Tag: Ben Wallace

The comments made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 22 December 2021.

Strengthening our partnerships in the Indo-Pacific is a strategic priority and this commitment with Japan, one of our closest security partners in Asia, is a clear example of that.

Designing a brand-new combat air system with a fighter aircraft at its heart is a highly ambitious project so working with like-minded nations is vital. Building on the technological and industrial strengths of our two countries, we will be exploring a wide-ranging partnership across next-generation combat air technologies.

The comments made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 15 December 2021.

Today is a significant day for the military community which for the first time has seen the Armed Forces Covenant enshrined in law.

The Armed Forces Act places a legal obligation on public bodies to consider the welfare of service personnel and veterans alike, giving them improved access to crucial services that we all rely on every day.

It will also strengthen the Service Justice System – an integral part of the Armed Forces and support the unique role of our people who operate globally.

The comments made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 10 December 2021.

At a time of growing threats and increasing competition in the High North, we have some of the closest cooperation with our Danish, Swedish and Norwegian partners.

We work together annually on military exercises and operations, learning from each other and strengthening our partnerships.

Our ability to operate in this way is the firm foundation of our shared resolve to stand up for our values.

The comments made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 4 December 2021.

Our dedicated Armed Forces personnel are working side by side with civil authorities to provide essential support to communities impacted by Storm Arwen.

The ability to deploy quickly to wherever in the UK assistance is requested makes us all safer and ensures we are able to look protect the most vulnerable in our society.

The comments made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 25 November 2021.

Future Soldier is reinforced by the ambition outlined in the Defence Command Paper to transform the Army into a more agile, integrated, lethal, expeditionary force.

We have underpinned this generational work with an extra £8.6bn for Army equipment, bringing the total investment to £41.3 billion.

Our army will operate across the globe, equipped with the capabilities to face down a myriad of threats from cyber warfare through to battlefield conflict.

The statement made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on 15 November 2021.

On 21 September, l committed to update the House on an investigation into MOD data breaches concerning the email addresses of Afghan nationals who are eligible for the Afghanistan relocations and assistance policy, but at that time remained in Afghanistan.

Incident

The first report of a data breach was received on the evening of 20 September and consisted of 245 live email addresses. On 22 September, following my statement to the House, the MOD was made aware of a previous breach of 55 addresses—10 of which were in addition to the first breach—which had occurred on 13 September. Subsequent investigations identified that a third breach had occurred on 7 September involving an additional 13 email addresses not previously compromised.

Upon learning of the initial breach, I immediately ordered the undertaking of an investigation and any actions that would prevent further breaches. The investigation was conducted in two parts. The first addressed the circumstances of the breach, its causes and the immediate and longer-term actions required to prevent recurrences and mitigate any potential additional risks to those Afghan nationals affected. The second part of the investigation concerned the data handling and data protection arrangements that were in use by the ARAP team and made recommendations on how best to ensure an appropriate data handling regime was in place.

Investigation findings

The investigation has concluded that the breaches arose in almost identical circumstances. All three took place in the ARAP casework team, tasked with providing personal support and advice to the cohort of ARAP-eligible Afghan nationals and all involved a group email to elements of that cohort, which used the “carbon copy” instead of “blind carbon copy” field to anonymise the recipients.

The cause of these mistakes was not simply human error in isolation, but a lack of written standard operating procedures and training, which should have prevented such a mistake being made. That in turn was assessed to be the result of several contributing factors, all arising from the intense speed, scale and operational pressure of the casework, and the fact that the team had been built and then expanded quickly in order to support the rapid increase in activity necessary as a result of the evacuation. As a result, some members of the team were inexperienced and insufficiently trained for such casework management.

The ARAP team’s efforts to evacuate as many Afghans as possible in a short period of time was followed by a rapid transition to communicating with those who were unable to relocate, in order to begin providing follow-on support. In the haste of this transition the risks arising from changing how officials communicated—which had previously been done on an individual basis, often by telephone rather than email—were not fully recognised or managed.

The MOD has undertaken further investigation of any possible increased threat to those affected. While media reports have indicated some localised Taliban reprisals against Afghan nationals formerly employed by coalition forces, the MOD assesses that the Taliban are not conducting centrally directed and co-ordinated targeting of ARAP-eligible persons. The investigation found that no further personal or locational information was revealed in the data breaches that has substantively increased the ability of the Taliban to target ARAP-eligible persons.

All ARAP-eligible individuals whose details were involved were notified within 30 minutes on discovery of the breach on 20 September and advised on actions to minimise the risk to them and have subsequently been contacted to provide additional security advice. The MOD is not aware that anyone has come to harm as a result of these breaches, but continues to provide security support to ARAP-eligible families while they await relocation to the UK.

Remedial actions

Significant remedial actions have now been taken to prevent such incidents occurring again. These include:

Establishing new data handling procedures for ARAP casework management.

Ensuring all staff appointed to the ARAP team are fully aware of those procedures and trained in their proper employment.

Creating a “Registry” function, with authority over data handling procedures and a remit to continually improve those processes and assure that all staff are familiar and compliant with them.

Appointing additional ARAP team members with specific responsibilities for all record keeping and information management.

Instigating a “two pairs of eyes rule” so that any external email to an ARAP-eligible Afghan national must be reviewed by a second member of the team before it is sent.

Ensuring that any group emails, such as routine updates, must be authorised at the OF-5 or B1 level (i.e. Colonel equivalent).

As a consequence of the breaches, two personnel were suspended from the ARAP team, pending the outcome of the investigation. The individuals’ actions that contributed to the data breaches were not found to have been deliberate or negligent, but the result of insufficient training and data handling procedures. They have subsequently been reassigned to other roles, outside of the ARAP team.

The ARAP team has now received additional recommendations and support from Defence Digital—the directorate responsible for ensuring effective use of digital and information technology across Defence—which are being applied to further improve the ARAP team’s handling and protection of casework data. Finally, the MOD reported itself to the Information Commissioner and will co-operate fully with all investigations and findings.

The remedial actions outlined above are already providing much greater assurance of data handling within the ARAP team. I am confident that their continued application is sufficient to prevent any recurrence, but have directed that the team seeks to continually improve its processes.

ARAP progress

The data breaches detailed above were unacceptable and fell short of the high standards to which the MOD typically holds itself. They were also a breach of the trust many former Afghan staff have placed in us to honour our commitment and do all that we can to keep them safe. We continue that work and it is also important to reflect on the scale of the challenges and achievements of the ARAP team.

Since the scheme was launched in April over 89,000 applications have been made and many more continue to be received, each requiring detailed review and processing. As a result of these efforts more than 7,000 Afghan nationals—staff and their families—who worked in support of the Government’s mission in Afghanistan have now been successfully relocated to start new lives in the security of United Kingdom.

There were a further 311 ARAP-eligible Afghans who were called forward with their families during the evacuation operation, but sadly unable to board flights. There are now fewer than 200 remaining in Afghanistan and we continue to work with urgency to relocate all those who remain via a range of routes. Those who have left Afghanistan for third countries are being provided with support in-country and assisted to continue their journey to the UK. As part of that process we have already conducted five RAF flights, carrying more than 400 people. The flights will continue as long as necessary and the ARAP scheme is not time-bounded so any further applicants who are found to be eligible will continue to be relocated indefinitely.

The scale of these achievements should not be underestimated and has been made possible by the professionalism and determination of the ARAP team and their colleagues across Defence who continue to honour our debt of gratitude to the Afghan nationals who supported our operations in the country. ARAP remains a foremost priority for the MOD and I continue to closely monitor the progress of the ARAP team to ensure its performance remains of the highest possible standard.

I would like to take the opportunity to assure the House that although the impact of these breaches appears to have been limited, all breaches of personal data are taken extremely seriously by MOD.

Finally, I offer again my sincerest apologies to all those affected by these data breaches and assure them that we continue to make every effort to relocate them to the UK as quickly and safely as possible.

The statement made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on 21 October 2021.

It is vital for UK Defence that our service justice system has the most up-to-date framework, skills and processes in place to deal with all allegations of offending. At the heart of the service justice system must be robust, independent, and trusted investigation processes that have the confidence of service personnel and the international community. It is for this reason, that on 13 October 2020, I announced a review by Sir Richard Henriques to examine investigative and prosecutorial processes for dealing with allegations of offences on overseas operations and improve the quality of investigations and their outcomes.

The review was to build upon but not reopen the recommendations of the service justice system review by HH Shaun Lyons and Sir Jon Murphy. The review was to be forward looking and, whilst drawing on insights from the handling of allegations from recent operations, was not to reconsider past investigative or prosecutorial decisions or reopen historical cases.

I am pleased today to publish that report. I am very grateful for the comprehensive and considered work Sir Richard has undertaken and I particularly welcome his recognition of the need for a separate system of military justice. With the improvements which will flow from his recommendations we can be confident it will be a more efficient and effective system for the accused and for victims.

Sir Richard’s report contains 64 recommendations, approximately a third of which are focused on taking forward the establishment of a defence serious crime unit, which was originally proposed in the earlier Lyons/Murphy review of the service justice system. There are also operations-related recommendations training, detention processes and record-keeping), recommendations for non-statutory protocols between the service police, the Service Prosecuting Authority and the judge advocate general relating to the investigation of allegations against UK forces of unlawful killing and ill-treatment in the context of overseas operations, recommendations for improving the technical/IT systems supporting the service courts, and recommendations relating to summary hearings. I particularly welcome Sir Richard’s support of the provisions in the current Armed Forces Bill to retain concurrent jurisdiction, and that the creation of the defence serious crime unit will help drive up conviction rates for serious offences.

We have considered Sir Richard’s recommendations carefully, and will be taking forward the work in the following ways:

The new defence serious crime unit is key to meeting our commitment to further strengthen the service justice system. The defence serious crime unit will brigade the investigative capability for serious offending of the existing three service police forces. Under the leadership of a new provost marshal for serious crime, it will be instrumental in ensuring our service police are fully capable of meeting the challenges faced by the service justice system now and in the years ahead. I have therefore prioritised this work. The Government will be bringing forward amendments to the Armed Forces Bill to implement the recommendations on this topic which require primary legislation at this stage. These amendments will ensure that the new provost marshal will have all of the legal powers and responsibilities of the existing provost marshals; and in particular, that the new provost marshal will be responsible for guaranteeing the independence of investigations conducted by the new unit.

In respect of the recommendations which draw on the work of former judge advocate general His Honour Jeffrey Blackett and Lord Thomas of Gresford for the creation of a non-statutory protocol about the handling of serious allegations arising in the context of overseas operations, the Government believe these are matters for the independent service police, the Service Prosecuting Authority and the judge advocate general to consider in the first instance.

Work on implementing four other recommendations is also expected to be taken forward over the coming months. These will amend standard operating procedures to ensure that service police are informed with minimum delay of reportable offences, establish a serious incident board within the permanent joint headquarters, create or upgrade an operational record keeping system, and adopt a uniform approach in respect of training of service legal personnel prior to their posting to the Service Prosecuting Authority.

The remaining recommendations including legal support to personnel, improved technology/IT for the service courts and improvements to the summary hearing process, raise wider implications relating to policy, legal and resourcing issues. Those will be considered further by the Department over the coming months. The goal will be to ensure that the recommendations dovetail with our overarching intent to maintain operational effectiveness, including the swift delivery of fair and efficient justice for victims and offenders. Where appropriate and necessary, legislation will be brought forward when parliamentary time allows. I will update the House in due course.

I am confident that this review—along with the earlier service justice system review—sets out a template for the service justice system for the future. As I have set out above, where possible we are seeking to implement the most important of the recommendations as quickly as possible; and we are committing to progress the rest in the way I have described. The Government believe that the recommendations by Sir Richard will significantly improve the quality of investigations, will be fully compliant with the requirements in the European convention on human rights and will help improve service to victims of crime within the forces.

A copy of Sir Richard’s report will be placed in the Library of the House.