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Category: Defence

  • Ministry of Defence – 2022 Statement on Ben Wallace’s Visit to Ukraine

    Ministry of Defence – 2022 Statement on Ben Wallace’s Visit to Ukraine

    The statement issued by the Ministry of Defence on 10 June 2022.

    The working visit took place this week to allow the Defence Secretary to hear first-hand how the operational needs of Ukraine’s Armed Forces are developing as the nature of the conflict continues to change. This will ensure that the UK’s continued support is evolving to meet those requirements and is tailored to the situation on the ground.

    The Defence Secretary visited Minister Reznikov on the first of the two day visit, before speaking with President Zelenskyy about how the UK support will continue to meet Ukraine’s needs as the conflict enters a different phase.

    The three agreed to work even more closely going forward in support of their shared goal of enabling Ukraine to liberate itself from illegal Russian occupation. They also discussed the range of equipment and training the UK is currently providing and what further support we can offer to help Ukrainian forces to defend their country.

    The meetings focused on the UK continuing to provide operationally effective lethal aid that meets the current and future threats facing Ukraine and follows up on a number of other in person meetings. In March, Minister Reznikov visited the Ministry of Defence and in April a Ukrainian military and political delegation visited Salisbury Plain training area to discuss UK provision of lethal aid. These face to face meetings allow for in-depth discussions on what support is required to meet the requirements of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

    Britain was the first European country to send lethal aid to Ukraine and has since sent military aid worth more than £750 million, including thousands of anti-tank missiles, air defence systems and armoured vehicles. The UK has also played a key convening role in the international effort to supply weapons to Ukraine, most notably hosting the first two international donor conferences. The Defence Secretary will ensure the insights and future requirements established from this visit will be used to support the wider international response.

    Following the new phase of the conflict in the Donbas, the UK recently announced it would gift M270 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Ukrainian forces defend themselves from Russian long-range artillery, which has been used indiscriminately to devastate population centres.

  • Ben Wallace – 2022 Comments on UK Gift of Rocket Launchers to Ukraine

    Ben Wallace – 2022 Comments on UK Gift of Rocket Launchers to Ukraine

    The comments made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 6 June 2022.

    The UK stands with Ukraine in this fight and is taking a leading role in supplying its heroic troops with the vital weapons they need to defend their country from unprovoked invasion. If the international community continues its support, I believe Ukraine can win.

    As Russia’s tactics change, so must our support to Ukraine. These highly capable multiple-launch rocket systems will enable our Ukrainian friends to better protect themselves against the brutal use of long-range artillery, which Putin’s forces have used indiscriminately to flatten cities.

  • Leo Docherty – 2022 Comments on Visit to DBS Veterans

    Leo Docherty – 2022 Comments on Visit to DBS Veterans

    The comments made by Leo Docherty, the Minister for Defence People and Veterans, on 1 June 2022.

    I would like to thank Veterans UK for their enduring hard work supporting our veterans and their families. The outputs of their transformation programme will greatly enhance the experience of those making a claim.

  • Jeremy Quin – 2022 Comments at the Canadian Defence Exhibition

    Jeremy Quin – 2022 Comments at the Canadian Defence Exhibition

    The comments made by Jeremy Quin, the Defence Minister, at the Canadian Defence Exhibition on 1 June 2022.

    Whether in the North Atlantic, the Indo-Pacific or the High North we need to work together to defend our values.

    Canada and the United Kingdom enjoy a steadfast bond, and it is through such alliances that we can protect ourselves against those who wish to undermine the international rules-based order.

    It has been a privilege to meet my Canadian counterparts and speak to industry partners. I am left in little doubt that as two key NATO allies, we have the shared capability, the shared industry and the shared talent to address current and future threats.

  • Michael Heseltine – 1990 Speech on the Crisis in the Gulf

    Michael Heseltine – 1990 Speech on the Crisis in the Gulf

    The speech made by Michael Heseltine, the then Conservative MP for Henley, in the House of Commons on 6 September 1990.

    I take issue with the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) on just one small, cavilling point. That is his comment that, if Saddam Hussein had been able to hear our debate he might have taken comfort from it. I do not think that he could take comfort in any way from it. I believe that it reflects overwhelmingly the view of the British people that a great wrong has been done and that Britain is determined to play its full part in putting it right. That is the only conclusion that anyone who has listened to the debate could draw. It is positively healthy that there has been the occasional speech, representing a negligible quantity of opinion, in which a different view has been taken. The very isolation of those speeches indicates the strength of the overwhelming majority in this place.

    The Government’s position I find exemplary. I have said consistently, as have so many others, that the Government have taken precisely the right view from the beginning of the crisis. However much we may have been out of touch during the past two or three weeks—we followed events as best we could, often only through the media of other countries—it is obvious that the process adopted by the Government has continued as it began.

    The position that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister set out this afternoon is clear and exactly right. It is completely compliant with resolution 661 of the United Nations. The Prime Minister has set out for none to misunderstand her interpretation, backed by the best legal advice available to her. She has made clear, on behalf of the British Government, what she believes the resolution to mean. It means that we shall apply mandatory sanctions, that we shall enforce them and that, within certain circumstances, as my right hon. Friend defined, that might need the use of force.

    It is necessary to have read only the occasional speech of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to know that the last thing that he wants, the Government want or our allies want is the use of force. No one can have any doubt, however, that in the mind of the Government, and presumably in the minds of our close allies, that context is not ruled out. It is not anticipated in any way in the short term but it is within our interpretation of resolution 661.

    We are an open society and part of the open world. If there are those in the United States who believe that we have misinterpreted the resolution and who wish to disown what we claim to be the meaning of the vote that they cast, they have plenty of time to make their position clear. They can start to do that now. They can react at once to what we are saying the resolution means by saying that, when they voted for it they thought that it meant something else. If they do not do so, they cannot complain if we act upon the interpretation that we set out at an early stage.

    The issue is whether we should return to the United Nations for further clarification if sanctions do not achieve the desired objective. Powerful arguments were put by the Leader of the Opposition and reinforced by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey). It is not that the law may be defective, but that there is a political dimension to the enforcement of that law which it might, on some subsequent occasion, be wise to pursue as opposed to legally necessary.

    I wish to put another view. We all want the sanctions to work—that is not in question—but let us suppose we reach a stage where it is perceived that they are not working. We are not playing cricket. The object then would be to win at the lowest possible, though doubtless awful, cost. A lonely judgment will have to be made by a limited number of people about whether their action, unheralded, would be more or less likely to secure the objectives of the original resolution. They would have to weigh that against the advance warning of a change of tactics that going back to the United Nations would imply.

    The announcement of a new dimension to the policy could provoke a first strike—or, as the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport said, a second strike, but from the Iraqis. Do we want that? I can think of no argument for saying that in a few weeks or a few months we should alert the Iraqis to a new dimension to our policy. Our task then will be to win quickly and decisively. That is the overwhelming reason why I hope that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, in replying to the debate, will give no further assurances. All the necessary assurances have already been given in the clearest language. To do so would only undermine the strength and clarity of our position in a way that he would be the last person to want to do.

    The tragedy of the crisis is that it is dynamic and events are unfolding. I have agreed with the right hon. Member for Devonport from the beginning—I do not think that the Iraqis will launch an attack on us or move into Saudi Arabia, because that is the way for them quickly to lose. They will try to bust the sanctions. By now, they will be combing the world to find ways to do what sanctions busters have always done, which is to get around the sort of peaceful coercion that the United Nations has imposed. No one knows whether they will succeed, but that is their best chance of success.

    If that happens, the dynamics will unfold and the moderate Arab leaders will begin to wonder whether they can win. The advocates of fundamental Islam will latch on to a new hero who is likely to advance their cause. The kingdoms of the Gulf will begin to wonder whether they can contain the ever larger numbers of people injected into their societies to spread the word that their days are numbered. All over the world, people will begin to say, “It is the Americans, the imperialists, the western powers and no one else.” Indeed, they will probably say that it is just the Americans. We have heard that today, but, to the source from which it came, it is always just the Americans. If the Iraqis got out of Kuwait as quickly as the Americans got out of Grenada or Panama, who would be complaining as loudly as we are likely to have to do?

    The most difficult point of the debate—it is not just enmeshed in this particular policy dilemma—is that the reason why the Americans are hated is because they can act. They are prepared and they have the strength and the coherence to move decisively and quickly—

    Mr. Faulds

    Even if they are wrong.

    Mr. Heseltine

    That is a judgment that the hon. Gentleman must defend, as he did in his speech. This House overwhelmingly believes that, in this case, the Americans are right.

    The issue is whether the Americans want to be isolated, alone and the big brother. Like so many right hon. Members, I served as a Defence Secretary in the NATO alliance. I agree that the Americans hustled us along. We have been trying to get the initiatives right and trying to keep our nerve. It would be a brave hon. Member who said that we could have done it without them. I could not say, with my hand on my heart, that all the European members of the NATO alliance were always in such agreement that they could be relied upon. I remember the footnotes and the qualifications. I remember the phone calls from national Parliaments saying, “Don’t do this, qualify that, hold back, wait a minute.” It was always the Americans who took the lonely, tough decisions, and that is where we are today. They have taken those decisions, and because our Government were the first to back them, we have contained the appalling damage of the occupation of Kuwait.

    Now we want to try to help, but how? The way to help is to strengthen the American support. Other nations of like mind to ourselves should increase their commitment, whether military or financial, to the American endeavour. The greater the endeavour that we make, the more we can ask to be consulted and the more influential we shall be in—

    Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Paul Dean)

    Order. I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but he has overrun his time.

  • Jeremy Quin – 2022 Comments on Innovation Fund to Support Ukrainian Military

    Jeremy Quin – 2022 Comments on Innovation Fund to Support Ukrainian Military

    The comments made by Jeremy Quin, the Defence Procurement Minister, on 30 May 2022.

    Since Russia’s brutal invasion UK defence suppliers with active support from MOD and DE&S have taken equipment from desktop ideas to the front line. This £25m plus fund is designed to capture ongoing work and support innovative ideas to meet Ukrainian defence requirements.

    Recent months have shown the ingenuity and innovation of the UK defence sector. We want to ensure ongoing creativity is harnessed and directed at key requirements and all companies with a capability that can help are aware of the challenge.

  • G7 – 2022 Joint Statement on North Korea’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Test

    G7 – 2022 Joint Statement on North Korea’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Test

    The joint statement made by the G7 on 30 May 2022.

    We, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, condemn in the strongest terms the test of yet another Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) conducted on May 25, 2022, by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Like a number of ballistic missile launches the DPRK has conducted since the beginning of 2022, this act constitutes a further blatant violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and undermines international peace and security as well as the global non-proliferation regime.

    We are very concerned by the unprecedented series of ballistic missile tests with increasingly versatile systems across all ranges, building on ballistic missile tests conducted in 2021. Together with the evidence of ongoing nuclear activities, these acts underscore the DPRK’s determination to advance and diversify its nuclear capabilities. These reckless actions flagrantly breach the DPRK’s obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions, which the Security Council most recently reaffirmed in resolution 2397 (2017). They also pose a danger and unpredictable risk to international civil aviation and maritime navigation in the region.

    We, the G7 Foreign Ministers and the High Representative of the European Union, reiterate our urgent call on the DPRK to abandon its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and to fully comply with all legal obligations arising from the relevant Security Council resolutions.

    We deeply regret that the Security Council has failed to adopt the draft resolution aimed at condemning the series of recent ballistic missile launches by the DPRK and strengthening measures against it despite support from 13 members. We urge all UN Member States, especially Security Council members, to join us in condemning the DPRK´s behaviour and reaffirm its obligation to abandon its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. These acts demand a united response by the international community, including a united stance and further significant measures by the UN Security Council.

    We reiterate our call on the DPRK to engage in diplomacy toward denuclearization and accept the repeated offers of dialogue put forward by the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan. By diverting its resources into weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs the DPRK further aggravates the already dire humanitarian situation in the DPRK. We urge the DPRK to facilitate access for international humanitarian organizations and for independent assessment of humanitarian needs such as food and medicines as soon as possible.

    We also call on all States to fully and effectively implement all relevant Security Council resolutions, and to address the risk of weapons of mass destruction proliferation from the DPRK as an urgent priority.

    The G7 remain committed to working with all relevant partners towards the goal of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and to upholding the rules-based international order.

  • Liz Truss – 2022 Comments in Sarajevo on Russian Invasion of Ukraine

    Liz Truss – 2022 Comments in Sarajevo on Russian Invasion of Ukraine

    The comments made by Liz Truss, the Foreign Secretary, in Sarajevo on 26 May 2022.

    Russia’s aggression cannot be appeased. It must be met with strength.

    We must not allow a prolonged and increasingly painful conflict to develop in Ukraine.

    We must be relentless in ensuring Ukraine prevails through military aid and sanctions. We can’t take our foot off the accelerator now.

  • Ben Wallace – 2022 Comments on Spanish and British Defence Plans

    Ben Wallace – 2022 Comments on Spanish and British Defence Plans

    The comments made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 25 May 2022.

    Across the globe, the UK and Spain are deployed helping our allies upholding our common values. Spain, as one of the leaders in European defence, is a key partner for the UK armed forces and a vital NATO ally.

    Spain and the UK have been NATO Allies for forty years and our armed forces have worked together in operations right across the world.

    As we have seen through Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, this defensive cooperation matters, as we continue to support Ukraine and focus on the wider stability and security of Europe.

  • James Heappey – 2022 Speech on NATO and International Security

    James Heappey – 2022 Speech on NATO and International Security

    The speech made by James Heappey, the Minister for the Armed Forces, in the House of Commons on 19 May 2022.

    I thank all colleagues for their contributions to the debate. As ever over the past four or five months, it has been defined by gentle disagreement politely put by well-informed contributors to the debate around defence and security in the Euro-Atlantic.

    NATO is inescapably the foundation on which Euro-Atlantic security is based. It is, always was and has proven itself over the past three months still to be the most enormous deterrent, even against Putin at his most belligerent. Other multinational fora, many of which have been mentioned today—the UN, the European Union, the G7, the coalition of donors that sit outside NATO and the coalition of those who have imposed sanctions on Russia—have all been able confidently to make interventions to try to resolve the conflict, safe in the knowledge that NATO’s overwhelming firepower keeps the conflict contained within Ukraine. That has enabled many international fora to take measures to impose cost on Russia and try to persuade it to change course.

    Not only does NATO have an enormous technological and numerical advantage but, as my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) and my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) made clear, the nuclear deterrent is inescapably important to the deterrence that NATO provides. That is why the SNP’s positions on nuclear and on NATO are so contradictory. Scotland’s geography is the gatepost on the southern side of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. That is the most strategic gateway to the north Atlantic and is essential to all NATO’s plans. Right now, at the very tip of Scotland, some of the most advanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities are based at RAF Lossiemouth. They are there because one of Europe’s best-funded and biggest air forces is able to have those capabilities alongside the fast air that polices threats in the Norwegian and northern seas and beyond.

    Of course, Scotland hosts the nuclear deterrent on which so many countries around NATO depend, because it is the only nuclear deterrent that is assigned to NATO. It therefore seems to me more than a little contradictory that a party that wants to expel the UK’s nuclear deterrent from Scotland wants to apply to join an alliance that is ultimately underpinned by that very same deterrent.

    Stewart Malcolm McDonald

    I will be brief. After a vote for independence, who will the nuclear deterrent belong to?

    James Heappey

    I am trying hard to follow the question. The answer is either that it belongs to the United Kingdom and the Scottish Government would insist on its removal—

    Stewart Malcolm McDonald

    Yes—so it is not ours.

    James Heappey

    Yet the hon. Gentleman’s position and that of his party is that he would want to join an alliance whose deterrence is underpinned by that deterrent. It feels inconsistent. To NATO countries around the alliance, the idea that that pivotal geography on the southern end of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap should wish to break away from one of the world’s biggest, best-resourced and best-trained armed forces seems like absolute nonsense.

    Mr Kevan Jones

    I agree. The argument is clear: NATO is a nuclear alliance. SNP Members always refer to other countries in NATO that do not have nuclear weapons, but those countries have a commitment not only to receive nuclear weapons but, in some cases, to have aircraft that deliver them. Would a future Scottish air force have to deliver the nuclear deterrent?

    James Heappey

    That is an interesting point. It seems to me that NATO is one of the most powerful arguments for the Union, because if one supports NATO, surely one continues to support the Union.

    Many colleagues have discussed the Madrid conference and shown particular interest in the strategic concept. Fundamentally, the strategic concept has three key elements for which we should be looking out and in which the UK has particular interests.

    The first key element of the strategic concept relates to the resilience of member states and the wider alliance, and to the interweaving of national security plans, reinforced by a wider NATO mass at appropriately high readiness, with robust enablers and industrial bases to get NATO into the fight and sustain it once it is there.

    The second element is adapting and modernising around advanced technologies. Inescapably, the battle space is changing. Everyone harks back to the armour-on-armour conflict of the past, and, of course, as we have seen in Ukraine, there is still a place for it, but, inescapably, there are technological advances that cannot be avoided and that the alliance must embrace. Missile technology is in the ascendancy. Cyber and space remain pivotal, even if their role in Ukraine has not been as great as we expected, and the alliance must embrace them.

    The third element is competing and integrating across domains using both military and non-military tools. Far too often in discussion, NATO is viewed through a military lens when the nature of competition is now more than just military mass on mass; it is the ability to bring to bear the full effects of the state, and all states within the alliance, to impose cost on the adversary.

    It is a selective retelling of history if the UK’s own increase in defence spending is ignored. I would argue that the UK led the way in encouraging people to increase defence spending in anticipation of the way the world was developing. Many countries have now followed, which is enormously welcome. That has changed the Euro-Atlantic security situation beyond recognition. In particular, Germany’s spending as a large continental power in the middle of Europe has massively changed things. It gives the UK and others a lot to reflect on around the capabilities that we should seek, given the mass that Germany and Poland will have in the centre of Europe.

    It is not just the cash spent on military mass that has changed; there has been a huge geo-strategic shift. As Members across the House have remarked, the fact that Finland and Sweden have abandoned decades of neutrality to join the alliance is a quite remarkable development—perhaps the most vivid example of just how badly Putin has miscalculated in his strategic aims for this conflict.

    I do not accept the Opposition’s charge that the integrated review has been overtaken by events. The IR was fundamentally about a return to systemic competition. I have an awful lot of time for the shadow Secretary of State, as he knows, but when he said that there was a section on the Indo-Pacific but not on Russia, I had a quick flick through the IR and the defence Command Papers since the IR. I found that almost every paragraph mentions NATO, Russia or the Euro-Atlantic. The one part that does not is the section on the Indo-Pacific to which he refers.

    In any case, the argument that the UK can focus only on the Euro-Atlantic is just not sound. The reality—this feels rather like watching my son’s football team play the Cheddar under-10s, where they all run around following the ball—is that there is lots to distract us in Europe right now, but there is a world beyond that is increasingly unstable and insecure. It is struggling with high food and fuel prices, which brings instability, as we saw in the Arab spring. The UK needs to keep an eye on that beyond Europe and remain engaged with it, because Iran, China, Russia and violent extremist organisations are all looking to use the west being distracted as an opportunity to stake their claim.

    Mr Baron

    Will my hon. Friend give way?

    James Heappey

    If my hon. Friend does not mind, I will push on because I have only a minute and a half to go.

    I pay tribute to our armed forces deployed right now across the entire eastern flank of NATO, in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, in the sea as well as in the air. Thousands of them are deployed, and they are enjoying their service alongside their NATO allies. They are coming to understand exactly what it is to be a part of NATO, believing in the collective defence of countries on the other side of Europe and being willing to give their lives in their defence, as the NATO treaty requires.

    We will continue lethal aid to Ukraine for as long as it is required. We are sending in a great deal of our own stuff, but we are also bringing influence to bear to encourage others around the world to send theirs. Then there is the race for Ukraine to rearm more quickly than a sanction-ridden Russia. We are working hard with the Ukrainians to understand what their requirements will be, work out how to get them the platforms and deliver the training that they will need to operate them. Of course, colleagues in the rest of Government are working to rebuild Ukraine when the conflict finishes. We must not get carried away by any of the successes for Ukraine in recent weeks. A great deal of hard fighting remains. There is no celebration when Russia fails, but Russia is failing far too often. We will continue to do everything we can to support Ukraine. NATO will continue to reinforce its eastern flank to reassure our allies there, and the UK will continue to do all we can to ensure that Putin fails.