Denis Healey – 1986 Speech on the Strategic Defence Initiative

Below is the text of the speech made by Denis Healey, the then Labour MP for Leeds East, in the House of Commons on 19 February 1986.

I beg to move,

That this House regrets Her Majesty’s Government’s support for the Strategic Defence Initiative.

In some ways the strategic defence initiative is probably the most important issue in the field of foreign and defence policy, disarmament and high technology that the House has discussed for many years. Its supporters and opponents will at least agree on that.

On 23 March 1983, President Reagan made a speech in which he asked for a fundamental change in the basic policy upon which western security has been built since the second world war. He made this speech without any consultation with any of his allies, although NATO’s nuclear planning group was meeting at that time. He said that the

“human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations by threatening their existence … peace could not rest much longer on the threat of mutual suicide.”

The President dedicated himself to produce a defence against nuclear ballistic missiles which would make:

“nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”

Later in Baltimore, he told schoolchildren that “the hand of providence” inspired that speech.

The President never explained how ballistic missile defence would protect the world against nuclear bombs which were carried on aircraft, such as those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, by cruise missiles, by individuals or in the hold of ships. He never explained how abolishing nuclear weapons would control conventional forces, which in an all-out war could inflict horrific damage, or how he could achieve any of his objectives without reducing the political tensions that have been the cause of the arms race. However, we can all agree that at least it was a noble vision, which has been endorsed by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

The strategic defence initiative that we are now discussing is very different from what President Reagan proposed nearly three years ago. The American Administration now say that the purpose of research is not to replace nuclear deterrence but to enhance it—to make the mutual suicide pact even more binding than it is today, and to threaten the survival of other nations more effectively. It is already clear that the Administration’s aim for the next 30 years at least will be to protect not the peoples of the world, but American land-based missiles, which are one of the components in America’s strategic nuclear triad.

“For the foreseeable future,”

the official American apologia for SDI now recounts,

“offensive nuclear forces, and the prospect of nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of deterrence.”

Therefore, simultaneously with SDI, the United States Government are beginning to deploy a whole arsenal of ​ new strategic nuclear weapons—the MX missile, the D5 submarine-launched missile and the Midgetman mobile missile. They foresee an immense increase in funding for research and development into what they call advanced strategic missile systems, which are a new arsenal of weapons that will enter service in the late 1990s when the first strategic defence is planned to be available. That must mean a stupendous acceleration of the arms race, greatly increasing the risk of nuclear war and making disarmament more difficult.

Indeed, the case against the President’s present proposals was made most eloquently by the President in his original speech when he said:

“If defensive systems were paired with offensive systems they could be regarded as fostering an aggressive policy, and nobody really wants that.”

The point that the combination of defence and offensive forces would appear to increase the possibility of a first strike against an enemy was repeated by him in his interview with Soviet journalists only last October, when he pointed out that it would make a first strike more feasible. The point was put most dramatically by ex-President Nixon when he said of the SDI:

“Such systems would be destabilising if they provided a shield so that you could use the sword.”

That is the basic case against the attempt to produce a ballistic missile defence, which is the purpose of the SDI.

It is not surprising that the SDI has been opposed in a somewhat coded way, not only by our Foreign Secretary in his remarkable speech in the middle of last year, for which I paid him tribute, but by two of the past three American Presidents—Presidents Carter and Ford—three of the past four American Defence Secretaries —Secretaries Brown, Schlesinger and McNamara—and all six of the surviving American Defence Secretaries who are opposed to breaking the ABM treaty, which would be necessary if a star wars system were to be deployed.

Faced with that threat which, to use President Reagan’s words, could make a first strike by the United States more likely, it is not surprising that the Soviet Government have made it clear that they will not sit on their hands. If SDI proceeds, they will increase the number of offensive missiles in the hope of swamping American defences, as the United Stated did by introducing multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles when the Russians first began deploying ballistic missile defences in the late 1960s, and, as Secretary Schlesinger, in a powerful. article attacking SDI, pointed out, as any Western Government would do in similar circumstances. Indeed, the Chevaline programme, which was introduced by the Conservative Government in the early 1970s, was introduced as a response to the Soviet deployment of an ABM system around Moscow.

That is not the only Soviet response. The Soviet Government will also seek to develop weapons which would either put the American space-based system out of action—the most likely weapon for that would be some sort of space bomb which would circle the world permanently—or make the system ineffective, for example by introducing fast burn into their intercontinental missiles so that the boost phase, which is the first target of the American system, would be reduced from five minutes to 50 seconds, and would take place entirely in the atmosphere, which it is much more difficult for the ​ proposed American laser weapons to penetrate. Finally, the Russians have made it clear that they would plan to develop their own space-based defensive systems.

Dr. Alan Glyn (Windsor and Maidenhead)

I have listened carefully to the right hon. Gentleman and I agree with him. But he has not mentioned the time scale for the development of the SDI by the Americans.

Mr. Healey

From discussions with General Abrahamson and others I understand that the Americans hope to start deploying some sort of ballistic missile defence within about 10 years, although the first system may be based on land rather than in space. The fact that the Americans are known to be researching into such systems makes it sensible for the Russians to start preparing against them now, just as western countries, faced with the possibility of Soviet systems, immediately started taking action either to swamp them or copy them.

Mr. James Couchman (Gillingham) rose—

Sir Antony Buck (Colchester, North) rose—

Mr. Healey

I shall give way from time to time, but I do not wish to conduct a seminar. I have no doubt that you, Mr. Speaker, will note the anxiety of hon. Members to speak.

American official sources have made it clear that in the next 10 years, if the arms race proceeds, the Soviet Union will be able to increase the number of its missiles much faster than the United States simply by keeping existing production lines open. Indeed, it could increase the number of its warheads from about 9,000 to 30,000 within 10 years, especially if the United States abandons the SALT II agreement, which would restrict the number of missiles, as the American Defence Department has asked the President to do.

Even that is not the full horror of the prospect before us. The United States has now admitted that it is examining the possibility of putting nuclear weapons into orbit to use as pumps for X-ray lasers. It has already carried out many tests for that purpose on its testing grounds in Nevada. It is already exploring nuclear weapons as an element in its SDI, although earlier it always said that the SDI would be an entirely conventional system.

We must never lose sight of the fact that the technologies that are now under examination could be used for offensive as well as defensive purposes. In response to papers produced by several American university teams, a spokesman for the American strategic defence initiative has already admitted that any laser weapon powerful enough to destroy a missile in the atmosphere could, with some redesigning, be used to incinerate a city. Even the non-nuclear lasers contemplated by the United States could produce climatic effects as horrific and catastrophic to humanity as the nuclear winter—a concept with which people are now becoming familiar.

Faced with that terrifying prospect, any European Government should be using all their efforts to stop the arms race from entering that new phase while there is still time. Despite the publicly expressed hostility of the French Government to the SDI, and despite the deep and public divisions in the German Government about the SDI, the ​ British Prime Minister decided to jump the gun on all her European allies and not only to endorse the programme but to offer to put British scientists at its disposal.

The Prime Minister sought to justify that sell-out by two arguments. First, she told us that the President gave her satisfactory undertakings at their meeting in December 1984 on the deployment of a space-based system. The second argument was that it was impossible to monitor an agreement to ban research into such a system. However, it is already clear that the American Administration have not the slightest intention of honouring three out of the four undertakings that they gave to the Prime Minister in Washington 14 months ago.

The first condition was that America would seek not to achieve superiority but to maintain the balance of strategic forces. On 1 February 1984, Secretary Weinberger told Congress:

“If we get a system … which we know can render their weapons impotent, we would be back in a situation we were in, for example, when we were the only nation with the nuclear weapon.”

He considered SDI as effectively giving the United States the monopoly that it had in 1945. That is not maintaining a balance in strategic forces.

Secondly, the President undertook that the deployment of a system related to the SDI— in view of the obligations that America accepted under the ABM treaty —would have to be a matter for negotiation with the Soviet Government as a fellow signatory of the ABM treaty, and with America’s allies. President Reagan was clear about the matter. On 6 November last year, in answer to questions, he said that if Russia did not agree to amend the ABM treaty to permit the deployment of a space-based defence system, he would go ahead and deploy it anyway. When asked by journalists whether he would permit the Soviet Government a veto on deployment, he said, “Hell, no.”

Mr. Weinberger made the same point in less colourful language. A year ago he stated:

“I am ruling out the possibility of giving up on strategic defence, either in the research stage or if it becomes feasible in the deployment stage.”

He refused to give up the possibility of deploying SDI under any circumstances if it proved feasible.

As the House will recall, it was that refusal even to consider negotiations that blocked all progress at the recent Geneva summit on disarmament of strategic nuclear forces. That in turn makes nonsense of the fourth undertaking, that East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

Both sides are now planning to increase greatly the number of their offensive systems and to increase new types of defensive weapons. There is no chance of progress on strategic nuclear disarmament unless the United States is prepared to negotiate about the abandonment of the strategic defence initiative. The tragedy is that that has become clear just at the time when the new Soviet proposals for disarmament—perhaps engendered to some extent by the fear of the SDI deployment—represent major concessions in the Soviet position, not least on intermediate nuclear forces, where the Soviets have accepted the zero option, which was first put to the Russians by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Foot) and myself when we met Mr. Brezhnev in 1981. It was also put forward by President Reagan on behalf of NATO in discussions with ​ the Soviet Union about a year later. Since the war there has never been a time when the prospects for progress on disarmament have been more propitious. There is now a real chance of doing that to which the American and Soviet Governments committed themselves when Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko agreed a year ago to end the arms race on earth and to prevent an arms race in space.

The Prime Minister’s excuse for supporting the SDI as a research programme is that it is impossible to monitor or verify a ban on research and that the Soviet Union is carrying out research into ballistic missile defence in any case.

As I pointed out when we previously debated this subject during the debate on the Queen’s Speech in November, although research carried on inside people’s heads or inside laboratories is impossible to monitor without access to those laboratories, such research cannot go far without physical tests, or “demonstrations” as the Americans call them. Tests of components in a possible system that take place outside laboratories can be monitored by satellite photography and other means and are continuously monitored by the American and Soviet Governments at present. The Russians have at last offered to draw a distinction between research in laboratories and brains and the type of tests outside laboratories that can be monitored, without which such research cannot proceed very far.

The Americans have listed such tests as having been carried out by the Russians. They have described some of the preparations that they say the Russians are making to produce a ballistic missile defence. However, I understand that their interpretation of the Krasnoyarsk radar—their prime exhibit—is not shared by the British Government. I hope that the Secretary of State will come clean on that matter in his reply. Evidence given to the Defence Committee by some officials made it clear that we do not endorse the American interpretation of Krasnoyarsk. The Russians have agreed to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk system if Britain dismantles similar systems at Fylingdales and Thule. Many people believe that they are as contrary to the ABM system as is the Krasnoyarsk radar.

Mr. Michael Heseltine (Henley)

The right hon. Gentleman was responsible for many years for Fylingdales. Was it part of an ABM system?

Mr. Healey

No, it was not then, but the right hon. Gentleman and his Government agreed to develop Fylingdales as a phased array radar of a type very similar to that at Krasnoyarsk. That is a new development which the Russians have already claimed is contrary to the ABM treaty, on exactly the same grounds as the Americans claim that Krasnoyarsk is contrary to the treaty. I am glad to see that the right hon. Gentleman does not dispute that fact.

Mr. Heseltine

Perhaps I would if the right hon. Gentleman gave me the chance. I was deeply involved in the matter. The purpose of the modernised Fylingdales is no different from the purpose over which the right hon. Gentleman presided.

Mr. Healey

That is precisely what the Russians argue about Krasnoyarsk: that its purpose is to track objects in space, not to—[Interruption.] Mr. Deputy Speaker, I would love to conduct a seminar because I know that education and instruction is widely required by Conservative Members.

Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood) rose—

​Mr. Healey

No, I have dealt with the question of the right hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine)—

Mr. Heseltine

The right hon. Gentleman is getting carried away. The essential difference is that Fylingdales existed before the ABM treaty and Krasnoyarsk did not.

Mr. Healey

Of course Fylingdales existed before the treaty, but it is being developed in a way that is incompatible with the treaty. That is precisely the complaint made by the Soviet Government. If the right hon. Gentleman is sensitive about his complicity in the matter, and if he believes, like the Americans, that the Krasnoyarsk radar violates the treaty, let the British Government agree to the Soviet proposal to cease development at Fylingdales, Krasnoyarsk and Thule, which seem to be a perfectly sensible proposal that would not harm Western security and would relieve many people of what I believe to be legitimate anxieties.

If the West is really worried about Soviet research into ballistic missile defence or anti-satellite systems, where in some respects the Soviet Union is further advanced than the United States, it could kill those systems stone dead by accepting a ban on observable tests. None of the Government’s excuses for supporting such tests hold the slightest amount of water, since they are fully capable of being monitored.

The strategic defence initiative has become the major obstacle to stopping the arms race. It is widely agreed that it would be possible with existing means to monitor a comprehensive test ban, especially since the Soviet Government have agreed to on-site inspection. But the SDI requires nuclear tests underground of X-ray laser bombs, some of which have already been carried out in Nevada. Mr. Miller, a top scientist at Livermore, has argued in public that even the non-nuclear components of the proposed SDI require testing in a nuclear environment which can be produced only by the explosion of nuclear weapons.

The tragedy is that this opportunity to stop the arms race may be the last unless we can pop this genie back in the bottle now. What must worry many hon. Members is that the major obstacle to a reduction in strategic weapons is the American attachment to the SDI, just as the major obstacle to accepting the Soviet proposal for the zero option on intermediate nuclear forces is the British Government’s determination to go ahead with the Trident programme, although there is growing opposition even in the services to continuing that programme, since, as the right hon. Member for Henley will recall, one reason why our forces cannot afford helicopters produced by Westland is that, in a few years’ time, 30 per cent. of the new equipment budget will be taken up by Trident.

Her Majesty’s Government and the American Government together have erected a massive road block on the way to peace. All this has been compounded during the past few months by the grubby conspiracy of the British Government to encourage British scientists to leave vital British programmes of civilian research, such as the Alvey programme, and work instead on SDI research for the American Government. It is yet another sell-out to American pressure— one of vital importance to the future of British industry.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) will deal at greater length with some problems surrounding the agreement made by the Secretary of State ​ for Defence, which General Abrahamson was pursuing during his recent visit to London. I hope that he will tell us a little more about the agreement, since I understand that he met General Abrahamson yesterday.

The memorandum of understanding that the Government signed with America on this matter is scarcely worth the paper on which it is written, because such memoranda can be overridden at any time by the American Congress, as Congress overrode the wartime agreement to share nuclear technology when it passed the McMahon Act, and as the Americans overrode another agreement when they cancelled the Skybolt project on which an earlier Conservative Government were relying to replace the aging V bombers. As the right hon. Member for Henley may remember, a few years ago, the Americans unilaterally broke the memorandum of understanding to produce an airfield attack weapon, the JP233. Indeed, it may have been before his time. That memorandum was signed by his predecessor, the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Pym) whom he has joined on the Government Back Benches. They seem to be a depository for former Defence Ministers.

But even if the memorandum of understanding is not overridden by the United States, it is vital that the House should know what its provisions are. We know only one thing about the memorandum: that the former Secretary of State completely failed in his stated objective to guarantee $1,500 million-worth of work for Britain. We must rely entirely on leaks, most of which are coming from the United States. However, some have come from the familiar source—the Department of Trade and Industry —which let it be known during the negotiation of the agreement that it was unhappy about the right hon. Gentleman’s failure to obtain satisfactory assurances on intellectual property rights and on technology transfer.

Connoisseurs of British politics will be intrigued by the fact that there was what psychologists call role-reversal on that occasion. The right hon. Member for Henley was trying to sell out to the Americans, and his comrade in adversity, the former Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, was trying to protect European technology. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that circumstances alter cases, although I found his posing as a great European odd when I considered his record on the memorandum of understanding on the SDI and his position on the purchase of the Trident missile.

We have been told by leaks that the Department of Trade and Industry was immensely unhappy about the provision to enable British scientists to use the knowledge which they acquire in this research and to produce products which can be transferred to other countries in commercial sale.

No information is available to the House about the provisions. There are no military security grounds for denying the House this information, and there is every reason for its having the information. Is it the case, as one of the American leaks has claimed, that intellectual property rights and technology transfer will have to be settled case by case in company-to-company contracts, and therefore the British Government have acquired no guarantees whatever in this field which will protect British interests?

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany have said in advance— they have not yet signed the ​ memorandum of understanding—that they will not cough up any of their own money. One of the leaks I have read says that Her Majesty’s Government have agreed to provide one third of the money for any Government-to-Government contracts from the British Treasury. That is a matter of immense importance to the House. Hon. Members have every reason to be told the truth, yet we are denied it.

We are also told that there are penal cancellation clauses in this agreement in an attempt to bind any future Government to implement its provisions. I am certain that any future House of Commons will demand the same right as the American Congress has often exercised, to override a memorandum of understanding about which it has been given no information whatever.

The central issue on this agreement is a general and simple one. We all know that Britain has a substantial lead over the United States in some of the new technologies, particularly those relating to fifth and sixth generation computers which, it is hoped, will have artificial intelligence and be capable of learning. It is essential—I hope the right hon. Member for Henley agrees, in the light of his recent speeches—that we should use this unique advantage in high technology to build a European base so that Europe can compete on equal terms in these areas with the United States and Japan.

We should not sell out to the United States, and particularly to American defence interests from which there will be only a small commercial spin-off, even if we are allowed under the agreement to make use of the spin-off. I noticed the other day that the assistant head of research at IBM, who can be regarded as a fairly independent authority on these matters, says that the right word is not “spin-off’, but “drip-off.” The amount of commercial advantage which even the Americans will get out of this diversion of research and development from civilian to military research will be small compared to the colossal resources which it is planned to invest in it.

In an earlier debate my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Monklands, East (Mr. Smith) said that to make these points is not to be anti-American; it is anti-British not to make them. It is time that this Government got off their hind legs and started putting Britain first. The Prime Minister and the Government as a whole have shown a feckless indifference to British interests. That has characterised the whole of their industrial policy, which we have been debating at length in recent weeks, and it threatens the very survival of the manufacturing side of our economy. Feckless indifference to the interests of peace by supporting the SDI is even more dangerous.

I ask the House to vote for the motion. At least it is one means of stopping the sell-out to American pressure which is corrupting every area of our public life, both at home and abroad.

Denis Healey – 1985 Speech on Foreign Affairs and Overseas Development

Below is the text of the speech made by Denis Healey, the then Shadow Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons on 8 November 1985.

Like the Foreign Secretary, I want to concentrate on the forthcoming Geneva summit where the leaders of the two most powerful countries in the world will meet. Our survival will depend in part on how that meeting goes. I strongly endorse the Foreign Secretary’s closing words in that regard.

I shall not talk about the economic problems facing the European Community, although the outlook is as depressing as I can ever remember. The Foreign Secretary referred to Spain and Portugal joining the Community just six weeks from now, but the last meeting of Community Finance Ministers failed utterly to take account of that in arrangements for the budget next year. We shall have an opportunity to discuss the Common Market budget next week, I believe, so some of those issues can be left until then.

I shall not talk about South Africa, which we debated a fortnight ago. I am sure that we shall return to the subject many times in the new Session. I do not applaud the choice of Lord Barber as the British representative on the Commonwealth mission—I do not think that the chairman of Standard Chartered Bank can be regarded as ​ totally without bias in these matters. I can only hope that the noble Lord distances himself as much from the Prime Minister on South African matters as he did from the Prime Minister’s views on monetary problems when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer.

I should like to say just a word about Argentina. Even The Times welcomed the recent meetings between my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, me and the leader of the Liberal party and President Alfonsin on the grounds that they had decisively broken the taboo on discussions of Falklands problems. I hope that, in spite of what he said today, the Foreign Secretary will exploit the opportunities that we have offered him to produce an environment in which we can at least reduce the heavy burden on our economy and defences imposed by the Prime Minister’s Fortress Falklands policy.

The Foreign Secretary must recognise that practical co-operation with Argentina on matters such as fisheries and communications with the Falkland Islands are bound to depend on our readiness to discuss all aspects of the Falklands problem.

Let me pass to the summit meeting. I deplore the tendency by newspapers and the Government to treat this essentially as a propaganda battle and to pay excessive attention to who is winning the propaganda war. I gather that when the Prime Minister last conversed with President Reagan she asked for a repackaging of the American proposals, as though they would be more acceptable if presented in gift-wrapping rather than brown paper.
The Foreign Secretary was curiously evasive in telling us whether the proposals which the NATO council discussed on Wednesday last week were the same as those put to the Soviet Union on Friday. My understanding is that they were not. The NATO council has not, so far, discussed the proposals as they were presented last Friday to the Soviet Government.

The real issues that underlie this so-called propaganda war are of vital importance to the people of Britain no less than to the people of the United States and the Soviet Union. Like the editor of the Financial Times, I could only see as a profound let down the speech at the United Nations in which President Reagan trailed his approach to the summit. Even as a propaganda effort it was clearly aimed at the right wing in his own Republican party rather than at world opinion.

Of course it is important that the Soviet Union and the United States should discuss regional problems that might bring them to blows. I welcome the talks on these matters which have already taken place, at least at official level, although I doubt that the President was wise to talk in September about joint Soviet-American “intervention” in the Third world. But in his United Nations speech the President’s choice of issues was gravely one sided and his description, especially of what was happening in Nicaragua, was ludicrously distorted. Above all, he left out entirely the regional problems of the middle east where the risks to world peace are the greatest and where the Soviet Union and the United States are already directly and militarily involved.
In half of the middleeast—the eastern half—Russia and the United States have reached a close understanding about the Gulf war which has already been responsible for the loss of one million lives. They should be trying to bring it to an end rather than acting simply as co-belligerents ​ with Iraq. Surely they need to reach an understanding with the other half of the middle east on how to get peace between Israel and her neighbours.

I shall mercifully draw a veil over the lamentable diplomatic shambles that attended the recent visit of two PLO representatives to London. I shall draw a veil also over the American achievement in undermining America’s two best friends in the Arab world—King Hussein, by banning a contract to provide him with arms, and President Mubarak, by skyjacking the Egyptian aircraft and failing to apologise for doing so.

Now that the dust has settled, it is clearer than ever that no progress on the problems separating Israel from her Arab neighbours can be made without involving the PLO —both King Hussein and President Mubarak restated that during the past few days—nor can progress be made without the acquiescence, if not the positive co-operation, of both Syria and the Soviet Union. Until, somehow, diplomacy can create a framework that takes account of those two facts, all purely Western efforts to encourage a settlement are bound to fail. I hope that the Minister for Overseas Development will tell us precisely what the Prime Minister meant at Question Time the other day when she talked about the need for a framework for a new initiative for such talks. I believe that the framework must include the PLO, Syria and the Soviet Union.
I welcome the indications that Prime Minister Peres is now in contact with the Soviet Union and is seeking diplomatic recognition of Israel and the release of more Jews who wish to settle in his country. I hope very much that the summit at least assists in that regard.

The central problem facing the summit—the problem which has made it the focus of interest for thinking people all over the world—is whether it will help to bring the nuclear arms race to an end. My concern, which I have expressed many times to the House, is that the nuclear arms race is moving into an area that will make arms control more difficult and war more likely, unless it can be stopped now. It is a staggering fact that the United States and the Soviet Union between them now have 20,000 strategic nuclear warheads and well over 50,000 nuclear warheads, if one adds the intermediate and tactical weapons that they possess. Those 50,000 nuclear warheads amount to more than 1·5 million Hiroshima-size atomic bombs. If those arsenals of nuclear weapons were ever used there would be an eternity of nuclear winter.

Yet neither side has gained one jot in its security by pursuing this arms race during the past 40 years. Both have wasted colossal sums of money which would have been far better spent on improving the lot of their peoples and, indeed, the lot of the world.

So far, the stability of the nuclear balance between Russia and the United States has proved invulnerable to wide variations in their relative capabilities. It is now universally recognised, even by Mr. Richard Perle of the Pentagon, that there is broad parity in strategic nuclear weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States. For this reason deliberate aggression by one or the other is well nigh inconceivable at the moment.

However, the colossal size of their existing arsenals has encouraged both Governments to think more and more about the possibility not just of deterring but of fighting a nuclear war. Each suspects the other of hoping to win a nuclear conflict if it can destroy sufficient of the enemy’s retaliatory forces in a first strike, so that each side is also thinking about pre-empting an enemy first strike. Mr. ​ Richard de Lauer, the Pentagon’s chief of engineering, recently recommended the Trident D5 missile to Congress on the ground that it was a counterforce weapon which might give the United States a pre-emptive capacity. That is the weapon that the British Government are planning to buy at colossal cost from the United States for Britain’s forces.

The Soviet Union and the United States are developing, and beginning to deploy in some cases, two or three new inter-continental ballistic missiles, new strategic nuclear bombers, new air-launched cruise missiles and new missile-carrying submarines. The United States is planning to replace its obsolete nuclear weapons in Europe with new nuclear missiles and artillery warheads, and no doubt the Soviet Union is doing the same.

Fears on both sides of a first strike are bound to increase rapidly if these developments continue. A report of the recently published unclassified version of the latest CIA national intelligence estimate stated that Soviet air defences would not be able to

“prevent large-scale damage to the USSR”

by United States nuclear bombers and cruise missiles for at least the next decade— that is bombers and cruise missiles alone. More important, Trident D5 is said to offer the United States for the 1990s the capacity to destroy 95 per cent. of Soviet inter-continental ballistic missiles if it strikes first. The same CIA assessment reports that, at least until the year 2000, Russia could pose “no significant threat” to American atomic submarines.

Those figures from American sources take no account of the enormous destructive power of America’s ICBM force, which is based on land. In addition, President Reagan is planning to equip the United States with a ballistic missile defence, through his star wars programme, and is inviting the Soviet Union to follow suit. He told a BBC correspondent that his message to the Soviet Union was:

“We wish you well with your defence plans.”

That is a different story from what the Foreign Secretary told us today and the President could have fooled me, because a welcome and goodwill for the Soviets’ ballistic missile plans are the last views I have heard from Secretary Weinberger or Mr. Shultz.

President Reagan’s personal attitude to star wars has not wavered since he first made a speech recommending it in March 1983, when he said:

“The human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence.”

The President said that he was determined

“to find a way of defence which will make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”

Bruce Kent and Joan Ruddock could not have put the case for nuclear disarmament more forcibly. The President added that if

“defensive systems were paired with offensive systems they could be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy—and nobody wants that.”

The tragedy is that that is exactly what the President’s star wars programme is leading to. When the President made his speech in March 1983, nearly all the experts in the United States believed that it was nonsense, but when he made it clear in the following months that he was not to be shaken, they all switched round. In fact, there has never been such a mass conversion since a Chinese general baptised his troops with a hose.

Today, no one who is involved in the star wars programme shares President Reagan’s view of it—not ​ General Abrahamson, who is in charge of the whole project, not Dr. Yonas, who is the chief scientific adviser to the programme, and not Dr. Keyworth, who is the President’s chief scientific adviser.

The State Department’s official pamphlet on star wars, published a few months ago, said that the project is designed not to replace nuclear deterrence, but to enhance it. In other words, it is designed to threaten the existence of other nations and human beings more credibly. Its purpose is not to make nuclear weapons obsolete or to give the peoples of the world immunity from nuclear attack; its purpose, as has been welt described in speeches by Dr. Keyworth and in a speech by Dr. Yonas that I heard in Ottawa recently, is to protect America’s land-based missiles, rather than to protect the American people. For that reason, it is bound to accelerate the arms race in both offensive and defensive systems and will lead exactly to the consequence against which President Reagan warned in his speech two and a half years ago. It will also lead to a situation in which, to use the recent words of Mr. Nitze, the

“growth of defences could support rather than discourage a first strike.”

That is why the star wars programme has been publicly opposed by the last three American Presidents—by Republican Presidents Ford and Nixon no less than by the Democrat President Carter—and by at least three of the last four American Defence Secretaries—by Republican Secretary Schlesinger no less than by Democrat Secretaries Brown and McNamara. In fact, the SDI programme in the United States is supported only by those who reject arms control in principle, such as Dr. Weinberger and Mr. Perle, and, of course, by those who cynically hope to get a lot of money out of it. As the House knows, star wars is described by the military and industrial community in the United States as pennies from heaven.

The President is sticking doggedly to his original vision, but he is alone. In spite of his words on the BBC, no one really believes that President Reagan’s successor —it will not be a decision for the present President—will give the Soviet Union the secrets of the star wars programme if it turns out to work.

After all, only the other day the American Administration forced the British Customs and Excise to take a child’s computer off the shelves of the duty-free shop at Heathrow because it might find its way to the Soviet Union.
Indeed, both American law and the ABM treaty forbid the United States to give information about ballistic missile defences even to its allies, including the United Kingdom. That fact casts an odd light on the idea of the Secretary of State for Defence that British firms could get great benefits from doing research for the United States into the SDI programme.

President Reagan told Soviet journalists last week that he would not deploy star wars until both sides had destroyed their offensive weapons, but on the very next day he was forced by his advisers to withdraw that undertaking. He then went to the other extreme and said that the United States would deploy star wars unilaterally if it could not get other world leaders to agree to an international system of defence against nuclear missiles. So much for the undertakings that the President gave to our Prime Minister in December. He now tells us not that he will consult or negotiate about deployment, but that if it proves feasible he will deploy unilaterally unless everybody else in the world agrees with him.

The European allies had grave misgivings about the star wars programme from the word go. Those misgivings were superbly listed by the Foreign Secretary in the speech to which he referred earlier and for which, I am told—I hope that I am wrong—the Prime Minister later apologised to President Reagan. If that is not true, I hope that we may be told so. The Foreign Secretary does not rise to respond to that challenge.

The tragedy is that the European allies did not make their position crystal clear in time. On the contrary, the Washington correspondent of The Sunday Times and The Guardian told us from American sources in September that the Prime Minister had used her support for SDI to try to get President Reagan’s support for buying the Ptarmigan project and threatened to withdraw her support for SDI if she did not get the Ptarmigan contract. The House will agree that The Times showed unusual innocence recently in asking why President Reagan delayed until this week publishing the decision, which must have been taken long ago, to buy the French system instead, even though President Mitterrand has openly opposed the star wars programme from the start.

Of course, the reason for the delay is obvious. The President wanted to be sure that he had our Prime Minister in the bag at the NATO meeting before he announced his decision. He took her for a ride. She gained nothing by sucking up to President Reagan except to explode the myth of a special relationship with the United States. Her only reward was another spillage of rancid bile from the Prince of Darkness, Mr. Richard Perle, who, according to The Sunday Times last week, accused her of following Baldwin and Chamberlain in appeasing the Soviet Union. He did so because she had dared to question Mr. Perle’s propaganda about certain alleged Soviet violations of the ABM treaty.

I agree with the Foreign Secretary that it is still possible for America’s European allies to exert a decisive influence on American policy in this area, provided that they are united and honest on a clear policy. There is always a power battle in Washington between the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and various parts of the Congress about almost every element of American foreign and defence policy. That power battle can be swung in Europe’s direction provided that Europe makes its views known in time. The best example of that was when united European pressure on the American Administration gave victory to Mr. Shultz over Mr. Weinberger on the interpretation of the ABM treaty on testing. I congratulate the Foreign Secretary on the part that he must have played in mobilising European support for that interpretation.

I strongly support the Foreign Secretary’s view—I have said so many times—that a collective European approach to the defence and diplomatic problems facing the Alliance is essential if we are to proceed in the direction of peace rather than war. It is important that Europe should constitute an independent pillar within the Alliance. I shall devote my remaining remarks to what Britain and Europe should be pressing the United States for in relation to the arms talks and the forthcoming summit.

The greatest danger of the arms race lies in the quality of the new weapons being planned rather than in the quantity of the old weapons. By far the best objective in the arms talks would be to seek a freeze on the testing, ​ development and deployment of new nuclear weapons. A nuclear freeze already has overwhelming popular support on both sides of the Atlantic as well as almost unanimous support in the United Nations.

Of course, a freeze is not without its own difficulties. There is a problem in deciding the point at which one cuts off programmes already under way. I believe that, since the two sides enjoy rough parity, that problem should not be difficult to overcome. Certainly it would be much easier to negotiate a freeze than a reduction in existing weapons when the pattern of the two sides’ deterrence is so different. Moreover, a freeze would be much easier to verify than a reduction in forces because it is easier to tell whether a new weapon is being tested than to know whether a weapon photographed by satellite is within a permitted ceiling.

The Prime Minister has made a great deal in the House of saying that it is not possible to verify a ban on research. She said that again the other day. That is true in relation to research in brains or in laboratories, but it is possible to verify a ban on the external testing associated with research, especially since public sources tell us that western satellite intelligence photography has a resolving power which enables its possessor positively to identify objects as small as 150 cms. across.

The United States Defence Department has already published a list of the tests that it plans to carry out as part of its SDI research programme, because it knows that Russia can and will observe them. Surely our objective, which we should press on our European allies to press on the United States, should be to tighten the ABM treaty so as to ban all tests relating to space defence—on both sides. That would kill not only the SDI before its birth but the possibility of a Soviet breakout.

I agree with the Foreign Secretary that the Russians have indulged in a great deal of activity in space defence in the last 15 years, but none of that activity could come to fruition in a new space defence system if tests were banned now.

If one seeks a ban on observable tests relating to SDI, one must also ban the development of anti-satellite systems on both sides. I remember Mr. Richard Burt, when he was still working at the State Department last December, saying that the United States would be proposing such a ban. However, the United States has not put forward such a proposal and Mr. Burt is now ambassador in Bonn. One can only guess at the new American policy.

Surely the United States has a major interest in banning anti-satellite systems now because it claims that the Soviet Union is ahead. Indeed, as the Foreign Secretary said, the Soviet Union is the only country which has a working ASAT system, although I believe it is a primitive one. Moreover, nothing would be more dangerous than for each side to acquire the ability to rob the other of its eyes and ears in a crisis. Dr. Keyworth, the President’s main scientific adviser, pointed out the other day that if America develops an anti-satellite system it will enable it to test its technologies for each of the three layers of space defence. If we do not reach agreement on a ban on anti-satellite activity now it will soon become very difficult to verify because the Americans plan to carry their anti-satellite weapons on F15 aircraft. They will be difficult to detect by what the Russians call “national means”, satellite photography.

By far the most important single contribution to a freeze would be a comprehensive test ban treaty. No one would deploy new nuclear weapons if they had never been tested in real life. It is only three years since the Prime Minister told us that negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty were going, alas, far too slowly and should be speeded up and completed. I hope that the Minister can assure us that the Government are now pressing for a reconvening of the conference for a CTBT because it would command overwhelming support in the rest of the world. The non-proliferation treaty review conference in Geneva the other day called upon the nuclear powers to start negotiations for a comprehensive test ban in the next six weeks—before the end of the year.

The only excuse offered for not proceeding to the signature of a comprehensive test ban treaty is the alleged inability of science to detect very small underground tests. However, this week’s issue of Modern Geology contains a long article by the leading British seismologist, Dr. Leggett of Imperial college, in which he demonstrates that there is no chance of the Soviet Union successfully evading detection if it breaks a comprehensive test ban. That chance has been further reduced since that article was written by the fact that in the last few days India, Sweden and four other neutral countries have agreed to make their territories available for monitoring a comprehensive test ban and to man seismological stations in the Soviet Union —which in principle the Soviet Union has already agreed to accept as part of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Another contribution which Britain could make, especially since the United States believes that the phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk is intended to control a ballistic missile system, is to take up the Soviet offer to stop the development at Krasnoyarsk in return for stopping work to produce a phased array radar at Fylingdales and at Thule in Danish territory.

If the American Government are worried about Krasnoyarsk, here is an opportunity to get rid of both. There is no question that if such phased array radars, whether in the Soviet Union, Britain or Greenland, were used as battle management stations for ballistic missile defence, they would be a flagrant violation of the antiballistic missile treaty. I suggest that the Foreign Secretary should immediately approach the United States and say that we insist that the United States should negotiate on the Soviet offer to stop development in Krasnoyarsk in return for stopping development at Fylingdales and Thule, and will refuse to proceed with the development until and unless such negotiations begin.

The correspondent for The Times in Washington reported last week that diplomats and politicians are asking two questions about President Reagan. Can he cope? Does he know what he wants? The second question is unfair. He knows exactly what he wants from the star wars system, and he described his desires eloquently in his interview with the BBC. The trouble is that nobody believes that what he wants is attainable. He has been deceived by his advisers on star wars as he was deceived by those who told him that there is no word in the Russian language for freedom. That is another remark that he made in his BBC broadcast. Those who share his yearning, as I hope all of us in the House do, to base the security of the human race on something other than mutually assured destruction know that star wars is not the answer. To pursue the star wars mirage means only an accelerating arms race in both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.

The truth lies elsewhere. We need a freeze on all new nuclear weapons as the basis of our negotiation on the more complex but less urgent task of reducing the number of existing weapons. I agree with what I hope the Foreign Secretary implied, that that task, at least in Europe, could be achieved quite quickly, certainly if the British and French Governments would agree to let their forces be counted in the balance.

I regret that the Prime Minister, as the Foreign Secretary told us, has refused to talk directly to the Soviet Union about British weapons, but I welcome the fact that she has agreed to let the Foreign Secretary talk to Mr. Shevardnadze about wider aspects of disarmament on a bilateral basis. I am asking the British Government to take a lead in bringing the world back to sanity, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and to offer us a future to which out children can look forward with hope rather than with despair.

Denis Healey – 1952 Maiden Speech to the House of Commons

Below is the text of the maiden speech made by Denis Healey to the House of Commons on 14 May 1952.

In rising to address the Committee for the first time, I am very conscious of the need for that indulgence which the Committee is accustomed to afford so generously to maiden speakers. I have noticed that long familiarity with this peculiar ritual of the maiden birth has given the Committee the somewhat clinical attitude of a midwife towards a maiden speech. But I can assure the Committee that for the initiate concerned the act of parthenogenesis is quite as painful an experience as any that he is ever likely to endure in his life. And I count myself very fortunate in enduring this agony at a time when the midwife is in a state of twilight sleep induced by an all-night Sitting the night before.

Although I have chosen to speak on a subject which is bound to be controversial, I hope that I shall not be considered unduly partisan in anything I say, because I agree very much with the right hon. and gallant Member for Kelvin-grove (Lieut.-Colonel Elliot) that opinion on the problem of Germany is divided irrespective of party lines, and I hope I may succeed in steering a course some way between the obvious and the offensive.

The present policy of the Western world is to prevent a third world war by deterring Soviet aggression. I suggest that this policy will not be possible if the manpower and industrial resources of Germany are lost to the Western side and become available to the Soviet side, because if that happens, the balance of world power would shift to the Soviet side, and a third world war would become inevitable.

The Western world might lose Germany either through force or through the free choice of the German people themselves. The immediate danger, of course, is that we should lose Germany through force, and it is because of that danger that we of the Western world are committed to build up on the ground in Europe sufficient armed strength to defend Western Germany; that means very heavy burdens on us now, and I fully agree with those hon. Members who have expressed the view that sooner or later the Germans themselves must carry their share of that burden.

But we can also lose Germany to the Western camp through the free choice of the German people themselves, and we should be very unwise indeed to underestimate that danger when we look at the history of the last 30 years from Rapallo to the German-Soviet Pact of 1939 and watch the activities of the Soviet Union with certain nationalist and right-wing German circles at the present time.

I do not think that it is sufficiently recognised in this Committee that the destiny of Germany, now that seven years have passed since the defeat of Hitler, is certain to be decided in the last resort by the German people themselves. The victorious Powers are no longer in the position of deciding the destiny of Germany against the wishes of the German people—indeed, Western Germany alone is already, in fact although not in law, the strongest single Power on the continent of Europe—and if and when Germany is united, as in my view is certain and is desirable, Germany will once again be a world Power of the same order as Britain herself.

The problem we face in the Western world now is not, as once it was, to ensure that Germany will never be powerful again. The time for that has gone, if it ever existed. The problem we now face is how to ensure that a Germany, which is certain to become powerful, works with the Western side by its own free choice and not with the Soviet Union. As I say, it is only the German people themselves who can make that choice.

No one has realised that better than the Soviet Government because its recent notes, although ostensibly addressed to the Western Powers, were in fact directed to the people of Germany herself. We should be unwise also to underestimate the difficulty of keeping Germany on the Western side. National unity will soon become the over-riding aim of the Western German people, and Germany will go to the side which offers her the best chance of getting national unity on acceptable conditions, and she will leave any side which denies her the chance of unity under conditions which she considers acceptable.

In the long run, Russia holds all the cards because it is only Russia which can give back to Germany her unity, including not only the Soviet zone but also the provinces lost to Poland. And she would not hesitate to do so if she thought she could get an agreement with Germany.

Moreover, we have to face the additional difficulty that any agreements we make now with the Western German Government are bound to be provisional. The Germans themselves do not regard the Federal Republic as a permanent affair any more than they regard Bonn as the permanent capital of Germany. Dr. Adenauer has recently stressed this point, greatly to the dismay of the French, that any agreement accepted by Western Germany will have to be negotiated again if and when Germany becomes united, even if unity comes about under the Basic Law, because we cannot bind 70 million people to agreements which were accepted by only a majority of 47 million people.

On the other hand, the cards which Russia holds are by no means so strong at the present time, because Western Germany is extremely conscious of its weakness and its inability to defend itself. Hatred and distrust of the Soviet Union are the dominating emotions throughout Western Germany, and for that reason the German people would not at this time accept national unity if the price of national unity were the rupture of their lifeline to the West.

Like the right hon. and gallant Member for Kelvingrove and other hon. Members, I also visited Germany recently and had an opportunity of discussing this question with members of all German parties. I was surprised to find that there was almost unanimity between the Government and the opposition on the fact that a united Germany at this time could not afford to be neutral, nor could Germany accept unity without the guarantee of security.

The only thing I would suggest, and on which there is disagreement in Germany, is that we should not now commit ourselves to a united Germany having security in the form of a military alliance with the West. One criticism I would make, if it is permitted to a maiden speaker, of the reply to the Soviet note is the reference to the all-German Government being allowed to make “such defensive arrangements as it wishes.” I think that we would be unwise to insist on that, if the phrase means a military alliance. If, on the other hand, it means security against the possibility of a Soviet coup or invasion, we must insist on it, and the Germans would be united in supporting us in insisting on it.

My conclusion is that, at the present time, German unity will only be acceptable to the German people on conditions that we ourselves would be the first to insist on. Indeed, as the Foreign Secretary has already said, the Western reply to the Soviet note in insisting on these conditions has been welcomed unanimously in Western Germany.

I am extremely glad that I should be able to make my maiden speech on a day when all the doubts created by Western policy in the last few weeks have been dispersed by the reply to the second Soviet note. There has been a great danger that the Western Powers’ reluctance to enter on a new series of Palais Rose discussions with the Russians will be interpreted in Germany as a reluctance to see Germany united again. I would say that at this moment, above all, we can afford to take the offensive on the question of German unity. We shall gain much and lose nothing by doing so.

There has been a good deal of discussion in the Committee this afternoon about the dangers in the delay of the carrying out of E.D.C., and there is no doubt that many people are concerned lest the delays inevitably imposed by talks with the Russians on German unity will lose us what is considered to be the last chance of getting an early German defence contribution to E.D.C. Here I come on to ground which may be considered very controversial, but I assure the House I have no intention whatever of being polemic or partisan, and I hope that my contribution will be received as a sincere effort to think the problem out.

The first point is that if it is really true, as the Foreign Secretary seemed to suggest in his speech, that public opinion is moving so rapidly against E.D.C. that unless we can get the agreement in the bag within the next 12 months we shall lose the chance for ever—if it is a question of now or never—then the agreement will be worthless even if we get it. I apologise if I have misinterpreted the Foreign Secretary’s remarks on that matter.

The second point is that both the demand for an early German defence contribution and the agreement to treat E.D.C. as the right framework for a German defence contribution—I hope it is not impertinent to remind the Committee of this—were accepted against the will of the British Government of the day and only under very heavy pressure from our Allies.

The decision taken by N.A.T.O. in 1950 to seek an immediate German defence contribution at a time when almost none of the European peoples wanted it, including the Germans themselves—the only exceptions were the Dutch and the Danes—would never have been taken then had it not been for very strong and insistent—and legitimate—American pressure. The agreement last September to treat the European Defence Community as the right framework for a German contribution would never have been accepted by N.A.T.O. had not our French ally said that they would not accept a German defence contribution in any other framework.

I hope it is not impertinent to remind the Committee of that fact, because my view is that the present commitment of the Western world to E.D.C. and to an immediate German defence contribution arises out of the panic induced by Korea. It represents a false start in solving the German problem, and we should be prepared to welcome the pause imposed by events in order to get back on the right road.

On the question of a German contribution, I believe that General Eisenhower was quite right in his immediate and instinctive response to the suggestion when he took up his command, when he said, “I do not want any unwilling soldiers under my command.” It is the case that, for whatever reasons—and for very many varied reasons—at present the majority of the German people, and the overwhelming majority of the Germans of military age, do not want a German defence contribution. Incidentally, the Western Powers have got into appalling difficulties by treating the Contractual Agreement, as the Foreign Secretary said, as a sort of bribe in order to buy unwilling German soldiers. We should have got the agreement through without the slightest difficulty if it had not been tied to the European Defence Community.

On the other hand—I disagree with some of my hon. Friends on this point—although public opinion in Germany is at present opposed to a defence contribution, public opinion will change very rapidly and very dramatically, possibly within the next 12 months, and once the Germans want to re-arm we shall not be able to stop them even if we want to. In other words, German re-armament in the short run is impossible; in the long run it is inevitable. It is entirely a matter of timing. “Ripeness is all” in the case of the German defence contribution.

What I suggest we should do is use the time still available to us, before the Germans want to make a defence contribution, in order to consider very seriously and quietly, and not in a panic, what framework will be best suited to contain a German defence contribution. No one can fail to recognise that, although a German defence contribution would bring great gains to the West, it would also carry very great dangers. We must choose a framework which will be strong enough and large enough to attract the Germans and to hold them for good. It is no good trying to force Germany now into a mould which she will crack when she becomes stronger.

Last September the Western Powers agreed to use E.D.C. as the framework for a German defence contribution only because France would accept no other. However, I suggest that it is becoming quite clear that the French themselves, who were the only people who wanted it in the first place, have now lost faith in E.D.C. as a means of controlling German re-armament.

E.D.C. can control a German defence contribution only if the non-German components are stronger than the German components. It is already evident that Western Germany alone would be stronger in E.D.C., in fact if not in form, than France, because of France’s great commitments outside Europe in Indo-China, and, indeed, stronger than all the other members of E.D.C. put together. The result is that the French are beginning to realise that E.D.C., which they first saw as an instrument to control Germany, will turn out to be an instrument by which Germany can militarily dominate Western Europe.

In any case E.D.C. cannot offer a longterm solution to the German problem because, as Dr. Adenauer has said, when Germany is united she will have to renegotiate all the agreements which she has made, whether E.D.C. or otherwise, and it would be very dangerous if we got into a position where the importance of a German defence contribution through E.D.C., once it was set up, became such that we were compelled to oppose German unity for fear of losing that contribution under those conditions.

There is a French proverb—I shall not try to give it in French—which says, “There is nothing which lasts like the provisional.” That proverb will not be very popular in Germany, and there is a very great danger in creating at this stage vested interests in a provisional solution which cannot possibly last into the future

The French see only one way out of their dilemma, and that is to get Britain into E.D.C. to balance the power of Germany. But Britain cannot join E.D.C., first, because of its federal structure and secondly, because it has become a cardinal principle of British policy since the war not to accept additional commitments in Europe which might be treated by America as an excuse for reducing American commitments. That principle can be differently expressed as “We should try to avoid accepting new commitments in Europe which we cannot get the Americans to share.”

The French are quite right in thinking that, if Germany is to be controlled in the future, Britain and America must have a hand in the controlling, but a guarantee from Britain and America to E.D.C. of such a nature as to prevent a German secession would be both impossible to frame and impossible to fulfil. There is only one way by which the French can get what they want, and that is by having Germany re-armed within the only framework in whose integrity Britain and America have a direct and vital interest, and that framework is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

I see the Foreign Secretary pursing his lips. He is right. That prospect at the moment dismays the French. But surely it is not beyond the resources of the Foreign Secretary’s diplomacy to show the French that, if they really want Britain and America involved in the longterm control of re-armed Germany, they must put Germany into the organisation in maintaining whose integrity Britain and the United States have an absolutely vital and permanent interest.

I do not suggest that we should now invite the Germans to enter the Atlantic Pact. This is entirely a matter of timing. It will be some time before the Germans themselves want to be re-armed under any circumstances. What I suggest is that we should use that time to strengthen N.A.T.O. so that it is capable of receiving this formidable new recruit. On the other hand, we must have more N.A.T.O. troops in Europe and, in particular, more French troops; and, on the other hand, we must tighten and more closely integrate the structure of N.A.T.O. I personally would not exclude tightening the military structure of N.A.T.O. in S.H.A.P.E. on the technical lines already found practical in E.D.C. That is the only way out of the problem.

To sum up, the problem of keeping a united Germany in the Western camp and out of the Soviet camp is the most crucial and urgent problem facing the whole of the West for many years ahead. In my opinion, in the panic following Korea, the Western Powers made a false start; but a pause is now imposed by events. It is our duty to make it creative. I am one of those who believe that the ever closer unity of the Atlantic peoples is one of the most fruitful developments of the postwar era. And I am convinced that it offers to us the one real chance of solving the perennial problem of Germany.