Category: Press Releases

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 7 June 2024.

Statement by Australia, the UK and the USA (AUKUS) to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on naval nuclear propulsion.

Thank you, Chair.

I have the honour of speaking on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to provide an update to the Board of Governors on Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program.

Chair,

Australia and the IAEA are continuing to hold bilateral technical consultations on a robust safeguards and verification approach for Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. These consultations include negotiations relating to the development of an arrangement under Article 14 of Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Arrangement. The most recent round of formal consultations between Australia and the Agency took place in May. These discussions encompassed legal and technical aspects of an Article 14 arrangement for Australia. Discussions are continuing.

We thank the Director General and the Secretariat for the Agency’s productive engagement with Australia in these ongoing consultations, in exercising its technical mandate to engage with Member States on the implementation of their safeguards agreements. Bilateral, in-confidence engagement between the Secretariat and Member States is fundamental to the non-proliferation regime.

We are confident that Member States will see through the attempts we observed earlier at the current Board meeting, and indeed ever since AUKUS was announced, to sow doubts about the Secretariat’s engagement with Australia on naval nuclear propulsion. We thank the many Board members who earlier in this meeting noted with appreciation the Secretariat’s engagement with the relevant States on naval nuclear propulsion, as accurately reflected in the 2023 Safeguards Implementation Report.

I refer Member States to my recent, publicly available remarks delivered at the workshop organised and hosted by the Permanent Mission of China, outlining the well-established legal and policy framework through which Australia is engaging the IAEA.

As I made clear at the workshop, it struck me as highly unusual for one country to organise an event targeted at another country’s sovereign endeavour and bilateral engagement. I decided to speak at the event in the interest of transparency, but fully aware the forum was not one designed to facilitate impartial discussion.

The IAEA’s technical role is an integral part of the non-proliferation system. It is crucial that all Member States respect the independence, mandate and technical authority of the IAEA. This is why Australia has expressed serious concern about references to ‘an intergovernmental process’. Such a process could subject the IAEA’s technical work to the political deliberations of Member States. All Member States share an interest in protecting the IAEA’s technical mandate – as we all rely on its ability to carry out its mandate independently and impartially in these challenging times.

Chair,

The AUKUS partners recognise that the acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines by Australia carries with it a responsibility to ensure the highest standard of non-proliferation is upheld. Under Australia’s Article 14 arrangement, the IAEA will maintain oversight of nuclear material. We reiterate our commitment that Australia will not enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel as part of this program and to ensuring that the non-proliferation approach for Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program will enable the IAEA to fulfil its technical objectives for Australia at all stages of the submarines’ lifecycle. The Agency will continue to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material; no misuse of nuclear facilities; and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia.

The Director General has confirmed that, once Australia’s Article 14 arrangement has been developed, he will transmit it to the Board for appropriate action. As we have stated before, we fully support this approach.

Chair,

We remain committed to keeping the Board updated on relevant developments concerning our three countries’ cooperation on naval nuclear propulsion. Since we met in March, Australia has announced the selection of industry partners for the build and sustainment of Australia’s future conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. In April, our defence ministers released a joint statement which, in addition to providing an update on a number of initiatives, outlined readiness to begin engaging additional countries on specific advanced capability projects under AUKUS Pillar Two. AUKUS Pillar Two does not involve nuclear cooperation or capability. It is separate from the initiative under AUKUS Pillar One to support Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, which will remain exclusively trilateral between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Together, our defence ministers demonstrated our united approach, and reiterated our commitment to setting the highest non-proliferation standard. They also referred to AUKUS partners’ initiatives to build Australia’s capability to safely and securely maintain its future submarines. These include initiatives to support workforce skills and development, including a maintenance activity to be conducted on a US nuclear-powered submarine in Australia, which is scheduled to occur in the second half of 2024.

As the Director General has said in recent statements, Australia and the Agency are engaging to ensure that relevant technical measures are in place ahead of any such activity, under Australia’s safeguards agreements with the Agency. Such engagement on safeguards implementation is entirely consistent with the Agency’s mandate and with longstanding practice.

Chair,

The Director General has confirmed he will continue to provide reports on naval nuclear propulsion programs to the Board as the need arises. We fully support his prerogative to decide the appropriate time for this matter to be placed on the Board’s agenda.

The AUKUS partners will continue to update the Board on developments relating to Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program, and to engage the international community, including at the upcoming NPT Prep Com. We welcome the opportunity to address questions from interested delegations regarding our non-proliferation approach, at future Board meetings and in other fora, as appropriate.

Thank you, Chair.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 7 June 2024.

Statement by Australia, the UK and the US about AUKUS safeguards under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Chair,

I take the floor on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to respond to comments made regarding Australia’s acquisition of a naval nuclear propulsion capability. We expressed our position on this agenda item in our Note Verbale, dated May 30, 2024, and I will not repeat it here other than to reiterate that this item has never enjoyed consensus support and is not a standing agenda item. However, we feel compelled – once again – to invoke our Right of Reply to respond to the remarks made today.

In response to a request in March and last November from my distinguished colleague who requested this agenda item, I and my counterparts from the United Kingdom and Australia have, indeed, sat and attentively listened to the remarks made today, just as we have done for two-and-a-half years. Unfortunately, much of what I have heard today, and what I have in fact heard under this item for the last two-and-a-half years, are serious mischaracterizations and misleading assertions from certain countries.

These assertions continue to ignore or misrepresent the information we have provided in good faith, and to disregard the answers which the Director General has already provided in response to the questions asked. We express our deep concern about these mischaracterizations. We, and the large majority of Board members who have spoken in previous meetings on this topic, have expressed confidence in Director General Grossi’s handling and prerogative on this issue. Indeed, we note many member states expressed confidence in the Agency’s engagement with relevant parties on naval nuclear propulsion under Agenda item 6b at this Board. We have been clear that this agenda item is unnecessary.

Chair,

The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation have spoken multiple times over the last two days of the need to avoid politicization of the Board, particularly on issues that the Board and the Director General have deemed to be of significant concern such as Iran, the DPRK, and Syria’s failure to meet obligations in their Safeguards Agreements as well as on the nuclear safety, security, and safeguards implications of Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine. It is difficult to understand why these states do not apply their own logic to this issue. Why, when the Director General has expressed his satisfaction and a majority of the Board has expressed no desire for quarterly discussion on one country’s naval nuclear propulsion program, do we continue to have this item added to the agenda?

The Director General has repeatedly stated that the Agency has “the necessary experience to develop the arrangements related to the use of nuclear material for naval nuclear propulsion in accordance with the Statute and relevant safeguards agreements.” The Director General has also made clear that Australia’s Article 14 arrangement will allow the Agency to continue to meet the technical safeguards objectives established for Australia, and that, once developed, it will be transmitted to the Board for appropriate action. Despite these statements, it remains deeply concerning that some states continue to call into question the Director General’s ability to perform the functions vested in him by the Statute, by the relevant safeguards agreements, and by decisions of the Board.

One country has called for referring the matter to the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation, known as SAGSI. Obviously, we fully support the Director General’s use of SAGSI as he sees fit and on technical matters within its remit. We defer to the Director General to determine whether to seek SAGSI’s input on naval nuclear propulsion, or, for that matter, any other technical issue relating to safeguards implementation. It is not this Board’s responsibility to dictate whether or how the Director General receives input from his own advisory group.

Chair,

The AUKUS partners have and will continue to engage consistently, openly, and transparently with Member States and the Secretariat on genuine questions. We welcome that the Agency has repeatedly reported its satisfaction with Australia’s engagement.

Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have provided updates on relevant progress at all Board meetings since the initial AUKUS announcement in September 2021, and will do so again at this meeting under Any Other Business. We will continue to keep the Board updated on our engagement, as appropriate. Our three countries – along with the majority of the Board – continue to oppose any proposal for this item to be a standing agenda item or to establish any efforts that undermine and politicize the independent technical mandate of the IAEA. We reject any suggestion that the Agency does not have a mandate to engage bilaterally with Member States on issues relevant to the implementation of their safeguards commitments. We urge colleagues to continue to reject deliberate efforts to challenge the Agency’s independence and integrity. And we welcome the Director General’s commitment to continuing to provide updates to the Board as and when he deems appropriate.

Thank you, Chair.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 6 June 2024.

Ambassador Holland voices support for Moldova, as it pursues a bold reform agenda and builds its future in Europe, in line with the wishes of the Moldovan people – all while defending against increased attention from hostile actors.

Thank you, Chair.

The UK supports Moldova in its considered rejection of the claims made by the Russian delegation at the Permanent Council meeting on 23 May. The Moldovan delegation’s comments speak for themselves, but I would nonetheless like to voice the UK’s support for Moldova. This is a country which is pursuing a bold reform agenda and building its future in Europe, in line with the wishes of the Moldovan people – all while defending against increased attention from hostile actors.

Firstly, the measured and proportional steps taken by Moldova in recent years have been necessary to address unprecedented levels of Russian disinformation, in an attempt to undermine Moldova’s democratic process. All Moldovans are entitled to credible and transparent journalism, free from propaganda and foreign interference. And as noted by my Moldovan colleague, Reporters without Borders placed Moldova 31st on the World Press Freedom Index. A well-earned position which demonstrates Moldova’s clear commitment to a free and independent media.

Moldova’s commitment to OSCE principles on election integrity and election observation is similarly welcome, building on the commitments agreed by all participating States at Copenhagen. We commend Moldova’s longstanding and close cooperation with ODIHR, including Moldova’s recent request for a legal opinion on postal voting and their other work to follow up on ODIHR’s election recommendations.

Regarding the Transnistrian settlement process, Russia’s request to resume the 5+2 format makes no sense. We would dearly have liked the 5+2 to continue but, as Russia well knows, it is on hold because Russia has chosen to pursue its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, and will continue to be on hold until all sides agree to resume. The UK continues to support a peaceful settlement under the 1+1 format, and we are grateful to the parties on both sides of the Nistru for their persistence in seeking constructive dialogue despite Russia’s repeated attempts to instrumentalise the process.

Madam Chair, it is ironic that many of the accusations made by the Russian delegation are a thinly veiled attempt to criticise them for taking the steps necessary to protect its democracy and territorial integrity from the very hybrid threats that Russia alone is responsible for. The UK stands resolutely with Moldova as it seeks to safeguard the democratic choices of its people.

Thank you.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 6 June 2024.

Ambassador Holland calls out Russia’s failure to live up to the commitments it signed up to in the OSCE’s Decalogue with its illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Thank you, Madam Chair.  Each week in this Council, we confront the reality of what is taking place on the ground in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion.  And that is right. As long as it continues to fight this war, we should never stop confronting the Russian Federation with what their so-called Special Military Operation means for the people on the ground; the heroically brave Ukrainian Armed Forces, the first responders to Russian attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure or the innocent civilian victims of Russia’s aggression. We should express our opposition and disgust at what is happening in the name of Russia in Ukraine – and hold Russia accountable.

However, occasionally, it is also worth taking a step back to remind ourselves of what the Russian Federation has done to comprehensive security overall in our region by their violation in Ukraine of the principles, agreed at Helsinki, that sit at the heart of this organisation: specifically, the Decalogue. The Decalogue was adopted, by consensus – and that means all of us – nearly half a century ago.

Looking at the Decalogue again, it is striking what a good job our predecessors did. If we were starting from scratch today to design a set of principles that should govern relations between the states of our region, I think and hope we would come out in a similar place.

Take for example the first principle:

“The participating States will respect each other’s sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other’s right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.

“Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have equal rights and duties. They will respect each other’s right to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other States in accordance with international law and in the spirit of the present Declaration. They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.  They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.”

Who among us would not want that principle applied to our own country?  None, I imagine.  Then why should that principle apply to 56 of us but not to Ukraine? The standards should apply to all of us. But that is clearly not the view of the Russian Federation who in invading Ukraine has driven a coach and horses through the principle of territorial integrity that they signed up to.

So, Madam Chair, I would like to ask a direct question of the Russian delegation as to whether they consider Russia’s actions in Ukraine to be in conformity with this first Helsinki principle.  If so, could they please explain how?

Thank you.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 6 June 2024.

Special sitting on the situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories. Statement by the UK’s Permanent Representative to the WTO and UN, Simon Manley.

Thank you Chair.

The UK, like others in this room today, wants to bring the Gaza conflict to a sustainable end as quickly as possible. We are shocked by the sheer scale of the loss of lives and livelihoods of both Israelis and Palestinians.

On 7 October, Israel suffered the deadliest terrorist attack in its history. Almost 250 days on and Hamas continues to hold hostages.

In Gaza, the situation is desperate. Palestinian civilians face a devastating and growing humanitarian crisis. We again urge Israel to let humanitarian aid enter Gaza through all relevant crossings, including Rafah.

The UK is grateful to the Director General and the ILO for their vital engagement. In particular, we commend the ILO’s staff who have been working tirelessly to implement the emergency response programme under immensely challenging circumstances. We of course regret that the annual mission could not take place in its usual format.

Both Palestinian and Israeli labour markets have been affected by this crisis. The absence of a functioning labour market in Gaza; rising rates of unemployment; and the effects on vulnerable workers including women and those with disabilities is particularly concerning. This has only been compounded by the destruction of businesses.

If we are to stop the loss of life, and allow the rebuilding of the labour market in both the West Bank and Gaza, the fighting needs to stop now. The fastest way to end the conflict is to secure a deal which gets the hostages out and allows for a pause in the fighting in Gaza. We must then work together to turn that pause into a sustainable, permanent ceasefire.

The UK supports an irreversible two-state solution that guarantees security and stability for both the Israeli and Palestinian people. The UK has offered support to the Palestinian Authority to implement much-needed reforms, and we encourage labour and social policy reforms to be resumed at the appropriate time. An effective PA is vital for lasting peace and progress towards a two-state solution.

Just as the PA must act, so must Israel. This means releasing frozen funds, halting settlement expansion, and holding to account those responsible for extremist settler violence.

The UK has already moved to ban those responsible for violence in the West Bank from entering the UK, and announced new sanctions designations against four extremist Israeli settlers.

So, in closing, let us join together today to renew our collective commitment to end the suffering and reach a long-term solution to this crisis. It is time for it to end.

Thank you, Chair.

The press release issued by the Foreign Office on 6 June 2024.

Statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and France on Gaza.

In the margins of the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the D-Day landings, the Leaders of Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France reaffirmed their full support for the comprehensive deal outlined by President Biden that would lead to an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, the release of all the hostages, a significant and sustained increase in humanitarian assistance at scale for distribution throughout Gaza, to include temporary shelters, and an enduring end to the crisis with Israel’s security and Gazan civilian safety assured. They emphasized that the deal further calls for the immediate refurbishment of essential services, including medical facilities, bakeries, electricity and water lines, clearing rubble, and setting conditions for a long-term reconstruction program. They reiterated their demand for Hamas to express its full acceptance of this comprehensive proposal, which has been presented and agreed to by Israel, and called on the parties to implement the plan without further delay, so to ultimately bring an end to this war. They committed to work in support of the mediation efforts to that end.

The four Heads of State and Government reiterated their commitment to a negotiated two-state solution, which remains the only viable solution to respond to the legitimate aspirations of the two peoples for peace and security. They reaffirmed the legitimacy of the Palestinian aspirations for an independent State living in peace and security alongside Israel, and the need to mark out a clear path in the direction. The Leaders stressed their unwavering commitment to Israel’s security.

They reaffirmed their support to the Palestinian Authority and for the reform program of Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa, and called for greater regional and international backing of his government, including the transfer of revenues by the Israeli government. In this regard, they underlined the need to restore a legitimate Palestinian governance in Gaza, with the appropriate international support, while answering Israel’s security needs. To that end, they stressed their determination to contribute to an international support effort to stabilization in Gaza, with a view to a long-term regional security for all, and ensuring that a crisis like this can never again recur.

The Leaders also underlined the utmost importance of preserving the stability of Lebanon and their determination to combine their efforts in supporting de-escalation on the Blue Line consistent with UNSCR 1701. They called on all parties to exert maximum restraint to avoid further regional escalation.

The Leaders stressed their determination to continue working together in support of the implementation of the deal as outlined by President Biden and towards regional peace and stability.