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The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 7 June 2024.

Statement by Australia, the UK and the US about AUKUS safeguards under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Chair,

I take the floor on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to respond to comments made regarding Australia’s acquisition of a naval nuclear propulsion capability. We expressed our position on this agenda item in our Note Verbale, dated May 30, 2024, and I will not repeat it here other than to reiterate that this item has never enjoyed consensus support and is not a standing agenda item. However, we feel compelled – once again – to invoke our Right of Reply to respond to the remarks made today.

In response to a request in March and last November from my distinguished colleague who requested this agenda item, I and my counterparts from the United Kingdom and Australia have, indeed, sat and attentively listened to the remarks made today, just as we have done for two-and-a-half years. Unfortunately, much of what I have heard today, and what I have in fact heard under this item for the last two-and-a-half years, are serious mischaracterizations and misleading assertions from certain countries.

These assertions continue to ignore or misrepresent the information we have provided in good faith, and to disregard the answers which the Director General has already provided in response to the questions asked. We express our deep concern about these mischaracterizations. We, and the large majority of Board members who have spoken in previous meetings on this topic, have expressed confidence in Director General Grossi’s handling and prerogative on this issue. Indeed, we note many member states expressed confidence in the Agency’s engagement with relevant parties on naval nuclear propulsion under Agenda item 6b at this Board. We have been clear that this agenda item is unnecessary.

Chair,

The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation have spoken multiple times over the last two days of the need to avoid politicization of the Board, particularly on issues that the Board and the Director General have deemed to be of significant concern such as Iran, the DPRK, and Syria’s failure to meet obligations in their Safeguards Agreements as well as on the nuclear safety, security, and safeguards implications of Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine. It is difficult to understand why these states do not apply their own logic to this issue. Why, when the Director General has expressed his satisfaction and a majority of the Board has expressed no desire for quarterly discussion on one country’s naval nuclear propulsion program, do we continue to have this item added to the agenda?

The Director General has repeatedly stated that the Agency has “the necessary experience to develop the arrangements related to the use of nuclear material for naval nuclear propulsion in accordance with the Statute and relevant safeguards agreements.” The Director General has also made clear that Australia’s Article 14 arrangement will allow the Agency to continue to meet the technical safeguards objectives established for Australia, and that, once developed, it will be transmitted to the Board for appropriate action. Despite these statements, it remains deeply concerning that some states continue to call into question the Director General’s ability to perform the functions vested in him by the Statute, by the relevant safeguards agreements, and by decisions of the Board.

One country has called for referring the matter to the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation, known as SAGSI. Obviously, we fully support the Director General’s use of SAGSI as he sees fit and on technical matters within its remit. We defer to the Director General to determine whether to seek SAGSI’s input on naval nuclear propulsion, or, for that matter, any other technical issue relating to safeguards implementation. It is not this Board’s responsibility to dictate whether or how the Director General receives input from his own advisory group.

Chair,

The AUKUS partners have and will continue to engage consistently, openly, and transparently with Member States and the Secretariat on genuine questions. We welcome that the Agency has repeatedly reported its satisfaction with Australia’s engagement.

Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have provided updates on relevant progress at all Board meetings since the initial AUKUS announcement in September 2021, and will do so again at this meeting under Any Other Business. We will continue to keep the Board updated on our engagement, as appropriate. Our three countries – along with the majority of the Board – continue to oppose any proposal for this item to be a standing agenda item or to establish any efforts that undermine and politicize the independent technical mandate of the IAEA. We reject any suggestion that the Agency does not have a mandate to engage bilaterally with Member States on issues relevant to the implementation of their safeguards commitments. We urge colleagues to continue to reject deliberate efforts to challenge the Agency’s independence and integrity. And we welcome the Director General’s commitment to continuing to provide updates to the Board as and when he deems appropriate.

Thank you, Chair.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 6 June 2024.

Ambassador Holland voices support for Moldova, as it pursues a bold reform agenda and builds its future in Europe, in line with the wishes of the Moldovan people – all while defending against increased attention from hostile actors.

Thank you, Chair.

The UK supports Moldova in its considered rejection of the claims made by the Russian delegation at the Permanent Council meeting on 23 May. The Moldovan delegation’s comments speak for themselves, but I would nonetheless like to voice the UK’s support for Moldova. This is a country which is pursuing a bold reform agenda and building its future in Europe, in line with the wishes of the Moldovan people – all while defending against increased attention from hostile actors.

Firstly, the measured and proportional steps taken by Moldova in recent years have been necessary to address unprecedented levels of Russian disinformation, in an attempt to undermine Moldova’s democratic process. All Moldovans are entitled to credible and transparent journalism, free from propaganda and foreign interference. And as noted by my Moldovan colleague, Reporters without Borders placed Moldova 31st on the World Press Freedom Index. A well-earned position which demonstrates Moldova’s clear commitment to a free and independent media.

Moldova’s commitment to OSCE principles on election integrity and election observation is similarly welcome, building on the commitments agreed by all participating States at Copenhagen. We commend Moldova’s longstanding and close cooperation with ODIHR, including Moldova’s recent request for a legal opinion on postal voting and their other work to follow up on ODIHR’s election recommendations.

Regarding the Transnistrian settlement process, Russia’s request to resume the 5+2 format makes no sense. We would dearly have liked the 5+2 to continue but, as Russia well knows, it is on hold because Russia has chosen to pursue its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, and will continue to be on hold until all sides agree to resume. The UK continues to support a peaceful settlement under the 1+1 format, and we are grateful to the parties on both sides of the Nistru for their persistence in seeking constructive dialogue despite Russia’s repeated attempts to instrumentalise the process.

Madam Chair, it is ironic that many of the accusations made by the Russian delegation are a thinly veiled attempt to criticise them for taking the steps necessary to protect its democracy and territorial integrity from the very hybrid threats that Russia alone is responsible for. The UK stands resolutely with Moldova as it seeks to safeguard the democratic choices of its people.

Thank you.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 6 June 2024.

Ambassador Holland calls out Russia’s failure to live up to the commitments it signed up to in the OSCE’s Decalogue with its illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Thank you, Madam Chair.  Each week in this Council, we confront the reality of what is taking place on the ground in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion.  And that is right. As long as it continues to fight this war, we should never stop confronting the Russian Federation with what their so-called Special Military Operation means for the people on the ground; the heroically brave Ukrainian Armed Forces, the first responders to Russian attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure or the innocent civilian victims of Russia’s aggression. We should express our opposition and disgust at what is happening in the name of Russia in Ukraine – and hold Russia accountable.

However, occasionally, it is also worth taking a step back to remind ourselves of what the Russian Federation has done to comprehensive security overall in our region by their violation in Ukraine of the principles, agreed at Helsinki, that sit at the heart of this organisation: specifically, the Decalogue. The Decalogue was adopted, by consensus – and that means all of us – nearly half a century ago.

Looking at the Decalogue again, it is striking what a good job our predecessors did. If we were starting from scratch today to design a set of principles that should govern relations between the states of our region, I think and hope we would come out in a similar place.

Take for example the first principle:

“The participating States will respect each other’s sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other’s right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.

“Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have equal rights and duties. They will respect each other’s right to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other States in accordance with international law and in the spirit of the present Declaration. They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.  They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.”

Who among us would not want that principle applied to our own country?  None, I imagine.  Then why should that principle apply to 56 of us but not to Ukraine? The standards should apply to all of us. But that is clearly not the view of the Russian Federation who in invading Ukraine has driven a coach and horses through the principle of territorial integrity that they signed up to.

So, Madam Chair, I would like to ask a direct question of the Russian delegation as to whether they consider Russia’s actions in Ukraine to be in conformity with this first Helsinki principle.  If so, could they please explain how?

Thank you.