Category: Defence

  • Al Carns – 2026 Personal Statement in the House of Commons

    Al Carns – 2026 Personal Statement in the House of Commons

    The statement made by Al Carns, the former Defence Minister, in the House of Commons on 16 June 2026.

    With your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a speech on my resignation.

    I start by echoing the remarks of so many in the House on the 10th anniversary of the death of Jo Cox. While I did not know Jo, I know what she stood for. Her unwavering commitment to equality has left a lasting legacy, and her words—we have more in common than that which divides us—still ring true and are still worth fighting for. I also pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey). This is the second time I have followed him in the last week, and it is a privilege to do so.

    Last week, I resigned as Minister for the Armed Forces. It was an exceptionally difficult decision. I have never quit anything in my life, as my mother will confirm; she tried to get me to quit the Marines for 24 years, but failed many times. I spent those 24 years in uniform, serving in operations around the world. I commanded men and women in combat and carried responsibility for their lives; I buried friends and stood beside families receiving the worst news imaginable. When I accepted ministerial office, I did so with a simple purpose: to serve those who serve us. I remain grateful to the Prime Minister for the opportunity to do so. I thank my ministerial colleagues, my hon. Friends on the Labour Benches, civil servants and, above all, the servicemen and women I have had the privilege to represent. But there comes a point when honesty requires action, and for me, that point came last week.

    As hon. Members know, I came into politics for one reason: to enact change. In order to work out where we are going, we must realise where we have come from. The Labour party that I joined was chiselled out of the mines of the north-east, hammered out of the shipyards of Govan, Liverpool and Belfast, and forged in the factories of the industrial revolution by people with calloused hands and sore backs—people who did a hard day’s graft and asked for one thing in return: a Government who have their back. That is the tradition in which I serve in this House, and it is the tradition that shaped the decision I took last week.

    I resigned for several reasons—first, because I no longer believe that the defence investment plan is preparing us for the wars we are most likely to fight. The character of warfare is changing at exceptional speed. In Ukraine, a navy without a ship has destroyed a navy. A drone costing thousands can destroy a tank costing millions. A drone can now strike 2,000 km into Russia at a fraction of the cost of a fighter jet. It is not either/or; it is an equitable mix of high-end sophistication coupled with low-end mass. That is the balance we must seek. In my view, the defence investment plan does not strike that balance for various reasons.

    I want to give just a small example to bring home that point, because it can often get lost. In a town in Ukraine the size of Hereford, there were 12,000 drones in the air in one day. Just comprehend that: 12,000 drones in the air. Some 90% of all casualties are from drones—not the rifle, the grenade, the tank or the artillery, but the drone. I ask the House: what will it take to realise that these figures are not fiction? They are not an embellishment of the truth, but a hard fact born out of the blood and steel of a hot war. That is the maths of modern war: millions of drones against high-end, sophisticated systems that deliver late, with huge levels of inflation, and, importantly, cannot be reproduced at the pace required to sustain a conflict against a major adversary. What will it take to learn that lesson? Do we need to rerun the Snatch Land Rover? Do we need to rerun the lack of body armour? Do we need to rerun the lack of protected vehicles in Afghanistan, which I saw impact men and women on the frontline? We do not, and we should not.

    Moreover, as the clouds of war darken Europe’s borders once more, do we need to learn the lessons our forefathers learned in world war two, or indeed the cold war? This is not about individual items of equipment or bespoke defence funding lines, but about preparedness, unity of purpose, prioritisation and national resilience. We are no longer packaging up our military to deploy to a foreign field; we must be ready to fight from here—from the home base—for democracy, for the right to self-determination and for European security. The reality is that we are spending too much time preparing for last year’s war, not tomorrow’s. I urge the House to push hard for transformation and to push for delivery this side of 2030.

    Secondly, I resigned because even if the plan had been right, it was not adequately funded. I do not lay all the blame at the door of No. 10 or No. 11; we failed—I failed—to make that argument. But national security and economic security are not competing priorities; they are the same priority. A country that cannot defend itself will not stay prosperous for long. Put simply, a country that cannot defend itself will struggle to protect its prosperity.

    Thirdly, I left because I could no longer ignore the continued failure to address the treatment of our veterans in Northern Ireland. It is a difficult issue, and I cannot describe how difficult this fight has been. Whatever people’s view of the troubles, a country owes a duty to those it sent into harm’s way under lawful orders, and that duty does not end when the uniform comes off. The labour movement was built on a simple idea—that the people who do the hard work that this country asks of them deserve the backing of the state in return. Too many veterans have carried uncertainty for too long, while others have benefited from political accommodations that were never available to those who served. I could not reconcile that with my own understanding of duty.

    To go into slightly more detail, the IRA failed to achieve its political ends through the use of terrorist tactics, and we must be exceptionally careful that we do not help them achieve those ends through other means. Constant, never-ending legal wranglings that undermine the contract between the nation and those who serve is neither a good use of taxpayer money nor an effective execution of strategy. Having inquests, inquiries and an independent commission creates a hierarchy of truth. It will cost us hundreds of millions for 15 years, painting the state as an aggressor, supporting our adversaries, leading to political objections and causing untold anguish for those who only ever deployed to protect us. We have neither the political capital nor the resources to spare for this unjust journey.

    In broader terms, in 2026 security means more than military strength alone. It means secure borders, secure energy, secure jobs and secure communities. It means people knowing that if they work hard and contribute, one unexpected bill will not push their family into crisis; it means knowing that their children will have opportunities that they did not. These things are absolutely connected. The cost of living is shaped by conflict thousands of miles from here. Hostile states target our infrastructure, supply chains and democracy. Energy security shapes economic security. Economic security shapes social cohesion. Importantly, above all else, social cohesion shapes national resilience.

    The old line between domestic policy and national security is breaking down in front of us, but our history points the way. In 1945, Britain was exhausted and in debt. Our cities had been bombed, and rationing went on for years. Yet Attlee’s Government did not conclude that Britain could afford only one priority. They built the NHS, expanded the welfare state and invested in housing. They took the decision that Britain would become a nuclear power. Those decisions came from the same understanding of what this Government and Labour are for. A country worth defending should look after its people. A country that wants to look after its people must be secure enough to do so. That is the Labour tradition.

    It is also, I would argue, the British tradition at its very best, but somewhere along the way we stopped thinking like that. We began treating defence, growth, energy, public services and social mobility as separate conversations. They are not. They are different parts of the same challenge: whether Britain can still provide security, opportunity and resilience for its people in a more dangerous world. That is why I ultimately concluded that I could no longer remain in Government. The issue was never simply a defence budget. It was whether the Government were moving with the urgency that the moment demands.

    Nearly a million young people are outside education, employment and training. Poor mental health costs this country hundreds of billions. We know that our armed forces need modernising. We know that our adversaries are becoming more aggressive. We know that our energy system remains exposed. We inherited a mess, but the population is fed up of us pointing the finger. They are looking to us for courage, clarity and conviction to make changes at the scale and, importantly, the speed that the nation requires.

    I have seen what our country can do. I have seen it in uniform. I have seen it in the communities across the nation. I have seen it on these Benches, where we are at our very best. The talent, the ideas, the passion, the courage—it is all here. Indeed, we have it all. I resigned because I believe that Britain and this Labour Government can deliver. I believe that we can think longer term and act earlier. I believe that we can once again build a country that provides security in the broadest sense of the word—security for our nation, communities, working families and the next generation. That is the debate that I am confident my resignation has started.

  • John Healey – 2026 Personal Statement in the House of Commons

    John Healey – 2026 Personal Statement in the House of Commons

    The personal statement made by John Healey, the former Defence Secretary, in the House of Commons on 16 June 2026.

    With your permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a personal statement on my resignation as the UK Defence Secretary. Many in the media have pressed me to say more since Thursday, but I am a proud parliamentarian, and I wanted first to speak in this House, as I take my seat on the Back Benches for the first time in more than 10 years.

    I took the decision to resign with the greatest regret and reluctance. I continue to be certain about the decision. In time, I believe it will be seen as necessary in securing the future of our armed forces and alliances. It has been the privilege of my life to work alongside the exceptional people who serve this country in Defence—military and civilian alike. They work 24/7, so often unseen, and are the very best of Britain. They, and the new Defence Secretary, have my fullest support.

    I have been a Labour MP for nearly 30 years, a Labour member for 45 years and a trade unionist for longer still. It is my family—literally. Jackie, my wife, worked for Labour HQ. We met at a union conference. Two weeks later, we were engaged. All of us in politics ask so much of our partners. We only ever wanted a successful Labour Government leading a stronger Britain. My decision last week was about country, not career.

    I loved the job, though I will not miss going to bed with three phones or the 3 am phone calls. I am proud of what we have done in less than two years as a Labour Government. We stepped up international leadership for Ukraine, raised defence investment three years earlier than anyone expected, won record defence export deals, gave the armed forces their biggest pay rise for 20 years, brought 36,000 forces family homes back into public ownership, and signed major defence agreements with Germany, Norway, France and the European Union. Delivering for defence; delivering for Britain.

    The Prime Minister has led that drive, rightly earning respect at home and abroad. He and I jointly commissioned the first-of-its-kind strategic defence review, which has set the vision to transform our armed forces to make our military more warfighting ready and better able to deter. We have been doing exactly that in the 12 months since the SDR was published. We are delivering in a different way: investment with deep reforms to get a grip on budgets, procurement and delivery; investment so that every taxpayer’s pound works twice, once for national security and once to back British industry and create British jobs; investment in new defence tech—drones and AI—that draws lessons from Ukraine for our UK forces.

    I will always seek cross-party common ground on defence, but I will not let the Conservatives forget their record in government or the hollowed-out legacy they left in our armed forces.

    Since the SDR, we have seen the world changing still faster, with threats increasing and demands on defence rising: conflict in the middle east, new NATO missions in the High North, the US moving forces away from Europe, intensifying attacks in Ukraine and increasing Russian aggression towards the UK. NATO has now said that we must prepare for war with Russia within the next five years. This is the age of hard power and rising threat. This is not the moment for calibration or incremental change. This means bigger politics, bolder priorities and harder choices. Britain’s challenge now is the transformation and rearmament of our armed forces.

    The Prime Minister knows what the country needs for defence. He spelled out the threat this month when he said:

    “it is our intelligence assessment, and the assessment of other countries in NATO, that there could be an attack by Russia on NATO as soon as 2030.”

    Britain must set the headmark of spending 3% on defence in 2030 and a clear path to 3.5% in 2035—the commitment all NATO nations have made to each other and to their people. I believe that this would command wide cross-party support.

    Our predecessors in this House experienced what happens when deterrence fails. They entrusted us with institutions such as NATO that they created to keep us safe. We do not choose the circumstances in which we serve or the responsibilities that fall upon us, either in this House or in government. It is the duty of our political generation to ready Britain for the uncertainties of the years to come. The decisions that we make in the months ahead will be judged by those who follow us.

    At this dangerous time, I see the current defence investment plans falling well short of what is required: a rise of 0.08% from next year to 2030, no date for reaching 3%, and no path to 3.5%. By 2030, well over half of NATO members will be spending 3% or more. When allies are looking for British leadership, we must not fall behind. When NATO needs European nations to step up, we must not fall short.

    Our adversaries do not follow timetables set by the Treasury. I appreciate how hard this is for Cabinet colleagues, and I am very grateful to those who support what is required, but not all needs to be done by cutbacks elsewhere. There are credible ways of meeting the mid-term funding challenges, working multinationally and as other nations in Europe are doing, that could allow us to protect the ability to deliver our Labour missions across Government.

    Beyond that, we need a bigger view of national security. It is not just a job for Defence or the agencies; every Department has a part to play in national security and national resilience. From Energy to Transport to Health, security must run through the Government like letters through a stick of rock. Security must be felt in communities right across Britain, reversing long-term decline and bringing new jobs and new hope.

    For now, Jackie is just grateful that I no longer carry three phones in my bag, although I do still have my bottle of HP sauce.

  • Luke Pollard – 2026 Statement on the Government’s Defence Investment Plan

    Luke Pollard – 2026 Statement on the Government’s Defence Investment Plan

    The statement made by Luke Pollard, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, in the House of Commons on 15 June 2026.

    Before I turn to the matter before us, the whole House will want to join me in recognising the remarkable work of our armed forces this weekend. In the channel, UK forces bordered a sanctioned vessel from Russia’s shadow fleet to disrupt the flow of funds to Putin’s illegal war in the Ukraine. The Defence Secretary will be making a statement on that shortly.

    These are extraordinary times for defence. The threats are real and they are increasing. It is no secret that I worked in lockstep with the former Defence Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey). He is a friend and mentor. I was his deputy and I am still standing at the Dispatch Box because he asked me to stay and because we need continuity in this complex and difficult operational environment.

    The DIP will be published before the NATO summit. Do we need to spend more on defence? Yes. Do the Prime Minister and the Chancellor agree with that? Yes. Are we spending more? Yes. This year the defence budget is £11 billion more than it was in the final year under the Conservatives. Are we learning the lessons from Ukraine? Yes. Are we retiring old kit to invest in new capabilities? Yes. Are we backing our people? Yes, with the biggest pay rise in 20 years and a £9 billion plan to fix the defence housing crisis that we inherited. It is working: intake is up 11.6%, outflow is down 8.9%, and morale is up.

    To answer the Leader of the Opposition’s question directly: if asked to fight tonight, could our forces defend the UK? Yes, and they already do every single day. Are we planning to increase their capabilities to deter and defend the UK and our allies? Yes, we are. Would I like to go further? Of course.

    The new Defence Secretary has stepped up to serve, as he has done before, sleeves rolled up and determined to meet the moment to get defence the best deal. Let me say plainly that I know the Prime Minister is committed to do so as well. He said in Munich:

    “To meet the wider threat, it is clear that we are going to have to spend more faster.”

    And at the weekend, he said

    “3% in the next Parliament…defence will be the number one priority at every spending review, including the next spending review.”

    The disagreement in recent weeks was never about whether we should fund our forces; it was about how fast we increase the spending for defence and on what capabilities. That is a serious argument to have—I make no apology for pushing hard within the Government to win it, because that is the job. But the job is also a team sport, and that is why the Ministry of Defence, with the new Defence Secretary, is working with the Treasury, other Government Departments and No. 10 to get this right.

  • Harold Wilson – 1966 Letter to Cabinet Colleagues on the Hawker Siddeley P.1127

    Harold Wilson – 1966 Letter to Cabinet Colleagues on the Hawker Siddeley P.1127

    The letter sent by Harold Wilson, the then Prime Minister, to cabinet colleagues on 20 December 1966.

    We have to take a decision by the end of the year on whether or not we should continue with the P.1127. In discussion in the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee there was a division of view and, although preponderant opinion was in favour of continuation, the decision is one which the Cabinet will wish to take.

    I attach a note by officials setting out the considerations on either side.

    H.W.

    10, Downing Street, S.W.1.

    20th December, 1966

    SECRET

    P1127

    Note by Officials

    Introduction

    The P1127 is an aircraft intended to provide close support for our ground forces. It is a major advance in this field through the exploitation of its unique ability to operate from very short rough strips in the forward area (short take off and landing capability or STOL) and to operate from small landing sites in the vertical take off and landing (VTOL) mode with a bomb or rocket load. At the time of the Defence Review it was hoped that the VTOL performance, which is limited in range and load, could be appreciably improved through incorporating plenum chamber burning, but further studies have established that this is not the answer and the most likely alternative would be costly in both development and production. There are, however, indications that engine thrust increases can be achieved in the normal course of development which will lead to worthwhile improvements in aircraft performance.

    There is no aircraft which can replace the special V/STOL characteristics of the P1127, but it is possible — admittedly with some detriment to the operational efficiency of our forces — to provide close support for the Army by means of different combinations of the Spey-Phantom and of the Anglo-French Jaguar. The latter course would be cheaper, but would involve additional expenditure in foreign currency and would have industrial implications for the future of the United Kingdom aircraft industry. The question is the degree of priority to be accorded to the gain in operational efficiency.

    Defence Requirements

    The Defence Review made provision for the purchase of 110 P1127 aircraft (93 solos and 17 duals). In considering the Review in February (CC(66) 9th Conclusions) the Cabinet agreed that the P1127 was important for United Kingdom industrial reasons and that at that stage we should plan on the assumption that it would be developed. The Cabinet, however, reserved the right to take a different decision should technical developments or the escalation of costs make it desirable to do so. Following their discussion, the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee agreed in March (OPD(66) 15th Meeting, Item 1) that an order should be placed for 60 aircraft, with an option for a further 40, and that the issue should be further considered in the autumn in the light of feasibility studies, the cost of production and the prospect of export orders.

    The present position is that the programme is going well, the first two aircraft are flying and development should be completed within the estimate of last March. Our commitments to the end of December in respect of both research and development and production will total about £45 million, which is over one-third of the estimated cost of the development and production of the first 60 aircraft (£120 million to £125 million) and 13 per cent of the total ten year programme cost of £336 million. In addition, we have spent, including contributions from the United States and German Governments to the Kestrel programme and payments on the cancelled P1154, a further £70 million on the technology of vectored thrust.

    The further defence studies might call also for a review of the number of P1127 (or alternative aircraft) which will be required. These studies will not be completed until July, 1967 and, theoretically, the decision on the future of the P1127 should be taken then in the light of the cost and implications of the alternative courses. By then, however, a further £26 million will have been committed on the P1127 and effectively deferment now would be equivalent to a decision to continue with the aircraft. The choice on whether to continue or cancel the P1127 is therefore open to us only until the end of the year.

    The argument for cancellation

    The argument for cancelling the P1127 is its cost and its low defence priority. Pressure on the Defence Budget has increased. There is still the problem of attaining the Defence Review target of £2,000 million at 1964 prices in 1969-70: and further defence studies are being undertaken to consider the possibility of substantial additional savings by 1970-71. To provide the total 110 P1127 aircraft which would be necessary for the defence commitments envisaged in the Defence Review would cost £130 million more over a ten-year period than a likely alternative. Such an alternative, although cheaper in budgetary terms, could, however, involve expenditure of £40 million in dollars, plus perhaps a further £25 million for the foreign currency element of the additional Anglo-French Jaguars. (Until the further defence studies are completed it is uncertain whether this requirement for a number of P1127, or alternative aircraft, can be reduced: it is therefore impossible to calculate with any precision the additional budgetary cost of the P1127 and the cost in foreign exchange of the alternative.)

    Although the P1127 is desirable on grounds of operational efficiency the priority to be accorded to it on defence grounds alone is not such as to justify its continuation in view of the pressure on the Defence Budget. The incidence of expenditure on the P1127 would moreover give rise to awkward budgetary problems in 1969-70 and 1970-71 and although alternatives to it, giving us a similar capability, could also do this, there would be greater room for manoeuvre. If the continuation of the P1127 is approved, then the Defence Budget will be higher than the total to which it could otherwise be reduced in consequence of the Defence Review and the further defence studies.

    The argument for continuation

    The argument for continuing with the P1127, apart from the gain in operational efficiency and the saving in foreign currency, is that it is the only advanced military aircraft at present under development in the United Kingdom and the only major national aircraft project this Government has initiated. Its adoption as a part replacement for the Hunter was intended to mitigate the cancellation of the TSR 2, P1154 and HS 681. If it were to be cancelled now the effect on the aircraft industry could be disastrous, particularly in the context of the uncertainty of the future of the Anglo-French variable geometry (VG) aircraft. Although the balance of probability is that the French will agree to the continuation of the latter, this is not certain, and if they withdrew we should then have to consider whether or not to continue with the development of a somewhat simpler form of this aircraft in the United Kingdom alone. This uncertainty is relevant to the future of the United Kingdom industry.

    Although the main work for a design team in the immediate future would be on a VG aircraft and not on the P1127, the loss of confidence from the abandonment of the P1127 alone would be such that it is doubtful if men of the right industrial, scientific and technological standing could be retained in the industry. In particular, this is the major project in the programme for Hawker Siddeley. It is around this firm, and its management, that the Government’s proposals for reorganising the airframe industry are built. If this project were now cancelled, Hawker Siddeley’s willingness to remain in the industry could evaporate: in that event any prospect of an effective United Kingdom aircraft industry on the basis of the Government’s proposals would disappear.

    Furthermore, the development of the VTOL and STOL capability is the only part of aircraft technology in which at present the United Kingdom is in advance of the rest of the world. To abandon the P1127 would be permanently to throw away that lead, with wider consequences for our technological capacity.

    Export Prospects

    The export prospects of the aircraft are necessarily uncertain until it is clear whether or not the Government intend to go ahead with production, since we cannot expect to sell military aircraft unless the RAF order them. However, a number of countries have shown interest. The most promising prospects so far appear to be Israel, India and Finland. In general, the Head of Defence Sales considers the export prospects are good but of course there can be no certainty of them.

    Numbers to be ordered

    If a decision were taken in favour of the continuation of the programme there would then be a choice between ordering now 60 single and ten dual aircraft (essential for training purposes) at a programme cost of £242 million while keeping an option open for a further purchase, the cost of which cannot be quantified until the end of the defence studies, or ordering now the full number of 110 (including 17 duals) at a programme cost of £336 million. The advantage of the former course is that it would leave options open if the defence studies showed either a requirement for fewer than 110, or that alternative cheaper aircraft should be provided for the full remaining requirement. The advantage of ordering the full 110 now is that if this number is required it would be marginally cheaper and that it would give greater industrial certainty and enhance exports prospects.

    The Choice

    The choice lies between:

    (1) cancelling the P1127 and

    (2) continuing the programme, in which case the choice is between:

    (a) ordering 70 aircraft now and keeping the option open on the remainder until mid-1967; and

    (b) ordering the full 110 now.

  • Dan Jarvis – 2026 Comments on the Drone Facility in Swindon

    Dan Jarvis – 2026 Comments on the Drone Facility in Swindon

    The comments made by Dan Jarvis, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 12 June 2026.

    The character of warfare is changing, and it is changing fast. From Ukraine to the Middle East, we are seeing right now how uncrewed systems are rapidly evolving and reshaping conflicts – on land, in the air and at sea

    Our new DroneTEX facility at the heart of our Uncrewed Systems Centre is Europe’s largest drone test and development facility, and will help us ensure the UK embraces technologies that are redefining warfare.

    Where once new technology could take years from inception to reaching our Armed Forces, we will now be able to develop and field new tech in a matter of weeks – because in this new era, those who innovate fastest will win.

  • Keir Starmer – 2026 Letter to John Healey Following his Resignation

    Keir Starmer – 2026 Letter to John Healey Following his Resignation

    The letter sent by Keir Starmer, the Prime Minister, to John Healey on 11 June 2026.

    Dear John,

    The world today is more dangerous and uncertain than at any point in our lifetimes. That requires a serious response to build our economic resilience and our national defences.

    We have achieved a great deal working together. We inherited a situation where our armed forces had faced years of underfunding and neglect. Our work leading the Coalition of the Willing on Ukraine, defending our Gulf allies, and working together with like-minded nations on a plan for the Strait of Hormuz has helped make the world more secure. I am proud of our record on funding. When we entered government in 2024, I took the decision to increase defence spending after the Conservatives hollowed out our armed forces. That required a cut to the international aid budget but the result was the highest sustained increase in defence spending since the Cold War. I will always do what is needed to keep our country safe. I thank you for your work to deliver on all of this.

    You are also right that we have to go further. The Defence Investment Plan does just that — delivering an unprecedented increase in defence spending in a sustainable way. It will provide the resources our military needs to keep us safe and the clarity the British defence industry needs to plan. It will make the big strategic investments we need for the long term and give the certainty which private finance needs to invest. It will allow our armed forces to transform and modernise and back them with the tools they need to change the way we fight — and to deter our enemies. And crucially it will ensure the money spent is spent wisely and used to back jobs and growth here in Britain.

    We are backing this with the necessary investment. The increases in spending that underpin this plan will be sustainable and fair. They will mean significant reallocations of funding from across government departments and the right choices to protect our nation. Strong public finances are part of what keeps us safe – irresponsible borrowing only puts that at risk.

    Taking these decisions is never easy. I am determined to rebuild our country after years of being buffeted by crises. I am sorry that you will not be part of that work going forward.

    All best wishes,

    Keir

  • Ben Wallace – 2026 Comments on the Resignation of John Healey

    Ben Wallace – 2026 Comments on the Resignation of John Healey

    The comments made by Ben Wallace, the former Secretary of State for Defence, on 11 June 2026.

    John Healey shadowed me for over 4 years. While I didn’t agree with everything he did I know he tried his best and had the interests of the Armed Forces at his heart. I know he loved the job and it will have not been easy to resign. His loyalty to his Party and PM was not reciprocated by them when it mattered and I think he was left with no choice. I wish him the very best. His resignation was one of principle.

  • Ed Davey – 2026 Comments on the Resignation of John Healey

    Ed Davey – 2026 Comments on the Resignation of John Healey

    The comments made by Ed Davey, the Leader of the Liberal Democrats, on 11 June 2026.

    Healey’s resignation is a wake-up call for Starmer and Burnham.

    Stop repeating the mistakes of the Conservatives and get serious about funding our armed forces properly.

    We cannot afford years more political chaos while our national security is put at risk.

  • Wes Streeting – 2026 Comments on the Resignation of John Healey

    Wes Streeting – 2026 Comments on the Resignation of John Healey

    The comments made by Wes Streeting, the former Health Secretary, on 11 June 2026.

    John was an excellent Defence Secretary.

    Every word of warning here needs to be heeded.

  • John Healey – 2026 Resignation Letter

    John Healey – 2026 Resignation Letter

    The resignation letter sent by John Healey to Keir Starmer, announcing his departure from the Defence Secretary role, on 11 June 2026.

    Dear Keir,

    This is a letter I never expected to write, and I do so now with great regret and reluctance.

    I am proud of what we have done in less than two years as a Labour Government. We’ve stepped up to lead internationally for Ukraine with the Coalition of the Willing and Ukraine Defence Contact Group, established Britain as a leading voice for Europe in NATO, raised defence investment to 2.5% of GDP three years earlier than anyone expected, launched the deepest defence reforms in 50 years, won the biggest UK defence export deals for decades, published a first-of-its-kind Strategic Defence Review, gave our Armed Forces the biggest pay rise in nearly 20 years, boosted military morale, fixed over 1,200 of the worst forces family homes, reset relations with European allies and signed major defence agreements with Germany, Norway and France.

    You have led this as PM, earning wide respect at home and abroad. Like me, I know you are exceptionally proud of our Forces and all of those who work in UK Defence.

    We came into Government, recognising Britain faced a new era of threat which demanded a new era for defence. The SDR we jointly commissioned set the 10-year vision to transform our Armed Forces, strengthen alliances, invest in the technology that is changing warfare and back British industry to make defence an engine for growth.

    This new era for defence required further investment through the Defence Investment Plan. The excellent and extensive cross-Government work that completed in January — overseen by you, me and the Chancellor — confirmed the scale of the challenge and the rising demands on defence.

    Since then, you have been unable, and the Treasury has been unwilling, to commit the resources that the nation needs to defend the country at this time of rising threats.

    Since then, the demands on defence have increased still further, as have the UK commitments you have rightly made to allies. Conflict in the Middle East, with the UK now leading the multinational Strait of Hormuz military mission; High North security, with the UK now leading NATO’s Arctic Sentry mission; increased Russian activity towards the UK and NATO nations and increased attacks in Ukraine, with the Paris Agreement confirming a British deployment to Ukraine after a ceasefire.

    We have worked to secure a Defence Investment Plan that does two things. First, deal with the increasing operational demands on defence now and step up the SDR actions to meet the increasing threat. Second, set a clear path to meet the new NATO commitment you agreed to spend 3.5% of GDP in 2035 through the next Spending Review.

    As we have regularly discussed, I am certain that a headmark date for 3% of GDP on defence in 2030 is what Britain must set. This commitment would have strong cross-party support. Other European allies are stepping up in this way.

    I know how hard you have worked to get to this point. And in funding the DIP, I fully recognise the strain this places on colleagues in other Departments, both now as you have required spending switched into defence and in the future. I am very grateful to those colleagues who have supported this, and I appreciate how difficult their choices will have been.

    As I’ve outlined to you, there are credible ways of meeting the mid-term funding challenges, working multi-nationally and as other European nations are doing, to allow us to protect our ability to deliver the missions of our Labour Government.

    However, your DIP financial settlement — which I was first given in full on Monday afternoon this week — falls well short of what is required for defence and the country at this dangerous time. The extra support is backloaded when the pressure of operations and imperative to speed up readiness to fight is in the first two years and it rises to just 2.68% of GDP in 2030, when we will reach 2.6% next year with the investment we are already making.

    You spelled out the threats last week: “it is our intelligence assessment, and the assessment of other countries in NATO, that there could be an attack by Russia on NATO as soon as 2030.”

    You know what defence needs. You made the argument for this powerfully in your speech at the Munich Security Conference back in February. Without a DIP that meets the moment in this way, I am being forced to make decisions that would reduce the readiness of our Forces and increase the risk to personnel on operations, and could make the country less safe.

    After explaining to you that I would not be able to accept a DIP settlement that does not give our Forces the resources they need, I am now left with no other option than to submit my resignation as your Defence Secretary.

    I wish you all continuing strength in the exceptional challenges you face as Prime Minister. As always, our Labour Government will continue to have my fullest support.

    Rt Hon John Healey MP