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Category: Defence

  • Leo Docherty – 2021 Statement on Lords Amendment 2B of the Armed Forces Bill

    Leo Docherty – 2021 Statement on Lords Amendment 2B of the Armed Forces Bill

    The statement made by Leo Docherty, the Minister for Defence, in the House of Commons on 13 December 2021.

    The House knows that this Bill is vital: it renews the Armed Forces Act 2006, so that the armed forces can continue to operate and enforce a system of discipline, and it also fulfils our commitment to further enshrine the armed forces covenant into law.

    On Lords amendment 1B, we have been listening to hon. Members here and in the other place. The Government recognise the fact that all Members of this House want to do the best for our armed forces and to ensure that criminal wrongdoing is robustly addressed for the sake of our forces and for the victims of crime. We are particularly mindful about the prominence that statistics have recently played in this debate. The Government have always welcomed scrutiny of our own performance and the role that parliamentarians have in performing that scrutiny. We should ensure that the statistics that we use are clear, transparent and cover the most serious offending that Parliament is concerned about. I am happy to confirm that we will therefore commit to an expansion and an improvement of our existing annual statistical update on sexual offending in the armed forces to include other serious offences.

    Our bulletin in spring 2022, in addition to reporting on rape statistics, will now include granular data on cases of murder and manslaughter, and, for sexual offending, those cases involving personnel serving in the armed forces who are under 18 at the time of the offence. Furthermore, from January 2022, we will start to record separately information about domestic violence and child sexual abuse in the service justice system, so that those, too, can be reported on in our spring 2023 bulletin.

    These bulletins will include information relating to police investigations, as well as court martial proceedings, meaning that all data related to the categories of serious offences referred to in the amendment of Lord Thomas of Gresford will be included. This will include: the number of reported incidents; how many cases are referred from the service police to the service prosecution authority; how many cases the service prosecution authority are able to prosecute; how many cases go to court martial; and how many cases result in a guilty verdict. We believe that this will increase the transparency of, and the confidence in, the service justice system, and we welcome this scrutiny. Greater reporting will demonstrate the good work that we are doing through this Bill, not least the establishment of the defence serious crime unit, and it is right that data is available to hold Government to account.

    Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)

    I have been listening very carefully to what my hon. Friend has to say. He has talked about the need for transparency, and, clearly, that is demonstrable and welcome. On the reports to which he now refers, he obviously hopes that they will make his case for him as they are published. If they do not, what happens then, other than just becoming tomes to gather dust in his or his successor’s office or in the Secretary of State’s office? In practical terms, what will be done to change the policies?

    Leo Docherty

    I reassure my hon. Friend that we will keep this under review. We are prepared to be judged by our performance.

    Simon Hoare

    I tell my children that I keep a lot of things under review, knowing full well that I will never acquiesce in what they are asking for—I hope they are not listening this evening. I know that my hon. Friend understands that this is a serious point for many of us. Keeping something under review, to ask us now to support the Government’s line, is laudable, but we need a bit more flesh on the bones as to what happens if the data in this report does not land where he and I—let us be frank—would hope that it would. One can keep something under review, but if there is no promise to come back with changes to the legislation, that is a pie-crust promise.

    Leo Docherty

    I expect the data to justify our confidence in the service justice system. My hon. Friend knows that the Government believe very strongly that the SJS needs to retain the full complement of capability because our armed forces are expeditionary by design and our justice system also needs to be expeditionary. He may not mean it sincerely when he deals with the children, but he will see that in my remarks this evening we certainly are sincere in our position.

    Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)

    My hon. Friend makes the point that we are expeditionary by design. I understand that, but I do not see how that links to the issue addressed by Lords amendment 1B, which is essentially that, where the offence is committed in the United Kingdom, unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary, which might involve an expeditionary issue, there should logically be a presumption that the starting point is dealing with it in the civilian system. What contradiction is there between the expeditionary nature of our armed forces—under certain circumstances, but not all—and a rebuttable presumption that the civilian system should hear offences committed in the United Kingdom?

    Leo Docherty

    My hon. Friend makes the case for flexibility, and I am pleased to confirm that we retain that flexibility through the protocol we have legislated for. The bottom line is that the civilian prosecutor will always have the final say, and it is principally for that reason that I urge hon. Members to reject Lords amendment 1B.

    Sir Robert Neill

    I understand what the Minister says about the civilian prosecutor’s ultimately having the final say, but an issue was raised last time about the role of the Attorney General, and whether there was a dangerous jurisdictional aspect in the Attorney’s consent being involved. The amendment removes that stumbling block. With that removed, and given what the Minister has said about flexibility, what now is the objection to the amendment in lieu, as opposed to the original Lords amendment?

    Leo Docherty

    The objection principally is about our need for an expeditionary system that should not be salami sliced. If we start to take components out of our service justice system, it would undermine the confidence that those serving should have. That is an additional reason for us to reject the amendment this evening.

    Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)

    The Minister is discussing an incredibly important issue, but in terms of “doing the right thing for the armed forces”, does he share my belief that it is also important that the Ministry of Defence resolve with the Home Office the outstanding question of the free visa applications for servicemen and women who are of non-UK nationality? Does he share my belief that the current proposal of 12 years’ service before such a free visa is available is too long a period for those involved, for us and for the wider public?

    Leo Docherty

    I am very pleased that my hon. Friend has raised such an important question. We are hugely grateful for the amazing contribution that our foreign and Commonwealth servicepeople make. I cannot pre-empt the Government announcement on the results of the consultation, but return of service is an important principle and I think it will be at the heart of the Government’s policy when it is announced in due course.

    Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)

    Will my hon. Friend allow me?

    Leo Docherty

    I would be delighted.

    Dr Lewis

    I am glad to be such a cause of pleasure to my hon. and gallant Friend. I am not a lawyer, so this might be entirely irrelevant, but I do not think so: before he leaves this first amendment, could he say whether those serious cases of murder abroad, such as has been reported in relation to an incident in Kenya some years ago—I appreciate that that case may still be live—are affected by this tussle between the upper House and this House on the question of whether such matters should be considered by court martial or civilian court? In other words, where there is a failure of the local police in another country, is it the Government’s case that the court martial system or the civilian legal system is better able to deal with it?

    Leo Docherty

    I am grateful for my right hon. Friend’s contribution; that is a very good case in point, and points to circumstances—although the numbers may be very small—in which the British military has to deploy to ungoverned spaces, let us say. Of course, that is not the case with regard to Kenya, but there are definitely advantages to the expeditionary capability of our service justice system.

    I move now to Lords amendment 2B, which would require a report to be laid within six months of this Bill’s receiving Royal Assent, setting out the implications of not applying the new covenant duty to central Government. The Government have already committed to reviewing the operation of the covenant duty to inform us on whether other policy areas or functions could be usefully included. Having listened carefully to the issues that have been so vigorously raised, and recognising the strength of feeling across both Houses, I can now commit to going further.

    Indeed, we are going further than Lords amendment 2B in the scope of the review we have in mind. We will review the operation of the new duty across the UK and will consider whether it would be beneficial to add to its scope. That will include specific consideration of whether central Government and any of their functions could usefully be added. The Government will report on the review as part of the covenant annual report in 2023, 18 months after the new duty is expected to come into effect. That timescale is more realistic than the six-month timeline from Royal Assent suggested by their lordships, which in our judgment is too short a period for any meaningful review to take place.

    Given that we expect to see the new duty standing up in law by the middle of 2022 at the earliest, we also need to allow for an implementation period to give local authorities time to adjust to their new responsibilities. We therefore believe that to conduct and publish a review at the 18-month point of the new duty having been in operation is most appropriate. However, given the level of interest in the new duty, we will provide an interim update in the covenant annual report in December 2022, some six months after the duty is expected to come into effect. At that point, we will be able to say more about the scope and methodology for conducting the review, and MPs will have the opportunity to assess and comment in the 2022 covenant report debate.

    The Government are committed to ensuring that parliamentarians from both Houses can contribute and give their views as part of the review process. I put on record my thanks and appreciation for the contributions of Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Craig of Radley. They, like us, want to see good law put in place to support our armed forces. In the light of the commitment that I have given, I urge the House to support the Government in resisting Lords amendment 2B.

  • Ben Wallace – 2021 Statement on UK Troops Assisting Poland

    Ben Wallace – 2021 Statement on UK Troops Assisting Poland

    The statement made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on 9 December 2021.

    I am today informing the House of the deployment of UK military personnel to Poland to provide assistance to the Polish armed forces.

    For a number of months Poland, along with their Baltic neighbours Latvia and Lithuania, have been under significant pressure from irregular migration originating across their border with Belarus, and facilitated by the Lukashenko regime. Poland has every right to protect its borders within international law in the face of an unprecedented and volatile situation. The UK is committed to standing shoulder-to-shoulder with our close allies as part of our commitment to European security.

    For this reason, the UK is deploying a squadron of Royal Engineers, along with associated support elements, to Poland in order to support Polish troops with specific engineering tasks. This follows the deployment on 11 November 2021 of an initial engineer reconnaissance element. This is not a combat deployment.

    This engineer squadron will be in addition to, but separate from, the 150 UK personnel based in Poland since 2017 as part of the US-led multinational battlegroup under NATO’s enhanced forward presence. The engineering personnel will be deploying on a bilateral basis, as UK national activity in support of a close ally. They are not deploying as part of a NATO response or operation and will not be under NATO command or control. The engineers are planned to be deployed until the end of April 2022.

  • Ben Wallace – 2021 Comments on the High North

    Ben Wallace – 2021 Comments on the High North

    The comments made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 10 December 2021.

    At a time of growing threats and increasing competition in the High North, we have some of the closest cooperation with our Danish, Swedish and Norwegian partners.

    We work together annually on military exercises and operations, learning from each other and strengthening our partnerships.

    Our ability to operate in this way is the firm foundation of our shared resolve to stand up for our values.

  • Jeremy Quin – 2021 Comments on Sky Sabre

    Jeremy Quin – 2021 Comments on Sky Sabre

    The comments made by Jeremy Quin, the Defence Procurement Minister, on 6 December 2021.

    Sky Sabre’s spearheading technology has significantly upgraded the protection of our forces from threats from the air. This cutting-edge of defence system is a clear demonstration of our warfighting capabilities to those who wish to do us harm.

  • Ben Wallace – 2021 Comments on Storm Arwen

    Ben Wallace – 2021 Comments on Storm Arwen

    The comments made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 4 December 2021.

    Our dedicated Armed Forces personnel are working side by side with civil authorities to provide essential support to communities impacted by Storm Arwen.

    The ability to deploy quickly to wherever in the UK assistance is requested makes us all safer and ensures we are able to look protect the most vulnerable in our society.

  • Ben Wallace – 2021 Comments on Future Soldier

    Ben Wallace – 2021 Comments on Future Soldier

    The comments made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 25 November 2021.

    Future Soldier is reinforced by the ambition outlined in the Defence Command Paper to transform the Army into a more agile, integrated, lethal, expeditionary force.

    We have underpinned this generational work with an extra £8.6bn for Army equipment, bringing the total investment to £41.3 billion.

    Our army will operate across the globe, equipped with the capabilities to face down a myriad of threats from cyber warfare through to battlefield conflict.

  • Ben Wallace – 2021 Statement on Afghan Relocations Assistance Data Breach

    Ben Wallace – 2021 Statement on Afghan Relocations Assistance Data Breach

    The statement made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on 15 November 2021.

    On 21 September, l committed to update the House on an investigation into MOD data breaches concerning the email addresses of Afghan nationals who are eligible for the Afghanistan relocations and assistance policy, but at that time remained in Afghanistan.

    Incident

    The first report of a data breach was received on the evening of 20 September and consisted of 245 live email addresses. On 22 September, following my statement to the House, the MOD was made aware of a previous breach of 55 addresses—10 of which were in addition to the first breach—which had occurred on 13 September. Subsequent investigations identified that a third breach had occurred on 7 September involving an additional 13 email addresses not previously compromised.

    Upon learning of the initial breach, I immediately ordered the undertaking of an investigation and any actions that would prevent further breaches. The investigation was conducted in two parts. The first addressed the circumstances of the breach, its causes and the immediate and longer-term actions required to prevent recurrences and mitigate any potential additional risks to those Afghan nationals affected. The second part of the investigation concerned the data handling and data protection arrangements that were in use by the ARAP team and made recommendations on how best to ensure an appropriate data handling regime was in place.

    Investigation findings

    The investigation has concluded that the breaches arose in almost identical circumstances. All three took place in the ARAP casework team, tasked with providing personal support and advice to the cohort of ARAP-eligible Afghan nationals and all involved a group email to elements of that cohort, which used the “carbon copy” instead of “blind carbon copy” field to anonymise the recipients.

    The cause of these mistakes was not simply human error in isolation, but a lack of written standard operating procedures and training, which should have prevented such a mistake being made. That in turn was assessed to be the result of several contributing factors, all arising from the intense speed, scale and operational pressure of the casework, and the fact that the team had been built and then expanded quickly in order to support the rapid increase in activity necessary as a result of the evacuation. As a result, some members of the team were inexperienced and insufficiently trained for such casework management.

    The ARAP team’s efforts to evacuate as many Afghans as possible in a short period of time was followed by a rapid transition to communicating with those who were unable to relocate, in order to begin providing follow-on support. In the haste of this transition the risks arising from changing how officials communicated—which had previously been done on an individual basis, often by telephone rather than email—were not fully recognised or managed.

    The MOD has undertaken further investigation of any possible increased threat to those affected. While media reports have indicated some localised Taliban reprisals against Afghan nationals formerly employed by coalition forces, the MOD assesses that the Taliban are not conducting centrally directed and co-ordinated targeting of ARAP-eligible persons. The investigation found that no further personal or locational information was revealed in the data breaches that has substantively increased the ability of the Taliban to target ARAP-eligible persons.

    All ARAP-eligible individuals whose details were involved were notified within 30 minutes on discovery of the breach on 20 September and advised on actions to minimise the risk to them and have subsequently been contacted to provide additional security advice. The MOD is not aware that anyone has come to harm as a result of these breaches, but continues to provide security support to ARAP-eligible families while they await relocation to the UK.

    Remedial actions

    Significant remedial actions have now been taken to prevent such incidents occurring again. These include:

    Establishing new data handling procedures for ARAP casework management.

    Ensuring all staff appointed to the ARAP team are fully aware of those procedures and trained in their proper employment.

    Creating a “Registry” function, with authority over data handling procedures and a remit to continually improve those processes and assure that all staff are familiar and compliant with them.

    Appointing additional ARAP team members with specific responsibilities for all record keeping and information management.

    Instigating a “two pairs of eyes rule” so that any external email to an ARAP-eligible Afghan national must be reviewed by a second member of the team before it is sent.

    Ensuring that any group emails, such as routine updates, must be authorised at the OF-5 or B1 level (i.e. Colonel equivalent).

    As a consequence of the breaches, two personnel were suspended from the ARAP team, pending the outcome of the investigation. The individuals’ actions that contributed to the data breaches were not found to have been deliberate or negligent, but the result of insufficient training and data handling procedures. They have subsequently been reassigned to other roles, outside of the ARAP team.

    The ARAP team has now received additional recommendations and support from Defence Digital—the directorate responsible for ensuring effective use of digital and information technology across Defence—which are being applied to further improve the ARAP team’s handling and protection of casework data. Finally, the MOD reported itself to the Information Commissioner and will co-operate fully with all investigations and findings.

    The remedial actions outlined above are already providing much greater assurance of data handling within the ARAP team. I am confident that their continued application is sufficient to prevent any recurrence, but have directed that the team seeks to continually improve its processes.

    ARAP progress

    The data breaches detailed above were unacceptable and fell short of the high standards to which the MOD typically holds itself. They were also a breach of the trust many former Afghan staff have placed in us to honour our commitment and do all that we can to keep them safe. We continue that work and it is also important to reflect on the scale of the challenges and achievements of the ARAP team.

    Since the scheme was launched in April over 89,000 applications have been made and many more continue to be received, each requiring detailed review and processing. As a result of these efforts more than 7,000 Afghan nationals—staff and their families—who worked in support of the Government’s mission in Afghanistan have now been successfully relocated to start new lives in the security of United Kingdom.

    There were a further 311 ARAP-eligible Afghans who were called forward with their families during the evacuation operation, but sadly unable to board flights. There are now fewer than 200 remaining in Afghanistan and we continue to work with urgency to relocate all those who remain via a range of routes. Those who have left Afghanistan for third countries are being provided with support in-country and assisted to continue their journey to the UK. As part of that process we have already conducted five RAF flights, carrying more than 400 people. The flights will continue as long as necessary and the ARAP scheme is not time-bounded so any further applicants who are found to be eligible will continue to be relocated indefinitely.

    The scale of these achievements should not be underestimated and has been made possible by the professionalism and determination of the ARAP team and their colleagues across Defence who continue to honour our debt of gratitude to the Afghan nationals who supported our operations in the country. ARAP remains a foremost priority for the MOD and I continue to closely monitor the progress of the ARAP team to ensure its performance remains of the highest possible standard.

    I would like to take the opportunity to assure the House that although the impact of these breaches appears to have been limited, all breaches of personal data are taken extremely seriously by MOD.

    Finally, I offer again my sincerest apologies to all those affected by these data breaches and assure them that we continue to make every effort to relocate them to the UK as quickly and safely as possible.

  • Sadiq Khan – 2021 Comments Following Remembrance Service

    Sadiq Khan – 2021 Comments Following Remembrance Service

    The comments made by Sadiq Khan, the Mayor of London, on 12 November 2021.

    I am truly humbled by the brave sacrifices of our armed forces. Their heroism made the precious freedoms we enjoy every day possible.

    We are in their debt and it is a true privilege to come together, stop, remember and honour those who paid the ultimate price for our freedom.

    This Remembrance Day, we reflect on the incredible courage of the service men and women who have worked to keep us safe and remember to never take for granted those who continue to protect our way of life.

  • James Heappey – 2021 Comments on Daesh Weapons Seized in Mali

    James Heappey – 2021 Comments on Daesh Weapons Seized in Mali

    The comments made by James Heappey, the Minister for the Armed Forces, on 3 November 2021.

    These operations are yet another example of how UK peacekeepers are making a real difference to the UN mission to protect civilians in Mali.

    Disrupting armed groups and taking valuable weapons and ammunition out of the hands of terrorists makes communities safer, while our presence in the region helps the UN mission to understand and counter threats to the local population.

  • James Cleverly – 2021 Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    James Cleverly – 2021 Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The statement made by James Cleverly, the Minister for the Middle East and North Africa, in the House of Commons on 1 November 2021.

    Today the UK published its national report ahead of the 10th review conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT). This report reviews the progress that the UK has made against the NPT’s three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It will be submitted to the UN before the 10th review conference that will take place in New York in January 2022.

    The UK’s commitment to the treaty and to fulfilling our NPT obligations remains undiminished. As an original signatory of the NPT, and a nuclear weapon state that takes its responsibilities seriously, the UK remains committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons where all states share in the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies.

    The NPT has been an unmitigated success for over 50 years. It is the centre of international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, to create a nuclear weapon-free world, and to enable access to the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

    Despite its successes, we should not underestimate the challenges facing the global nuclear order. We have previously identified risks to the UK from major nuclear armed states, emerging nuclear states and state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. Those risks have not gone away; some have increased. We face a deteriorating nuclear security environment. The increase in global competition, challenges to the international order, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons pose a significant challenge to strategic stability. We must work to reverse this trend. The NPT will be central to this and we must continue to work with others to reinforce the parts of the international architecture that are under threat. We must also shape the international order of the future so that it can respond effectively.

    We are proud of our contributions to the NPT and the steps we have taken since the last review conference in 2015.

    We have played a leading role by pioneering work in nuclear disarmament verification, championing transparency and advancing risk reduction. We continue to work closely with international partners, civil society and academia to enhance mutual trust and confidence and create the environment for further progress on disarmament. We continue to press for significant steps towards multilateral disarmament. This includes the entry into force of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and successful negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the conference on disarmament. We possess the smallest stockpile of any of the nuclear weapon states recognised by the NPT and are the only one to maintain a single delivery system. Maintaining the UK’s nuclear deterrent capability at a minimum credible level, taking into account the international environment, is fully consistent with our international legal obligations, including those under article VI of the NPT.

    The UK continues to be a strong supporter of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which underpins non-proliferation under the NPT. We have sought to strengthen the international nuclear safeguards system, through our diplomatic efforts and through direct assistance from our nuclear safeguards programme. The review conference offers opportunities to encourage all states that have not yet done so to sign, ratify and implement safeguards agreements. We seek new opportunities to enhance the security of nuclear materials, ensuring these arrangements remain robust and evolve to meet new threats. We will promote the ratification of security conventions at the review conference and continue to provide direct assistance to other states through our global nuclear security programme.

    Finally yet importantly, we want to highlight the sometimes overlooked part of the NPT: the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies. The UK has encouraged and will continue to encourage the development and exchange of peaceful nuclear technologies enabled by the NPT. This has a positive impact on people’s lives through nuclear medicine, food safety and pest control. Nuclear technologies have a critical part to play in tackling climate change—not only in helping to achieve net zero, but also through nuclear applications that can help countries to adapt and become more resilient to climate change.

    Looking towards the 10th review conference, the UK seeks an outcome that strengthens the NPT as the irreplaceable foundation and framework for our common efforts on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The UK is ready to work with all countries to strengthen the regime and to promote international stability, peace and security.

    A copy of the report has been placed in the Libraries of both Houses and on the www.gov.uk website.