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Category: Speeches

  • Boris Johnson – 2020 Statement on the Coronavirus 22/03/2020

    Boris Johnson – 2020 Statement on the Coronavirus 22/03/2020

    Below is the text of the statement made by Boris Johnson, the Prime Minister, on 22 March 2020.

    Good afternoon everyone

    Thank you for coming, and thank you to Robert Jenrick, the Communities Secretary, and Dr Jenny Harries, the Deputy Chief Medical Officer.

    I want again to thank everyone in the country today for the huge effort that we are collectively making.

    I want to thank the amazing workers in the NHS, everybody working in social care, in every sector, in food distribution, transport, you name it – absolutely everyone who is keeping this country going today.

    And I want to thank everyone who is being forced to do something differently today.

    Everyone who didn’t visit their mum for Mother’s Day but Facetimed them, Skyped them, rang them instead.

    Thank you for your restraint and for what you did.

    Everyone who was forced to close a pub or a restaurant or a gym or any other business that could have done fantastic businesses on a great day like this.

    Thank you for your sacrifice, I know how tough it must be.

    And I can tell you again that this government will be standing behind you – behind British business, behind British workers, employees, self-employed – throughout this crisis.

    And the reason we are taking these unprecedented steps to prop up businesses, support businesses and support our economy and these preventative measures is because we have to slow the spread of the disease and to save thousands of lives.

    Today we have come to the stage of our plan that I advertised at the outset, when we first set out the plan of the UK government.

    When we have to take special steps to protect the particularly vulnerable.

    I said the moment would come where we needed to shield those with serious conditions. There are probably about 1.5 million in all.

    And in a minute Robert Jenrick will set out the plan in detail.

    But this shielding will do more than any other single measure that we are setting out to save life. That is what we want to do.

    Also to reduce infection and to slow the spread of the disease.

    We have to do more to make sure that the existing measures that we are taking are having the effect that we want.

    So it is crucial that people understand tomorrow that the schools are closed.

    And tomorrow you should not send your child to school unless you have been identified as a key worker.

    And more generally in the view of the way people have responded over the last few days to the measures we have set out I want to say a bit more about how we interact outdoors.

    Of course I want people to be able to go to the parks and open spaces and to enjoy themselves – it is crucial for health and mental and physical wellbeing.

    But please follow the advice and don’t think that fresh air in itself automatically provides some immunity.

    You have to stay two metres apart; you have to follow the social distancing advice.

    And even if you think you are personally invulnerable, there are plenty of people you can infect and whose lives will then be put at risk.

    And I say this now – on Sunday evening – take this advice seriously, follow it, because it is absolutely crucial.

    And as I have said throughout this process we will keep the implementation of these measures under constant review and, yes of course, we will bring forward further measures if we think that is necessary.

    Always remember that in following this advice- and I know how difficult that is – that each and every one of us.

    You are doing your bit in following this advice to slow the spread of this disease.

    The more we collectively slow the spread, the more time we give the NHS to prepare, the more lives we will save, the faster we will get through this.

    And always remember – we will get through this, and we will beat it together.

    Next Robert Jenrick to outline the shielding measures.

  • Anthony Kershaw – 1978 Speech on Overseas Students

    Below is the text of the speech made by Anthony Kershaw, the then Conservative MP for Stroud, in the House of Commons on 13 March 1978.

    I wish to call the attention of the House to the treatment which overseas students in this country are receiving. I shall argue that the policy of Her Majesty’s Government towards them is unjust, even illegal, and that the consequences are hurtful to the students and harmful to the interests of the United Kingdom.

    In fact, it is difficult to know what the policy of Her Majesty’s Government is, because they have not at any time spelt out the basis of their approach. In 1976, the Secretary of State announced various increases in fees, the result of which is that overseas undergraduates pay £650 compared with £500 for home students, and graduates £850 compared with £750 for home graduates.

    However, in November 1976 the Secretary of State said that it was her intention, in due course, to remove the fee differential. Even if this is a rather a hollow promise, because fee levels effectively apply almost solely to overseas students since the vast majority of home students have their fees paid by public funds, nothing has yet been done towards fulfilling that promise. The Minister of State last July was only able to say that increases for the coming year would be made to take account of inflation.

    We have had inspired Press leaks which indicate that future policy will be towards positive discrimination in which rich students from richer countries will be charged very much higher fees, calculated to produce £120 million in a year, which will be used to subsidise poor students from poorer countries. I ask how it will be possible to determine the real income of students, how it will be possible to make it compatible with the free entry to universities of students other than those nominated by their home Governments. That is something I cannot understand.

    How are the countries to be nominated? As someone pertinently asked, are we now to refuse education investment into the United Kingdom from the ​ United States in projects such as those from the Brookings Institute?

    How do we stand with regard to the EEC? Are we to continue to charge high fees and to keep on raising them against other countries—against countries such as Germany and France, who receive a far larger number of British students than we take from them and who charge nothing or almost nothing? If those countries retaliate, what will be the effect on our students wishing to go abroad? Has that been considered?

    Is the conduct of the Government in this regard compatible with membership of the EEC? The only thing that the Government have done to mitigate hardship is to replace the widely used overseas students fees award scheme with the fee support schemes for postgraduates only. This has proved totally inadequate. The burden of easing hardship has been shuffled off on to local authorities, who are inappropriate for the job, and upon universities and polytechnics, who have struggled to help but without the slightest assistance from Government, except the so-called £1 million divided between universities and the State sector, which was not additional real money but was what would otherwise have been cut. What is certain is that the Government wish to limit the number of overseas students.

    The public expenditure White Paper of January 1978 shows the decline in the number of overseas students anticipated, from 52,000 this year to 44,000 in 1981–82, in higher educational establishments, and from 28,000 to 22,000 in non-advanced institutions. Why have these figures not been made public by the Department responsible and justified by argument? Why do we learn of them from a Treasury table? I shall tell the Minister why this is so. These instructions about quotas come from the notorious and largely incomprehensible Circular 8/77. This circular not only imposes quotas but authorises differential tuition fees, local education hostel charges and admission charges. It encourages reclassification of certain categories of immigrant students so that they may be charged higher fees. The circular apparently includes in the quota students who are wholly paid for by their own Government, imposing no charges ​ on the British taxpayer and bringing in investment earnings.

    For example, 1,500 Nigerian students are due here in September, bringing in £7 million a year. But they are to be part of the quota, apparently, a quota presumably designed to limit our costs. In fact, they are a profit.

    The reason why the Department of Education and Science will not explain its circular and give guidance to LEAs and others is that, paradoxically, it acts not in the name of common sense but for fear of offending against the Government’s Race Relations Act, which was designed to prevent, not promote, discrimination.

    I call upon Her Majesty’s Government, who so recently worked themselves up into a phoney lather about immigration and race, to withdraw Circular 8/77, which I say is morally and legally offensive. There sit the racists tonight—in the Department of Education and Science.

    The harassment of overseas students is becoming a scandal. Their hours of attendance are checked. They are forbidden to apply for continuation courses until their examination results are through, by which time they may well be too late to apply for the next course.

    The Inner London Education Authority, that creature of this Government, fined two London polytechnics £50,000 for accidentally exceeding their quota of overseas students, though I understand that one has now been let off paying that amount. Referring to this shameful incident and to the whole matter, The Times Higher Education Supplement wrote:

    “Either they’

    —that is, the polytechnics—

    “must work an unworkable racist quota, and thus perhaps fall foul of the law. Or they can refuse to work it and be fined.”

    In short, overseas students in this country are being treated not as honoured guests but shabbily, as if every one of them was a potential illegal immigrant. This curmudgeonly attitude is directly contrary to the short-term and long-term interests of the United Kingdom.

    In the long term, the kind of reception and treatment which students receive here will have an important influence on those who, in later years, will be prominent in the counsels of their countries. Our industrial, cultural and political influence in ​ the world will to some extent depend upon what they have thought of us.

    In the short term, the Treasury calculations of the costs of overseas students are manifest nonsense. These calculations appear to take no account of the money which students spend while they are here. The calculations depend upon the total costs of an institution being divided by the number of students to give a cost per head, ignoring that the buildings, the professors and the other overheads would still be there even if not one overseas student came. It is very arguable that, far from there being an expense, there is a net profit from overseas students.

    Certainly, the calculations take no account whatever of the academic value to us, especially of post-graduates. Great institutions such as the London School of Economics would be lamed and crippled if their numbers of foreign students were drastically curtailed. It is not only a matter of academic benefits. The material benefits of post-graduate research can be demonstrated to have brought much benefit to us, notably, perhaps, in medicine.

    No British student, so far as I have been able to ascertain, has been excluded from a course by too many foreigners. On the contrary—many courses from which British students take benefit could not be kept going without the foreign entry. But even if it were to happen that British students replaced foreign ones, that would bring not savings but extra expense, for we should be substituting subsidised British for fee-paying foreigners. The Government’s argument is economic nonsense, founded upon a false premise and wholly against the interests of this country.

    What is to be done? The first thing is to decide who in the end is responsible for policy. At least eight Departments, starting with the Department of Education and Science, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Overseas Development and the Home Office, have different and conflicting interests and responsibilities in this matter. Someone must be found to take overall charge if the drift is to be stopped.

    It is natural to look to the Secretary of State for Education and Science to do this, but she has been a great disappointment. When she came to office she was ​ widely regarded as a person in whom people of differing opinions could place confidence. When she leaves office, as shortly she will, she will be remembered as the best receiver of delegations in the business. Everyone goes away satisfied, but after a bit everyone notices that nothing happens.

    The Secretary of State gives the lie to the old saying

    “There is no smoke without fire”.

    With her, there is nothing but smoke. There is no fire of action, no flame of determination, and apparently no influence in the Cabinet. However, some Department must take the lead, whether the DES or another Department.

    My second suggestion is that, as there are so many conflicting influences, a commission of all those professional, academic and voluntary bodies directly interested, perhaps with the right to summon civil servants, should be set up to give advice. Such a body would provide a focal point where the interests of the universities, of educationists generally and perhaps also of this House and of the Government Departments concerned could be thrashed out. The Minister would benefit as a result.

    Certain it is that at present Government policy is obscure, unfair and contrary to the interests of this country.

  • Clinton Davis – 1978 Speech on Stansted Airport

    Below is the text of the speech made by Clinton Davis, the then Under-Secretary of State for Trade, in the House of Commons on 10 March 1978.

    The hon. Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. Haselhurst) has spoken eloquently about his fears concerning the future of Stansted Airport, but he has failed to give any proper recognition to the considerable effort the Government have deployed to develop sensible and realistic policies which take account of the views of those most concerned with airport development. I heard no word of that in his speech. He has attributed designs to the Government that I reject as being no part of our policy. I hope I shall be able to give him some reassurance on this point.

    As to a debate on the White Paper, I would certainly very much welcome that possibility, but the hon. Gentleman knows what the agenda of the House of Commons is before Easter. I do not have to remind him about that. With respect, that was rather a fruitless effort on his part, but if the Opposition feel as devotedly about it as he does, there is the opportunity of a Supply Day. I look forward to seeing whether the Opposition want to take advantage of that.

    The White Paper on airports policy is the result of unprecedentedly extensive consultations. We started the process in 1975, when we published the consultative document “Airport Strategy for Great Britain”, which sets out in the greatest detail the major issues involved in planning airport development for the future—the need for additional capacity in the London area, the problem of aircraft ​ noise, the implications for the environment, for surface transport and for employment.

    This was backed by an analysis or demand forecasts and by detailed supportive evidence on other technical matters. The Government’s intention was to lay the whole problem open to discussion and to involve all those concerned or affected by airport development in the policy-making process. In consequence of that, nearly 1,000 organisations and individuals contributed their views, and many took part in discussions—and in discussions with Ministers. It is from this thorough, painstaking, examination that the Government’s policy has emerged.

    The Government never expected that its conclusions would be universally accepted. This is just not possible when there are so many conflicting views and interests. What we have sought to do, and I think succeeded in doing—I think this is generally accepted, despite the hon. Gentleman’s assertion—is to strike a balance and adopt a sensible, flexible approach to airport development. We have acknowledged that our conclusions, particularly as regards the London area, are based on demand forecasts which are inherently uncertain. Who could have forecast the changing developments which took place between 1970 and the present day?

    The hon. Gentleman is inviting ms, in fact, to be more certain in my forecasting over the next 12 years. I cannot do that. But what we have undertaken to do is to keep these forecasts under constant review—another point that he failed to mention —and to lay the methodology of forecasting open to discussion, so that decisions about the future may be taken in full knowledge of the facts and of the uncertainties. I think that that is a particularly reasonable way of going about this matter. It involves open government in this area, and I should have thought that that would be welcome to the hon. Gentleman.

    The White Paper is concerned with the 1980s. With regard to the longer term, the Government have undertaken to continue to consult consumers of air services, amenity groups, local authorities and others about the provision of capacity ​ beyond 1990. There is no question of taking decisions about the longer term by stealth. Any further development must be subject to full and wide-ranging consultations, as I have said on a number of occasions. That is clearly stated in the Government’s policy.

    I visited Stansted on 13th February to discuss the White Paper with representatives of the various interests concerned. The hon. Gentleman was there. I invited him to attend my discussions. There was nothing furtive about it at all. He will know from his attendance that I totally rejected any suggestions that the Government have a ready-made solution and have already taken a decision to develop Stansted Airport or that there are any ineluctable development. I confirm to the House what I said to the people of Stansted.

    As explained in the White Paper, the problem we have to face in the London area is the shortage of airport capacity in relation to the expected growth in demand. The forecasts suggest that demand will range between 66 million and 89 million passengers a year by 1990—as the hon. Gentleman said—compared with a throughput of about 33 million in 1977. However, we have grounds for believing that the top end of the forecast range is too high.

    The hon. Gentleman asked me to say something about the methodology of the forecasts and the discussions that took place on the forecasting. There was the most careful consultation between the CAA and the BAA. There was also discussion with British Airways and British Caledonian. Although I cannot tell the House today what their present views about the forecasting may be, they are entitled to have their views. One has to channel those views through the machinery that we are proposing to set up. We see no reason for being tardy or for delaying the establishment of the machinery. We need to do that as rapidly as possible.

    Capacity at the four main London Airports—Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted and Luton—will be close to 50 million passengers a year by the end of 1978 when existing development work at Gatwick and Heathrow will have been completed. This should be sufficient to meet demand during the early 1980s, provided that a better distribution of traffic can be achieved between the respective airports.

    Beyond that, the White Paper provides for expansion of capacity at the existing airports up to 1990; a fourth terminal at Heathrow, raising capacity to 38 million subject, of course, to the results of the public inquiry but no fifth terminal; a second terminal at Gatwick, raising the capacity from 16 million to 25 million, but no second runway—it is the view of the BAA that there is no need for a second runway—and smaller improvements at Stansted and Luton to enable these airports to handle 4 million and 5 million passengers a year respectively.

    The White Paper expressly rules out any further expansion at Heathrow, Gatwick and Luton, but a major expansion at Stansted remains a possibility in the longer term if demand continues to grow. But that stands alongside several other options.

    It is this which has led to the hon. Gentleman’s unease, because he would like a ceiling to be set on the expansion of Stansted and he believes—wrongly, as I said earlier—that the decision has already been taken to expand Stansted to an airport on a similar scale to Gatwick.

    Mr. Haselhurst rose—

    Mr. Davis

    I shall not give way because I have rather a lot to say. The developments I have described are all subject to the normal planning procedures and, as appropriate, to a public inquiry, as in the case of the fourth terminal at Heathrow. They would provide a total capacity of 72 million passengers a year at the London airports. We believe that this will be sufficient to accommodate demand up to 1990, depending on the outturn of traffic. As I said earlier, we intend to monitor demand very closely, and to improve our forecasting methods, in order to base longer-term decisions on more accurate data, and to avoid being tempted by costly and grandiose projects which could turn out to be white elephants, as I believe Maplin would most certainly have been.

    Some would have preferred the Government to commit more than £1,000 million of taxpayers’ money to the building of the first stage of Maplin, with all the necessary road and rail connections. But, ​ as a responsible Government, we examined the proposition in great detail, in the light of the demand forecasts, and rejected this solution emphatically at the time.

    The first stage of Maplin would have provided accommodation for 18 million passengers a year. But the proposals in the White Paper would provide the same level of passenger capacity at Gatwick, Stansted and Luton, at a cost of only £150 million. That is an important figure, an important difference. We believe that it is necessary, particularly in the light of current economic expectations, to continue to restrain public expenditure. We believe that that should be done in practice as well as in theory, although it is the theory which applies mostly to Opposition thinking.

    Because of the uncertainty of demand forecasts and of the massive costs involved in airport development, we have decided to adopt a step-by-step approach to the provision of airport capacity. That means that we shall take the necessary decisions at the appropriate time.

    As regards Stansted, I am only too well aware of the opposition of local amenity groups to any expansion whatsoever. I was told, when I went to Stansted, that the tom-toms of the natives were beating steadily. There are other views which have been put to me. As a Government we have to take a broad view and seek to balance the conflicting interests, taking a less jaundiced view of what the local interests are than some would have us take.

    The aim of our strategy is to meet the expected growth in demand. There is no escaping the fact that 80 per cent, of all passengers using London airports have origins and destinations in the South-East. While the development of tourism in the region and the rationalisation of regional airport capacity should help to divert traffic from London in the longer term, it would be unrealistic to try to compel passengers to use airports remote from their homes or destinations. We have to face the fact that London airports will continue to bear most of the burden.

    My right hon. Friend announced on 5th April 1977 that charter traffic would be banned from Heathrow starting on ​ 1st April this year and that the Government and the British Airports Authority would pursue a policy of transferring scheduled traffic to Gatwick, with a view to sharing the load more evenly between these two major airports. We have already made some progress in that direction, and Gatwick is rapidly developing into a major international airport.

    Part of the Government’s policy, as outlined in the White Paper, is to concentrate short-haul charter traffic at Luton, and, over time, long-haul charter traffic at Stansted, which at present is grossly under-utilised, as the hon. Gentleman accepted.

    The aircraft noise situation at Stansted is less adverse than that of any other London airport. Moreover, the policy on night jet restrictions will ensure that noise disturbance at night is kept to a minimum, as traffic there develops. I believe that Stansted must play its role in helping to meet the demand during the 1980s. It would be quite inequitable to expect that other airports, which already handle considerable volumes of traffic, and the large number of people living in their vicinity, should accept a greater share to spare the Stansted area.

    With regard to the future, I want to make it clear again that the Government do not at present envisage the expansion of Stansted airport beyond a capacity of 4 million passengers a year. In the longer term, beyond 1990, there is likely to be a need for additional capacity in the London area, if demand continues to grow. With the increasing use of larger aircraft, this should not involve the construction of a massive four-runway airport, as envisaged in the earlier proposals for Stansted, Cublington, or Maplin, but a more modest solution. It is that which represents the difference in the parameters of thought between what I am saying and what the hon. Gentleman was seeking to stipulate.

    The White Paper sets out the three possibilities, to which he referred. We are prepared to consider these three possible solutions and the other options which might be proposed for meeting the demand. We shall shortly be discussing with local authorities and others ​ concerned the setting up of a formal structure to advise on longer-term policies.

    The Government have no preference for one solution over another. All of the options will be thoroughly examined before any decision is taken. We have given sufficient proof of our determination to continue the process of consultation which has worked well in the working out of the national airport strategy. Our intention now is to take the right decision at the right time.

    The hon. Member has poured scorn on some of the propositions in the White Paper. I think that he has been less than fair. He is characteristically a very fair Member, but I understand that his thinking must to some extent be subjective.

    There are obviously constituency interests which must impinge upon his consideration of these matters. I make no complaints about that. He is here, among other things, to defend his constituency interests. But what I want to establish quite clearly in this debate is that we have no intention of trying to ignore those constituency interests—of developing, as I have said, Stansted by stealth. That would be most unfair.

    The hon. Member sought to intervene earlier. I have virtually completed what I want to say. In fairness, I let him intervene now.

    Mr. Haselhurst

    I am very grateful to the Minister. It was a question of the constructive intent of the Government rather than the deliberate intent, and if their forecasts are wrong the worry is that the inevitable consequence will be a further expansion at Stansted and that that is being made necessary by the strategy.

    Mr. Davis

    I understand the hon. Member’s concern, but we have neither an express nor an implicit design to go beyond what we have said in this debate or in the White Paper. I want to be absolutely fair to the people living around Stansted and working around Stansted. They have a right to be consulted. They will be consulted. Also, of course, the local authorities in the whole of the London area have a vested interest in ensuring that the development within the London area is sensible and pays heed to ​ the various conflicting interests that apply.

  • Alan Haselhurst – 1978 Speech on Stansted Airport

    Below is the text of the speech made by Alan Haselhurst, the then Conservative MP for Saffron Walden, in the House of Commons on 10 March 1978.

    I am very grateful for the opportunity to discuss the future of Stansted Airport, in my constituency. Without being ungrateful to Lady Luck, who has allowed me this occasion, I think that we would be better off discussing the future of Stansted Airport in a wider debate on the White Paper on airports policy. It is regrettable that the Government have not found time before Easter for a debate, because consultations seem to be going on throughout the country on the implications of the White Paper without this House being consulted.

    In any criticisms that I may make of the White Paper, I do not imply any criticism of the existence of Stansted as an airport or its existence at a given capacity of operation. Certainly one can use words about the White Paper which can be misinterpreted as criticism of the use of the airport at all, so that should ​ be made clear. Such general criticism is not my intention.

    I believe that there would be fairly wide acceptance in my constituency and among the local authorities concerned if there were a known limit to the expansion of the usage of the airport. The absence of such a limit gives rise to fears and suspicions of the White Paper’s proposals.

    There are weaknesses and shortcomings in the White Paper; i which should be exposed to greater scrutiny. These have unfortunate implications in my constituency and for the area around. I am authorised by my hon. Friend the Member for Braintree (Mr. Newton) to say that he wishes to be entirely associated with my remarks.

    The White Paper gives forecasts to justify the degree of expansion proposed in the airports in the South-East. I must accept that it is notoriously difficult to forecast what the likely usage of airports will be over a period of 12, 15 or more years. It is clearly difficult, but it is the responsibility of government to try to take decisions which are sensible even if the calculations behind the decisions are necessarily complex.

    What is worrying is that there are precise provisions in the White Paper, namely, the statement that it will be sought to achieve a capacity in the South-East airports of 72 million passengers per annum up to 1990. The Government’s own forecasts in the White Paper at a low level show a passenger throughput of 65·9 million and at the high level a throughput of 89·4 million. Even at the midpoint of the two forecasts it seems that, given any kind of accuracy in the forecast, there will be an excess of 5·6 million passengers above the 72 million for which the Government are providing. That seems to be a fairly evidence weakness of the strategy set out in the document.

    If the forecasts on the high side prove to be the more accurate, there could be, on figures in the White Paper, an excess by 1990 of 17·4 million passengers wishing to use the South-East airports, although the capacity provided at that stage will be only 72 million.

    The question in the minds of many people, particularly many people in my constituency and in my local authority ​ areas, is: what is to happen to any excess over that for which provision is being made at this stage? It must also be said about the forecasts that figures are bandied about of a certain number of passengers being able to use a particular airport, but it will be accepted that it cannot necessarily be the case that a stated figure can always be put through a particular airport, simply because it is not ever possible to direct airlines so precisely that it will be possible to make up the figures to those which are stated in public documents.

    For example, I understand that there is a query whether, with a single-runway airport at Gatwick, it will be possible to achieve a throughput of 25 million passengers. Therefore, if that figure cannot be met it throws even further doubt on the White Paper’s figures.

    The major British airlines are more bullish in their forecasts about passengers than are the Government—witness the figures that they use in the White Paper. I must ask the Secretary of State to tell the House what he knows about the forecasts of British Airways and British Caledonian, and whether these suggest that the increase in passenger usage of our airports is starting to gather pace. There is a possibility that this will be the case. We are on the threshold of what seems to be a price war, and there were headlines in the papers about this matter only recently. I believe that it is likely that an increasing number of people will wish to travel—I suppose mainly for holiday purposes—and that will boost the number of people wishing to use our airports. There must be considerable doubts whether the forecasts given in the White Paper are adequate.

    Paragraph 104 of the White Paper states that

    “Even at the higher passenger forecast, these terminal developments”

    —that is, those proposed up to 1990—

    “should be sufficient to accommodate demand up and beyond the middle of the 1980s and quite possibly”—

    I emphasise the words “quite possibly”—

    “it could prove adequate up to 1990.”

    So it is only on the strength of a forecast which quite possibly may be right that we are invited to accept the strategy set out in the White Paper.

    The White Paper says that the capacity being provided may “quite possibly” cope with demand up to 1990, so one has to ask the hon. Gentleman whether it is not fair and reasonable to say that, on the other hand, quite possibly the capacity may be inadequate. That is certainly a question which has to be asked by any Member representing Saffron Walden and by anyone concerned at the effects of growth and expansion of airports, because more room may have to be found than that which is being provided.

    The second point about the White Paper to which I want to draw attention is the question of the options laid down after 1990. These are three. There is a further major expansion at Stansted; there is the possible use by conversion of a military airfield; there is the construction of an entirely new airport. The firmness with which the Government have closed the door on Maplin suggests that a wholly new airport site is not something at the forefront of their thinking—I put it no higher than that.

    From the questions that have been asked, it would appear that at this stage the Government have really no clear idea of any military airfield that might be drummed into service. Therefore, it appears to me and to many other people that if the forecasts, even the ones in the White Paper, prove right, the extra capacity that will be needed by 1990 will have to be put at Stansted, and that if there is continued growth after 1990 the only option that will be open effectively to the Government, whoever are in power, will be to continue to expand Stansted. That is what I wish particularly to draw the attention of the House towards.

    It seems to me to be unreasonable that, whilst approaching the problem on a reasonable basis, with a variety of options, in practice few calculations are on target in terms of the capacity in 1990, and if there is a growth of demand after 1990 the only place that it can go is Stansted. Not to come out plainly with that is, I believe, a grievous fault of the White Paper.

    If it is the Government’s intention that Stansted should accept that much bigger expansion, it should be plainly laid out so that it can be judged and assessed accordingly. There is the fear that this ​ is the way that the White Paper intends to go in future, and that much is certainly resented.

    Even those who most strongly support the usage of the airport—one can quote the views of the workers there—would not wish to see the airport expanding and expanding. Their concern is, naturally, for their own security and the provision of a reasonable number of jobs and prosperity in the district, but no one wants to see a kind of incremental increase in the usage of the airport. Yet that seems to be the heavy implication of the White Paper.

    There are two places in the White Paper where the Government make encouraging noises about the local authorities, and I want to press the hon. Gentleman on them. The Government indicate in paragraphs 79 and 159 that they are prepared to consider amendments to the general development order so that local planning authorities can have some say over what happens within the perimeter of an airport—a say that they do not have at present. May we have an assurance that these amendments will be determined and made before the British Airports Authority brings along its proposals for the first stage increase at Stansted, the proposal that the throughput should be increased from the present limit of capacity of 1 million to 4 million?

    Then there is the question of forward planning machinery to deal with the post-1990 situation. This is referred to in paragraphs 39 and 172 of the White Paper. I should like the Under-Secretary of State to comment on how quickly this machinery can be brought into being. I suggest that it can be brought in very quickly, and needs to be. If we wanted to have the option of a new airport to deal with excess capacity in the 1990s, it is clear that, because the lead time for a new airport is about 12 years, the decision would have to be taken very quickly. The Standing Conference on London and South-East Regional Planning seems to me to be the obvious body which should be commissioned to look at the strategy for future airport development in this country. I do not see why there have to be protracted discussions to bring about that very desirable result. I should be very grateful if the Under-Secretary of State would comment on that.

    My complaint, in essence, as I said at the beginning, is that there is bad methodology behind what the Government are doing, and this affects my constituents and the area that I represent. They may be forgiven for supposing, as a result of one inquiry after another, that Stansted was not to be considered for the major development of London airport capacity, yet the question has now come up again, and they must be wondering about our governmental process when this can be the case.

    If there cannot be absolute certainty about the future, I hope that there can be some clarity, and I think that the Government have that obligation towards my constituents and my county.

  • Ursula von der Leyen – 2020 Statement on the Coronavirus

    Ursula von der Leyen – 2020 Statement on the Coronavirus

    Below is the text of the statement made by Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, on 17 March 2020.

    It was indeed very good to see how the Member States strongly endorsed the packages we have brought forward over the last days – it is the package on borders; the package on the economy; on the joint public procurement we have; and of course including the research part. So it was good to see that it was a full approval on the side of the Member States.

    To go into a few of these topics more deeply: Indeed, one of the first topics was the implementation of the temporary entry restrictions on the external borders. So we got a lot of support by the Member States. It is up to them now to implement – they said they will immediately do that, this is good in order to have an unanimous and united approach what the external borders are concerned. There was a lot of approval what our proposal is concerned.

    A big topic today were of course also the internal borders and consequently the blockages there. And here, it is absolutely crucial that we unblock the situation, because we know that too many people are stranded within the European Union and have a problem to go back home. They have to be supported to go back home.

    And of course, we have a lot of traffic jam of lorries transporting goods. The flow of goods has to be swift, we need these goods for the functioning of the internal market. And therefore, there was a broad welcome concerning the guidelines we issued yesterday, that were discussed yesterday in the Justice and Home Affairs Council. So big approval for the so-called ‘green lanes’, fast track lanes, mainly for the flow of goods.

    But we have also to make sure that the commuters can go back and forth where they live, or where they work. There was an impressive example from Luxembourg: The Prime Minister of Luxembourg said very clearly that it is for Luxembourg essential that they have the commuters coming back and forth, because the majority of the health workers in the hospitals are living either in France or in Germany and have to commute swiftly and it cannot take them hours to go to work or back home. So it is important that we fix that situation here. Same goes for the lorries: My Commissioners are in constant contact with the respective ministers of the different Member States in order to solve that now. We have the guidelines, there was approval for the guidelines and they have to be implemented now.

    One point that was very positive as well: We had been asked to set up a group of experts – virologists, epidemiologists – to give us advice and we had the first meetings and it was good to see that they fully approve in their recommendation what the measures for – the term is ‘social distancing’ are concerned. So it is absolutely correct on this evidence-based and scientific-based approach to have these measures: to slow down the spread of the virus, to make sure that we have no public gatherings, that universities and schools are closed, that entertainment places are closed. Because we want people, in this case, not to have contact with each other so that we can reduce the speed of the spread of the virus, and therefore reduce the pressure on the health sector and the patients that have to be treated.

    We launched today public procurement for gloves and masks, and yesterday for respiratory ventilators. 24 Member States are participating – that is good. The companies have now six days to tender and then, the Member State can immediately sign up the contract the day after the tender is closed within the next six days.

    We are working also with the industry throughout Europe to ramp up the production of these scarce goods, so concerning the personal protective equipment, but also the ventilators that are desperately needed.

    And finally, on Friday, indeed, we launched a strong economic package. This too was unanimously endorsed by the Member States. Friday feels already quite a while ago, because since Friday, we see that things have gotten even more serious. The situation has worsened, the economic situation is extremely serious and therefore all the measures that have been taken on the health side, which are correct to contain the virus, we see that they have a huge impact on our economy.

    This is an external shock and it hits the whole world. We have never had that before. The enemy is a virus and now we have to do our utmost to protect our people and to protect our economies. Since last Friday, we are working on all fronts to deliver on the ground. First, we are right now finalising the new Temporary Framework for state aid that will provide very high flexibility to Member States to support, for example, their companies. Second, it was good to see that yesterday the Eurogroup welcomed our readiness to activate the general escape clause. We are working on it and will come forward with a proposal to the Council in the next days.

    And let me stress once more, we are ready to do everything that is required. We will not hesitate to take additional measures as the situation evolves.

    Thank you.

  • Boris Johnson – 2020 Statement on the Coronavirus and Mother’s Day

    Boris Johnson – 2020 Statement on the Coronavirus and Mother’s Day

    Below is the text of the statement made by Boris Johnson, the Prime Minister, on 22 March 2020.

    Today is Mother’s Day. It is a day when we celebrate the sacrifice and the effort of those who gave us life, and across the country I know that millions of people will have been preparing to do something special; not just a card, not just flowers. I know that everyone’s strongest instinct is to go and see their mothers in person, to have a meal together, to show them how much you love them.

    But I am afraid that this Mothering Sunday the single best present that we can give – we who owe our mothers so much – is to spare them the risk of catching a very dangerous disease. The sad news is that means staying away. This time the best thing is to ring her, video call her, Skype her, but to avoid any unnecessary physical contact or proximity. And why? Because if your mother is elderly or vulnerable, then I am afraid all the statistics show that she is much more likely to die from coronavirus, or Covid-19. We cannot disguise or sugar coat the threat.

    The numbers are very stark, and they are accelerating. We are only a matter of weeks – two or three – behind Italy. The Italians have a superb health care system. And yet their doctors and nurses have been completely overwhelmed by the demand. The Italian death toll is already in the thousands and climbing. Unless we act together, unless we make the heroic and collective national effort to slow the spread – then it is all too likely that our own NHS will be similarly overwhelmed. That is why this country has taken the steps that it has, in imposing restrictions never seen before either in peace or war.

    We have closed the schools, the pubs, the bars, the restaurants, the gyms, and we are asking people to stay and work at home if they possibly can. In order to help businesses and workers through the crisis, we have come up with unprecedented packages of support. All of this is putting our country, and our society, under enormous strain. But already this crisis is also bringing out the best in us all – in the army of volunteers that has sprung up to help the vulnerable, in the millions of acts of kindness; in the work of all the people who are continuing to provide essential services, from transport workers to supermarket staff to health and social care workers.

    Yes, this disease is forcing us apart – at least physically. But this epidemic is also the crucible in which we are already forging new bonds of togetherness and altruism and sharing. This country will be changed by coronavirus, but there is every reason to think we will come through it stronger and better than ever before. And the more effectively we follow the medical advice, the faster we will bounce back to health – medically and economically.

    So this Mothering Sunday let’s all do everything we can to show our respect and love to those who gave us life – and minimise the risk to their own lives. Bit by bit, day by day, we are all helping to delay the spread of the disease, and to give our amazing NHS staff the time to prepare for the peak. So let’s follow the advice, stay home this Mothering Sunday. Send her your love by phone or skype.

    Let’s stay at home, protect our NHS, and together we will save literally thousands of lives.

  • Jim Sillars – 1978 Speech on the Doon Valley

    Below is the text of the speech made by Jim Sillars, the then Labour MP for South Ayrshire, in the House of Commons on 9 March 1978.

    The people of Doon Valley are very grateful that this subject should have been selected for debate this evening. For them the development status of the area with implications for future levels of employment, is a matter of supreme importance.

    The constituency of South Ayrshire covers 700 square miles, and has a number of communities in different areas, all of which fact: considerable problems over employment. We already have two special development areas—one of long standing covering the Girvan district in the south, and one in the north at Cum-nock, the designation of which is of more recent origins, and is relevant to the subpect of the Doon Valley.

    I emphasise that I do not and nor does anyone else in the Doon Valley object to the designation of Cumnock as a special development area. Although Cumnock is not the subject of the debate this evening, unemployment is high there too. There is constant anxiety about future developments and the special development area status is fully justified and should be retained. There is no question of Cumnock versus Doon Valley. My contention is that both areas justify special status, and my complaint is that only one area of need has been recognised.

    It is a tribute to the fair-mindedness of the people of the Cumnock district that they have expressed shock at the exclusion of Doon Valley and that they give full support to its inclusion. There are anxieties and problems in most parts of South Argyleshire, but one could find unanimous agreement that the area with the greatest number of problems, and that which faces, the most acute jobs crisis, is the Doon Valley.

    My purpose is to prove the case that the Doon Valley should be included in the special development status given to Cumnock just under a year ago. To make the case I want to sketch in some of the background and provide details of the character of the problem confronting us now.

    The main villages are Dalmellington, Bellsbank, Patna, Rankinston, and Dalrymple. The total population is about 10,000 in these villages. The coal deposits underlying most of the area gave rise to the rapid development of the Valley, starting around 1840, when the iron masters moved in to exploit the mineral wealth. Exploit them they did, and they exploited the labour, too.

    Ironfounding declined from the turn of the century and by the 1920s it was coal mining that dominated the Valley. It is still coal mining, with only one pit left—Pennyvenie colliery—that dominates employment. One pit, and still no alternative work for men.

    It is not as though this situation that we face is new. There have been six colliery closures since 1952. In 1960, total colliery manpower was 2,034, which, together with associated activities, gave us a male work force of 2,202. By 1970 that had declined to a total work force of 1,056, and we are now down to just around the 500 level. In the past eight years, since I became the Member for the area, the needs of the Doon Valley have been raised several times in similar debates, and the local authorities and interest groups within the area have persistently pressed for action.

    What I have described is a pattern of exploitation which has been the curse of the Doon Valley—namely, all give and no take, and the extraction of wealth with no retention or return of industrial investment to secure the future of the people without whose effort the wealth would never have been produced.

    It has been pointed out to me with some force by Tom White, the district council’s area officer, that the pattern of exploitation continues. The NCB opencast executive is now working on the Beoch area, above Dalmellington and, with an annual output of around 192,000 tons in a highly profitable operation, is taking the last of the coal-based wealth from the valley. Again the valley gives.

    Because of the dominant position of the coal industry in the area, and because coal has been in public ownership for 30 years, the Doon Valley and its people have, in effect, been in public ownership. They are entitled to expect from that situation, to which Socialists strive, better treatment than they have received.

    Had the iron masters remained in control these past 30 years and ripped off the wealth of the area and left it in a state of decline and demoralisation, they would rightly stand condemned. The fact that they were replaced by a publicly-owned industry, with Government assuming public responsibility, in no way lessens the condemnation. Indeed, the degree of condemnation increases because the replacement of private by public control ​ is supposed to avoid what the valley is now going through.

    The position that we now face is grim. The local councils—Strathclyde Regional Council and the district council—have appointed an area co-ordinator. This post for the Doon Valley has been set up on an experimental basis for three years to tackle the worst effects of multiple deprivation.

    This initiative comes after the publication by the district council of a special report on the Doon Valley, which was published in September 1976. That report highlighted the priority category of the valley. I quote from paragraph 3.3:

    “The most recent blow to the employment situation came from the closure of the Minnivey Colliery, which stopped production in November 1975, with the loss of 290 jobs. The only remaining colliery at Pennyvenie has an employment force of 440 but the reserves in this colliery are not expected to last for more than four years at the outside. The number of new jobs required to absorb the labour available from this pit closure alone is evidence of the need for immediate action if the existing communities are to remain viable.”

    Later the report went on to state, in paragraph 7.2:

    “Very briefly, it is clear that the failure to act quickly and attract industry to the Doon Valley will result in a considerable blow to the communities involved. One very possible scenario would include a rapid fall in population due to out-migration, the increase in unemployment rates, the decreased likelihood of entrepreneurs investing in the area, an ageing population, the declining viability of schools, shops and other essential services, the gradual worsening of public transport, etc. Cause and effect may be difficult to establish, but all factors would serve to mutually reinforce each other in an inevitable and vicious downward spiral.”

    That is what is happening now. We are in a downward spiral. With constant fears about the life-span of Pennyvenie, unemployment rising, an absence of any moves on a new industrial base, morale among the people is sagging again.
    I shall show figures to prove that I do not exaggerate. These were presented at a meeting called by the area co-ordinator, held in Patna on 26th January. They are the figures for male unemployment based upon a 17 per cent, sample of the village communities. They are as follows: Rankinston, 29·8 per cent.; Patna, 19·7 per cent.; Dalrymple, 21·6 per cent.; Dalmellington, 33·2 per cent.; Bellsbank, 25·2 per cent.; and the Doon Valley as a whole, 25·2 per cent. If anything happened to the Pennyvenie colliery, the ​ figures would leap upwards, with some areas having male unemployment of between 30 per cent, and 40 per cent.

    I understand that it is not the remit of the Department of Industry to answer for Pennyvenie. I have already sought assurances from the Department of Energy and the National Coal Board about the life of the colliery. Everyone knows that there is limited life there, and that makes it imperative to get new industry in with male jobs.

    Given the levels of unemployment, the pronounced decline in mining, the precarious position of the last pit, the need to demonstrate that the people of the valley are not forgotten and the known views of the district council for special treatment, it came as a stunning blow to be excluded when the Cumnock designation took place.

    Cumnock and Doon Valley district is in two distinct parts. To extend special development area status to one part and exclude the other more depressed area is obvious nonsense. Moreover, it is dangerous nonsense, as it totally undermines the strategy adopted by the regional and district councils. It puts the Doon Valley at a serious disadvantage when everyone states without equivocation that it needs to be advantaged.

    Since that remarkable error of judgment I have been to both the Minister of State, Scottish Office, and the Minister of State, Department of Industry. I have taken local authority deputations to both Ministers. I have written on a number of occasions to the Minister of State Department of Industry. I am told by him in correspondence dated 2nd March that he is

    “still considering the representations about Special Development Area status but I do see considerable difficulties in making any further substantial upgradings at this stage.”

    What no Minister has yet explained, and the people are entitled to know is why the Doon Valley was excluded in the first place. Given the facts of the situation, it was an incredible blunder. That point requires an answer tonight. Did the Department make the necessary inquiries? Did it know the facts, or did it overlook the valley altogether when making its assessment of where to place the designation of special development area status? We are not talking about making “further substantial upgradings” ​ but of correcting an obvious and glaring injustice to a community of just over 10,000 people.

    I hope that when my hon. Friend replies he will not shelter behind the device that the Doon Valley is included in the Ayr employment exchange area, and that this makes it difficult to identify it administratively and thus to give it special development designation. I tell him in advance that to plead administrative problems is not acceptable. Any administrative problems pale into insignificance when compared with the valley’s unemployment rate, its bleak economic condition and the needs of the people.

    My experience is that where there is a political will—the Government’s wages policy is an example—there is an administrative way. What has been lacking so far is the acknowledgement of error in excluding the valley, an acknowledgement that it must be an area of high priority, and the political will on the part of Government to make it such. Without those, it is patently obvious that so-called administrative problems are mere excuses for inaction.
    What surprises many people in the Doon Valley and, indeed, in the Cum-nock area, is that this case should have to be made at all. Everyone else except the Government regards it as self-evident.

    University departments concerned with policies of rehabilitation know about the Doon Valley. Those committees of Strathclyde Regional Council which deals with multiple deprivation and industrial policy, know of the special problems afflicting the Doon Valley. The district council told the Scottish Office in its report in 1976 that it wanted special development area status. The Scottish Development Agency knows how special the problem is. A large number of people walking about the streets in the West of Scotland know of the special nature of the problems in the valley, because of the publicity given to it over a long period. Everyone, it seems, knows except the Government.

    The people that I represent in the valley are feeling sore. When they want to be picked out for special industrial help, they are ignored. When they do not want to be picked out as a possible nuclear waste area, they are picked out. ​ Legitimate requests for industrial action go unheard and equally legitimate objections to nuclear waste projects also fall upon deaf ears. They feel used and abused.

    Understandably, the Government’s reputation in the Doon Valley is not high. Even their most active supporters feel let down. There is an opportunity tonight, with an affirmative to my request for special development area status, for the Minister to restore some of that lost faith.

    Earlier in my remarks I said that South Ayrshire had a number of priority areas. That is true. But the Doon Valley on any and every test is the most urgent. No matter the measurement criterion—be it geographical location, geology, topography, social environmental, economic, industrial—the Doon Valley is an outstanding priority. The people would prefer that this were not the case. They want it to be different. They deserve to have it different. But to achieve the progress that will make it different, we need recognition from the Government. I ask my hon. Friend to start tonight by conceding the case.

  • Shirley Summerskill – 1978 Speech on the Taxi Trade in London

    Below is the text of the speech made by Shirley Summerskill, the then Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office, in the House of Commons on 8 March 1978.

    I welcome the opportunity provided by the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton (Sir G. Young) to discuss this matter and to put the record straight about London taxi fares. I thank him for giving me notice of the questions that he raised.

    On the first one, about the general state of the industry, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State always has in mind the requirements of the general public in London for an efficient taxi service with ready availability of vehicles for hire at reasonable rates. Over the last few years, the rates of increase and the number of taxis in use and of drivers to drive them suggest that the trade is growing and flourishing. The number of taxis in use increases by about 500 to 600 each year—last year by 614. I have the figures for the last seven years. The number of drivers increased by 300 to 400—last year by 322. The number of owner-drivers would also appear to be increasing. All this suggests a faith in the future of the industry.

    London taxis and drivers are licensed by the Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. Day-to-day licensing control is carried out by the Public Carriage Office of the Metropolitan Police. There are about 12,000 licensed taxis in London and about 16,000 licensed drivers. I should like to pay tribute to the work of the Public Carriage Office, which, with the support of the Metropolitan Police, has the very difficult task of maintaining standards in what is otherwise an unregulated business activity.

    London taxi fares are determined not by the Commissioner of Police but by the Home Secretary. These fares apply to all taxi journeys in London, whatever their length, provided that they begin and end within the Metropolitan Police District. This responsibility has rested with my right hon. Friend for many years. I believe that the original purpose in regulating London taxi fares was to achieve uniformity, but over the years it has been necessary for various factors to be borne in mind in determining the appropriate fare scale.

    We should appreciate that the arrangements under which London taxi drivers operate vary considerably. There are some drivers who own their own taxi. About a third of the drivers are in that position. About two-thirds of the drivers rent their taxis by the day, by the week or by a longer period. Those drivers pay either a fixed daily or weekly rental, or share the daily takings with the owner of the taxi in pre-determined proportions. It is, therefore, a rather complicated and varied situation. Any discussions on the scale of London taxi fares need to take into account the separate interests of the owners of taxis, the interests of drivers and the interests of the travelling public.

    If fares are too low, there is insufficient incentive for the vehicle owners to invest in new taxis. Over a period that could lead to a decline in the number of taxis operating and a worsening of the service to the public. If fares are too high, that may lead to a reduction in the use of taxis by the travelling public, with a consequent falling off in takings by taxi owners and drivers.

    Those were the considerations in mind when increases in London taxi fares were approved in July 1975, and again in December 1976. The application for a further substantial increase in London taxi fares was made in July 1977. The application was for an increase of 10p in the initial hiring charge of 30p and for the time and distance rate of 5p for each 450 yards to be doubled after two miles. Because of the combination of a fixed and a variable increase, the total effect of this claim, if granted, would have varied for different journey lengths. The increase for a short journey of half-a-mile would have teen 33 per cent. while the increase for a journey of four miles would have been 60 per cent. The fare increase on the typical two-and-a-half mile journey would have been 25 per cent.

    In the vast majority of cases taxi drivers’ earnings are directly related to the fares charged, and fare increases of the sort proposed would have led to very large increases in drivers’ earnings. In our view, increases of the magnitude that I have mentioned were quite unjustified, bearing in mind that unless steps were taken to prevent them very large increases would have been obtained by London taxi drivers at a time when other members of the working population were being expected to keep their pay increases in line with the Government’s 10 per cent. guidelines.

    As for the hon. Gentleman’s second question, fares have been substantially increased since the middle of 1975. There was an increase averaging 30 per cent. in July of that year. A further increase of 10p per hiring—that is, 13 per cent.—took place in December 1976. There was a third increase of 10 per cent. in December 1977. These increases represent a total increase of 61·6 per cent. over the early months of 1975. If the effect of inflation and higher taxation is set aside, the taxi driver must be much better off than he was in early 1975.

    I turn to the hon. Gentleman’s third question concerning the man who buys a new taxi and works it for 54 hours a week. I cannot confirm the hon. Gentleman’s statement, but the London taxi trade is an entirely private enterprise operation and every driver has complete freedom to choose when and where to offer his cab for hire and how many hours he shall work each week. Each driver maximises his earnings by using his knowledge and experience of the pattern of business offered and earnings will vary accordingly. The number of vehicles and drivers increases every year, as does the number of drivers who buy their own taxi. This does not appear to indicate that there is a loss on the operation.

    Nevertheless, the case put forward on behalf of the taxi trade was carefully considered at several meetings with my right hon. Friend and me and the point of view of drivers was carefully considered. The Home Secretary had an important meeting on the subject last November and it became clear that it was necessary to look more deeply into the ​ basic cost structure of the industry. It was therefore decided that the Price Commission should undertake such a study.

    It was also decided that this study should be extended to cover the costs and margins of both taxis and private hire cars not only in London but throughout Great Britain. This would provide a broad picture of the cost structure of the taxi and private car industry as a whole.

    As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer Protection announced in December last, the Price Commission is now hard at work on this study and is collecting the required information. I am sure that the representatives of the London taxi trade will put before it all the relevant statistical information.

    I hope that the Commission will be able to indicate what proportion of the metered fare and of extras—for example, for additional passengers and baggage—goes towards the maintenance of the vehicle, and how much is available for the driver personally. It will be important in future discussions on London taxi fares to be able to distinguish between these elements and to ensure that drivers’ earnings are not artificially inflated as a result of increases intended to compensate for rises in vehicle operating costs.

    The hon. Gentleman asked two specific questions about the Price Commission. He asked for an assurance about when the Price Commission would report. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer Protection has directed the Price Commission to examine the prices, costs and margins of the taxi and private hire trades and to report to him not later than 30th June. I have no reason to expect other than that it will report by that date. Obviously any assurance on this score lies with my right hon. Friend.

    On the subject of the recommendation of the Price Commission, I can inform the House that the Secretary of State has already told the taxi trade representatives whom he met in November last that he will carefully examine the results of the examination and will take them fully into account when reaching decisions, but that he cannot enter into any commitments about implementation.

    Sir George Young

    The Home Secretary has given commitments in regard to other inquiries into wage matters which are the responsibility of the Home Office. Why cannot he do the same for taxi drivers?

    Dr. Summerskill

    That is a question for my right hon. Friend. Clearly, he does not wish to commit himself at this stage. I cannot say more than that. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would like to question my right hon. Friend further on that point.

    On 6th December 1977 my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary made an order increasing London taxi fares with effect from 22nd December last year. This represented an increase of 10 per cent. on metered fares. In the Government’s view, such an increase was the most that could be justified in the circumstances and would enable owners to obtain a reasonable increase to meet rises in operating costs and to provide an increase in drivers’ earnings in line with increases obtained by other members of the working population.

    The Government believe that the continuing fall in the rate of inflation will be of significant benefit to the owners of taxis in London, as well as to the population at large.

    We recognise that sacrifices have had to be made by all sections of the community, including taxi drivers, in the fight against inflation, but it now seems to be generally accepted that this fight has to be won. Individual sections of the community may claim that there are special circumstances affecting their situation. Most sections of the community seem to make that claim at one time or another, but I am sure that in the longer term the London taxi trade will recognise that its claim for increases of up to 60 per cent. in London taxi fares could not properly have been granted.

    Sir George Young

    Would the hon. Lady accept that, halfway through the negotiations, the basic rules were changed? If they had been adhered to as originally set by the Price Code, the tariff increase would have gone through. Can she also confirm that her Department has had, for 10 months, the detailed figures on which I rested my case and which showed the deterioration in the financial position and ​ that she does not accept them? My figures showed that a new cab runs at an annual loss of over £1,000, and she claims that that is a fictitious figure. Will she also answer my second question, which related to the position as from July 1975? She carefully did not answer it as from July 1975 but chose a month earlier in the year, which was not what I argued.

    Dr. Summerskill

    On the hon. Gentleman’s first question, I can only reiterate that the basic reason why a greater price rise was not permitted was the principle of adhering to the Government’s 10 per cent. guidelines. That is the principle to which the Government have adhered all through the talks, and it was not possible to go beyond it.

    The hon. Gentleman’s question about new taxis was hypothetical. It was based on hypothetical figures. I have shown that each taxi driver operates in his own particular way, driving his own number of hours a week, and choosing when and where to offer his cab for hire. Will the hon. Gentleman repeat his third question?

    Sir George Young

    I asked whether the position from July 1975 to now had not deteriorated. The hon. Lady did not answer it because she chose a totally different base month from which to work, namely, January or February 1975. Will the hon. Lady now admit that the current level of tariffs means that a taxi driver working as hard now as in July 1975 is substantially worse off in money terms on vehicle operation, setting aside the ravages which taxes and inflation have made on any take-home pay?

    Dr. Summerskill

    I would still say that it would seem improbable. As I have shown in the figures I have quoted, successive fare rises at intervals over the last few years have brought about substantial increases since the middle of 1975. Over the whole period, even if the effect of inflation and higher taxes is set aside, the taxi driver must surely be better off than in early 1975.

  • George Young – 1978 Speech on the Taxi Trade in London

    Below is the text of the speech made by George Young, the then Conservative MP for Ealing Acton, in the House of Commons on 8 March 1978.

    Most hon. Members are now on their way home—most of them, I suspect, in their own cars, one or two enlightened Members by bicycles. Many hon. Members will be outside at the Members’ Entrance, waiting for taxis to arrive to take them home. If they find that they have to wait a little longer than usual, and if their cab driver is a little less alert and cheerful than they might expect, the reason is that the 16,500 taxi drivers in London have been singled out by the Government for harsher treatment than any other section of the community. They bitterly resent the way in which the Home Office has handled their application for a tariff increase.

    I spent a few nights in Ilford, North a few weeks ago, for obvious reasons. I met many taxi drivers there. The animosity they expressed about this matter was something I shall always remember. I am delighted to see in his place my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Bendall), who will represent not only taxi drivers but everyone else in Ilford, North for a long time. I am also pleased to see my hon. Friend the Member for Southgate (Mr. Berry), who has a large number of taxi drivers in his constituency.

    Although the economics of the taxi industry are complicated, the basic case ​ which I wish to put to the House tonight is reasonably simple. It is that the cost increases that the taxi drivers have had to bear over the past two and a half years have been far higher than the tariff increases that the Home Office has allowed. As a result, the fleet proprietors have had to go out of business. The owner-driver is having to work far longer hours even than Members of Parliament and insufficient funds are being set aside for future investment.

    The responsibility for this state of affairs rests entirely on the Home Office. To substantiate my argument I go back to July 1975 when the last major tariff increase took place, based on a claim made in December 1974. Since then the drivers have had a lop interim surcharge, introduced in December 1976.

    It was against that background that a claim was made last July for an increase of 28 per cent. That sounds a lot, but we have to bear in mind that the increase in British Rail fares from January 1975 to January 1977, a roughly comparable period, was 93 per cent., that London Transport but fares went up 126 per cent., in that period and that Underground fares rose 147 per cent. Those organisations have access to capital funds to help them invest and also have access to revenue subsidies. Both of these advantages are denied to taxi drivers.

    Put in the context of the costs of other transport organisations the drivers’ claim was a modest one, reflecting the fact that, for example, a taxi cab that cost £2,900 in 1975 cost £4,500 in 1977. The cost of fuel has risen by over 50 per cent. and the cost of all the other related goods and services have gone up likewise. The figure of 28 per cent. was not plucked out of the air. It was substantiated in a detailed memorandum sent to the Home Office on 11th May last year based on a formula for calculating costs and revenues of the average cab used by the 1970 Maxwell Stamp report. Since that claim was put in nearly a year ago, costs have continued to rise.

    The approach of trying to justify a tariff increase on the basis of costs was in line with the Price Code operating at that time. I quote from a letter which the Home Secretary—whom we are delighted ​ to see in the House—wrote to another London Member on 10th May last year:

    “In fixing the appropriate scale of charges for London cabs I, as Home Secretary have to have due regard to the provisions of the Price Code. Under the Code fares may be increased to an extent sufficient to offset the increase in prices which has occurred since the base date for the Code which, in the case of taxis, is taken to be 30th September 1972.”

    London’s taxi drivers accepted that those were the rules, and they were quite happy to play the game by those rules.

    The country had a high rate of inflation and the Government introduced a policy to try to tackle it. Because taxi drivers suffer from inflation like everyone else, they supported the initiative and wished to stay within the limits allowed by the Price Code.

    Now we come to the skulduggery, which is what has deeply upset the trade. Halfway through the game, when the taxi drivers felt that they were winning the argument, the Government changed the rules. This is set out in a letter dated 14th February from the Under-Secretary herself:

    “However, at the end of our deliberations, the Government had had to conclude that under current counter-inflation policy it would no longer be appropriate to allow a straight passing-through of cost increases into price rises. As you will recall, earlier stages of the counter-inflation policy placed emphasis on allowable cost increases. Under the current stage less emphasis is placed upon cost increases and more on profit margins, return on capital, and the factors affecting these, such as the efficiency of the enterprise and the use of resources.”

    That is a totally different game with a totally different timescale and totally different rules set up not by the Maxwell Stamp Committee but by the Price Commission.

    The matter was referred to the Price Commission on 12th December last year, according to a parliamentary reply on that date:

    “Following consultation with the Price Commission and the Director General of Fair Trading I have today directed the Price Commission to examine and report to me on prices, costs and margins in the provision of cab services. The examination will cover all of Great Britain, and will include both hackney carriages, such as London taxis, and certain other private hire vehicle services, as laid down in the terms of direction.”—[Official Report, 12th December 1977; Vol. 941, c. 15.]

    We learn from the Minister’s letter of 14th February that the Commission had been directed to report by 30th June.
    ​

    By that time events had infuriated the taxi drivers and the matter had been made worse by the Secretary of State and the Price Commission. If the inquiry had been confined to London’s taxi drivers, and if it had started work on 13th December and used the figures of the audited accounts of the taxi fleets and the owner-drivers, which were available, it might have been completed by now. But none of that happened. The questionnaires on which the report is to be based have not even gone out yet. The offers of audited accounts were refused and, three months after the inquiry was announced, very little progress seems to have been made.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead (Mr. Finsberg) was provoked to wonder in Taxi of 2nd March.

    “whether there was a conspiracy between the Home Office and the Price Commission to drive London taxi drivers so close to bankruptcy that the Labour Party proposals for the municipalisation of London taxis actually looks attractive.”

    The red herring of hire cars outside London has been dragged across the stage, and it is quite irrelevant to the problems facing London’s taxi drivers.

    In the meantime, an increase of 10 per cent. came into being on 22nd December last year based apparently on the 10 per cent. maximum wage guidelines. This is an entirely inappropriate basis on which to treat the taxi drivers’ claim. By all means give the police and the firemen 10 per cent., but they do not have to buy the police cars or the fire engines and run them. To treat this as a wage claim instead of a tariff increase is totally inappropriate.

    I should like to try to set out in simple terms the problems now facing the average cab driver. The average cab driver driving, say, 24,000 miles a year, which is approximately 54 hours a week, and allowing him a 10 per cent. return on his capital and letting him put enough money aside to replace his cab after five years, would in July 1975 have earned £2,730. His total costs in that year would have been £3,171. That left him a deficit of £441 per year. That has two consequences: either inadequate funds are set aside to replace his vehicle, or he has to work excessive hours.

    If the situation was bad in 1975, by January 1978 it was disastrous. The figures for that month were: income ​ £3,430; total expenditure £4,587. It is not surprising that in the meantime firms have gone bankrupt. Since July 1975, five fleet proprietors, operating some 650 vehicles, have stopped trading. I calculate that to break even now a taxi driver would have to work an extra eight hours per week than he worked in 1975. This is before the impact on his take-home pay of higher taxation and inflation.

    The taxi drivers are confident that the current inquiry will vindicate their claim, but they need the increase this summer. If the report is delayed, if the Government do not accept it or refuse to implement it on time and winter comes without another tariff increase, the situation will be desperate. I have had discussions with the Leader of the GLC, Horace Cutler, who obviously has an interest in an efficient taxi service, as it is part of the transport strategy for the capital. In a letter dated 7th March, I was pleased to hear from him:

    “We hold regular meetings with representatives of the trade to ascertain their views and we support them in their efforts to operate economically.”

    Basically, they want equal support from the Government.

    It is against this background of growing financial problems and total exasperation with the Government that I put five specific questions to the Minister, of all of which I have given her notice. The answers may define the area of agreement, clarify the situation and perhaps demonstrate that the Government have some residual sympathy for the taxi trade.

    First, will the Minister confirm that she and her Government believe that the capital city needs a flourishing and efficient taxi industry?

    Secondly, will she admit that the current level of tariffs means that a taxi driver working as hard now as he worked in July 1975 is substantially worse off on his vehicle operation, setting aside the ravages which taxes and inflation may have made on any take-home pay?

    Thirdly, will the hon. Lady confirm that there is now no incentive to become a taxi driver, as a man who buys a new vehicle today, who makes the accepted provisions for depreciation, running costs and so on, will lose over £1,000 a year on his vehicle operation? Fourthly, will she give an assurance that the Price Commission will report on this matter, as ​ requested, by the end of June? Finally, in view of the intolerable delay to date and the impossibility of back-dating any increase, will she accept and implement as speedily as possible the recommendations it contains?

    I forgot to say earlier that there is present my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, North-East (Mr. Weatherill), who shares the concern of other London Members about this matter.

    Licensed taxi drivers are entitled, if they are entitled to nothing else, to some straight answers to the straight questions that I have put to the Minister.

  • Les Huckfield – 1978 Speech on British Leyland’s Speke Plant

    Below is the text of the speech made by Les Huckfield, the then Labour MP for Nuneaton, in the House of Commons on 7 March 1978.

    I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Garston (Mr. Loyden) for giving me an opportunity to speak on an issue which has understandably raised a great deal of concern. That is because the proposal to close Speke No. 2 assembly plant has some wide-ranging implications for British Leyland and for Merseyside. As my hon. Friend has ​ said, I am sure that on both sides of the House we all wish that the British Leyland management did not need to take difficult decisions of this sort.

    That need is dictated primarily by the state of British Leyland, which, as the chairman of the company, Mr. Michael Edwardes, made clear in his speech to employees on 1st February, is critical. The company has made no secret of the fact that its performance has been unsatisfactory. That is reflected in the fall in British Leyland’s market share from 33 per cent. to less than 25 per cent. last year, and to 21 per cent. in January.

    I am glad to note that provisional indications are that British Leyland’s market share for February has shown some signs of improvement. Nevertheless, one thing is clear: the company needs a period of sustained production accompanied by a major effort to reduce costs so that British Leyland can compete with other European manufacturers both at home and in export markets. This means adjusting capacity and manpower in line with realistic market prospects, taking account of the impossibility of recovering market share overnight and of the fact that British Leyland still has power and manpower levels geared to production on the pre-Ryder scale.

    If the company fails to adjust capacity now and its market share continues to decline, the result will be that many more jobs will be lost than those affected by the closure of Speke 2. The collapse of the company would have unthinkable consequences for employment in this country. Not only is British Leyland dirt country’s seventh largest employer; thousands of wage earners in supplier industries are dependent on the survival of the company. As Michael Edwardes has made clear, without realistic measures to improve production and reduce costs, that survival must be in doubt.

    This is the task facing the management at British Leyland. It is the management which, in consultation with the National Enterprise Board, must decide on the specific measures necessary to restore the company’s fortunes. The Government have accepted the view of the British Leyland Board and the National Enterprise Board that British Leyland’s capacity, including manpower, must be brought into line with market prospects, but the ​ Government cannot set themselves up as an alternative manager of the company, so that means to achieve this must be left for British Leyland management to decide in consultation with the National Enterprise Board.

    As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in the House on 31st January, the Government have full confidence in the new management at British Leyland and are committed to supporting Michael Edwardes in his attempt to improve the company’s performance. A start has been made. As hon Members may know, steps have been taken to restructure the company, and at the meeting at Kenilworth on 1st February Michael Edwardes secured the backing of employees for his proposals. At the same time the British Leyland board has submitted to the National Enterprise Board its corporate plan for 1978 outlining its proposals for a future strategy for the company.

    It would, however, be difficult for the Government to justify both to this House and to the public at large further investment in British Leyland, especially on the scale that British Leyland is likely to need, unless the management can clearly demonstrate that firm steps are being taken to tackle the company’s problems. Those steps may be unpleasant and, in the case of the proposal to close Speke 2, they have been made all the more difficult to take by the fact that the plant is located on Merseyside.

    I fully understand what my hon. Friend said about the situation on Merseyside. It was because of our concern for Merseyside that we designated it a special development area in August 1974. This means that Merseyside gets regional development grants, Government factories, regional selective assistance, removal grants and grants to encourage the movement of offices and other service industries. In fact, Merseyside is among those places which are given the highest priority in the steering of new investment.

    We estimate that Merseyside received about £302 million of regional financial assistance over the five years 1972–73 to 1976–77. The assistance under Section 7 of the Industry Act has safeguarded or created 40,000 jobs since 1972.
    As my hon. Friend realises, we had a report from the NEB on investment ​ potential in the North-East and North-West. That report made recommendations particularly in favour of widening the differential in regional selective financial assistance in favour of special development areas. The Government also increased the maximum rent-free periods on Government factories to five years.

    The role of the NEB has been strengthened following the establishment of an NEB regional board for the North-West. We have commissioned a firm of consultants to identify the types of business most likely to prosper close to the port of Liverpool. The Liverpool partnership area, which Speke immediately adjoins, will benefit from increased resources under the Department of the Environment’s urban programme, and the greater powers to assist industry given to them under the Inner Urban Areas Bill. I could give my hon. Friend more details about my Department’s small firms information centre in Liverpool and about assistance under Section 8 of the Industry Act.

    Under the Hardman decisions on the dispersal of Government work from London, Merseyside probably comes out as one of the best areas. The bulk of the 4,000 dispersals to the North-West, nearly 3,000 posts, will go to Merseyside. The Hardman dispersals will inevitably take some time to carry out, but I am sure that hon. Members will welcome these additional office jobs and appreciate that this shows recognition of the serious problem.

    There are achievements on the plus side. I shall name but a few. Vauxhall has recruited 2,000 workers at Ellesmere Port. The Co-operative Bank will provide 600 new jobs at hard-hit Skelmersdale. Cross International has announced a £2½ million investment programme with 200 jobs to come over four years at Knowsley. YKK is recruiting at Run- ​ corn. Tate & Lyle is investing heavily. Shell Chemicals has planning permission for a £50 million plant at Stanlow.

    These are a few of the projects in Merseyside.

    In co-operation with the Manpower Services Commission, the Government have introduced a wide range of special schemes designed specifically to alleviate increased unemployment. They include the job creation and work experience programmes, the youth employment subsidy, the job release scheme, the temporary employment subsidy and the small firms employment subsidy.

    It is estimated that over 41,000 persons, many of them young people, have been assisted by these measures in Merseyside. The temporary employment subsidy has been of particular benefit—with applications approved in respect of over 16,000 workers in the area.

    It is difficult to satisfy my hon. Friend in a debate such as this. I fully appreciate the statement that he has made on behalf of his constituents. I and the Department understand the problems of Merseyside.

    There are plans for a new 100-place skillcentre to be established in the Wirral and for a smaller 60-place centre for adults and young people in Liverpool itself. Both of these should be in operation by 1980–1981.

    It is, as I have already made clear, for British Leyland management to take the difficult decisions necessary for the company’s survival and, in this particular case, to decide whether to proceed with the closure after.