Tag: 2025

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 1 October 2025.

Statement on the UK reimposing UN sanctions on Iran due to significant Iranian non-performance of its JCPoA commitments.

On 28 August 2025, the Foreign Ministers of the UK, France and Germany (the E3) notified the UN Security Council (UNSC) to trigger the mechanism to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran due to significant Iranian non-performance of its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) commitments. 

Today, the UK has reimposed those sanctions, following an end to the “snapback” process. Today’s sanctions include the reapplication of 121 designations on individuals and entities involved in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missiles programme. 

This follows an announcement by the UK on the 29 September to apply sanctions on over 70 Iranian individuals and organisations linked to Iran’s nuclear programme. UN Iran sanctions have been reimposed following the re-instatement of six UNSC resolutions related to Iran’s nuclear proliferation activities on 28 September 2025. 

The UN sanctions that have come back into force include: 

• A UN embargo on the transfer of conventional arms to and from Iran;  
• A ban on the supply or transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy-water related activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery system; 
• Financial and trade restrictions related to nuclear and missile programmes; and  
• 121 designations targeting those involved in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missiles programme. 

The following individuals and entities are designated under today’s UN sanctions: 

• 7th of Tir
• Abbas Rashidi
• Abbas Rezaee Ashtiani
• Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co.
• Ahmad Derakhshandeh
• Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi
• Ali Akbar Tabatabaei
• Ali Hajinia Leilabadi
• Amin Industrial Complex
• Amir Moayyed Alai
• Amir Rahimi
• Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG)
• Armament Industries Group
• Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran
• Azim Aghajani
• Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar
• Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International
• Barzagani Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies
• Behineh Trading Co.
• Behman Asgarpour
• Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi
• Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi
• Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie
• Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani
• Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi
• Cruise Missile Industry Group
• Dawood Agha-Jani
• Defence Industries Organisation (DIO)
• Defense Technology and Science Research Center
• Doostan International Company
• Dr. Mohammad Eslami
• Ehsan Monajemi
• Electro Sanam Company
• Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre (NFRPC) and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC)
• Ettehad Technical Group
• Fajr Industrial Group
• Farasakht Industries
• Farayand Technique
• Fater (or Faater) Institute
• Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani
• First East Export Bank, P.L.C
• Gen Hosein Salimi
• General Zolqadr
• Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem
• Ghasem Soleymani
• Ghorb Karbala
• Ghorb Nooh
• Haleh Bakhtiar
• Hamid-Reza Mohajerani
• Hara Company
• Houshang Nobari
• Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute
• Industrial Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery
• Irano Hind Shipping Company
• IRISL Benelux NV
• Jabber Ibn Hayan
• Jafar Mohammadi
• Javad Rahiqi
• Joza Industrial Co
• Kala-Electric
• Karaj Nuclear Research Centre
• Kaveh Cutting Tools Company
• Kavoshyar Company
• Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters
• Khorasan Metallurgy Industries
• Lt Gen Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri
• M. Babaie Industries
• M. Javad Karimi Sabet
• Maj Gen Yahya Rahim Safavi
• Makin
• Malek Ashtar University
• Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi
• Mesbah Energy Company
• Ministry of Defense Logistics Export
• Mizan Machinery Manufacturing
• Modern Industries Technique Company
• Mohammad Fedai Ashiani
• Mohammad Qannadi
• Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi
• Mohsen Hojati
• Morteza Behzad
• Naser Maleki
• Niru Battery Manufacturing Company
• Novin Energy Company
• Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine
• Omran Sahel
• Oriental Oil Kish
• Parchin Chemical Industries
• Pars Aviation Services Company
• Pars Trash Company
• Pejman Industrial Services Corporation
• Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries
• Qods Aeronautics Industries
• Rah Sahel
• Rahab Engineering Institute
• Rear Admiral Morteza Safari
• Reza-Gholi Esmaeli
• Sabalan Company
• SAD Import Export Company
• Safety Equipment Procurement (SEP)
• Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO)
• Sahel Consultant Engineers
• Sanam Industrial Group
• Sepanir
• Sepasad Engineering Company
• Seyed Jaber Safdari
• Seyyed Hussein Hosseini
• Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG)
• Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG)
• Shahid Karrazi Industries
• Shahid Satarri Industries
• Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries
• Sho’a’ Aviation
• South Shipping Line Iran (SSL)
• Special Industries Group
• TAMAS Company
• Tiz Pars
• Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian
• Ya Mahdi Industries Group
• Yas Air
• Yazd Metallurgy Industries

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 1 October 2025.

Statement from the G7 Foreign Ministers and the High Representative of the EU on support for the E3 activation of the snapback sanctions and other restrictions against Iran.

“We, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union, stand united in our support for the E3 activation of the snapback reimposing United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and other restrictions against Iran. This action is the result of the Iranian Government’s continued failure to meet its requirements under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

“We welcome the re-instatement since 20:00 EDT (00:00 GMT) on 27 September 2025 of previously lifted Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010).

“In accordance with our obligations as UN members, we are now proceeding with the swift reintroduction of restrictions reapplied by these UNSC resolutions. We urge all UN member states to fully implement and comply with these sanctions and other restrictions.

“The E3 and the United States have repeatedly offered diplomatic avenues in good faith to Iran to avoid the snapback and reach a durable and comprehensive negotiated resolution. Diplomacy remains essential now that the UNSC process has led to the reimposition of sanctions. We call on Iran to refrain from any escalatory action, immediately engage in direct talks with the United States and make demonstrable progress towards fully meeting its nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

“Iran must fully cooperate with the IAEA without any further delay and fully implement its obligations under its NPT-required Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. This includes allowing for IAEA inspections to resume in all its nuclear facilities and accounting for all of the nuclear material it holds, in particular its stockpile of highly enriched uranium for which no credible civilian justification exists. We will continue to work with all parties towards a diplomatic solution to ensure Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon.”

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 1 October 2025.

UK Counsellor, Ankur Narayan, repeats questions to Russia, which the UK has asked over the last two weeks, about Russia’s recent violations of NATO airspace.

Madam Chair, in addition to holding each other to account against OSCE principles, this Forum is also mandated to discuss risk reduction.

Last week, the Russian delegation asked what measures its ‘opponents’ are ready to take to stop the escalation of potential military incidents into a high-stakes conflict.

Firstly, we assume the question was directed at NATO, given the wider context of their question. We repeat that NATO is a defensive alliance. Its purpose is to protect. We do not see Russia as an ‘opponent’.

We do, however, agree on the need to prevent unintended escalation. That is why, since the Opening Session of the FSC, the UK has been asking Russia to clarify responsibility for the airspace violations observed in Poland on 9 September. We have not received direct answers to our questions. The Russian delegation has said that the Russian military has no plans to attack Poland but did not deny that Russian drones launched from Russia had flown into NATO airspace. Or what Russia would do to prevent recurrence. So, in the spirit of our Forum’s mandate on risk reduction, we ask our three questions again:

Firstly, if the incursions are unintentional, what steps is Russia taking to prevent recurrence? 

Secondly, if they were deliberate, what is Russia’s intent? 

Thirdly, will Russia commit to preventing future incursions including assuring NATO members that such violations will cease?

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 1 October 2025.

UK Counsellor, Ankur Narayan, cites the latest OSCE Moscow Mechanism Report on evidence that Russia’s treatment of Prisoners of War are a widespread and systematic violation of international law.

Thank you, Madam Chair.  I echo the condemnation by our colleagues on Russia’s escalating airstrikes in Ukraine.

Last week, the Moscow Mechanism reported its latest findings on the treatment of Ukrainian Prisoners of War, by Russia. In addition to previous findings by the Mechanism, ODIHR and the UN, this latest report is also categorical. I quote: “the Russian Federation has engaged in widespread and systematic violations of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in its treatment of Ukrainian Prisoners of War”. These violations include how Russia systematically denies Ukrainian soldiers and foreign members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces status as Prisoners of War. The report also evidences “arbitrary killings, torture, ill-treatment, denial of fair trial rights, and unsafe detention and transfer conditions”.

The OSCE’s Code of Conduct compels States to ensure that their armed and security forces abide by international law. It makes clear that breaches of international law, including international humanitarian law, are a “direct and legitimate” concern for us all. That is why the UK calls for Russia to halt these violations, to recognise and protect Prisoner of War status, to end torture and executions and to allow unfettered international monitoring.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 1 October 2025.

The Federal Government of Somalia, the African Union Commission, the United Nations, and the United Kingdom have issued a summary following the High-Level Financing Event for The African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which took place on 25 September 2025.

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the African Union Commission (AUC), the United Nations (UN), and the United Kingdom (UK), jointly convened a High-Level Financing Event for the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 25 September 2025.

The meeting reaffirmed the shared commitment to Somalia’s security transition and to the principle of Somali ownership. Participants recognized the vital role of AUSSOM in supporting Somali Security Forces in combatting Al-Shabaab, protecting population centres, securing main supply routes, and sustaining stabilisation efforts.

Participants expressed their deep appreciation to the African Union Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs) for their invaluable sacrifices and commitment. They paid tribute to the bravery of their forces and honoured those who made the ultimate sacrifice in pursuit of peace and stability in Somalia. They further underscored the important role played by the European Union in its financial contributions over the years to the African Union, and the TCCs/PCCs in their efforts to support stabilisation in Somalia.

This High-Level Event built on the Somalia Security Conference of December 2023, which endorsed the Somali Security Development Plan (SSDP) as the guiding framework for Somalia’s security trajectory. The FGS and AU reiterated the need to resource the SSDP and to ensure continued alignment with the AUSSOM Strategic Concept of Operations.

The meeting acknowledged Somalia’s significant progress in recent years under the leadership of His Excellency President Dr. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, including:

• Security: Somali Security Forces efforts in maintaining the momentum in its fight against Al-Shabaab with the support of African Union troops, recovery of strategic territory, and securing of vital infrastructure and supply routes;
• Governance and accountability: reforms in public financial management, payroll systems, and transparency measures;
• Stabilisation and reconciliation: delivery of quick-impact projects, local reconciliation initiatives, and restoration of governance in newly recovered areas;
• Regional leadership: enhanced cooperation with neighbours and regional organisations, positioning Somalia as a constructive partner in peace and integration.

Despite the progress achieved, participants noted the serious risks to Somalia’s security transition if predictable and sufficient financing is not secured. Without predictable and urgent support:

• Gains made against Al-Shabaab could be reversed;
• Main Supply routes and newly recovered areas remain vulnerable;
• Stabilisation and governance delivery are at risk of stalling.

Participants stressed that AUSSOM’s sustainability depends on closing the current financing gap, which remains substantial.

Participants frequently called for traditional and new donors to secure adequate, predictable, sustainable and flexible funding for AUSSOM, to support implementation of the mission’s full mandate throughout the remainder of the transition period. They further welcomed pledges towards the mission’s costs.

The African Union announced a financial pledge of USD 20 million in support of AUSSOM’s 2025 operations. In addition, the AU committed to provide personnel and logistical enablers to strengthen operational effectiveness, while reaffirming its political solidarity and leadership role in Somalia’s stabilisation.

The United Kingdom announced a financial pledge of GBP 16.5 million in support of AUSSOM’s 2025 operations, reaffirming its longstanding partnership with Somalia and commitment to burden-sharing.

Other participants announced current and forthcoming pledges, including the Republic of Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Kingdom of Spain. The European Union looked forward to announcing specific support to the military component of AUSSOM in the near future.

Looking ahead, participants discussed the need to maintain momentum and to further consolidate financing and political support for AUSSOM and Somalia. The co-chairs welcomed proposals for future initiatives, to continue working towards broadening the donor base and securing multiyear financing for AUSSOM and outlining a longer-term partnership architecture for Somalia’s security and stabilisation.

The Federal Government of Somalia emphasized that the success of AUSSOM is not only a Somali imperative but also central to regional and global security. The co-chairs reaffirmed their determination to ensure accountability, transparency, and the effective use of resources entrusted to the mission, while working with partners to design mechanisms that guarantee long-term sustainability and Somali ownership.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 1 October 2025.

Statement following the meeting of the G7+ Special Representatives for Afghanistan on 29-30 September 2025.

Special Representatives for Afghanistan and representatives from Australia, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Norway, Switzerland, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States met in London on 29-30 September 2025. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Political) and current Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Georgette Gagnon, also briefed the group. The UK, as the current Chair of the group, presents the following summary:

1. Participants noted relevant UNSC resolutions on Afghanistan and reaffirmed their commitment to supporting the people of Afghanistan amidst ongoing humanitarian, economic, and political challenges, emphasising the importance of coordinated international engagement and, for those who contribute aid, to ensure it reaches the most vulnerable Afghans.
2. The group expressed concern over the persistent terrorist threat and cross-border migration security challenges emanating from Afghanistan. They acknowledged the important role regional actors were playing on this matter and discussed what more could be done to cooperate on counterterrorism issues, and safeguard all from terrorism originating from Afghan soil.
3. All expressed their deep concern about the Taliban’s continued denial of the most basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Afghan population, especially Afghan women and girls, such as limiting their access to education, employment, healthcare and public life, as well as the recent restriction on female Afghan staff accessing UN compounds. They reiterated the need for the Taliban to comply with their international obligations. 
4. The group also expressed alarm regarding the Taliban’s shutdown of internet services and the detrimental impact this will have on Afghans’ access to the outside world, the delivery of vital aid, and wider Afghan economy. They called for the full restoration of internet access for all Afghans.
5. The humanitarian crisis, including September’s devastating earthquake, the impact of large-scale deportations of Afghans from neighbouring countries, and the urgent need to pre-position resources ahead of winter, was discussed. The important role of International Financial Institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, in sustaining basic services across Afghanistan was also noted.
6. Recalling the most recent update to the UN Security Council on 17 September, participants reviewed the UN-led process known as the ‘Comprehensive Approach’. The group discussed the need for effective coordination within the UN system and expressed hope that the Secretary-General and the new SRSG, once appointed, will pay full attention to advancing these efforts in a unified UN approach on Afghanistan.
7. The group underlined the importance of this being an inclusive Afghan process, as ultimately political pluralism and inclusive governance are required for Afghanistan to truly succeed. Lastly, they stressed the need for the Taliban to demonstrate more willingness to engage constructively and in good faith with the international community.