Category: Brexit

  • Bill Cash – 2020 Speech on EU Negotiations

    Bill Cash – 2020 Speech on EU Negotiations

    Below is the text of the speech made by Bill Cash, the Conservative MP for Stone, in the House of Commons on 4 June 2020.

    I welcome the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who has adopted, on behalf of the Government, the motion proposed by the European Scrutiny Committee, which I have the honour to chair. This motion derives from section 13A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as provided for by the 2020 Act. I emphasise that, because it was passed on Second Reading in this House by a majority of no fewer than 124 Members.

    Under the motion, my European Scrutiny Committee has the duty of reviewing EU laws made and proposed during the transition period that affect UK vital national interests. In pursuance of that, and our report of 11 March, the motion is concerned with the Council decision in February that sets out the EU’s negotiating mandate, instructing Michel Barnier, which raises clear matters of our own vital national interests. We left the European Union on 31 January. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has special responsibilities in relation to these negotiations, consistent with those of his distinguished predecessor John Bright, who coined the expression “the mother of Parliaments”.

    The 2020 Act passed following the general election last December, and it contained in section 38 the historic affirmation of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament, to rectify the failure of successive Government policies on the EU, including the European Communities Act 1972 itself. Now that we have left the EU as the result of a succession of Acts of Parliament, including the referendum Act itself and the result of the referendum to leave, endorsed by the general election last year, we have a Conservative majority of 81. That endorsed Brexit, and left the other parties floundering in the wake of the democratic will of the British people, in line with the Conservatives’ commitment to our democratic self-government.

    My Committee’s report on the EU’s negotiating mandate noted that, on the one hand, the EU recognises the autonomy of the UK, as well as our right to regulate economic activity as we deem appropriate. That is then contradicted by the EU proposing draconian conditions of UK compliance with what the EU describes as

    “robust level playing field commitments”.

    These include massive EU tax, social, employment and environmental standards, and EU state aid laws, as well as a fisheries deal with the EU enjoying pre-Brexit access to UK waters—not to mention the vexed Northern Ireland protocol.​

    That protocol was badly conceived by the previous Administration and included concessions on EU jurisdiction and the status of Northern Ireland. There were even reports that Martin Selmayr, the then deputy to Mr Juncker, regarded Northern Ireland as the price that the UK would have to pay for leaving the EU. Furthermore, there never has been a level playing field. For example, the subsidies in relation to steel and coal generally have always been continuously distorted against the interests of the UK.

    I can remember raising these questions over 20 years ago in relation to, if I may say to the hon. Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield), my experience having been brought up in Sheffield, which was surrounded by coal communities and, of course, was the engine of the steel industry of the United Kingdom and the world. It was quite clear that the European Coal and Steel Community was operating on a basis that, for example, gave the German nation £4 billion a year in authorised subsidies, which put it in a hopelessly advantageous position as against us. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard and a list of other great economists have continually made clear the distortions in relation to state aid that have such a devastating impact upon us. We cannot allow ourselves to be drawn back into the framework of state aid prescribed by the European Union.

    Indeed, according to The Brussels Times a few days ago, the German economy is receiving 52% of the total state aid approved by the European Commission under the EU coronavirus package. Similarly, the EU insisted on law enforcement and criminal justice conditional on our continuing with the European convention on human rights and personal data law along EU lines. It went further, insisting on an overall governance framework that would include a continuing role of the European Court of Justice. What planet are they living on?

    This is encapsulated by the difference in language between the EU and the UK in relation to these negotiations. It speaks about a new partnership. Our White Paper refers to the future relationship. The EU is not a sovereign state. We are, and we have a sovereign Parliament. We have decided to leave, and we have left. It is bound to recognise us as such, but it refuses to do so.

    Hilary Benn

    The hon. Gentleman has set out the clear Government policy that they will not accept the adjudication of the European Court of Justice, but in any agreement—and we all hope an agreement is reached—there will have to be a dispute resolution mechanism. It would be helpful if he could tell the House his views on what kind of mechanism that would be and whether there might be a place within that for independent arbitration to deal with disputes. Given that he has just argued that EU member states have got away with state aid to the disadvantage of the UK, is he satisfied that the Government are asking for sufficient reassurance from the European Union that that will not happen in future under any agreement that is reached?

    Sir William Cash

    To answer the second point first, I am, of course, very conscious of what is going on in the negotiations. I hear what has been said repeatedly by the Government with respect to maintaining and protecting our vital national interests, and I believe that that will be the outcome—namely, we will ensure that ​we are not made subject to EU state aid in the way in which we have experienced it in the past. I have made the case. I can say more about it, but I do not need to for the moment.

    With respect to the question of arbitration, it refers back in a funny way to my reference to John Bright, who was one of the initiators of the notion of international arbitration in the Alabama case. I will simply say this. I believe that the European Court’s jurisdiction cannot be allowed, but I go further: I think that some form of arbitration may be necessary, but not, under any circumstances, including our being subjugated to the rules and jurisdiction of the European Court.

    I will now move on. For our report, my Committee consulted with 24 Select Committees, and we are immensely grateful to all of them for their contributions. The Prime Minister, in a written statement, followed by a Command Paper in February, made it clear—in line with Acts of Parliament that had already been passed, not to mention the outcome of the general election—that there would be no rule for the European Court of Justice, nor any alignment of our laws with the EU, and nor would any of the European institutions, including the Court, have any jurisdiction in the UK. Those statements and policies are entirely consistent with the democratic will of the British people. We asked the Government to publish their draft legal text, and I am glad to say that that has been done.

    The timing of this debate is crucial because the Prime Minister will engage in a high-level meeting towards the end of this month. I ask the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster for the exact date when that will take place, the agenda that will be before the meeting and who will attend on behalf of the EU and the EU27. This, in turn, is crucial, because Germany takes over the presidency on 1 July and there is all the sensitive history associated with Germany’s engagement with the EU, which I have debated and written about since April 1990, and have discussed face-to-face with many of its leading politicians, including Helmut Schmidt and others. My approach has been demonstrably justified by events. For example, the coronavirus package would move the EU towards greater EU fiscal and political integration, which the Germans would influence much more heavily than even they do today. Their slogan for the presidency is:

    “Together. Making Europe Strong Again”

    I simply add that we were not a minute too soon in leaving the EU.

    The Government, in their Command Paper, say that by the end of June there is the opportunity for the

    “outline of an agreement…capable of being rapidly finalised by September. If that does not seem to be the case…the Government will need to decide whether the UK’s attention should move away from negotiations and focus solely on…preparations to exit the transition period in an orderly fashion.”

    Recent correspondence between our chief negotiator, David Frost, and Michel Barnier indicates that there is no real progress in the negotiations, because the EU is invariably asking for the impossible and, as correctly indicated by David Frost, the EU is not offering a “fair free-trade relationship” but a

    “low-quality trade agreement…with unprecedented…oversight of our laws and institutions..”

    Our vital national interests, which derive from our democracy and self-government, which is what this debate is about, are paramount.​

    I was extremely glad to hear what the Leader of the House said at today’s business questions on the issue of the extension of the transitional period, because he used the hallowed words of the late Margaret Thatcher, “No, no, no.” I am delighted to hear similar sentiments expressed by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster this afternoon. Any extension of the transition period, through which Mr Michel Barnier is outrageously trying to seduce remainers, would simply prolong negotiations; as David Frost stated, it would create more uncertainty, leaving us paying far more to the EU and binding us to EU laws, when we have democratically and lawfully decided to leave the EU by our own sovereign decision and our own sovereign legislation.

    As for the Labour amendment to this motion, it completely turns the purpose of the “good faith” and “best endeavours” in article 184 of the withdrawal agreement, which places an obligation on the EU to enshrine European sovereignty, on its head. The amendment would betray that and with it the democratic will of the British electorate. In conclusion, I urge the Government to review the Northern Ireland protocol, which raises concerns about EU law and European Court jurisdiction, and the status of Northern Ireland. I look to the Government to ensure that the whole UK leaves on our own terms, because our sovereignty and self-government is an absolute bulwark of our freedom and our democracy.

  • Paul Blomfield – 2020 Speech on EU Negotiations

    Paul Blomfield – 2020 Speech on EU Negotiations

    Below is the text of the speech made by Paul Blomfield, the Labour MP for Sheffield Central, in the House of Commons on 4 June 2020.

    I beg to move an amendment, to leave out from “the UK’s Approach to Negotiations,” to end and insert—

    “commends the European Scrutiny Committee on its Fifth Report of Session 2019–21, HC 333, whose Annex draws upon responses from other select committees identifying matters of vital national interest in the EU negotiating mandate; recalls that during the 2019 general election and the passage of the Withdrawal Agreement Act, Government ministers committed that negotiations on the UK’s future relationship with the EU would be based on the Political Declaration; notes that in Article 184 of the Withdrawal Agreement the UK agreed to “use their best endeavours, in good faith and in full respect of their respective legal orders, to take the necessary steps to negotiate expeditiously the agreements governing their future relationship referred to in the Political Declaration of 17 October 2019”; therefore calls on the Government to negotiate an “ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership”, including an “ambitious, wide-ranging and balanced economic partnership” that entails “no tariffs, fees, charges or quantitative restrictions across all sectors”, a deal that would safeguard “workers’ rights, consumer and environmental protection”, including “effective implementation domestically, enforcement and dispute settlement” and a “broad, comprehensive and balanced security partnership” underpinned by “longstanding commitments to the fundamental rights of individuals, including continued adherence and giving effect to the ECHR, and adequate protection of personal data”.

    I join the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in commending the determined work, over so very many years, of the Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee, and I thank him, and members of the Committee, for their report. That is both because of the important issues that the report raises, and because it provides the House with a rare opportunity to debate with Ministers about the negotiations as they reach a crucial stage. There might be issues in the report that Labour would set out differently, and we have shaped those in our ​amendment. At this stage, however, because of the extraordinary circumstances in which we are currently conducting business, although I will speak to the issues in the amendment, we do not intend to press it to a vote.

    Let me begin with the issue on which we agree wholeheartedly with the Committee, and indeed with the motion, which is the central point of accountability. We have consistently pressed for accountability and transparency throughout these negotiations, as we were promised at the outset. The Prime Minister told us on 20 December that

    “Parliament will be kept fully informed of the progress of these negotiations.”—[Official Report, 20 December 2019; Vol. 669, c. 150.]

    On 27 February, the last time that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster actually addressed or made a statement to the House on these negotiations, he said that

    “we will keep Parliament fully informed about the negotiations, and colleagues will be able to scrutinise our progress.”—[Official Report, 27 February 2020; Vol. 672, c. 469.]

    But it has not worked like that, has it? Indeed, since those negotiations started, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has made no oral statement on them at all. He has only updated the House once when he was forced to do so by an urgent question from my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves). That silence has spanned three months for negotiating rounds, Joint Committee meetings and all the disruption resulting from covid-19. By comparison, during phase one of the negotiations, either the Brexit Secretary or the Prime Minister reported personally to Parliament after every key negotiating round and after each meeting of the European Council.

    This week, as the Chancellor has made clear, sees the fourth and crucial round of talks before the Joint Committee and high-level meeting at which progress is to be reviewed. I hope that, in her wind-up, the Minister will give an assurance to the House that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster will commit to making a statement to the House on Monday, and that the Prime Minister will update the House in person after the high-level meeting in June. I hope she will also commit to making real efforts to consult the devolved Administrations, because the terms of reference for the Joint Ministerial Committee referred to reaching agreement with the devolved Administrations on the approach to the negotiations and Ministers made repeated promises that engagement would be stepped up, after disappointment was expressed at an earlier stage, once we moved on from the withdrawal negotiations. That has not happened, has it?

    Michael Gove

    I would like to take this opportunity, as the hon. Gentleman is kind enough to give way, to say that the Paymaster General has indeed stepped up engagement with all the devolved Administrations, and we are grateful to them for their work. One thing has come through though: the Welsh First Minister—the Labour First Minister—has been clear that he seeks an extension of our time in the transition period. Is that official Labour party policy?

    Paul Blomfield

    I am looking forward to addressing precisely that point. I do understand why the Minister is so keen to talk about the process. It is because he does not really want to address the substance of the negotiations. ​Let me just say a further word on the consultation with the devolved Administrations, because that may be his perspective, but it is certainly not the perspective of the devolved Administrations themselves who feel that the engagement has been cursory, and has not been meaningful either around the negotiating mandate or in updating them on the progress.

    Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)

    Does the hon. Gentleman agree with my colleague, the Brexit Minister in the Scottish Parliament, Mike Russell, that the whole process of involvement with the devolved Administrations has been merely about letting them know what is happening rather than letting them influence what is happening in the negotiations or having any input in decisions on any crucial issues?

    Paul Blomfield

    I do indeed, and that is a concern that has, I think, been widely expressed by others as well. Indeed, it reflects the Government’s approach to this Parliament. They keep us a little bit informed, with a written ministerial statement here and there, but there is no meaningful engagement.

    Parliament must be given the opportunity of holding the Government to account for the pledges they made to the British people in the election to which the Minister referred. At that election, the Conservative manifesto promised an “oven-ready deal”. That deal was the new withdrawal agreement and political declaration that the Prime Minister triumphantly renegotiated in October 2019.

    Jacob Young

    I appreciate what the hon. Gentleman has just said about the fact that we had a clear pledge in our manifesto and that you are well aware of the fact that we won the general election. In the light of that, what is your view on Michel Barnier’s letter to Opposition leaders calling for an extension to the transition period?

    Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)

    Order. I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman is new to the House and I do not want to upset the flow of the debate, but other Members may not be aware that you should not address someone in the House as “you”. “You” only means the Chair. During these unusual times, standards have been slipping and we must not allow that to happen. I know that I can trust the hon. Gentleman. I do not want to pick him out but he has just given me the opportunity to make sure that, from now on, he will refer to the hon. Gentleman as the hon. Gentleman.

    Jacob Young

    But the question stands.

    Paul Blomfield

    And the question will be answered, but one of the things the hon. Gentleman will learn is that there is no firmer upholder of standards than you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

    The hon. Gentleman is right to focus on the mandate that the Government secured in December, and we acknowledge that the arithmetic the general election produced gives them a clear a majority in the House, but instead of talking about process, we should focus on the substance of the mandate. What was that promise? It was not, “Get Brexit done at any price.” It was, “Get Brexit done on the basis of the oven-ready deal.”

    That deal promised the British people

    “an ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership”​
    with

    “no tariffs, fees, charges or quantitative restrictions across all sectors”.

    It promised to safeguard workers’ rights and consumer and environmental protection, and to include

    “effective implementation domestically, enforcement and dispute settlement.”

    The Minister talks about deals such as that with Canada as a reference point. He will know that the comprehensive economic and trade agreement contains some provisions for a level playing field with enforcement mechanisms, and in fact negotiations are taking place for those to be enhanced.

    Delivering on those promises matters, because the Government have sought to talk down expectations about their ability to achieve the pledges they made to the British people. We face a huge economic hit as a result of covid-19. We must not make that worse through a bad deal on our future relationship with the European Union.

    The director general of the CBI said on Tuesday:

    “For many firms fighting to keep their heads above water through the crisis, the idea of preparing for a chaotic change in EU trading relations in seven months is beyond them. They are not remotely prepared. Faced with the desperate challenges of the pandemic, their resilience and ability to cope is almost zero.”

    One of those firms, Nissan, warned yesterday that tariffs on cars exported to the EU would make its business model unsustainable if we left the transition, for example, on the much-vaunted Australia model—the “no deal exists” model. Meanwhile, obviously concerned about progress, the Governor of the Bank of England has urged banks to step up their preparations for the UK leaving the transition period without a future trading relationship in place.

    Of course, the deal is not just about goods and services; there are nine other strands to the talks, among which security is critical. At the general election, the public were promised

    “a broad, comprehensive and balanced security partnership …underpinned by long-standing commitments to the fundamental rights of individuals, including continued adherence and giving effect to the”

    European convention on human rights,

    “and adequate protection of personal data”.

    However, since the election, the Government have rowed back on their commitment. On 11 March, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster told the Committee on the Future Relationship with the European Union that

    “we may not necessarily have concluded everything on internal security by”

    31 December.

    That is of deep concern, as the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), pointed out yesterday at Prime Minister’s questions. Without a comprehensive security agreement, even for a short period, extradition would be slower and more bureaucratic, law enforcement agencies would find it harder to get crucial information for investigations as they lost access to EU-wide databases, and it would be more difficult for UK investigators and prosecutors to collaborate with EU partners.

    We have left the European Union. The task now is to build the best possible new relationship for jobs and the economy in all parts of the UK through tariff and ​barrier-free trade in goods and services, to maintain the security of the UK by retaining existing co-operation as far as possible, and to maintain protection for workers, consumers and the environment. And of course nothing must be done that undermines the Northern Ireland protocol and the Good Friday agreement.

    That is what the country was promised at the election. That is the deal that the Government have to deliver. They have said that they will deliver that deal by December. They should confirm today that they remain confident that the oven-ready deal that they pledged to the British people, summed up in the political declaration that they signed with the European Union, will be delivered—not any deal; that deal—and by the end of the year. They should also spell out how they plan to, in the words of their own motion, “facilitate essential parliamentary scrutiny” on their progress.

  • Michael Gove – 2020 Statement on EU Negotiations

    Michael Gove – 2020 Statement on EU Negotiations

    Below is the text of the statement made by Michael Gove, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office, in the House of Commons on 4 June 2020.

    I beg to move,

    That this House, having regard to the constitutional and legal functions enshrined in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, urges the Government to conduct its negotiations with the European Union with the fullest possible transparency to facilitate essential parliamentary scrutiny; also urges the Government to make regular progress reports on the negotiations, including on stakeholder contributions to the consultation on The Future Relationship with the EU: the UK’s Approach to Negotiations, and to address the issues identified by the European Scrutiny Committee in its Fifth Report of Session 2019–21, HC 333, as matters of vital national interest.

    I am delighted to be opening this important debate. In particular, I would like to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash). I am sure the House will be aware that, having first been elected in 1984, he has been a distinguished campaigner on a number of issues, including improving the UK’s role in overseas development. Above all, he will be remembered for his commitment to restoring the sovereignty of this House. For more than 35 years he has served on the European Scrutiny Committee, which he now chairs. Having served on it for a brief period when I was a Back Bencher in the 2005 to 2010 Parliament, I can say that his attention to detail, his commitment to this House and his service to the country are things that all of us should recognise and applaud.

    The motion we are considering today asks the Government to do three things: to negotiate transparently in order to ease the way for essential parliamentary scrutiny of the Executive; to provide regular reports on the progress of the negotiations; and to address the issues raised specifically by the European Scrutiny Committee about the impact of legislation being passed at European Union level while we are in the transition period, not fully part of the EU but of course subject to its acquis.

    With respect to the transparency of our negotiations, it is the case that a Command Paper was published earlier this year outlining the approach that the UK Government would take towards the negotiations. I made an oral statement in this House to outline our approach. Since that time, the UK Government have outlined their approach in detail by the publication of draft texts covering not just our future economic partnership but areas such as fisheries and security. The publication of those draft texts has also been accompanied by my appearance alongside David Frost, the Prime Minister’s sherpa and EU negotiator, in front of the Select Committee of the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) on the future relationship with the European Union on three occasions, in front of the House of Lords Select Committee covering European affairs on ​two occasions and, of course, in front of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee on one occasion as well.

    Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)

    The document to which the right hon. Gentleman has just referred makes it clear that the Government want an agreement that involves no tariffs, but in the interests of transparency, will he explain to the House why the Government are prepared to contemplate tariffs being imposed from 1 January next year, when he will know that the president of the National Farmers Union has described that prospect as catastrophic for the industry, and that only this week the chief operating officer of Nissan has warned that the Sunderland plant would not be sustainable if tariffs on car exports transpire?

    Michael Gove

    The right hon Gentleman is right; it is our intention. Indeed, it is a commitment in the political declaration that accompanies the withdrawal agreement that both sides will work towards ensuring that we have a zero-tariff, zero-quota approach. One of the problems we face is that the European Union is placing an unprecedented demand on the United Kingdom, which is that in order to secure that zero-tariff, zero-quota approach, we accept a suite of commitments—the so-called level playing field commitments—that would place obligations on the UK Government and our institutions to follow EU law in a way that no other sovereign nation would and in a way that no other free trade agreement requires. That takes us to the heart of the UK’s approach.

    In all these appearances and opportunities in which the House has allowed me, on behalf of the Government, to explain our approach, we have taken a consistent line, and that is in keeping with the political declaration. We want a free trade agreement with the European Union, and the free trade agreement that we seek is built on precedent. There is nothing novel, outrageous or excessive about our requests, and the free trade agreement that we seek is, as I say, one that builds on precedents from Canada, Japan and South Korea and agreements that other sovereign nations have entered into with the EU.

    The challenge that we face, however, is that the European Union argues that, because of the size of our market and our geographical proximity, we should be subject to rules of the club that we have left, which they impose on no other sovereign nation. At the same time, the EU insists that in the hugely important area of fisheries, it should continue to have access on terms that are similar, if not identical, to the common fisheries policy, which so many people in this country recognise as having worked against the interests of our coastal communities and of marine conservation.

    It is on that basis that the fourth round of negotiations is currently being conducted. David Frost, our negotiator, is negotiating hard today, and I am sure that Michel Barnier will update us with his perspective on these negotiations tomorrow. We will also be laying a written ministerial statement next week and, of course, should the House require any further updates on the progress of the negotiations, I would be delighted to give them.

    Sammy Wilson (East Antrim) (DUP)

    Does the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster also accept that another impediment is Michel Barnier’s insistence that the EU’s draconian interpretation of the provisions of the withdrawal ​agreement and the Northern Ireland protocol should be implemented? Does he agree that the Government cannot and must not give in to those demands?

    Michael Gove

    I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for making that point. The protocol is part of the withdrawal agreement, but it makes it clear that Northern Ireland is part of the UK customs territory. Also, in the Command Paper that we published recently—which was broadly welcomed, albeit with caveats by political parties, businesses and citizens across Northern Ireland—we made it clear that we would not impose additional physical customs infrastructure and that we would do everything we could to ensure that the Good Friday agreement was upheld in its essentials, and that means that the citizens and the businesses of Northern Ireland should continue to enjoy unfettered access to the rest of the United Kingdom’s internal market, its customs territory and its nation overall.

    In these negotiations, there will inevitably be commentary, in the form of shots fired from outside and attempts by some who do not have an interest in us reaching an agreement, to suggest that an agreement is impossible, and certainly impossible within the time allowed. However, there is ample time for us to reach an agreement. The detailed work that has been undertaken by both sides should not be set aside or diminished. All that is required is political will, imagination and flexibility, and I believe that with the advent of the German presidency of the European Union on 1 July, we will see the leadership required to guarantee that we secure the agreement that we need.

    Jacob Young (Redcar) (Con)

    I thank my right hon. Friend for everything he has just said. What is his response to Michel Barnier’s letter to Opposition party leaders on 25 May, encouraging them to extend the transition period beyond 31 December? Would that be a betrayal of our voters and the recent general election?

    Michael Gove

    Yes, I think it would be a mistake. Different people have sincere views on this matter. For example, the Welsh Assembly Government—Labour—want an extension; the Mayor of London—Labour—wants an extension. The position of the Labour leader is not clear on this matter, but perhaps the hon. Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) will enlighten us. The Scottish National party is clear in its view that there should be an extension, and the Democrat Unionist party is clear that there should not be. Every party in the House has a clear position—either for or against an extension—apart from the Labour party, although that point might be elucidated.

    The reason I think we should not have an extension is that if we did, we would end up paying the EU more money, which we could spend on our own NHS. We would have to pay for continued membership. We would not know how much that would be; we know only that it would more than we currently pay on an annual basis. We would also be subject to rules shaped at European level, although we would have no say, and that would constrain our capacity to respond not just to the coronavirus crisis, but to other coming economic challenges. During that period, the decisions made by the EU27 will be, entirely legitimately, in their interests, and not necessarily in ours. That is why an extension would be unwise and run counter to the clearly expressed view of the British ​people when they elected my right hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson) as Prime Minister, on a manifesto that clearly spelled out that we will leave the European Union’s transition period at the end of this year.

    Before I sit down and allow other Members to make their points, I am conscious that the explanatory memorandums that some Departments have provided to the Committee chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) have not always been as diligent and detailed as they should have been in ensuring that the European Scrutiny Committee can do its valued work. I assure my hon. Friend that I and the Paymaster General have spoken to all Departments to ensure that the Committee’s work can continue. It is vital, particularly during a period when we are not represented at European level, that any new addition to the acquis is scrutinised effectively by the House, and that the House has a chance to determine what response we make.

    I look forward to contributions from across the House, and in particular I thank all 23 Select Committees that joined the European Scrutiny Committee in putting forward propositions for the Government to take account of during the course of the negotiations. I am grateful to Members from across the House for the continued and constructive engagement in helping us to secure a good deal.

  • Liam Fox – 2020 Speech on the Trade Bill

    Liam Fox – 2020 Speech on the Trade Bill

    Below is the text of the speech made by Liam Fox, the Conservative MP for North Somerset, in the House of Commons on 20 May 2020.

    I will not go over the detailed points in relation to the Bill so eloquently made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State—I have to say that I recognised some of the phraseology in her arguments—but I want to deal with the context in which it is being brought forward.

    During the long gestation of the Bill, a lot has changed. Not only have we had the covid crisis, which will have a fundamental effect on the global economy, but in 2019 we saw the culmination of many of the predictions that were made by the Department for International Trade. We predicted that we would see first a slowdown in the growth of global trade and then potentially a contraction of global trade itself. We watched through 2019 the WTO make predictions on global trade growth, down ​from 2.8% to 2.2% and 1.4%. It finally came in at 0.7%. The key element was that it contracted in Q4, which has generally in history presaged a downturn in the global economy.

    That happened for a number of reasons. The US-China trade dispute had a general effect on global trade, and in particular we saw the shortening of global supply chains, as people sought to onshore and shorten global supply chains by minimising the import of intermediate goods. We saw the inevitable consequence of the trend over the decade of the G20 countries applying more and more non-tariff barriers to trade—quadrupling them in the first half of this decade—and they all matter. A bit of consumer protection here, a bit of environmental protection there and a bit of producer protection here are all justifiable in themselves, but they all add up. They have all resulted in a silting up of the global trading system, and the skies over the global trading system are now darkening with those chickens coming home to roost.

    Why does it matter? It matters because a free and open trading system has been our route to the reduction in global poverty, with more than 1 billion people taken out of abject poverty in just one generation. There is another reason it matters, which is that access to prosperity, political stability and security are part of the same continuum. It is unthinkable that the wealthiest countries in the world should pull up the ladder behind us, stopping developing countries gaining access to the same levels of prosperity. It is absurd to believe that we can do that without seeing disruption in global security. If we deny people access to prosperity, do not be surprised if we see more mass migration and more radicalisation. We need to understand that we cannot separate the concepts. Those who wish to introduce protectionism into the global economy will have to bear the consequences of the actions they are currently embarked upon.

    I want to see us, through this Bill and beyond, doing more on global trade liberalisation. Going back to where we were pre-covid will not be enough, because global trade was contracting. I was a proud Brexiteer, but I have never been a little Englander. My objection to the European Union in the era of globalisation was not the absurd notion that it was foreign, but that it was not foreign enough. It did not have global aspirations that were in tune with what we as a country wanted to see. Post covid, all the challenges we face together will be bigger, and we will have to work with all those who believe in free trade to put them right.

    The UK exports 30% of our GDP. Germany exports 48% of its GDP, and OECD data shows that the trade slowdown has hit the European Union hardest of all in the global economy, with exports from the EU contracting by 1.8% in the third quarter of 2019, even before global trade itself contracted. That is the scale of the challenge that we face.

    The Government’s proposed tariff regime reform is to be hugely welcomed, although it could be even more liberal yet. The new FTAs and the roll-over agreements allowed through the Bill are also to be welcomed. Those who put obstacles, political and otherwise, in the way of both the roll-over agreements and the new FTAs through largely pointless and irrelevant arguments need to understand the consequences to the wider global economy, as well as to our domestic prosperity, of doing so.​

    My right hon. Friend was right when she talked about the bigger picture and how we must champion World Trade Organisation reform. Without it, we will be unable to maintain the rules-based system, which is already substantially under threat. The alternative to a rules-based system is the survival of the strongest, and that will have the biggest impact on the poorest countries. This is an area where we can give a lead as a country not only economically, but morally.

  • Emily Thornberry – 2020 Speech on the Trade Bill

    Emily Thornberry – 2020 Speech on the Trade Bill

    Below is the text of the speech made by Emily Thornberry, the Labour MP for Islington South and Finsbury, in the House of Commons on 20 May 2020.

    I beg to move,

    That this House recognises that upon leaving the European Union, the UK will need effective legislation to implement agreements with partner countries corresponding to international trade agreements of the European Union in place before the UK’s exit, to implement procurement obligations arising from the UK becoming a member of the Government Procurement Agreement in its own right, to set out the basis of a Trade Remedies Authority to deliver the new UK trade remedies framework, and to establish the powers for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to collect and disclose data on goods and services exporters; but declines to give a Second Reading to the Trade Bill because it fails to set out proper procedures for Parliamentary consultation, scrutiny, debate and approval of future international trade agreements, fails to protect the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty in respect of the implementation of international trade agreements previously negotiated by the European Union and in respect of changes to existing government procurement regulations arising from the UK’s or other countries’ accession to the Government Procurement Agreement, fails to establish sufficient scrutiny procedures to replace those that have pertained while the UK has been a member of the European Union, fails to guarantee that the UK’s current high standards and rights will be protected in future trade agreements, and fails to render the Trade Remedies Authority answerable to Parliament or representative of the full range of stakeholders who should be included in its membership.​

    In moving this amendment in the name of the Leader of the Opposition, I am conscious that, for many of us, there will be a strong sense of déjà vu: the personnel may have changed, but we have all been here before, with the same Bill, the same amendment, and the same arguments. For once, the Government are correct when they say that nothing has changed. The inescapable truth remains that this Trade Bill, as it currently stands, is a massive missed opportunity for the Government, for this Parliament and for our country.

    For the past five decades, our trade policies have been set at European level. Indeed, there is not a single Member of this House who was in Parliament the last time the UK set its own trade policies, so, like it or not, this Bill carries an historic significance, and that is what I want to address today. Is this Bill, in its current form, fit to rise to its historic challenge? After five decades, in which we have seen tremendous upheaval in our global economy, does the Bill provide the legislative framework and the bold and far-reaching vision that we need to underpin Britain’s trade policies for several years to come? After five decades, does the Bill ensure that issues such as climate change and human rights, which were barely a consideration the last time the UK set its own trade policies, are now at the heart of our decision-making and central to our relationships overseas? And after five decades, does the Bill give a proper voice to the devolved Administrations, who did not even exist back then, and to all other private, public and civic-sector bodies whose ideas and insights constantly improve our policy-making and remind us that Whitehall does not know best?

    Finally, after five decades, does this Bill restore full sovereignty to Parliament over Britain’s trade policies, especially when it comes to the formulation, scrutiny and approval of new trade agreements? Those are the questions I asked myself. As I will explain, the answer that came back, on every front, was a resounding no—even worse, a warning cry that far from restoring the powers of Parliament when it comes to trade policy, this Bill erodes them to nothing.

    Let me begin with the first question, namely whether this Bill gives us a legislative framework and a bold new vision for decades of trade policy to come. Here we find ourselves in the strange position of having Ministers themselves tell us that the answer is no. They say that there is nothing of significance in this legislation, and that it is simply a continuity Bill that is designed to maintain the status quo beyond 31 December. I will come back to whether that is right, especially in respect of new trade agreements, but one thing is for sure: there is no bold, long-term vision in this Bill. There is no great legislative framework for the future, and when it comes to the UK shaping its own trade policy after five long decades, this Bill certainly was not worth the wait.

    That brings us to the second question, namely to what extent the Bill reflects the necessary and welcome widening of Britain’s trade policy objectives over five decades, and the extent to which it puts at the heart of our future trade agreements the issues of climate change, environmental protection, human rights, workers’ rights, sustainable development and gender equality. Again, we should all be ashamed to say that the answer is: not at all.

    I will take just one of those issues, namely human rights. It is disappointing enough that the Government are failing to make it a key priority in negotiating new ​trade agreements, but what is truly damaging is the Government’s willingness to omit from their rolled-over trade agreements the human rights clauses that are now mandatory in all deals with the EU. If the Government want to refute that, the Minister of State has a simple task when he closes the debate later. He should guarantee that the rolled-over trade agreements that the Government are still trying to negotiate before 31 December with Cameroon and Egypt will both contain clauses enabling the UK to terminate the agreements if those countries continue their horrendous abuse of human rights. Will he ensure that the same policy applies to Turkey, Singapore, South Sudan and every other country with whom we are in negotiation?

    The third question was whether the Bill marks a decisive break with the “Whitehall knows best” attitudes that dominated policy making five decades ago, and instead paves the way for Britain’s new trade policies to be formed in a transparent and inclusive way, for example by consulting the elected representatives of our regions and devolved Administrations, benefiting from the expertise of our development and environmental non-governmental organisations, or listening to the concerns of British businesses and their employees. Again, the answer, sadly, is no.

    We see that most starkly when it comes to the Bill’s proposals for the membership of the trade remedies authority. That will be a vital body with a vital task, but it will have no guaranteed representation from the UK’s industry bodies and trade unions—the representatives of the people most affected by the unfair practices that the TRA is supposed to prevent. No wonder there are such concerns and suspicions that the Government’s true agenda for the TRA is not to defend Britain against underpriced imports, but somehow to balance the damage they do to domestic producers against the perceived benefits for domestic consumers. That is not the job of the trade remedies authority. That is why we instead need there to be proper representation on the board for the businesses and workers that it has been set up to defend, and why we need the TRA to be accountable to Parliament rather than Government.

    That brings me to the final question, which is of the greatest immediate significance: whether, after five decades, this Bill succeeds in restoring parliamentary sovereignty over our country’s trade policies or whether, in fact, the opposite is true, as Members here and in the other place—all formidably led by my predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Brent North (Barry Gardiner)—have consistently said over the past two and a half years.

    Let us take an example. The Secretary of State is a fan, it would seem, of the Government procurement agreement. As my colleagues have pointed out in the past, no matter how much we agree with the GPA, it is still incredible that the UK can accede to the GPA and MPs have no practical means to stop it; that the UK’s coverage schedules can be sent to the WTO and MPs have no opportunity to approve them; and that changes can be made in the future to the UK’s commitment under the GPA, and MPs will have less chance to scrutinise them than we did when Brussels was in charge and the European Scrutiny Committee was in place. So in an area such as Government procurement, the Bill does not advance parliamentary sovereignty—it does not even leave us standing still. The Bill takes us backwards.​

    Let us look at a more contentious area: new trade agreements. The Government have tried to convince us that, because the Bill only seeks to provide the basis to roll over existing agreements, we do not have to worry about the almost complete absence of accompanying parliamentary scrutiny or approval. But the reality is that in many cases there are or will be major differences between the UK’s third country agreement and the EU equivalent it is opposed to replicate.

    Let us look at some of the examples we have seen. We have agreements with five countries in a trade bloc where the UK only covers three. We have EU agreements with mandatory clauses on human rights that the UK has agreed to drop. We have an EU agreement with Turkey based on a customs union, which the UK has explicitly rejected. We have an EU agreement with Japan, which both the Secretary of State and her Japanese counterpart have said our bilateral deal should go beyond, and that will doubtless be true of the Canada deal as well.

    In short, we will end up with several major new trade deals all significantly different from their EU equivalents, but all subject to the same minimal amount of parliamentary scrutiny and approval, as proposed in the Trade Bill. That is not a restoration of parliamentary sovereignty. That is not anywhere near the gold standard of parliamentary consultation, scrutiny and approval of trade deals that we see in Australia or the United States. That is not therefore what I would call taking back control.

    In conclusion, I believe that this Trade Bill offers a historic opportunity, but that opportunity has so far been missed. Instead of a bold, strategic vision for the future of our trade policy, we have a stopgap piece of legislation that even Ministers are trying to talk down. Instead of issues such as climate change and human rights being put at the heart of our trade policy, they have been ignored or consciously dropped. Instead of opening our trade policy to the expertise of others, the Government are denying them even a seat at the table. And instead of restoring Parliament’s sovereignty over trade policy, this Bill leaves MPs even more powerless than before. That is why I urge colleagues on both sides of the House to support the Opposition’s amendment. After five decades, let us spend the time and effort we need to get this historic Bill right.

  • Liz Truss – 2020 Statement on the Trade Bill

    Liz Truss – 2020 Statement on the Trade Bill

    Below is the text of the speech made by Liz Truss, the Secretary of State for International Trade, in the House of Commons on 20 May 2020.

    I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

    Coronavirus is the biggest threat this country has faced in decades. All over the world we see its devastating impact. We will do whatever it takes to support United Kingdom businesses to continue trading, with our network of 350 advisers across the country and trade commissioners across the world.

    This crisis highlights just how important it is to keep trade flowing and supply chains open, so that we can all have the essential supplies we need. It is free and open trade that has ensured that we have food on our table and access to vital personal protective equipment and medication. At meetings with my fellow G20 Trade Ministers, I have continually called for a united global response, tariff cuts on key supplies and reform of the World Trade Organisation. Although it is unfortunate that some countries have resorted to protectionism, many have sought to liberalise in the face of this crisis. In particular, I have been working with colleagues such as Australia, New Zealand and Singapore to highlight the importance of keeping trade flowing.

    Free trade and resilient supply chains will be crucial to the global economic recovery as the crisis passes. Time after time, history has shown us that free trade makes us more prosperous, while protectionism results only in poverty, especially for the worst off. Britain has a proud history as a global leader and advocate of free trade. The bold and principled decision of Sir Robert Peel to take on the power of the wealthy producers and repeal the corn laws in 1846 ushered in an unprecedented era of free trade that saw ordinary people in Britain benefit from more varied and cheaper food, helping to grow our cities and power forward the world’s first industrial revolution.

    I see a real opportunity again for industrial areas across Britain as we become an independent trading nation. By cutting tariffs and reducing export red tape, our great British businesses will be able to sell more goods around the world. British steel, ceramics and textiles are some of the world’s best, but all too often they are subject to high tariffs and barriers. Those industries are already looking forward to the opportunities that future trade deals will bring.

    The US imposes tariffs of 25% on steel; removing them would boost our domestic industries. As my hon. Friend the Member for Scunthorpe (Holly Mumby-Croft) knows, that will particularly benefit areas such as Yorkshire and the Humber, which account for more than a third of our iron and steel exports to the United States. Indeed, just this week UK Steel said:

    “A new UK/US Free Trade Agreement would provide a significant boost to our trade to this high-value market, create a global-competitive advantage for UK steel producers, and open up valuable new market opportunities.”​

    Our farmers and food producers stand to gain from a trade deal with the US. The US is the world’s second largest importer of lamb, but current restrictions mean that British producers are kept out. We can also grow, for example, our malting barley exports from Scotland and the east of England.

    The tech trade will benefit from a US free trade agreement through cutting-edge provisions on digital and data. Telecoms and tech have more than doubled in the past decade, and an ambitious FTA could see those exports grow further.

    While free trade provides opportunities, protectionism would harm farmers, tech entrepreneurs and steel manufacturers. We have already seen this before: in 1930, the Smoot-Hawley Act raised US tariffs on more than 20,000 imported goods, resulting in retaliation from other nations and the deepening and prolonging of the depression. As President Reagan said in 1985:

    “Protectionism almost always ends up making the protected industry weaker and less able to compete against foreign imports…Instead of protectionism, we should call it destructionism. It destroys jobs, weakens our industries, harms exports, costs billions of dollars to consumers, and damages our overall economy.”

    We have a golden opportunity to make sure that our recovery is export led and high value—a recovery that will see our industrial heartlands create more high-quality and high-paying jobs across all sectors. Free trade does not just benefit us here in Britain; it benefits the world. Since the end of the cold war, free trade has lifted a billion people out of extreme poverty. For want of a better word, free trade is good. It is those benefits that underpin our Government’s approach: free and fair trade fit for the modern world.

    Let me turn to the contents of the Bill. We can have fair trade only if it is free trade. The Bill will embed market access for British companies by enabling the UK to join the WTO’s Government procurement agreement as an independent member. This will provide businesses with continued access to the extraordinary opportunities of the global procurement market, worth some £1.3 trillion a year. The GPA is an agreement between 20 parties that mutually opens up Government procurement. We have already seen in the UK the way that competition drives up quality while keeping prices low. The GPA keeps suppliers competitive and provides them with opportunities overseas. It is a driver of growth, not a threat to our economy. The idea that we can, or even should, do everything domestically is not desirable or practical in this increasingly interconnected world. Instead, we should be making sure that we have resilient supply chains through a more diverse range of partners. We will be an international champion for free and fair competition in the coming months and years through our discussions at the WTO, the G20 and bilaterally. We will urge other countries not to heed that false, but enticing, call for protectionism.

    Let me be clear to the House: the GPA sets out rules for how public procurement covered by the agreement is carried out. As an independent member, we are free to decide what procurement is covered under the agreement. The UK’s GPA coverage does not and will not apply to the procurement of UK health services. Our NHS is not on the table.

    We are also committed to continuing our trade with existing partners that have agreements through the EU, such as South Korea and Chile. To date, we have signed ​20 such trade agreements representing 48 countries, and others are still under negotiation. This accounts for £110 billion of UK trade in 2018, which represents 74% of continuity trade. People said that we would not be able to roll over these agreements—well, they were wrong, and we will be signing more in the coming months. This work is part of securing the Government’s aim to have 80% of UK trade covered by free trade agreements in the next three years.

    We are also looking to new partners. Negotiations with the US and Japan are kicking off. We are prioritising signing FTAs with Australia and New Zealand and accession to the comprehensive and progressive agreement for trans-Pacific partnership, otherwise known as the CPTPP. With the UK global tariff now published, there will be an increased incentive for other countries to come to the table to maintain or improve upon their preferential terms and conditions. Fundamentally, free trade is humanitarian and we will maintain preferential margins for developing countries, helping businesses lift millions out of poverty. As a Government, we have committed to going further than the EU has in terms of trade for development, and we are looking at reducing or removing tariffs where the UK does not produce goods and getting rid of cliff edges in current tariff schedules.

    That brings me to the second part of our approach: fair trade. The Bill will help establish the independent trade remedies authority, which will help protect British businesses against injury caused by unfair trading practices such as dumping or subsidy, or unforeseen import surges. I tell the House that while free trade has no stauncher friend than this Government, unfair trading practices that hold back British businesses will have no worse enemy. We will fight against state-owned enterprises that use public money to subsidise their goods and Governments who support the lobbying of these under-priced products into the UK market.

    Excellent UK industries such as ceramics and steel—represented ably by my hon. Friends the Members for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Jo Gideon), for Stoke-on-Trent North (Jonathan Gullis), for Stoke-on-Trent South (Jack Brereton), for Redcar (Jacob Young) and for Scunthorpe—should not face unfair trade. The TRA will be responsible for investigating claims of unfair trading practices based on the evidence available. It will then make impartial representations to Ministers.

    The TRA’s impartiality is vital. Decisions on trade remedies cases can have a material impact on business and financial markets. This Bill will allow us to create an independent body to carry out objective investigations in which businesses can have full confidence. In developing our own trade policy for the first time in almost 50 years, we will use technology to ensure that our trade agreements are fit for the modern world. Therefore, this Bill will give the Government powers to collect and share the trade data that will help our independent trade policy. This will make it easier for our trade policy to reflect the interests of businesses across the UK.

    Let me assure the House that this Bill is a continuity Bill. It cannot be used to implement any trade agreement between the UK and the EU itself, nor can it be used to ​implement an agreement with a country that did not have a trade agreement with the EU before exit day, such as the United States of America. The Bill can be used only to transition the 40 free trade agreements that the EU had signed with third countries by exit day, and these powers are subject to a five-year sunset clause to ensure that we can maintain the operability of transitioned agreements beyond the end of the transition period. Any extension of this five-year period will require explicit consent of both this House and the other place.

    We face a period of unprecedented economic challenge. It is vital that we do not just maintain the current global trading system, but make it better. That means diversifying our trade and supporting those businesses that export. Exports, be they software or steel, cars or ceramics, barley or beef, will underpin our recovery. This Bill will ensure continued access to existing markets by letting us implement trade agreements with partner countries that previously applied under the EU. It will secure continued access for UK businesses to the £1.3 trillion global public procurement market. It establishes the independent body in the Trade Remedies Authority to give our great British businesses the protection they need from unfair trade practices. Trade will be fair as well as free. By adopting a cutting-edge digital first approach, we will be able to give businesses the best possible support.

    As we recover from the economic shock of the coronavirus crisis, providing certainty and predictability in our trading arrangements will be vital to securing the interests of businesses and consumers. We will unleash the potential and level up every region and nation of our United Kingdom. Now is the time for this House to speak out against protectionism. It is time for us to embrace the opportunities that free trade and an export-led recovery will bring. I commend this Bill to the House.

  • Pete Wishart – 2020 Speech on the Northern Ireland Protocol

    Pete Wishart – 2020 Speech on the Northern Ireland Protocol

    Below is the text of the speech made by Pete Wishart, the SNP MP for Perth and North Perthshire, in the House of Commons on 20 May 2020.

    Ninety seconds? Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

    Today, we seem to be presented with another episode of Schrödinger’s border—one that is both there and not quite there, all dependent on what side of the EU negotiations a person happens to be on. UK Ministers ​have repeatedly said that there will be no border or any checks down the Irish Sea. We now know that that is not exactly the case, as we heard in the last response. From the very beginning, the possibility of that was crystal clear given what is in the withdrawal agreement and the need for a level playing field between the EU and Northern Ireland. We all know that there will be customs checks between the rest of the UK and Northern Ireland, so why do the UK Government not just acknowledge that fact? The EU has said that there must be the introduction of customs procedures and formalities in Northern Ireland for all goods traded between Northern Ireland and Great Britain.

    There have been no discussions about this with the Scottish Government, even though we will be placed at a competitive disadvantage with Northern Ireland because of these arrangements. We would give our national right hand to have the arrangements and competitive advantage that Northern Ireland will have, so why can we not get some of this if Northern Ireland does not want it?

    These negotiations need skill, guile and dexterity, and I think we have seen again today a Government who are singularly not up to it.

  • Rachel Reeves – 2020 Speech on the Northern Ireland Protocol

    Rachel Reeves – 2020 Speech on the Northern Ireland Protocol

    Below is the text of the speech made by Rachel Reeves, the Labour MP for Leeds West, in the House of Commons on 20 May 2020.

    I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement and the Command Paper.

    During the election campaign, the Prime Minister told Northern Irish businesses that if they were asked to fill in any extra paperwork, they should call him personally and

    “I will direct them to throw that form in the bin”.

    On 22 January, when the Prime Minister was asked in this House whether that meant unfettered access between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Northern Ireland and Great Britain, he said: “Emphatically it does.” But today, for the first time, the Command Paper states that there will be “some new administrative requirements”.

    Checks on animals and agrifood will be a significant escalation of what currently takes place and will mean a border management system that is quite new in terms of its scope and scale. The document published today states that we will need to

    “expand some existing entry points…to provide for proportionate additional controls.”

    Will the Minister confirm what proportion of animal and agrifood products he expects will require additional physical checks? Will those checks take place at ports in Northern Ireland? Physical checks require a product to be taken off the lorry, opened, inspected, tested and quarantined until deemed legitimate. That is quite a burden. Can the Minister confirm that there will be physical checks, or, indeed, that there definitely will not be physical checks?

    The document published today states that

    “some new administrative process for traders,”

    including

    “electronic import declaration requirements, and safety and security information, for goods entering Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK”

    will apply.

    This is no small matter. Import declarations can require 40 separate data points, and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs has estimated that each declaration for shipment will cost between £14 and £56. Can the Minister confirm the number of checks and the costs of those checks to businesses? For the 1.8 million goods vehicles that crossed from Great Britain into Northern Ireland last year, that certainly adds up.​

    On tariffs, the Government have previously promised that there would be no tariffs on goods traded either way between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Indeed, they have said that there will be no tariffs, fees or charges or quantitative restrictions. But today, for the first time, the Government have accepted that there will be tariffs on goods entering Northern Ireland. The Command Paper says that

    “goods ultimately entering Ireland…or at clear and substantial risk of doing so, will face tariffs.”

    So can the Minister say who will be levying or administering those tariffs, what “clear risk” means, and who will define it? Could tariffs be applied and later reimbursed, and if so, what would the timetable for that be? The Command Paper says:

    “We will produce full guidance to business and third parties before the end of the transition period.”

    That does not give much time for businesses to prepare for what could be quite profound changes.

    The Minister says that goods moving from Great Britain do not need to be checked because the majority will remain in the UK. This is a hugely important point. Indeed, 70% of goods that flow from Great Britain are destined for the high street. I hope that a way forward can be found so that those goods can move freely. However, the Command Paper accepts that

    “some new administrative process for traders, notably new electronic import declaration requirements, and safety and security information, for goods entering Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK”

    will apply. So can the Minister confirm that that will include rules of origin checks, safety and security checks and import declarations, and if so, where and how will those checks take place? There is no mention in the document published today of a trusted trader scheme, which is surely essential for ensuring the free flow of goods without tariffs from Great Britain into Northern Ireland that we all want to see.

    We welcome this statement, but it does expose the broken promises made by the Prime Minister. Today, for the first time, there has been an admission that there will be additional checks and that there will be tariffs on goods at risk of entering the single market. Even now, many fear that the Government are not willing to admit the full extent of those. We have seven months to get this right, and we must.

  • Michael Gove – 2020 Statement on the Northern Ireland Protocol

    Michael Gove – 2020 Statement on the Northern Ireland Protocol

    Below is the text of the statement made by Michael Gove, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, in the House of Commons on 20 May 2020.

    With permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a statement on the Government’s approach to implementing the Northern Ireland protocol as part of the withdrawal agreement with the European Union.

    The protocol exists to ensure that the progress that the people of Northern Ireland have made in the 22 years since the Belfast/Good Friday agreement is secured into the future. The Belfast agreement is built on the principle of consent. It was ratified by referendums in both Northern Ireland and Ireland, and the agreement is crystal clear that any change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom can come only if the majority in Northern Ireland consent to any change.

    The vital importance of consent is recognised in the provision for any alignment in the protocol to be disapplied if Northern Ireland’s political representatives conclude that it is no longer desirable. Embedding that recognition of consent in the protocol was intrinsic to its acceptance by the Government. Therefore, for the protocol to work, it must respect the needs of all Northern Ireland’s people, respect the fact that Northern Ireland is an integral part of the customs territory of the UK, and respect the need to bear as lightly as possible on the everyday life of Northern Ireland.

    Although there will be some new administrative requirements in the protocol, these electronic processes will be streamlined and simplified to the maximum extent. As the European Commissioner’s own negotiator, Michel Barnier, has spelled out, the protocol’s procedures must be as easy as possible and not too burdensome, in particular for smaller businesses. As is so often the case, but not always, Monsieur Barnier is right. The economy of Northern Ireland is heavily dependent on small and medium-sized enterprises. Subjecting traders to unnecessary and disproportionate burdens, particularly as we wrestle with the economic consequences of covid-19, would not serve the interests of the people of Northern Ireland, for whom the protocol was designed. The protocol text itself is explicit that implementation should impact as little as possible on the everyday life of communities.

    In that context, it is important for us all to recall that the clear majority of Northern Ireland’s trade is with the rest of the United Kingdom, so safeguarding the free flow of goods within the UK’s internal market is of critical importance to Northern Ireland’s economy and people.

    Today, we are publishing a Command Paper that outlines how the protocol can be implemented in a way that would protect the interests of the people and the economy of Northern Ireland, ensure the effective working of the UK’s internal market, and also provide appropriate protection for the EU single market, as well as upholding the rights of all Northern Ireland’s citizens. Delivering on these proposals will require close working with the Northern Ireland Executive, underscoring once again the significance of the restoration of the Stormont ​institutions in January. I would like to put on record my gratitude for the constructive approach that has been shown by Northern Ireland politicians, including by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, as well as by hon. Members from across this House.

    There are four steps we will take to ensure the protocol is implemented effectively. First, we will deliver unfettered access for NI producers to the whole of the UK market. Northern Ireland to Great Britain goods movements should take place as they do now. There should not be export declarations or any other processes as goods leave NI for GB, and we will deliver on unfettered access for Northern Ireland goods through legislation by the end of this year.

    Secondly, we will ensure that there are no tariffs on goods remaining within the UK customs territory. In order to ensure that internal UK trade qualifies for tariff-free status, there will need to be declarations on goods as they move from Great Britain to Northern Ireland, but these systems will be electronic and administered by UK authorities. It will be for our authorities to determine any processes that are required, using the latest technology, risk and compliance techniques to keep these to an absolute minimum.

    That will also allow us to deliver on our third key proposal, which is that implementation of the protocol will not involve new customs infrastructure. We acknowledge, however, as we have always done, that on agrifood and live animal movements, it makes sense to protect supply chains and the disease-free status of the island of Ireland, as has been the case since the 19th century. That will mean some expansion of existing infrastructure to provide for some additional new processes for the agriculture and food sector, but these processes will build on what already happens at ports such as Larne and Belfast, and we will work with the EU to keep these checks to a minimum, reflecting the high standards we see right across the UK. There is no such case, however, for new customs infrastructure, and as such there will not be any.

    Fourthly, we will guarantee that Northern Ireland businesses will benefit from the lower tariffs that we deliver through new free trade agreements with third countries. This ensures that Northern Ireland businesses will be able to enjoy the full benefits of the unique access that they have to the UK and EU markets.

    These four commitments will ensure that, as we implement the protocol, we give full effect to the requirements in its text to recognise Northern Ireland’s place in the UK and in its customs territory. As we take the work of implementation forward, we will continue to work closely with the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, with Northern Ireland MPs from across parties, and with the business community and farming groups that have provided such valuable feedback for our approach.

    Of course, we have already guaranteed, in the “New Decade, New Approach” deal, that the Northern Ireland Executive have a seat at the table in any meeting where Northern Ireland is being discussed and the Irish Government are present. Alongside that, there will be a new business engagement forum to exchange proposals, concerns and feedback from across the community on how best to maximise the free flow of trade, and we will ensure that those discussions sit at the heart of our thinking.​

    We recognise that there will be a wide range of voices and responses to our Command Paper. We will listen to these respectfully while we continue to put our own case with conviction at the Joint Committee. Our approach will of course continue to be informed by extensive engagement with businesses, politicians and individuals right across communities in Northern Ireland. We stand ready to work with the EU in a spirit of collaboration and co-operation so that a positive new chapter can open for Northern Ireland and its people in every community, and it is in that spirit that I commend this statement to the House.

  • Jeremy Miles – 2020 Statement on Wales and the Exit from the EU

    Jeremy Miles – 2020 Statement on Wales and the Exit from the EU

    Below is the text of the statement made by Jeremy Miles, the Counsel General for Wales, on 7 May 2020.

    This statement provides members with an update on issues related to the UK’s exit from the EU, focusing on the latest position in the negotiations on the UK / EU future relationship and the implications of this for the huge and complex programme of work required by the end of the transition period given that governments in the UK and EU are rightly focused on responding to Covid-19.

    Responding to the Covid-19 pandemic continues to be the immediate priority of the Welsh Government, and we maintain that the negotiations on the future UK / EU relationship should be paused and an extension to the transition period sought. Despite the realities of the current crisis, the UK Government continues to argue that successful negotiations, and the necessary work to implement an agreement, can be concluded alongside dealing with the current national emergency. We have seen no evidence to support that position.

    EU / UK Negotiations

    Following an understandable pause in formal talks between the UK and EU as all parties rightly focused their efforts on responding to Covid-19 and keeping all of our citizens safe, the negotiations resumed in the week commencing 20 April, albeit with reduced numbers and via videoconference.

    At the end of the second full round of talks, there were clearly major differences remaining between the two sides as outlined by Michel Barnier in recent comments. The largest areas of difference include: the UK Government’s unwillingness to sign up to a ‘level playing field’ of economic, social and environmental standards which the EU insists should underpin the envisaged zero-tariff, zero-quota trade deal; the UK Government’s rejections of any role for the Court of Justice of the European Union in relation to aspects of the future relationship; the UK Government’s position that there should be multiple separate agreements as opposed to the EU’s preference for one overarching agreement; and fishing rights. There seems to have been little, if any, progress in resolving these fundamental differences despite the fact we are now half way between the publication of negotiating mandates and the critical end of June date (which under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement is the last point at which an extension to the transition period can be agreed).

    The negotiations have to date focused on the presentation and clarification of negotiating positions. If the UK Government persists in seeking to work to the original timetable, then the negotiations need to reach agreement swiftly, which will require compromise and pragmatism. Despite best efforts there will inevitably be limitations about what can be achieved by video conference rather than face to face negotiations, especially when there are clear fundamental differences between the two sides.

    The UK Government continues to refuse to contemplate extending the end date of the transition period. This is despite requests from us and many others to pause the negotiations and extend the transition period, recognising the fundamentally changed circumstances facing the economy and society due to the Covid-19 pandemic. It is of great concern in the current circumstances that we will exit transition on 31 December 2020. The focus must be for us to work together to combat Covid-19 and the economic consequences thereafter, rather than unnecessarily compounding these issues by adding the economic shock a change in our economic relationship with the EU will inevitably entail. The UK Government must also recognise that conducting complex negotiations under these constrained circumstances is unlikely to lead to an outcome which protects our interests.

    UK Government engagement with the Devolved Governments on the negotiations remains deficient: despite the promises of improved engagement as the future relationship negotiations got underway, Ministerial engagement became even more inadequate. The UK Government has failed despite their formal commitment in the terms of reference of the Joint Ministerial Committee (EU Negotiations) to seek agreement with the Devolved Governments on the negotiations to provide us with meaningful opportunities to influence. Whilst we have made clear that the UK Government position is not one we can support since it does not represent Wales’ interests, as a responsible government, we continue to take any opportunities that we can to press our case on specific points. We will, of course, continue to speak up for what we believe is in Wales’ interests in these negotiations, both in our dealings with the UK Government and in public.

    A meeting of the Joint Ministerial Committee (EU Negotiations) is being arranged for the middle of May. This is the first meeting since January. I have also spoken bilaterally this week and last week with the UK Government’s Paymaster General, Penny Mordaunt MP. These short calls are welcome but necessarily limited in their effectiveness and therefore I continue to press for structured, collective and detailed discussions involving all three Devolved Governments and the UK Government on the negotiations, and in particular on changes to the UK Government’s negotiating position.

    EU Exit Implementation

    The uncertain and deeply concerning situation on the negotiations exacerbates the pressures and risks we face in preparing for the end of the transition period – in particular on preparedness, legislation, frameworks, policy and finance.

    In relation to preparedness overall, at the end of transition we need to be able to implement any deal reached on the future UK / EU relationship, or manage the implications if no such deal is agreed. We may not know until well into the autumn, or even later, which scenario we face.

    Covid-19 has already affected the current capacity of both the UK Government and the Welsh Government to prepare for the end of transition. More fundamentally, the scale of the immediate crisis has hugely reduced the capacity of people, businesses and other organisations to consider, let alone take action to prepare for, the end of transition. The risks of this will multiply if significant changes to trade and supply chains hit already fragile businesses which are not prepared and still suffering from the impact of the pandemic – with potentially serious implications across Wales.

    We have repeatedly pressed the UK Government to work with the Devolved Governments on the preparations for the end of the transition period, as happened – eventually – in respect of preparations for a ‘no deal’ scenario in 2019. However, at a central level the UK Government is choosing not to share information or work with the Devolved Governments on the wide range of preparedness work which we know it is seeking to carry out, including on the functioning of the Northern Ireland Protocol. As we made clear during the work on a ‘no deal’ scenario previously, it is not possible for the Welsh Government to prepare Wales for whatever situation we face at the end of transition period in isolation from the UK Government’s work in England or at a UK level. Moreover, the UK as a whole cannot be properly prepared if the UK Government does not work effectively with the Devolved Governments. As such, the UK Government’s continued reluctance to share information and to work with the Devolved Governments – and the months of time lost for joint preparedness work as a result is profoundly concerning.

    In relation to legislation, there remains a high degree of uncertainty with relatively limited information available from the UK Government on the scope and nature of the legislation needed, in particular on the implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement and related agreements, and with even less certainty regarding a possible treaty on the future relationship with the EU. We have asked the UK Government to share a credible plan for how all the necessary legislation can be passed by the end of December, but no such plan has been shared. The successful implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement requires a cross-UK approach, or at least understanding, and this cannot be achieved without input from the UK Government. We are very aware that there is likely to be a significant programme of SIs required and we will continue to press the UK Government to work with us on such legislation and to ensure that the devolution settlement is properly respected.

    Moreover, there is extensive work required in relation to ‘common frameworks’ by the end of 2020. Officials from all four administrations have been working together to consider how to deliver the most important framework areas. However, even achieving this by the end of this year will be difficult. More broadly, work in relation to common frameworks and the internal market serves to illustrate powerfully how inter-governmental relations and devolution / constitutional issues could well grow significantly in breadth and complexity in the future. There is much work to do in a short period of time to resolve potential challenges and maintain a positive economic and constitutional landscape within the UK.

    In addition to frameworks, there is a wide-ranging policy agenda which relates to EU exit, encompassing policy making in Wales (for example, in respect of future agriculture policy) and our need to seek to influence policy making at a UK level (for example, on how the UK internal market will function, and on migration policy) to ensure they meet the needs of Wales. All this will also need to be calibrated according to the progress of recovery from the Covid-19 crisis.

    Furthermore, there is an important set of issues relating to finance. Around £700m a year comes to Wales now from the EU and whereas there are short-term reassurances from the UK Government on aspects of this, we need to protect our interests in longer-term funding decisions, particularly in respect of the possible Shared Prosperity Fund (SPF) and future agricultural and rural development funding. We will hold the UK Government to promises made that Wales will not be a penny worse off as a result of leaving the EU, and that the Welsh Government will continue to be responsible for deploying these funds in Wales.

    This statement demonstrates the scale and the complexity of the work on EU exit issues facing us in the remainder of 2020 and illustrates how it links to the new realities and work arising from the Covid-19 pandemic. The Welsh Government will continue to do all we can to seek to influence the negotiations and to work on the necessary preparations for the end of the transition period. This is constrained however, by the current approach of the UK Government. I will continue to keep members up to date on developments, in particular following the anticipated JMC(EN) meeting later this month.