving solicitors – who are simply not considering a career as a judge. There are immediate steps that we can and must take to attract qualified individuals to apply to the bench. Essential to improving quality in diversity is to gain an understanding of the genuine barriers, real or perceived that exist to judicial office.

Research into these barriers, conducted by my department, has thrown up some interesting results. Many interviewed cited nothing more substantial than a lack of awareness or knowledge of the types of post available, or of the application process or eligibility requirements. Others perceived the judiciary to be an isolated career choice, and feared giving up the more sociable aspects of their current career. Long hours and inflexible working patterns were a disincentive for some. What I found most encouraging about these findings was that there was no sense of a great cultural antipathy towards a career in the judiciary. Rather many concerns were either borne out of the lack of sufficient information to make an informed decision or were around work/life issues that we are committed to resolving.

The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcements Bill currently before Parliament includes clauses to extend eligibility for judicial office. Post qualification experience rather than rights of audience will be at the heart of the new eligibility criteria. By removing the emphasis on rights of audience I hope this will encourage more solicitors to apply for judicial office. In addition the changes will also allow for Legal Executives, Patent Agents and Trademark Attorneys, with the appropriate experience, to apply for certain judicial posts. This will widen the pool of potential applicants even further, and recognises that not only solicitors and barristers have the appropriate skills and experience to become judges of the highest calibre.

In September 2006 I announced my intention that former Judges should be able to return to practice as solicitors and barristers. I remain committed to this idea, not as has been suggested, because I want to encourage existing judicial office holders to leave the judiciary. This is about encouraging more applicants. There is evidence to suggest that prohibition on return to practice is a significant psychological barrier for many potential candidates. In particular solicitors and barristers can be deterred by the realisation that taking up a salaried judicial post would close off future career options.

Return to practice proposals, with the necessary safeguards, is about increasing the attractiveness of judicial appointment to a wider pool. It recognises that the job market has changed. Flexibility and choice have become hallmarks of our successful economy and employment market. While taking up judicial office is a very special position requiring commitment and dedication, I believe we have to move with the times and give Judges the option of having more flexibility in their career, as is the case with other professions. I remain unconvinced by the argument that permitting return to practice will lead to the risk of bias, real or perceived. The position of fee paid Judges- part time judges who continue to work as solicitors and barristers tends to show that this is not so.

For those who have participated in the scheme, salaried part time working enables a balance to be struck between one’s professional life, one’s family commitments and one’s other interests. The scheme has proved enormously attractive for many, with around 90 salaried part-time judges. We have had the first 9 salaried part time circuit judges, experienced judges who have embraced a new way of working, and by April this year they will have been joined by several others. Salaried part-time judges are also sitting on both District Judges benches, in the Appeal Service, the Employment Tribunal Service, the Lands Tribunal, and the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. A number of whom have gone on to sit full time. As well as attracting people to the bench as a career; we need to explore ways of keeping them there. And the introduction of more flexible working arrangements will be essential in maintaining the judiciary as an attractive and viable career choice.

And of course one of the reasons I am here at Wragge and co today, is to reiterate my commitment to finding ways of promoting judicial service in our courts and tribunals to solicitors. There is a profound sense of preaching to the converted this afternoon – I am delighted that so many of you are here and expressing an interest in judicial office. I wish you every success.

Solicitors are still under-represented in the judiciary – with a significant gap in numbers between those who are eligible and those who apply. Solicitors also tend to apply for the more junior posts. We need to understand what the barriers are – and we need to overcome them. Lack of awareness about requirements for judicial office isn’t good enough. I want to dispel the myth that the Bar is the only career route to judicial office. In conjunction with the Law Society we recently sent letters to every solicitor in the country who has recently become eligible for judicial service. And so far, we have signed up 7 major firms, including our hosts, to a 5 point action plan to promote diversity and judicial service. 7 large firms represents progress, but once again not at the pace or depth I wish to see.

I was particularly pleased to see Lawrence Collins, now Lord Justice Collins appointed to the Court of Appeal not long ago. As a solicitor, he demonstrates that professional background need not be a barrier to taking high judicial office. I am delighted that he is here today, and I urge you all to make the most of his not inconsiderable talent and experience. I hope that he will become an inspiration for many more solicitors in the future.

Judicial diversity is not tokenism and political correctness. It is not just a numbers game. I want to see a judiciary that has more understanding and engagement with the communities it serves. In no sense is this a slight on the thoroughly able, skilled and connected judiciary that currently provide such marvellous service to their communities. Rather it is a reflection on the future direction of the justice system. As we evolve as a society – so must our systems, structures and institutions adapt; the justice system and the judiciary are no different from any other public service in this regard.

I want to see the level of community engagement enhanced. I want to see more judges out and about in their local communities, speaking to local people, understanding local concerns, to be more responsive to their local environments.

The public are increasingly demanding more from their public services, increasingly expecting more from lawyers and judges. Community justice pilots in Liverpool and Salford represent a new way of doing justice. A way of making sure that the courts and the wider justice system are connected to the communities that they are there to support. It is a successful model that I want to see in practice right across England and Wales within the next two years. What the examples of Salford and Liverpool show, is that a visible, credible accessible judge is vital in strengthening links between the courts and the local community. Better connections leads to increased confidence in the work of the court – and what the pilots have demonstrated is that, in turn, greater confidence in the effective delivery of justice can empower communities to play an ever increasing role.

Judicial diversity isn’t a choice. Unless the profession widens the base from which it is drawn it will be missing out on quality. Unless the profession becomes more representative of the communities it serves there will be gaps in public confidence. Justice is rooted in confidence – confidence is rooted in diversity. When I see the statistics on diversity I do find it concerning – we still don’t have enough women, we still don’t have enough people from ethnic minority groups, or from less privileged backgrounds. But what gives me hope is that these issues are being raised now. What gives me encouragement is that many in the legal profession recognise that they have a responsibility to encourage people from a wider background to consider and pursue a career in the law. What gives me encouragement is that an independent JAC will encourage a more diverse pool of applicants from which to draw the judiciary. What gives me encouragement is that increasingly, through the roll out of community justice, judges will be making ever stronger links with their communities.

Now is the time we must press for change – not to fix something that is broken but to secure the continued high quality of the judiciary. The measure of success for any diversity strategy should not be statistics – it should be confident communities and effective justice. Thank you.

Below is the text of the speech made by Lord Falconer on 23rd March 2007 at Bangor University. The speech was made at the Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest Memorial Lecture.

Noswaith dda or good evening.

It is for me a real honour to be here to-night.

My week has been a north Wales week. I do not mean by that that I was topped for speeding.

On Wednesday I gave, in London, the Williams of Mostyn memorial lecture.

Gareth was, as you will all know, born in a taxi travelling between Prestatyn and Rhyl. Or that is what he told me. He never let on whether his mother was leaving the hospital in despair, or did not get there in time.

Gareth was a great lawyer, a great leader of the lords and an immensely brave and effective Attorney General.

Arriving here last night I passed the spot where he was born. How much we have lost by his all too early passing.

I have spent the day in North Wales. I started the building work at the new Carnarfon criminal justice centre. I opened the new witness suite at Llandudno magistrates court . I saw the work going on to increase the size of offices, in Mold combined court.

And I heard how so many more cases than before from Wales are now tried in Wales.

Justice is strong and growing here in Wales.

It is a real pleasure and an appropriate end to my visit to be invited to give the Lord Morris Memorial lecture here tonight in Bangor.

Lord Morris, rightly, is recognised as being one of the breed of Law Lords who fully encapsulated the qualities for which our judiciary are renowned. He was a judge of thirty years standing. He moved rapidly through the ranks and, as a Law Lord, presided over a significant number of cases which were not only influential in the development of our law then, but remain so now. I need only give one example; the Home Office v Dorset Yacht. A case that is familiar to all law students, young and indeed old. His judgment remains influential even today in defining the duty of care for public bodies and officials.

He was a great man, who served his country not only on the bench, but also in defence of its freedom during the First World War. That desire to serve and protect our nation’s liberty is a trait which was seen throughout his time on the Bench. He was, it has been written, ‘vigilant in protecting the freedom of the individual when threatened by the executive.’

And it is this trait which I think makes the topic of my lecture tonight entirely appropriate. And one, I believe that both Lord Morris and Lord Mostyn, would have welcomed.

What I want to speak about this evening is human rights. I believe that the Human Rights Act which this government put on to the statute book in 1998 is, and will be seen as, one of the great legal, social and constitutional reforms not just of this government but of all of the post-war governments in the United Kingdom. It will be, I believe, a ratchet reform: one which it will not be possible to turn back – an embedded element of our legal and constitutional framework.

But I accept that there have been at times problems with the way the legislation has been operationally interpreted, and arguments and controversy about what effect it has had on our law. That’s why I have been campaigning for it, arguing its merits in speeches and interventions in Parliament, up and down the country, and in visits I have made ranging from Australia to America. I want to continue that argument today.

So what I want to argue tonight is:

– that human rights and our human rights legislation is vitally important to this country now, and that the legislation is important not just for the few, but for the many

– that in looking and continuing to look at the effects and impact of the legislation on our laws and our practices, our conclusion, based on the evidence we have so far, is that the legislation has neither caused a crisis in our courts nor changed the nature of our law

– that, far from that effect, the legislation has in fact had a profound effect on policy and decision making throughout the State

– and that as a result, the Human Rights Act guarantees protection not just for minorities, but for everyone: that human rights are mainstream, not marginal

Firstly, then, the value of human rights. Human Rights are for everyone. They apply to everyone. They can be relied on by everyone. They are secured and guaranteed by the State, for all. Regardless of age, race, sex or religion they are a constant on which we can all rely. They both protect us from an overmighty state. They also require the state to provide proper protection for each one of us from crime, from having our privacy infringed, and for the protection of all of our human rights.

Human Rights are a necessary and vital part of our democracy, and they are for us all.

They have been guaranteed by the state, for each one of us, since the Human Rights Act came into force in 2000. It was a significant day for us as citizens and for us as a nation, as the clarion call to ‘Bring our rights home’ was answered. Our citizens now can enforce their Rights and claim their remedies in British courts in front of British judges, as a direct result of the Act obviating the need for the UK citizen to go to Strasbourg. It has meant rights can be vindicated much more quickly and much more easily.

As I shall explain later the knowledge that infringements can be enforced so much more quickly has had an effect much more profound than the effect on the comparatively small number of litigants who have been saved the air-fare to the European court of human rights in Strasbourg. For the policy makers awareness that maybe in a number of years, if the European Court of Human Rights can get through its backlog, and its complicated procedures it might determine that a provision or a decision offends the convention, is not a real or significant pressure in the making of decisions. The fact you might be breaking English law is a profound pressure on the way policy-makes frame legislation.

Secondly, the impact of human rights. Last year I commissioned a review of the Human Rights Act. To see, six years on, how it was working.

Prior to the introduction of the Act there had been many soothsayers who prophesied the Act would change our law unrecognisably, and for the worse. They said it would cause a constitutional crisis and grid-lock in the courts. They were wrong.

Firstly: there has been no constitutional crisis.

The Act has made clear that Parliamentary Sovereignty remains. The Act, I believe, purposefully and skilfully maximises the protection of human rights without trespassing on parliamentary sovereignty. Judges have shown considerable restraint in ensuring their role does not become politicised. And power rightly remains in Westminster, with the legislature and the executive.

Secondly: it has not led to gridlock in the courts.

Doomsday predictions of the courts facing gridlock, being swamped and overwhelmed by the constant taking of human rights points , and the legal system grinding to a halt, have as might be expected turned out to be hopelessly wrong. The system has worked well. The courts have not ground to a halt. The judges have been sensible robust and unintimadated by the change in the law.

They have strike the right balance, using the Act when appropriate, not being afraid to disregard it when it is not apposite or necessary. They have been robust, and they have been fair. Many cases which sought to suggest Human Rights arguments have rightly been dismissed as misconceived or irrelevant to the case. The judiciary I believe have used considerable wisdom to ensure that the Human Rights Act is and remains a much valued piece of legislation.

Thirdly: building on this the Act has allowed renewed dialogue with the European Court of Human Rights.

Not only have British citizens been able to enforce their rights in British courts in front of British judges, but British judges have been able to add to, and aid European human rights jurisprudence. One example will suffice. In Z v UK in 2001, the ECHR refused to follow one of its earlier judgements, Osman v UK, because of the discussion relating to Osman that the House of Lords had undertaken in Barratt v LB Enfield earlier that year. Through increased dialogue human rights jurisprudence has noticeably improved. It has also allowed the UK to be able to assert itself squarely into the debate internationally about Human Rights. Being able as we now are as a country to point to effective and comprehensive Human Rights legislation enhances our credibility as we seek to promote it internationally.

The impact of the HRA on the courts has been overwhelmingly positive because it has made a tangible a difference to individuals who have had their rights violated by the State. It has given them effective and speedy redress. It has given them meaningful protection. It is no good to speak of one’s commitment to HR if one does not give those whose rights are infringed, a remedy.

Yet there has been little impact on our law, because I believe many of these rights were already reflected within our law. A culture which the Act has sought to build on. Whilst our current rights have been supported and strengthened by its presence, the Act has in practice had very little discernible effect on existing law. It has been raised in a number of decisions right across a huge range of issues but it has not caused outcomes which are unexpected or which would not have been achieved under existing law. It has enhanced our law by providing remedies and clarity. But as the report found it has not caused the law books to be rewritten. The European Convention on Human Rights was written in large measure by English lawyers who underlined English principles.

Yet, as I indicated earlier, the Act has had a far greater, a far more profound effect on society outside of the court. The Act has not been just about what goes on in the courtroom, it has been about what goes on outside, in wider society.

Before turning to that reality, it is also true to say that the Act has provided the opportunity for the promotion of a number of myths – myths which, if we do not counter them properly, are damaging – damaging to the legislation, and so damaging to the protection the legislation offers our people. Part of my job is to counter those myths – and to take every opportunity to do so.

The day to day operation of the human rights act is something that rarely, if ever, is covered in the media. Given the nature of the coverage around human rights one would be forgiven for assuming that human rights are purely for minority groups, for defendants, for foreigners, for criminals, for chancers.

It is no surprise that in some parts of our community this view of human rights has taken hold. Just consider a selection of headlines of the past two years; “Traitor wins Human Rights Payout”, “Ordinary Britons deserve human rights too”, “human rights, social wrongs”, “Terrorists’ Charter”. Such headlines are as damaging as they are misconceived.

In this view human rights are other people’s rights – they are rights which I will never need, and therefore they are for other people, who always on this analysis misuse them.

There are a number of issues at play here.

Firstly, media coverage tends to be dominated by a number of myths and misunderstandings, and by grey areas where matters of principle are at stake as much as matters of the law. I do not intend to go into this point in great detail, as I have discussed these at length elsewhere, but I think it important to raise them by way of illustration. Three brief examples.

Take the infamous Kentucky Fried Chicken episode. It is widely believed and widely reported that a man in Gloucestershire, while evading capture by the police holed up on the roof of a house whereupon he demanded drink, cigarettes, and food – Kentucky Fried Chicken, apparently – from the police who were pursuing him.

A spokeswoman on behalf of the police is reported as saying, and I quote “although he’s a nuisance, we still have to look after his wellbeing and human rights”.

Two points here. Firstly, it is utter nonsense that his human rights entitled him to KFC on the roof. This was a purely operational matter for the police to decide, whether or not providing him with food would bring about a peaceful and swift resolution to the stand-off. Secondly, and significantly, the incident was reported as the man receiving food because of his human rights.

Second example, Dennis Neilsen. In 2001 it was widely reported Nielsen, a multiple murderer, was able to obtain hard-core pornography while in prison by citing the Human Rights Act. This is entirely untrue. He did apply for a judicial review of the Prison Governor’s decision to deny him access to hard-core porn – but that was refused at the permission stage, and again when he renewed the application. The Human Rights Act categorically did not lead to his being supplied porn. The second half of this story- perhaps unsurprisingly was not covered by the press.

The third example is more complex, and demonstrates a case which is in a grey area. In 2000, a group of nine Afghan nationals hijacked a plane and forced it to land at Stansted. They claimed that they were escaping a violent, oppressive regime which they feared would shortly assassinate them because of their political affiliations. They were charged in Britain with hijacking, and after a hung jury which could not agree on whether they had a defence of duress, they were convicted on a retrial. After they had spent years in jail throughout this process their conviction was quashed when the Court of Appeal held the judge had misdirected the jury by failing to leave the issue of duress to them and then because the judge considered a fear of political assassination in the future was insufficiently targeted to constitute the defence of duress. They were released. They sought asylum. They were refused because of the hijacking. But the tribunal which considered their case held that they were at risk of political assassination by the Taliban even though the Taliban were no longer the government, if they were returned to Afghanistan. The consequence was as a result of the Chahal case in the European Court of Human Rights they could not be deported. The Government accepted that they could not deport. They refused to give the hijackers exceptional leave to remain, which would have been the norm. Instead they sought to create a new category of “permission to stay”. The difference between leave to remain and permission to stay was that the hijackers could not work in this country. The court held that the state could not invent a new category without primary legislation.

This case caused an uproar – with the media invective directed at the Human Rights Act which they interpreted as a licence for hijackers and terrorists. Why should they be allowed to stay? Why should they be free to potentially pose a threat to the public? Why are they being rewarded for a very serious crime? What will stop others like them? Why should their human rights outweigh mine? All legitimate questions. But none of them have simplistic answers.

Speaking for myself, I believe the question is, do we want to be living in a society where we send people back to certain torture or death when they do not pose a threat in this community? I do not believe that we do. Human rights are the values we live by – and we must be true to them as a society. We must practice what we preach – even when that means taking difficult decisions, unpopular decisions, decisions on the margins.

What these three illustrations show is the nature of the human rights stories that tend to get in the papers – either myths, like the KFC example where human rights never even come into it, or partial reporting, when the outcome is conveniently forgotten, or the grey areas, the issues on the margins – like the Afghan hijackers.

A common denominator though is that whenever human rights hit the headlines they seem to be concerning minority. Regardless of the accuracy or otherwise of the reporting we rarely see human rights in any other light.

We don’t hear about human rights operating for the benefit of the mainstream of society, or indeed operating in the mainstream of society; we only hear about it at the margins; when it is misapplied, when the State is challenged in the courts, or in the grey areas where decisions are seen as going against the grain of popular opinion.

But the reality of human rights, and the Human Rights Act is that it protects each of us every day without attracting comment, notice or attention. The Human Rights Act impacts on all our lives in many unseen ways.

The third principal point I want to argue tonight is the effect of the legislation on policy – on areas where decisions about our protections, about our freedoms, about ensuring our dignity are made every day.

It is perhaps shown at its clearest by the example of the elderly couple who despite being married for over 30 years, were separated and moved to different care homes because it was considered too expensive to let them live together. But it was the Human Rights Act that ensured they were brought back together, and cared for in the same home. Without recourse to the Act they would have had no way of getting the local authority to act. But because of the Act they were able to enforce their rights.

The local authority failed in its duty to consider the human rights of that elderly couple when it made its decision. The Act put upon them a duty to ensure the couple’s rights were upheld. In every decision, whether operational or policy. And the Act has ensured that decisions like that one shouldn’t happen again. It forces local authorities and public bureaucracies to focus on the interests of the people they serve.

Local authorities up and down the country makes hundreds of decision every day which affect everybodys’ rights. Not just about the elderly, the vulnerable, the marginalised. But about everybody. They make decisions that impact on our dignity, that ensure we are treated equally and fairly. That ensure that our floor of rights, minimum standards as defined by the Human Rights Act are taken into consideration.

Making decisions, developing policy and delivering legislation can have a huge effect on our day to day lives. The Act recognises that, and that is where the Acts huge benefit for us all can be seen. It is in the day to day that the Act has its greatest effect for all of us.

The Act creates a number of positive obligations, which are responsible for this profoundly welcome effect.

1- Firstly, the Government is required to make a statement of compatibility with the Human Rights Act about all legislation going through Parliament

2- Secondly, the Act places an obligation on all public bodies to not breach the Act in developing policy

3- Thirdly, Human Rights obligations should be met in all decisions made by public bodies.

Legislation and s19

Turning firstly to legislation and declarations of compatibility. Since the Human Rights Act came into force in 2000 all Bills and subordinate legislation coming before Parliament must be “human rights proofed”. There are now statutory requirements under Section 19 of the Act for a Minister to make a statement to the effect that either; “the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the Convention rights” or that although the Minister “is unable to make a statement of compatibility the Government wishes the House to proceed with the Bill”.

This is an important step. It means that human rights considerations are at the heart now of how laws are made. They are not an afterthought, nor an add on. Human rights proofing is not simply an exercise to be carried out after the legislation has been passed. Questions of proportionality and the identification of issues and options that produce the least interference with human rights are now embedded in the very process of law making.

Since 2000 therefore, human rights have become an integral and statutory consideration of all legislation. Every law passed since then will have been human rights proofed. The effect of this measure has been to force policy makers to consider human rights in the development of that policy.

The Human Rights Act leads to better laws, by ensuring that the needs of all members of the United Kingdom’s increasingly diverse population are appropriately considered.

Policy making

This has had a very beneficial affect on policy making. The immediacy of the Human Rights Act, enforceable in British courts, before British judges, not requiring time consuming and expensive recourse to Strasbourg – has had a positive impact on public authorities. That the Act makes it unlawful for a public authority to behave in a way incompatible with human rights has placed an onus on them to think more broadly about the impact of their policies.

Policy making has also responded to case law which has contained human rights principles. Where existing policies are found to be in breach of Human Right principles in the courts, mechanisms exist by which government can respond and amend policy so that breaches do not continue to occur. This brings benefits not only for the citizen, in the fact that unlawful violations of their rights are stopped. But also for the government because policies that are infringing on citizens rights can be quickly rectified. Ensuring proper protection for society is provided, and minimising the amount of resources being swallowed by being taken to court for breaches.

Decision making

Perhaps the greatest impact, as I suggested briefly above, has been the impact of the Act on the decision making process of public bodies. The positive onus to consider rights before acting is a significant one. It prompts the decision maker to think first, to consider what the effect of the decision might be. On individuals and on society. Just as in the case of the elderly couple who were initially separated. Or the case of the elderly patient who was left on the toilet for long periods of time because staff were too busy to move her or the members of an old peoples home who were fed breakfast whilst they were sitting on a commode. The Human Rights Act should force such decisions to never be countenanced. By promoting dignity, and increasing awareness of fundamental human rights the Act encourages decision makers to protect rights. It promotes protection through pre-emption. Not as an after thought to be enforced later in the courts, or when the damage has been done, but right from the off.

Protection through prevention. Protection that has far greater meaning.

The HRA defines a floor of rights which inform the decision maker. Setting out minimum standards of treatment, of care, of action by which we all expect to be treated. Through more human rights friendly legislation and policy – government and public authorities are daily acting to the benefit of wider society – in the interest of all our rights. Rarely is this seen, rarely is this acknowledged – but it is there providing protection to each and every one of us.

The positive obligations of the Human Rights Act has brought benefits for all of us. Legislation and policies take account of our rights from the very beginning of any thought processes. Ensuring they are compatible, trying to improve protection rather than erode it. And responding quickly to challenges to existing practice and legislation, ensuring violations do not continue to occur. Importantly the positive obligation also enshrines the duty of protection in operational decision making. Promoting consideration of the rights of the individuals and of society before decisions are taken provides far more meaningful protection. And is of enormous benefit. Far better t o prevent the violation than merely give redress afterwards. The positive obligations laid out in the Act provide protection that is for everyone.

And my fourth principal point is the legislation’s guarantee of state protection for all. The Human Rights Act has had a far more a profound effect on our society than perhaps has been realised by society. Its effect has been far more beneficial than the occasional court case. Or the isolated right upheld. It has moved rights into the mainstream. It has changed the focus of rights to be for the mainstream. Not for others. Not just for the terrorist, or criminals or chancers, but for the majority. For the ordinary decent hard working man and women, young and old. It is not a terrorist’s charter, nor is it accurately represented in the media. It is society’s charter. It has a defining effect on the state and the relationship between the state and every individual

The Human Rights Act has brought rights home. It has made rights real in our British Courts. It has enshrined meaningful and real protection. For everyone.

And it has done so not just through the courts but through embedding a culture where people’s dignity is respected throughout the State, at national and local level.

It is an effective mechanism, which promotes consideration of rights at every step of development of policy, legislation and decision making. It ensures proper consideration is given to the relationship with citizen. And that the wider interests of society are fully considered. Without the Act, it is hard to see how such guarantees could be given.

That I can say so boldly that the Act gives guarantees is because the Act also provides a mechanism by which rights that the State fails to protect can be enforced. Ensuring policy and legislation that are in breach can be re-considered. And decisions which violate the rights of the citizen can be questioned, remedies provided and steps taken to ensure that there is no further violation. All of this protection comes because of the Act, not in spite of it.

As I have sought to set out in my remarks, the guarantee given by the HRA is both hidden and visible – it can be held up, pointed to, and importantly relied upon when the interests of the individual are violated. Yet for all the confidence that its visibility can provide, its invisibility can achieve great effect. Day by day, being used as a tool by public bodies in policy and decision making to inform and frame decisions. To ensure that the rights of each one of us are at the forefront of all decisions

The Human Rights Act brings rights into the mainstream. It is for the majority. Sometimes that produces hard results. The Afghan Hijackers is such a case. But that does not mean we should give up on protection, or turn our back on guaranteeing society’s rights. Thomas Paine, the great advocate of the rights of man got it right I think when he said:

‘He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from repression’

The Human Rights Act brings the protection of rights to the forefront of modern society. And it places the onus squarely on the Sate to protect them for everyone. There is no guarantee unless they are for everyone.

That is a duty that this Government is proud to bear. And which it is determined to fulfil. The HRA is an effect mechanism by which all of our rights can be protected, and be guaranteed. They are for everyone and we must make sure they continue to be so.

Thank you.

Below is the text of a speech made by Lord Falconer on 7th November 2006 at the Legal Aid Forum held at the Law Society, Chancery Lane, London.

Introduction

Thank you for asking me here today.

It is the second time in almost as many weeks that I have addressed solicitors on the issue of legal aid.

Rightly so. Dialogue’s very important. And we will listen

Importance of Legal Aid

Legal Aid is a vital issue; it is something we must get right.

Society demands a legal aid system. It demands a system which aids the delivery for justice, which provides quality and which provides value for money. Since Attlee introduced legal aid nearly 60 years ago, it has provided millions of people with advice, support and representation. Many of whom would have been otherwise denied access to justice because they could not have afforded to pay.

Free access to justice for those who need legal aid is as integral to the Welfare State as the NHS or state education.

Without legal aid for anyone charged with a significant criminal offence, the criminal justice system could not function, and could not function fairly.

Without legal aid for family law – critical decisions around whether or not, for example a child should be taken into care could not be properly made.

Without legal aid the most socially excluded would not get advice and support for welfare, debt, relationship or housing 7problems.

Legal aid provides equality in the justice system.

Commitment to principles

This is why, in the UK, we should be proud of our legal aid system – proud but determined to ensure it continues to reach the people who need it

This is why the Government would never countenance the withdrawal of legal aid.

We remain committed to the principles of social justice. They are as essential now as they were for Attlee. And we remain as committed to safeguarding access to justice.

This is why I asked Lord Carter to look at how legal services were procured by Legal Aid authorities, particularly with regard to criminal defence, so that we have a sustainable future that can ensure continued, equitable, access to justice.

That is why we must go forward. Forward to a sustainable future that not only hangs on price, but also – and more importantly – the quality of legal aid services that are delivered.

I want to take the opportunity to reiterate some of the comments I made at the annual conference, and explain why there has been no backtracking, why I think it is important we implement the reforms and why I think it is vital that we work together

Some of what I say may be familiar to you – I make no apology for that. I say it because I believe it to be right, because I believe that the direction set by Carter is the right one and because I believe the public need a legal aid system that delivers for those who need to advice and representation and that represents value for money for the tax-payer.

This is a timely event. It is critical for the provision of legal aid services that we resolve the issues that we currently face and that we work effectively together. But also that we think about how it currently works in practice

We expect to publish our formal response to the consultation in the coming weeks.

And the government has already indicated we will accept Lord Carter’s plan as a blueprint for reform. The destination for legal aid will be best-value tendering, which has quality at its centre.

Market-based reform is the way forward for legal aid.

Because it seeks to ensure the money is targeted as much as possible on those who need it.

However, I accept that some aspects of Lord Carter’s proposals may need refinement – for example, for the period before the price element of best value competition is introduced.

There is no retreat in our position for reform – we stand by the principles of fixed and graduated fees, as a prelude to competition, in all areas of legal aid – civil, family, immigration, and criminal. What we do accept is that these need to be appropriate to the nature of the work. We want providers to be able to do the most effective job and to have incentives related to this.

So we are looking afresh at the detail of our proposals on family legal aid. Many of the responses we received were specifically on this area. And I know it is something that Vera Baird was keen to address, after encountering significant concern over the family proposals during her summer tour to meet you and many others across the country.

So we are acting responsibly and looking again at the family proposals. It is a sign that the consultation is working, that it is doing what it is meant to.

We have listened and we are re-evaluating some of the key elements.

But we are not retreating from implementing the principles of Carter.

I am also acutely aware, following the Law Society Annual Conference of some other key issues which were raised by the delegates in the Q+A. This is how I understand them, and forgive me if this is not the case;

Firstly, there is not enough money.

Secondly, that the reforms will lead to over 800 firms going out of business;

and thirdly, that as a result of the reform it will be increasingly hard to attract lawyers to do legal aid work.

Serious and real concerns to many of you. But let me, if you’ll permit, address those concerns and suggest that all is not as bleak as it perhaps seems.

Not enough money

Firstly, not enough money. There is no extra money for legal aid. There is no bottomless pot. If I had the money I would give it to Legal Aid.

This Government has increased spending on public services dramatically over the last 10 years. And yet increased expenditure has also gone hand in hand, rightly, with increased efficiencies. The amount of money spent on legal aid has risen to more than £2billion during this period – which represents around a 37% increase in spending, an increase which compares favourably with all other public services, possibly bar health.

But there are finite resources for legal aid – just as for all public services -and those resources must be judged against other priority areas like health and education.

And despite the substantial investment over the past 10 years, the procurement of publicly funded legal advice and representation has not kept up with the pace of change. The system has grown organically rather than in a systematic way. Reform is long overdue – legal aid has not always provided a fair deal.

Above all it has not always been fair for vulnerable people. There has been a disproportionate growth in the criminal legal aid spend. And this is to the detriment of civil advice – advice which helps us tackle poverty and social exclusion. The balance must be redressed.

The taxpayer needs a fairer deal. The overall cost of legal aid has grown considerably in recent years. If we are going to justify this pressure on the public purse, we have to ensure that all of the money is being spent on the right things and that it is spent well.

But in all of this we want to ensure that legal aid rates continue to provide respectable remuneration for hard working practitioners. There needs to be a network of provision.

Legal aid spending in context

£2 billion is a considerable amount spent on legal aid – considerably more in fact than in any other comparable jurisdiction – it is simply not the case that under-funding is the problem. The problem is that this money could be more effectively utilised. What is required is for us to find efficiencies in the procurement system that can enable us to continue to deliver a world-class service. We also need to recognise that other parts of the system need to become more efficient as well.

There is simply no extra money for legal aid. We must operate within these parameters.

Like the provision of other mainstream public services, legal advice needs to deliver for the public. And this is more than delivering a high quality service to a client – this is delivering value-for-money for the taxpayer.

And this must come, in part, from a move to a market based approach.

A move I believe the Carter reforms will initiate.

A move I am committed to making work.

2. Profitability levels and firms being driven out of business

A great deal of concern has also been raised regarding the financial viability of the proposals. Concern that the timing of the introduction of fixed prices- before the efficiencies of a new system are able to reap benefit will put considerable pressure on businesses. And concern that profitability will be low even when the efficiencies are in place.

Dealing firstly with the timing of introducing fixed prices.

We are well aware of the pressure this may bring. And I assure you we are taking a long hard look at the sequencing of the reforms.

We remain eager to enter into a constructive discussion to find a workable arrangement – But finding more money is not a feasible nor constructive argument.

The second and more serious concern is the long term impact the reform will have.

I very much realise that to move from present arrangements to price competition, with interim fixed and graduated fees, will mean a great deal of change for suppliers in all areas of legal aid. But I accept Lord Carter’s view that such change is desirable, indeed it is essential, if we are to have a sustainable and increasingly effective supply base. Things simply cannot go on as they are.

There must be a move to the market. A move to a market based approach which will lead to increased efficiencies.

Fixed and graduated pricing rewards efficiency. Marketisation allows efficient suppliers to deliver and receive increased volumes of work.

Lord Carter’s model for best value tendering will free suppliers who meet the quality threshold to develop their own means of delivering products or services in response to external incentives and pressures. This means that where good quality services are costly to provide, prices will be higher, and where services are relatively inexpensive to provide, prices will be lower. The price element of competition means that it is the practitioners, in effect, who will therefore set the prices. This will ultimately result in good quality efficient suppliers earning a reasonable level of profit.

The issue is how many solicitors there are undertaking legal aid work. The market will dictate the number of solicitors who can undertake legal aid and the market will reward those solicitors who deliver efficiently. It is through supply and demand that efficiencies will be found, as solicitors find new and efficient ways of working. It is these efficiencies that are found that will, I believe, safeguard the future of solicitors providing legal aid services.

And this leads to the third area of concern; that these reforms will lead to a diminishing number of solicitors prepared to undertake legal aid work.

Dearth of Solicitors

I fully accept that we cannot provide those who need help with that help unless the profession can continue to attract people to do legally aided work.

The move to the market will provide fresh incentives for solicitors. The market will reward the efficient solicitor of quality, not drive them away. And the reforms we are proposing will mean that solicitors can all compete on an equal footing, regardless of the size of their firm.

I firmly believe that there will be opportunity for firms, even in large rural or black and ethnic minority areas to increase their profitability.

I truly believe that the reforms are workable and achievable. Incentives are there. There are practitioners out there – indeed very likely some here today- who will be able to take advantage of the opportunities they give, in a way that is good for the client, good for the legal aid system, good for the taxpayer, and good for practitioners.

But to achieve this we must work together to ensure that we continue to have a supplier base that can meet the needs of those who require advice and represent particularly those who are socially excluded.

It is this desire to make sure that everyone, and in particular the most vulnerable of our society, has recourse to high quality legal aid that underpins the importance of a sustainable and effective legal aid system.

Peer review

You, the providers, will ensure that quality is at the heart of the legal aid framework. Lord Carter proposed that the responsibility of quality assurance – through a process of peer review – should be passed to the Law Society.

Peer review by the Law Society will ensure that only quality-assured providers will be able to undertake legal aid work. This is one of the most important aspects of the proposals. Peer review has been almost universally welcomed and, I am confident that it will guard the public against any diminution in the quality of legal advice.

However, we also recognise that such radical reform will ostensibly require a change in the way practitioners operate.

That is why the LSC are currently working with the Law Society to sort out the details of the grant programmes with the Law Society. Grant programmes which will be used to help provide specialist assistance in restructuring your firms or to invest in modernising your IT. The Law Society has an important role to play in assisting firms throughout this transitional period.

Consultation

A large number of individual legal aid practitioners – as well as the Law Society itself – contributed formally by submitting written responses to the proposals. The consultation closed on 12 October and I would like to extend my thanks to the Law Society and its members for engaging fully in the process.

We are considering the comments of everyone who has responded. We will not shy away from difficult decisions, nor will we be afraid to look again at proposals if we believe them to be wrong.

Conclusion

And it is now right that we go forward. That we go forward with the principles of Carter leading the way.

A market based approach will ensure sustainability.

It will ensure value for money for the taxpayer. It will ensure a fair deal for all.

But it will not enforce a one size fits all solution. There will be differences between an urban and a rural practice, for example.

We want to get these reforms right, for all our society, but particularly for those who most need it.

We need to get these reforms right.

And we need to get these reforms underway. We must take steps over the coming months to ensure the long term viability of the system – a system I know we all believe passionately should exist.

But we need your involvement. If we are to achieve this we want to work with you, to ensure that we get this right.

My vision is for a legal services market that is reflective and responsive to modern society. A legal system that is suitable for the modern democratic world we live in. A legal services market which has at its core a profession driven by the need of its clients and in so doing holding public confidence.

The current legal aid system needs reform. It needs an overhaul. We are committed to moving forward. We are committed to moving to the market. My hope is for a legal aid system which is fair to the vulnerable, fair to taxpayers, fair to defendants, and fair to practitioners.

A system we need your help to implement.

Below is the text of the speech made by Lord Falconer on 26th November 2004 to the Law for Journalists Conference on 26th November 2004.

I am delighted to be here to speak to you today.

Because today is an important milestone on our path to good government: government which is both more open, and government which is more effective.

This morning, I signed the Commencement Order which officially brings the Freedom of Information Act fully into force on 1 January 2005 – now barely a month away.

This is, I believe, an important step towards the realisation of a long-promised commitment: a commitment to openness, to freedom of information, to radical reform.

I want to talk to you today about this reform:

– what it means, to you and to the public

– what we’re doing to make it work

– and what you need to do for your part to make it work

Signing the Order this morning is an important step. But it is only a step. We will deliver on our commitment to freedom of information when the Act comes into force in a few weeks’ time. But only in part.

Because real delivery will only take place when freedom of information is integrated fully into what government does. Now, and in the future. Not a bolted-on afterthought. But fully part of how government does its business.

Getting even to this point has been far from easy. Reaching the stage where the implementation of the legislation is only a few weeks away has been a hard, hard road.

No-one should be in any doubt about how tough it has been, how tough it is being now, and how tough it will be to change the way governments do things.

When people talk about cultural change, the glibness of the phrase can sometimes not get anywhere near catching the scale of the challenge.

Cultural change in Whitehall is exactly like turning round the classic ocean liner. Opening up Whitehall and introducing freedom of information is a titanic task.

But it’s also a vital task – and vital that it succeeds.

It’s essential that government finally embraces openness.

The benefits of open government are clear: transparency, accountability, honesty. That’s the kind of government which people want to see.

Making sure that people get those benefits is hard. But it’s worth it.

Politics rarely achieves anything without a struggle. Securing freedom of information has been a real struggle. But: no pain, no gain. The difficulty of opening up Whitehall is a measure of precisely how important it is to do it.

From January 1, the Act puts in place, for the first time in this country, a presumption of openness. A presumption that there is general public interest in access to information.

And, just as importantly, it also recognises that this presumption, in order to enable the government to govern, must have limits.

Just as the Act itself struck a balance between openness and retention, so we shall strike a balance in its application.

Good government is open government. But good government must be effective government too.

Without openness we cannot hope to encourage greater participation in our democratic life.

Without openness we cannot hope to build public confidence in the way that we are governed.

And without confidence we cannot develop the credibility and effectiveness of public authorities, both in Whitehall and beyond.

These objectives – greater democratic engagement; greater confidence in government; greater credibility and effectiveness – are objectives for which all of us should strive.

One of the tests of the success of this Freedom of Information Act will be the extent to which it improves the quality of government.

Openness and transparency lead to better decision-making.

Greater accountability will improve standards.

The Act is designed to bring about a more transparent and honest dialogue, and to make services more responsive to the public.

We have cast the net widely.

The scope of the Act is almost without international precedent, with over one hundred thousand public authorities covered by the legislation.

From those who provide the services on your doorstep to the largest Government department, from the regional health authority to the local doctor’s surgery, and from 10 Downing Street to the local school: the Freedom of Information Act applies to them all.

And we will not be passive in our approach.

This is not about leaving the statute on the shelf – sitting back and waiting to see whether it will succeed or fail.

In fact, it’s the opposite.

In our preparations for 1 January 2005, we have sought to learn the lessons from other Freedom of Information jurisdictions overseas. Some jurisdictions in other countries left Freedom of Information to manage itself, leaving the policy rudderless. We will not do that.

A clear lesson is the crucial importance of leadership and management not just in the lead-up to a new regime, but in the months and indeed years that follow.

I will make sure this happens.

We’ve done a lot – over a number of years – to turn the aspiration of open government into a reality. And we will do all we can to make the reality work.

My Department has been focussing its energies primarily on preparations within central government; the Information Commissioner has been taking the leadership role across the broader public sector. I believe that that division of labour has been invaluable in preparing the way for successful implementation of the Act.

I am determined to make the Act work. I urge you to judge us by what we do to make it happen, and by what we have already done:

Today, as well as signing the implementation order, my Department is publishing a revised Statutory Code of Practice showing what public authorities must do to make a success of the Act.

A month ago, my Department published clear and comprehensive guidance aimed at officials and lawyers in government departments.

This guidance will ensure that a potentially complex piece of legislation, with connections to other legislation and information access regimes, is consistently and appropriately applied. It provides a balanced and responsible approach to the proper application of the Act.

My Department has also established a Central Clearing House to assist officials in dealing with complex requests for information. This Clearing House will act as an expert advice centre from which advice on the appropriate application of these access regimes can be sought by officials in central government departments. It will be responsive to emerging case law as our practical experience develops.

And information is for all, not the privileged few. We are clear that no individual should be priced out of the right to know.

Under the fees proposals that I announced last month, there will be no charge for the majority of information supplied under the Freedom of Information Act.

The Government will lay fees regulations before Parliament shortly. There will be no charge for information that costs public bodies less than £450 to provide. And for central government, the cost ceiling will be set at £600. This is the right approach. It confirms our commitment to making open government a reality for all.

What does all this mean in practice ? What difference will FOI make to the public ?

One answer is the difference it is already making.

In many areas, Freedom of Information is already making a significant difference, before the full introduction on 1st January.

Look, for example, at the schemes set up by the police forces, by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department of Health, which – for example – now publishes information on local MRSA rates on its website.

Major announcements, such as the assessment of the five economic tests for joining the Euro, are now underpinned by the publication of supporting studies, including externally commissioned studies on technical economic policy issues.

And my own Department has published, for the first time, its evidence to the Senior Salaries Review Body, which makes recommendations about the pay of the judiciary.

I believe this is all imaginative, user-friendly and interactive information – provided as a matter of course, rather than after being prodded to do so. Communication direct to the public.

But we will go even further than this

Where, for example, we see scope in raising the standard for Whitehall publication schemes, we will take it.

By referring to a departmental publication scheme, individuals will be able to directly access information, including a wide range of background factual analysis behind policy decisions and contract information.

All departments have publication schemes in place already. What we need to do now is develop this. My department is encouraging others within government to review their publication schemes continually, so that all meet a ‘gold standard’, giving the public easy access to information without the need to make a request.

And, in government, we are committed to pro-active releases of information, including releases of the background material assembled and analysed in the development of policy and the making of decisions.

Let me give you a concrete example:

Police forces up and down the country have already begun to release more information about speed cameras. Information that responds to genuine public concerns about their use. Information that is proactively released in publication schemes.

And now we’re going further.

In January and April of next year, the Department for Transport will publish extensive data on the location of cameras and ‘before and after’ casualty rates. Data of direct interest to everybody who uses the roads across the country. Freely available in the department’s scheme.

A simple, powerful example of our commitment to release information without anybody asking us to do so.

Releases of information of this kind, some of which represent information released for the very first time, demonstrate our commitment to a clear step-change in terms of the openness that people can expect from government.

But let me be clear too – about what Freedom of Information will not be.

The Freedom of Information Act does not signify a ‘free for all’.

It does not mean disclosure of every piece of advice.

It does not mean every discussion and disagreement becomes the subject of public debate.

When the Bill was going through Parliament there were people who said it did not go far enough – that the exemptions were too numerous and that no provision should have been made for a ministerial override, even one so narrowly drawn.

But the exemptions are there for good reason. If the balance goes too far the other way, good government would be impossible.

Governments of all political stripes, need to be able to reflect upon policy options. To share their ideas and proposals candidly before collectively deciding on an official policy line.

FOI will not change this. It is not in the public interest for policy to be formulated in an atmosphere that prevents Ministers and officials from thinking across the whole range of options.

Similarly FOI does not allow for real-time access to Cabinet minutes. And nor should it. There needs to be balance to allow access to information, but also to allow scope for private debate, discussion and dissent.

But, once policy decisions have been publicly taken, the supporting information – the background and the statistical facts – used to adopt the policy position should be made available.

Let me give you some examples of what I mean:

If the Government is making decisions on its renewable energy programme, it is important to make available the empirical evidence on which decisions were made. Information which would help members of the public understand the basis on which decisions were made.

But it would hinder good government, if we were to make available the full range of policy advice Ministers considered. To do so would hinder innovation. It would risk undermining free and frank policy-making in the future.

And let’s take another example where balance is needed – in the international arena.

No-one could argue that information provided to us in confidence by another state should be disclosed in all circumstances.

There will be occasions where the clear effect of disclosure would be to sour the relationship between two countries. It would send out a highly negative message to our international partners about the value we place on the information they provide to us.

This would not be in the public interest, nor the national interest.

Nobody really disagrees that exemptions are necessary to protect crucial information in areas such as defence, foreign affairs or national security.

In these sensitive areas, it is right that many of the discussions held and decisions taken should be shielded from full public glare.

So, we need to look at freedom of information in terms of balance.

In individual cases, we need to look at the balance between the need for confidentiality as a means of promoting effective government, and openness as the best means of promoting that same objective.

In the months and years to come, there will no doubt be a great deal of debate about whether particular, individual documents should be disclosed.

And, no doubt, these individual decisions will be held up as examples of the Act being either a complete failure, or a resounding success.

But what we should really be looking for is whether there is a shift in approach across the piece. Whether public bodies are becoming more open, whether the standard of information and of debate is being raised.

As journalists you have a clear part to play here. You are the prism through which the public will often look at open government.

We are taking our responsibilities seriously. We are determined to make this work in a way that is pragmatic, sensible and shifts the balance in a very real way.

I hope you will share this approach. You need to take your responsibilities seriously too.

The media in all its forms – television, radio, advertising, newspapers, the internet – now penetrates all our lives every day in a way that would have been impossible thirty years or more ago.

With that increased influence comes an increased responsibility.

From January, the public’s right to know – and your right to know – will be supported in statute and enforceable in practice.

Freedom of Information will give you as journalists access to more information than has been made available before.

This is a powerful new tool and I hope that you will welcome the opportunity to use it constructively.

One of the reasons why freedom of information has been vital in opposition, but unappealing in government is because it presents risks.

More cautious Governments would say that freedom of information means more challenges. More questions. More complaints.

But it is right that we do this. Let me give you a recent example:

The Press Gazette, just two weeks ago, reported how the Ipswich Evening Star approached the Suffolk constabulary for a look at files on a notorious, but now decades-old, unsolved murder.

The police dealt with this as if it were a request on the 2nd of January. They opened their files.

It led to a great splash in the paper.

But more importantly it started to build a better connection between the media, the public institution – in this case the police – and the public.

There was openness and people could see for themselves the facts of the case and make their own judgements based on all the information.

Under Freedom of Information, the public themselves will have the opportunity to have access to the information and form their own view.

We in government and you in journalism have a clear responsibility to help them in doing so.

It is in our interest as government to show people how government reaches decisions in their names. Freedom of information, done properly, will mean better government.

And it is in your interest to use the act wisely, so that people can see the full picture. Freedom of information, used properly, will mean better journalism.

The debate about freedom of information in the coming weeks will inevitably focus on the details. What is being disclosed, what will be exempt.

That’s important. But the argument over freedom of information runs at a deeper and even more important level too.

Freedom of information is an important step – a bold and significant step – in how people and the state work together. With the media as a key agent in that relationship.

It is the next stage in a revolution which, step-by-step, is reshaping the relationship between citizen and state – strengthening the connection between government and the public we serve.

It will change the relationship between the citizen and the state, between school and parent, between patient and hospital, even between politician and journalist.

For too long, freedom of information was an aspiration of political parties – more particularly, my political party – when in opposition. And for too long, it remained for political parties an aspiration if or when they reached government.

From January 1, that is about to change.

From January 1, freedom of information can bring about a real change in the quality as well as the quantity of information that both government and the media put into the public domain.

From January 1, freedom of information can improve the quality, accuracy and completeness of the public debate.

From January 1, freedom of information can mean that the relationship between the government and the people, and between the media and the people, can be different. Can be better. Can be more open. More transparent. More honest.

Those are objectives worth striving for.

And we both have a job to do.

We as politicians in government. You as journalists in the media.

Not for the benefit of government. Not even for the benefit of the media. But for the benefit of the public.

Let’s get on and do it.