Category: Defence

  • Ben Wallace – 2021 Statement on UK Troops Assisting Poland

    Ben Wallace – 2021 Statement on UK Troops Assisting Poland

    The statement made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on 9 December 2021.

    I am today informing the House of the deployment of UK military personnel to Poland to provide assistance to the Polish armed forces.

    For a number of months Poland, along with their Baltic neighbours Latvia and Lithuania, have been under significant pressure from irregular migration originating across their border with Belarus, and facilitated by the Lukashenko regime. Poland has every right to protect its borders within international law in the face of an unprecedented and volatile situation. The UK is committed to standing shoulder-to-shoulder with our close allies as part of our commitment to European security.

    For this reason, the UK is deploying a squadron of Royal Engineers, along with associated support elements, to Poland in order to support Polish troops with specific engineering tasks. This follows the deployment on 11 November 2021 of an initial engineer reconnaissance element. This is not a combat deployment.

    This engineer squadron will be in addition to, but separate from, the 150 UK personnel based in Poland since 2017 as part of the US-led multinational battlegroup under NATO’s enhanced forward presence. The engineering personnel will be deploying on a bilateral basis, as UK national activity in support of a close ally. They are not deploying as part of a NATO response or operation and will not be under NATO command or control. The engineers are planned to be deployed until the end of April 2022.

  • Ben Wallace – 2021 Comments on the High North

    Ben Wallace – 2021 Comments on the High North

    The comments made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 10 December 2021.

    At a time of growing threats and increasing competition in the High North, we have some of the closest cooperation with our Danish, Swedish and Norwegian partners.

    We work together annually on military exercises and operations, learning from each other and strengthening our partnerships.

    Our ability to operate in this way is the firm foundation of our shared resolve to stand up for our values.

  • Jeremy Quin – 2021 Comments on Sky Sabre

    Jeremy Quin – 2021 Comments on Sky Sabre

    The comments made by Jeremy Quin, the Defence Procurement Minister, on 6 December 2021.

    Sky Sabre’s spearheading technology has significantly upgraded the protection of our forces from threats from the air. This cutting-edge of defence system is a clear demonstration of our warfighting capabilities to those who wish to do us harm.

  • Ben Wallace – 2021 Comments on Storm Arwen

    Ben Wallace – 2021 Comments on Storm Arwen

    The comments made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 4 December 2021.

    Our dedicated Armed Forces personnel are working side by side with civil authorities to provide essential support to communities impacted by Storm Arwen.

    The ability to deploy quickly to wherever in the UK assistance is requested makes us all safer and ensures we are able to look protect the most vulnerable in our society.

  • Ben Wallace – 2021 Comments on Future Soldier

    Ben Wallace – 2021 Comments on Future Soldier

    The comments made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 25 November 2021.

    Future Soldier is reinforced by the ambition outlined in the Defence Command Paper to transform the Army into a more agile, integrated, lethal, expeditionary force.

    We have underpinned this generational work with an extra £8.6bn for Army equipment, bringing the total investment to £41.3 billion.

    Our army will operate across the globe, equipped with the capabilities to face down a myriad of threats from cyber warfare through to battlefield conflict.

  • Ben Wallace – 2021 Statement on Afghan Relocations Assistance Data Breach

    Ben Wallace – 2021 Statement on Afghan Relocations Assistance Data Breach

    The statement made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on 15 November 2021.

    On 21 September, l committed to update the House on an investigation into MOD data breaches concerning the email addresses of Afghan nationals who are eligible for the Afghanistan relocations and assistance policy, but at that time remained in Afghanistan.

    Incident

    The first report of a data breach was received on the evening of 20 September and consisted of 245 live email addresses. On 22 September, following my statement to the House, the MOD was made aware of a previous breach of 55 addresses—10 of which were in addition to the first breach—which had occurred on 13 September. Subsequent investigations identified that a third breach had occurred on 7 September involving an additional 13 email addresses not previously compromised.

    Upon learning of the initial breach, I immediately ordered the undertaking of an investigation and any actions that would prevent further breaches. The investigation was conducted in two parts. The first addressed the circumstances of the breach, its causes and the immediate and longer-term actions required to prevent recurrences and mitigate any potential additional risks to those Afghan nationals affected. The second part of the investigation concerned the data handling and data protection arrangements that were in use by the ARAP team and made recommendations on how best to ensure an appropriate data handling regime was in place.

    Investigation findings

    The investigation has concluded that the breaches arose in almost identical circumstances. All three took place in the ARAP casework team, tasked with providing personal support and advice to the cohort of ARAP-eligible Afghan nationals and all involved a group email to elements of that cohort, which used the “carbon copy” instead of “blind carbon copy” field to anonymise the recipients.

    The cause of these mistakes was not simply human error in isolation, but a lack of written standard operating procedures and training, which should have prevented such a mistake being made. That in turn was assessed to be the result of several contributing factors, all arising from the intense speed, scale and operational pressure of the casework, and the fact that the team had been built and then expanded quickly in order to support the rapid increase in activity necessary as a result of the evacuation. As a result, some members of the team were inexperienced and insufficiently trained for such casework management.

    The ARAP team’s efforts to evacuate as many Afghans as possible in a short period of time was followed by a rapid transition to communicating with those who were unable to relocate, in order to begin providing follow-on support. In the haste of this transition the risks arising from changing how officials communicated—which had previously been done on an individual basis, often by telephone rather than email—were not fully recognised or managed.

    The MOD has undertaken further investigation of any possible increased threat to those affected. While media reports have indicated some localised Taliban reprisals against Afghan nationals formerly employed by coalition forces, the MOD assesses that the Taliban are not conducting centrally directed and co-ordinated targeting of ARAP-eligible persons. The investigation found that no further personal or locational information was revealed in the data breaches that has substantively increased the ability of the Taliban to target ARAP-eligible persons.

    All ARAP-eligible individuals whose details were involved were notified within 30 minutes on discovery of the breach on 20 September and advised on actions to minimise the risk to them and have subsequently been contacted to provide additional security advice. The MOD is not aware that anyone has come to harm as a result of these breaches, but continues to provide security support to ARAP-eligible families while they await relocation to the UK.

    Remedial actions

    Significant remedial actions have now been taken to prevent such incidents occurring again. These include:

    Establishing new data handling procedures for ARAP casework management.

    Ensuring all staff appointed to the ARAP team are fully aware of those procedures and trained in their proper employment.

    Creating a “Registry” function, with authority over data handling procedures and a remit to continually improve those processes and assure that all staff are familiar and compliant with them.

    Appointing additional ARAP team members with specific responsibilities for all record keeping and information management.

    Instigating a “two pairs of eyes rule” so that any external email to an ARAP-eligible Afghan national must be reviewed by a second member of the team before it is sent.

    Ensuring that any group emails, such as routine updates, must be authorised at the OF-5 or B1 level (i.e. Colonel equivalent).

    As a consequence of the breaches, two personnel were suspended from the ARAP team, pending the outcome of the investigation. The individuals’ actions that contributed to the data breaches were not found to have been deliberate or negligent, but the result of insufficient training and data handling procedures. They have subsequently been reassigned to other roles, outside of the ARAP team.

    The ARAP team has now received additional recommendations and support from Defence Digital—the directorate responsible for ensuring effective use of digital and information technology across Defence—which are being applied to further improve the ARAP team’s handling and protection of casework data. Finally, the MOD reported itself to the Information Commissioner and will co-operate fully with all investigations and findings.

    The remedial actions outlined above are already providing much greater assurance of data handling within the ARAP team. I am confident that their continued application is sufficient to prevent any recurrence, but have directed that the team seeks to continually improve its processes.

    ARAP progress

    The data breaches detailed above were unacceptable and fell short of the high standards to which the MOD typically holds itself. They were also a breach of the trust many former Afghan staff have placed in us to honour our commitment and do all that we can to keep them safe. We continue that work and it is also important to reflect on the scale of the challenges and achievements of the ARAP team.

    Since the scheme was launched in April over 89,000 applications have been made and many more continue to be received, each requiring detailed review and processing. As a result of these efforts more than 7,000 Afghan nationals—staff and their families—who worked in support of the Government’s mission in Afghanistan have now been successfully relocated to start new lives in the security of United Kingdom.

    There were a further 311 ARAP-eligible Afghans who were called forward with their families during the evacuation operation, but sadly unable to board flights. There are now fewer than 200 remaining in Afghanistan and we continue to work with urgency to relocate all those who remain via a range of routes. Those who have left Afghanistan for third countries are being provided with support in-country and assisted to continue their journey to the UK. As part of that process we have already conducted five RAF flights, carrying more than 400 people. The flights will continue as long as necessary and the ARAP scheme is not time-bounded so any further applicants who are found to be eligible will continue to be relocated indefinitely.

    The scale of these achievements should not be underestimated and has been made possible by the professionalism and determination of the ARAP team and their colleagues across Defence who continue to honour our debt of gratitude to the Afghan nationals who supported our operations in the country. ARAP remains a foremost priority for the MOD and I continue to closely monitor the progress of the ARAP team to ensure its performance remains of the highest possible standard.

    I would like to take the opportunity to assure the House that although the impact of these breaches appears to have been limited, all breaches of personal data are taken extremely seriously by MOD.

    Finally, I offer again my sincerest apologies to all those affected by these data breaches and assure them that we continue to make every effort to relocate them to the UK as quickly and safely as possible.

  • Sadiq Khan – 2021 Comments Following Remembrance Service

    Sadiq Khan – 2021 Comments Following Remembrance Service

    The comments made by Sadiq Khan, the Mayor of London, on 12 November 2021.

    I am truly humbled by the brave sacrifices of our armed forces. Their heroism made the precious freedoms we enjoy every day possible.

    We are in their debt and it is a true privilege to come together, stop, remember and honour those who paid the ultimate price for our freedom.

    This Remembrance Day, we reflect on the incredible courage of the service men and women who have worked to keep us safe and remember to never take for granted those who continue to protect our way of life.

  • James Heappey – 2021 Comments on Daesh Weapons Seized in Mali

    James Heappey – 2021 Comments on Daesh Weapons Seized in Mali

    The comments made by James Heappey, the Minister for the Armed Forces, on 3 November 2021.

    These operations are yet another example of how UK peacekeepers are making a real difference to the UN mission to protect civilians in Mali.

    Disrupting armed groups and taking valuable weapons and ammunition out of the hands of terrorists makes communities safer, while our presence in the region helps the UN mission to understand and counter threats to the local population.

  • James Cleverly – 2021 Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    James Cleverly – 2021 Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The statement made by James Cleverly, the Minister for the Middle East and North Africa, in the House of Commons on 1 November 2021.

    Today the UK published its national report ahead of the 10th review conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT). This report reviews the progress that the UK has made against the NPT’s three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It will be submitted to the UN before the 10th review conference that will take place in New York in January 2022.

    The UK’s commitment to the treaty and to fulfilling our NPT obligations remains undiminished. As an original signatory of the NPT, and a nuclear weapon state that takes its responsibilities seriously, the UK remains committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons where all states share in the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies.

    The NPT has been an unmitigated success for over 50 years. It is the centre of international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, to create a nuclear weapon-free world, and to enable access to the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

    Despite its successes, we should not underestimate the challenges facing the global nuclear order. We have previously identified risks to the UK from major nuclear armed states, emerging nuclear states and state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. Those risks have not gone away; some have increased. We face a deteriorating nuclear security environment. The increase in global competition, challenges to the international order, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons pose a significant challenge to strategic stability. We must work to reverse this trend. The NPT will be central to this and we must continue to work with others to reinforce the parts of the international architecture that are under threat. We must also shape the international order of the future so that it can respond effectively.

    We are proud of our contributions to the NPT and the steps we have taken since the last review conference in 2015.

    We have played a leading role by pioneering work in nuclear disarmament verification, championing transparency and advancing risk reduction. We continue to work closely with international partners, civil society and academia to enhance mutual trust and confidence and create the environment for further progress on disarmament. We continue to press for significant steps towards multilateral disarmament. This includes the entry into force of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and successful negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the conference on disarmament. We possess the smallest stockpile of any of the nuclear weapon states recognised by the NPT and are the only one to maintain a single delivery system. Maintaining the UK’s nuclear deterrent capability at a minimum credible level, taking into account the international environment, is fully consistent with our international legal obligations, including those under article VI of the NPT.

    The UK continues to be a strong supporter of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which underpins non-proliferation under the NPT. We have sought to strengthen the international nuclear safeguards system, through our diplomatic efforts and through direct assistance from our nuclear safeguards programme. The review conference offers opportunities to encourage all states that have not yet done so to sign, ratify and implement safeguards agreements. We seek new opportunities to enhance the security of nuclear materials, ensuring these arrangements remain robust and evolve to meet new threats. We will promote the ratification of security conventions at the review conference and continue to provide direct assistance to other states through our global nuclear security programme.

    Finally yet importantly, we want to highlight the sometimes overlooked part of the NPT: the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies. The UK has encouraged and will continue to encourage the development and exchange of peaceful nuclear technologies enabled by the NPT. This has a positive impact on people’s lives through nuclear medicine, food safety and pest control. Nuclear technologies have a critical part to play in tackling climate change—not only in helping to achieve net zero, but also through nuclear applications that can help countries to adapt and become more resilient to climate change.

    Looking towards the 10th review conference, the UK seeks an outcome that strengthens the NPT as the irreplaceable foundation and framework for our common efforts on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The UK is ready to work with all countries to strengthen the regime and to promote international stability, peace and security.

    A copy of the report has been placed in the Libraries of both Houses and on the www.gov.uk website.

  • Greg Hands – 2021 Statement on Fees for Military Drivers During Fuel Crisis

    Greg Hands – 2021 Statement on Fees for Military Drivers During Fuel Crisis

    The statement made by Greg Hands, the Minister of State at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, in the House of Commons on 27 October 2021.

    The Secretary of State will be using powers under the Energy Act 2013 to increase the hourly rate for use of military drivers paid by hauliers in an ESCALIN deployment.

    In response to the disruption to the availability of fuel in late September, the Government deployed Operation ESCALIN, on the 27 September. ESCALIN is a long-standing fuel supply contingency measure jointly managed by my Department and the Ministry of Defence to make trained military drivers available to support fuel deliveries. A total of 222 drivers were deployed to civilian haulage companies that participate in the scheme.

    It has always been the intention that the hauliers who make use of Operation ESCALIN should be required to make a contribution to the costs that is in line with the costs of employing civilian drivers, although this is below the full cost to the taxpayer of the deployment. The current charge to hauliers for the use of a military driver in an ESCALIN deployment is set at £25 per hour, per driver. This price was set in 2013 and has remained unchanged since. During this nine-year period the cost of labour has increased and I would like the price to reflect this change.

    A direction under section 148(3)(b) of the Energy Act 2013 was made to increase the hourly price from £25 to £28.51. This will take effect on 28 October. I believe this direction is fair and proportionate as it will now take account of inflationary price increases from 2013 calculated using the consumer price inflation index. However, the Secretary of State reserves the right to make further changes to the charging regime if that becomes necessary.

    My Department will work with hauliers to ensure that use of military personnel is continued for only as long as absolutely necessary. The Secretary of State reserves the right to withdraw military support once we are confident that the fuel supply system as a whole is adequate to meet normal demand, irrespective of the position of individual companies.