Tag: 2024

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 22 August 2024.

Ed Miliband worked on strengthening the UK’s bonds with Brazil on climate focused agenda ahead of Brazil’s presidency of G20 this year and COP30 in 2025.

Climate leadership is essential if we are to protect both the UK and global citizens from the climate crisis, the Energy Secretary highlighted during his first international visit to Brazil – a key ally in driving forward the global clean energy transition.

Ahead of taking personal control of the UK’s climate negotiations later this year, Miliband has met key figures from the Brazilian Government to position the UK as a trusted partner to help deliver an ambitious G20 Presidency and COP30.

On his first day in the country (Sunday 18 August), he saw how the Amazon Fund is supporting the Quilombola in Abaetetuba. In 2023, the UK committed to providing £115 million to the Fund, which as part of its work helps develop economic alternatives and sustainable production practices for small farms and indigenous peoples, who are the best stewards of the forests.

On Monday 19 August, he visited Pecem Port – a huge industrial complex which has recently received $35 million to scale up its green hydrogen production via UK-backed Climate Investment Funds.

The Energy Secretary also set out his ambitions to tackle the climate and nature crisis in a series of bilateral meetings and engagements with his Government counterparts and the finance and energy industries in the capital, Brasilia, 20-21 August – with industrial decarbonisation continuing to be a key theme of his visit.

Following their meeting in London last month, he first held talks with National Secretary of Climate Change, Ana Toni. He also met with the Secretary for Climate, Energy and the Environment at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, André Corrêa do Lago and Minister for the Cabinet Office, Rui Costa.

On his final day in Brazil, he met Climate Minister Silva and Minister of Mines and Energy, Alexandre Silveira. During his visit he spoke to major businesses too – holding a renewables-focused roundtable with major energy companies, including Shell Brazil, BP, Rolls Royce, Subsea 7, ERM, and the British Chamber of Commerce to discuss the economic opportunities the clean energy transition presents.

There was a separate roundtable focused on mobilising finance for the clean energy transition – which was attended by the Brazilian Ministry of Finance and the Brazilian Development Bank. This follows the recently-signed MOU between the UK and the Brazilian Development Bank that supports cooperation between the two countries on this important issue.

Energy Secretary Ed Miliband said:

“The UK Government has a duty to protect current and future generations in the UK and around the world from the devastating effects of the climate crisis.

“In my first international visit to Brazil, I have been loud and clear that the UK stands ready to work with our Brazilian partners to keep 1.5C alive in this critical decade.

“From hosting this year’s G20 Presidency to next year’s COP30, Brazil is in a unique position to drive climate action on the world stage. As home to the largest rainforest on Earth, the potential to deliver real change here is huge. From speaking to business and energy leaders and fellow Ministers, we have discussed how we can tackle this shared challenge together and encourage others to match our clean energy ambitions.”

Ends

Notes to Editors:

• Since co-founding in 2008 alongside the US, Japan and the World bank, the UK has been one of the largest donors to the Climate Investment Funds having contributed £2.7bn to date.
• The CIFs are a leading part of the international climate finance architecture, working exclusively through Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to leverage wider public and private financing to deliver climate investments at scale in developing countries.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 22 August 2024.

This statement outlined the UK’s approach to the Strengthening the Review Process work strand, especially regarding transparency.

Thank you, Chair,

Allow me to start by putting on record the United Kingdom’s appreciation for your efforts as Chair of the 2023 Working Group on further strengthening the NPT review process. The UK was prepared to join consensus on the Chair’s recommendations in Vienna last year. We very much regret that a small handful of States blocked that consensus, and that one State blocked the subsequent proposal on interactive consideration of national reports. We stand ready to continue to engage on the basis of the Chair’s recommendations and encourage continued consultations between here and the 3rd Preparatory Committee in New York.

Mr Chair,

The UK urges States Parties to support steps to strengthen the NPT and the review process. This is an important part of ensuring the NPT is successful for the next 50 years. From effectiveness and efficiency, through transparency and accountability, to practical steps around the nominations and role of Chairs and working groups, there are several steps we can collectively take to strengthen our ability to realise the objectives of the NPT.

While Strengthening the Review Process is not limited to transparency – the last few days have illustrated once again the need for a pack of measures aimed at strengthening the review process – I will nonetheless focus my comments on this, and the related question of accountability.

Mr Chair,

In my statement under Cluster One, I noted that the United Kingdom strives for the greatest level of transparency in our nuclear doctrines, policies and capabilities consistent with our national security and non-proliferation responsibilities. Transparency in the context of nuclear disarmament has two aims: first, to increase mutual confidence among the Nuclear Weapon States and enable practical disarmament steps; and second, to provide accountability as to the implementation of Treaty obligations and other commitments and undertakings.

It is crucial for Nuclear Weapon States to be as transparent as possible about their nuclear capabilities, doctrines and policies. Transparency plays an important role in building confidence. Transparency and dialogue are necessary to prevent or reduce risks of miscalculation and misperception, and thus strengthen stability and reduce risk of unintended nuclear use. As we made clear in our national statement in the General Debate, we remain committed to the P5 nuclear process.

The UK regrets that some Nuclear Weapons States do not publish details of their overall warhead stockpiles or on the delivery systems they deploy. In not doing so, these states are undermining trust and confidence in the NPT process, particularly when states are expanding their capabilities rapidly, at scale and across multiple delivery systems.

Mr Chair,

This brings me to the question of accountability. States must be held accountable for the implementation of the obligations under Treaties they have signed up to and other commitments they have entered into.

One of the primary means of accountability for the UK is its National Implementation Reports. In preparing our report for the last NPT RevCon, the UK conducted an extensive consultation exercise involving the other nuclear-weapon States, nonnuclear weapon States and civil society. The report is a comprehensive statement of the UK’s national measures on disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Mr Chair,

The UK will continue to prioritise the question of improving transparency and accountability in the current NPT review cycle. While Action 20 of the 2010 Action Plan asks all States Parties to submit national implementation reports, it is right, building on Actions 5 and 21, that the Nuclear Weapon States should take steps to improve the quality and consistency of reporting on our specific nuclear disarmament commitments.

We continue to support the idea of allocating dedicated time in the formal proceedings of the review cycle for the interactive consideration of the reports of States Parties.

As in past review cycles, the UK intends to submit its draft National Implementation Report at the third session of the Preparatory Committee in New York next year, using the common reporting framework agreed upon by the Nuclear Weapon States in 2013. We would once again welcome discussion and feedback from other States Parties and from civil society in order to ensure the final report to the Review Conference in 2026 is as useful as possible to its readers.

Thank you.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 22 August 2024.

This statement outlined the UK’s support for the expansion of safe access to nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, including through UK projects.

Thank you, Chair,

The NPT plays a vital role in facilitating access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, in a safe, secure and safeguarded manner. These technologies contribute to addressing some of the biggest challenges facing the world, including delivering the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), tackling the climate crisis and achieving net zero. Sharing and expanding access to peaceful nuclear technologies has never been more important.

Chair,

Public confidence in the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies is an essential component in their deployment. The actions of one State Party are undermining this confidence. The UK remains gravely concerned about the implications for safety, security and safeguards of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, and Russia’s continued presence at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. In his most recent report on Ukraine, the IAEA Director General noted that all of his ‘seven pillars of nuclear safety and security’ had been completely or partially compromised. Russia must immediately withdraw its forces and grant Ukrainian authorities and IAEA inspectors unfettered access to all areas of ZNPP.

As States Party to the NPT, we all have an important part to play in maintaining trust in nuclear technologies – not just for energy purposes, but for health, agriculture and climate applications. To do so, we must continually demonstrate our commitment to safety standards, security guidelines, and the robust application of safeguards. The UK fully supports the independent and impartial role of the IAEA in developing these standards and guidelines, and in verifying States compliance with their commitments under the NPT.

Chair,

The United Kingdom is committed to removing barriers to access to nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. This is a priority for us in our work with the IAEA and under the UK and US led Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses (SDPU).

We are a longstanding supporter of the IAEA’s work including its programme to support research, development and transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies to its Member States through the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme and Peaceful Uses Initiative. We have contributed more than £5 million to the IAEA for this programme this year alone. We have provided funding for projects to monitor changes in atmospheric processes as evidence of climate change, for research to assess the impacts of climate change on food security, and for projects to address marine plastic pollution.

Chair,

The UK is proud to champion the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses, as part of a group of States Parties who are raising the profile of nuclear technologies in addressing development challenges. Now in its second year, the Sustained Dialogue promotes international cooperation and aims to widen participation, ensuring and expanding the accessibility of peaceful uses of nuclear technology for development purposes. The programme brings a wide range of stakeholders together, including policy makers, the development community, scientific experts, the private sector, and of course the IAEA.

In its first 2 years, the SDPU has focused on promoting peaceful uses of nuclear science, paving the way for these technologies to:

• advance water security in the Middle East and North Africa
• improve outcomes for cancer patients in West Africa and
• tackle food insecurity and malnutrition in Latin America and the Caribbean, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

To build on this foundation, participants are developing additional activities across these continents to continue raising awareness, improving understanding and increasing uptake of the part nuclear technologies can play in responding to development needs of participating nations.

To demonstrate further this work at this PrepCom, the UK and US, alongside SDPU facilitator CRDF Global hosted a side event on the Sustained Dialogue on 25th July. The panel included national representatives, recent workshop participants and the IAEA. It discussed activities to date as well as sharing perspectives on improving peaceful nuclear technology use and empowering participants to contribute to future SDPU activities.

Chair,

As a practical means to support and champion the benefits of Pillar III we invite interested States Parties to support the SDPU to improve and expand peaceful uses assistance.

Thank you, Chair.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 22 August 2024.

This statement emphasised the UK’s support for comprehensive nuclear safeguards and other non-proliferation measures under the NPT, including via the IAEA.

Mr Chair,

For over half a century, the NPT has kept us safe. It has enabled the growth of a secure international civil nuclear sector while restricting the number of States possessing nuclear weapons to single figures. This is to be rightly celebrated, and we must recognise what has enabled that success, alongside looking to what should be done to ensure its work continues.

The NPT is underpinned by the tireless efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The UK remains one of the IAEA’s largest extra-budgetary contributors in support of its work on safeguards. This support has helped train IAEA inspectors, provided samples analysis to the IAEA, and supported open-source information collection. The UK will remain steadfast in our support for the Agency and will champion its independence and impartiality given its importance to international security.

In pursuing its mission, the IAEA provides expertise and confidence to its membership. The value of this is seen clearly in its verification of robust international safeguards. We encourage all states to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol, together with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, as the universal verification standard under the NPT.

The UK supports the IAEA’s work on nuclear security. The high engagement with and participation at ICONS this year demonstrated strong global support for nuclear security. We encourage all remaining states to become party to nuclear security instruments. It was disappointing to most of us that the ICONS Ministerial Declaration was in the end not adopted and blocked by just one state. That must not distract from the vital work that is being carried out, and we fully support the co-Presidents’ statement.

We also underline the importance of the IAEA’s role in protecting nuclear security in Ukraine, where Russia’s illegal invasion and continued presence at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant threatens nuclear safety, security and safeguards.

Mr Chair,

The UK is also working to ensure developments in technology and new partnerships uphold and strengthen safeguards. We are working closely with our US and Australian partners so that Australia’s development of a nuclear-powered submarine capability sets the highest non-proliferation standard. AUKUS partners will host a side event in Geneva on 26 July to discuss our non-proliferation objectives in developing a naval nuclear propulsion programme.

Mr Chair,

While the vast majority of NPT States Parties fully comply with their safeguards obligations and uphold the integrity of the NPT, there remain serious problems that should be of concern to us all.

Iran’s nuclear programme is more advanced than ever and poses a clear threat to regional and global security. Iran’s persistent lack of cooperation with the IAEA on its legally binding safeguards obligations undermines the safeguards system and the IAEA’s authority. The UK continues to hold Iran to account. At the June IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the Board adopted a resolution condemning Iran’s failure to cooperate and reiterated its support to the IAEA’s efforts to resolve the long outstanding safeguards issues. We call on Iran to fulfil its legal obligations and clarify and resolve all outstanding issues.

The DPRK’s illegal nuclear and ballistic missile programmes remain a serious threat to international security, including the threat of a seventh nuclear test. We call on the DPRK to abandon their nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, to return to their NPT obligations and IAEA safeguards oversight and to renew dialogue.

Mr Chair,

There are other tools that we must deploy to ensure Non-Proliferation standards are upheld. Export controls is one such tool, that facilitates the responsible exchange of civilian nuclear technology. They give states the confidence to transfer nuclear technology which supports economic growth and contributes to sustainable development while minimising proliferation risks. The UK continues to engage with the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee and urges all States to adhere to NSG’s Guidelines.

The UK also supports Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and the contribution they can make to enhance regional and international security. The UK has signed and ratified the Protocols to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk providing legally binding negative security assurances to more than 100 countries. We stand ready to do sign and ratify the Treaty of Bangkok. The UK remains committed to a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East, based on arrangements freely arrived at by all countries in the region.

Mr Chair,

Non-proliferation and the protection that the NPT provides is in all our security interest. Over the coming review cycle the UK stands ready to work with all States Parties to reinforce the global non-proliferation system and through its application, expand access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 22 August 2024.

This statement reiterated the UK’s commitment to transparent, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament, with undiminished security for all.

Chair,

The United Kingdom remains committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable, and irreversible manner and with undiminished security for all. We firmly believe the best way to achieve this goal is through gradual multilateral disarmament negotiated through the NPT. The only viable, effective framework for achieving the complex technical requirements for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The global security environment remains extremely challenging – we are working on disarmament in a more contested and volatile world. There is greater need than ever for all states to recognise these challenges, and to work together to create the environment in which we can make disarmament a reality.

As a nuclear weapon state, the UK takes its responsibilities seriously. We remain committed to working with others – including those who may threaten our interests and security – to build stability, transparency, and better mutual understanding, and to identify and implement effective measures which will ultimately shape the conditions for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

Chair,

The UK remains proud of our contributions to the reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons. We are the only nuclear-weapon state to reduce our deterrent capability to a single delivery system. We continue to be transparent on maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of our deterrent through our statements to Parliament, the public and in international fora.

Progress on disarmament is reflected not just through reduction in weapon numbers but also by building confidence in the disarmament process. Building collective trust and creating a suitable security environment is necessary if we want to achieve our ultimate goal.

Chair,

Notwithstanding the challenges, there are opportunities to make progress towards disarmament, through focusing our efforts on verification, irreversibility, and transparency, and building on the working papers the UK submitted, on our own and with partners, at the 2022 Review Conference. These areas remain the fundamental building blocks toward a trusted, verifiable process of disarmament.

On verification, the UK will continue our domestic research programme and international work including the QUAD Nuclear Verification Partnership with Norway, Sweden and the US and with the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. This week, the UK will co-host a Nuclear Verification side event under the QUAD partnership giving an overview of our work, for both technical experts and policy makers alike.

We will continue our efforts on irreversibility. With Norway, we are facilitating an enhanced dialogue among States parties to build a common understanding of the conditions that would make nuclear re-armament as difficult and unlikely as possible. We will be hosting a side event later this week and aim to broaden this work with a wider range of States.

The UK will continue to focus on transparency as a priority. We publish the UK’s overall warhead stockpile limit. We issue regular updates on maintaining the safety, security and effectiveness of our deterrent through our statements to Parliament, the public and in international fora. We will continue to pursue strategic dialogues to develop greater trust, confidence, and transparency between states in relation to nuclear weapons. The UK recently published the Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper, which sets out, for the first time, a full account of what it takes to deliver the UK’s nuclear deterrent. We are ready to explore integrating discussion of National Reports within the NPT cycle and we look forward to sharing a draft of our National Report ahead of the next PrepCom in 2025.

Chair,

We reiterate our long-standing positions calling for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and we urge all States that have not already done so to sign and ratify the Treaty, and particularly those listed in Annex 2. We also call for the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on an international and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

Chair,

Let me conclude by assuring you, once again, of the UK’s continued commitment to progress on this issue throughout this Review Cycle.

Thank you.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 22 August 2024.

This statement outlines the UK’s ongoing support for the Non Proliferation Treaty across the 3 pillars of disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses.

Thank you Chair,

I would first like to congratulate you on your election, and to extend the thanks of the United Kingdom’s delegation to you and to the secretariat for your efforts to deliver a constructive and productive PrepCom.

This PrepCom marks the half-way point on the road to the 2026 Review Conference. It is an important opportunity to reflect on the core principles that should guide our work. The rule of law is the cornerstone of any just and prosperous society, and in an increasingly connected world the importance of international rules, multilateral institutions and political leadership cannot be overstated.

For more than half a century, the NPT has been a vital pillar of the international peace and security architecture, and the rules based international order, in which nations can thrive. The NPT provides the only credible and sustainable route to multilateral nuclear disarmament. It has created the non-proliferation framework that has both limited the spread of nuclear weapons and enabled safe access to nuclear technologies for peaceful uses. As a Government that believes in the rule of law at home and internationally, the United Kingdom remains as committed to its full implementation and universalisation as we did when the Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, signed it in 1968.

Chair,

This PrepCom takes place in an ever more unstable and dangerous world. Global arms control is under huge strain. Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, and reckless endangering of nuclear power plants are not the behaviours of a responsible nuclear weapons state. Iran and the DPRK continue to undermine the non-proliferation architecture and threaten international security. A lack of transparency from other states, including China, on the nature and extent of their nuclear programmes also fuels international concern.

It is against this backdrop that now, more than ever, the first duty of any responsible government must be to keep their nation safe. My Prime Minister has made clear that for as long as others have nuclear weapons, the UK will maintain a nuclear deterrent. Our posture of minimum credible nuclear deterrence, assigned to the defence of NATO, is a vital safeguard for the UK, our Allies, and for maintaining global peace and security.

By the same token, it is at the moments of the greatest geopolitical tension that efforts to reduce nuclear risk and miscalculation are most important. The UK is taking practical steps to reduce the risk of nuclear war and prepare for a future where meaningful progress towards a world without nuclear weapons is possible. We remain committed to the P5 nuclear process, which was first proposed by the UK Defence Secretary, Desmond Browne, in 2008. We will deepen our conversations with non-nuclear weapons states, including in the Global South, and with civil society; and continue to develop practical initiatives on irreversibility, verification, transparency, and accountability. Building a more secure environment is a collective responsibility.

Chair,

The NPT also enables the safe and secure exchange of transformative nuclear technologies for peaceful uses. Alongside addressing energy challenges, it can make a significant contribution to the UN Sustainable Development Goals by supporting a range of applications of nuclear technology in areas such as climate change, agriculture, and health, that can help to protect our planet and improve lives across the world.

The UK is pleased to champion the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses, which aims to expand access to the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology, breaking down barriers to equal access, to allow all states the opportunity to realise the benefit of nuclear technology.

Robust non-proliferation, safety, and security standards enable full access to those peaceful uses. The UK strongly supports the IAEA’s independence and safeguards mandate. The IAEA plays a critical role in verifying that nuclear material remains in peaceful uses, as well as promoting global nuclear safety and security. It is essential that all States Parties bring into force full safeguards measures, including the Additional Protocol as well as export controls, as key enablers of peaceful nuclear trade.

As new technologies emerge, such as new reactor designs and novel fuel types, we need to ensure that safeguards, safety and security are implemented at the design phase.

Chair,

This approach embodies the Foreign Secretary’s commitment to progressive realism as the foundation of our foreign policy. We are both realistic about the conditions we find ourselves in, yet progressive in our commitment to the ultimate goal of peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons.

We all have our part to play. The UK stands ready to play its part, and calls on all states to work together, in good faith, to lay the foundations for a successful Review Conference in 2026.

Thank you.