Tag: Ben Wallace

The statement made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on 18 July 2023.

With permission, I would like to make a statement on the publication of our refreshed defence Command Paper. It is just over two years since we published the original Command Paper in March 2021. In those two years, our security has been challenged in so many ways. This is Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world.

In the last four years that I have been Defence Secretary, I have been consistent about the reform I have sought to implement. I want Defence to be threat-led—understanding and acting on the threats facing our nation as our sole mission; not protecting force structures, cap badges or much-loved equipment but ensuring that we are focused on challenging threats.

I want the Ministry of Defence to be a campaigning Department, adopting a more proactive posture, and our forces more forward and present in the world, with a return to campaigning assertively and constantly, pushing back those threats and our adversaries. I want Defence to be sustainable in every sense. For too long, Defence was hollowed out by both Labour and Conservative Governments, leaving our forces overstretched and underequipped. We must match our ambitions to our resources, our equipment plans to our budget, and take care of our people to sustain them in their duties. We must never forget the travesty of the Snatch Land Rovers in Afghanistan.

The 2021 defence Command Paper was true to those principles and, with some tough choices, presented an honest plan for what we can and will achieve: a credible force, capable of protecting the nation, ready to meet the threats of today but investing heavily to modernise for those of the future; a force in which every major platform would be renewed by 2035, from armoured vehicles to Dreadnought submarines, frigates to satellites.

We did not plan on issuing a new Command Paper just two years on. Many of the conclusions of that Command Paper remain right: Russia was and is the greatest threat to European security, and China’s rapid military modernisation and growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific and beyond do pose an increasing challenge to us all. However, I have always said that as the situation changes, we must change with it. Since the first DCP was released, the world has shifted once more, from a competitive age to a contested and volatile world. The technology advances we predicted materialised. The threats and challenges we feared have manifested.

There is no more immediate threat than Russia. Its full-scale invasion of Ukraine was not simply an assault on a proud and sovereign nation but an attack on all our values, European security and the open international order on which stability and prosperity have depended for over three quarters of a century. Right now, the people of Ukraine are suffering the tragic consequences of President Putin’s illegal, unprovoked invasion. His naked aggression and imperial ambitions have played out in a tragedy of epic human suffering. The brave citizen soldiers of the armed forces of Ukraine are protecting their own nation and people, quite heroically taking on the once mighty Russian forces. The whole House recognises that they fight not just for their freedom but for ours. They are not just liberating their homeland but defending the rules-based system.

As Defence Secretary it is important to import the lessons learned from the conflict to our own forces. While I wish such lessons were generated in a different way, the conflict has become an incubator of new ways of war. They are proving the way for warfare in the 2020s—whole of nation, internationally partnered, innovative, digitised, operating with a tempo, precision and range requirement and a recognition that there is a trade-off between assurance levels and operational impact.

I am proud, too, of the role the UK is playing in supporting Ukraine, whether providing equipment, training or political support, or galvanising European and international allies and industrial partners to do likewise. But the return of war to the continent of Europe, alongside growing threats elsewhere in the world, has meant that we must sharpen our approach. The integrated review refresh published in March outlined how we would do that. It would shape the global strategic environment, increase our focus on deterrence and defence, address vulnerabilities that leave our nation exposed and invest in the UK’s unique strengths.

Defence is central to all those efforts. That is why, after three decades in which all parties have continued drawing the post cold-war peace dividend, this Prime Minister reversed that trend and provided Defence with an additional £24 billion over four years. He and the Chancellor have gone further since, in response to the war in Ukraine. Next year we will spend over £50 billion on defence for the first time in our history. That is nearly £12 billion a year more cash investment than when I became Defence Secretary in 2019—a real-terms increase of more than 10%. This Government have committed to increasing spending yet further over the longer term to 2.5% of GDP, as we improve the fiscal position and grow our economy.

Our defence plans, and the armed forces to deliver them, must be robust and credible—not fantasy force designs, unfunded gimmicks or top trump numbers. As Russia has so effectively proven, there is no point having parade ground armies and massed ranks of men and machines if they cannot be integrated as a single, full spectrum force, sustained in the field under all the demands of modern warfighting. That takes professional forces, well equipped and rapidly adaptable, supported by critical enablers and vast stockpiles of munitions. That is why in this document, hon. Members will not find shiny new announcements, comms-led policies driving unsustainable force designs or any major new platforms for military enthusiasts to put up on their charts on their bedroom wall. We stand by the Command Paper we published in 2021 but we must get there faster, doing defence differently and getting ourselves on to a campaign footing to protect the nation and help it prosper.

As I said standing here when DCP21 was announced, we owe it to the men and women of our armed forces to make policy reality. The work was just beginning. In this refresh, we have focused on how to drive the lessons of Ukraine into our core business and on how to recover the warfighting resilience needed to generate credible conventional deterrence. The great advantage of having served in Defence for some time is that my ministerial team and I have now taken a proper look under the bonnet. Consequently, we are clear that our strategic advantage derives from four key sources which require urgent prioritisation.

First and foremost are our first-class people. Our men and women are not just brave and committed, but talented and incredibly skilled. They are our real battle-winning capability. It is our duty to ensure they are as well supported, prepared and equipped as possible, so we are going to invest in them. Last year, I commissioned Richard Haythornthwaite to conduct the first review of workforce incentivisation for almost 30 years. It is such good work that we are incorporating the response into our Command Paper, and today I am unveiling a new employment model and skills framework for our armed forces. It will offer our people a spectrum of service that allows far greater career flexibility, making it easier for military personnel to zig-zag between different roles, whether regular or reserve, or between the civil service and industry.

We are transforming our forces’ overall employment offer by adopting a total reward approach to provide a much more compelling and competitive incentivisation package. Since all our armed forces personnel deserve the best quality accommodation, we are injecting a further £400 million to improve our service accommodation in the next two years. Many of us over Christmas will have been frustrated by the poor support our service personnel and their families received from those tasked with looking after their accommodation. It is for that reason that I have withheld their profit and used the money to freeze for one year only the rent increases our personnel were due to pay. Taken together alongside such initiatives as wraparound childcare, they are intended to enrich careers and enhance the ability of our most talented people to keep protecting the British people, and to ensure they are rewarded and fulfilled while they do so.

Our second priority is further strengthening our scientific and technological base. We are already world leaders in specific areas, but to continue outmatching our adversaries we must stay ahead of the curve in digital, data and emerging scientific fields. In 2021, we said we would invest £6.6 billion in advanced research and development. In fact, we are now investing significantly more to stay ahead in the technologies proving themselves vital on the battlefields of Ukraine, such as AI, quantum and robotics. We are enabling a culture of innovation across Defence, pulling through those R&D breakthroughs to the frontline. Following in Ukraine’s footsteps, we are increasingly sourcing the £100 solutions that can stop £100 million threats in their tracks, winning both the kinetic and economic exchanges of modern warfare.

Of course, our ability to do that depends on the quality of our relationship with the industry, which is our third priority. I am pushing the Ministry of Defence to form a closer alliance with our industrial partners. A genuine partnership to sustain our defence will mean doing things differently. Ukraine reminds us that time waits for no one. It is no good holding out for the 100% solution that is obsolete by the time it is launched. Often, 80% is good enough, especially if it means swiftly putting kit into the hands of our service personnel. Capabilities can be rapidly upgraded, spirally developed, for the relentless cycles of battlefield adaptation to win the innovation battle. Instead of sticking to acquisition programmes that drag on for decades, we are setting maximum delivery periods of five years for hardware and three years for digital programmes.

Our fourth priority is productivity and campaigning. To face this increasingly contested and volatile world, we need to make major changes to the machinery of the Department and its methods. We are emphasising an ethos focused ruthlessly on the delivery of real-world effect, increasing the bang for buck in everything we do. This approach reaches into every part of the Defence enterprise, from the front line to the back office, and involves a major redesign of the Department. We must shift our whole organisational culture away from the previous peacetime mentality to one where we live and operate as we would fight, focusing more on outputs than inputs and achieving a better balance between risk and reward. That means empowering people to live and operate alongside partners, and sometimes to be enabled by them when in lower threat environments. That means ensuring our equipment, whether Type 31, Challenger 3, or Typhoons, has the infrastructure and supplies needed to sustain operations more of the time and to deliver real-world effect wherever and whenever it is needed. And it means working with the relevant regulatory authorities, for example the Military Aviation Authority, to accelerate the experimentation, testing and innovating of new technologies, while remaining within legal bounds.

I want to emphasise one final aspect of the Command Paper refresh, namely the development of a global campaigning approach. We started with a review of our head office, where we broke out campaign delivery from policy formation and established integrated campaign teams. They have adversary focuses, not geographic, and will drive our enduring campaigns in the same way operational commanders lead our forces on deployed operations. The indivisibility of operational theatres in today’s world means Defence must be constantly ready to respond globally to safeguard our interests and those of our allies. Sometimes it will be to evacuate our citizens in moments of crisis, such as in Sudan. Other times it will be to deter an adversary or reassure a friend. As we have shown through our support for Ukraine, the UK Government have the political will, but that only matters if it is matched by our military agility. Today, we are establishing a defence global response force. Ready, integrated and lethal, it will better cohere existing forces from across land, sea, air, space and cyber, to get there first in response to unpredictable events around the world.

Crucially, today’s paper also recognises that it is in the interconnected world and that the UK is unlikely to act alone. Partnerships are critical to our security and prosperity. In future, we will be allied by design and national by exception. Our support for NATO will remain iron-clad, but we will continue to prioritise our core relationships. We will invest in deepening relationships with our new partners. It is why we have invested to expand our global defence network, improving communications, and co-ordinating defence attachés within our intelligence functions. None of that is headline-grabbing stuff, but it is the fine details that make the difference to our national security.

To conclude, the paper is the result of having several years in the Department to understand where it needs most attention. That continuity in office is improving and I am incredibly grateful to the long-serving Minister for Armed Forces, my right hon. Friend the Member for Wells (James Heappey), whose experience in uniform and public office provided the basis for this paper. We are grateful to the hundreds of individuals and groups who contributed to the first challenge phase of its drafting, from academics to serving personnel and industry representatives, not to mention the many Members of this House. Most of what we learned from them is encapsulated in the document.

This is likely to be one of my last appearances at the Dispatch Box. It has been the greatest privilege to serve as Secretary of State for Defence for the last four years. I thank my team, civil servants, special advisers and Members for their support and their challenge. All of us here have the common interest of defending this fine country, its values and its freedoms. Of all the many functions of Government, Defence is the most important and is more important than ever, as the next 10 years will be more unstable and insecure. The men and women of our armed forces are second to none and Britain’s place in the world is anchored in their professionalism and sacrifice. I believe we will increasingly call on them in the years ahead. We must ensure that they are ready to answer that call. I wish them and whomever replaces me well. I commend the statement to the House.

The statement made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on 17 July 2023.

I have today laid before the House a departmental minute describing the provision of infrastructure worth £4,226,970 to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in Gao, Mali.

MINUSMA is a UN-led, non-combat mission to support the political processes in Mali and to carry out a number of security related task, for which the UK contribution, since December 2020, was the Long Range Reconnaissance Group (Mali) (LRRG(M)).

The security and political situation in Mali has deteriorated significantly since the UK review of MINUSMA at the start of 2022.There have been two coups in the past two years and the transitional Government of Mali (TGoM), which seized power in 2021, has continued to delay democratic transition and has routinely failed to address the numerous security and humanitarian issues it is facing. The TGoM has also behaved in a way that is constraining MINUSMA’s delivery against its mandate. On 14 November 2022 the Government announced they were withdrawing their forces from Mali.

The UK Ministry of Defence intend to gift the Camp Bagnold infrastructure, with a value of £4,226,970, for $1(US) to UN MINUSMA. The gifting transfers all ownership rights of the camp to the UN, including any future responsibility for the remediation and disposal of the site.

On the 16 June 2023 the TGoM asked MINUSMA to leave Mali “without delay”. Despite this, we still intend to gift the Camp to the UN MINUSMA. Given the fast-moving situation on the ground we request special urgency to lay a departmental minute in Parliament for four sitting days before recess. This is necessary to allow us to meet the UN MINUSMA request that any contract to transfer the ownership of the camp must be signed before 31 July 2023.

The speech made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 6 June 2023.

The speech made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, in Singapore on 3 July 2023.

Good morning and thank you to IISS for hosting. It’s a privilege to be here in Singapore. An island nation and trading powerhouse with which the UK has much in common, not to mention a shared history. And I’m delighted to share this panel with my colleagues from Canada and the Philippines, just two of the nations we’re working closely with to keep strengthening the international order that benefits everyone.

Lots has happened since the last UK Defence Secretary spoke here and the world already looks different in so many ways. We’ve fought off the pandemic. We did that by collaboration, not by isolation. The UK has had three Prime Ministers and we’ve lost our great Queen. Her similarly great namesake, the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier group, made her maiden visit to the Indo-Pacific in 2021. In that same year, the United Kingdom published the Integrated Review, signalling our increased commitment to this region.

That review has been updated this year and we’re pressing ahead with our ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific, not least becoming ASEAN’s first new Dialogue Partner this century. Of course, events in Europe are focusing us closer to home at the moment.

Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine is forcing a rethink of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. And it has spurred yet more countries to seek the collective security of NATO membership, precisely what President Putin claimed he was acting to prevent.

But as busy as things are at home, developments continue apace. Indo-Pacific economic performance makes this the world’s undisputed growth engine – 40 per cent of global GDP, 60 per cent of global shipping, home to half the world’s population, and some of the fastest growing and most innovative economies.

But far from seeking to secure blocks of interests, we believe this region offers enormous economic opportunity for all. It’s why European companies and countries are looking east, and why the United Kingdom Government considers our interests to lie as much here as they do in Europe. Indeed, in 2022 our total exports to the Indo-Pacific amounted to £127 billion – a remarkable increase of 22 per cent on the previous year.

Yet just as we seek to benefit from the opportunities here, so must we also share  responsibility for the challenges. And in both regards, none are bigger than the “epoch defining” rise of China – as it was described in our Integrated Review Refresh.

We are all now navigating the consequences of China’s rise – both those opportunities and those challenges. Lifting vast numbers out of poverty. Trading with the world. And the undeniable truth, that none of our most fundamental global issues can be solved without engagement with China.

Be they climate change, energy and food security, economic stagnation, tech regulation, nuclear proliferation. But we must also speak plainly and acknowledge that there are also challenges from that ‘rise’. Illegal fishing, tensions in territorial waters, sovereignty disputes, and debt diplomacy.

This session, Mr Chairman, asks ‘how can we create balance and stability in the Indo-Pacific?’ Many do consider that question purely through the lens of China and the balancing of some ‘great power competition’. But we don’t agree it has to be. We can do this in three ways… this might surprise you, coming from a Defence Secretary, but those ways are not primarily military.

First and foremost, by upholding international rules and promoting common standards. Why rules? Because the ‘balance and stability’ we are talking about today is ultimately based on adherence to shared rules.

The Ukraine invasion is a tragic reminder of the terrible costs when leaders disregard human life, national sovereignty, and the rules-based international system. Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, is constantly claiming that the system is simply made up by the US as they go along.

Of course, this is a fabrication. He’s talking about the very system – including the United Nations Charter – that we conceived, including Russia, together after the Second World War and for which we fought together, in the hope of saving future generations from the scourge of war.

Of course, Russia doesn’t want ordinary countries to now benefit from those protections or the freedom to choose because they might not choose Russia. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine – trampling sovereignty and brutalising innocent civilians – is a result of its utter disregard for rules and the belief that ‘might is right’.

Well, they are wrong and that’s being proven by the international community’s determination to enforce those rules. Because rules are agnostic of nations’ military or economic power. They are common to all our needs. Their adherence prevents competition escalating into conflict, and disputes are resolved without fear or favour.

What unites us is that rules apply to us all, regardless of actor or geography. We are all equal in the eyes of the law. It provides a level playing field. It ensures fair play. Which is one of the reasons, I believe, why Singapore has been so successful in recent decades. Because of the respect here for the regulatory environment, anti-corruption, dispute resolution and fair play. If it can work for Singapore, why can’t it work elsewhere?

Whether you are the smallest country seeking to protect your fishing rights, or the largest seeking a greater share of global trade, the rules-based system is there to protect and enable us all. Yes all, including China. It is why the UK strongly believes so strongly in protecting the rights of littoral states in their Exclusive Economic Zones, as well as in the importance of upholding the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

We reject any claims that do not adhere to its tenets. Attempts to restrict the global commons are fundamentally damaging to us all and our trade. If international treaties bearing the signature of 157 parties are junked on a whim, this represents an attack not just on one treaty, but on the entire international system.

So, the United Kingdom will continue to demonstrate that all parties stick as close as possible to UNCLOS. Because responsible powers have a duty to protect international rules. And neither can they take a back seat in evolving those rules as well. We want a system of 21st century laws designed by all, for all.

The second way we maintain balance and stability is by backing free trade.

The UK has always believed in free commerce and capital flows. The more we open up competition, the more we reduce overdependence and build resilience. And neither can we afford to ‘decouple’, commercially or diplomatically.

We believe the best resilience comes from diversification, not from protectionism. That’s why the UK is working to diversify our supply chains. It’s why we have done deals with Japan, Australia and, of course, Canada, and why we will be enthusiastic new members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

You cannot put a price on the ability to sell to 500 million people with a combined GDP of £11 trillion. And we’re building on that momentum having signed free trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand – as well as Singapore, Japan, Vietnam and the Republic of Korea.

Third, and finally, the way we preserve stability is through the promotion of our principles and values.

Coming to Shangri-la and visiting Singapore I feel immediately at home. Despite very different national systems, we share many of the same principles and values. The belief that all nations have the right to chart their own course. Instinctive understanding of the importance of global trade. And above all, a belief in fair play.

You don’t need to have mastered the rules of cricket to know that fair play is ingrained in the British psyche. No matter how big or small you are, how rich or poor, we believe nations should treat each other fairly, with respect. The UN conventions reinforce that and as a P5 nation, we believe we have a responsibility to help uphold those rules around the globe.

And that’s where Defence does come in, because it has an important supporting role to play, not just in hard power projection but soft power promotion. The skills and capability of our Armed Forces are there to help friends when they’re in trouble, from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to crisis management and civilian evacuations. And ultimately, in times of conflict.

I know you share that view, many of you here. We’ve seen it in Ukraine. Alongside our troops training Ukrainians in the United Kingdom are Australians, New Zealanders, as well as Canadians. The US-chaired Ukraine Defense Contact Group now includes many countries represented in this room. And we appreciate the very material support that you are sending to Ukraine to help return stability to our continent. And that’s because you recognise, as our PM said recently, that Atlantic and Pacific security is indivisible. Our security is your security.

And that’s why the UK is becoming more proactive and more persistently engaged in the Indo-Pacific. We have been using HMS Spey and Tamar – our two Royal Navy ships, permanently deployed in the region – to deliver humanitarian aid to tsunami-hit Tonga. To help enforce the sanctions regime against DPRK. And to undertake 16 port visits and over 20 regional exercises.

We have expanded our network of Defence Attachés and regional defence staff – including the recently restored Defence Section in Manila, Philippines – to deepen our understanding and influence in over 20 countries. And we’ve been growing our wider Defence presence in the region, whether here in Singapore, our garrison in Brunei, or the recent Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan.

As a result of all this we’ve been able to increase our tempo, conducting over 60 defence activities in the last two years alone, from exercises and training teams to staff talks and personnel exchanges. And, as I speak, there are 45 officers from the regional partners here today attending professional military education courses back in the United Kingdom. And all that activity helps to build partnerships. Because it is only by deepening friendships, knitting together a tapestry of partners and allies, that we can collectively secure our populations and our interests.

The UK is a proud member of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. The region’s ‘original’ defence arrangement – established when its security landscape looked very different.  We celebrated the FPDA’s 50th anniversary in 2021 and, from my discussions while here, I’m convinced it has an even more important role to play in the years ahead. In parallel, we’re now entertaining new partnerships with the recent announcements on AUKUS and GCAP with Japan and Italy. And for the avoidance of doubt, these are not just about countering threats, or the submarines and planes that we’re building.

They’re about the collaborative efforts that underpin them – partnering for technology-transferring, skill-sharing, information exchanges. They are national and generational enterprises. They will allow us to sustain our capabilities over the long term, and they’ll strengthen our supply chain resilience to help us prosper through the 2020s and 2030s. That’s why ASEAN is also so important. And why – in recognition of ‘ASEAN centrality’ – I formally applied in March this year for the UK to join ADMM-Plus.

It’s this ‘partnership principle’ that runs through everything we’re doing in UK Defence, as much as it does in our trade. It’s in our refreshed Integrated Review and will shortly be reinforced in our Defence Command Paper Refresh. And it’s central to every defence engagement, every exchange programme and capability programme, every exercise or operation.

In 2025 our Carrier Strike Group will be returning to the Indo-Pacific. It’s a great symbol of our partnership approach. Showing that, in a more turbulent world the UK will not retreat to its own shores but continue sailing far over the horizon. Using our unique convening power to bring like-minded partners together, wherever they are in this world.

Protecting our freedom to navigate and operate today and shaping our ability to travel and trade, long into the future. So we can focus on what really matters.

Building the best possible future for all our people.

The speech made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, made in Japan on 15 March 2023.

The statement made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on 19 December 2022.

Today, I am pleased to lay before Parliament, “The Armed Forces Covenant and Veterans Annual Report 2022.” This year has thrown into sharper focus the importance of our armed forces as standard bearers for the values we hold dear as a nation. This includes the support the armed forces have provided to Ukraine to defend its sovereign territory against Russian aggression, the role the armed forces played during the 10 days of national mourning and state funeral of Her late Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, and in this year’s commemorations of the 40th anniversary of the Falklands conflict. More than ever, our armed forces community is central to our national life, and about who we are as a country.

The UK’s promise to support our armed forces community and to ensure they are treated fairly is as important as ever. We owe them a vast debt of gratitude and have a duty to ensure that those who serve, or who have served in our armed forces, and their families, suffer no disadvantage in comparison to other citizens. In some cases, special consideration is appropriate, particularly for those such as the injured or the bereaved. This is what the covenant sets out to do. In the same vein, this Government have committed to making the UK the best place in the world to be a veteran, acknowledging veterans’ service to this country and setting out our plans in the strategy for our veterans.

Never has the armed forces covenant and support to veterans been more vital, and we recognise that partners across the UK, at all levels of the public, private and charitable sectors, have been working hard to support those who serve or have served, and their families. I am proud to lay this report before Parliament as a demonstration of that work.

Highlights from this year’s report include:

The Government have fulfilled its 2019 manifesto commitment to “further incorporate the armed forces covenant into law”. A new armed forces covenant duty has been created, that places a new legal obligation on specific public bodies to have due regard to the covenant principles when delivering certain services, or deciding certain policies, in healthcare, education and housing, that could impact the armed forces community.

Armed forces covenant signings are rapidly approaching 10,000, with 1,634 signing over the last 12 months alone.

The inclusion of veterans’ health in the GP training curriculum and national GP licensing assessment in England and Scotland, and the launch of a veterans’ health innovation fund.

The Office for Veterans’ Affairs published the Veterans’ Strategy Action Plan 2022-24, setting out over 60 commitments, with over £70 million of additional funding, from across Government to further improve the lives of our veteran community.

A servicewomen’s health improvement team worked on an eight-month sprint to address issues related to servicewomen’s health, resulting in ground-breaking new policies and guidance to support servicewomen throughout the armed forces.

There were record levels of investment in service family accommodation in financial year 2021-22, with £179 million invested overall.

The Ministry of Defence has published its new UK armed forces families strategy, which provides the framework for an ambitious 10-year programme. Delivery of initiatives under each workstream has begun.

This report is a collaborative effort with input from service providers and professionals from a diverse array of backgrounds. I would like to thank colleagues across central Government, the devolved Administrations and local authorities, and those at every level and from every sector who are continuing to drive forward the work of the covenant and the strategy for our veterans in support of our armed forces community. We are also grateful to the external members of the Covenant Reference Group who provided their independent observations.

The statement made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on 12 December 2022.

I am pleased to inform the House that I am today laying a departmental minute to advise that the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has received approval from His Majesty’s Treasury to recognise new contingent liabilities associated with the Skynet 6 programme. This programme, as set out in the defence Command Paper “Defence in a Competitive Age”, will provide the MOD with a world class, modern military satellite communications network to support our and our allies’ operations globally. This will be achieved through new capital investment in the ground stations, spacecraft and user terminals that form the Skynet strategic capability. These new contingent liabilities are specifically related to the launch of our first next generation satellite, known as Skynet 6A, which is scheduled to take place in financial year 2025-26 using a SpaceX Falcon 9 launch vehicle from Cape Canaveral. This follows four Skynet 5 satellites (A, B, C and D) currently in orbit, which will be initially supplemented, and then incrementally replaced by 6A and a further four satellite systems being procured through the Skynet 6 enduring capability (EC) project. His Majesty’s Treasury approved the proposed three contingent liabilities and Chairs of the Public Accounts Committee and Defence Committee were notified on 23 June 2020.

Three contingent liabilities are recognised.

The first contingent liability relates to loss of capability of the Skynet 6A system. The MOD will take ownership of the Skynet 6A spacecraft at launch and has not sought to secure insurance for the launch or acceptance phases, as it was assessed as not providing value for money. The post mitigation worst-case financial exposure of risk of loss of capability related to these events, assuming the need to re-procure a spacecraft with similar capabilities, has been assessed at a value of £720 million.

The second contingent liability relates to long delay of launch. The MOD has agreed to bear the allowable costs of a launch-related delay which arise for reasons entirely outside of the control of the contractor. A long launch delay would result in the MOD incurring additional storage, prelaunch insurance, maintenance, launch service provider and other delay-related allowable costs. The post mitigation worst-case financial exposure of a long launch delay has been assessed at a value of £253 million.

The third contingent liability relates to a cross-waiver of liability in favour of the Skynet 6A launch service provider. Cross-waivers are standard practice in space launches. The MOD has agreed a cross waiver of liability in favour of SpaceX and related parties in respect of damage to Ministry of Defence property and personal injury, death or property damage incurred by Ministry of Defence employees. This liability is assessed as unquantifiable due to the nature, scope, range, and scale of possible scenarios that might occur, which means that it is not currently possible to provide a realistic estimate of cost.

The attachment can be viewed online at: http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2022-12-12/HCWS436/.

The statement made by Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on 9 December 2022.

In the summer I updated the House on progress under the UK combat air strategy, setting out the crucial importance of combat air to the nation’s security, sovereign industrial base and to our role in international affairs. I outlined the significant progress being made to develop a next generation combat air system, highlighting the substantial work underway with close and valued partners Japan and Italy.

It is with great pleasure that I now offer a further update on international partnering for our future combat air capability. In a landmark announcement, the Prime Ministers of the UK, Japan and Italy announced that we will work together under a joint programme partnership, the next step in deepening our collaboration. Within the UK, the aircraft under development will be known as Tempest.

Together, our ambition is to develop a next generation capability designed to outmatch adversaries even in the most highly contested environments, by utilising a network of cutting-edge capabilities such as advanced sensors, weapons and data systems. Due to enter service in 2035, it is being developed to keep ahead of the threat for decades to come and undertake a wide variety of missions within our wider military, across all domains.

Tempest will be developed by the newly formed Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), under a spirit of equal partnership, created by the merging of Japan’s FX programme with the UK and Italy’s Future Combat Air System (FCAS). This new programme will take forward our joint concepting activity and support technological and operational sovereignty across partner nations.

This announcement represents a major opportunity to develop our sovereign defence-industrial capabilities, demonstrating our commitment to the 2018 combat air strategy and the 2021 defence and security industrial strategy. The programme is delivering an uplift in skilled jobs for all three partner nations, providing a launchpad for careers in science and engineering. The enterprise already employs over 2,500 highly skilled personnel in the UK alone, including engineers and programmers, with recruitment expanding rapidly.

This programme will also be important in supporting economic growth across the country, with key combat air hubs in the north-west and south-west of England and in Edinburgh, supported by a supply chain of hundreds of organisations from one end of the UK to the other. It is a key avenue for investment in research and development, both public and private, with MOD and our industry partners having already invested well over £1 billion in developing the skills and technologies needed to deliver at pace.

This capability will be designed by some of the world’s leading defence companies. In the UK, these include BAE Systems, Leonardo UK, MBDA UK and Rolls-Royce, working closely with the Ministry of Defence. The international partnership includes MHI, IHI and MELCO for Japan; and Leonardo SpA., Avio Aero, MBDA IT and Elettronica for Italy.

This is a truly strategic endeavour, demonstrating our commitment to maintaining the capabilities needed to defend the UK, protect and reassure our allies and partners and deter those who would threaten international security. It is a clear sign of a global Britain working with like-minded partners from across the world to deepen our defence capabilities, grow our advanced industrial capacity, and demonstrate our shared commitment to international security.