Tag: Charles Walker

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Charles Walker on 2016-09-06.

To ask the Secretary of State for Health, whether NHS England is operating a moratorium on the opening of new mental health beds in the areas of Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services and eating disorders; and if he will make a statement.

Nicola Blackwood

At present, annual expenditure on in-patient facilities for children and young people with mental health problems is £280 million this includes the expenditure on beds for those with children and young people who have eating disorders.

In 2014, the Government provided £5 million in 2014/15 to open an additional 56 beds, bringing the total to 1,442. Whilst there is no moratorium on the opening of new mental health beds , NHS England is currently undertaking a re-procurement of all Children and Young People’s Mental Health beds, so that services are commissioned which meet the needs of children and young people who require in-patient care and ensure that they are located appropriately.

The major £1.4 billion programme of investment over five years to transform children’s mental health services will increase the opportunities for earlier intervention in the community. This investment includes £150 million over five years to develop community eating disorder services for children and young people in every area of the country, as the evidence indicates that those with eating disorders recover better with this model of care.

NHS England will continue to work with clinical commissioning group commissioners to build integrated pathways of care that ensure that children and young people are only admitted to inpatient beds when it is clinically appropriate, and are discharged as soon as possible, with any appropriate follow-up care in place. For eating disorders, this will include the development of dedicated teams which will in time reduce the need for inpatient beds and shorten lengths of stay.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Charles Walker on 2015-11-24.

To ask the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, what plans she has to ensure that water companies build sufficient capacity and tolerance into their infrastructure to cope with low rainfall years or weather cycles.

Rory Stewart

We have a statutory planning framework through which water companies demonstrate how their water supply systems will cope with future demands, taking account of population and economic growth and climate change. Their long-term plans set out how they will ensure they can continue to supply sufficient water, taking account of these changing pressures, weather cycles and drought.

We are currently considering how to enhance our policy framework to ensure we have a strategic approach to delivering resilience over the very long term.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Charles Walker on 2016-03-08.

To ask Mr Chancellor of the Exchequer, if he will make it his policy to consider the board members of UK banks as politically exposed persons for the purposes of the Fourth Money Laundering Directive; and if he will make a statement.

Harriett Baldwin

The Government is taking concerns about the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) requirements regarding Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) seriously. While addressing corrupt PEPs is an important aspect of global efforts to tackle corruption and money laundering, it is essential that this be done proportionately. The current AML regime is governed by the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, which implement the EU’s Third Money Laundering Directive and are based on the global Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards. We intend to seek views on the transposition of the EU’s Fourth Money Laundering Directive, which addresses domestic PEPs, in our consultation which will be published in the spring.

It is for individual financial institutions to apply a risk-based approach when considering Enhanced Due Diligence measures with regards to PEPs, in accordance with the Regulations and with FATF standards. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is the Treasury-appointed supervisor which oversees financial institutions’ implementation of the Regulations.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Charles Walker on 2016-03-21.

To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what estimate his Department has made of the number of its senior civil servants who will potentially fall under the provisions of the Fourth EU Money Laundering Directive, 2015/849; and what assessment he has made of which of his Department’s agencies or other public bodies will potentially be classed as holding a prominent public function for the purposes of that directive.

Matthew Hancock

The Government’s view is that the Directive permits a risk-based approach to the identification of whether an individual is a politically exposed person and, when identified, the Directive enables the application of different degrees of enhanced measures to reflect the risks posed. The Government will be setting out this view in a consultation which will be published shortly.

The changes proposed under the Directive should not prevent any individual in this category from gaining or maintaining access to financial services. We regularly raise these issues with financial institutions and the regulator, and we encourage financial institutions to take a proportionate, risk-based approach when applying these measures.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Charles Walker on 2016-04-12.

To ask Mr Chancellor of the Exchequer, with reference to recommendations 12 and 22 of the Financial Action Taskforce guidance, entitled Potentially Exposed Persons, what steps the Government has taken to provide guidance to financial institutions and Designated Non-financial Businesses and Professions on what constitutes a prominent public function for domestic and foreign politically exposed persons; and if he will make a statement.

Harriett Baldwin

In line with the Financial Action Task Force’s international standards, the Government believes that institutions should take reasonable measures to determine whether an individual qualifies as a Politically Exposed Person. The Money Laundering Regulations 2007 set out a non-exhaustive list of individuals who could be politically exposed. The FCA and the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group have published further guidance to assist the industry in identifying and banking Politically Exposed Persons.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Charles Walker on 2016-09-08.

To ask the Leader of the House, pursuant to the Answer of 5 September 2016 to Question 43403, what the evidential basis is for his assertion that no hon. Members have handed in the text of their Bill; what discussions he and his officials have had with House authorities on the status of each of the Private Members’ Bills presented on 29 June 2016; and which Bills have been received by Parliamentary Counsel in draft as part of the process of discussion with Departments.

Mr David Lidington

Bills formally submitted to the Public Bill Office are available to all Members and are published online. Government Departments are holding discussions with several Members about their Bills.

The Government will set out its position on each Bill at the relevant Second Reading.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Charles Walker on 2016-01-12.

To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, whether he has received representations from the Mayor of London on his concerns about the number of private hire vehicles being licensed each month in London.

Andrew Jones

We receive representations on a number of issues from the Mayor of London, and this has included the impact of the increasing number of private hire vehicles in London on congestion, air quality and parking issues on London’s road network.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Charles Walker on 2016-03-16.

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what estimate his Department has made of the number of its senior civil servants who will potentially fall under the provisions of the 4th EU Money Laundering Directive, 2015/849; and what assessment he has made of which of his Department’s agencies or other public bodies will potentially be classed as holding a prominent public function for the purposes of that directive.

Mr David Lidington

Under the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, which will be transposed into national law by June 2017, a politically exposed person is one who has been entrusted with a prominent public function domestically or by a foreign country. This would include some senior civil servants, such as ambassadors and chargés d’affaires. The Government’s view is that the Directive permits a risk-based approach to the identification of whether an individual is a politically exposed person and, when identified, the Directive enables the application of different degrees of enhanced measures to reflect the risks posed. The Government will be setting out this view in a consultation which will be published shortly.

The changes proposed under the Directive should not prevent any individual in this category from gaining or maintaining access to financial services. The Treasury regularly raises these issues with financial institutions and the regulator, and we encourage financial institutions to take a proportionate, risk-based approach when applying these measures.”

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Charles Walker on 2016-03-21.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what estimate his Department has made of the number of its senior civil servants who will potentially fall under the provisions of the Fourth EU Money Laundering Directive, 2015/849; and what assessment he has made of which of his Department’s agencies or other public bodies will potentially be classed as holding a prominent public function for the purposes of that directive.

Mr Julian Brazier

I refer my hon. Friend to the answer given to his Question 31527 on 22 March 2016.

The below Parliamentary question was asked by Charles Walker on 2016-04-12.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will identify for the purpose of Article 3(9)(F) of the Fourth EU Money Laundering Directive which ranks in the armed services will be classed as high-ranking.

Mark Lancaster

The Fourth EU Money Laundering Directive seeks to prevent the financial and certain non-financial sectors from being used for money laundering (the conversion, by various means, of the proceeds of crime into apparently ‘clean money’) and terrorist financing (the provision or collection of funds used to carry out any terrorist offences).

In addition to the financial sector, the directive applies to certain non-financial sectors including lawyers, notaries, accountants, estate agents, providers of gambling services, trust and company service providers, and to all providers of goods when payments are made in cash in excess of €15,000.

The directive introduces additional requirements and safeguards (‘enhanced due diligence’) for situations posing a higher risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, for example, trading with correspondent banks situated outside the EU. Amongst those additional requirements is a broader definition of Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).

Those subject to the directive are required to:

Identify and verify the identity of their customer (‘customer due diligence’) and of the beneficial owner (person(s) who ultimately owns or controls the customer on whose behalf a transaction is being carried out, e.g. in the case of a company, the owner of a sufficient percentage of the shares or votes), and to monitor their business relationship with the customer,

Report suspicions of money laundering or terrorist financing to the public authorities

Ensure that personnel are properly trained and that appropriate internal preventive policies and procedures are set up.

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is not a financial institution nor does it fall into the non-financial sector organisations identified by the Directive, and it is not a provider of goods where payments are made in cash in excess of €15,000.

The responsibility of implementing the requirements of the Directive is for the financial sector and the non-financial sectors identified by the Directive and not the MOD.

The new Directive gives additional guidance in dealing with those risks and issues relating to corrupt activities. As with all legislation it cannot differentiate between those nations, sectors and institutions that are more or in the UK’s case, less corrupt. What this Directive attempts to do is give those organisations and sectors at risk of money laundering and terrorist finances the ability to make their own judgements as to what they deem as a high risk person (PEP) or transaction. Whilst ambassadors, chargés d’affaires and high-ranking officers in the Armed Forces are included in the Directive as PEP’s, the financial institutions in particular will assess their individual risk. In some countries the military are involved and in some cases run the political and governing systems, this makes them a significant corruption risk. The UK, its ambassadors, chargés d’affaires and high-ranking officers carry a lesser risk than some others; it is therefore unlikely that the extended Directive will affect them. But the interpretation of the Directive is for the financial and certain non-financial sectors to interpret.

The MOD takes its responsibility to prevent, detect, deter and investigate fraud (including corruption, money laundering and terrorist financing) very seriously and has undertaken detailed risk assessments to identify its risks, where needed implementing additional preventative and detective controls and undertakes due diligence on its suppliers.

Transparency International publishes a Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index based on 77 indicators which assesses the existence, effectiveness and enforcement of a nation’s ability to manage the risk of corruption including money laundering.

The UK MOD scored an ‘A’ (very low corruption risk) in the 2015 index, the only country to achieve this in the G20 and NATO as well as being one of only two in the world to achieve this.

Transparency International attributed the ‘A’ to the UK MOD having strong anti-corruption systems underpinned by effective independent oversight mechanisms.