Category: Speeches

  • Owen Thompson – 2023 Speech on the Defence Command Paper Refresh

    Owen Thompson – 2023 Speech on the Defence Command Paper Refresh

    The speech made by Owen Thompson, the SNP spokesperson on defence, on 18 July 2023.

    I too thank the Secretary of State for advance sight of a draft statement, albeit that there were one or two additions on delivery. I also, perhaps pre-emptively, join in wishing him well in whatever comes next. Although I have not directly shadowed him, I certainly pass on those thoughts from my hon. Friend the Member for Angus (Dave Doogan), who has worked closely with him over a period now.

    I will start on a positive note. I welcome a number of the points made. I very much welcome the fact that people are put front and centre. That is absolutely critical in anything we do in defence. People are what make it work, and if we are not supporting the men and women of the forces, what are we doing at all? There is probably that more we can do, even beyond this. While it will not surprise Ministers to hear me say that we need to support those serving, we also need to continue to look at what we are doing to support our veterans. I know that the Minister is working on that, but it is an area in which we need to try to do more.

    I also welcome the recognition of some of the accommodation conditions. I welcome the fact that steps are being taken and matters looked at, but that needs to be moved forward at a greater pace.

    I note that the Secretary of State says we are going to spend over £50 billion for the first time next year. I wonder whether he can tell us how much of that is simply down to inflation created by this Government. I am not trying to be awkward, but that is clearly quite a significant factor.

    We have also heard of the ongoing and long-lasting issues around procurement, with reports showing that roughly £2 billion is wasted each year in failed equipment programmes and cancelled procurement contracts. Is the Ministry of Defence making the necessary reforms to make its procedures better, and will they deliver value for money?

    Recruitment and retention issues have been flagged up; the Haythornthwaite review clearly highlighted those. Is the right hon. Gentleman confident that the steps being taken now on the skills agenda will be the necessary actions to address recruitment and retention issues?

    Finally, the Haythornthwaite review highlighted cyber capability as a major issue. Is the right hon. Gentleman confident that the steps being taken and outlined today will do enough to deliver that capability in the way that we all want to see?

    Mr Wallace

    I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, and grateful for his party’s support on Ukraine.

    On the Haythornthwaite review and skills, right across Europe and the west we are seeing recruitment challenges in the military. I was with my New Zealand counterpart recently, and my Canadian counterpart, and they too have a challenge. The skills shortage across society is big, and it is no different in the armed forces, which is why we have to adapt rapidly and tackle some of the challenges.

    On procurement, as I said, the figures have started to improve. Yes, there are challenges, and we could spend a whole day debating the reasons for those challenges. Complex procurement is not as straightforward as many people think, and the hon. Gentleman will know from the Scottish Government’s procurement issues that it is not straightforward to deal with. I certainly believe that if we invest in the people and are prepared to invest in continuity—if instead of having the senior responsible owners who help manage our projects here today and gone tomorrow, we ensure that they are there for the long term and link their incentives to success, and help them manage our projects—we will have a better chance of delivering better value for money.

  • John Healey – 2023 Speech on the Defence Command Paper Refresh

    John Healey – 2023 Speech on the Defence Command Paper Refresh

    The speech made by John Healey, the Shadow Defence Secretary, in the House of Commons on 18 July 2023.

    I thank the Defence Secretary for the advance draft copy of his statement and welcome some elements he announced today that were not in that draft copy, such as the improved childcare package and the rent freeze for armed forces personnel.

    Following the Defence Secretary’s decision to stand down, I want to start by paying tribute to his time in this House. He is a political survivor. I remember that his first job in 2010 was as Parliamentary Private Secretary to Ken Clarke, and for the last four years he has been a dedicated Defence Secretary. In particular, I want to recognise his work on Ukraine, and that of the Minister for Armed Forces, the right hon. Member for Wells (James Heappey). His decisions on sending military support to Ukraine, getting other nations to do more and declassifying intelligence have all been beneficial for Ukraine and for Britain.

    Today, the Defence Secretary is presenting his plan for the future of the British armed forces at a time when, as he told the House this afternoon, we have

    “the return of war to the continent of Europe, alongside growing threats elsewhere in the world”.

    As his own future is now short, how long is the shelf-life of his plan? Industry and military leaders cannot be sure that his successor will agree with his decisions, will accept his cuts, will act on his approach; and they cannot be sure how the strategic defence review plan of both his party and mine after the next election will reboot defence planning.

    It did not have to be this way. Labour wanted this to be the nation’s defence plan, not the plan of current Conservative Defence Ministers. We offered to work with the Government on a plan to make Britain secure at home and strong abroad. This is not such a plan. It is not a good enough response to war in Europe. It is not enough to accelerate support for Ukraine, to fulfil in full our NATO obligations, to halt the hollowing out of our forces, and to renew the nation’s moral contract with those who serve and the families who support them.

    Why has this defence plan been so delayed? It is 510 days since Putin shattered European security. Since then, 26 other NATO nations have rebooted defence plans and budgets. In the time it has taken the Defence Secretary to produce this long-trailed new defence strategy, Finland has carried out its own review, overturned decades of non-alignment, increased defence spending by 36%, applied to join NATO, and seen its application approved by 30 Parliaments before last week’s NATO summit in Vilnius. That successful NATO summit has made the alliance stronger and support for Ukraine greater. We fully back NATO’s new regional plans and the G7 long-term security commitments to Ukraine, and if UK military aid is accelerated in the coming days, that too will have Labour’s fullest support.

    There is a welcome “back to basics” element in this plan—a focus on stockpiles, training, service conditions and more combat-readiness—but it is clear that the plan is driven by costs, not by threats. It is driven by the real cut in day-to-day resource departmental expenditure limits spending that the Defence Secretary agreed in November 2020, and by the failure to secure the £8 billion extra that he said was needed in the spring Budget just to cover inflation. Where is the halt in further cuts in the Army, while NATO plans an eightfold increase in its high readiness forces? Where is the commitment to fulfil in full our NATO obligations? Where is the action plan for military support to Ukraine, first promised by the Defence Secretary in August last year? Where is the programme to reverse record low levels of satisfaction with service life? Where is the full-scale reform of a “broken” defence procurement system for which the Defence Committee called on the very day the Defence Secretary announced that he was stepping down? In fact, it is hard to tell from his announcement today what has changed. The £6.6 billion for defence research and development was promised in the 2021 integrated review, the “global response force” and force level cuts were announced in the Secretary of State’s defence Command Paper 2021, and the “strategic reserve” was recommended by Lord Lancaster in 2021.

    As the right hon. Gentleman steps down as the Conservatives’ longest-serving Defence Secretary, will he accept that many of the biggest challenges are being left to the next Defence Secretary, and to the next Government? Finally, as we may not see him again at the Dispatch Box, may I, on behalf of Members in all parts of the House, wish him well in his post-parliamentary career?

    Mr Wallace

    I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his kind comments. Unfortunately for him, I will, however, be here again tomorrow, delivering my very last statement.

    I understand what the right hon. Gentleman is saying, but this is the refresh of the defence Command Paper. It is not a complete redrawing of a strategic defence and security review. We have done those, periodically, so many times, and so many times they have been published under Governments of both parties, and so many times they have not had real funding attached to them. So many times we have reached the end of the SDSR period, under Labour and Conservative Governments, with black holes, with unspent money and overspends. It has happened time and again. But this is a report to make us match-fit: to ensure that, whether we have 3%, 2.5%, 2% of GDP, we have the reforms that, in my view and, I hope, that of my successor, will help us to deal with the growing threats that we face in the decade ahead, and will also reflect the lessons that we have seen in Ukraine.

    The right hon. Gentleman mentioned Finland’s defence review. He will know that Finland and Sweden periodically conduct a fixed in-Parliament, in-schedule review. That is how it will always be. Those countries ask a parliamentary committee to carry out the review, and then hand it to their Defence Ministries to implement. That is their process. Finland’s review was not triggered by anything specific, and the fact that it produced that review before I did this refresh is not a benchmark; it has been predicted and profiled. I will say, however, that long before Sweden and Finland joined NATO, I was the architect of last January’s security pact between the UK and those countries. That was because I recognised that they were our friends and our allies, and while they were not in NATO, it was inconceivable that we, as Britain, would never come to their aid should a more aggressive Putin attack them. That was the beginning of the process of developing our strong relationship with them.

    The right hon. Gentleman talked about defence procurement. I have read the report produced by my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), and I thank him for it. Many of the things in it we are now doing. I give credit to him, obviously, for his report, but some of its observations have also been mine—observations about SROs, about 75% and 50%, about a spiral development cost; observations that the House has heard from this Dispatch Box about gold-plating and the over-speccing that has too often driven prices through the roof, and is a cumbersome thing. [Interruption.]

    Let me say this to the Opposition Members who are heckling, and who have been Ministers in this Department. They will know that of all the Departments to serve in, this is not one that moves at the greatest speed of reform. The process of reform takes time, and Members need only look at the records of every single former Minister to know how hard it is. That does not undermine their contribution, and it does not make any of them less of a Minister, but this Department of 220,000 people, a Department that seeks every authority through a ministerial chair, is not—and I have served in a number of Departments—the quickest to change. No doubt the right hon. Gentleman, if he succeeds in his ambition to be the next Defence Secretary or the one after next, will learn that all too well. What I promise him, as I will promise my successor, is that I will not come to this House and pretend that the problems with which my successor is dealing were made the week before. They were made 20, 10, 15 years before. That is the truth of many of the policies and procurement challenges with which we deal in this Department.

    I believe that the Command paper will stand the test of time because it is about facing the threat—and that is the answer to the right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey).

  • Ben Wallace – 2023 Statement on the Defence Command Paper Refresh

    Ben Wallace – 2023 Statement on the Defence Command Paper Refresh

    The statement made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on 18 July 2023.

    With permission, I would like to make a statement on the publication of our refreshed defence Command Paper. It is just over two years since we published the original Command Paper in March 2021. In those two years, our security has been challenged in so many ways. This is Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world.

    In the last four years that I have been Defence Secretary, I have been consistent about the reform I have sought to implement. I want Defence to be threat-led—understanding and acting on the threats facing our nation as our sole mission; not protecting force structures, cap badges or much-loved equipment but ensuring that we are focused on challenging threats.

    I want the Ministry of Defence to be a campaigning Department, adopting a more proactive posture, and our forces more forward and present in the world, with a return to campaigning assertively and constantly, pushing back those threats and our adversaries. I want Defence to be sustainable in every sense. For too long, Defence was hollowed out by both Labour and Conservative Governments, leaving our forces overstretched and underequipped. We must match our ambitions to our resources, our equipment plans to our budget, and take care of our people to sustain them in their duties. We must never forget the travesty of the Snatch Land Rovers in Afghanistan.

    The 2021 defence Command Paper was true to those principles and, with some tough choices, presented an honest plan for what we can and will achieve: a credible force, capable of protecting the nation, ready to meet the threats of today but investing heavily to modernise for those of the future; a force in which every major platform would be renewed by 2035, from armoured vehicles to Dreadnought submarines, frigates to satellites.

    We did not plan on issuing a new Command Paper just two years on. Many of the conclusions of that Command Paper remain right: Russia was and is the greatest threat to European security, and China’s rapid military modernisation and growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific and beyond do pose an increasing challenge to us all. However, I have always said that as the situation changes, we must change with it. Since the first DCP was released, the world has shifted once more, from a competitive age to a contested and volatile world. The technology advances we predicted materialised. The threats and challenges we feared have manifested.

    There is no more immediate threat than Russia. Its full-scale invasion of Ukraine was not simply an assault on a proud and sovereign nation but an attack on all our values, European security and the open international order on which stability and prosperity have depended for over three quarters of a century. Right now, the people of Ukraine are suffering the tragic consequences of President Putin’s illegal, unprovoked invasion. His naked aggression and imperial ambitions have played out in a tragedy of epic human suffering. The brave citizen soldiers of the armed forces of Ukraine are protecting their own nation and people, quite heroically taking on the once mighty Russian forces. The whole House recognises that they fight not just for their freedom but for ours. They are not just liberating their homeland but defending the rules-based system.

    As Defence Secretary it is important to import the lessons learned from the conflict to our own forces. While I wish such lessons were generated in a different way, the conflict has become an incubator of new ways of war. They are proving the way for warfare in the 2020s—whole of nation, internationally partnered, innovative, digitised, operating with a tempo, precision and range requirement and a recognition that there is a trade-off between assurance levels and operational impact.

    I am proud, too, of the role the UK is playing in supporting Ukraine, whether providing equipment, training or political support, or galvanising European and international allies and industrial partners to do likewise. But the return of war to the continent of Europe, alongside growing threats elsewhere in the world, has meant that we must sharpen our approach. The integrated review refresh published in March outlined how we would do that. It would shape the global strategic environment, increase our focus on deterrence and defence, address vulnerabilities that leave our nation exposed and invest in the UK’s unique strengths.

    Defence is central to all those efforts. That is why, after three decades in which all parties have continued drawing the post cold-war peace dividend, this Prime Minister reversed that trend and provided Defence with an additional £24 billion over four years. He and the Chancellor have gone further since, in response to the war in Ukraine. Next year we will spend over £50 billion on defence for the first time in our history. That is nearly £12 billion a year more cash investment than when I became Defence Secretary in 2019—a real-terms increase of more than 10%. This Government have committed to increasing spending yet further over the longer term to 2.5% of GDP, as we improve the fiscal position and grow our economy.

    Our defence plans, and the armed forces to deliver them, must be robust and credible—not fantasy force designs, unfunded gimmicks or top trump numbers. As Russia has so effectively proven, there is no point having parade ground armies and massed ranks of men and machines if they cannot be integrated as a single, full spectrum force, sustained in the field under all the demands of modern warfighting. That takes professional forces, well equipped and rapidly adaptable, supported by critical enablers and vast stockpiles of munitions. That is why in this document, hon. Members will not find shiny new announcements, comms-led policies driving unsustainable force designs or any major new platforms for military enthusiasts to put up on their charts on their bedroom wall. We stand by the Command Paper we published in 2021 but we must get there faster, doing defence differently and getting ourselves on to a campaign footing to protect the nation and help it prosper.

    As I said standing here when DCP21 was announced, we owe it to the men and women of our armed forces to make policy reality. The work was just beginning. In this refresh, we have focused on how to drive the lessons of Ukraine into our core business and on how to recover the warfighting resilience needed to generate credible conventional deterrence. The great advantage of having served in Defence for some time is that my ministerial team and I have now taken a proper look under the bonnet. Consequently, we are clear that our strategic advantage derives from four key sources which require urgent prioritisation.

    First and foremost are our first-class people. Our men and women are not just brave and committed, but talented and incredibly skilled. They are our real battle-winning capability. It is our duty to ensure they are as well supported, prepared and equipped as possible, so we are going to invest in them. Last year, I commissioned Richard Haythornthwaite to conduct the first review of workforce incentivisation for almost 30 years. It is such good work that we are incorporating the response into our Command Paper, and today I am unveiling a new employment model and skills framework for our armed forces. It will offer our people a spectrum of service that allows far greater career flexibility, making it easier for military personnel to zig-zag between different roles, whether regular or reserve, or between the civil service and industry.

    We are transforming our forces’ overall employment offer by adopting a total reward approach to provide a much more compelling and competitive incentivisation package. Since all our armed forces personnel deserve the best quality accommodation, we are injecting a further £400 million to improve our service accommodation in the next two years. Many of us over Christmas will have been frustrated by the poor support our service personnel and their families received from those tasked with looking after their accommodation. It is for that reason that I have withheld their profit and used the money to freeze for one year only the rent increases our personnel were due to pay. Taken together alongside such initiatives as wraparound childcare, they are intended to enrich careers and enhance the ability of our most talented people to keep protecting the British people, and to ensure they are rewarded and fulfilled while they do so.

    Our second priority is further strengthening our scientific and technological base. We are already world leaders in specific areas, but to continue outmatching our adversaries we must stay ahead of the curve in digital, data and emerging scientific fields. In 2021, we said we would invest £6.6 billion in advanced research and development. In fact, we are now investing significantly more to stay ahead in the technologies proving themselves vital on the battlefields of Ukraine, such as AI, quantum and robotics. We are enabling a culture of innovation across Defence, pulling through those R&D breakthroughs to the frontline. Following in Ukraine’s footsteps, we are increasingly sourcing the £100 solutions that can stop £100 million threats in their tracks, winning both the kinetic and economic exchanges of modern warfare.

    Of course, our ability to do that depends on the quality of our relationship with the industry, which is our third priority. I am pushing the Ministry of Defence to form a closer alliance with our industrial partners. A genuine partnership to sustain our defence will mean doing things differently. Ukraine reminds us that time waits for no one. It is no good holding out for the 100% solution that is obsolete by the time it is launched. Often, 80% is good enough, especially if it means swiftly putting kit into the hands of our service personnel. Capabilities can be rapidly upgraded, spirally developed, for the relentless cycles of battlefield adaptation to win the innovation battle. Instead of sticking to acquisition programmes that drag on for decades, we are setting maximum delivery periods of five years for hardware and three years for digital programmes.

    Our fourth priority is productivity and campaigning. To face this increasingly contested and volatile world, we need to make major changes to the machinery of the Department and its methods. We are emphasising an ethos focused ruthlessly on the delivery of real-world effect, increasing the bang for buck in everything we do. This approach reaches into every part of the Defence enterprise, from the front line to the back office, and involves a major redesign of the Department. We must shift our whole organisational culture away from the previous peacetime mentality to one where we live and operate as we would fight, focusing more on outputs than inputs and achieving a better balance between risk and reward. That means empowering people to live and operate alongside partners, and sometimes to be enabled by them when in lower threat environments. That means ensuring our equipment, whether Type 31, Challenger 3, or Typhoons, has the infrastructure and supplies needed to sustain operations more of the time and to deliver real-world effect wherever and whenever it is needed. And it means working with the relevant regulatory authorities, for example the Military Aviation Authority, to accelerate the experimentation, testing and innovating of new technologies, while remaining within legal bounds.

    I want to emphasise one final aspect of the Command Paper refresh, namely the development of a global campaigning approach. We started with a review of our head office, where we broke out campaign delivery from policy formation and established integrated campaign teams. They have adversary focuses, not geographic, and will drive our enduring campaigns in the same way operational commanders lead our forces on deployed operations. The indivisibility of operational theatres in today’s world means Defence must be constantly ready to respond globally to safeguard our interests and those of our allies. Sometimes it will be to evacuate our citizens in moments of crisis, such as in Sudan. Other times it will be to deter an adversary or reassure a friend. As we have shown through our support for Ukraine, the UK Government have the political will, but that only matters if it is matched by our military agility. Today, we are establishing a defence global response force. Ready, integrated and lethal, it will better cohere existing forces from across land, sea, air, space and cyber, to get there first in response to unpredictable events around the world.

    Crucially, today’s paper also recognises that it is in the interconnected world and that the UK is unlikely to act alone. Partnerships are critical to our security and prosperity. In future, we will be allied by design and national by exception. Our support for NATO will remain iron-clad, but we will continue to prioritise our core relationships. We will invest in deepening relationships with our new partners. It is why we have invested to expand our global defence network, improving communications, and co-ordinating defence attachés within our intelligence functions. None of that is headline-grabbing stuff, but it is the fine details that make the difference to our national security.

    To conclude, the paper is the result of having several years in the Department to understand where it needs most attention. That continuity in office is improving and I am incredibly grateful to the long-serving Minister for Armed Forces, my right hon. Friend the Member for Wells (James Heappey), whose experience in uniform and public office provided the basis for this paper. We are grateful to the hundreds of individuals and groups who contributed to the first challenge phase of its drafting, from academics to serving personnel and industry representatives, not to mention the many Members of this House. Most of what we learned from them is encapsulated in the document.

    This is likely to be one of my last appearances at the Dispatch Box. It has been the greatest privilege to serve as Secretary of State for Defence for the last four years. I thank my team, civil servants, special advisers and Members for their support and their challenge. All of us here have the common interest of defending this fine country, its values and its freedoms. Of all the many functions of Government, Defence is the most important and is more important than ever, as the next 10 years will be more unstable and insecure. The men and women of our armed forces are second to none and Britain’s place in the world is anchored in their professionalism and sacrifice. I believe we will increasingly call on them in the years ahead. We must ensure that they are ready to answer that call. I wish them and whomever replaces me well. I commend the statement to the House.

  • Nigel Huddleston – 2023 Statement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership

    Nigel Huddleston – 2023 Statement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership

    The statement made by Nigel Huddleston, the Minister for International Trade, in the House of Commons on 18 July 2023.

    The Secretary of State for Business and Trade signed the accession protocol to the comprehensive and progressive agreement for trans-Pacific partnership on Sunday 16 July in Auckland. The UK will be the first new member since CPTPP was created. With the UK as a member, CPTPP will have a combined GDP of £12 trillion and will account for 15% of global GDP. Accession to the agreement sends a powerful signal that the UK is using our post-Brexit freedoms to boost our economy. It will secure our place as the second largest economy in a trade grouping dedicated to free and rules-based trade. It gives us a seat at the table in setting standards for the global economy.

    The agreement is a gateway to the wider Indo-Pacific, which is set to account for the majority of global growth and around half of the world’s middle-class consumers in the decades to come. That will bring new opportunities for British businesses abroad and will support jobs at home. More than 99% of current UK goods exports to CPTPP countries will be eligible for zero tariffs. The UK’s world-leading services firms will benefit from modern rules, ensuring non-discriminatory treatment and greater transparency. That will make it easier for them to provide services to consumers in other CPTPP countries.

    In an historic first, joining CPTPP will mean that the UK and Malaysia are in a free trade agreement together for the first time. That will give businesses better access to a market worth £330 billion. Manufacturers of key UK exports will be able to make the most of tariff reductions to that thriving market. Tariffs of around 80% on whisky will be eliminated within 10 years, and tariffs of 30% on cars will be eliminated within seven years. Joining CPTPP marks a key step in the development of the UK’s independent trade policy. Our status as an independent trading nation is putting the UK in an enviable position. Membership of that agreement will be a welcome addition to our bilateral free-trade agreements with more than 70 countries. I pay tribute to the many officials and Ministers who have worked on this deal over the past two years, some of whom are in the Chamber today.

  • Kevin Hollinrake – 2023 Statement on Post Office Horizon IT Scandal Compensation

    Kevin Hollinrake – 2023 Statement on Post Office Horizon IT Scandal Compensation

    The statement made by Kevin Hollinrake, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade, in the House of Commons on 18 July 2023.

    I thank the right hon. Member for his question and his tireless campaigning on this issue. I am also grateful to Sir Wyn Williams for his work and for publishing his interim report. We will, of course, consider that properly in the coming days and provide a formal response to the House.

    Sir Wyn’s report recaps the progress made in delivering compensation. He notes our repeated commitment, which I reiterate again, that that compensation should be full and fair. He notes allegations from some lawyers that there are impediments to providing such compensation, but says that he cannot see any legal reason why we cannot deliver our commitment. He is right, and that commitment will be delivered.

    Sir Wyn’s first four recommendations deal with the advisory board, of which the right hon. Gentleman is a member. As he knows, the board was established at the instigation of my Department, and its composition and remit were extended as a result of discussions between Ministers, officials, himself and the rest of the board. It has already performed a very valuable service. Notably, its last meeting made recommendations about an appeals process independent of the Post Office. We are considering that recommendation and will reply in due course.

    Sir Wyn also refers to the tax treatment of compensation payments. The right hon. Member will acknowledge that when we worked with him and the board on that matter, it resulted in £26 million of additional payments in the historic shortfall scheme, and exemptions from income tax, capital gains tax and national insurance contributions. Sir Wyn also suggests that we should legislate to extend the deadline for the group litigation order compensation scheme.

    As we have stated, we will not let an arbitrary date stand in the way of paying full and fair compensation to postmasters. As compensation is being delivered under the sole authority of the Appropriation Act, spending on it is limited to a two-year window that closes in August next year. The Government are determined to deliver compensation by that date. That remains perfectly possible, but challenging. If it seems likely that we will not be able to compensate everyone in time, we shall of course consider legislation, as Sir Wyn recommends. I want to deliver by that date not for some legalistic reason, but in the interests of postmasters who have waited too long for justice.

  • Huw Merriman – 2023 Statement on the Integrated Rail Plan for the North and Midlands

    Huw Merriman – 2023 Statement on the Integrated Rail Plan for the North and Midlands

    The statement made by Huw Merriman, the Minister of State at the Department for Transport, in the House of Commons on 17 July 2023.

    The Integrated Rail Plan, published in November 2021, set out a £96 billion investment to benefit the midlands and the north, the largest ever Government investment in the railways. The Government stand by the conclusions of the plan and continue to consider it the most effective way of providing rail benefits to the north and the midlands.

    As part of the plan, we also committed to take forward a study to consider the most effective way to run HS2 trains to Leeds.

    I am today publishing the terms of reference for this work, which will include consideration of station capacity at Leeds, and the implications of different options on the wider network.

    The proposals set out in the Integrated Rail Plan bring communities and labour markets together and will support growing our economy in towns and cities across the nation.

    The work in the study will consider a range of options and take account of: value for money; affordability; deliverability and timescales; economic development; disruption to passengers; and local views and evidence. The study will be extensive and will take two years to complete.

    As this work progresses, we intend to review the case for dropping certain options, taking account of evidence gathered, particularly on costs, affordability, benefits and value for money.

    In addition, the Transport Select Committee on 13 July published the Government’s response to its report on the Integrated Rail Plan. In response to the following recommendation on Bradford:

    The Government should reconsider the case for the development of a new station in Bradford. The development of the St James’s Market station would not only enhance rail connectivity in the North, allowing further investment in the city, but also provide further opportunities for rail development in Bradford after the ‘core pipeline’ of IRP upgrades take place. (Paragraph 63)

    I have confirmed that the Government accept this recommendation.

    The Government stand by the conclusions of the Integrated Rail Plan on Bradford, and the benefits that plan brings to the city. However, in the light of this recommendation, a re-assessment of the evidence for better connecting Bradford and the case for a new station will now form part of the Northern Powerhouse Rail development programme and the HS2 to Leeds study.

    The Government’s approaches for Leeds and Bradford remain those that were set out in the Integrated Rail Plan, and the undertaking of this work does not guarantee further interventions will be agreed or progressed.

    The Government remain committed to the Integrated Rail Plan’s £96 billion envelope and expect that additions or changes to the core IRP pipeline will be affordable within that. Any options that are progressed, including those that would exceed the £96 billion envelope, will be subject to the established adaptive approach, as set out in the IRP.

  • Robert Jenrick – 2023 Statement on Changes in Immigration Rules

    Robert Jenrick – 2023 Statement on Changes in Immigration Rules

    The statement made by Robert Jenrick, the Minister for Immigration, in the House of Commons on 17 July 2023.

    My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary is today laying before the House a statement of changes in Immigration Rules.

    Changes to the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) and EUSS Family Permit

    We are making certain changes to the EUSS, which enables EU, other European economic area (EEA) and Swiss citizens living in the UK by the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020, and their family members, to obtain immigration status. In particular, meeting the deadline for the application (or, in line with the citizens’ rights agreements, having reasonable grounds for the delay in making an application) will become a requirement for making a valid application. Consistent with the agreements, this will enable us to consider whether there are reasonable grounds for a late application as a preliminary issue, before going on to consider whether a valid application meets the relevant eligibility and suitability requirements. We will also prevent a valid application as a joining family member being made by an illegal entrant to the UK, thereby reinforcing our approach to tackling illegal migration.

    We are closing the EUSS on 8 August 2023 to new applications under two routes not covered by the agreements: family member of a qualifying British citizen (on their return to the UK having exercised free movement rights in the EEA or Switzerland, known as “Surinder Singh” cases) and primary carer of a British citizen (known as “Zambrano” cases). The UK made generous transitional provisions enabling such persons to access the EUSS for more than four years. It is now appropriate, as a matter of fairness to other British citizens wishing to sponsor foreign national family members to settle in the UK, that any new applications should have to meet the family immigration rules applicable to others. The routes will remain open to those who are already on them (or with a pending application, administrative review or appeal) or who have pending access to them via a relevant EUSS family permit.

    The EUSS family permit will also close on 8 August 2023 to new applications by a family member of a qualifying British citizen. Those granted an EUSS family permit as such a family member via an application made by this date will still be able to come to the UK and apply to the EUSS.

    Extension of the Ukraine Extension Scheme

    We are extending the application deadline for the Ukraine extension scheme for a further six months to 16 May 2024.

    This change extends the scheme to allow Ukrainian nationals and their family members who obtain permission to enter or stay in the UK for any period between 18 March 2022 and 16 November 2023 to apply to the Ukraine extension scheme and obtain 36 months’ permission to stay in the UK. All applications must now to be made by 16 May 2024.

    The extension to the application deadline is intended to encourage people to apply for leave under the Ukraine extension scheme to ensure they maintain a lawful immigration status. This will provide greater certainty and clarity for the individual, the Home Office and other Government Departments and organisations which require evidence of immigration status to confirm entitlement to services.

    Student Route (dependants and switching)

    As announced by the Home Secretary on the 23 May 2023, and following the Government commitment to reduce net migration, we are removing the right for international students to bring dependants unless they are on postgraduate courses currently designated as research programmes. We are also removing the ability for international students to switch out of the student route into work routes before their studies have been completed.

    These changes preserve the ability for dependants already in the UK to extend their stay, and for international students on taught postgraduate courses beginning before 1 January 2024 to bring dependants. They also preserve existing exemptions for dependants of Government-sponsored students and for dependent children who are born in the UK.

    The switching restrictions will ensure that students are generally not switching in-country to another route until they have completed their course. Students on courses at degree level or above will be able to apply before course completion to switch to sponsored work routes, as long as their employment start date is not before course completion. Those studying towards PhDs will be able to switch after 24 months’ study.

    Asylum—pausing the differentiation policy

    Provisions within the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (NABA), which came into force on 28 June 2022, set out the framework to differentiate between two groups of refugees who ultimately remain in the UK: “group 1” and “group 2″.

    The primary way in which the groups are differentiated is the grant of permission to stay: group 1 refugees are normally granted refugee permission to stay for five years, after which they can apply for settlement, whereas group 2 refugees are normally granted temporary refugee permission to stay for 30 months on a 10-year route to settlement.

    The differentiation policy was intended to disincentivise migrants from using criminal smugglers to facilitate illegal journeys to the UK. This was the right approach. Since then, the scale of the challenge facing the UK, like other countries, has grown—and that is why the Government introduced the Illegal Migration Bill. The Bill goes further than ever before in seeking to deter illegal entry to the UK, so that the only humanitarian route into the UK is a safe and legal one. The Bill will radically overhaul how we deal with people who arrive in the UK illegally via safe countries, rendering their asylum and human rights claims (in respect of their home country) inadmissible and imposing a duty on the Home Secretary to remove them. This approach represents a considerably stronger means of tackling the same issue that the differentiation policy sought to address, people making dangerous and unnecessary journeys through safe countries to claim asylum in the UK.

    We will therefore pause the differentiation policy in the next package of immigration rules changes in July 2023. This means we will stop taking grouping decisions under the differentiated asylum system after these rules changes and those individuals who are successful in their asylum application, including those who are granted humanitarian protection, will receive the same conditions. Our ability to remove failed asylum applicant remains unchanged.

    Individuals who have already received a group 2 or humanitarian protection decision under post-28 June 2022 policies will be contacted and will have their conditions aligned to those afforded to group 1 refugees. This includes length of permission to stay, route to settlement, and eligibility for family reunion.

    On 23 February 2023 the Home Office announced the streamlined asylum processing model for a small number of cases of nationalities with high asylum grant rates: Afghanistan, Eritrea, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Because this model focuses on manifestly well-founded cases, positive decisions can be taken without the need for an additional interview. No one will have their asylum application refused without the opportunity of an additional interview.

    Those claims made between 28 June 2022 and the date of introduction of the Illegal Migration Bill (7 March 2023) will be processed according to this model. This, will also include claimants from Sudan. Sudanese legacy claimants are already being processed in line with established policies and processes and will be decided in line with the Prime Minister’s commitment to clear the backlog of legacy asylum claims by the end of 2023.

    Improving Clarity Regarding Withdrawing Asylum Claims

    The updated paragraph 333C provides clarity on the circumstances in which an asylum application will be withdrawn, whilst strengthening our ability to promptly withdraw asylum applications from individuals who do not comply with established processes.

    It clarifies that there will be no substantive consideration of asylum claims that have been withdrawn and provides greater flexibility to accept explicit withdrawals where a claimant requests to withdraw their claim in writing but fails to do so on a specified form, in doing so preventing duplicative correspondence with the claimant.

    In addition, the updates will support the efficient progression of applications by helping to prevent absconder scenarios by making it clear that the burden is on the claimant to keep the Home Office up to date with their contact details, and that failure to do so may result in a withdrawal of their asylum claim.

    Furthermore, it is now made clear that failure to attend a reporting event may result in an asylum application being treated as implicitly withdrawn, ensuring efficiency with application progression through preventing potential absconder scenarios.

    These changes will enable decision-making resources to be concentrated on those who genuinely wish to continue with their asylum claims in the United Kingdom.

    The changes to the Immigration Rules are being laid on 17 July 2023.

    The changes relating to asylum, pausing the differentiation policy and the changes relating to students will come into force at 3 pm today.

    The changes relating to the EUSS will come into effect on 9 August 2023.

    All other changes will come into effect on 7 August 2023.

  • Andrew Mitchell – 2023 Statement on Aid and Support for Afghanistan

    Andrew Mitchell – 2023 Statement on Aid and Support for Afghanistan

    The statement made by Andrew Mitchell, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, in the House of Commons on 17 July 2023.

    My Noble Friend, the Minister of State (Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and United Nations) (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon), has made the following Written Ministerial Statement:

    Today I am updating the House on UK efforts to support those most in need in Afghanistan. Afghanistan remains one of HM Government’s (HMG’s) largest bilateral aid allocations and we continue to be a major contributor to humanitarian, health and education support. Since April 2021, HMG has disbursed over £532 million in aid for Afghanistan while the country continues to experience one of the world’s most acute humanitarian crises. This financial year we have made a further commitment of £100 million and plan an additional £151 million for next financial year. HMG continues to influence international thinking on how to support basic services in Afghanistan, challenge the Taliban on human rights abuses, and build consensus on engaging with the Taliban to make progress on issues of mutual benefit. We remain committed that at least 50% of people reached with UK aid in Afghanistan will be women and girls, a commitment we met in 2021-22 and are on track to meet for 2022-23.

    The scale of the need in Afghanistan is profound. Two thirds of the population are estimated to be in humanitarian need. We remain appalled at the continued erosion of the rights of women and girls, which has led to their almost total exclusion from political, educational and social spaces. On 23 March 2022, the Taliban banned girls’ access to secondary schools and closed universities to women in December 2022. On 5 April 2023, the Taliban banned Afghan women from working for the UN in Afghanistan, extending their 24 December 2022 directive banning Afghan women from working for non-governmental organisations (NGOs). HMG has strongly condemned the Taliban’s decisions through a range of international statements, including the UN Security Council Resolution 2681. Together with like-minded countries—including those in the organisation of Islamic co-operation—we continue to press the Taliban to reverse their prohibitive decrees.

    Afghan women play a vital role in the delivery of aid operations, and the FCDO is supporting our international partners to adapt programmes and find solutions to include women and girls in the implementation of aid. Afghan women and girls must have safe and equitable access to aid. HMG continues to support girls’ education in Afghanistan through bilateral and multilateral contributions to NGOs, UN partners and multilateral funds. Educated, empowered women will contribute to Afghanistan’s economic development, as well as to its peace and stability.

    The UN’s Humanitarian Appeal for Afghanistan this year is for $3.2 billion and is currently only 15% funded. We continue to press donors to meet their commitments to support the Afghan people. In 2022-2023, the UK disbursed £95 million to the UN’s World Food Programme, supporting 4.2 million people. Through UNICEF, HMG expects to reach an estimated 1.6 million people with nutrition, water and sanitation, and child and social protection services in 2022-23. £50 million was allocated to the UN Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund last year to provide support for health, water, protection, shelter, food, livelihoods, and education interventions.

    As co-chair of the Afghanistan co-ordination group until recently, HMG has worked with international partners to deliver sustained essential services for the Afghan people. In 2022, HMG supported the Asian Development Bank to approve a $405 million package of support. This followed an approval in December 2021 to transfer $280 million of funds from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund to UN agencies. This funding supports UN agencies to finance core public health services, education, and the provision of emergency food services.

    We continue to engage pragmatically with the Taliban, primarily through the UK Mission to Afghanistan, based in Doha. FCDO ministers are in regular contact with their international counterparts on Afghanistan. In 2023 The Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP and I as Minister of State have met UN Deputy Secretary General, Amina Mohammed, Afghan women and civil society organisations to discuss the Taliban’s restrictions on women and girls. The Foreign Secretary and his ministerial team regularly discuss Afghanistan during their international engagements. The Prime Minister’s Special Representative to Afghanistan regularly engaged with international counterparts, including at a substantive meeting for special envoys hosted by the UN Secretary General in Doha in May 2023.

  • Andrew Mitchell – 2023 Statement on the 0.7% of GNI ODA Target

    Andrew Mitchell – 2023 Statement on the 0.7% of GNI ODA Target

    The statement made by Andrew Mitchell, the Foreign Office Minister of State, in the House of Commons on 17 July 2023.

    The Government took the difficult decision to reduce temporarily the official development assistance (ODA) budget from 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) to 0.5% from 2021, because of the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on the economy and public finances. The Government will return to 0.7% when the fiscal situation allows.

    The International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act 2015 envisages situations in which a departure from meeting the target of spending 0.7% of GNI on ODA may be necessary—for example, in response to “fiscal circumstances and, in particular, the likely impact of meeting the target on taxation, public spending and public borrowing”.

    The FCDO’s annual report and accounts for 2022-23, published today, reports that the 0.7% target was not met in 2022, on a provisional basis. As required by section 2 of the 2015 Act, an Un-numbered Act Paper has been laid before Parliament, in the same terms as this statement.

    In a written ministerial statement on 12 July 2021, my right hon. Friend the former Chancellor of the Exchequer confirmed that the decision to reduce the ODA budget is temporary and set out the conditions for returning to spending 0.7% of GNI on ODA. The principles for a return will be met when, on a sustainable basis, the Government are not borrowing for day-to-day spending and underlying debt is falling. The House of Commons voted to approve this approach to returning to 0.7% on 13 July 2021. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary reaffirmed this in his 22 November 2022 written ministerial statement.

    Each year the Government will review, in accordance with the 2015 Act, whether a return to spending 0.7% of GNI on ODA is possible against the latest fiscal forecast provided by the Office for Budget Responsibility. The most recent assessment, set out in HM Treasury’s autumn statement 2022, showed that the principles for a return to 0.7% had not been met.

  • Mark Spencer – 2023 Statement on Fisheries Management

    Mark Spencer – 2023 Statement on Fisheries Management

    The statement made by Mark Spencer, the Minister for Food, Farming and Fisheries, in the House of Commons on 17 July 2023.

    Today the UK Government are publishing a number of consultations and consultation responses, and announcing funding to use post-Brexit freedoms to support a thriving fishing sector.

    Seizing the opportunities of being an independent coastal state, the UK is introducing a world class system of fisheries management which draws on the best available science and the expertise of our fishermen and anglers to ensure that our fish stocks are healthy and sustainable long into the future.

    The UK has some of the finest fish stocks in the world. Healthy fish stocks are a vital resource, providing livelihoods, enjoyment, and prosperity to our coastal communities. Since we left the EU, the UK Government have taken important steps for our fishing industry, anglers and marine environment.

    As an independent coastal state, we negotiated significant uplifts in fishing opportunities for UK vessels, valued at around £101 million this year. We are investing in the long-term future of the UK fisheries sector through our £100 million UK Seafood Fund, to drive innovation, support job creation, and boost seafood exports to new markets. We introduced the first Fisheries Act for nearly thirty years and published the Joint Fisheries Statement.

    In replacing the Common Fisheries Policy with our own domestic policy, we aim to maximise our newfound freedoms to introduce a world class fisheries management system.

    Today we take another step in that journey, unveiling proposals for a reform package that will transform how we manage our fisheries. Ensuring a thriving, sustainable industry and healthy marine environment for future generations. These reforms play a crucial role in achieving the goals in our Environmental Improvement Plan and the UK Government Food Strategy as well as levelling up some of our much-loved coastal towns and communities.

    This new system will be underpinned by Fisheries Management Plans—blueprints for how best to manage fish stocks—with the first six published today, including bass, king scallops, crab and lobster.

    Based on the best available science and experience from fishermen and anglers, FMPs assess the fish stocks, and set out actions to manage them sustainably. The first six draft FMPs and associated environmental reports are being published today for consultation.

    We are also consulting on a range of other important changes. These include:

    Expanding the use of remote electronic monitoring (REM) in English waters.

    Introducing a new approach to managing discards in England.

    Establishing a licensed recreational bluefin tuna fishery.

    Permanently lifting the quota cap on licences for small vessels in English waters.

    We are also awarding £45.6 million to modernise and improve infrastructure across the seafood sector, helping to support around 1,500 jobs and ensure we are using the best science, research, and technology in fisheries management as part of our £100 million UK Seafood Fund.

    Finally, we are publishing a response to our consultation on flyseining measures in English waters, noting we will change legislation to make squid fishing more sustainable and will take forward other measures through the FMPs. We will also publish the summary of responses to our consultation on spatial management measures for sandeels. A clear majority of respondents supported a proposal of a full closure of sandeel fishing in English waters of the North Sea.

    This package marks a clear departure from the Common Fisheries Policy and will deliver our ambition to build a modern, resilient and profitable fishing industry underpinned by sustainable fish stocks and a healthy marine environment.