Tag: Winston Churchill

  • Winston Churchill – 1931 Duty in India Speech

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    Below is the text of the speech made by Winston Churchill at the Albert Hall, in London, on 18th March 1931.

    I think it hard that the burden of holding and organising this immense meeting should be thrown upon the Indian Empire Society. One would have thought that if there was one cause in the world which the Conservative party would have hastened to defend, it would be the cause of the British Empire in India. One would have expected that the whole force of the Conservative party machine would have been employed for months past in building up a robust, educated opinion throughout the country, and in rallying all its strongest forces to guard our vital interests. Unhappily all that influence, and it is an enormous influence, has been cast the other way. The Conservative leaders have decided that we are to work with the Socialists, and that we must make our action conform with theirs. We therefore have against us at the present time the official machinery of all the three great parties in the State. We meet under a ban. Every Member of Parliament or Peer who comes here must face the displeasure of the party Whips. Mr. Baldwin has declared that the three-party collusion must continue. And in support of that decision he has appealed to all those sentiments of personal loyalty and partisan feeling which a leader can command. Is it not wonderful in these circumstances, with all this against us, that a few of us should manage to get together here in this hall to-night?

    Our fight is hard. It will also be long. We must not expect early success. The forces marshalled against us are too strong. But win or lose, we must do our duty. If the British people are to lose their Indian Empire, they shall do so with their eyes open, and not be led blindfold into a trap. Already in our campaign we have had a measure of success. The movement and awakening of opinion in the Conservative party have already caused concern to our leaders. They feel they have to reckon with resolute forces in the party, and far beyond it, who will not be easily quelled. Already they have rejected the plan of sending a three-party delegation out to India for which Lord Irwin pleaded so earnestly. For the moment, therefore, we have a breathing space. The Socialist and subversive enemy have been thrown into disarray by the breakdown of their scheme to entice the Conservatives out to India. They are arranging their forces for a renewed attack. Mr. Gandhi, their supreme hope, is to come to London, as soon as they can persuade him to come, and here in the centre of the Empire he will discuss with British ministers and politicians the best means for breaking it up. But by that time we shall be ready too. We shall not be taken by surprise, as the country was during the Round Table Conference. We are not entirely defenceless or without means of expression.

    We have behind us the growing strength of Conservative opinion. We have the prospect at no great distance of a Conservative victory. Nothing will turn us from our path, or discourage us from our efforts; and by the time Mr. Gandhi has arrived here to receive the surrender of our Indian Empire, the Conservative party will not be so ready to have its name taken in vain.

    What spectacle could be more sorrowful than that of this powerful country casting away with both hands, and up till now almost by general acquiescence, the great inheritance which centuries have gathered? What spectacle could be more strange, more monstrous in its perversity, than to see the Viceroy and the high officials and agents of the Crown in India labouring with all their influence and authority to unite and weave together into a confederacy all the forces adverse and hostile to our rule in India? One after another our friends and the elements on which we ought to rely in India are chilled, baffled and dismissed, and finally even encouraged to band themselves together with those who wish to drive us out of the country. It is a hideous act of self-mutilation, astounding to every nation in the world. The princes, the Europeans, the Moslems, the Depressed classes, the Anglo-Indians – none of them know what to do nor where to turn in the face of their apparent desertion by Great Britain. Can you wonder that they try in desperation to make what terms are possible with the triumphant Brahmin oligarchy?

    I am against this surrender to Gandhi. I am against these conversations and agreements between Lord Irwin and Mr. Gandhi. Gandhi stands for the expulsion of Britain from India. Gandhi stands for the permanent exclusion of British trade from India. Gandhi stands for the substitution of Brahmin domination for British rule in India. You will never be able to come to terms with Gandhi. You have only to read his latest declarations, and compare them with the safeguards for which we are assured the official Conservatives will fight to the end, to see how utterly impossible agreement is. But let me tell you this. If at the sacrifice of every British interest and of all the necessary safeguards and means of preserving peace and progress in India, you come to terms with Gandhi, Gandhi would at that self-same moment cease to count any more in the Indian situation.

    Already Nehru, his young rival in the Indian Congress, is preparing to supersede him the moment that he has squeezed his last drop from the British lemon. In running after Gandhi and trying to build on Gandhi, in imagining that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Mr. Gandhi and Lord Irwin are going to bestow peace and progress upon India, we should be committing ourselves to a crazy dream, with a terrible awakening.

    No! Come back from these perilous paths while time and strength remain. Study the report of your own statutory commission headed by Sir John Simon and signed unanimously by the representatives of all the three parties in the State. Let us take that as our starting-point for any extensions we may make of self-government in India. It is very wrong that the vast majority of Conservative electors throughout the country, and the vast majority of all those who are acquainted with and have practical experience of India, and of that enormous mass of patriotic people not attached to any party, should have these vital questions settled over their heads by an agreement or an understanding between the two front benches in the House of Commons, and have their future settled as if they were a lot of sheep.

    We are told that three-party unity must be preserved at all costs. What does that mean? Up to the present it has only meant one thing, namely, that the Conservative party has had to toe the Socialist line, and has been dragged at the Socialist tail. Here are these Socialists, maintained in office only on sufferance or by intrigue, expecting all other parties to serve them, and to dance to their tune. We are here to-night to say ‘No, that shall not be.’ We have a right to our own convictions; we are entitled to act in accordance with them. We will certainly make our faith apparent by every means in our power, and in every quarter of the land.

    I repudiate the calumny which our opponents level at us that we have no policy for India but repression and force. Do not be deceived by these untruths. Do not be disquieted by exaggerations of the difficulty of maintaining order in India which are spread about for interested motives by the Socialist ministers and their allies. In the whole of the disturbances of the last year -.except on the frontier – scarcely a British soldier has been required. Very few people have been killed or severely wounded in the rioting. But how did the most of them get hurt? They got hurt not by the Indian police, but in religious fights between Moslems and Hindus.

    The great body of expert opinion which is represented upon the Indian Empire Society will support me when I say that a calm, capable, determined Viceroy properly supported from home could maintain peace and tranquillity in India year after year with a tenth of the repressive measures which Lord Irwin in his misguided benevolence has been compelled to employ.

    Neither is it true that we have no constructive policy. We take our stand upon views almost universally accepted until a few months ago. We believe that the next forward step is the development of Indian responsibility in the provincial governments of India. Efforts should be made to make them more truly representative of the real needs of the people. Indians should be given ample opportunities to try their hand at giving capable government in the provinces; and meanwhile the central Imperial executive, which is the sole guarantee of impartiality between races, creeds and classes, should   preserve its sovereign power intact, and allow no derogation from its responsibility to Parliament. Is that Diehardism?’ That is the message of the Simon report, unanimously signed by the representatives of the three parties. That is the purport of the alternative scheme submitted a few months ago by the Viceroy himself.

    After all, it opens immediately an immense and fertile field for Indian self-government. The provinces of India are great states and separate nations comparable in magnitude and in numbers with the leading powers of Europe. The responsible government of territories and populations as large as Germany, France, Poland, Italyor Spain is not a task unworthy of Indian capacity for self-government, so far as it has yet been displayed. It is a task the successful discharge of which would certainly not conflict with the ultimate creation of a federal system. On the contrary it is the indispensable preliminary without which no federation, desirable or undesirable, is possible. Why, the very word ‘federal’ signifies a foedus or treaty made between hitherto sovereign or autonomous states.

    All federations have arisen thus. In the United States of America, in Canada, in Australia, in South Africa, in every case the units have first been created. Why should these unpractised, unproved, unrepresentative, self-chosen groups of Indian politicians disdain the immense possibilities offered within the limits of the Statutory Commission’s report, and demand an immediate setting up of a United States of India, with themselves in control, and the British army at their orders? Before a Federal system for India could be set up there must be first the self-governing constituent provinces; and secondly, far greater, more real, more representative contact between the Indian political classes and the vast proletariat they aspire to rule.

    Even Europe cannot achieve such a united organisation. But what would be said of a scheme which handed the federal government of the United States of Europe over to political classes proportionately no larger than the inhabitants of Portugal, and no more representative of the needs and passions of a mighty continent than the inhabitants of a single city like Rome? Such are the follies we are forced to expose. We therefore resist upon the highest experience and authority the viewy hysterical megalomania of the Round Table Conference.

    Why is it that the principles of Government and lessons of history which we have learnt in our experience with the great self-governing dominions, which we have learnt in Canada, in South Africa and in Ireland, apply only in a limited degree to India? It is because the problem of Indian government is primarily a technical one. In India far more than in any other community in the world moral, political and economic considerations are outweighed by the importance of technical and administrative apparatus. Here you have nearly three hundred and fifty millions of people, lifted to a civilisation and to a level of peace, order, sanitation and progress far above anything they could possibly have achieved themselves or could maintain. This wonderful fact is due to the guidance and authority of a few thousands of British officials responsible to Parliament who have for generations presided over the development of India.

    If that authority is injured or destroyed, the whole efficiency of the services, defensive, administrative, medical, hygienic, judicial; railway, irrigation, public works and famine prevention, upon which the Indian masses depend for their culture and progress, will perish with it. India will fall back quite rapidly through the centuries into the barbarism and privations of the Middle Ages. The question at stake is not therefore the gratification of the political aspirations towards self-government of a small number of intellectuals. It is, on the contrary, the practical, technical task of maintaining the peace and life of India by artificial means upon a much higher standard than would otherwise be possible. To let the Indian people fall, as they would, to the level of China, would be a desertion of duty on the part of Great Britain.

    But that is not all. To abandon India to the rule of the Brahmins would be an act of cruel and wicked negligence. It would shame for ever those who bore its guilt. These Brahmins who mouth and patter the principles of Western Liberalism, and pose as philosophic and democratic politicians, are the same Brahmins who deny the primary rights of existence to nearly sixty millions of their own fellow countrymen whom they call ‘untouchable’, and whom they have by thousands of years of oppression actually taught to accept this sad position. They will not eat with these sixty millions, nor drink with them, nor treat them as human beings. They consider themselves contaminated even by their approach. And then in a moment they turn round and begin chopping logic with John Stuart Mill, or pleading the rights of man with Jean Jacques Rousseau.

    While any community, social or religious, endorses such practices and asserts itself resolved to keep sixty millions of fellow countrymen perpetually and eternally in a state of sub-human bondage, we cannot recognise their claim to the title-deeds of democracy. Still less can we hand over to their unfettered sway those helpless millions they despise. Side by side with this Brahmin theocracy and the immense Hindu population – angelic and untouchable castes alike – there dwell in India seventy millions of Moslems, a race of far greater physical vigour and fierceness, armed with a religion which lends itself only too readily to war and conquest. While the Hindu elaborates his argument, the Moslem sharpens his sword. Between these two races and creeds, containing as they do so many gifted arid charming beings in all the glory of youth, there is no intermarriage.

    The gulf is impassable. If you took the antagonisms of France and Germany, and the antagonisms of Catholics and Protestants, and compounded them and multiplied them ten-fold, you would not equal the division which separates these two races intermingled by scores of millions in the cities and plains of India. But over both of them the impartial rule of Britain has hitherto lifted its appeasing sceptre. Until the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms began to raise the question of local sovereignty and domination, they had got used to dwelling side by side in comparative toleration. But step by step, as it is believed we are going to clear out or be thrust out of India, so this tremendous rivalry and hatred of races springs into life again. It is becoming more acute every day. Were we to wash our hands of all responsibility and divest ourselves of all our powers, as our sentimentalists desire, ferocious civil wars would speedily break out between the Moslems and the Hindus. No one who knows India will dispute this.

    But that is not the end. The Brahmins know well that they cannot defend themselves against the Moslems. The Hindus do not possess among their many virtues that of being a fighting race. The whole south of India is peopled with races deserving all earnest solicitude and regard, but incapable of self-defence. It is in the north alone that the fighting races dwell. Bengal, for instance, does not send from her forty-five million inhabitants any soldiers to the native army. The Punjab is a place where fighting races dwell|, on the other hand, and the Pathans, together with the Ghurkas and the Sikhs, who are entirely exceptional sects of Hindus, all dwelling in the north, furnish three-quarters of the entire army in the time of peace, and furnished more than three-quarters of it in time of war. There can be no doubt therefore that the departure of the British from India, which Mr. Gandhi advocates, and which Mr. Nehru demands, would be followed first by a struggle in the North and thereafter by a reconquest of the South by the North, and of the Hindus by the Moslems.

    This danger has not escaped the crafty foresight of the Brahmins. It is for that reason that they wish to have the control of a British army, or failing that, a white army of janissaries officered, as Mr. Gandhi has suggested, by Germans or other Europeans. They wish to have an effective foreign army, or foreign-organised army, in order to preserve their dominance over the Moslems and their tyranny over their own untouchables. There, is the open plot of which we are in danger of becoming the dupes, and the luckless millions of Indians the victims.

    It is our duty to guard those millions from that fate.

    Let me just direct your attention once more upon these untouchables, fifty or sixty millions of them, that is to say more than the whole population of the British Isles; all living their lives in acceptance of the validity of the awful curse pronounced upon them by the Brahmins. A multitude as big as a nation, men, women and children deprived of hope and of the status of humanity. Their plight is worse than that of slaves, because they have been taught to consent not only to a physical but to a psychic servitude and prostration.

    I have asked myself whether if Christ came again into this world, it would not be to the untouchables of India that he would first go, to give them the tidings that not only are all men equal in the sight of God, but that for the weak and poor and downtrodden a double blessing is reserved. Certainly the success of Christianity and missionary enterprise has been greater among the untouchables than among any other class of the Indian population. The very act of accepting Christianity by one of these poor creatures involves a spiritual liberation from this obsession of being unclean; and the curse falls from their minds as by a miracle. They stand erect, captains of their fate in the broad sunlight of the world. There are also nearly five million Indian Christians in India, a large proportion of whom can read and write, and some of whom have shown themselves exceptionally gifted. It will be a sorry day when the arm of Britain can no longer offer them the protection of an equal law.

    There is a more squalid aspect. Hitherto for generations it has been the British policy that no white official should have any interest or profit other than his salary and pension out of Indian administration. All concession-hunters and European adventurers, company-promoters and profit-seekers have been rigorously barred and banned. But now that there is spread through India the belief that we are a broken, bankrupt, played-out power, and that our rule is going to pass away and be transferred in the name of the majority to the Brahmin sect, all sorts of greedy appetites have been excited, and many itching fingers are stretching and scratching at the vast pillage of a derelict Empire. I read in the Times newspaper, in the Times mind you, only last week of the crowd of rich Bombay merchants and millionaire millowners, millionaires on sweated labour, who surround Mr. Gandhi, the saint, the lawyer, Lord Irwin’s dear colleague and companion. What are they doing there, these men, and what is he doing in their houses?

    They are making arrangements that the greatest bluff, the greatest humbug and the greatest betrayal shall be followed by the greatest ramp. Nepotism, back-scratching, graft and corruption in every form will be the handmaidens of a Brahmin domination. Far rather would I see every Englishman quit the country, every soldier, every civil servant embark at Bombay, than that we should remain clutching on to the control of foreign relations and begging for trading facilities, while all the time we were the mere cloak of dishonour and oppression.

    If you were to put these facts, hard, solid indigestible facts, before Mr. Ramsay MacDonald or Mr. Wedgwood Benn, or Sir Herbert Samuel, they would probably reply by pointing to the follies of Lord North in the American revolution, to the achievements of Lord Durham in Canada, or to what has happened in South Africa or in Ireland. All the Socialists and some of the Liberals, together with, I am sorry to say, the official Conservatives, have got these arguments on the tip of their tongue. They represent all of us and the millions who think with us, and the instructed Anglo-Indian administrators on whose advice we rely, as being mere dullards and reactionaries who have never been able to move with the age, or understand modern ideas. We are a sort of inferior race mentally deficient, composed principally of colonels and other undesirables who have fought for Britain. They are the sole possessors and monopolists of the spirit and of the message of our generation. But we do not depend on colonels – though why Conservatives should sneer at an honoured rank in the British army I cannot tell – we depend on facts. We depend on the private soldiers of the British democracy. We place our trust in the loyal heart of Britain. Our faith is founded upon the rock of the wage-earning population of this island which has never yet been appealed to, by duty and chivalry, in vain.

    These great issues which arise from time to time in our history are never decided by the party caucuses. They are decided by the conscience and the spirit of the mass of the British people. It is upon the simple faith and profound unerring instinct of the British people, never yet found wanting in a crisis, that we must put our trust. We are deliberately trying to tell our story to the British masses, to the plain and simple folk to whom the fame of the British Empire is ever dear. In assailing the moral duty of Great Britain in India, the Socialist Government and all who aid and abet Mr. Ramsay Macdonald and his Socialist Government, or make their path smooth, will find they have stumbled upon a sleeping giant who, when he arises, will tread with dauntless steps the path of justice and of honour.

  • Winston Churchill – 1922 Speech on the Ireland Situation

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    Below is the text of the speech made in the House of Commons by Winston Churchill, then the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on 16th February 1922.

    The SECRETARY of STATE for the COLONIES (Mr. Churchill) I beg to move, “That the Bill be now read a Second time.”

    I feel that I am entitled to ask the indulgence of the House because I have had to make so many inroads on their attention and upon their patience on Irish matters during the course of the present week, but I have felt that on the whole it is a good thing to keep the House most closely in touch with every move and change in the Irish situation and to publish the full picture of Ireland which is presented both by the Northern and Southern Governments before the House and the country from day to day. It is my duty to ask the approval of the House for this Bill. It gives effect to the Treaty which both Houses of Parliament have already approved by such large majorities. It clothes the Provisional Government with lawful power and enables them to hold an election under favourable conditions at the earliest moment. The importance and urgency of this Bill are plain. Take, for instance, the object of clothing the Irish Provisional Government with law. Is it not fatal to peace, social order and good Government to have power wielded by men who have no legal authority? Every day it continues is a reproach to the administration of the Empire. Every day tends to bring into contempt those solemn forms of procedure on the observance of which in every country the structure of civilised society depends. Only three days ago I spoke about some criminals, murderous criminals, who had been caught by the Irish Provisional Government in Southern Ireland, accused of murdering and robbing a British officer, and I said that I presumed that they would be handed over to be dealt with with the full rigour of the law. I was interrupted by an hon. Friend on these Benches with the remarks: “There is no law,” and “What law?” It is perfectly true, but is it reasonable to make such interruptions and not support the Bill which alone can clothe with law the acts of the Irish Government? A Provisional Government, unsanctified by law, yet recognised by the Crown, by His Majesty’s Ministers, is an anomaly, unprecedented in the history of the British Empire. Its continuance one day longer than is necessary is derogatory to Parliament, to the Nation, and to the Crown. We must legalise and regularise our action. Contempt of law is one of the great evils manifesting themselves in many parts of the world at the present time, and it is disastrous for the Imperial Parliament to connive at or countenance such a situation in Ireland for one day longer than is absolutely necessary.

    Mr. RONALD McNEILL It is your own creation.

    Mr. CHURCHILL Yes, with the full approval of both Houses of Parliament. Moreover, what chance does such a situation give to the Irish Executive who, at the request of the King’s representative in Ireland—made, of course, on the advice of His Majesty’s Government—have assumed the very great burden and responsibility of directing Irish affairs? How can you expect such a Government to enforce a respect for its decisions when such decisions are absolutely unsanctioned by law? How can you wonder that such Ministers are set at defiance by the more turbulent elements amongst their followers and that the prisoners captured from the Northern Border have to be released, not by powerful authoritative action, but by processes of expostulation and persuasion? I am asked questions every day about the non-payment of rents in Ireland, about the spread of lawlessness, and even anarchy, in different parts of the country, about crimes of violence against persons and property increasingly committed among a population hitherto singularly free from common crime as opposed to political crime. I am asked these questions every day, and I ask in my turn: “How can you expect these tendencies to be arrested except by a Government entitled to display the insignia of lawful power and to proceed by methods which have the sanction of antiquity and prescription?” I notice that this succession of unanswerable truisms excites no challenge.

    The Bill, in addition, will enable an election to be held in Ireland at an early date under favourable circumstances, or under the least unfavourable circumstances which are possible. What are the objects to be sought at this election? I am going to tell some of those objects to the House. The first of these objects is a National decision upon the Treaty by the Irish people. I am asked every day by my hon. Friends below the Gangway questions about the Irish Republican Army. I will explain the view of the Irish Government on that point. It is very important we should understand the different points of view. Whether we agree with them, or sympathise with them, or recognise them, is quite another matter, but it is important we should understand them. This is the view of the Irish Government, the Irish signatories of the Treaty. Their view is that the Irish Republic was set up by the Irish people at the elections which took place during the Conference, and that this Irish Republic can only be converted into an Irish Free State by the decision of the Irish people. That is not our view. We do not recognise the Irish Republic. We have never recognised it, and never will recognise it. I am explaining their view and they say that they were elected by the Irish people on a certain basis, and that only the Irish people can release them. They are determined to stand by the Treaty and to use their utmost influence with the Irish people to procure their adhesion to the Treaty, and that will, from the Irish point of view, be the act which will disestablish finally the Republic. Take Mr. Griffith’s position. Mr. Griffith has not joined this Government. He has been chosen as the President of the Dail. He is also, in Irish eyes, the President of the non-recognised Irish Republic, and if the Irish people accept his advice and guidance, and ratify the Treaty and endorse the Treaty which he has signed, he will be able to disestablish the Irish Republic and to lay aside these functions. These matters do not affect us in our procedure in any way; but is it not a desirable thing that upon the authority of the Irish people recorded at an election, the Republican idea should be definitely, finally and completely put aside?

    The second object of the election is to secure an adequate constituent assembly. You certainly have not got that now. To try to make a constitution for the Irish Free State with the present truncated body, almost half of whose Members have definitely seceded from the Southern Irish Parliament, would be an impossible task, and were such a constitution made it would not command any definite or lasting assent among the Irish people. The third object—and I commend this to the serious consideration of the House, of British Members as well as of Ulster Members—is to secure afresh a normal, and if I may say so, a sensible Parliament in Ireland. How was this present Parliament made? The men who were elected to it were chosen, not because of any fitness for conducting business—[An HON. MEMBER: “Just the same as this Parliament.”]—they were chosen because they were the men thought to be most obnoxious to the British power at a time when passions were at their fiercest. This Parliament was made out of men who hated this country most in Ireland. It is obvious that if any progress is to be made, we must get, or there ought to be—for after all, it is not for us finally to decide—a Parliament which represents the hope of the future rather than the hate of the past.

    Lastly, it is a bad thing for any body of Ministers to continue in a position of power without being supported in that position by a national mandate. [Interruption.] If that interruption is intended to have any application to this bench, it is singularly inapplicable, considering that the mere rumour that Ministers were inclined to seek a renewal of their mandate was greeted with the most violent and most panic-stricken protest. Irish Ministers must know where they stand with the Irish nation. Some people think that they have waited too long already in choosing the time of their election. The sooner that election comes in Ireland the better. I am anxious to deal with every aspect. I shall be asked: “Supposing Mr. de Valera and his friends win this election in Ireland, what is to happen then?” If I do not deal with this now, I shall be blamed for leaving, it out. Let me say, I do not think that there is any advantage in speculating upon these ugly hypotheses. It is perfectly clear that the repudiation by Ireland of the Treaty would free all parties from their engagements, and that the position of Great Britain, standing on the Treaty, ready to carry out the Treaty, if others could be found, on behalf of the Irish nation, to do their part, that that position would be one of great moral as well as of undoubted material strength. The position of Southern Ireland, on the other hand, would be one of the greatest weakness and division—absolutely isolated from the sympathy of the world, bitterly divided in herself. The position of Northern Ireland would be also quite unaffected. I do not think it is prudent or necessary at this stage to assume for a moment such a result, and all the information we are able to obtain leads us to feel that any such treatment would not only be unnecessary but incorrect. But it Would be a pity for us to go threatening and blustering at this stage and to give the impression that the Irish people are being made to vote under duress or at the point of the bayonet. All such language and suggestions would be very unhelpful at the present time, and if such language were indulged in, the fact that it could be stated that the votes had been given under duress would tend to impair the authority of the decision at a subsequent date. That is what I have to say on a perfectly fair point which may be made as to who would win the Irish election.

    There is another suggestion which is made and with which I must deal. There are those who think that the present Irish Government may be overturned by a coup d’état and that a red Soviet Republic may be set up. We do not think that is at all likely, but if it were it is quite clear that a Soviet Republic in Ireland would ruin the Irish cause for 100 years, but would not in any respect impair the foundations of the British Empire or the security of Ulster. No people in the world are really less likely to turn Bolshevik than the Irish. Their strong sense of personal possession, their respect for the position of women, their love of country and their religious convictions constitute them in a peculiar sense the most sure and unyielding opponents of the withering and levelling doctrines of Russia. What we know of the characters and personalities at the head of the Provisional Government in Ireland leads us also to believe that they are not the men who would tamely sit still and suffer the fate of a Kerensky. Therefore I do not think this second evil alternative is one which we need allow to embarrass us or obstruct our thoughts and decisions at the present time. But this Irish Government, this Irish Ministry, ought not to be left in the position in which even the most necessary measures which they take for their own defence or for the enforcement of authority, or even for the maintenance of law and the suppression of brigandage or mutiny, are devoid of formal sanction.

    If you want to see Ireland degenerate into a meaningless welter of lawless chaos and confusion, delay this Bill. If you wish to see increasingly serious bloodshed all along the borders of Ulster, delay this Bill. If you want this House to have on its hands, as it now has, the responsibility for peace and order in Southern Ireland, without the means of enforcing it, if you want to impose those same evil conditions upon the Irish Provisional Government, delay this Bill. If you want to enable dangerous and extreme men, working out schemes of hatred in subterranean secrecy, to undermine and overturn a Government which is faithfully doing its best to keep its word with us and enabling us to keep our word with it, delay this Bill. If you want to proclaim to all the world, week after week, that the British Empire can get on just as well without law as with it, then you will delay this Bill. But if you wish to give a fair chance to a policy to which Parliament has pledged itself, and to Irish Ministers to whom you are bound in good faith, so long as they act faithfully with you, to give fair play and a fair chance, if you wish to see Ireland brought back from the confusion of tyranny to a reign of law, if you wish to give logical and coherent effect to the policy and experiment to which we are committed, you will not impede, even for a single unnecessary week, the passage of this Bill.

    Surveying the whole situation since we met in the winter and approved of the Irish Treaty, I ask myself this question: Ought we to regret what we then did? [HON. MEMBERS: “Yes,” and “No!”] In endeavouring to examine this matter with candour I do not feel that that question is one which we ought to leave on one side. Ought we to regret having made the settlement and signed the Treaty? I am looking at it, not from an Irish point of view which I am not specially concerned as a British Member; I am looking at it from a British point of view. I think we are better off in every respect in this Irish matter than we were six months ago. Contrast the position which we are now in and the position in which we were six months ago. Contrast the difficulties of my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary, the impossible position in which he was, with the position in which the Government now stands. I know I have differences in this matter with hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway. They will see that I am endeavouring to deal with the subject in a reasonable manner worthy of its gravity, and in a spirit of mutual respect, even with those with whom, no doubt, there are naturally large and legitimate differences.

    Contrast the positions. It appears to me as if the tables were turned. Ireland, not Britain, is on her trial before the nations of the world. Six months ago it was we who had to justify ourselves against every form of attack. Now it is the Irish people who, as they tell us, after 700 years of oppression, have at last an opportunity to show the kind of government that they can give to their country and the position which they can occupy amongst the nations of the world. An enormous improvement in the situation, as I see it, has been effected in the last six months. Take the position of Ulster. The position of Ulster is one of great and unshakable strength, not only material strength, but moral strength. There was a time when, as is well known, I and others with whom I was then associated thought that Ulster was not securing her own position, but was barring the way to the rest of Ireland to obtain what they wanted. Those days are done. Ulster, by a sacrifice and by an effort, has definitely stood out of the path of the rest of Ireland, and claims only those liberties and securities which are her own, and standing on her own rights, supported as she is and as she will be by the whole force and power, if necessary, of the British Empire, I am entitled to say that she is in a position of great moral and material strength at the present time.

    The position of the Imperial Government has also become greatly improved. It is very desirable that the great affairs of the British Empire should be increasingly detached from the terrible curse of this long internal Irish quarrel, and that the august Imperial authorities should stand on a more impartial plane. I think we have nothing to regret in the course we took last December, as far as the Imperial Government, or as far as Ulster is concerned, with one exception with which I shall deal later. But the position of Ireland is one which deserves a much greater measure of sympathy. The position of Southern Ireland is one of great difficulty and danger. The trials and responsibilities of the new Government are most serious. I have explained the weakness of their present position. I have explained how urgent it is that we should come with this Bill and clothe them with greater authority and strength. We see the efforts they are making. We cannot tell how far they will be successful. All the world is looking on at their performance. They are the people at the present time, not Ulster, not Great Britain, whose difficulties and whose task deserve sympathy and support.

    Take the case of the signatories of the Treaty, the men who put their names to that document in Downing Street in December. They go back to their own comrades or colleagues in Ireland, with whom they were working. They are practically put on their trial for having betrayed the Irish Republic. These men who, whatever you may think of them, at any rate from their own country’s point of view were the most vigorous and effective fighting men, were absolutely put on their trial and condemned by the more talkative section, largely composed of people whom the British Government all through regarded as perfectly harmless, and some of whom we gave the strictest instructions, should not be arrested, and when on some occasions they were arrested by mistake, they were let loose again, as you return under-sized fish to the water. These men, I say, standing by the Treaty against this kind of unfair attack, as long as they stand by the Treaty and we have confidence in them, deserve our help and deserve to be given the means of making good.

    The situation on the frontier of Northern Ireland has, I think, been a little improved by the agreement of both Governments to the establishment of a border Commission to make sure that there is no hostile attack on a large scale being organised on the one side or the other. It has also been improved, I think, by the agreement of both Governments to an impartial Commission of Inquiry into the Clones affair; and it has been, I think, generally improved by the control which has been enforced. I hope that the releases of the kidnapped men will continue. Twenty-six have already been released, and I hope the releases will continue in the next few days until that matter is completely cleared out of the way. The position in Belfast is terrible. Things are being done there of a most awful character, and I know the efforts that are being made by the Northern Government to calm things there, and to control the people and the furious and inhuman passions that are alive amongst certain sections of the population, Catholic and Protestant. I do trust that in the near future, whatever may have occurred since their last meeting, there will be some form of parley between the heads of the two Governments, or representatives of the two Governments. I would point out that the Southern Government has definitely, formally, asked for such a meeting. I do trust it may be possible to bring it about in the course of the next few days or weeks. It is most desirable, from every point of view, to arrive at some method of calming the terrible vendettas and the counter-vendettas which are rife in the streets and in the alleys of Belfast.

    I come to the difficult part of what I have to say to the House. I come to the question of the Boundary Commission. There is an Amendment on the Paper, which definitely challenges the whole policy and position of the Government upon the Treaty in this particular respect. I have no doubt that we shall be asked in the course of the discussion to give an assurance, on this side or on that side, of what was meant, what we thought, or what was intended. It may be very proper that legal authority should inform the House what they consider is the interpretation of the Treaty. It may be perfectly right and proper for Ministers to state to the House what they meant and intended when they signed the Treaty, but, as the House will see, nothing that can be said now can possibly affect the Treaty. The Treaty, in Article 12, prescribes what is going to be done, what is going to happen, and we have no power, except by tearing up the Treaty, to alter what is prescribed in that Article. No declaration that may be made now will have the power to alter that Article. When the time comes it will have to be interpreted in the manner prescribed in the Treaty. By that interpretation we shall be bound. Those who signed the Treaty will be absolutely bound, and those who have voted for the Treaty will also be bound to accept that interpretation.

    I think it much better—and I am going to put everything quite plainly and bluntly before the House—that we should know exactly where we are. I know that will be the feeling of my hon. Friends who have the special interests of Ulster in their charge. Of course, all this trouble in regard to the boundaries surrounds the boundaries of Fermanagh and Tyrone. I remember on the eve of the Great War we were gathered together at a Cabinet meeting in Downing Street, and for a long time, an hour or an hour and a half, after the failure of the Buckingham Palace Conference, we discussed the boundaries of Fermanagh and Tyrone. Both of the great political parties were at each other’s throats. The air was full of talk of civil war. Every effort was made to settle the matter and bring them together. The differences had been narrowed down, not merely to the counties of Fermanagh and Tyrone, but to parishes and groups of parishes inside the areas of Fermanagh and Tyrone, and yet, even when the differences had been so narrowed down, the problem appeared to be as insuperable as ever, and neither side would agree to roach any conclusion.

    Mr. R. McNEILL We knew what you were at.

    Mr. CHURCHILL I am where I was. Then came the great War. Every institution, almost, in the, world was strained. Great Empires have been overturned. The whole map of Europe has been changed. The position of countries has been violently altered. The modes of thought of men, the whole outlook on affairs, the grouping of parties, all have encountered violent and tremendous changes in the deluge of the world, but as the deluge subsides and the waters fall short we see the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone emerging once again. The integrity of their quarrel is one of the few institutions that has been unaltered in the cataclysm which has swept the world. That says a lot for the persistency with which Irish men on the one side or the other are able to pursue their controversies. It says a great deal for the power which Ireland has, both Nationalist and Orange, to lay their hands upon the vital strings of British life and politics, and to hold, dominate, and convulse, year after year, generation after generation, the politics of this powerful country.

    I am going to speak plainly, and if I say anything which my hon. Friends below the Gangway who represent Ulster do not approve of, do not let them think that I am expecting them to agree. I am trying to show them the outlook upon the subject which we have at the present time, and to put them in a position to do what they think is their duty, without any chance of misunderstanding or misconception. I was speaking just now of the great strength of the Ulster position at the present time, morally and materially. In that position there is, it seems to me, only one weak point and it is this: Certain of these districts in Fermanagh and Tyrone, even in the county boundary, may be districts in which—I am not pre-judging—the majority of the inhabitants will prefer to join the Irish Free State. If that be true, and to the extent to which that is true, one feels that the tremendous arguments which protect the freedom of Protestant Ulster have, in those districts, lost their application and have, possibly, an opposite application. There is also one weak point in the position of His Majesty’s Government in respect to Ulster and in the position of the Ministers who signed the Treaty in respect to Ulster. I am not concealing it for a moment. I am locating it, defining it and exposing it. This is the weak point: The Boundary Commission to be set up under Article 12 affects the existing frontiers of the Ulster Government and may conceivably affect them prejudicially. It is far better to face facts and not to gloss them over. To that extent, Ulster may have a ground of complaint against the Government. What is the answer which the Government will make? I cannot do better than quote the words of my right hon. Friend the Member for Central Glasgow (Mr. Bonar Law), the late Leader of the House. That right hon. Gentleman, whose re-appearance in the winter Session gave so much pleasure to the House, in speaking on this subject, in his cool, judicial, and fair-minded way, said: Very likely the Government felt that if they did not conclude the negotiations right away they might not conclude them at all. If so, I think that that is a defence which ought to be seriously taken into account.”—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th December, 1921; cols. 203–4, Vol. 149.] I think to-day also it ought seriously to be taken into account. We were bound, we considered ourselves bound, to try to reach a settlement. Had we waited to refer the details of that settlement at the last moment to the Northern Government it is quite evident by what occurred in the Dail, and by the violent opposition encountered there, that no settlement would have been achieved at all. Therefore, we agreed to the Boundary Commission. We agreed to it with, no doubt, a feeling that the argumentative position of this country in regard to some of those districts in Fermanagh and Tyrone was not as strong as in regard to what is characteristically the Protestant part. We agreed, knowing well that outside the limits of those counties there are also Protestant districts of great importance and considerable population and dimensions which it seemed to us must be taken into account and consideration in the general question of rectifying the boundaries which is entrusted to the Boundary Commission. There is no doubt whatever that we felt the difficulty in this matter. If we are accused to-day of having brought the settlement to a conclusion without having referred it, as we should have liked to do in this matter, at the last moment to the Northern Government—

    Sir W. DAVISON You promised to do it.

    Mr. CHURCHILL I will deal with that point in a moment, and I think we shall not have any difference on the subject. If we are reproached for that, let the House consider what would have been the position of this country as a whole, not the position of the Government, but of the country, sore pressed at the present time with burdens, with threats, with menaces in every quarter of the world, if we had had to break off the Conference, destroy the negotiations, and embark upon what was literally the re-conquest of Ireland, at enormous expense in money and in men, to embark upon bloodshed, upon a far larger scale than anything that had ever occurred and to appeal to the country for support, when the only difference which could be disclosed would not be the question of allegiance to the Crown, or of common citizenship in the British Empire; not the question of the exclusion or the right of Ulster to contract out—it would not have been any of those questions which did in former times, and might in future almost justify men in their wrath in drawing the sword, but simply the question of the right of option of certain Catholic districts in Fermanagh and Tyrone and, of course, certain Protestant districts in Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan and elsewhere. We may be censured, but we must be judged in relation to the whole situation and in regard to our efforts to cope with it.

    There is really no need for anger on the point. If we have done wrong, action should be taken by the House without anger being shown. If our supporters in the House feel convinced that we have done wrong in the Boundaries Clause, into which we have entered, and from which, having pledged ourselves to it, it is altogether out of our power to recede, if they think it impossible on general grounds to endorse our action, then they should do their duty as we have endeavoured to do ours. This is no time for any Government to ask favours. This is no question on which this Government stands in need of asking a favour. The issues are far too serious. The days in which we live are far too difficult. The burden of affairs is far too onerous for any Government to wish to hold office except on public grounds and for public causes. The question should therefore be dealt with quite impersonally, quite dispassionately, with mutual respect, and without heat or recrimination on either side. But before any Member, wherever he may sit, takes the momentous step of voting for an Amendment which, if carried, will destroy the Treaty and the Administration pledged to the Treaty, let him ponder carefully and long upon the responsibilities to be assumed and upon the alternatives which are involved, upon the consequences which would surely follow. Let him, as Mr. Gladstone said 40 years ago at this box, think well, think wisely, think not for the moment but for the years that are to come.

    If I am not trespassing on the time of the House, I will conclude the full scope of the argument which I am endeavouring to submit. If the House in its wisdom decides that we are not to take that step, if it decides, as we think it will, to stand by the Treaty at all costs, then let us see what the future course of events is likely to be. I am going to try to make a forecast and give a time-table of the next few months for the information of this House and, of course, I make it, as they say, with all reserve, and with a prophetic sense which has been frequently corrected by contact with ultimate realities—but not so frequently as is commonly supposed. The first thing to do is to pass this Bill through both Houses of Parliament, which we may hope will be achieved in the course of the next month. Do you want more margin than that?

    The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Lloyd George) No.

    Mr. CHURCHILL The next thing will be the holding of the Irish election, which I might provisionally fix for March or April. The next thing is that the Irish Free State Parliament should assemble and, acting as a Constituent Assembly, should make the Constitution. Let us hope that that will be in progress in May or June. Then there is the final confirmatory legislation of the Imperial Parliament, which, we may say, will take place in June or July, if the time-table were observed. I must read on this point the actual words of what we have agreed with our co-signatories of the Treaty in this respect. The question is from what gate, according to the Treaty, does the Ulster option month begin to run. Does it run from the passing of this Bill or from the passing of the final confirmatory Act. There were differences of opinion on this point: There is a doubt as to whether on the strict reading and interpretation of the Treaty the month in which North East Ulster must exercise its option does not run from the date of the passing of this Bill. The Irish Ministers hold quite definitely that it should. On the other hand the Attorney-General holds a different view as to the correct interpretation. The Irish Ministers, however, recognising that as a matter of fairness, apart from strict interpretation, much could be said as to the advisability of allowing North East Ulster to consider the Constitution of the Irish Free State before exercising her option, they are willing not to insist on their construction and to allow the month to run as from the date of the Act of the British Parliament recognising the constitution framed by the Provisional Parliament. These are the exact words agreed to with the co-signatories of the Treaty. We have not in any way departed from our reading of the Treaty, nor they from theirs, but they have waived their point on the ground of what they think reasonable and fair in respect to the exercise of the option.

    Lord ROBERT CECIL Will it be confirmed by this Bill?

    Mr. CHURCHILL It does not require any special legislation. It is a question of the interpretation in good faith of the Treaty by the parties. We are convinced that the words of the Treaty justify the reading of which the Attorney-General has approved, but there will be no quarrel about it because, apart from questions of law altogether, the other signatories to the Treaty agree as a matter of reason and fair play, and so it comes to this—

    Sir W. DAVISON What is the opinion of the Ulster Government on the matter?

    Mr. CHURCHILL It is a question of the interpretation of the Treaty, and of extending the option, and extending it in such a form that Ulster can see what form of constitution it is and what kind of Government it is that they are invited to decide as to whether they will accept it or not. I should like to know what would have been said if we had been told that under the Treaty the option was to run from the passing of this Bill, and that Ulster had to take a decision of the kind without even seeing the kind of Government or the form of constitution with which she was invited to associate herself. There are enough real grievances now without our going out of the way to look for imaginary grievances.

    Mr. R. McNEILL Will it be open to the Northern Government in Ireland to pass their address within a month after the passing of this Act, because their object will be to pass it at the earliest possible moment?

    Mr. CHURCHILL No. The constitutional time for presenting the Address under the Treaty will be within a month of the passing of the final confirmatory legislation promulgating the constitution of the Irish Free State. Meanwhile Ulster is wholly unaffected by this legislation. If the House will follow this time table they will see that it cannot be until the end of July or the beginning of August at the very earliest that the Boundaries Commission could commence its complicated labours.

    Therefore it cannot be until September or October at the earliest, and it may possibly be a much more remote date, if the constitution of the Irish Free State takes longer in the making than the 2 months, which is certainly a possibility, or if the Boundaries Commission takes longer than 2 or 3 months, before this decision upon the boundaries can possibly be arrived at.

    Sir F. BANBURY They will all be dead by then.

    Mr. CHURCHILL That is just what I was expecting to hear—that we shall all be dead by then.

    Sir F. BANBURY No, but they will all be dead in Ireland. They will have killed each other.

    Mr. CHURCHILL Then our task will be greatly simplified. But it will be said—it is said, and I quite understand the feeling—”are we to be kept in this uncertainty all these months? Things will be getting worse all the time.” Even if that were so, we should have to face it. There is no way of avoiding it. If it is true that things are going to get continually worse we have got to stand up to that fact.

    Mr. M’GUFFIN You have not stood up.

    Mr. CHURCHILL We shall have to face what will come. It is inevitable. But why should you assume that things will get worse during all this time, provided, of course, that we all try to make them better, and that no one, who has any influence or responsibility, tries to make them worse? I do not think that things are bound to get worse. I think, on the contrary, that they are going to get better. In order to form a reasonable opinion about the next few months it is necessary to study the real interests of both parties in North Ireland and South Ireland. Let us begin with the North. There was the Craig-Collins interview of 3 weeks or a month ago, and its great decision, which was taken between the heads of the two Governments by agreement. So far as the boundaries question is concerned it is evident that the discussion which then took place was premature, and that it was not possible to arrive at a clear understanding upon that subject. When both parties to that agreement began to address their own supporters they found that the discrepancies between their views and the gaps between their claims were so large that that part of the agreement has undoubtedly at present completely broken down. But as to other parts of the agreement I do not agree, nor does the Prime Minister of North Ireland, that that has been the case. The removal of the boycott in Southern Ireland has been, on the whole, effective to a very large extent, and I know that great efforts have been made by the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland to mitigate the lot of the Catholic workers who were discharged during the late trouble, and who are now out of work.

    Mr. DEVLIN What were the efforts?

    Mr. CHURCHILL I will not deal with that. I know that efforts are being made by Sir James Craig, and he has approached me on the subject, to see what assistance the British Government can render, and that these efforts will continue to be made in a loyal and faithful spirit I am confident. Then there is the most important question of an alteration in the form of the Council of Ireland. The Council of Ireland cannot be altered except by mutual consent, but anything can be done by the mutual consent of the two Irish Governments. This House, I am certain, would hasten to ratify and give effect to anything in the nature of a settlement or agreement reached between the two Governments. I have just received a letter from Sir James Craig on this subject. It is dated 15th February. The Prime Minister says: The Government of Northern Ireland has been carefully considering the subject of the continuance under the new Free State Act of the Council of Ireland and has come to the conclusion that it would be advisable for many reasons to substitute some other means of dealing with those services entrusted to the Council by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920. It will be within your recollection that in the agreement I reached with Mr. Collins, a change was hinted at to which he was by no means averse. It appears to me the position of the Council under Article 12 of the Treaty would be both unworkable and likely to lead to continuous irritation between the two Governments. We have had experience already of the Ministers for Labour in Northern and Southern Ireland respectively meeting together to settle matters in dispute as regards the railways, which is one of the powers relegated to this Council. The short experience has shown fruitful results, and I feel strongly that in all matters under the purview of the Council the Executive of each Government could better deal with the subject as a separate Government consulting the other on terms of equality than by an ad hoc Committee, the majority of the members of which have no executive authority. I will not trouble the House with the rest of the letter, which is not relevant. What I am anxious to show is that the agreements which were reached between Sir James Craig and Mr. Collins at their meeting have not lapsed as a whole. There has been a breakdown on one point, but the rest of those agreements stand, and the project of endeavouring to reach a settlement of the outstanding difficulties is by no means cast aside and finally abandoned. Is it not in the interests of the North to see what sort of Parliament and Government will emerge from the elections in the South? May not that Parliament and Government be in a far stronger position and be of a far more reasonable complexion than the present Dail Eireann? Is it not better to discuss passionate questions like the boundary question after the election than when everyone is preparing for it, and when the supporters of the Treaty are constantly exposed to the bitter reproaches of Mr. De Valera and his extreme Republican sect, and when a renegade Englishman like Mr. Erskine Childers is doing his best to poison the relations between the Irish people and their chosen leaders? Will it not be very much better to take up the difficult question of the boundary after the Irish elections have been held than before? After the election let us see what comes of it and let us then make up our mind what is best to do. Let us now see what is the interest of Southern Ireland in this matter. What is their heart’s desire more than anything else? [HON. MEMBERS: “A Republic.”] Not at all; that is a delusion, and my hon. Friends are absolutely at sea when they say so. A Republic is an idea most foreign to the Irish mind, associated with the butcheries of Cromwell in their minds and foreign to all the native genius of the Irish race, which is essentially monarchical.

    Major C. LOWTHER Why have they an Irish Republican Army if it is so foreign to them?

    Mr. CHURCHILL Because they have been fighting for position against this country. I say really what the Southern Irish most desire and what Irishmen all over the world most desire is not hostility against this country, but the unity of their own. They can never attain that unity by force. That they are at last compelled to recognise and admit. They can never attain it by harshness or by hostile action towards Ulster. Take the boundary question as an example. There is no one who can predict what the Commission will decide. Let me take an extreme and absurd supposition. Let us assume that the Commission, going far beyond what any reasonable man would expect, and far beyond what those who signed the Treaty meant, were to reduce Ulster to its pre-ponderatingly Orange areas. I am taking that extreme and absurd supposition. Suppose that were to happen, would not that be a fatal and permanent obstacle to the unity and co-operation of Ireland?

    Let us just see what would happen. The Protestant North would be violently and finally sundered from the rest of Ireland, there would be no mitigating or modifying element or influence, and common interests between the two would be reduced to a nullity. The resentment of Ulster would be enduring, and her practically homogeneous population would, for generations, aim not, as Southern Irishmen hope, at bringing Ireland as a whole into harmony with the British Empire, but would rivet herself by every conceivable means on to England and Scotland, so that in the course of time Ulster would effectively become a part of Great Britain and not a part of Ireland. I am addressing this argument not only to this House; I am endeavouring to lay down the true way along which the permanent interests of the Southern Irish Parliament and Government lie. What would Great Britain do in such an absurd and extreme contingency as that which I have indicated? She is bound by the Treaty; but, in my opinion, if we saw Ulster maltreated and mutilated by the Boundary Commission so that she was no longer an Irish economic entity, we should be bound to reconsider her whole economic and financial position. [HON. MEMBERS: “Oh, oh!”]

    Now I hope my argument will be carefully considered; although I say it myself, it is worthy of consideration. Not only should we defend 1280 every inch of Ulster soil under the Treaty as if it were Kent, but we should be bound to take special measures to secure that Ulster was not ruined by her loyalty to us. It is evident that our position, if we only study it and reflect upon it, is one of tremendous strength, and that with patience and with care we may easily succeed in bringing about a result acceptable to all. If I were an Irish Nationalist I should dread more than anything else such a development as I have indicated, against which I could do absolutely nothing, nothing by force against the British Empire, nothing by persuasion against the inflexible will of the Northern Protestants, nothing by appeal to the judgment of the world, for the world, be assured, will always uphold the Treaty and Ulster’s right to self-determination under the Treaty. If I were an Irish Nationalist, I would far rather go to the other extreme. I would far rather say: Take more Catholics, not less; make a more even balance in your Assembly; agree with us in friendship for common purposes; keep all your own rights, but share ours too, and instead of cutting this partition line deeper and deeper across the soil of Ireland, instead of painting the map on either side of this line in ever more vivid contrasts of orange and green, let us try to blend a little more and modify those contrasts and divisions.

    Pursuing that line of thought, if that line of thought is found to have validity, it is clear the boundary line would cease to have the same bitter significance in proportion as North and South are associated for important common purposes in some higher organisation than their existing Parliaments. Nothing in the agreement between Sir James Craig and Mr. Collins was more important than the improved arrangements for a Council of Ireland, on the subject of which I have read a letter to the House. Since then we have had a bad set-back, but we are, I think, repairing and restoring the situation. We must have time, we must have patience, we must have this Bill. Ulster must have British comfort and protection. Ireland must have her Treaty, her election and her constitution. There will be other and better opportunities of dealing with the difficult boundary question, and if the House will take the advice of the Government, we strongly deprecate any attempt to reach a final conclusion upon that subject now.

    Let me, before I sit down, leave Ireland and the Irish point of view and Irish interests, and say to the House what is the function of the Imperial Parliament. That, after all, is our point of view. That is our first and proper care in this House. Our interest is very clear, and it should be everywhere recognised and proclaimed what our interest is. The Imperial interest, taking a long view, seeks both the unity of Ireland and the unity of the British. Empire, or if you prefer it, Commonwealth of Nations. We can help Ireland to the one if Ireland helps us to the other, and we may be willing to help Ireland to the one in proportion as she helps us to the other. We ought to use our great power and our great unmeasured strength to that end, and in this method of policy, and we shall be justified in so doing at every step by our interest, by our honour, by our good faith and by fair play. From an Imperial point of view we are bound to endeavour to act in an impartial manner; but though we are impartial we cannot be indifferent. Naturally, our hearts warm towards those in the North who are helping, and have helped so long, to keep the old flag flying, and who share our loyalty and our sentiments, and address us in terms of common kinship and not in those of forced aversion.

    Ulster has a great part to play in these next few months, an immense part, and the opportunity perhaps of rendering service to the British Empire of inestimable value, and of long lasting consequences in history, and I am very glad indeed to think that at this juncture there should be a man like Sir James Craig as Premier of the Northern Government and that Ulster will be represented in this House and in the House of Lords by representatives who are fully alive to the Imperial aspect of this great question, and are not likely ever to lose sight of that. I end in the way I began, upon the Treaty to which we now ask the House to give statutory effect, and the Bill which we ask the House to read a second time. For generations we have been wandering and floundering in the Irish bog, but at last we think that in this Treaty we have set our feet upon a pathway, which has already become a causeway—narrow, but firm and far-reaching. Let us 1282 march along this causeway with determination and circumspection, without losing heart and without losing faith. If Britain continues to march forward along that path, the day may come—it may be distant, but it may not be so distant as we expect—when, turning round, Britain will find at her side Ireland united, a nation, and a friend.

  • Winston Churchill – 1901 Maiden Speech in the House of Commons

    winstonchurchill

    Below is the text of the maiden speech of Winston Churchill, held in the House of Commons on 18th February 1901.

    I understood that the hon. Member to whose speech the House has just listened, had intended to move an Amendment to the Address. The text of the Amendment, which had appeared in the papers, was singularly mild and moderate in tone; but mild and moderate as it was, neither the hon. Member nor his political friends had cared to expose it to criticism or to challenge a division upon it, and, indeed, when we compare the moderation of the Amendment with the very bitter speech which the hon. Member has just delivered, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the moderation of the Amendment was the moderation of the hon. Member’s political friends and leaders, and that the bitterness of his speech is all his own.

    It has been suggested to me that it might perhaps have been better, upon the whole, if the hon. Member, instead of making his speech without moving his Amendment, had moved his Amendment without making his speech. I would not complain of any remarks of the hon. Member were I called upon to do so. In my opinion, based upon the experience of the most famous men whose names have adorned the records of the House, no national emergency short, let us say, of the actual invasion of this country itself ought in any way to restrict or prevent the entire freedom of Parliamentary discussion. Moreover, I do not believe that the Boers would attach particular importance to the utterances of the hon. Member.

    No people in the world received so much verbal sympathy and so little practical support as the Boers. If I were a Boer fighting in the field—and if I were a Boer I hope I should be fighting in the field—I would not allow myself to be taken in by any message of sympathy, not even if it were signed by a hundred hon. Members. The hon. Member dwelt at great length upon the question of farm burning. I do not propose to discuss the ethics of farm burning now; but hon. Members should, I think, cast their eyes back to the fact that no considerations of humanity prevented the German army from throwing its shells into dwelling houses in Paris, and starving the inhabitants of that great city to the extent that they had to live upon rats and like atrocious foods in order to compel the garrison to surrender. I venture to think His Majesty’s Government would not have been justified in restricting their commanders in the field from any methods of warfare which are justified by precedents set by European and American generals during the last fifty or sixty years. I do not agree very fully with the charges of treachery on the one side and barbarity on the other.

    From what I saw of the war—and I sometimes saw something of it—I believe that as compared with other wars, especially those in which a civil population took part, this war in South Africa has been on the whole carried on with unusual humanity and generosity. The hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs has drawn attention to the case of one general officer, and although I deprecate debates upon the characters of individual general officers who are serving the country at this moment, because I know personally General Bruce Hamilton, whom the hon. Member with admirable feeling described as General Brute Hamilton, I feel unable to address the House without offering my humble testimony to the fact that in all His Majesty’s Army there are few men with better feeling, more kindness of heart, or with higher courage than General Bruce Hamilton.

    There is a point of difference which has been raised by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition upon the question of the policy to be pursued in South Africa after this war has been brought to a conclusion. So far as I have been able to make out the difference between the Government and the Opposition on this question is that whereas His Majesty’s Government propose that when hostilities are brought to a conclusion there shall be an interval of civil government before full representative rights are extended to the peoples of these countries, on the other hand the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition believes that these representative institutions will be more quickly obtained if the military government be prolonged as a temporary measure and no interval of civil government be interposed. I hope I am not misinterpreting the right hon. Gentleman in any way. If I am, I trust he will not hesitate to correct me, because I should be very sorry in any way to misstate his views. If that is the situation, I will respectfully ask the House to allow me to examine these alternative propositions. I do not wish myself to lay down the law, or thrust my views upon hon. Members. I have travelled a good deal about South Africa during the last ten months under varying circumstances, and I should like to lay before the House some of the considerations which have been very forcibly borne in upon me during that period.

    In the first place I would like to look back to the original cause for which we went to war. We went to war—I mean of course we were gone to war with—in connection with the extension of the franchise. We began negotiations with the Boers in order to extend the franchise to the people of the Transvaal. When I say the people of the Transvaal, I mean the whole people of the Transvaal, and not necessarily those who arrived there first. At that time there were nearly two and a-half times as many British and non-Dutch as there were Boers, but during the few weeks before the outbreak of the war every train was crowded with British subjects who were endeavouring to escape from the approaching conflict, and so it was that the Uitlanders were scattered all over the world. It seems to me that when the war is over we ought not to forget the original object with which we undertook the negotiations which led to the war. If I may lay down anything I would-ask the House to establish the principle that they ought not to extend any representative institutions to the people of the Transvaal until such time as the population has regained its ordinary level. What could be more dangerous, ridiculous or futile, than to throw the responsible government of a ruined country on that remnant of the population, that particular section of the population, which is actively hostile to the fundamental institutions of the State? I think there ought to be no doubt and no difference of opinion on the point that between the firing of the last shot and the casting of the first vote there must be an appreciable interval that must be filled by a government of some kind or another.

    I invite the House to consider which form of government—civil government or military government—is most likely to be conducive to the restoration or the banished prosperity of the country and most likely to encourage the return of the population now scattered far and wide. I understand that there are hon. Members who are in hopes that representative institutions may directly follow military government, but I think they cannot realise thoroughly how very irksome such military government is. I have the greatest respect for British officers, and when I hear them attacked, as some hon. Members have done in their speeches, it makes me very sorry, and very angry too. Although I regard British officers in the field of war, and in dealing with native races, as the best officers in the world, I do not believe that either their training or their habits of thought qualify them to exercise arbitrary authority over civil populations of European race. I have often myself been very much ashamed to see respectable old Boer farmers—the Boer is a curious combination of the squire and the peasant, and under the rough coat of the farmer there are very often to be found the instincts of the squire—I have been ashamed to see such men ordered about peremptorily by young subaltern officers, as if they were private soldiers. I do not hesitate to say that as long as you have anything like direct military government there will be no revival of trade, no return of the Uitlander population, no influx of immigrants from other parts of the world—nothing but despair and discontent on the part of the Boer popuation, and growing resentment on the part of our own British settlers.

    If there was a system of civil government on the other hand, which I think we have an absolute moral right to establish if only from the fact that this country through the Imperial Exchequer will have to provide the money—if you had a civil government under such an administrator as Sir Alfred Milner—[Cries of “Hear, hear,” and “Oh”]—it is not for me to eulogise that distinguished administrator, I am sure he enjoys the confidence of the whole of the Conservative party, and there are a great many Members on the other side of the House who do not find it convenient in their own minds to disregard Sir Alfred Milner’s deliberate opinion on South African affairs. As soon as it is known that there is in the Transvaal a government under which property and liberty are secure, so soon as it is known that in these countries one can live freely and safely, there would be a rush of immigrants from all parts of the world to develop the country and to profit by the great revival of trade which usually follows war of all kinds. If I may judge by my own experience there are many Members of this House who have received letters from their constituents asking whether it was advisable to go out to South Africa. When this policy of immigration is well advanced we shall again have the great majority of the people of the Transvaal firmly attached and devoted to the Imperial connection, and when you can extend representative institutions to them you will find them reposing securely upon the broad basis of the consent of the governed, while the rights of the minority will be effectively protected and preserved by the tactful and judicious intervention of the Imperial authority. May I say that it was this prospect of a loyal and Anglicised Transvaal turning of the scale in our favour in South Africa, which must have been the original “good hope” from which the Cape has taken its name.

    It is not for me to criticise the proposals which come from such a distinguished authority as the Leader of the Opposition, but I find it impossible not to say that in comparing these two alternative plans one with the other I must proclaim my strong preference for the course His Majesty’s Government propose to adopt. I pass now from the question of the ultimate settlement of the two late Republics to the immediate necessities of the situation. What ought to be the present policy of the Government? I take it that there is a pretty general consensus of opinion in this House that it ought to be to make it easy and honourable for the Boers to surrender, and painful and perilous for them to continue in the field. Let the Government proceed on both those lines concurrently and at full speed. I sympathise very heartily with my hon. friend the senior Member for Oldham, who, in a speech delivered last year, showed great anxiety that everything should be done to make the Boers understand exactly what terms were offered to them, and I earnestly hope that the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary will leave nothing undone to bring home to those brave and unhappy men who are fighting in the field that whenever they are prepared to recognise that their small independence must be merged in the larger liberties of the British Empire, there will be a full guarantee for the security of their property and religion, an assurance of equal rights, a promise of representative institutions, and last of all, but not least of all, what the British Army would most readily accord to a brave and enduring foe—all the honours of war.

    I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not allow himself to be discouraged by any rebuffs which his envoys may meet with, but will persevere in endeavouring to bring before these people the conditions on which at any moment they may obtain peace and the friendship of Great Britain. Of course, we can only promise, and it rests with the Boers whether they will accept our conditions. They may refuse the generous terms offered them, and stand or fall by their old cry, “Death or independence!”[Nationalist cheers.] I do not see anything to rejoice at in that prospect, because if it be so, the war will enter upon a very sad and gloomy phase. If the Boers remain deaf to the voice of reason, and blind to the hand of friendship, if they refuse all overtures and disdain all terms, then, while we cannot help admiring their determination and endurance, we can only hope that our own race, in the pursuit of what they feel to be a righteous cause, will show determination as strong and endurance as lasting. It is wonderful that hon. Members who form the Irish party should find it in their hearts to speak and act as they do in regard to a war in which so much has been accomplished by the courage, the sacrifices, and, above all, by the military capacity of Irishmen. There is a practical reason, which I trust hon. Members will not think it presumptuous in me to bring to their notice, is that they would be well advised cordially to co-operate with His Majesty’s Government in bringing the war to a speedy conclusion, because they must know that no Irish question or agitation can possibly take any hold on the imagination of the people of Great Britain so long as all our thoughts are with the soldiers who are fighting in South Africa.

    What are the military measures we ought to take? I have no doubt that other opportunities will be presented to the House to discuss them, but so far as I have been able to understand the whispers I have heard in the air there are, on the whole, considerable signs of possible improvement in the South African situation. There are appearances that the Boers are weakening, and that the desperate and feverish efforts they have made so long cannot be indefinitely sustained. If that be so, now is the time for the Government and the Army to redouble their efforts. It is incumbent on Members like myself, who represent large working class constituencies, to bring home to the Government the fact that the country does not want to count the cost of the war until it is won. I think we all rejoiced to see the announcement in the papers that 30,000 more mounted men were being despatched to South Africa. I cannot help noticing with intense satisfaction that, not content with sending large numbers of men, the Secretary of State for War has found some excellent Indian officers, prominent among whom is Sir Bindon Blood, who will go out to South Africa and bring their knowledge of guerilla warfare on the Indian frontier to bear on the peculiar kind of warfare—I will not call it guerilla warfare—now going on in South Africa. I shall always indulge the hope that, great as these preparations are, they will not be all, and that some fine afternoon the Secretary of State for War will come down to the House with a brand-new scheme, not only for sending all the reinforcements necessary for keeping the Army up to a fixed standard of 250,000 men, in spite of the losses by battle and disease, but also for increasing it by a regular monthly quota of 2,000 or 3,000 men, so that the Boers will be compelled, with ever-diminishing resources, to make head against ever increasing difficulties, and will not only be exposed to the beating of the waves, but to the force of the rising tide.

    Some hon. Members have seen fit, either in this place or elsewhere, to stigmatise this war as a war of greed. I regret that I feel bound to repudiate that pleasant suggestion. If there were persons who rejoiced in this war, and went out with hopes of excitement or the lust of conflict, they have had enough and more than enough to-day. If, as the hon. Member for Northampton has several times suggested, certain capitalists spent money in bringing on this war in the hope that it would increase the value of their mining properties, they know now that they made an uncommonly bad bargain. With the mass of the nation, with the whole people of the country, this war from beginning to end has only been a war of duty. They believe, and they have shown in the most remarkable manner that they believe, that His Majesty’s Government and the Colonial Secretary have throughout been actuated by the same high and patriotic motives. They know that no other inspiration could sustain and animate the Regulars and Volunteers, who through all these hard months have had to bear the brunt of the public contention. They may indeed have to regret, as I myself have, the loss of a great many good friends in the war. We cannot help feeling sorry for many of the incidents of the war, but for all that I do not find it possible on reflection to accuse the general policy which led to the war, we have no cause to be ashamed of anything that has passed during the war, nor have we any right to be doleful or lugubrious. I think if any hon. Members are feeling unhappy about the state of affairs in South Africa I would recommend them a receipt from which I myself derived much exhilaration. Let them look to the other great dependencies and colonies of the British Empire and see what the effect of the war has been therel Whatever we may have lost in doubtfu. friends in Cape Colony we have gained ten times, or perhaps twenty times, over in Canada and Australia, where the people—down to the humblest farmer in the most distant provinces—have by their effective participation in the conflict been able to realise, as they never could realise before, that they belong to the Empire, and that the Empire belongs to them. I cannot sit down without saying how very grateful I am for the kindness and patience with which the House has heard me, and which have been extended to me, I well know, not on my own account, but because of a certain splendid memory which many hon. Members still preserve.