Tag: Emily Thornberry

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Emily Thornberry on 2015-12-17.

To ask the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, when he expects to submit the full business case for universal credit to HM Treasury; and when he expects final approval of that case to be granted.

Priti Patel

The Strategic Business Case was submitted and signed off by HMT in 2014. As HMT colleagues stated at the PAC on 7 December (link below) the Outline Business Case was approved in December 2015 and the Full Business Case will be submitted in 2017.

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmworpen/1082/1082.pdf

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The below Parliamentary question was asked by Emily Thornberry on 2015-12-17.

To ask the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, with reference to his Department’s report, Universal Credit Extended Gateway Evaluation, published on 6 December 2015, what assessment he has made of the reasons for the report’s finding on page 39, that participants in the study who were claiming universal credit were more flexible regarding the type of work they would consider at the outset than people claiming jobseeker’s allowance.

Priti Patel

The research finding that Universal Credit claimants appeared to be more flexible regarding the type of work they would consider is broadly consistent with other findings from the same research report that indicate that UC claimants are more engaged with the labour market than their JSA counterparts. UC claimants are spending longer on job search per week, and Universal Credit appears to be driving more active labour market behaviour, resulting in better labour market outcomes.

The key finding from another recently published report entitled, ‘Estimating the Early Labour Market Impacts of Universal Credit’, is that UC has a substantial impact on the chances of people moving into work after they make a new claim. UC claimants were 8 percentage points more likely to get a job within 270 days of claiming than equivalent new claims to JSA made at the same time in similar areas by similar individuals.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Emily Thornberry on 2016-01-26.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many and what proportion of (a) Tornado and (b) Typhoon aircraft in the Forward Available Fleet are classed as short term unserviceable as a result of undergoing (i) short term maintenance and (ii) other short term works.

Mr Philip Dunne

The information requested is detailed in the attached table.

The Forward Available Fleet comprises aircraft which are serviceable and those which are short-term unserviceable. Short-term unserviceable aircraft are undergoing minor works, forward maintenance or any other rectification or technical inspection work that can arise on a day-to-day basis. Dependent on the nature of the work, aircraft may be designated as requiring either ‘short-term maintenance’ or ‘short-term works’.

The Sustainment Fleet numbers represent those aircraft in the Depth Fleet, which comprises aircraft which are undergoing planned depth maintenance or upgrade programmes.

Decommissioning and disposal are part of the same process and are therefore grouped together.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Emily Thornberry on 2016-02-01.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what amount was spent on the maintenance and repair of (a) HMS Daring, (b) HMS Dauntless, (c) HMS Diamond, (d) HMS Dragon, (e) HMS Defender and (f) HMS Duncan for (i) planned maintenance and (ii) repair work in each of the last six years.

Mr Philip Dunne

The amount spent on Maintenance and Repair for the six Type 45 Destroyers is detailed in the table below rounded to the nearest half million:

Name of Ship	In-Service Date	Maintenance/Repair	Cost (£ million)
HMS DARING	July 2010	Programmed Maintenance	£7
Unprogrammed Work/Repair		£4.5
HMS DAUNTLESS	November 2010	Programmed Maintenance	£4.5
		Unprogrammed Work/Repair	£4.5
HMS DIAMOND	July 2011	Programmed Maintenance	£9.5
		Unprogrammed Work/Repair	£3.5
HMS DRAGON	April 2012	Programmed Maintenance	£7
		Unprogrammed Work/Repair	£2
HMS DEFENDER	March 2013	Programmed Maintenance	£2
		Unprogrammed Work/Repair	£3
HMS DUNCAN	December 2013	Programmed Maintenance	£1.5
		Unprogrammed Work/Repair	£2

The table below reflects the number of planned maintenance days per ship over the six year period. Repair work on individual ship systems takes place during both planned maintenance periods and operational deployments and data relating to the number of days’ worth of repair work is not collected. Unprogrammed work/repair figures shown cover the extension of maintenance periods.

Name of Ship	In-Service Date	Maintenance/ Repair	Duration
HMS DARING	July 2010	Programmed Maintenance	360
		Unprogrammed Work/Repair	105
HMS DAUNTLESS	November 2010	Programmed Maintenance	215
		Unprogrammed Work/Repair	20
HMS DIAMOND	July 2011	Programmed Maintenance	350
		Unprogrammed Work/Repair	0
HMS DRAGON	April 2012	Programmed Maintenance	250
		Unprogrammed Work/Repair	0
HMS DEFENDER	March 2013	Programmed Maintenance	100
		Unprogrammed Work/Repair	0
HMS DUNCAN	December 2013	Programmed Maintenance	130
		Unprogrammed Work/Repair	0

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The below Parliamentary question was asked by Emily Thornberry on 2016-02-08.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 4 February 2016 to Question 25006, for what reason the repair and maintenance costs of HMS Diamond were greater than those of the other Type 45 Destroyers.

Mr Philip Dunne

The primary cause of the greater repair and maintenance costs for HMS DIAMOND was a longer Docking Period than the other two routine docking cycles. HMS DARING and HMS DAUNTLESS are the only other Type 45 Destroyers to have completed a routine docking cycle. The additional length of the Docking Period was a reflection of the number of capability upgrades and modifications, fitted to HMS DIAMOND. This was entirely normal for a class of warship of this age and all future Docking Periods for the Class are now programmed for a similar duration.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Emily Thornberry on 2016-02-10.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many (a) Sea King HC4, (b) Wildcat, (c) Gazelle, (d) Apache, (e) Chinook HC2/3, (f) Puma HC2 and (g) Merlin Mk 3/3A helicopters were used for military flight training in each of the last six years.

Mr Philip Dunne

The following table shows the numbers of aircraft, broken down by type, for the previous six financial years:

FY	Sea King HC4	Wildcat BRH Mk1	Gazelle	Apache	Chinook HC2/3	Puma HC2	Merlin Mk 3/3A
14-15	2	12	4	11	4	10	2
13-14	2	61	3	12	8	41	2
12-13	2	–	4	12	10	–	2
11-12	2	–	2	11	10	–	2
10-11	2	–	3	12	11	–	2
09-10	2	–	6	12	15	–	2

Note ¹: Not in service before 2013-14.

All Chinook HC2/2a aircraft have undergone modification with new cockpit avionics and are now HC4. In December 2015 there were 26 HC4 aircraft in the forward fleet and 12 in sustainment.

The (eight) Chinook HC3 were all removed from the forward fleet last year and are undergoing modification with new cockpit avionics and a new digital automatic flight control system. Once modified, these aircraft become Chinook HC5.

The Wildcat HMA MK2 entered service in January 2015, but was not used for training in that financial year as it was in a trials phase.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Emily Thornberry on 2016-02-23.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 1 February 2016 to Question 24278, how much has been set aside in his Department’s budget for potential costs associated with the decommissioning and disposal of HMS Ocean.

Mr Philip Dunne

Much of the work to decommission Royal Navy ships is undertaken using contracts that provide support services for all ships conducting Fleet activities at HM Naval Base, Portsmouth. Costs are not attributed to individual vessels.

Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) will be responsible for the removal of classified equipment and known hazardous materials from HMS OCEAN after the ship has been decommissioned. The DE&S financial plan will include a provision for this work but a figure has yet to be approved.

The Disposal Services Authority (DSA), part of DE&S, disposes of defence equipment that is surplus to requirement. DSA costs are not attributed to individual platforms and information is not held in the format requested.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Emily Thornberry on 2016-02-23.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to his Department’s press release, UK to step up NATO maritime commitment, published on 10 February 2016, which Type 45 Destroyer will be deployed to NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 1 in October 2016.

Penny Mordaunt

The Secretary of State did announce that the Royal Navy will deploy a Type 45 Destroyer to NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 1 in October 2016.

However, I am withholding details of the ship that will be deployed as such a disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Emily Thornberry on 2016-03-01.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many (a) regular RAF personnel and (b) RAF volunteer reserves have been deployed to (i) Iraq since September 2014 and (ii) Syria since December 2015.

Penny Mordaunt

The number of individual Regular RAF personnel who have been deployed to Iraq for a period greater than 24 hours at any point between 1 September 2014 and 31 January 2016 was 470.

There were fewer than 5 RAF Volunteer Reserve personnel who have been deployed to Iraq for a period greater than 24 hours at any point between 1 September 2014 and 31 January 2016.

There were no RAF personnel deployed to Syria between 1 December 2015 and 31 January 2016.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Emily Thornberry on 2016-03-24.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, on how many occasions his Department’s cyber strike capability was used in (a) 2014 and (b) 2015.

Penny Mordaunt

We continue to develop the ability of our Armed Forces to deploy a broad range of offensive cyber capabilities as an integrated part of military operations. As with other sensitive defence capabilities, we do not reveal specific details in order to safeguard national security. As we have previously made clear in the context of the war powers convention, we do not propose to define the circumstances in which we would consult Parliament about the use of particular military capabilities.