Tag: 2023

Mr Chairman, let me begin by congratulating you on your election and assuring you of the full cooperation of the United Kingdom delegation as you carry out your important duties.

This PrepCom marks the start of our collective work towards the Eleventh Review Conference. We were all disappointed that one State Party chose to block the adoption of a consensus outcome document at the Tenth Review Conference. Nonetheless, the discussions last year demonstrated the commitment and desire of the overwhelming majority of States Parties to uphold and strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The NPT is a cornerstone of the international peace and security system, underpinned by international law and the fundamental principles of the UN Charter. It is of crucial importance to all states.

As a Nuclear Weapon State that takes its responsibilities seriously, the United Kingdom is fully committed to the full implementation of the NPT, in all its aspects.

The NPT provides the only credible route to nuclear disarmament. It has also created the framework that has limited the spread of nuclear weapons, and it enables safe access to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear technologies.

Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine began over 500 days ago. The implications of Russia’s actions for the NPT – including its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, its reckless endangering of the security of nuclear power plants, and its undermining of the credibility of its negative security assurance – overshadowed the Tenth Review Conference. We cannot ignore Russia’s actions as we begin this new review cycle.

Mr Chairman, this review cycle should focus on the significant global contribution, which the peaceful uses of nuclear technology make to improving people’s lives, including through the attainment of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. We believe more countries can benefit. The UK will prioritise this through our work with the IAEA and the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses initiative.

High non-proliferation, safety, and security standards enable those peaceful uses. The UK strongly supports the IAEA’s independence and safeguards mandate. We call for State Parties to bring into force the full safeguards suite, including the Additional Protocol. We champion export controls as the key enabler of peaceful nuclear trade. And, as new technologies emerge, we will work to ensure that the same levels of international safeguards, security and safety standards apply.

In May, the UK Prime Minister visited Hiroshima. Alongside fellow G7 leaders, he reaffirmed the UK’s commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons, with undiminished security for all. The UK remains committed to our Article VI obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith toward disarmament. We must lay the groundwork for future disarmament while recognising the challenges of the deteriorating security environment. The UK will continue our efforts on practical initiatives, based on the fundamental principles of irreversibility, verification and transparency on which we have all agreed, to help bring the prospect of a world without nuclear weapons closer.

At Hiroshima, the Prime Minister also underscored the importance of the 77-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons and that the UK stands by the joint statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States issued in January 2022, on ‘Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races’. As a responsible Nuclear Weapon State, the UK calls on Russia to recommit – in words and deeds – to the principles enshrined in that statement.

Building on this, the UK will continue its work on strategic risk reduction. We will engage with non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society on this issue, because building a more secure environment is a collective responsibility. It is not a replacement for disarmament, but it is complimentary to the NPT’s overarching goals.

Mr Chairman, as we begin this Eleventh Review Cycle, despite the challenges, we must remain energetic and determined, with a high ambition for what we can achieve together.

Last week, in the Working Group on the further strengthening of the review process, we were encouraged by the range of constructive proposals, including in the key areas of improving transparency, reporting and accountability. As we begin the Preparatory Committee today, the UK is fully committed to working in good faith to strengthen the review process and to uphold and reinforce the integrity of the NPT.

Chair, sharing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology is a success story of the NPT – albeit one that is often overshadowed.

In this review cycle, the United Kingdom is committed to expanding access to the benefits of peaceful uses, enabling more countries to benefit from nuclear technologies – particularly those that contribute to the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Chair, the United Kingdom is a strong supporter of the IAEA’s work researching, developing and transferring peaceful nuclear technologies to its member states. The UK continues to contribute to the IAEA’s technical cooperation (TC) programme and the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI). In the last year we have contributed more than £5 million to projects, including modernising of the IAEA Nuclear Applications laboratories in Seibersdorf; supporting the Marie Sklodowska Curie Fellowship Programme to encourage women into the nuclear sector, addressing marine plastic pollution; and enhancing the impact of climate change on water availability. We are supporting the Agency’s presence at the COP28 pavilion to demonstrate the contribution that nuclear technology can make to addressing global energy and climate needs.

Chair, despite these efforts, many actors, including development agencies, do not realise that nuclear technologies can be part of the solution to development and climate change challenges. To address this, the UK is proud to be part of a group of States Parties who have come together to create the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses, set out in a new working paper that the distinguished US Ambassador spoke about just now.

The facilitator of the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses, CRDF Global, has partnered with the Water Authority of Jordan, the Ministry of Heath of Ghana and is working with stakeholders in the Philippines to create 3 separate workshop series. We welcomed participants at our 2 events in Amman and Accra which demonstrated the value that bringing different stakeholders together can add – participants made new connections with counterparts, learned about the support the IAEA can provide and co-created potential further work that will contribute to addressing regional development challenges.

We are still in the first year of the Sustained Dialogue and we welcome more partners joining the initiative. We look forward to hosting further events later this year, including in Manila.

We are hosting a side event on the Sustained Dialogue tomorrow, 9 August, at 1:15pm in Room M7. A panel including national representatives, recent workshop participants and the IAEA will discuss how peaceful uses can contribute to delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Chair, Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine undermines public confidence in the peaceful use of nuclear technologies. Russia’s barbaric attacks on Ukraine’s civil infrastructure and its unprecedented and illegal control of the Zaporizhzia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is contrary to all international nuclear safety and security norms. We call again on Russia to immediately return control of ZNPP to the competent Ukrainian authorities, and to fully withdraw from Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders.

Chair, the UK respects and agrees with the science behind releasing treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi site and we trust the IAEA’s assessment that there will be a “negligible radiological impact on people and the environment”. We welcome the Japanese Government’s continued transparency and close cooperation with the IAEA on this matter to help prevent the spread of misinformation. Chair, we find ourselves in challenging times. Supporting the use of peaceful nuclear technologies and the benefits they provide has never been so necessary. We want to build momentum for concrete action under this pillar and ask States Parties for their support to the Sustained Dialogue for Peaceful Uses to improve and expand peaceful uses assistance.

Mr Chair, for over 50 years, the NPT has restricted the number of states possessing nuclear weapons to single figures. Its framework of systematic safeguards, implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency, has curtailed the nuclear arms race while best practice standards enable a safe and secure international civil nuclear sector.

However, the threat of nuclear proliferation remains real. The United Kingdom is committed to working with all States Parties to reinforce the system in the face of modern threats.

Mr Chair, the continued independence and impartiality of the IAEA is vital for the international safeguards system. The IAEA has a clear and long-established mandate to verify that states comply with their commitments under the NPT and engage with member states on safeguards implementation.

We continue to work closely with the IAEA to strengthen safeguards. The UK will remain one of the largest IAEA extra-budgetary contributors on safeguards to this end.

A Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement plus an additional protocol is the universal verification standard under the NPT which we want to see universalised during this cycle. Only the additional protocol can provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities within a state.

Nuclear security enables peaceful uses. The UK will therefore encourage all remaining states to become party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its amendment, and support measures which enhance the ability to detect, deter and disrupt illicit tracking of nuclear material. We look forward to the next International Conference on Nuclear Security in 2024, and call on all states to engage with the preparatory process.

Export controls are another enabler of the safe exchange of civilian nuclear technology, supporting economic growth and sustainable development whilst minimising the risks of proliferation. The UK supports the efforts of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. All states should adhere to the NSG’s guidelines when deciding on nuclear and nuclear-related exports.

We are working closely with our US and Australian partners to ensure our approach to delivering a nuclear-powered submarine capability to Australia sets a strong precedent for safeguards and verification in naval nuclear propulsion. We, along with the US and Australia, will host an event on 7 August to discuss naval nuclear propulsion and non-proliferation.

As part of our commitment to the NPT, the UK supports the principle and practice of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, in order to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and enhance regional and international security. We have signed and ratified the Protocols to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Semipalatinsk, and stand ready to do the same for the Treaty of Bangkok. We also remain committed to the goal of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, based on arrangements freely arrived at by all countries of the region.

Mr Chair, while the vast majority of NPT States Parties fully comply with their safeguards obligations and uphold the integrity of the NPT, problems remain.

Iran’s long-standing lack of cooperation with the IAEA on its legally-binding safeguards obligations undermines the safeguards system and authority of the IAEA. Iran’s growing nuclear programme is now more advanced than ever and poses a clear threat to regional and global security.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s illegal nuclear and ballistic missile programmes remain a serious threat to international security, including the threat of a seventh nuclear test. We call on the DPRK to return to their NPT obligations and IAEA safeguards oversight; to renew dialogue and to abandon their nuclear and ballistic missile programmes – completely, verifiably and irreversibly.

The IAEA must be able to conduct, in full, its global safeguards verification activities and do so safely. Russia’s senseless and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and illegal control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is preventing the IAEA from fulfilling this role in Ukraine. Russia should immediately withdraw and return control of the ZNPP to the competent Ukrainian authorities.

We are also deeply concerned that Russia has violated UN Security Council Resolution 2231 by procuring UAVs from Iran, and sought to obtain arms from the DPRK through the Wagner group – in contravention of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). Russia sending a Defence Minister to visit the DPRK’s military parade and exhibit risks signalling support for UN sanctioned nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

Mr Chair, despite the environment, the UK is optimistic that by working together, we can make progress on non-proliferation in this cycle. The UK stands ready to work with other States Parties to reinforce the global non-proliferation system and to expand access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.