Tag: 2024

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 12 September 2024.

UK Ambassador to the IAEA Corinne Kitsell’s statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors meeting on Ukraine.

Chair,

The United Kingdom thanks the Director General both for his comprehensive report on Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine and for the recent report entitled: ‘Two years of IAEA continued presence at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant’. We are, as ever, grateful to the IAEA personnel working to help maintain nuclear safety, security and safeguards across Ukraine under the most challenging of circumstances. We also value the IAEA as the only reliable, impartial provider of information to the International Community on what is actually happening at ZNPP.

Chair

As the DG has said, the situation at ZNPP continues to be precarious. The report before us today identifies a numerous specific concerns, all consequences of Russia’s seizure, occupation and militarisation of a previously well run Ukrainian nuclear power plant. I would like to highlight three areas of particular concern:

First – that two years on, the ISAMZ mission cannot secure the access it requires to fully assess whether the DG’s 5 Concrete Principles for Protecting the ZNPP are being observed at all times. Russian armed troops have blocked access to the western parts of the turbine halls. What are they hiding? The ISAMZ team has also been prevented from accessing the cooling pond isolation gate and the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP) switchyard. At the same time, this report confirms the presence onsite of armed troops and military equipment including armoured personnel carriers and weapons mounted armed vehicles;

Second – that, two years on, the IAEA continues to identify major shortcomings in existing emergency arrangements, specifically the ability to ensure an effective response in the event of any emergency that warrants implementation of public protective actions off site. To be clear this is about protecting people and the environment in the event of an emergency.

Third – Water and Power – that the IAEA report describes the diminishing availability of water at ZNPP and the vulnerable state of the off-site power supply to the Plant. Two years on, ZNPP continues to rely on only two off-site powerlines. Only last week one of those lines (the 330 kilovolt back up line) was disconnected for nearly three days.

Chair

Across Ukraine’s NPPs, reliability of power supply remains concerning. On 26 August one reactor at Rivne NPP and one at South Ukraine NPP went into automatic shutdown, with reductions in operating power reported in the remaining reactor units at those plants, as a result of electrical grid fluctuations. On 26 August, Ukraine was enduring a massive Russian missile and drone attack, which targeted critical energy infrastructure. We welcome the DG’s 3rd September update emphasising the importance of protecting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure to ensure it does not impact nuclear safety and announcing planned IAEA assessments of damaged Ukrainian substations.

Despite these extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants remaining under Ukrainian control, continue to operate safely and effectively, carrying out scheduled maintenance, with reliable supply chains, and conducting large scale emergency exercises. We are aware of the toll this takes on the operating staff, hence our support for trauma risk management workshops in July aimed at equipping NPP managers, supervisors and psychologists with the skills to spot signs of distress and provide support.

Chair,

Mindful of the time, I apologise for adding a couple of additional points to the statement that I had planned to make but I must address some of the Russian propaganda that we have heard this evening:

First, drone attacks. The UK has made clear, including at the UN Security Council, our support for the DG’s 5 Principles for protecting the ZNPP – principles that have been necessary because of Russia’s seizure and occupation of a Ukrainian nuclear power plant. We do not condone any drone attacks at, towards, or from ZNPP.  In relation to alleged drone attacks – reports coming from Russian personnel exercising control over the Plant – we appreciate, and rely on, the fact based, impartial reporting of the IAEA  - our only source of reliable information.

Second, this Board must be clear that the situation at Kursk NPP and ZNPP are not comparable. Unlike Russia we have not witnessed Ukraine intentionally seize and endanger a NPP on another country’s sovereign territory. And we all heard our distinguished Ukrainian colleague make a clear statement to the Board this week that Ukraine has no intention of targeting a NPP.

With that, I take note of report GOV/2024/45 and ask that it be made public.

Thank you, Chair.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 11 September 2024.

France, Germany, the UK and United States (the Quad) gave a joint statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about Iran’s implementation of its obligations under its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement.

Chair,

France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States thank Director General Grossi for his report on the implementation of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement.

We commend the DG and the Secretariat for their continued professional, independent and impartial efforts to verify Iran’s implementation of its safeguards obligations, including the Agency’s repeated efforts to engage Iran to clarify information regarding the “correctness and completeness” of its declarations under its NPT-related Safeguards Agreement. Unfortunately, due to Iran’s failure over several years to address the outstanding issues, the Agency continues to report that it is unable to assure that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

Chair,

Yet again we have in front of us a report from the Director General that demonstrates there has been no progress. Iran has not provided technically credible explanations in response to the IAEA’s questions regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at Turquzabad and Varamin. Iran’s continued stonewalling runs contrary to its legal obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement and the commitments it made to cooperate with the Agency under the Joint Statement of March 2023.

We also find ourselves once more discussing Iran’s continued refusal to apply modified Code 3.1 as part of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. This is a legal obligation that Iran cannot unilaterally suspend or modify. As the Director General reminds us, report after report, Iran is the only State with significant nuclear activities that is not implementing modified Code 3.1. This refusal prevents the Agency from obtaining early design information for new nuclear facilities necessary to prepare its safeguards approach. This should not be taken lightly. Given Iran’s history of undeclared nuclear facilities, past and current unresolved questions, and several public statements made by current and former Iranian officials concerning Iran’s technical capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, Iran’s actions further fuel serious doubts over whether Iran’s nuclear activities remain exclusively peaceful.

Chair,

The report also highlights a number of other concerning issues, including the Agency’s determination that the amount of uranium contained in the solid waste sent from Jaber Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratory (JHL) to the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) for dissolution was less than had been declared by Iran in 2003-2004. We also note with concern that in August 2024, the Agency informed Iran that, with respect to uranium metal experiments conducted at JHL from 1995-2000, the amount of nuclear material the Agency found to be unaccounted for was greater than the amount the Agency had previously communicated. We commend the Agency for their diligent efforts so far and support the Agency continuing to investigate the discrepancy. In this regard, we urge Iran to fully co-operate with the Agency to clarify this matter.

We condemn the fact that Iran has confirmed it will not reverse its decision to de-designate several of the IAEA’s most experienced inspectors, despite repeated requests by the DG and the international community since last September. As the DG previously reported, Iran’s decision effectively made the Agency’s independent technical work subject to political interpretation, and seriously affects the Agency’s ability to effectively conduct its verification activities in Iran. Iran’s unjustified decision clearly runs counter to the positive engagement with the Agency that Iran claims to want. We hope that Iran will reverse this decision in line with the spirit of collaboration agreed to in the March 2023 Joint Statement.

Let us make clear once again: Iran must implement its safeguards obligations in full and without further delay. As long as such cases of concern exist, there remains reasonable doubt about the nature of Iran’s nuclear activities. The longstanding nature of these cases is also at risk of harming the broader global non-proliferation architecture, and risks setting dangerous precedents regarding the fulfilment of safeguards obligations.

Chair,

The E3 and the United States commend the DG’s long-standing efforts to remain open to constructive engagement with Iran. Yet instead of seizing opportunities to engage constructively to resolve all outstanding questions, Iran has failed to offer any immediate concrete actions.

For five years now, the Board of Governors has been asking Iran to engage in good faith to resolve the safeguards investigations. Indeed, the Board has passed four resolutions on this matter since 2020, most recently in June 2024.

We would like to recall specifically that in June the Board reaffirmed its decision in its November 2022 resolution that it is essential and urgent that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and reiterated its call on Iran to:

1. Provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin in two undeclared locations in Iran
2. Inform the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of the contaminated equipment,
3. Provide all information, documentation and answers the Agency requires for that purpose,
4. Provide access to locations and material the Agency requires for that purpose, as well as for the taking of samples as deemed appropriate by the Agency.

Since June, we have again seen no progress from Iran or any real indication of a change in its longstanding pattern of delay with which this Board is familiar. Instead, Iran has doubled down on its decision to remove Agency inspectors, has made no progress on the outstanding safeguards issues, has continued to withhold required design information, and has so far ignored requests from the Agency to service cameras all while further expanding uranium enrichment activities that go well beyond any legitimate civil needs.

This Board has shown considerable patience. But that patience has its limits, and we will not stand by while Iran continues to obfuscate. If Iran continues to fail to provide the necessary, full and unambiguous cooperation with the Agency to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues, further action by this Board will be necessary. This could include, in the coming months, a request to the DG to compile a Comprehensive Report. This report would provide a clear and updated assessment of all relevant information, allowing consideration of whether further steps would be needed, including making a finding under Article 19 of Iran’s CSA.

Iran could render this action unnecessary if, as we have long called for, it chooses to urgently, fully and unambiguously co-operate with the Agency. Our efforts aim to resolutely support the Agency to this end – for the sake of the integrity of the international non-proliferation architecture and ultimately, global security. We cannot allow Iran to evade its NPT-related safeguards obligations year after year.

Chair,

We once again thank the DG for his commitment and express our unwavering support to the Agency for its impartial and professional work on this issue. We encourage the DG to continue to report to the Board in a timely manner and ask for the report contained in GOV/2024/44 to be derestricted and made public.

Thank you, Chair

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 12 September 2024.

Ambassador Holland addresses the Opening Session of the 2024 EEF, saying sustainable development and climate adaptation are two casualties of Russia’s war.

Madam Chair,

Unlike last year, we meet today in Prague under the official auspices of the OSCE. It is important that the full range of mandated meetings across the OSCE’s comprehensive concept of security, are allowed to take place.

Last year Russia chose to block the consensus needed to hold this event. Though we welcome our being able to convene like this, some things have not changed. Russia continues its illegal invasion of Ukrainian sovereign territory and Russian troops continue to occupy Ukrainian land.

Sustainable development and climate adaptation – the topics of this year’s forum – are just two casualties of Russia’s war. The effects of Russia’s war have stretched across the global economy. This has cost Ukraine in particular – to the tune of almost half a trillion dollars – but has also cost the aggressor billions of dollars and the rest of the world considerable hardship through disruption to supply chains, inflation and general increases to the cost of living.

As this group well knows, it is not just economic development that has been affected. Last year’s Chatham House report said the war risks putting climate action on the backburner and complicates the multilateral action needed to avert dangerous climate change and to adapt to its impacts.

Russia must be held to account for its actions. The UK is proud to have been able to support the OSCE’s project on assessing the environmental damage of Russia’s war in Ukraine. We encourage all delegates to attend the side event later today on that research.

Madam Chair, at home, the new UK Government unveiled a new 1.5 billion pound budget to help build new green infrastructure as part of the mission to deliver clean power by 2030. The UK will aid economic development by joining the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty’s Board of Champions, contributing our global network of development organisations. And the UK’s new Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act will establish new, faster, more effective tools to address the unique barriers to competition in digital markets.

I would like to thank the Maltese Chairpersonship and the Office of the Co-ordinator of Economic and Environment activities for organising this event, and our Czech colleagues for hosting us. My team and I look forward to the discussions to come.

Thank you.