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Tag: 1978

  • David Owen – 1978 Statement on Zaire

    Below is the text of the statement made by David Owen, the then Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons on 16 May 1978.

    The Government are making every effort, through the British Embassy in Kinshasa and other Western countries with communities in Shaba province to ensure the safety of the British community in the area of the fighting. The total number of British and Commonwealth citizens in the Shaba province—the area affected—is believed to be 171. We are in close touch with the mining companies, who employ a number of British subjects. The town of Kolwezi, where there are 24 British and Commonwealth citizens, is ​ reported to have been taken by the invading force. We have, so far, had no reports of harm to British subjects. The mining town of Tenke-Fungurume, east of Kolwezi, could be affected. Of the 19 British subjects there, six dependants were flown by their company to Kinshasa yesterday and other dependants are being flown today to Zambia.

    My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I discussed this question in detail with President Kaunda yesterday. The President has assured us that Zambia will give every facility to British subjects evacuated from Shaba province.
    This is a serious and threatening development to the stability of this part of Africa. I will keep the House closely informed and make all possible information available to the relatives of those concerned.

  • Michael Heseltine – 1978 Speech on Windscale

    Michael Heseltine – 1978 Speech on Windscale

    Below is the text of the speech made by Michael Heseltine, the then Conservative MP for Henley, in the House of Commons on 15 May 1978.

    You have asked, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that we be brief. I very much take the point made by the Secretary of State that we have already had a wide-ranging debate at which many hon. Members who are in their places today were present on 22nd March and that many of the issues were ventilated extremely widely and fully on that occasion.

    I understand the case pleaded by the leader of the Liberal Party that we should have more time and take another look at many of the questions that he put forward. But the fact is that there is no decision which has to be taken to which that kind of approach cannot be adopted. One can always argue that there should be more delay. No matter how detailed the investigation, the inquiry or the report which precedes the point at which we are to take the decision, ​ there will always be those who are against the decision that they think we are about to take, who argue that we should have yet further delay or who call in aid some future event which we should await before reaching our decision.

    I think that the House should approve the Windscale special development order. In doing so, we should remember what we are doing. We are not, as the leader of the Liberal Party suggested, taking an irrevocable decision to move into the plutonium age. We are taking a decision to give planning permission for certain consequences to flow.

    The consequence that flows immediately is work on the storage ponds associated with the Windscale project, and there is no risk associated with the development of the storage ponds. It would only be if we moved into the full-scale work that follows from THORP that the kind of contingencies about which the House is rightly concerned would have to be anticipated. It is not conceivable that that kind of step would be taken for perhaps another four or five years at the earliest. Therefore, I believe that the House should ask questions about the way in which it is to be kept informed of the developments that will take place between the passage of the order tonight, if that is the will of the House, and the irreversible decision which the Leader of the Liberal Party assumed would be taken tonight, but which in practice will not be taken for four or five years.

    I listened to what the Leader of the Liberal Party said about Concorde. I had certain experience of the problems connected with that project, together with many other former Ministers responsible for it. The fact of the matter is that practically no high technological decision which has to be taken by modern Governments would be taken today if we argued that some of the decisions taken in the past proved more expensive than people expected. The problem with the state of the art of high technology in which virtually all modern Governments are becoming deeply immersed, is that we cannot predict exactly what it will cost or how long it will take. The fact is that, for political or economic reasons, we decide that it is right that Governments should move forward in those areas. I and, I am sure, the Secretary of State would not want to put ​ a price tag on the Windscale development and claim that in 10 years we shall come back to this House and say that we got the figures 100 per cent. right.

    Mr. John Mendelson

    Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

    Mr. Heseltine

    No. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me. We are short of time. I am sure that he will want to make his own contribution.

    I was told of the reason why the Americans got their space budget so accurate. It was because, when all the experts had made their calculations, the President multiplied them by 10, and he turned out to be pretty close to the mark.
    We are deciding whether to grant planning permission, a consequence of which would be that certain work could take place. The work which is of concern to the House is connected with planning and design. In consequence, it should not be put in a position where it equates with it. As a consequence of the planning and design work, I believe that we keep open certain very large commercial options which are considered to be of importance to this country.

    If we were to decide not to proceed, I believe that one consequence would be that the commercial options which are open to us at the moment would diminish. We might find that by the time we wish to reconsider the matter in two years, the countries which at the moment are prepared to enter into commercial relationships with us for reprocessing would have developed their own facilities or gone to other parts of the world to seek the contracts which are conceivably on offer to us.

    We are deciding the degree of probability of developing certain reprocessing facilities. The Secretary of State rightly made the point that, whatever we do, none of us can be certain that the risks are totally eliminated. Indeed, the shattering statistic produced in the House not long ago was that in the coal mining industry some 53,000 people have died in this century. That indicates the scale of difficulties which beset anyone trying to forecast what is likely to happen.

    The fact is that at this time—no one can be sure that it will be so in future—the nuclear industry has a good record of safety. It is obviously of prime concern ​ in the decision that we take tonight to remember that and to maintain the high standards that have brought it about.

    In the debate in March the Secretary of State made the point that if, as the process and the investigation continue, he is not satisfied—I shall want to ask what information the House will get about his tack of satisfaction—he has every power to refuse to allow the procedures to go on. Therefore, it is vital for the House to remember that we are not saying that from this moment on this matter moves out of the control of the politicians. It does not. It remains totally within the power of the Secretary of State of the day. Indeed, on 22nd May—column 1542 of Hansard—the Secretary of State made it absolutely clear that he had all the powers that he needed to exercise the degree of control that everybody in the House would wish to see.

    I have examined the Secretary of State’s reply to the Parker inquiry and I wish to ask about the number of organisations and public bodies that will be involved in the next few years. I have made a list. I do not claim that it is exhaustive but it is sufficiently long to raise a number of questions. Those organisations involved include British Nuclear Fuels, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, the Health and Safety Executive, the local liaison committees, the Industrial Pollution Inspectorate in Scotland, the National Radiological Protection Board, the Fisheries Radiobiological Laboratory, the Radiochemical Inspectorate of the Department of the Environment and some independent person to check the security situation. There are also the Department of the Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Scottish Office and the Department of Energy.

    All those organisations have some specific role to play in the evolution of the Windscale project. What is the degree of co-ordination of all those organisations? For example, will there be—as I suggest that there should—either an annual statement to Parliament or perhaps a statement in two years’ time on the progress that is being made in all the spheres for which these organisations are responsible? If there were we should not have to wait for one report after another nor have to try to piece them all together. It should be the responsibility ​ of the Secretary of State to see that there is co-ordination of all the monitoring, checking and processing of information for which those bodies are responsible to the House.

    With the best will in the world and without wishing to indulge in the scare-mongering techniques which are so easy—the Friends of the Earth could not conceivably be accused of that—it is necessary for the wide number of bodies to be drawn together so that a co-ordinated view of their findings can be put before us.

    Can the Secretary of State explain which hurdles he thinks that this project will now have to jump before the final decisions are taken in four or five years’ time? The leader of the Liberal Party asked for a general review. This is not the time for that because we have reviewed the relevant issues thoroughly in what the Secretary of State rightly described as one of the most far-ranging public processes that any country has devised.

    But there is a case for a review before a final decision is taken. It would be helpful if the Secretary of State explained exactly what that will be and the way in which Parliament will be involved in that process. I hope that during that review we shall hear about the quest for alternative sources of energy, which must be an important factor in the decisions that we have to take. But I take the view that we shall come to the conclusion that nuclear power has a significant role to play in our industrial future.

    I praise the Secretary of State for his determined attempt to meet the conditions laid down by the Parker inquiry. In his written reply to the hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Johnson) he dealt with all the points raised. He has tried to find answers which indicate a great concern for the issues involved and do not lapse behind the phraseology of further reviews and more reports, which is an easy method of trying to escape from taking decisions.

    The leader of the Liberal Party raised the question of security. The Parker inquiry recommended an independent person. It has also been suggested that there should be a Select Committee to deal with the House’s anxiety about security. ​ I thought about this in the earlier debate and again today. I see no way in which this House can become involved directly in the security provisions at Windscale. I do not believe that it will be possible to divorce the security of the nation from the considerations and techniques that will apply at Windscale. I am convinced that one cannot meaningfully have a process whereby a Select Committee—however well-meaning its members—probes and checks security. Argument on the Floor of the House is not necessary to make the majority of hon. Members understand the vulnerability of a technique of that kind.

    The leader of the Liberal Party is naive to believe that one can expose the nation’s security to semi-public inquiry. Ministers of the Crown do not all have access to the security provisions of the nation. Only a small number of members of the Government have that in any Government. It would be wrong to extend it to the 80 members of the Government and impracticable to extend it to a Select Committee. I understand the need for independent scrutiny but in practice it would be difficult to go as far as has been suggested.

    The Secretary of State in his announcement dealt with the question of the independent commitment of environmentally minded people to the surveillance of radiation standards. It is not always possible to pick up the full details of an announcement, but I understand that the Secretary of State is to appoint to the advisory body representatives from all the main energy institutions and that there will be a majority of non-experts from outside. That is a satisfactory outcome and I am glad that the Secretary of State has made that decision.

    Any reasonable forecasts of energy requirements must assume a nuclear capability for this country. If we are to take a decision to move along that road, decisions will have to be made about the disposal of waste material, even if we pursue a nuclear commitment only for our own energy requirements. The moment that we take a decision of that sort, which was taken many years ago, we are faced with the choice of either storing or reprocessing waste. I accept the view of the Parker inquiry and of the Secretary of State that it is unlikely that one can conceive for all time that we ​ should want to go for storage. Reprocessing seems to be a safer and more efficient method of coping with the problems. It is right to move towards that decision as quickly as safety conditions allow.

    I ask the Secretary of State to consider my argument seriously. We should recognise that we are not taking an irreversible decision tonight. The Secretary of State should come forward with an argument that will satisfy the House and those who have legitimate doubts that there will be a final moment at which the House has another opportunity to look at the whole matter. He should take into account not only the promises and the optimism upon which British Nuclear Fuels’ submission is made but the facts and what has happened in the three or four years that separate us from that irreversible decision.

  • Peter Shore – 1978 Speech on Windscale

    Below is the text of the speech made by Peter Shore, the then Secretary of State for the Environment, in the House of Commons on 15 May 1978.

    After the Wind-scale inquiry took place and I received the inspector’s report I decided that it was essential that Parliament should debate the proposed development of the oxide fuel reprocessing plant at Wind-scale before any decision was reached. That debate, which ranged fully and freely over all the issues involved, took place on 22nd March, and although it was not my wish that any vote should take place at that stage, a Division was called and a substantial majority was recorded.

    Since then, under the special procedure which I told the House I intended to follow, I have made a special development order giving planning permission for the development subject to certain conditions. The House will tonight decide by its vote whether the Windscale development will proceed. None of us has any doubt about the importance of this decision.

    I shall comment on some of the remarks made by the Leader of the Liberal Party, the right hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. Steel) during the course of his speech but I will say at once, because I do not think that he was with us when we last debated this matter, that many of the issues on which he had, inevitably, simply to touch during a short speech were thoroughly dealt with in the House during the full day’s debate.

    Let me assure the right hon. Gentleman that those of us who are taking a different view have no contempt for those who have objected to the Windscale order. On the contrary, we have taken their objections with the utmost serioussness and we are trying to treat the matter with the concentration and concern which I believe it deserves. I do not think it right to argue or assert that the people of this country are being put upon by technical expertise when the one thing that has preceded the whole of this parliamentary procedure and public discussion has been the longest and most thorough investigation that has ever taken place into any project. This public discussion was held openly before a disinterested inspector. It has been the most open discussion on such a subject in any country.

    None of us has any doubt about the importance of this decision. When I spoke in the debate on the report of the inquiry on 22nd March I discussed very fully the three major considerations which had weighed with me in considering the recommendations of the report. They were whether the proposed development posed any unacceptable risk to the environment or to health, whether it presented security problems which would pose a new challenge to our democratic way of life and whether it would adversely affect our policy to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

    On these three immensely important issues, which I think we all agree lie at the heart of the argument on whether British Nuclear Fuels’ proposals should go ahead, I said why I found the inspector’s conclusions persuasive. I do not intend to recapitulate all the reasons I then advanced. I would like to recall to the House how I summed up my own approach on two of the major issues involved. Whilst fully aware of the energy and the economic case for proceeding I said then

    “that if I considered that reprocessing involved any significant radiological danger to the general public, to workers or to the environment, there would be no question of my giving outline planning permission for the proposals which BNFL has put forward.’

    There would be no question at all. On the reprocessing of foreign fuels I said:

    “this raises issues that go far beyond the calculus of economic gain, and we should need to be fully satisfied that by doing so we would not be undermining our major interest in making effective the non-proliferation Treaty. If we were not so satisfied we could not, and should not, proceed.”—[Official Report. 22nd March 1978; Vol. 946, c. 1541–7].

    That was my stance then and now. It is against that background that I have studied the arguments put forward in the course of the March debate and the anxious and critical comments made by individuals and organisations outside the House.

    Mr. John Mendelson (Penistone)

    The Secretary of State is laying great emphasis on the assertion which he certainly made, that if he could conceivably come to the view that there were radiological dangers he would not give planning permission. Surely that is putting the question the wrong way. What the House and the country have to know is that, beyond ​ any reasonable doubt, he is completely convinced that there can be no such danger before he commits himself.

    Mr. Shore

    Nothing is beyond any possible reasonable element of doubt. What we have to do, using all the knowledge and information that we have available to us, is to come to a judgment that will not imperil the interests and health of our people. To proceed in any other way would be wholly irresponsible.

    Since I am the responsible Minister I shall turn first to the whole question of radioactive waste management policy. Let me start with one point that commands universal agreement. Within the next few years, up to 20 per cent. of all our electricity will be generated by nuclear power stations. These stations, as they burn their fuel, will produce radioactive spent fuel. Clearly, we must find means for dealing with this. The choice is between storage and reprocessing. I remain of the view that reprocessing is the better way. With our Magnox stations we have been reprocessing spent fuels for the past 20 years—and no one has suggested that we should store them. We believe that our new fuels from our advanced gas-cooled reactors should similarly be reprocessed in the proposed Windscale plant.

    Against this two questions have been raised. First, if we do reprocess, can we be confident of safely disposing of the resultant highly active waste, solid and liquid? The solid wastes almost certainly present the lesser problem and if research now under way is successful, we may deal with them by separating out the highly radioactive content and putting it in with the liquid wastes. For the liquid wastes two steps are required.

    The first is to put them into a form suitable for permanent disposal and the second is actual disposal. On the first, we must carry through to a conclusion the extensive work—I say this especially to the right hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles—which has already been done on vitrification. This process has already been carried out successfully. A demonstration plant at Harwell vitrified high-level wastes from reprocessing 10 years ago. Work is now going on into a more advanced process.

    Doubts are inevitable in high technology but the doubts which have been ​ raised about the practicability of vitrification do not in my view match the facts and we have good reason to believe that the work will be brought to a successful conclusion.

    Mr. T. H. H. Skeet (Bedford)

    Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is an industrial plant operating in France which vitrifies high-level nuclear waste making use of borosilicate glass?

    Mr. Shore

    That is not the only country which has made progress in this technology.

    Research into disposal by deep geological or ocean burial must take longer. But there is no reason to think that its feasibility will not have been adequately tested by the time the vitrified waste is ready for disposal. I know of no scientific opinion which basically disputes this view.

    The second question is whether storage of spent fuel as opposed to reprocessing is a practicable alternative. The position can be simply put. The storage of unreprocessed spent fuel, whether in controlled water conditions or in gas and air, is surrounded by questions to which answers are certainly not now known. What is known—and this is based on the Atomic Energy Authority’s study for the inquiry—is that it would be wise to assume some failures after five years’ storage in water.

    The strategy proposed by the objectors to reprocessing would involve some elements being in store for at least 20 years. To move from storing spent fuel elements in water to storing them in gas and/or air would again require much further study. There are too many doubts to make it reasonable to require British Nuclear Fuels Limited to jettison all its experience, perhaps greater than anyone else in the world, in favour of the alternative system. I do not consider that this constitutes “assymetrical criteria of soundness”. It is simply prudence in matters of the utmost importance for the protection of man and the environment.

    I realise that there are many people who may accept the case for reprocessing but are still unhappy about the routine discharges of low-level radioactivity that may result, people who are anxious whether our control limits are sufficiently stringent, particularly by comparison with those which apply in the United ​ States. This was the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Central (Mr. Cook) on 22nd March and referred to by others.

    In reply I have placed in the Library of the House a copy of a letter that I have sent to my hon. Friend on this subject. As the House will know, the National Radiological Protection Board has recently published an appreciation of environmental radiation protection standards, which also compares the limits of the United States and the United Kingdom. Both discuss the subject much more fully than I have time to do now, but I want to emphasise some salient points.

    The first point is that both the United States approach and our own conform to the basic radiation protection standards recommended by the international Commission on Radiological Protection. Although our methods differ, in practice the end result is not materially different. Scondly, such comparisons need to have regard to major differences of circumstances in various countries. The American standards, for example, are based on the assumption that no liquid radioactive wastes will be discharged—they will presumably have to be converted to solids.

    Britain, however, is not a continent but an island, and we therefore are able to discharge liquid effluents to the sea where the radioactivity so discharged, although nearly 100,000 times greater in one particular case stated by my hon. Friend than the United States discharges to the atmosphere, nevertheless results in only a small additional dose to the population. Nor should it be thought that we fail to monitor the seas. The marine pathways back to man are very closely monitored.

    Finally, and this is most important, the comparison to which my hon. Friend drew attention is based on BNFL’s proposals. These proposals will be subject to the most rigorous scrutiny by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and myself with a view to reducing them as far as is reasonably practicable.

    Mr. Eric Moonman (Basildon)

    My right hon. Friend’s last remarks will probably cause concern among some of us. Will he enlarge on that point? Will he ​ accept that at present Windscale is leaking? It does not require any further establishment to prove that.

    Mr. Shore

    The occasional leaks that occur, and other incidents in our nuclear establishments are made public as soon as they occur under the policies pursued by my right hon. Friends and myself. However, they have not been of a character or of a scale to cause the sort of apprehensions that I think are at present in my hon. Friend’s mind.

    Much has been heard about the distinction between what is medically safe and what is publicly and politically acceptable. This last is a matter for our decision, and we shall have that consideration fully in mind when the time comes to frame the discharge authorisations, which have to be separately issued under the Radioactive Substances Protection Act.

    During the last debate the House stressed, and rightly in my view, the importance of the recommendations in chapter 17 of the inspector’s report. And I was asked to indicate the Government’s response to them before this debate. I have already announced that we have accepted 12 of the 15 recommendations outright. Together their implementation will still further tighten controls over radioactive discharges, will increase monitoring, and will strengthen safeguards.

    Particular interest may perhaps centre on the decision to press ahead with the development of a krypton arrestment plan for THORP, and also on the provision of whole-body monitoring facilities for local people. I believe that these are all welcome improvements in existing arrangements that will provide still further reassurance.

    The three remaining recommendations are those calling for an independent check on security precautions at Windscale—there are difficulties there, as I am sure the right hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles understands—the inclusion of an independent person or body with environmental interests in the system for advising government on the fixing of radiological protection standards, and for a single inspectorate responsible for advising on the limits to be placed on all radioactive discharges.

    The Government have accepted the underlying purpose of all three recommendations. They do, however, involve ​ organisational changes and we have to consider how best we might achieve what the inspector had in mind. We shall be doing this as quickly as possible, and I hope that the House will accept that the Government have made a full response to hon. Members who expressed concern about all these matters during the previous debate.

    The inclusion of independent advice on security precautions at Windscale and on the fixing of radiological protection standards is, of course, quite separate from the wider scientific advice that I aim to obtain on radioactive waste management policy from the radioactive waste management advisory committee recommended by the Flowers Report.

    I am now happy to be able to announce the setting up of the committee. Its terms of reference will be to advise me and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland and my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Wales on major issues relating to the development and implementation of an overall policy for the management of civil radioactive wastes, including the waste management implications of nuclear policy, the design of nuclear systems, research and development, and including the environmental aspects of the handling and treatment of wastes.

    We are fortunate to have as chairman of the committee Sir Denys Wilkinson, who is a Fellow of the Royal Society and Vice-Chancellor of Sussex University. I am sure that his previous background in nuclear physics—as head of that department at Oxford and chairman of the Science Research Council’s nuclear physics board—will be invaluable. We are aiming to keep the committee to a reasonable size with, in addition to the chairman, a majority of nine or 10 independent members with relevant scientific knowledge and experience together with one member each from the UKAEA, the BNFL, the National Nuclear Corporation and the electricity generating industry, and some members from the nuclear industry trade unions. I shall be announcing the names of these members as soon as I can. And the House may care to be reminded that the committee will be asked to submit an annual report, which will be laid before Parliament.

    As the Leader of the Liberal Party reminded us, non-proliferation is one of ​ the issues at the heart of the matter. The Government’s position was clearly stated by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs during our previous debate on these issues. It is our objective to establish a system of international management of plutonium under which plutonium produced—for example at Windscale—would be stored there and returned to its owner only under internationally agreed safeguards and supervision designed to prevent its diversion from civil use. This must be better than leaving those countries that have nuclear power, 27 with plants in operation or under construction now, and like us needing to reprocess their spent fuel, in a position that would induce them to embark on reprocessing themselves, thus multiplying the sources of plutonium supply.

    Linked with this question, as the Leader of the Liberal Party put it, was the further question: why not wait for the results of the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation programme—INFCEP—on which President Carter took the initiative a year ago?

    First, as I have already shown, we must have a reprocessing plant for our own spent fuel. Secondly, even if when INFCEP was completed and the result was a decision that precluded overseas reprocessing, it would still be possible for the company to review its position and to consider how best in terms of plant size and timing to provide capacity to deal solely with United Kingdom fuels. Finally, to assume that INFCEP will result in a decision that would preclude reprocessing of overseas fuel seems to me to rest on a misconception. As my right hon. Friend said in the last debate, these studies are primarily a clearing house for ideas and the evaluation of technical alternatives. It just is not sensible to proceed on the assumption that a ban on reprocessing agreed by all 40 countries concerned will necessarily come out of INFCEP.

    Finally, I want to say a word about the whole procedure which we have adopted for deciding the issue. The 100 days of the Windscale inquiry represent an event not just of national, but of international importance. No country in the world has had a more searching and serious inquiry into major nuclear issues than ​ we have had during that long process of inquiry and cross-examination before Mr. Justice Parker and his two very able assessors. Of course, the inspector’s finding and analysis have come under critical scrutiny and attack. Given the magnitude and complexity of the issues, it would indeed have been amazing if they had not. But I must reject the suggestion made by only a few opponents that the inquiry itself was a charade. I do not accept—nor do I believe will the House—that either he or his distinguished assessors discharged their duties other than honourably or faithfully.

    The Government and, I believe, this House and the country at large accept that the process of public inquiry is an essential element in the public debate on major questions of nuclear development. Further, we have established that the House itself must play a decisive role. As the House knows, the Government have declared their intention of devising a special procedure for use on future occasions when proposals for nuclear development are put forward. I believe that the procedure that we followed, or something comparable, is the only rational way to deal with these questions. But if we can devise a better procedure, we shall.

    I ask the House to reject the motion to withdraw the Windscale special development order.

  • David Steel – 1978 Speech on Windscale

    Below is the text of the speech made by David Steel, the then Liberal MP for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles, on 15 May 1978.

    I beg to move,

    That the Town and Country Planning (Windscale and Calder Works) Special Development Order 1978 (S.I., 1978, No. 523), dated 3rd April 1978 a copy of which was laid before this House on 3rd April, be withdrawn.
    I intend to be mindful of your statement, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

    This motion is in an updated form. The Prayer was signed by more than 50 hon. Members on both sides of the House earlier this year, and there is no doubt that some hon. Members who wish to take part in the debate will have more fundamentalist objections than I have to proceeding with the reprocessing plant at Windscale. Therefore, in my brief opening speech I do not propose to deal with either the financial or the technical arguments, which no doubt other hon. Members will wish to deploy and some of which were aired in the debate in March, although I have read the recent reports from the United States which cast doubt on the wisdom of proceeding on both the financial and the technical grounds.

    In my view, the arguments on both sides are finely balanced and contain many uncertainties. It is because of that that I believe the burden of proof ought to lie quite firmly on the side of those who are pressing this order and who argue that we should now be taking this firm step into the plutonium economy.

    In fact, I disagree entirely with the conclusion, although I agreed with many of the arguments, of this morning’s leader in The Times which, rather surprisingly, concluded:

    “The overwhelming importance of keeping the widest range of options open in the coming world shortage of power resources amply justifies going ahead at this stage. The relative novelty of the technology is itself a reason for pressing on, since success or failure will to a great extent define those options in future. But the project is a venture into political and technological waters that are very incompletely charted, and it is important that it should be kept under genuine and fundamental review as it develops, and that today’s vote should not be seen as setting it on an inflexible and irrevocable course.”

    My first argument is that, unhappily, in this Parliament we know that these matters too easily get set on an inflexible and irrevocable course. Perhaps I may take the mind of the House back to the discussions that we had on the Concorde project. I question seriously whether, if we knew in 1962 what we know today about the costs and the effects of the Concorde project, the House would ever have given approval for it. I have looked out the figures. In November 1962, the House was told that the project would cost us £150 million to £170 million. The latest figure, given earlier this month, was £1,137 million, not to mention the annual operating cost losses to British Airways of £8·5 million, none of which takes account of the small number of orders for the aircraft or the write-off of the capital costs.

    I say that merely in passing because, if one is to take The Times argument that we should not regard this vote as irrevocable—

    Mr. Michael Jopling (Westmorland) rose—

    Mr. Steel

    I hope that I shall not be pressed to give way, because I know that a great many right hon. and hon. Members are waiting to speak.

    Mr. Jopling

    Will the right hon. Member give way on that point?

    Mr. Steel

    Other right hon. and hon. Members can counter my argument in the debate. I promised to curtail my remarks as much as possible. We have only three hours. The hon. Member for Westmorland (Mr. Jopling) knows that usually I give way in debate, but this is ​ a debate of a rather special nature and I must proceed with my speech. If any hon. Member wishes to challenge my figures, he may do so later in the debate. However, I obtained the figures from the Library.

    Mr. Jopling

    They are wrong.

    Mr. Steel

    The first reason why I oppose this order is precisely that I think that it is not possible, once we are past this stage, easily for Parliament or future Governments to review it and draw back.

    My second reason is that I think that public opinion is increasingly concerned about the way in which we push forward technology at the dictates of the expert without adequate thought of safeguards given by the layman. On occasion, that concern turns into outrage when matters go wrong. I give three examples. There was the accident at the Seveso plant in Italy. Afterwards, a great many articles were written about it in which people said how tragic it was and what precautions might have been taken there.

    Then there was the crash landing of the Russian space satellite in Canada, which happened in an unpopulated part of Canada but which nevertheless caused concern about the release of radioactivity. Then, coming nearer home, we had the wreck of the “Amoco Cadiz”. Leaving aside the effects on tourism, which are temporary and ephemeral, the destruction of a total environment in part of the world surely gives rise to considerable public concern. Increasingly, people are asking what it is that we are doing to a world of which we are simply temporary trustees. I believe that the magnitude of the decision that we are asked to take today is greater than any of the examples that I have given.

    It must be said that the record of safety of our nuclear industry is excellent. In the course of my visit to the prototype fast-breeder reactor at Dounreay and when I was at Windscale, I was immensely impressed by the record of the nuclear industry, and it is right to resent implications that it is less safe and less scrupulous than other dangerous industries.

    Having said that, however, we are lucky in that we have never had a major incident in our nuclear industry. No one ​ can guarantee, no Government can, and no hon. Member can, that there might not be some incident in the future. The fact that 10,000 people were prepared to go to Trafalgar Square peacefully on a Sunday—[Interruption.]—and 3,000 to Torness on the South-East coast of Scotland—[Interruption.]—is an indication of growing public concern. I know that the groans coming from some of the Benches indicate precisely what alarms me, which is that these people are written off as cranks or political misfits. That is a wrong attitude to what is a genuine growth of public concern about these issues. A Parliament which is arrogant and sweeps these people aside is adopting entirely the wrong attitude.

    That is my second reason for suggesting we should think again about going ahead with this project.

    My third reason for opposing this order is that we still—and the evidence is in the Parker Report—require further investigation into the safety and security of nuclear materials both on site and in transit and of waste storage and that the information that we have so far on all these is inadequate.

    It was accepted by the Secretary of State for the Environment in his speech during our debate in March—and it was accepted by Mr. Justice Parker in his report—that there is no case for domestic reasons related to a future fast-breeder reactor programme for pressing ahead now with the Windscale reprocessing plant. Indeed, in its evidence to the inquiry, BNFL said that it could withstand a further delay of up to five years without its affecting the CFR programme.
    So we should not be pushed by arguments of urgency into agreeing to this order tonight. On the safety and security questions we should pause and consider what was said by the Flowers Commission. It said:

    “The unquantifiable effects of the security measures that might become necessary in a plutonium economy should be a major consideration in decisions on substantial nuclear development. Security issues require wide public debate.”

    In the debate in March there were many criticisms of the perfunctory manner in which the security question was dealt with by the Windscale inquiry and the Parker Report.

    In the Written Answer which the Secretary of State for the Environment gave earlier this month in the Government’s official reaction to Mr. Justice Parker’s recommendations, the right hon. Gentleman said:

    “The Government accept the principle that security measures at Windscale should be checked by an independent person not involved in their design or operation, and will examine how best to put the recommendation into effect (No. 1). There are, however, wider security implications which need further consideration before detailed arrangements can be worked out.”—[Official Report, 8th May 1978; Vol. 949, col. 337.]

    Bearing in mind the perfunctory way in which security matters have been dealt with, and considering the statement that there is still quite a lot to be worked out, there is a case for examining the matter further. I suggest, whether we proceed with the order or not, that the Government should consider the appointment of a Select Committee to consider these matters, because I accept that we are limited in the degree of public debate that we can have on them.

    If I may cite a precedent, the Select Committee on Services, of which I was a member a few years ago, which deals with security in the Palace of Westminster, is a model of how a delicate matter can be dealt with by private Committee. I believe that we would all be willing to trust our colleagues to look more deeply into these questions.

    It is not simply a question of holding material on site. There is also the question of the transporting of nuclear material to and from Windscale. The Parker Report recommended that the majority of the transport should continue to be by rail. No doubt that will be the case. However, there was a report earlier this year that some material was being ferried by air from Windscale to Dounreay. I do not know whether the Secretary of State can confirm that. This gives rise to some anxiety.

    When I visited Dounreay I was struck by the fact that if we are to have a commercial fast-breeder reactor in the future, and if it is to be at Dounreay, which appears to be the most favourable site, there is a case for examining again the Windscale project and for arguing that purely for domestic reasons the reprocessing ​ should be carried out where the material is to be used. This casts doubt on whether Windscale is the right place if, in the future, for domestic reasons, we want to have a commercial fast-breeder reactor programme.

    I suggest that we should have a Select Committee, whether or not we proceed with the order, to consider all the questions of security.

    There is still doubt about the method and location of storage. The Flowers Report says:

    “We are confident that an acceptable solution will be found and we attach great importance to the search; for we are agreed that it would be irresponsible and morally wrong to commit future generations to the consequences of fission power on a massive scale unless it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that at least one method exists for the safe isolation of these wastes for the indefinite future.”

    I notice the very careful words used by the Secretary of State in March when he was interrupted by the hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Blenkinsop). The Secretary of State replied on this point by saying:

    “The vitrification process has been subject to a great deal of research and pilot demonstration. I believe, again, that the evidence is clear that it offers a promising solution to the problem.”—[Official Report, 22nd March 1978; Vol. 946, c. 1544.]

    That does not strike me as being beyond reasonable doubt. We have yet to reach the stage at which we have on the necessary scale proved vitrification as a satisfactory process.

    There is also the question of the location of storage. Here I am slightly critical of the Atomic Energy Authority. It has been seeking planning permission and in some cases engaging in the boring of test holes in places such as Cornwall, the Scottish borders, Northumberland, the Highlands and the Orkneys. It appears to have made a tour of Liberal constituencies for that purpose, omitting for some reason Rochdale—a much more likely candidate.

    I believe that the authority has run slightly ahead of both Government decisions and public opinion and has needlessly stirred up much resentment and concern about the location of future storage, particularly when the method of storage has not yet been proved. I hope that this process will not be continued. ​ The public require much greater reassurance about the safe handling of all these materials, both active and waste, before we press ahead with the project.

    My fourth and last reason for opposing the order is that if we go ahead with it we shall be giving an international lead in the wrong direction. Even the Parker Report, which came out in favour of the project, said in paragraph 6.2:

    “A nuclear bomb can be constructed with the grade of plutonium recovered by reprocessing. A country, which had in its hands such plutonium, could produce a bomb or bombs more rapidly, and with less risk of its actions being detected in time for international diplomatic pressure to be exerted, than if it had no such plutonium.”

    Paragraph 6.6 says:

    “At present the system for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is founded on a number of agreements … and … the system of safeguards which they contain or for which they provide is essentially one of reporting and inspection. This system was acknowledged by everyone to be in need of strengthening and improvement.”

    The reason why we ought not to proceed with the order now is because of the international evaluation programme being conducted on the initiative of the United States. It is interesting to note that this is a bi-partisan policy in the United States which runs directly counter to what appears to be a bipartisan approach in Britain. President Ford initiated the programme in October 1976, when he said

    “The United States should no longer regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear fuel cycle.”

    He went on to say that

    “the avoidance of proliferation must take precedence over economic interests.”

    My hon. Friend the Member for Truro (Mr. Penhaligon), when speaking in the debate in March, quoted Mr. Justice Parker’s version of President Carter’s updating of that initiative of April 1977 when he talked about the

    “indefinite deferment of commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium.”—[Official Report, 22nd March 1978; Vol. 946, c. 1598.]

    President Carter said

    “Increasing United States capacity to provide adequate and timely supplies of nuclear fuels to countries that needed them ‘so that they will not be required or encouraged to reprocess their own materials’.”

    He then announced that what he was wanting was ​

    “an embargo on the export of equipment or technology that could permit uranium enrichment or chemical reprocessing.”

    He said that he was pursuing discussions on

    “a wide range of international approaches and frameworks that would permit all countries to achieve their own energy needs, while at the same time reducing the spread of the capabilities of nuclear explosive development.”

    When the Government refer to the INFCE they do so in strange terms. The Secretary of State for the Environment in March told the House:

    “We hope, however—and we shall work for it—that INFCE will recommend better safeguards with perhaps greater international participation, for sensitive nuclear plants and movements of nuclear materials.”—[Official Report, 22nd March 1978; Vol. 946, c. 155.]

    The Foreign Secretary said that after INFCE he hoped to convert the Carter Administration

    “to our view of reprocessing on non-proliferation grounds.”

    In that speech he argued what I thought was a completely false piece of logic when he said:

    “If we need to reprocess fuel irradiated in the United Kingdom on grounds of better use of our energy resources and better waste management, and there is a case to be made for that, it is only right that we should offer the use of the plant to other governments who share our view that reprocessing is a necessary part of the nuclear fuel cycle. In this way I believe that we shall reduce the need for other governments to build their own reprocessing plants. In offering our services to other governments we hope to satisfy their, and our, concern about the possible misuse of plutonium.”

    The emphasis must be on the word “hope”. That is a non-provable assertion and I should have thought it much more likely that, if we have an international evaluation programme involving 40 nation States, and if we decide to go ahead regardless of that programme. we shall simply encourage others to follow suit.

    The House has a straight choice between looking at the longer term results of a decision that we take tonight against the undoubted economic value of the Japanese and other contracts which we could acquire. I believe that the onus must lie heavily on the Government, who have brought forward the order, to persuade us that we are wrong. If they do not persuade us beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be right to vote in favour of the order being withdrawn.

  • David Penhaligon – 1978 Speech on Cornish Tin Mine Closures

    Below is the text of the speech made by David Penhaligon, the then Liberal MP for Truro, in the House of Commons on 11 May 1978.

    This is the story of two tin mines in my constituency and some 750 jobs. The background is that in 1971 the Consolidated Gold Fields Company opened a mine not many miles from the village where I live. In 1974 a company called the Cornwall Tin and Mining Company opened one no further than a mile from the first mine, called Mount Wellington. Between them they provided some 750 jobs. In our area they were good and well-paid jobs. They were welcome and represented the whole hope in an area where unemployment is nearly endemic. The last figures I saw gave the average unemployment for my county as 11 per cent.; for men it is over 14 per cent.

    I have elicited that there is not a labour exchange within 40 miles of Chacewater, the village nearest these mines, which has today a male unemployment rate of less than 10 per cent. In this area there simply are no other jobs. There is certainly not a single job on offer which pays anything like the national average wage.

    My involvement with this matter started about a week or so before the first mine announced its closure when certain things I heard made me put down parliamentary Questions to find out what was happening and whether the Government knew what was happening at the Mount Wellington mine. Eventually there was a meeting in Zurich where the directors announced that the mine was to close.

    No more than two or three days later the Consolidated Gold Fields company made a similar announcement that its mine also was to close. The reason given at the time by Consolidated Gold Fields was that the water which had undoubtedly been a substantial problem in Mount Wellington, pouring in at some 8 million gallons a day, would follow the laws of gravity and quickly invade its mine. The cost of pumping this water out was understood to be £500,000 a year.

    I must admit that it was this more than anything else which raised by suspicions and made me decide to launch a major attack in this place to find out what was happening.

    There is no doubt that Consolidated Gold could have applied for temporary employment subsidy, and, virtually at the drop of a hat, received some £420,000—at an annual rate. It would have given those in the locality some time to judge the matter and negotiate matters instead of looking down a gun barrel, as we have been doing ever since this announcement was made.

    Indeed, Consolidated Gold was recruiting labour up to two weeks before its closure and I have long suspected—we shall probably never know—that the truth is that the company has been running this mine for some seven years with considerable managerial difficulties. It has had four or five managers since I have been the Member for Truro.

    It is difficult to know whether mining is likely to be profitable; one never knows exactly what one will get until the mineral is dug out. Besides that, the pound is oscillating. But, for all that, last year some £6·8 million worth of minerals were produced—950 tons of tin, 3,300 tons of copper, 3,250 tons of zinc and just over 1·4 tons of silver. The value of this on the metal exchange was nearly £7 million. Besides that, it must be remembered that Mount Wellington was making its own contribution as well. These mines make a significant balance of payments contribution, especially bearing in mind the number of people involved. They have some strategic significance, too, as Cornwall has Europe’s only supply of tin.

    The absolutely horrifying secondary effects hardly need quantifying. The companies used outside contractors for all the painting, surface digging and building operations. They bought some £1½ million worth of supplies locally. The men themselves had a purchasing power of £2 million to £3 million.

    The local reaction was swift and strong. Some 600 miners and their families came to London. They announced that they were prepared to give up next year’s increment in pay—a substantial offer in these days of inflation.

    The Cornwall County Council, which is not famous for throwing away money, quickly offered some £20,000 to enable the pumps to be run for a more substantial period while the problem could be studied sensibly. No wonder: in my village, if these mines totally collapse, I shall have 40 per cent. male unemployment. In the villages of Threemilestone, Crofty and St. Day the situation will be little better. The issue has not been off the local radio and television screens since it was first announced.

    Cornwall has become cynical about the treatment given by the Government to its problems. Large sums of money are going to the steel and car industries. We argue that our problems are no different. This is a basic industry providing basic employment.

    We hope that our treatment will be different on this occasion. Certainly I must admit that the Minister has kept me extremely well informed since this saga started. I believe that on this occasion the Government are prepared and willing to give help. I know that they are now negotiating with other parties. There are problems of confidence in disclosing exactly what is happening and during the period of negotiation it is an absolute impossibility to give a blow-by-blow account publicly.

    I should like some assurances from the Minister making it clear to people in my part of the country that the local appearance that these mines are lost is not the case, and that there is real and genuine help on the way. One rescue plan mentioned is that the shafts that run from Wellington towards Wheal Jane should be plugged, and that some extra pumps should be installed in Wheal Jane to hold back the water that is bound still to leak. Obviously there would be some ancillary piping and this would cost a capital sum of some £600,000, including a considerable contingency in case some of the estimates have gone wrong. The actual operating cost increase in Wheal Jane is estimated at £100,000.

    Facts in this case have been difficult to elicit, but as I understand it—and I have been assured on this point by some of those who work for the company—in the quarter before this terrible thing ​ happened to my county the company was making a positive cash flow. Basically the company has developed and was ready to take the ore from what is called the ninth level in that mine. It had been driving a shaft down to the fifteenth level and had in fact reached a depth of 1,300 ft.

    There is now considerable anguish in the area, as the negotiations go on behind closed doors, about the company’s action in dismantling some of the facilities underground. There is a suspicion that the rescue operation is getting more difficult by the hour. There is no doubt that some substantial sums of money will be required. The company, Consolidated Gold Fields, negotiated, in June 1976, a loan of £2·5 million I have never been clear why that loan was not taken up, but it was negotiated and has never been used.

    Let me warn the Minister that the alternative will be the loss of 700 or even 1,500 jobs. The Department of Employment officials, in an interview, told me that if the mines closed, they might be prepared to use the area for a special temporary employment subsidy scheme. One can imagine the cost and the loss of income tax, rates and national insurance contributions.

    Above all, there is the fear of living in an area with 40 per cent. unemployment and of being defeated and demoralised. Because of Cornwall’s history, mining is more important than the number of jobs involved. There is all the mythology of mining—”Poldark” and the other series of which people are aware—and these mines represented in my area a feeling that there would be growth in employment. The mines were new and we welcomed the general upturn in the growth of the Cornish mineral industry.

    If nothing is done about these mines, I believe that the hope of any outside investment in Cornwall is finished. There will be no hope of persuading any of the large mining corporations to come to my county. The Government, despite my opposition, have saved a considerable amount of money by scrapping regional development grants for the mining industry in development areas. Perhaps some of that money could be used to assist my county.

    I wish to put a number of questions to the Minister. Where do we stand in regard to pumping arrangements? I take the view that we are still fighting this battle and stand a reasonable chance of winning so long as the pumps are kept running. Will the Minister let my constituents know precisely what are the future pumping arrangements? How hard are the Government trying to rescue the position? Will he give some idea of the progress of negotiations? I recognise the difficulties, but what progress has been made in real terms?

    Will the Minister also say what will happen if the negotiations with interested parties break down? What will the Government’s attitude be in that event? Will they keep the pumps going for a period while some other party may be interested in the operation? The important question to which my constituents would like an answer is “When will a decision be known?”.

    It is not difficult to realise the tragedy that hits a family in such an area when relatively well-paid employment is lost. One can imagine a family’s feelings when its income is cut off. In the village of Threemilestone scores of workers who have taken on mortgages in the last 12 or 18 months are now wondering where they stand. They are looking to the Government because they realise that there is nobody else who can give the guidance and assistance required to rescue this mining operation. I look forward with great interest to hearing the Minister’s reply.

  • David Ennals – 1978 Statement on Vaccine-Damaged Children

    Below is the text of the statement made by David Ennals, the then Secretary of State for Social Services, in the House of Commons on 9 May 1978.

    With permission, I shall make the statement on payments for vaccine damage referred to by my right hon. Friend the Prime ​ Minister on 16th March. My right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland wish to be associated with what I am about to say.

    The House will recall that last June the Government accepted in principle that there should be a scheme of payments for those seriously damaged by vaccination which has been recommended in the interests of the community. The details of the scheme could not be settled before we received the Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury.

    The Royal Commission has recommended, first, that in future there should be strict liability in tort for severe damage suffered by anyone as a result of vaccination which has been recommended in the interests of the community; and, secondly, that there should be a new weekly benefit for all seriously disabled children whatever the source of their handicap. These and other recommendations are being considered carefully by the Government. But this is bound to take time and, in view of the clear undertaking we have given in respect of vaccine damage, the Government have decided to bring forward urgently a scheme of payments.

    The scheme will provide for the payment of a lump sum of £10,000, tax-free, in respect of those, whether children or adults, who have, since 5th July 1948, been severely damaged as a result of vaccination which has taken place in the United Kingdom against diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, poliomyelitis, measles, rubella or tuberculosis (BCG), or smallpox up to the date when its routine use ceased to be recommended.

    In the interests of speed and ease of of administration we shall accept, as the initial, but not the exclusive, criterion of severe damage, the receipt of attendance or mobility allowance for conditions which could be attributed to vaccine damage. Decisions whether the severe damage was due to vaccination will be made on the balance of probabilities.

    There will be a right of appeal to an adjudicating body, made up of two medical specialists and a legal chairman, which would be fully independent.

    The scheme will cover existing cases and any which may occur while it continues ​ in operation. But I want to stress particularly that the fact that we are bringing it forward does not in any way pre-empt the decisions which we shall in due course have to make on the recommendations of the Royal Commission as a whole, and that it will not prejudice the rights of those who have suffered damage to take action in the future.

    Unfortunately, there is no prospect of parliamentary time in this Session for a Bill to cover the scheme I have outlined. However, we are determined to help these children and their families as quickly as possible. The payments will therefore be covered, in the first instance, by a new Vote sub-head in the summer Supplementary Estimates and a Bill will be brought forward as soon as parliamentary circumstances permit. The cost will of course depend on the number of awards but if that number were to turn out to be something like 700, it would be £7 million, spread over this and succeeding financial years.

    The Vote sub-head procedure, and the simplicity of the scheme itself, will enable payments to be made as early as possible to families who have already had a long wait. While finalising the arrangements and processing claims will inevitably take some time, we shall do our best to start making payments before the end of this year.

    I am sure that the whole House will welcome this announcement, which implements the Government’s pledge to that small minority of families who, in seeking protection from disease for their children and the community at large, have suffered such tragic consequences.

  • Andrew Faulds – 1978 Apology to the House of Commons

    Below is the text of the personal statement made by Andrew Faulds, the then Labour MP for Warley East, in the House of Commons on 8 May 1978.

    Last Thursday evening, towards the end of the debate on Southern Rhodesia, I was prompted by a momentary surge of annoyance to make a vulgar rejoinder to a comment from the right hon. Member for Knutsford (Mr. Davies) about hon. Members not having been to Africa. As you will appreciate, Mr. Speaker, in my earlier profession we indulge in exchanges which are more often candid and colourful rather than precise and parliamentary. But my importation of such phraseology into the Chamber was inexcusable.

    Unfortunately, I cannot expunge the offensive words, but I have already written to the right hon. Member for Knutsford apologising to him, and now I wish to extend my apology to you, Sir, and to the House for my regrettable lapse.

  • Clinton Davis – 1978 Statement on Oil Pollution on the East Anglian Coastline

    Below is the text of the statement made by Clinton Davis, the then Under-Secretary of State for Trade, in the House of Commons on 8 May 1978.

    The Greek tanker “Eleni V” and the French bulk carrier “Roseline” collided in fog at about 12.15 p.m. on Saturday 6th May, some eight ​ and a half miles east of Happisburgh and six miles off the coast of Norfolk.

    I am glad to be able to inform the House that no lives were lost and that there were no serious injuries reported. The 39 crew members of the tanker were taken aboard the “Roseline” and have been taken to France.

    The “Eleni V” was cut in two about one quarter of the way from its bows. The larger after section is under tow and is off the Hook of Holland, awaiting entry to Rotterdam. The smaller forward section tilted through rather more than 90 degrees, to leave the bows almost vertical with about 20 feet above and some 80 feet below water.

    Given the condition of the forward section and in view of some deterioration in the weather outlook at about Sunday midday, it was decided to attempt to beach the forward section off Yarmouth, in a reasonably favourable position for further salvage operation.

    Unfortunately, the forward section swung on touching the bottom this morning, and the tow line parted. The last report I have is that, after drifting south, the section is on Corton Sand, about three miles off Lowestoft. A Trinity House vessel and four tugs, including two equipped for spraying, are in attendance and are seeking to secure a line to that section.

    The “Eleni V” was carrying some 16,800 tons of heavy fuel oil from Rotterdam to Grangemouth, including approximately 5,000 tons in the forward section.

    My Department’s anti-pollution organisation was activated immediately after the collision. A helicopter reconnaissance on Saturday afternoon, in poor to moderate visibility, located only one oil patch of any size. Reconnaissance flights are continuing.

    By midday on Sunday, eight spraying vessels were in operation off Yarmouth, with a naval vessel acting as on-scene commander, and succeeding in breaking up the patch into smaller slicks. Ten spraying vessels are there at present.
    Some oil has come ashore this morning on 15 miles of coastline between Winterton and Lowestoft. At worst it is about 25 feet wide but in most places it ​ is in patches. The local authorities are satisfied that they are coping with this oil.

    I am very conscious that the remaining oil on the forward section—perhaps 3,000 to 4,000 tons—represent a potential pollution risk. Our objective is to remove this threat of pollution as soon as this can practicably and safely be done.

    The French authorities have put in hand an inquiry into the conduct of the master and crew of the French ship and it is also hoped to take evidence from the personnel of the Greek ship. I have only just been advised that the Greek authorities are proposing to undertake a public inquiry.

  • William Rodgers – 1978 Statement on the Port Of London

    Below is the text of the statement made by William Rodgers, the then Secretary of State for Transport, in the House of Commons on 8 May 1978.

    On 6th April, Mr. John Cuckney, whom I appointed chairman of the Port of London Authority in the autumn of last year, reported to me a rapidly deteriorating financial situation in the Port of London. He had previously expressed concern about the PLA’s ability to manage within its existing financial resources and the need to agree a comprehensive strategy for the port in the form of a corporate plan.

    In the last month, the gravity of the situation has been fully apparent. On 4th May Mr. Cuckney told me that, in the event of no change of policy, mounting losses would total £76 million by 1982, the loss for 1982 probably being £17 million. The full picture is not yet established.

    The chairman has set out his explanation of this state of affairs in his annual report, published last week, of which copies are available in the Library. In brief, the chairman says that although the fixed costs of the port have been reduced over the years by dock closures, the disposal of surplus property and the severance of personnel, reductions have not kept pace with the decline in trade. Since 1974, losses and costs have reduced ​ the PLA’s reserves by £52 million. A major contributory factor has been the cost of maintaining uneconomic facilities and a dock labour force much in excess of need.

    The chairman believes that if costs can be cut and productivity raised the port can adapt by building on the positive aspects of its business. I have no reason to dissent from this broad analysis.

    Mr. Cuckney is continuing his urgent examination of the financial situation and is in the closest touch with me and with my Department. I have also arranged for Price Waterhouse &Co. to advise me on the Authority’s financial forecasts. I have made clear to Mr. Cuckney that any proposals from his board should be designed to chart a path to viability and a secure future.

    The Government have no executive authority over the PLA, but I am considering with my ministerial colleagues whether and by what means the Government can assist the PLA in its task. We are very fully aware of the industrial, social and environmental aspects of the problem. No solution will be easy.
    I will report further to the House in due course.

  • Eric Deakins – 1978 Speech on Multiple Sclerosis and the Naudicelle Treatment

    Below is the text of the speech made by Eric Deakins, the then Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Security, in the House of Commons on 5 May 1978.

    I am glad to have this opportunity of replying to the points raised this afternoon by my hon. Friend the Member for Derby, North (Mr. Whitehead). I know that his interest in this subject—which goes back a number of years—is shared by other hon. Members. Let me say frankly at the outset that there is very little I can add to what my right hon. Friend the Minister has already said on this matter in reply to hon. Members who have written to him and put down Questions in the House.

    The reason for this is that in all fields of treatment and prescribing of medicines one must tread most carefully and cautiously and, as I hope I can show to the satisfaction of my hon. Friend that, in this area particularly, there is very good reason indeed for slow progress. Let me first explain something of the general context in which treatment under the National Health Service occurs.

    Family doctors, under the National Health Service, are free to prescribe any drug or medicine they consider necessary for the proper treatment of their patients, though they may be asked to justify their prescribing decisions, if the cost appears excessive, or if the substance may not be a drug. Only the doctor concerned can decide whether something is necessary for the treatment of his patient and whether that substance is something that should properly be prescribed as a charge on the National Health Service.

    If there is any doubt on the latter point, the doctor will consider carefully whether he would feel able to justify the ​ decision to prescribe a substance if called upon to do so. If he is satisfied on this point, there is nothing to prevent him from issuing the prescription and it being dispensed in the normal way.

    I emphasise that it is the doctor, and only the doctor, who can determine which medicines or drugs should or should not be prescribed for a patient. It is certainly not the Department’s job and it would be quite wrong for it or anyone else—including the patient—to attempt to influence the doctor’s decision.

    My hon. Friend asked about representations from doctors. Over the course of some three years there have been 69 cases of family doctors who have defended their decision to prescribe Naudicelle for multiple sclerosis before their professional colleagues on the local medical committee. In 25 of these cases the doctor concerned was about to satisfy his colleagues that the substance had been properly prescribed in the circumstances.

    National Health Service legislation does not define a “drug”. The question of which items or substances should or should not be regarded as drugs, which form part of the pharmaceutical services under the National Health Service Act, has been considered on several occasions by independent professional committees. Precise terminology has varied, but the basic conclusion of each committee has been that substances of a primarily nutritional nature cannot be regarded as drugs and, because they are therefore “foods”, cannot be provided on National Health Service prescription.

    Often the question whether a particular substance is a drug depends upon the circumstances, and no definition could hold good for every case. However, for practical medical purposes, it is reasonable to expect that, where a substance is prescribed for a patient, the substance will have both pharmacological and therapeutic effect on the condition being treated.

    In certain conditions, a “food” may have the characteristics of a “drug”. To advise on the circumstances in which items may be regarded as “drugs”—and therefore prescribable at National Health Service expense—the Department and the profession are very fortunate to have the services of an independent professional body chaired by Professor Barbara ​ Clayton of the Hospital for Sick Children. This body is known as the advisory committee on borderline substances.

    The advisory committee plays a continuing role in examining claims of therapeutic efficacy for individual substances and preparations in relation to particular conditions—that is, whether in particular conditions they may be regarded as having the effect of a drug. Such is the prestige of this independent committee of experts among their professional colleagues that any recommendation which is made is usually acceptable to all concerned. However, I must point out again that whatever the committee’s recommendations, the final decision whether a substance should be prescribed for a patient’s condition rests with the doctor.

    The practical effect of this is that if the committee recommends that a substance acts like a drug for a particular condition then, if the doctor prescribes it for that condition, the National Health Service pays for it. If the committee does not so recommend, decisions to prescribe that substance may be challenged, but—and to re-emphasise the point that I made at the beginning about the prescribing freedom of the family doctor—doctors can and often do successfully defend their prescribing decisions, through the machinery laid down in regulations for this purpose, notwithstanding an advisory committee recommendation.

    I have described this framework in some detail, because it is germane to the fundamental question raised by my hon. Friend why the substance known as Naudicelle cannot at present be provided at National Health Service expense in the treatment of multiple sclerosis at home. I say “at home” deliberately, because a patient in hospital is provided with all his daily needs. These include whatever food and toilet preparations may be considered advisable for him and which he would be expected to provide for himself as necessities of normal life if he were living at home.

    As those who have had anything to do with the disease will know—my hon. Friend stressed this matter—multiple sclerosis is a very distressing disease and one which is most difficult to treat. I understand its effects are so variable between individual patients and that the ​ course the disease follows is so erratic that often it is difficult for a layman to appreciate that a multiple sclerosis patient in remission is ill. I am told that many of the features of multiple sclerosis can present—variability, erratic and unpredictable developments—make every patient’s case uniquely individual.
    That being so, formidable barriers are presented to those evaluating the efficacy of particular types of treatment. At any time patients may experience spontaneous remissions of the condition, sometimes of long duration, so that it can be most difficult to know whether encouraging changes are in fact due to treatment.

    Multiple sclerosis is the general term given to cover many symptoms of weakness and loss of use occurring in different parts of the body. Experts differ in their views on the disease, and for this reason no single method to treat the condition or alleviate the symptoms has been arrived at. One view is that if the proportion of saturated fat in the diet were reduced relative to unsaturated fat, it might help a patient’s nervous system function more effectively. To explore the validity of this theory, multiple sclerosis patients have been given oils such as sunflower seed oil which contain the unsaturated fat, linoleic acid. An even less saturated fat, gamma linoleic acid is, I understand, found in the oil of the evening primrose, as my hon. Friend pointed out, and it is this oil which is contained in Naudicelle capsules.

    The capsules are a proprietary preparation manufactured by Bio-Oils Research Limited of Nantwich, Cheshire. From the outset it has claimed that the Naudicelle capsules contain a pre-digested form of linoleic acid which acts more directly and more quickly than other linoleic acid derivatives.

    This claim was included in the evidence submitted to the advisory committee on borderline substances in July 1974. At that time the committee convened a special meeting to consider in detail the whole question of the use of dietary supplements and linoleic acid and its derivatives in the management of multiple sclerosis. The committee examined in great detail all the available evidence published during the preceding years. In addition, it considered the written evidence from several consultants—some of ​ whom participated at the meeting—who were either known to the chairman or who had been recommended by the Medical Research Council as being or having recently been engaged in research into the problem. I am advised that the research for the meeting, the trouble taken to canvass informed opinion and members’ keen interest and sympathy combined to make this probably the most carefully prepared exercise the advisory committee on borderline substances had ever undertaken.

    Reluctantly, after much deliberation, the committee decided that there was no evidence which could justify recommending that linoleic acid or its derivatives should be regarded as a drug in the management of multiple sclerosis. The committee was particularly concerned that any advice offered should be founded firmly on scientific evidence. It felt that it would be wrong to offer advice that might raise false hopes among multiple sclerosis patients, their families or friends, that an effective palliative or cure was close at hand—a point emphasised by my hon. Friend. Members noted that research into the value of unsaturated fats in the management of multiple sclerosis was continuing and expressed their readiness to reconsider their decision if and when fresh scientific evidence became available.

    Moreover, in October 1974 a conference on multiple sclerosis, arranged jointly by the Medical Research Council and the Multiple Sclerosis Society of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reached broadly the same conclusion on the question of dietary supplements as the advisory committee on borderline substances. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that the Medical Research Council’s annual report for 1975–76 stated:

    “The evidence for a beneficial effect of linoleic acid supplements in the diet is unconvincing but the existing studies should be continued; meanwhile no further trials should be supported.”

    I must take serious note of this view. It is an expert one and is endorsed by my medical advisers in the Department.

    To give the House further evidence of the Government’s constant concern to leave no stone unturned in this matter, I should like to point to my right hon. Friend’s meeting with a deputation from the Multiple Sclerosis Action Group early ​ last year. Particular attention was paid at that meeting to the claims that were being made for Naudicelle capsules and the superior virtues of their active ingredient, gamma-linolenate as compared with those of linoleic acid and to the need for further research. The deputation included a distinguished research scientist who, I understand, is engaged in the field of multiple sclerosis research and who explained the claims for gamma-linolenate very lucidly. However, my right hon. Friend had to tell the deputation that, having consulted the Department’s medical advisers afresh about these claims and the value of further research, he felt that he would not be justified in initiating or supporting more research. He promised to ensure that any new scientific evidence that may appear is placed before the advisory committee without delay.

    I understand that, in addition to the research mentioned in the MRC report that I quoted earlier, a trial financed by the Multiple Sclerosis Society of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of dietary supplements, including Naudicelle capsules, has been undertaken at a hospital in the North-East. The results are expected shortly. The chairman of the advisory committee is in touch with the research teams concerned and hopes to convene at an early date a meeting of the committee, augmented by other experts invited for the occasion to consider these results. Of course, we can make no assumptions yet about the outcome of the trials.

    Since the submission to the advisory committee in 1974, Bio-Oils Research Limited has applied for and been granted a product licence for Naudicelle capsules under the Medicines Act 1968 as

    “dietary supplements where unsaturated fatty acids are needed”.

    Aside from the researches sponsored by MRC and the Multiple Sclerosis Society, I understand that Bio-Oils Research Ltd. has been granted a clinical trial certificate to enable it to have its product tested in relation to multiple sclerosis. The certificate is valid until November this year. Naturally, if the firm were then to produce evidence of the efficacy of its product in relation to multiple sclerosis, it would be open to it to apply for its existing product licence to be varied so as to specify the disease.

    If such a variation were granted there would be no question that Naudicelle might be regarded as a drug in the management of multiple sclerosis.

    The Government regard the promotion of health and the prevention and eradication of disease as a prime responsibility of my Department. However, we cannot will the results or the developments that we desire. I know of nobody who does not wish that a drug that would cure or alleviate multiple sclerosis were available.

    Certainly the moment any substance or preparation is shown scientifically to have a beneficial effect, then, whatever it is, it will be made available as soon as possible as a drug for the treatment of the disease. However, I am bound to remind the House, as I implied at the outset, that ​ the history of research into multiple sclerosis is one of repeated disappointments.

    My hon. Friend has raised a number of issues including early diagnosis and the possibility of the Department having field trials about which I shall write to him. In the meantime, let me repeat that the reason why Naudicelle would be challenged if prescribed by a family doctor at National Health Service expense is that we are advised that the only scientifically reliable evidence that we have does not justify the belief that dietary supplements such as Naudicelle capsules are helpful in the management of multiple sclerosis.